End-to-end encryption method and system based on SOME IP communication

Abstract

The invention relates to an end-to-end encryption method and system based on SOME IP communication, the system comprises a communication initiating end and a receiving end, both the communication initiating end and the receiving end are integrated with SE security chips, and manufacturer root keys are pre-implanted in both the communication initiating end and the receiving end. The communication initiating end synchronizes a dynamic session key generated by the SE security chip based on the root key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel; the method comprises the following steps: generating an SOME / IP message by an initiating end, and dividing fields of the SOME / IP message into a non-sensitive type, a low-sensitive type and a high-sensitive type according to a sensitive level rule; by calculating encryption time consumption of a high-sensitivity field and combining MAC layer sending time slot planning, an initiating end calls an SE chip in advance for encryption, so that a message generation moment is accurately matched with a sending window; and the encrypted message is added into a transmission queue and is sent out at the next sending time slot. According to the scheme, while the security of core data is guaranteed, the encryption time consumption is reduced by more than 50%, the end-to-end communication time delay is controlled within 15ms, and the high-real-time scene requirements of automatic driving, chassis control, OTA and the like are met.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data encryption technology, specifically to an end-to-end encryption method and system based on SOME IP communication. Background Technology

[0002] As automobiles upgrade towards electrification and intelligence, the SOME / IP protocol, due to its support for "service-based communication," has become the core protocol of automotive Ethernet and is widely used in the transmission of autonomous driving perception data (LiDAR, cameras), chassis control commands (braking, steering), OTA, and other systems. However, current SOME / IP communication encryption schemes have three major pain points, making it difficult to meet the requirements of high real-time scenarios: 1. Excessive latency due to full message encryption: Existing solutions mostly use "full message AES encryption". Taking a 128-byte control message as an example, full message encryption takes 5-8ms, accounting for 30%-40% of the total end-to-end communication latency, which can easily lead to delays in the transmission of emergency control commands.

[0003] 2. Static keys pose security risks: Most solutions rely on software-layer distribution of static keys, which are permanently fixed and stored in the domain controller's flash memory. Once the vehicle system is compromised, the static key is easily stolen, leading to the cracking of the vehicle's SOME / IP communication data and posing a risk of unauthorized vehicle control. Furthermore, key updates require restarting the communication link, making it unsuitable for dynamic driving scenarios.

[0004] 3. Decoupling of Encryption and Transmission Scheduling: Encryption tasks are executed independently from SOME / IP message transmission. When encryption tasks are queued, messages may miss transmission slots. For example, when data from multiple sensors arrive simultaneously, the encryption module needs to process them sequentially. Instructions may be delayed by 20-30ms due to waiting for encryption, which cannot meet the "millisecond-level response" requirement of autonomous driving.

[0005] The methods described in this section are not necessarily methods that had been previously conceived or adopted. Unless otherwise specified, no method described in this section should be assumed to be prior art simply because it is included in this section. Similarly, unless otherwise specified, the issues mentioned in this section should not be considered to be accepted in any prior art. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention addresses at least one of the technical problems existing in the prior art by providing an end-to-end encryption method and system based on SOME / IP communication. By processing SOME / IP messages in layers according to their sensitivity level, generating dynamic keys using the vehicle-mounted SE security chip as the hardware root of trust, and coordinating encryption tasks with transmission timing, the encryption time is reduced by more than 50% while ensuring the security of core data. The end-to-end communication latency is controlled within 15ms, meeting the high real-time requirements of scenarios such as autonomous driving, chassis control, and OTA.

[0007] The technical solution of the present invention to solve the above-mentioned technical problems is as follows: On one hand, this invention provides an end-to-end encryption method based on SOME IP communication, wherein both the communication initiator and receiver integrate an SE security chip and both are pre-embedded with a vendor root key. The end-to-end encryption method includes: The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and synchronizes the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack; The communication initiator collects control data and generates SOME / IP messages; The communication initiator splits the SOME / IP message into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitivity fields, and high-sensitivity fields according to the preset sensitivity level rules, and calculates the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitivity fields in the SOME / IP message using the dynamic session key; The communication initiator obtains the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determines the opening time of the next transmission window, and, based on the encryption time, calls the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window. The initiating end adds the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and sends the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot.

