Lightweight security access method for unmanned aerial vehicle formation network

Abstract

The invention provides an unmanned aerial vehicle formation network lightweight security access method, and relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle cluster network security and cryptography, and the method comprises the steps: building an unmanned aerial vehicle formation network model, carrying out unmanned aerial vehicle node ground registration, and carrying out unmanned aerial vehicle network topology switching air authentication. And lightweight security access of the unmanned aerial vehicle formation network model is realized. Through an identity registration mechanism based on a physical unclonable function and a bidirectional authentication protocol taking a ground station as a core, extreme balance between safety and performance is realized under the condition that resources are limited, and the method has the remarkable advantages of low calculation overhead and low communication overhead, perfectly adapts to a lightweight unmanned aerial vehicle platform, and has a wide application prospect. The method has the advantages that the authentication efficiency and the system reliability are obviously improved while the high security is maintained, and a solid security foundation is laid for the large-scale application of the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster. The method is simple and convenient to operate, can effectively resist multiple network attacks such as replay, eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle, and guarantees the communication security in the dynamic topology environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of network security and cryptography technology for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms, and in particular to a lightweight secure access method for UAV swarm networks. Background Technology

[0002] As a key representative of modern intelligent technology, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm networks have demonstrated significant practical value in fields such as military reconnaissance, disaster relief, and logistics transportation due to their advantages of collaborative efficiency, flexibility, and scalability. Through multi-UAV autonomous networking and task allocation, swarm systems can significantly improve mission execution efficiency, reduce the risk of single points of failure, and adapt to complex and dynamic environments, becoming one of the core carriers of future intelligent applications. However, due to the actual mission requirements, UAV swarms often require flexible and dynamic topology switching and complete missions in formation, making their network vulnerability a significant security risk. The formation topology switching requirements are as follows: Figure 1a and Figure 1b As shown.

[0003] Currently, drone swarm networks face multiple challenges, including weak authentication mechanisms, difficulties in key management under dynamic topologies, and the risk of malicious node intrusion. Traditional security solutions often struggle to adapt to the high mobility and distributed nature of swarms, making communication links vulnerable to eavesdropping, forgery, or denial-of-service attacks. Traditional security solutions are mostly designed for static, large-scale networks and are ill-suited to the high mobility and distributed nature of drone swarms. Centralized authentication architectures suffer from single-point-of-failure risks, while distributed solutions face the problem of escalating communication overhead and latency. This contradiction makes swarm communication links vulnerable to eavesdropping, data forgery, or denial-of-service attacks in open environments, especially in high-risk scenarios such as military confrontations or densely populated urban environments, where security threats are even more pronounced. Furthermore, lightweight drones, limited by computing, storage, and energy resources, cannot directly port complex encryption or authentication protocols. How to achieve efficient and robust secure access while ensuring low latency and high throughput real-time performance has become a key bottleneck restricting the large-scale application of swarm technology. Especially in resource-constrained lightweight scenarios, how to achieve efficient and secure access while ensuring real-time performance remains a critical technical bottleneck that urgently needs to be overcome. Therefore, designing a lightweight secure access method for drone swarm networks is essential. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies, the purpose of this invention is to provide a lightweight and secure access method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm networks.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following solution: This invention provides a lightweight and secure access method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm networks, comprising: Step 1: Establish a drone formation network model; Step 2: Perform ground registration for the drone node; Step 3: Perform over-the-air authentication for drone network topology switching to achieve lightweight and secure access to the drone swarm network model.

[0006] Preferably, in step 1, a drone formation network model is established, specifically as follows: The UAV swarm network model includes a ground station, UAV nodes, and an authentication server. The ground station interacts with each UAV node for authentication and establishes a direct communication link. The UAV nodes are controlled by the ground station. Multiple UAV nodes constitute a distributed swarm communication network. The authentication server is used to centrally manage authentication-related data.

