An underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection method and system

Abstract

This invention discloses a method and system for ensuring the security of remote control communication for underwater vehicles, belonging to the field of nuclear engineering technology. It aims to solve the problems of easy command interception due to open underwater acoustic channels, high latency of traditional encryption, and poor interference concealment. The method includes: the surface control terminal encrypting the issued control commands with AES; when the underwater vehicle transmits data back, it generates a deceptive signal based on the acoustic characteristics of marine animals and mixes it with the real data to mislead potential eavesdroppers; after receiving the mixed signal, the surface control terminal uses wavelet multi-resolution analysis technology to separate and filter out the deceptive components, reconstructing the real data. This invention integrates encryption, active deception, and signal processing technologies to achieve low latency, high concealment, and strong anti-interference in remote control communication, ensuring the operational safety of underwater vehicles.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of nuclear engineering technology, specifically relating to a method and system for ensuring the security of remote control communication for underwater vehicles. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of marine nuclear power technology, nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) using silent heat pipe reactors as their energy source have become important platforms for long-endurance, long-range deep-sea missions. To ensure the safe and stable operation of the nuclear reactor, the nuclear-powered UUV needs to receive power setting commands from the mother ship (surface control terminal) and shore-based systems in real time via an underwater acoustic channel, and transmit the reactor core thermal parameters back to the control terminal. However, the underwater acoustic channel has inherent characteristics such as narrow bandwidth, strong multipath propagation, high attenuation, and open broadcasting, making the communication vulnerable to interception, analysis, or tampering by third parties, directly threatening the safety of the nuclear power system and the mission's stealth.

[0003] Traditional information security methods primarily rely on cryptographic encryption. However, due to limitations in computing resources and energy budgets at the underwater execution end, highly complex algorithms significantly increase transmission latency and reduce the real-time performance of reactor regulation. Furthermore, the modulation characteristics exposed by the encrypted signals themselves can still be used by adversaries for location tracking or jamming. In addition, existing underwater countermeasures technologies are mostly focused on suppression-style jamming, which suffers from high power consumption, poor stealth, and vulnerability to targeted countermeasures, making it difficult to meet the requirements of long-term silent missions.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive security protection architecture that takes into account low latency, high concealment, and reversibility to solve the information security bottleneck of remote control communication for silent heat pipe stacks. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and system for protecting the remote control communication of underwater vehicles, which addresses the shortcomings of the prior art. This method and system solve the technical problems of open broadcasting of underwater acoustic channels, which makes it easy for power commands to be intercepted and parsed; the difficulty in balancing the real-time performance and stealth of data transmitted back by underwater vehicles; and the high power consumption and poor stealth of traditional suppression jamming.

[0006] The present invention adopts the following technical solution:

[0007] A method for ensuring the security of remote control communication for underwater vehicles includes the following steps:

[0008] S1. The surface control terminal encrypts the control commands sent to the underwater vehicle to obtain an encrypted command signal and sends it; the underwater vehicle receives and decrypts the encrypted command signal to obtain the control commands.

[0009] S2. Based on the acquired control commands, the underwater vehicle collects operational data and generates an inducement deception signal that accompanies the operational data. The mixed signal containing the operational data and the inducement deception signal is then sent to the surface control terminal. The inducement deception signal is generated based on the acoustic signal characteristics of marine animals.

[0010] S3. The water surface control terminal receives the mixed signal, performs signal decomposition processing on the mixed signal, separates and removes the inducing deception signal component, and reconstructs the operating data.

[0011] Preferably, in step S1, the encryption and decryption are implemented using the AES encryption algorithm.

[0012] Preferably, in step S2, generating the induced deception signal specifically includes:

[0013] The pre-stored marine animal click signal template is invoked, and its power and code phase are adjusted to make it have a set time-frequency domain similarity with the running data.

[0014] Preferably, adjusting the power and code phase includes:

[0015] In the initial stage, the power of the induced deception signal is controlled to be lower than the operating data, and its code phase is gradually brought closer to the code phase of the operating data; after the code phase error is less than a set threshold, the power of the induced deception signal is increased to be higher than the operating data, and then its code phase is gradually deviated from the code phase of the operating data.