[0008] Preferably, the communication initiating end calls the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and synchronizes the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack, including: The communication initiator sends a SOME / IP SD "service request message" to the receiving end. The service request message contains the hardware unique identifier (UID) of the initiator's SE security chip. The receiving end calls the SE security chip to verify the legitimacy of the UID, generates a "key negotiation response message", and transmits the RSA public key and the key negotiation response message to the initiating SE security chip through the hardware encryption channel. The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to encrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA public key, and sends the encrypted dynamic session key back to the receiving end through the hardware encryption channel; The receiving SE chip calls the SE security chip to decrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA private key, thus completing the dynamic session key synchronization.

[0009] Preferably, the dynamic session key is stored only in the internal RAM of the SE security chip.

[0010] Preferably, the communication initiator obtains the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determines the opening time of the next transmission window, and, based on the encryption time, pre-calls the SE security chip to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message, including: The communication initiator determines the opening time T of the next transmission window based on the transmission time slot planning of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer; Let the encryption time be t. Then, at time Tt, the encryption task is triggered, the SE security chip is called, and the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message are encrypted using the dynamic session key.

[0011] Preferably, the end-to-end encryption method further includes calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the low-sensitivity field and writing the SHA-256 hash value into the SOME / IP message.

[0012] Preferably, after receiving the SOME / IP message, the receiving end verifies the SOME / IP message, including: Parse non-sensitive fields to confirm the module the route points to; Calculate the SHA-256 hash value of the low-sensitivity field and compare it with the hash value carried in the SOME / IP message; The receiving end invokes the SE security chip to decrypt highly sensitive fields using the dynamic session key.

[0013] Preferably, when the receiving end calls the SE security chip to decrypt the highly sensitive field using the dynamic session key, if the decryption fails, the receiving end sends a "key renegotiation request" to the communication initiator and terminates the data reception of the current session. After receiving the key renegotiation request, the communication initiator re-triggers the dynamic session key generation process to generate a new dynamic session key.

[0014] Preferably, the communication initiator triggers a dynamic session key update and synchronization operation every preset time interval.

[0015] Preferably, the communication initiator calls the SE security chip and uses the AES-128 encryption algorithm to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message.

[0016] On the other hand, the present invention also provides an end-to-end encryption system based on SOME IP communication, including a communication initiator and a receiver, wherein both the communication initiator and the receiver are integrated with an SE security chip and both are pre-embedded with a vendor root key; The communication initiating end is used to call the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and to synchronize the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack; The communication initiator is used to collect control data and generate SOME / IP messages; The communication initiator is used to split the SOME / IP message into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitive fields, and high-sensitive fields according to the preset sensitivity level rules, and to calculate the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message using the dynamic session key. The communication initiator is used to obtain the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determine the opening time of the next transmission window, and based on the encryption time, call the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window. The communication initiator is used to add the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and send the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot.

[0017] The beneficial effects of this invention are: 1. This invention breaks the "full message encryption" mode. By pre-establishing a sensitivity level rule base for vehicle-mounted SOME / IP message fields, the message is divided into three types of fields and processed differently. Non-sensitive fields are not encrypted, low-sensitivity fields are hashed and verified, and high-sensitivity fields are encrypted using dynamic session keys. This greatly reduces the encryption time of a single message from 5-8ms to 2-3ms, a reduction of 50%-62.5%.

[0018] 2. A dynamic key generation, distribution, and update system is constructed with the vehicle-mounted SE security chip as the core. During the key generation phase, a one-time dynamic session key is generated based on the manufacturer-pre-embedded root key; this key is not stored locally. The session key is transmitted through a hardware-encrypted channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack. After verifying the initiating hardware identifier, the receiving SE security chip decrypts and stores the session key, avoiding security risks associated with software-layer transmission. During the session's duration, a dynamic session key update and synchronization operation is triggered every preset time interval, synchronizing to the receiving end via the hardware channel, and the old key is immediately destroyed. If an anomaly is detected in the key transmission link, the SE security chip immediately terminates the current session, triggering renegotiation to eliminate the risk of key leakage.