[0007] Preferably, in step 2, the ground registration of the UAV node is performed, specifically as follows: Step 201: The drone node generates challenge value and response value, and generates identity key based on node identifier and response value, and finally generates registration request information and sends the registration request information to the ground station; Step 202: The ground station receives the registration request information, generates a fake identity based on the registration request information, securely stores the fake identity and registration request information in the authentication server, and returns the fake identity to the drone node; Step 203: The drone node receives the fake identity and stores it along with the identity key in itself, while deleting the challenge value and response value.

[0008] Preferably, in step 201, the drone node generates a challenge value and a response value, and generates an identity key based on the node identifier and the response value, ultimately generating registration request information, specifically as follows: The drone node generates a challenge value through a random number generator, uses the challenge value as input to a physically unclonable function to obtain a response value, constructs a node identifier, generates an identity key based on the node identifier and the response value, and generates registration request information based on the node identifier, challenge value, and response value.

[0009] Preferably, in step 202, the ground station receives the registration request information, generates a pseudo-identity based on the registration request information, securely stores the pseudo-identity and registration request information in the authentication server, and returns the pseudo-identity to the drone node, specifically as follows: The ground station receives the registration request information and combines the ground station's master key with the node identifier information in the registration request information to generate a pseudo identity through hash operation; The fake identity and registration request information are combined into a four-tuple, which is then stored in the authentication server. The fake identity is then returned to the drone node.

[0010] Preferably, in step 3, over-the-air authentication for UAV network topology switching is performed to achieve lightweight and secure access to the UAV swarm network model, specifically as follows: Step 301: Calculate the first authentication parameters and the second authentication parameters of the first UAV node and the second UAV node, generate an authentication message, and send it to the ground station; Step 302: The ground station verifies the timeliness of the authentication message based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, and calculates and verifies the authentication parameters; Step 303: After both parties have successfully authenticated, the ground station calculates the session key material for the first UAV node and the second UAV node, and sends the session key material and timestamp to the corresponding UAV node respectively. Step 304: The first UAV node and the second UAV node verify the corresponding timestamp and extract the corresponding session key material to obtain the shared key, and establish a secure communication channel based on the shared key.

[0011] Preferably, in step 301, the first authentication parameter and the second authentication parameter of the first UAV node and the second UAV node are calculated, an authentication message is generated, and it is sent to the ground station, specifically as follows: The first and second drone nodes generate random numbers and obtain timestamps, calculate the first authentication parameters based on the timestamps and corresponding identity keys, calculate the second authentication parameters based on the timestamps, pseudo-identity and random numbers, construct an authentication message based on the first authentication parameters, second authentication parameters, pseudo-identity and timestamp, and send it to the ground station.

[0012] Preferably, in step 302, the ground station verifies the timeliness of the authentication message based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, calculates and verifies the authentication parameters, specifically as follows: The ground station obtains the authentication messages of the first and second UAV nodes and verifies the timeliness of the messages based on the timestamp. Obtain the registration request message of the corresponding drone node, and restore the key, random number and second authentication parameter based on the registration request message and authentication message. If the restored second authentication parameter is the same as the second authentication parameter in the authentication message, the identity authentication is completed.

[0013] According to specific embodiments provided by the present invention, the present invention discloses the following technical effects: This invention provides a lightweight and secure access method for UAV swarm networks. The method includes establishing a UAV swarm network model, performing ground registration of UAV nodes, and conducting over-the-air authentication for UAV network topology switching, thereby achieving lightweight and secure access to the UAV swarm network model. The significant advantages of this invention are reflected in multiple aspects: First, it achieves an ultimate balance between security and resource consumption, perfectly meeting the stringent constraints of lightweight drone platforms. This is the core breakthrough of this invention. Traditional security solutions, such as asymmetric cryptography, have high computational and communication overhead, which is difficult for resource-constrained drone nodes to bear, often resulting in excessive authentication latency and failing to meet the real-time requirements of swarm collaboration. This invention innovatively adopts physically unclonable functions as the security foundation, using their inherent physical properties to generate unique identifiers and keys, avoiding complex cryptographic operations from the source. In the entire authentication protocol, the core operations are designed as lightweight hash functions and XOR operations, greatly reducing the computational burden and energy consumption of nodes. At the same time, through a carefully designed message structure, the communication overhead of a single authentication is controlled to an extremely low level. This "lightweight" design allows this invention to be seamlessly deployed on small and even micro drones with extremely limited computing power, storage space, and battery energy, clearing the security obstacles for large-scale, low-cost drone swarm applications.