[0016] Preferably, in step S3, the signal decomposition processing is implemented using a multi-resolution analysis method based on wavelet transform.

[0017] Preferably, the wavelet transform-based multi-resolution analysis method includes:

[0018] The mixed signal is subjected to multi-level discrete wavelet decomposition to obtain approximation coefficients and detail coefficients; components matching the spectral characteristics of marine animal click signals are identified and removed from the high-level detail coefficients; and the signal is reconstructed using inverse wavelet transform with the retained coefficients.

[0019] Preferably, before step S1 begins, the keys used for encryption and decryption are injected and stored once in the security chip of the surface control terminal and the underwater vehicle.

[0020] Preferably, when the underwater vehicle detects that the other party's sonar is in an active period, the underwater vehicle is controlled to suspend the transmission of the operational data and only transmit the deception signal.

[0021] Secondly, embodiments of the present invention provide a remote control communication security protection system for underwater vehicles, comprising:

[0022] The first safety module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to encrypt the power command signals sent to the underwater vehicle.

[0023] The second safety module, deployed at the underwater execution end, is used to generate an inducement deception signal based on marine animal click sound signals when transmitting real-time measurement signals back to the heat pipe stack, and mix it with the real-time measurement signal for transmission.

[0024] The third safety module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to perform multi-resolution analysis based on discrete wavelet transform on the received mixed feedback signal in order to filter out the induced deception signal components and reconstruct the real real-time measurement signal.

[0025] Preferably, it further includes:

[0026] The key module is used to manage encryption keys using a one-time download method;

[0027] The silent operation module is used to control the underwater vehicle to suspend real signal transmission and send only the deception signal when the other party's sonar is detected to be active.

[0028] An adaptive interference template library for storing various click sound signal templates for marine animals.

[0029] Thirdly, a computer device includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the above-described underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection method.

[0030] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer-readable storage medium including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the above-described method for protecting the remote control communication security of underwater vehicles.

[0031] Fifthly, a chip includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the above-described underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection method.

[0032] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide an electronic device, including a computer program, which, when executed by the electronic device, implements the steps of the above-described method for remote control communication security protection of underwater vehicles.

[0033] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0034] A method for ensuring secure remote control communication for underwater vehicles is presented, for the first time systematically integrating active deception and passive signal processing techniques to address the challenge of covertness in underwater control communication. Traditional methods either rely on complex encryption at the expense of real-time performance or employ high-power suppression to expose the communication itself. This invention, however, generates deception signals that accompany and resemble real data. Without significantly increasing power consumption or signal complexity, it actively creates false targets to disrupt enemy eavesdropping, concealing genuine communication within a seemingly natural background or interference. Simultaneously, signal processing at the receiving end ensures reliable reconstruction of friendly information, forming a complete solution for external deception and interference while ensuring accurate internal reconstruction. This fundamentally enhances the anti-interception and anti-analysis capabilities of the communication link.

[0035] Furthermore, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128) block encryption is adopted to balance security and computational efficiency, avoiding the latency issues caused by the high complexity of asymmetric encryption. Public-Key Cryptography Standard #7 (PKCS7) padding ensures that the instruction frame meets the 128-bit block boundary requirement, preventing encryption errors caused by data length mismatch. The hardware coprocessor controls the encryption time to within 0.8ms, far below the real-time threshold for heat pipe stack adjustment, avoiding the impact of instruction latency on reactor stability. The one-time injection design before the key task avoids the risk of leakage during underwater key distribution, further improving the security of the encryption link. In actual tests, it can resist the interception and parsing of power commands by third parties.

[0036] Furthermore, to address the shortcomings of high attenuation and strong multipath propagation in underwater acoustic channels, the ciphertext signal is first pre-processed using Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) demodulation and Root Raised Cosine (RRC) matched filtering to reduce the impact of signal distortion on decryption. The MCU incorporates a hardware decryption module to avoid excessive computational resource consumption by software decryption, keeping the decryption time to 0.9ms and the total encryption / decryption delay <20ms, fully meeting the fast response requirements of nuclear power heat pipe reactors. The measured bit error rate is ≤10%. -4 This demonstrates that even in a low signal-to-noise ratio underwater environment, accurate decryption of commands can still be guaranteed, avoiding reactor regulation anomalies caused by bit errors and improving the system's resistance to channel interference.