[0019] 3. Deeply bind the encryption task with the SOME / IP message transmission timing to avoid latency fluctuations caused by encryption queuing. By pre-calculating the encryption time and based on the encryption time, the SE security chip is called in advance to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message, so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next sending window, achieving "seamless encryption-sending". Attached Figure Description

[0020] Figure 1 A timing flowchart of an end-to-end encryption method based on SOME IP communication provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an end-to-end encryption system based on SOME IP communication, provided as an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0021] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0022] In the description of this application, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the stated features. In the description of this application, "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0023] In the description of this application, the term "for example" is used to mean "used as an example, illustration, or description." Any embodiment described as "for example" in this application is not necessarily to be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments. The following description is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention. Details are set forth in the following description for purposes of explanation. It should be understood that those skilled in the art will recognize that the invention can be made without using these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and processes will not be described in detail to avoid obscuring the description of the invention with unnecessary detail. Therefore, the invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown, but is consistent with the broadest scope of the principles and features disclosed in this application.

[0024] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment of the invention provides an end-to-end encryption method based on SOME IP communication. In the end-to-end encryption method, both the communication initiator and receiver are equipped with SE security chips, and both are pre-embedded with the vendor's root key. The hardware interface adaptation between the SE security chip and the domain controller MPU and the Ethernet MAC layer is also completed.

[0025] The end-to-end encryption method includes the following steps: S1, the communication initiator calls the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and synchronizes the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack.

[0026] Specifically, the communication initiator sends a SOME / IP SD "service request message" to the receiving end. The service request message contains the hardware unique identifier UID (0x1A2B3C4D) of the initiator's SE security chip. The receiving end calls the SE security chip to verify the legitimacy of the UID, for example, by matching it against a preset vehicle hardware whitelist. Then, it generates a "key negotiation response message" and transmits the RSA public key along with the key negotiation response message to the initiating SE security chip via the hardware encryption channel. This hardware encryption channel can be an SPI secure channel.

[0027] The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to encrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA public key, and then sends the encrypted dynamic session key back to the receiving end through the SPI secure channel.

[0028] The receiving SE chip calls the SE security chip to decrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA private key, thus completing the dynamic session key synchronization. The dynamic session key is stored only in the internal RAM of the SE security chip and is not written to external flash memory.

[0029] Session keys are transmitted via a secure SPI channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack, avoiding security risks associated with software layer transmission.

[0030] S2, the communication initiator collects control data and generates SOME / IP messages.

[0031] S3, the communication initiator splits the SOME / IP message into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitivity fields, and high-sensitivity fields according to the preset sensitivity level rules, and calculates the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitivity fields in the SOME / IP message using the dynamic session key.

[0032] Import the preset SOME / IP message field sensitivity level rule base into the security management module of the controller at the communication initiator or receiver. Example rules are shown in the table below:

[0033] The communication initiator collects control data (such as "steering angle = 3.5°, braking pressure = 1.2MPa") and segments the messages according to sensitivity level rules, for example: Non-sensitive fields: Service ID=0x123, Method ID=0x001 (unencrypted); Low-sensitivity fields: Data length = 16 bytes, sensor number = 0x05 (calculate SHA-256 hash value); Highly sensitive fields: Steering angle = 3.5° (binary: 0x40666666), Braking pressure = 1.2MPa (triggers AES-128 encryption of SE security chip).

[0034] By pre-establishing a sensitivity-level rule base for in-vehicle SOME / IP message fields, messages are divided into three categories and processed differently. Non-sensitive fields are used only for routing and parsing and do not require encryption; low-sensitivity fields use SHA-256 hash verification. The SHA-256 hash value of the low-sensitivity field is calculated and written into the SOME / IP message for hash verification to ensure the data has not been tampered with, without encryption; high-sensitivity fields use the AES-128 encryption algorithm (balancing security and computational efficiency) to ensure the security of core control and perception data. This "on-demand encryption" reduces encryption computation by more than 60%, significantly lowering latency.

[0035] S4, the communication initiator obtains the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determines the opening time of the next transmission window, and, based on the encryption time, calls the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window.

[0036] Specifically, the communication initiator determines the opening time T of the next transmission window based on the transmission time slot planning of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer; Let the encryption time be t. Then, at time Tt, the encryption task is triggered, the SE security chip is called, and the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message are encrypted using the dynamic session key.

[0037] For example, the highly sensitive field is 8 bytes long. Considering the hardware computing efficiency of AES-128, calculated at 0.016ms / byte, it is expected to take 0.128ms. After reading the Ethernet MAC layer transmission slot, the next transmission window will open after 2ms. Therefore, the SE security chip encryption task is triggered at 1.872ms. After encryption is completed (taking 0.12ms), the message immediately enters the MAC layer transmission queue and is transmitted to the receiving end via the vehicle Ethernet at 2ms.

