RFID device, system and two-way authentication method

Abstract

The present invention discloses an RFID device, system and two-way authentication method, which relates to the field of asset management and is used to solve the problem of secure access to RFID tag information. In the present invention, an RFID reader / writer requests a first identifier from an RFID tag, generates first authentication information in combination with a second identifier, and authenticates the RFID tag after encryption. The RFID tag decrypts and parses the first identifier for authentication. After authentication, a third identifier is generated, and the second authentication information is generated in combination with the second identifier, and is encrypted and authenticated to the RFID reader / writer. The RFID reader / writer decrypts and parses the second identifier for authentication. The present invention solves the problem of authority management during the circulation and use of tags, and realizes highly reliable and eavesdropping-proof tag security access operations.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of asset management technology, and in particular to an RFID device (including an RFID reader / writer and an RFID tag), an RFID system, and a two-way authentication method for an RFID device. Background Art

[0002] With the trend of mobileization and the rise of social e-commerce, online shopping has become a part of the daily life of most netizens, covering many fields from food, clothing to electronic products, household goods, etc., which has further promoted the rapid development of the logistics industry. However, this also brings another problem: personal privacy protection. At present, major express delivery companies have adopted privacy labels to solve this problem. Privacy labels are a form of express delivery labels that protect consumers' personal information. It uses technical means to encrypt or partially hide key personal information on express packages, such as the recipient's name, phone number, etc., and replace them with specific codes or symbols. This is intended to reduce the risk of personal information leakage during the express delivery process and enhance privacy security.

[0003] Due to the core advantages of passive tags, low cost, strong penetration, data encryption, large storage capacity, and multiple read and write capabilities, ultra-high frequency (UHF) RFID technology has been widely used in asset management, warehousing and logistics, service trade and retail, medical care, tobacco and alcohol, and other industries. In recent years, with the significant decline in the cost of UHF RFID readers and tags, UHF RFID technology has broken through the traditional typical industrial application scope and gradually expanded to a wide range of diverse consumer application scenarios. Since data information is stored in the RFID tag chip, personal privacy and security issues have also been resolved.

[0004] With the large-scale application of UHF RFID in warehousing, logistics, retail and other related fields, UHF RFID readers and writers will become increasingly popular. In this way, there is a risk that RFID tag information can be read at will, which will lead to the risk of personal privacy leakage. Obviously, the encoding and decoding method of the virtual number of the privacy label can be used to protect the RFID tag information. However, this software-based encoding and decoding method cannot achieve two-way authentication, that is, the tag (commodity) information can be cloned at will, and absolute security cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, it is more effective to consider the identity permissions of both parties in RFID communication. Therefore, in the RFID scenario, to ensure that the RFID tag information is not read at will, it is necessary to first solve the identity authentication problem of both parties in communication. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an RFID device, system and two-way authentication method to solve the problem of secure access to RFID tag information in order to solve all or part of the above-mentioned problems.

[0006] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0007] An RFID reader / writer, wherein the RFID reader / writer is configured as follows:

[0008] In response to reading the TID of the RFID tag, obtaining a private key corresponding to the TID based on the public key; the RFID tag is configured with the TID and the private key;

[0009] Requesting a first identifier from the RFID tag, generating first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identifier, encrypting the information with a private key and sending the information to the RFID tag, wherein the first authentication information carries a second identifier generated by the RFID reader;

[0010] In response to the second authentication information returned by the RFID tag indicating that the authentication is successful, the second authentication information is decrypted using the private key, and the RFID tag is authenticated based on the generated second identifier, where the second authentication information carries the second identifier and is encrypted with the private key.

[0011] Furthermore, the RFID reader generates the second identifier in response to receiving the first identifier, and generates the first authentication information based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a preconfigured first algorithm.

[0012] Furthermore, the RFID reader / writer uses a preconfigured second algorithm to parse out a second identifier from the decrypted second authentication information, and uses the generated second identifier to identify the parsed second identifier to perform identity authentication on the RFID tag.

[0013] Furthermore, the RFID reader is also configured as:

[0014] Request the public key and store it locally;

[0015] Get the TID and write it to the corresponding RFID tag, and configure the TID to be non-rewritable;

[0016] The private key corresponding to the TID is obtained from the public key, the private key is written into the RFID tag, and the private key is configured to be in an unreadable state.