[0037] Furthermore, a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is employed for rapid extraction of operational data and generation of deception signals without consuming the core computing power of the Microcontroller Unit (MCU). The Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) baseband signal is combined with a Click Signal Template (click) from the Chinese white dolphin, making the deception signal difficult to identify as interference. The initial power is 3-6 dB lower than the operational data to prevent premature exposure of the deception signal. A slow 0.05 chip / s approximation of the code phase ensures that the deception signal and operational data are highly similar in the time and frequency domains, laying the foundation for subsequent induction of the target. Simultaneously, the 32-byte operational data transmission volume is streamlined, reducing underwater channel occupancy and further enhancing stealth.

[0038] Furthermore, the code phase control strategy of approaching first and then moving away achieves a complete deception logic of induction-traction-locking: when the code phase error is <1 / 8 chip, the power is increased to ensure that the opponent's hydrophone prioritizes the acquisition of the deception signal; the code phase is moved away by 0.1 chip / s, gradually increasing the distance from the real signal, so that the opponent continues to track the deception signal; the judgment criteria of continuous adjustment with correlation peak difference ≥2 chips for 5 seconds ensure the stability of the deception effect and avoid misjudgment; the additional delay of the whole process is only 45ms, and the total return delay is ≤180ms, which does not affect the real-time performance of heat pipe stack status monitoring; the real signal is transmitted in parallel at low power, which ensures that the surface control end can receive it and avoids exposure, perfectly balancing concealment and data integrity.

[0039] Furthermore, the db4 wavelet was chosen to meet the decomposition requirements of underwater non-stationary signals; the 9-level multi-resolution decomposition can finely separate different frequency components, providing a foundation for subsequent removal of spoofing signals; a 24-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC) samples at 200kHz to ensure high-precision acquisition of mixed signals and avoid sampling distortion; the IntelIPP wavelet library accelerates the decomposition, controlling the single-frame processing time to within 12ms, meeting the real-time requirements of multi-frame continuous processing; the MATLAB / Simulink environment provides a mature platform for algorithm implementation, reducing engineering difficulty while ensuring decomposition accuracy, providing a prerequisite for accurate signal reconstruction.

[0040] Furthermore, D6-D9 level interference is specifically eliminated to avoid accidentally deleting useful signals, with an energy threshold of 3×10. -5Extensive experimental verification has shown that it can accurately identify spoof signal spikes; retaining A9 and D1-D5 ensures that the reconstructed signal fully preserves the characteristics of the operating data; the correlation coefficient between the reconstructed signal and the original signal is ≥0.98 and the 5s step error is ≤0.4, proving that the data is highly authentic and can support the accurate judgment of the heat pipe reactor's operating status by the surface control terminal; the high-gain receiver design with cyclic redundancy check (CRC) failure switching is used to cope with extreme channel environments, improve system robustness, avoid closed-loop regulation interruption due to data loss, and ensure nuclear reactor safety.

[0041] Furthermore, to address the risks of underwater sonar detection, a dynamic adaptation strategy is designed: when the sonar is active, real data transmission is paused, and only deception signals are sent to avoid real signals being detected and located, achieving zero exposure; the deception signals are based on bio-acoustic templates and are fused with marine environmental noise, further reducing the probability of being identified as interference; no additional hardware is required, and it is implemented through software logic, without increasing system power consumption or complexity, adapting to the long-term silent mission requirements of underwater vehicles, filling the gap of traditional protection that is only passive and lacks active avoidance, and improving survivability in complex adversarial environments.