[0014] Secondly, a highly robust two-way authentication and key negotiation mechanism is constructed for dynamic topology environments, fundamentally resisting various mainstream network attacks. The most significant characteristic of UAV swarm networks is their dynamism, with frequent node additions, removals, and rapid topology switching posing a severe challenge to secure access. This invention is not a static authentication scheme but is deeply integrated into this dynamic scenario. By introducing an authentication architecture with a ground station as a trusted third party, it provides instant and reliable authentication services for any two UAV nodes when they need to establish a connection. The deeply integrated timestamp mechanism in the protocol effectively prevents replay attacks and ensures the freshness of each authentication request. More importantly, the entire process enables UAV nodes to establish a connection with each other. The two-way authentication between ground stations allows the ground stations to verify the legitimate identity of the drones, while the drones indirectly confirm the authenticity of the ground stations by receiving verifiable session key materials from them. This effectively defends against intrusions by fake nodes or "black flight" drones. In addition, the protocol ultimately negotiates and generates a dynamic, one-time pad session key for both communicating parties. This key is not transmitted directly but is calculated separately by both parties, perfectly ensuring forward security. Even if the key is leaked in the long term, it will not endanger the security of historical communications. The analysis results of the formal verification tool AVISPA have confirmed that the protocol can effectively resist various attacks under the Dolev-Yao threat model, providing a solid security guarantee for swarm communication.

[0015] Third, it significantly improves the overall scalability and mission reliability of the formation network. The hierarchical network model proposed in this invention combines the efficiency of centralized management with the resilience of distributed communication. The ground station and authentication server, as the security core, are responsible for the registration and online authentication of all nodes. This design makes key management centralized and efficient, avoiding the complexity and high overhead of key distribution and updates in fully distributed schemes. When the formation size expands and new nodes need to be added, they only need to complete registration at the ground station to integrate into the entire security system, demonstrating strong scalability. At the same time, during mission execution, the failure or exit of any UAV node will not affect the secure link between other nodes and the ground station, ensuring the robustness of the entire system. This architecture ensures that even if some nodes are damaged in complex battlefield environments or disaster relief scenarios, the formation network can still maintain basic communication security and mission execution capabilities, greatly improving the success rate of missions and the survivability of the system.

[0016] Fourth, through modular and process-oriented design, the feasibility and verifiability of the solution are enhanced. This invention clearly divides the complex secure access process into two logical stages: "ground registration" and "over-the-air authentication." The registration stage assigns an initial identity to the node, while the authentication stage handles dynamic connections. This modular design not only makes the protocol logic clear and easy to implement and debug, but also facilitates independent security analysis and verification. Each step has clear input, output, and verification conditions, such as the ground station's verification of timestamps and the restoration and comparison of authentication parameters during the authentication process, forming an interlocking security chain. This rigorous design ensures the correctness of the protocol and lays the foundation for automated security verification using formal tools, such as... Figure 5a and Figure 5b The AVISPA analysis report shown provides strong and objective evidence of the security of the solution. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1a This is a schematic diagram of drone access; Figure 1b This is a schematic diagram of the formation network topology switching; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a formation network architecture; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the ground-based identity registration process; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the certification process. Figure 5a This is a schematic diagram of the OMFC analysis results report; Figure 5b This is a schematic diagram of the CL-AtSe analysis results report; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram comparing communication overhead experiments; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram comparing computational performance experiments; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] The purpose of this invention is to provide a lightweight and secure access method for UAV swarm networks. By adopting an identity registration mechanism based on physically unclonable functions and a two-way authentication protocol centered on ground stations, it achieves an ultimate balance between security and performance under resource-constrained conditions. This method has significant advantages in low computational and communication overhead, is perfectly adapted to lightweight UAV platforms, and can effectively resist various network attacks such as replay attacks, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle attacks, ensuring communication security in dynamic topology environments. While maintaining high security, this method significantly improves authentication efficiency and system reliability, laying a solid security foundation for the large-scale application of UAV swarms.