[0038] By pre-calculating the encryption time and based on that time, the SE security chip is invoked in advance to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message, so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next sending window, achieving "seamless encryption-sending".

[0039] S5, the communication initiator adds the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and sends the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot.

[0040] S6. After receiving the SOME / IP message, the receiving end verifies the SOME / IP message.

[0041] Specifically, after receiving the SOME / IP message, the receiving end executes the following process: 1) Parse non-sensitive fields to confirm the module to which the route points; 2) Calculate the SHA-256 hash value of the low-sensitivity field and compare it with the hash value carried in the SOME / IP message. If they match, the integrity check passes. 3) The receiving end calls the SE security chip, uses the dynamic session key to decrypt the highly sensitive fields, obtains the original control data, and then transmits it to the actuator.

[0042] When the receiving end calls the SE security chip to decrypt highly sensitive fields using the dynamic session key, if decryption fails, such as prompting "key mismatch" or displaying garbled characters in the decryption result, the receiving end sends a "key renegotiation request" to the communication initiator and terminates the data reception of the current session to prevent invalid data from entering the executor.

[0043] After receiving the key renegotiation request, the communication initiator re-triggers the dynamic session key generation process, generates a new dynamic session key, and repeats the key negotiation and distribution process.

[0044] In a preferred embodiment, the communication initiator triggers a dynamic session key update and synchronization operation every preset time interval (e.g., 10 seconds). The SE security chip at the communication initiator generates a new session key and synchronizes it to the receiving end via the SPI secure channel. The old key is destroyed immediately after the new key takes effect, ensuring dynamic key security.

[0045] During the session duration, the initiating SE security chip automatically generates a new session key every 10 seconds and synchronizes it to the receiving end through the SPI security channel. The old key is destroyed immediately. If an abnormality is detected in the key transmission link (such as a packet loss rate of ≥3%), the SE security chip immediately disconnects the current session and triggers renegotiation to prevent the risk of key leakage.

[0046] When an emergency message (such as a collision warning command, with a priority level of 0) is detected, the collaborative scheduling module suspends the encryption task of low-priority messages (such as an air conditioning control command, with a priority level of 3), allocates dedicated encryption resources to the SE security chip, and ensures that the encryption time of the emergency message is ≤1.5ms, giving priority to meeting the high real-time requirements.

[0047] The end-to-end encryption method provided in this invention, compared with conventional encryption schemes, exhibits significant performance improvements. In terms of single-message encryption time, it reduces the time from 5-8 milliseconds to 2-3 milliseconds, an improvement of 50% to 62.5%. The total end-to-end latency for SOME / IP is shortened from 20-25 milliseconds to 12-15 milliseconds, a reduction of 30% to 40%. CPU utilization during encryption decreases from 15%-20% to 5%-8%, a reduction of 66% to 75%. Abnormal key recovery time is drastically reduced from 80-100 milliseconds to 15-20 milliseconds, an improvement of 81% to 85%. Regarding security, the risk of key breaches is fundamentally improved. In existing technologies, keys are easily tampered with or stolen at the software layer, while the end-to-end encryption method provided in this invention, through hardware anchoring technology, increases the difficulty of cracking by more than 10 times, resulting in a significant improvement in security level.

[0048] Example 2 Based on Embodiment 1, this embodiment of the invention also provides an end-to-end encryption system based on SOME IP communication, such as... Figure 2 As shown, it includes a communication initiator and a receiver. Both the communication initiator and the receiver are integrated with an SE security chip and are pre-embedded with the manufacturer's root key. The communication initiating end is used to call the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and to synchronize the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack; The communication initiator is used to collect control data and generate SOME / IP messages. The communication initiator is used to split SOME / IP messages into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitive fields, and high-sensitive fields according to preset sensitivity level rules, and to calculate the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitive fields in the SOME / IP messages using dynamic session keys; The communication initiator is used to obtain the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determine the opening time of the next transmission window, and based on the encryption time, call the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window. The communication initiator is used to add the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and send the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot; The receiving end is used to verify and decrypt the SOME / IP message after receiving it.

[0049] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used to rearrange, add, or delete steps. For example, the steps described in this disclosure can be performed in parallel, sequentially, or in a different order, as long as the desired result of the technical solution disclosed in this disclosure can be achieved, and this is not limited herein.