[0017] The present invention also provides an RFID tag, wherein the RFID tag is configured with a TID and a private key; the RFID tag is configured as follows:

[0018] Sending the TID in response to a TID request from an RFID reader;

[0019] In response to receiving a first identification request from the RFID reader, the first identification is sent, so that the RFID reader generates first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identification and returns it after being encrypted using a private key, wherein the first authentication information carries a second identification generated by the RFID reader;

[0020] In response to receiving the first authentication information from the RFID reader, decrypting the first authentication information using the private key, and authenticating the RFID reader based on the generated first identifier;

[0021] In response to the identity authentication of the RFID reader being successful, second authentication information requesting identity authentication is generated based on the second identifier and encrypted with a private key and sent to the RFID reader, so that the RFID reader uses the generated second identifier to authenticate the RFID tag.

[0022] Furthermore, the RFID tag uses a preconfigured first algorithm to parse out a first identifier from the decrypted first authentication information, and uses the generated first identifier to identify the parsed first identifier to perform identity authentication on the RFID reader.

[0023] Furthermore, in response to the identity authentication of the RFID reader being successful, the RFID tag generates a third identifier, and generates the second authentication information based on the second identifier and the third identifier using a preconfigured second algorithm.

[0024] Furthermore, the RFID tag is also configured as:

[0025] Receive the TID written by the RFID reader and store it in an unrewritable state;

[0026] Receives the private key written by the RFID reader and stores it in an unreadable state.

[0027] The present invention also provides an RFID system, which includes the above-mentioned RFID reader / writer and the above-mentioned RFID tag.

[0028] The present invention also provides a two-way authentication method for an RFID device, which comprises:

[0029] The RFID reader reads the TID of the RFID tag; the RFID tag is configured with the TID and the private key;

[0030] The RFID reader obtains the private key corresponding to the TID based on the public key;

[0031] The RFID reader requests the RFID tag for a first identification, and the RFID tag feeds back the first identification in response to the RFID reader's request for the first identification;

[0032] The RFID reader generates first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identifier and encrypts the information using a private key and sends the information to the RFID tag. The first authentication information carries a second identifier generated by the RFID reader.

[0033] The RFID tag receives the first authentication information of the RFID reader / writer, decrypts the first authentication information using the private key, and authenticates the RFID reader / writer based on the generated first identifier;

[0034] After the RFID tag passes the identity authentication of the RFID reader, the RFID tag generates second authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the second identifier and encrypts the information with a private key and sends the information to the RFID reader;

[0035] The RFID reader receives the second authentication information, decrypts the second authentication information using the private key, and performs identity authentication on the RFID tag based on the generated second identifier.

[0036] In summary, due to the adoption of the above technical solution, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0037] The present invention, based on the encryption of communication data using public and private keys, can avoid the risk of being cracked due to pre-configured identification information by instantly generating identification information for authentication on RFID readers and RFID tags. It also solves the problem of authority management during the circulation and use of tags in conjunction with a two-way authentication strategy, and implements highly reliable, eavesdropping-proof tag security access operations. Combined with physical layer chip-level encryption technology, communication security is greatly improved. Under the conception of the present invention, it is allowed to use different forms and security levels of security access methods for specific encryption methods and the level of identification data in response to security encryption level requirements for different application scenarios, with high selectivity and flexibility. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] The present invention will now be described by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0039] Figure 1 This is a data flow diagram of an RFID reader initializing an RFID tag in one embodiment of the present application.

[0040] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of two-way authentication between an RFID reader and an RFID tag in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] All features disclosed in this specification, or steps in all methods or processes disclosed, except mutually exclusive features and / or steps, can be combined in any manner.

[0042] Any feature disclosed in this specification (including any additional claims and abstract), unless otherwise stated, may be replaced by other equivalent or alternative features having similar purposes. That is, unless otherwise stated, each feature is only an example of a series of equivalent or similar features.

[0043] In order to solve the problem that ordinary RFID tag information is easily stolen illegally, the embodiments of the present application provide an RFID device, system and two-way authentication method, aiming to improve the security of RFID tag information access operations.

[0044] For this purpose, the present application embodiment proposes an RFID reader / writer having the following configuration:

[0045] In response to reading the TID of the RFID tag, a private key SK corresponding to the TID is obtained based on the public key PK. The RFID tag is configured with the TID and the private key SK.

[0046] Usually, the RFID reader requests the TID for a specific RFID tag. For the specific RFID tag, the RFID reader sends an inventory command with a handle (i.e., a TID request) to select the RFID tag.