[0042] An underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection system adopts a surface-underwater dual architecture, adapted to the half-duplex characteristics of underwater communication. The communication parameters are optimized to balance transmission distance and anti-attenuation capability. The first security module focuses on secure command issuance and is responsible for secure command issuance. The second security module focuses on covert data transmission and active deception. The third security module is responsible for accurate information restoration, avoiding the failure risk caused by functional coupling. Through a three-layer collaborative mechanism of encryption to ensure confidentiality, deception to achieve concealment, and reconstruction to ensure availability, the system creatively solves the fundamental contradiction in underwater control communication where security, real-time performance, and concealment are difficult to balance. It achieves the unity of active defense and accurate restoration in a low-power and low-complexity manner, significantly improving the survivability and reliability of the communication link of underwater vehicles in high-threat waters.

[0043] Furthermore, the key management module solidifies a secure key lifecycle management process. The silent operation control module enables automatic switching of the system's defense posture. The adaptive interference template library allows the system to flexibly select the most suitable animal acoustic template to generate deception signals based on the biological noise characteristics of the actual operating sea area, making the deception behavior more realistic and more environmentally adaptable.

[0044] It is understood that the beneficial effects of the second to sixth aspects mentioned above can be found in the relevant descriptions in the first aspect mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0045] In summary, this invention addresses the remote control communication environment of underwater vehicles by integrating encryption, jamming, and signal processing technologies to achieve low detectability and high reliability in remote control communication security.

[0046] The technical solution of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. Attached Figure Description

[0047] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the process of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 This is a structural diagram of the three-layer protective barrier for remote control communication security of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 A graph of multi-level decomposition coefficients based on db4 wavelets;

[0050] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a computer device provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 5 This is a block diagram of a chip provided according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0052] Among them, 60. Computer equipment; 61. Processor; 62. Memory; 63. Computer program; 600. Electronic device; 610. Processing unit; 620. Storage unit; 6201. Random access memory unit; 6202. Cache memory unit; 6203. Read-only memory unit; 6204. Program / utility; 6205. Program module; 630. Bus; 640. Display unit; 650. Input / output interface; 660. Network adapter; 700. External device. Detailed Implementation

[0053] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0054] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the terms "comprising" and "including" indicate the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or collections thereof.

[0055] It should also be understood that the terminology used in this specification is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the invention. As used in this specification and the appended claims, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0056] It should also be further understood that the term "and / or" as used in this specification and the appended claims refers to any combination and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items, and includes such combinations. For example, A and / or B can represent three cases: A alone, A and B simultaneously, and B alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this invention generally indicates that the preceding and following objects have an "or" relationship.

[0057] It should be understood that although terms such as first, second, third, etc., may be used in the embodiments of the present invention to describe the preset range, these preset ranges should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the preset ranges from one another. For example, without departing from the scope of the embodiments of the present invention, the first preset range may also be referred to as the second preset range, and similarly, the second preset range may also be referred to as the first preset range.

[0058] Depending on the context, the word "if" as used here can be interpreted as "when," "when," "in response to determination," or "in response to detection." Similarly, depending on the context, the phrase "if determination" or "if detection (of the stated condition or event)" can be interpreted as "when determination," "in response to determination," "when detection (of the stated condition or event)," or "in response to detection (of the stated condition or event)."

[0059] The accompanying drawings illustrate various structural schematic diagrams according to embodiments disclosed in this invention. These drawings are not to scale, and some details have been enlarged for clarity, and some details may have been omitted. The shapes of the various regions and layers shown in the drawings, as well as their relative sizes and positional relationships, are merely exemplary and may deviate from reality due to manufacturing tolerances or technical limitations. Furthermore, those skilled in the art can design regions / layers with different shapes, sizes, and relative positions as needed.

[0060] This invention provides a method for ensuring the security of remote control communication for underwater vehicles. It addresses the remote control communication links of nuclear-powered underwater vehicles equipped with silent heat pipe reactors and non-nuclear-powered underwater vehicles. Through a three-layer security barrier of AES encryption, induced deception interference, and wavelet reconstruction, it achieves anti-interception, anti-interference, and information restoration throughout the entire process of power command issuance and measured data transmission. It is applicable to remote control information security systems in complex marine environments such as deep sea, shallow sea, and under ice.