[0050] While embodiments or examples of this disclosure have been described with reference to the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the methods, systems, and devices described above are merely exemplary embodiments or examples, and the scope of the invention is not limited by these embodiments or examples, but only by the granted claims and their equivalents. Various elements in the embodiments or examples may be omitted or replaced by their equivalents. Furthermore, the steps may be performed in a different order than that described in this disclosure. Further, various elements in the embodiments or examples may be combined in various ways. Importantly, as the technology evolves, many elements described herein can be replaced by equivalents that appear after this disclosure.

Claims

1. An end-to-end encryption method based on SOME IP communication, wherein both the communication initiator and receiver integrate an SE security chip and both have a pre-embedded vendor root key, characterized in that, The end-to-end encryption method includes: The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and synchronizes the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack; The communication initiator collects control data and generates SOME / IP messages; The communication initiator splits the SOME / IP message into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitivity fields, and high-sensitivity fields according to the preset sensitivity level rules, and calculates the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitivity fields in the SOME / IP message using the dynamic session key; The communication initiator obtains the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determines the opening time of the next transmission window, and, based on the encryption time, calls the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window. The initiating end adds the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and sends the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot.

2. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and synchronizes the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack, including: The communication initiator sends a SOME / IP SD "service request message" to the receiving end. The service request message contains the hardware unique identifier (UID) of the initiator's SE security chip. The receiving end calls the SE security chip to verify the legitimacy of the UID, generates a "key negotiation response message", and transmits the RSA public key and the key negotiation response message to the initiating SE security chip through the hardware encryption channel. The communication initiator calls the SE security chip to encrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA public key, and sends the encrypted dynamic session key back to the receiving end through the hardware encryption channel; The receiving SE chip calls the SE security chip to decrypt the dynamic session key using the RSA private key, thus completing the dynamic session key synchronization.

3. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The dynamic session key is stored only in the internal RAM of the SE security chip.

4. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication initiator obtains the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determines the opening time of the next transmission window, and, based on the encryption time, pre-calls the SE security chip to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP packet, including: The communication initiator determines the opening time T of the next transmission window based on the transmission time slot planning of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer; Let the encryption time be t. Then, at time Tt, the encryption task is triggered, the SE security chip is called, and the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message are encrypted using the dynamic session key.

5. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes calculating the SHA-256 hash value of low-sensitivity fields and writing the SHA-256 hash value into the SOME / IP message.

6. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 5, characterized in that, After receiving the SOME / IP message, the receiving end verifies the SOME / IP message, including: Parse non-sensitive fields to confirm the module the route points to; Calculate the SHA-256 hash value of the low-sensitivity field and compare it with the hash value carried in the SOME / IP message; The receiving end invokes the SE security chip to decrypt highly sensitive fields using the dynamic session key.

7. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 6, characterized in that, When the receiving end calls the SE security chip to decrypt highly sensitive fields using the dynamic session key, if the decryption fails, the receiving end sends a "key renegotiation request" to the communication initiator and terminates the data reception of the current session. After receiving the key renegotiation request, the communication initiator re-triggers the dynamic session key generation process to generate a new dynamic session key.

8. The end-to-end encryption method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, The communication initiator triggers a dynamic session key update and synchronization operation every preset time interval.

9. The end-to-end encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication initiator calls the SE security chip and uses the AES-128 encryption algorithm to encrypt highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message.

10. An end-to-end encryption system based on SOME IP communication, characterized in that, It includes a communication initiator and a receiver, both of which are equipped with an SE security chip and have a pre-embedded manufacturer root key. The communication initiating end is used to call the SE security chip to generate a dynamic session key based on the root key, and to synchronize the dynamic session key with the receiving end through a hardware encryption channel independent of the SOME / IP protocol stack; The communication initiator is used to collect control data and generate SOME / IP messages; The communication initiator is used to split the SOME / IP message into non-sensitive fields, low-sensitive fields, and high-sensitive fields according to the preset sensitivity level rules, and to calculate the encryption time required to encrypt the high-sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message using the dynamic session key. The communication initiator is used to obtain the transmission time slot plan of the vehicle Ethernet MAC layer, determine the opening time of the next transmission window, and based on the encryption time, call the SE security chip in advance to encrypt the highly sensitive fields in the SOME / IP message so that the message generation time matches the opening time of the next transmission window. The communication initiator is used to add the encrypted SOME / IP message to the transmission queue and send the message to the receiving end in the next transmission time slot.

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