[0021] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0022] like Figure 8 As shown, this invention provides a lightweight and secure access method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarm networks, comprising: Step 1: Establish a drone formation network model; Step 2: Perform ground registration for the drone node; Step 3: Perform over-the-air authentication for drone network topology switching to achieve lightweight and secure access to the drone swarm network model.

[0023] In step 1, a drone formation network model is established, specifically as follows: The drone swarm network model includes a ground station, drone nodes, and an authentication server. The ground station interacts with each drone node for authentication and establishes a direct communication link. The drone nodes are controlled by the ground station, and multiple drone nodes constitute a distributed swarm communication network. The authentication server is used to centrally manage authentication-related data, such as... Figure 2 As shown, this invention presents a UAV swarm network model. In this model, each UAV in the swarm, controlled by the ground station, establishes a direct communication link with the ground station. Authentication is achieved through the ground station, and an optimized topology network structure is formed within the swarm, thus creating a distributed swarm communication network. This design makes communication within the UAV swarm more flexible and resilient. Each UAV can independently communicate with the ground station to achieve authentication interaction, enabling real-time data exchange and collaborative authentication access without relying on centralized relay nodes. The ground station is responsible for sending authentication signals during communication topology switching, ensuring that only authorized UAVs can establish or maintain communication links. An authentication server is deployed to centrally manage authentication-related data. This server, as a secure storage unit, can properly store sensitive information such as encryption keys and identity credentials.

[0024] Step 2 involves ground registration of the drone node, specifically as follows: When a drone needs to access the formation network and perform identity authentication, it must first complete identity registration at the ground station. This step, based on physically non-cloning functions, involves designing a protocol for interaction between the drone and the ground station to generate a unique identifier for the drone, thus achieving ground station identity authentication and registration for the drone node. The specific flowchart of the registration protocol is shown below. Figure 3 As shown, the specific steps are as follows: In step 201, the drone node generates a challenge value and a response value, and generates an identity key based on the node identifier and the response value, ultimately generating registration request information, specifically: drone nodes First, a challenge value is generated using a random number generator. This value is then used as input to the Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) to obtain the response value. Subsequently, based on node identifiers With response value XOR to generate identity key: (1) final, Send a registration request message to the ground station (GS) Complete the initialization process; In step 202, the ground station receives the registration request information, generates a pseudo-identity based on the registration request information, securely stores the pseudo-identity and registration request information in the authentication server, and returns the pseudo-identity to the drone node. Specifically: Ground station received Then combined with the ground station master key With drones identifier The pseudo-identity is generated through hash operation as follows: (2) This false identity will form a quadruple with the drone-related registration information. The false identity is securely stored in the authentication server, and the ground station sends the false identity to the drone. For drones ; In step 203, the drone node receives the fake identity and stores it along with the identity key in itself, while simultaneously deleting the challenge value and response value. Specifically: Register drones Store on device after receiving message And delete .