[0047] The RFID reader stores a public key. Based on the read TID, a key distribution algorithm is used to distribute the public key PK to obtain the private key SK corresponding to the TID. The private key SK is also the private key SK configured in the RFID tag.

[0048] In some embodiments, the RFID reader is further configured to initialize the RFID tag including configuring the TID and the private key SK. Specifically, the RFID reader is configured to:

[0049] Request the public key PK from the authentication management center and store it in the local storage;

[0050] The TID to be written to the RFID tag is obtained from the server, written to the corresponding RFID tag, and the TID is configured to be in a non-rewritable state.

[0051] Based on the TID obtained from the server, a key distribution algorithm is used to obtain the private key SK corresponding to the TID from the public key, and the private key SK is written to the RFID tag, and the private key SK is configured to be unreadable. Thus, a one-to-one correspondence between TID and private key is established. Due to the uniqueness of TID, the private key SK of each RFID tag is also unique. The private key SK configured in the RFID tag can only be rewritten under authorized conditions through specific security commands, which is usually carried out in an absolutely safe environment such as when the RFID tag leaves the factory and is authorized.

[0052] As a feasible implementation method, the key distribution algorithm in the embodiment of the present application can adopt an existing symmetric encryption algorithm or an asymmetric encryption algorithm, or it can be a custom encryption algorithm adopted by the user.

[0053] The RFID reader is also configured to:

[0054] A first identification RT is requested from the RFID tag, first authentication information requesting identity authentication is generated based on the first identification RT, and is encrypted with a private key SK and sent to the RFID tag. The first authentication information carries a second identification generated by the RFID reader.

[0055] As a possible implementation, the RFID reader requests the first identification RT by sending a request authentication command Req_SAuth (i.e., a first identification request) to the RFID tag. The first identification RT is data temporarily generated by the RFID tag in response to the first identification request, rather than pre-configured data, such as an n-bit random number (or string, the same below) generated by the RFID tag in response to Req_SAuth. After receiving the first identification RT fed back by the RFID tag, the RFID reader generates a second identification RR, such as an m-bit random number, and generates the first authentication information RRT based on the first identification RT and the second identification RR using a pre-configured first algorithm.

[0056] As a possible implementation, the RFID reader generates the first authentication information RRT based on the first identifier RT and the second identifier RR using the first algorithm, expressed as: RRT = f(RT, RR). On this basis, the RFID reader encrypts RRT using the private key SK to obtain the encrypted first authentication information Token1 = SM7_En(RRT). Of course, the encryption operation here is adjusted accordingly when the key distribution algorithm changes. After obtaining Token1, the RFID reader sends it to the RFID tag through the two-way authentication command Mul_SAuth, so that the RFID tag authenticates and authenticates the Token1.

[0057] The RFID reader is also configured to:

[0058] In response to the second authentication information returned by the RFID tag indicating that the authentication is successful, the second authentication information is decrypted using the private key, and the RFID tag is authenticated based on the generated second identifier. The second authentication information carries the second identifier and is encrypted with the private key.

[0059] In some embodiments, the RFID reader / writer uses a preconfigured second algorithm to parse out a second identifier from the decrypted second authentication information, and uses the generated second identifier to identify the parsed second identifier to perform identity authentication on the RFID tag.

[0060] Assuming that the encrypted second authentication information fed back by the RFID tag is Token2, the RFID reader uses the private key SK to decrypt the Token2 and obtain the second authentication information RRT3 = SM7_Dec (Token2). Then, the second identifier is parsed from RRT3 using the second algorithm. To distinguish it from the second identifier RR generated by the RFID reader and the second identifier RR1 parsed from the first authentication information by the RFID tag, the second identifier parsed from RRT3 is represented by RR2. Then, the generated second identifier RR is compared with RR2. If RR2 = RR, the authentication is successful, otherwise the authentication fails.

[0061] After the RFID reader / writer passes the identity authentication of the RFID tag, the RFID reader / writer can perform access operations such as reading, writing, and locking the specific storage area MEMO of the RFID tag. These access operations performed by the RFID reader / writer can be based on secure communication Sec_Com or ordinary access operations. Secure communication Sec_Com encrypts the entire access command to protect sensitive information from air interface eavesdropping, which has higher security. The read and write information in ordinary access operations can be directly transmitted in plain text, or the read and write information can be encrypted to protect sensitive information from air interface eavesdropping.

[0062] The present application also provides an RFID tag, in which a TID and a private key are configured. In some embodiments, the RFID tag is configured as follows:

[0063] Receive the TID written by the RFID reader and store it in an unrewritable state;

[0064] Receives the private key written by the RFID reader and stores it in an unreadable state. It can only be rewritten under authorized conditions through a specific security command.