[0061] Please see Figure 1 This invention discloses a method for ensuring secure remote control communication for underwater vehicles, which may be nuclear-powered or non-nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles. The method includes the following steps:

[0062] S1, the first layer of security protection – AES encryption;

[0063] The power command signal or reactor power control signal generated by the mother ship (surface control end) is converted into a byte stream according to the sampling rate, and padded to the 128-bit boundary using PKCS7; 10 rounds of AES iterative encryption are performed, with each round sequentially performing byte substitution (SubBytes), row shifting (ShiftRows), column mixing (MixColumns), and round key XOR (AddRoundKey) operations, outputting the ciphertext signal; the underwater vehicle (underwater execution end) pre-stores the same key and completes decryption through reverse round operation to restore the original command. The entire encryption and decryption process has a latency of <20ms. The specific steps are as follows:

[0064] S101. The mother ship (surface control terminal) generates a power command frame with a length of 200B, in the format of [frame header 2B][time stamp 4B][power setting value 4B][CRC16 2B][reserved 188B];

[0065] S102. Using PKCS7 padding, 200B is padded to 208B, resulting in 13 128-bit blocks;

[0066] S103, call the hardware AES-128 coprocessor. The 128-bit key is injected once before the mission by the mother ship (surface control end) security chip (MAXQ1065). The 10 rounds of encryption take 0.8ms and output 208B ciphertext.

[0067] S104, the ciphertext, after being RRC filtered and QPSK modulated, is transmitted through a power amplifier driving a transducer. The measured bit error rate (BER) is ≤10. -4 (SNR=8dB);

[0068] S105. After receiving the signal, the underwater vehicle (underwater actuator) first performs QPSK demodulation and RRC matched filtering, and then the MCU's built-in AES-128 hardware module decrypts the signal to restore the original power command. The decryption time is 0.9ms, which meets the real-time requirement of ≤20ms.

[0069] S2, Second Layer of Security Barrier – Deceptive Interference

[0070] The underwater vehicle (underwater actuator) extracts the power, code phase, and carrier frequency of the real transmitted signal in real time. It then uses a high-frequency acoustic signal template from the Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin (Click Signal Template) to generate a deception signal with an initial power 3–6 dB lower than the real signal, approximating the code phase at a rate of 0.05 chip / s. When the code phase error is less than 1 / 8 chip, the deception signal power is increased to 2–4 dB higher than the real signal. Subsequently, the code phase is gradually increased at a rate of 0.1 chip / s, causing the correlator to completely track the deception peak, thus concealing the real signal. The entire process involves zero-encryption computation, meeting the rapid response requirements of the heat pipe stack. The specific steps are as follows:

[0071] S201. After receiving the "return request" frame from the mother ship (surface control terminal), the underwater vehicle (underwater actuator) initiates a deception signal generation task. The MCU sends the actual measured signals (electrical power, nuclear power, and temperatures of each node, totaling 32 bytes) to the FPGA (Xilinx Artix-7 35T) for digital domain processing via Direct Memory Access (DMA).

[0072] S202, the FPGA's internal Direct Digital Synthesizer (DDS) generates a BPSK baseband signal with a center frequency of 25kHz and a bandwidth of 4kHz, a chip rate of 4kchip / s, and a Gold code length of 102; at the same time, it reads the pre-stored Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin click signal template from Flash and transforms it to the frequency domain using a 256-point block FFT.

[0073] The center frequency of the bottlenose dolphin click signal template is 30kHz and the bandwidth is 5kHz. The center frequency of the false killer whale click signal template is 22kHz and the bandwidth is 3kHz. The adjustment method is the same as that of the Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin click signal template. The power and code phase of the pre-stored marine animal click signal template are adjusted to make it have a set time-frequency domain similarity with the running data, and the time-frequency domain correlation coefficient is ≥0.9.

[0074] S203, Power control: The initial spoofing signal power is set to -5dB of the real signal power; Code phase control: The FPGA internal code NCO adjusts the delay in steps of 0.05 chip / s, so that the code phase of the spoofing signal gradually approaches the real signal.

[0075] S204. When the correlation peak difference is ≤1 / 8 chip, the synchronization phase begins. The MCU controls the power amplifier gain through the digital-to-analog converter (DAC) (AD5689R), so that the spoofing signal power is linearly increased to +3dB within 200ms. At this time, the other party's hydrophone is more likely to capture the spoofing peak.