[0025] In step 3, over-the-air authentication for UAV network topology switching is performed to achieve lightweight and secure access to the UAV swarm network model. Specifically: After completing the registration phase, the drone's identity authentication information is securely stored in the ground station. When the formation needs to switch network topology, the drone... and To establish a communication connection, both parties need to complete secure authentication and exchange shared keys through a ground station. This authentication process employs an identity authentication and key exchange protocol with the ground station as a trusted third party. It uses a random number generator to produce random variables, utilizes a hash function to reduce communication overhead, and implements identity authentication and key exchange based on a PUF (Public Authentication Function). The specific implementation steps of the authentication phase protocol are as follows: Figure 4 As shown, it specifically includes the following steps: In step 301, the first authentication parameters and the second authentication parameters of the first UAV node are calculated, an authentication message is generated, and it is sent to the ground station, specifically as follows: Generate random numbers And obtain the timestamp And calculate two authentication parameters, namely: (3) (4) After generation, the authentication message will be sent. Send to the ground station. In step 302, the ground station verifies the timeliness of the authentication message based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, calculates and verifies the authentication parameters, specifically as follows: Ground station received After the message, first check the timestamp. Verify message timeliness by checking whether the received message time falls within the timeliness threshold of the current time t. Within the range, that is ; Then query the authentication server to obtain Registration and authentication information Calculate the recovery key based on the authentication information. Random numbers and authentication parameters : (5) (6) (7) If the restored authentication parameters With drones Received If the matches are equal, then the pair is complete. If the identity verification is not equal, the match fails, the authentication protocol is terminated, and the system sends a request to [the relevant authority / organization]. Send authentication error message to terminate the establishment of a secure communication connection; In step 303, the first authentication parameters and the second authentication parameters of the second UAV node are calculated, an authentication message is generated, and it is sent to the ground station, specifically as follows: Regarding the other party's drone Perform a similar operation to step 301 to generate random numbers. and timestamp And calculate two authentication parameters as follows: (8) (9) After generation, the authentication message will be sent. Send to the ground station.

[0026] In step 304, the ground station verifies the timeliness of the authentication message based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, calculates and verifies the authentication parameters, specifically as follows: Ground station received After the message is sent, a verification process similar to step 302 is executed, starting with the timestamp. Verify message timeliness Then query the authentication server to obtain Registration and authentication information Calculate the recovery key based on the authentication information. Random numbers and authentication parameters : (10) (11) (12) If the restored authentication parameters With drones Received If the matches are equal, then the pair is complete. If the identity verification is not equal, the match fails, the authentication protocol is terminated, and the system sends a request to [the relevant authority / organization]. Sends an authentication error message and terminates the establishment of a secure communication connection.

[0027] In step 305, after both parties have successfully authenticated, the ground station calculates the session key material for the first UAV node and the second UAV node, and sends the session key material and timestamp to the corresponding UAV node, specifically as follows: After both parties have successfully authenticated, the ground station generates a random number. and timestamp Calculate separately and The session key material is as follows: (13) (14) and respectively to and Send session key materials and timestamps and ; In step 306, the first UAV node and the second UAV node verify the corresponding timestamp and extract the corresponding session key material to obtain the shared key. A secure communication channel is then established based on the shared key, specifically as follows: Verify timestamp After the expiration period, the session key is extracted to obtain: (15) Same verification Then obtain the session key: (16) After the above agreement is executed, and Two-way authentication based on ground stations was successfully implemented, and it can be achieved through shared keys. Establish a secure communication channel.

[0028] AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) is a formal validation tool based on the Dolev-Yao threat model. It effectively detects whether authentication protocols can resist various active and passive attack methods, including secret disclosure, eavesdropping, replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. This tool provides a modular formal expression language for protocol security analysis and integrates automated validation endpoints based on different proof theories, including four validation backend engines: OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC, and TA4SP.

[0029] In our verification process, by defining in AVISPA , The protocol operation is simulated using three roles: ground station, and [other roles]. Figure 5a and Figure 5b As shown, the verification results indicate that the protocol of this invention successfully meets all security requirements and can effectively resist various attacks under the Dolev-Yao threat model.

[0030] Compared with existing protocols, the protocol of this invention achieves optimal results in minimizing communication and computing costs, making it particularly suitable for resource-constrained drone application scenarios.

[0031] Through real-world scenario protocol simulation, a comparison of the communication bit overhead of four advanced UAV network authentication protocols was achieved, such as... Figure 6 As shown, the simulation result of the single-communication overhead of the protocol of this invention is 2176 bits, which is less than that of existing advanced UAV network authentication protocols.

[0032] like Figure 7 As shown, through real-world scenario protocol simulation, the computational overhead performance of four advanced UAV network authentication protocols was compared. The proposed protocol achieves a single authentication process time of 3.86ms, which is superior to existing advanced UAV network authentication protocols.