[0065] For the scenario of secure access to tag information, the RFID tag is configured as follows:

[0066] The TID is sent in response to a TID request from the RFID reader. As mentioned in the above embodiment, the TID request may be an inventory command with a handle sent by the RFID reader.

[0067] In response to receiving the first identification request of the RFID reader, the first identification RT is sent, so that the RFID reader generates the first authentication information RRT requesting identity authentication based on the first identification RT and returns it after encryption using the private key, and the first authentication information RRT carries the second identification RR generated by the RFID reader. Taking the embodiment of the RFID reader in the previous text as an example, the first identification RT generated by the RFID tag is an n-bit random number, which is fed back to the RFID reader to trigger the RFID reader to generate an m-bit random number as the second identification RR, and the first authentication information RRT is generated according to the first identification RT and the second identification RR using the first algorithm and encrypted to obtain the encrypted first authentication information Token1=SM7_En(RRT).

[0068] In response to receiving the first authentication information Token1 from the RFID reader, the first authentication information Token1 is decrypted using the private key SK, and the RFID reader is authenticated based on the generated first identifier RT. The RFID tag decrypts the received Token1 using the private key SK to obtain RRT1=SM7_Dec(Token1), and further, the first identifier is parsed from the decrypted first authentication information RRT1 using the preconfigured first algorithm (i.e., the inverse operation of the first algorithm in the RFID reader), i.e., the first identifier is parsed from RRT1. To distinguish it from the generated first identifier RT, the parsed first identifier is referred to as RT1 here, and RT1=f -1 (RRT1), f -1 () is the inverse operation of f(). The generated first identifier RT is then compared with the parsed first identifier RT1. If RT1 = RT, the RFID tag passes the identity authentication of the RFID reader, otherwise the authentication fails.

[0069] In response to the identity authentication of the RFID reader being successful, the second authentication information RRT1 requesting identity authentication is generated based on the second identifier RR1 and encrypted with the private key SK and sent to the RFID reader, so that the RFID reader uses the generated second identifier RR to authenticate the RFID tag.

[0070] In some embodiments, the RFID tag generates a third identifier RT2 in response to successful identity authentication of the RFID reader, and generates second authentication information RRT2 based on the second identifier RR1 and the third identifier RT2 using a preconfigured second algorithm.

[0071] Still taking the above-mentioned RFID reader / writer embodiment as an example, when RT1=RT, the RFID tag generates an n-bit random number as the third identifier RT2, and uses the second algorithm to calculate the third identifier RT2 and the second identifier RR1 (parsed from RRT1) to obtain the second authentication information RRT2=g(RT2,RR1), and then uses the private key SK to encrypt RRT1 to obtain the encrypted second authentication information Token2=SM7_En(RRT2). The RFID tag sends Token2 to the RFID reader / writer so that the RFID reader / writer uses the generated second identifier RR to authenticate the RFID tag. In the above-mentioned RFID reader / writer embodiment, in response to receiving Token2, the RFID reader / writer uses the private key to decrypt Token2 to obtain the decrypted second authentication information RRT3=SM7_Dec(Token2), and the RFID reader / writer then uses the second algorithm to parse the second identifier from RRT3. To distinguish it from the generated second identifier RR, the second identifier parsed (from RRT3) is referred to as RR2 here, RR2=g -1 (RRT3), g -1 () is the inverse operation of g(). RR2 is identified based on RR. If RR2 = RR, the RFID reader / writer successfully authenticates the RFID tag.

[0072] The embodiment of the present application further provides an RFID system, which includes the RFID reader / writer in the above embodiment and the RFID tag in the above embodiment.

[0073] The embodiment of the present application also proposes a two-way authentication method for an RFID device, wherein the RFID device involves an RFID reader and an RFID tag.

[0074] In some embodiments, see Appendix Figure 2 , the two-way authentication method includes the following process:

[0075] S0. RFID reader / writer initializes RFID tag TID and private key.

[0076] This step is optional. In some feasible implementations, such as Figure 1 As shown, the RFID reader requests the public key PK from the authentication management center and stores it in the local memory. The RFID reader then obtains the TID to be written to the RFID tag from the server, writes it to the corresponding RFID tag, and configures the TID to be unrewritable. Based on the TID, the RFID reader uses the key distribution algorithm to distribute the corresponding private key SK from the public key PK, and writes the private key SK to the RFID tag (key storage area), and configures the private key SK to be unreadable.