[0033] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other.

[0034] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of the present invention. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for lightweight secure access of a UAV formation network, characterized in that, The application relates to a lightweight secure access method for a UAV formation network model. The method comprises the following steps: Step 1: establishing a UAV formation network model; Step 2: performing ground registration of a UAV node; 2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Step 3: performing air authentication of UAV network topology switching to realize lightweight secure access of the UAV formation network model. In step 1, the UAV formation network model is established, and the UAV formation network model comprises a ground station, a UAV node and an authentication server.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The ground station is used for authentication interaction with each UAV node and for establishing a direct communication link. The UAV node is controlled by the ground station. A plurality of UAV nodes form a distributed formation communication network. The authentication server is used for centralized management of authentication related data.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, In step 2, the ground registration of the UAV node is performed, and the ground registration of the UAV node comprises the following steps: Step 201: the UAV node generates a challenge value and a response value, generates an identity key based on a node identifier and the response value, and finally generates registration request information.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, The registration request information is sent to the ground station. Step 202: the ground station receives the registration request information, generates a pseudo identity based on the registration request information, stores the pseudo identity and the registration request information into the authentication server in a safe manner, and returns the pseudo identity to the UAV node. Step 203: the UAV node receives the pseudo identity and stores the pseudo identity and the identity key in the UAV node, and deletes the challenge value and the response value.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, In step 201, the UAV node generates the challenge value and the response value, generates the identity key based on the node identifier and the response value, and finally generates the registration request information. The UAV node generates the challenge value through a random number generator, obtains the response value by taking the challenge value as the input of a physically unclonable function, constructs the node identifier, generates the identity key based on the node identifier and the response value, and generates the registration request information based on the node identifier, the challenge value and the response value. In step 202, the ground station receives the registration request information, generates the pseudo identity based on the registration request information, stores the pseudo identity and the registration request information into the authentication server in a safe manner, and returns the pseudo identity to the UAV node. The ground station receives the registration request information, combines the master key of the ground station with the node identifier information in the registration request information, and generates the pseudo identity through hash operation. The pseudo identity and the registration request information form a four-tuple, the four-tuple is stored into the authentication server, and the pseudo identity is returned to the UAV node. In step 3, the air authentication of UAV network topology switching is performed to realize the lightweight secure access of the UAV formation network model, and the air authentication of UAV network topology switching comprises the following steps: Step 301: the first authentication parameter and the second authentication parameter of the first UAV node and the second UAV node are calculated, an authentication message is generated, and the authentication message is sent to the ground station; Step 302: the ground station verifies the timeliness of the authentication message based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, and calculates and verifies the authentication parameter; Step 303: after the authentication of both parties is passed, the ground station calculates the session key material of the first UAV node and the second UAV node, and sends the session key material and a time stamp to the corresponding UAV node; Step 304: the first UAV node and the second UAV node verify the corresponding time stamp and extract the corresponding session key material to obtain a shared key, and establish a secure communication channel based on the shared key.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein, In step 301, the first authentication parameter and the second authentication parameter of the first UAV node and the second UAV node are calculated, an authentication message is generated, and the authentication message is sent to the ground station, specifically: The first UAV node and the second UAV node generate random numbers and obtain timestamps, calculate the first authentication parameter based on the timestamp and the corresponding identity key, calculate the second authentication parameter based on the timestamp, the pseudo-identity and the random number, construct the authentication message based on the first authentication parameter, the second authentication parameter, the pseudo-identity and the timestamp, and send the authentication message to the ground station.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein, In step 302, the ground station verifies the message timeliness based on the authentication message, queries the authentication information, calculates and verifies the authentication parameter, specifically: The ground station obtains the authentication message of the first UAV node and the second UAV node, verifies the message timeliness based on the timestamp; The registration request message of the corresponding UAV node is obtained, the key, the random number and the second authentication parameter are restored based on the registration request message and the authentication message, and if the restored second authentication parameter is the same as the second authentication parameter in the authentication message, the identity authentication is completed.

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