[0077] S1. An RFID reader reads the TID of an RFID tag; the RFID tag is configured with the TID and a private key.

[0078] In some feasible implementations, the RFID reader requests the TID of a specific RFID tag by sending an inventory command with a handle, and the RFID tag feeds back the TID to the RFID reader after receiving the inventory command.

[0079] S2. The RFID reader obtains the private key corresponding to the TID based on the public key.

[0080] In some feasible implementations, the RFID reader stores a public key PK, which is obtained from the authentication management center and stored locally. Based on security considerations, the public key PK of the RFID reader also needs to be updated regularly. Based on the obtained TID, the private key SK corresponding to the TID is obtained from the public key PK using a key distribution algorithm and temporarily stored in the local memory.

[0081] S3. The RFID reader requests the RFID tag for a first identification, and the RFID tag feeds back the first identification in response to the first identification request of the RFID reader.

[0082] In some feasible implementations, the RFID reader sends a request authentication command Req_SAuth to the RFID tag. After receiving the Req_SAuth, the RFID tag generates an n-bit random number as a first identifier RT and feeds it back to the RFID reader.

[0083] S4. The RFID reader generates first authentication information for requesting identity authentication based on the first identifier, encrypts the information with a private key, and sends the information to the RFID tag. The first authentication information carries a second identifier generated by the RFID reader.

[0084] In some feasible implementations, after receiving RT, the RFID reader generates an m-bit random number as a second identifier RR, generates first authentication information RRT=f(RT,RR) from RT and RR using a preconfigured first algorithm, and encrypts it using a private key SK to obtain the encrypted first authentication information Token1=SM7_En(RRT), and sends Token1 to the RFID tag through a two-way authentication command Mul_SAuth.

[0085] S5. The RFID tag receives the first authentication information of the RFID reader / writer, decrypts the first authentication information using the private key, and performs identity authentication on the RFID reader / writer based on the generated first identifier.

[0086] In some feasible implementations, after receiving Token1, the RFID tag uses the private key SK to decrypt it to obtain the decrypted first authentication information RRT1=SM7_Dec(Token1), and uses the pre-configured first algorithm to parse the first identifier RT1=f from RRT1. -1 (RRT1), and also parse out the second identifier RR1=f -1 (RRT1). The generated RT is used to authenticate RT1. If RT1 = RT, the RFID tag passes the identity authentication of the RFID reader. Otherwise, the identity authentication fails. If the identity authentication fails, the security access process is exited.

[0087] S6. After the RFID tag passes the identity authentication of the RFID reader / writer, the RFID tag generates second authentication information for requesting identity authentication based on the second identifier, encrypts the information with a private key, and sends the information to the RFID reader / writer.

[0088] In some feasible implementations, when RT1=RT, the RFID tag generates an n-bit random number (or other data) as a third identifier RT2, generates second authentication information RRT2=g(RT2,RR1) based on RT2 and RR1 using a preconfigured second algorithm, then encrypts RRT2 using the private key SK to obtain the encrypted second authentication information Token2=SM7_En(RRT2), and sends Token2 to the RFID reader.

[0089] S7. The RFID reader receives the second authentication information, decrypts the second authentication information using a private key, and performs identity authentication on the RFID tag based on the generated second identifier.

[0090] In some feasible embodiments, the RFID reader receives Token2, decrypts Token2 using the private key SK to obtain the decrypted second authentication information RRT3=SM7_Dec(Token2), and uses the preconfigured second algorithm to parse the second identifier RR2=g from RRT3. -1 (RRT3), using the generated second identifier RR to identify the parsed second identifier RR2, so as to authenticate the identity of the RFID tag. If RR2 = RR, the RFID reader / writer succeeds in authenticating the RFID tag, otherwise the authentication fails.

[0091] The above steps belong to the two-way authentication steps in the tag information access operation. For the tag information access operation, after step S7, it also includes:

[0092] S8. The RFID reader / writer accesses the data stored in the RFID tag.

[0093] In some feasible implementations, the RFID reader / writer accesses the specific storage area MEMO of the RFID tag and performs operations such as reading, writing, and locking. These access operations can be based on secure communication Sec_Com or ordinary access operations. Secure communication Sec_Com encrypts the entire command to protect sensitive information from air interface eavesdropping, which has higher security. The read and write information in ordinary access operations can be directly transmitted in plain text or encrypted to protect sensitive information from air interface eavesdropping. The specific implementation method to be adopted can be selected according to the actual application scenario.

[0094] In actual applications, the asset information is stored in the RFID tag. After the two-way authentication of the above embodiment, the RFID reader can read the asset information stored in the RFID tag and perform operations such as deletion and modification.

[0095] The present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned specific embodiments, but extends to any new features or any new combination disclosed in this specification, as well as any new method or process steps or any new combination disclosed.

Claims

1. An RFID reader / writer, characterized in that: The RFID reader is configured as follows: In response to reading the TID of the RFID tag, obtaining a private key corresponding to the TID based on the public key; the RFID tag is configured with the TID and the private key; Requesting a first identifier from the RFID tag, generating first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identifier, encrypting the information with a private key and sending the information to the RFID tag, wherein the first authentication information carries a second identifier generated by the RFID reader; In response to the second authentication information returned by the RFID tag indicating that the authentication is successful, the second authentication information is decrypted using the private key, and the RFID tag is authenticated based on the generated second identifier, where the second authentication information carries the second identifier and is encrypted with the private key.

2. The RFID reader / writer according to claim 1, characterized in that: In response to receiving the first identifier, the RFID reader generates the second identifier, and generates the first authentication information based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a preconfigured first algorithm.

3. The RFID reader / writer according to claim 1, characterized in that: The RFID reader / writer uses a preconfigured second algorithm to parse out a second identifier from the decrypted second authentication information, and uses the generated second identifier to identify the parsed second identifier to perform identity authentication on the RFID tag.

4. The RFID reader-writer according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The RFID reader is also configured as: Request the public key and store it locally; Get the TID and write it to the corresponding RFID tag, and configure the TID to be non-rewritable; The private key corresponding to the TID is obtained from the public key, the private key is written into the RFID tag, and the private key is configured to be in an unreadable state.

5. An RFID tag, characterized in that: The RFID tag is configured with a TID and a private key; the RFID tag is configured as follows: Sending a TID in response to a TID request from an RFID reader; In response to receiving a first identification request from the RFID reader, the first identification is sent, so that the RFID reader generates first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identification and returns it after being encrypted using a private key, wherein the first authentication information carries a second identification generated by the RFID reader; In response to receiving the first authentication information from the RFID reader, decrypting the first authentication information using the private key, and authenticating the RFID reader based on the generated first identifier; In response to the identity authentication of the RFID reader being successful, second authentication information requesting identity authentication is generated based on the second identifier and encrypted with a private key and sent to the RFID reader, so that the RFID reader uses the generated second identifier to authenticate the RFID tag.

6. The RFID tag according to claim 5, wherein: The RFID tag uses a preconfigured first algorithm to parse out a first identifier from the decrypted first authentication information, and uses the generated first identifier to identify the parsed first identifier to perform identity authentication on the RFID reader.

7. The RFID tag according to claim 5, characterized in that: In response to the identity authentication of the RFID reader being successful, the RFID tag generates a third identifier, and generates the second authentication information based on the second identifier and the third identifier using a preconfigured second algorithm.

8. The RFID tag according to claim 5, wherein: The RFID tag is also configured to: Receive the TID written by the RFID reader and store it in an unrewritable state; Receives the private key written by the RFID reader and stores it in an unreadable state.

9. An RFID system, characterized in that: It comprises the RFID reader / writer as described in any one of claims 1 to 4, and the RFID tag as described in any one of claims 5 to 8.

10. A two-way authentication method for RFID equipment, characterized in that: include: The RFID reader reads the TID of the RFID tag; the RFID tag is configured with the TID and the private key; The RFID reader obtains the private key corresponding to the TID based on the public key; The RFID reader requests the RFID tag for a first identification, and the RFID tag feeds back the first identification in response to the RFID reader's request for the first identification; The RFID reader generates first authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the first identifier and encrypts the information using a private key and sends the information to the RFID tag. The first authentication information carries a second identifier generated by the RFID reader. The RFID tag receives the first authentication information of the RFID reader / writer, decrypts the first authentication information using the private key, and authenticates the RFID reader / writer based on the generated first identifier; After the RFID tag passes the identity authentication of the RFID reader, the RFID tag generates second authentication information requesting identity authentication based on the second identifier and encrypts the information with a private key and sends the information to the RFID reader; The RFID reader receives the second authentication information, decrypts the second authentication information using the private key, and performs identity authentication on the RFID tag based on the generated second identifier.

Images