[0076] S205, Traction Phase: The numerically controlled oscillator (NCO) step is changed to -0.1 chip / s for 5 seconds, so that the code phase of the deception signal gradually moves away from the real signal; at the same time, the real signal is transmitted in parallel through another low-power path to ensure that the mother ship (surface control end) can receive it.

[0077] S206. Lock-on Detection: The FPGA calculates the cross-correlation coefficient in real time. When the time difference between the deception peak and the real peak is ≥2 chips, it is considered that the other party has been successfully towed. The underwater vehicle stops increasing its deception power, enters silent listening mode, and waits for the confirmation frame from the mother ship (surface control end). The entire process has an additional delay of 45ms, and the total return delay is ≤180ms.

[0078] In the initial stage, the power of the induced spoofing signal is controlled to be 3-6 dB lower than the operating data, and its code phase is gradually brought closer to the code phase of the operating data; after the code phase error is less than a set threshold (1 / 8 chip), the power of the induced spoofing signal is increased to be 2-4 dB higher than the operating data.

[0079] When the underwater vehicle detects that the other party's sonar is active, it controls the underwater vehicle to suspend the transmission of operational data and only transmit the deception signal. This is used to automatically switch to the deception signal transmission mode during the active period of the other party's sonar, suspend the transmission of real signals, and achieve zero exposure.

[0080] The criteria for determining when the enemy's sonar is in an active period are as follows:

[0081] The underwater vehicle collects signals from the surrounding waters through its built-in sonar receiver and performs spectrum analysis on the signals. If a continuous signal with a frequency range of 10-50kHz, a power exceeding -60dBm, and a duration of ≥3s is detected, it is determined that the other party's sonar is in an active period.

[0082] S3, the third layer of security protection barrier – wavelet reconstruction

[0083] After receiving the mixed signal, the mother ship (surface control terminal) uses Daubechies-4 wavelet to perform a 9-level multi-resolution decomposition to obtain approximate coefficients. With detail coefficient In the detail coefficients of levels 6–9, interference components corresponding to the center frequency of the dolphin click signal are identified and removed through spectrum matching; the remaining coefficients are used for inverse wavelet transform to reconstruct the true thermal parameter signal, restoring 100% FP within 5 seconds. The 90% FP step change characteristic, the specific steps are as follows:

[0084] The output of the S301 mother ship (surface control terminal) receiving transducer is sampled at 200kHz by a 24-bit ADC (ADS127L01) to obtain a mixed digital signal containing the real signal and dolphin click interference.

[0085] S302. In the MATLAB / Simulink Real-Time environment, the db4 wavelet is used to perform a 9-level decomposition. The filter coefficients are pre-calculated and stored in memory. The decomposition operation is accelerated by the Intel IPP wavelet library, and the time taken per frame is 12ms.

[0086] S303. Interference Identification: Perform energy detection on detail coefficients at levels D6–D9, setting a threshold Th equal to 3 × 10⁻⁶. -5 If the energy of 5 consecutive coefficients exceeds Th, it is marked as dolphin click interference and set to zero;

[0087] S304, Signal Reconstruction: Retain the A9 approximation coefficients and D1–D5 detail coefficients, call the ippwtlInv function to perform inverse transformation, and output the reconstructed signal; after testing, the correlation coefficient between the reconstructed signal and the original real signal is ≥0.98, and the maximum error of the 5s step segment is 0.4.

[0088] S305. The reconstructed measurement frame is sent to the reactor control software on the mother ship (surface control end) to complete closed-loop power regulation. If CRC check fails for 3 consecutive frames, the system automatically switches to "high-gain reception + retransmission request" mode to ensure system robustness.

[0089] Please see Figure 2In another embodiment of the present invention, a remote control communication security protection system for underwater vehicles is provided. This system can be used to implement the aforementioned remote control communication security protection method for underwater vehicles. The execution system of the present invention consists of two parts: a mother ship (surface control end) and an underwater vehicle (underwater execution end). The two communicate in half-duplex mode via a single underwater acoustic transducer. The mother ship (surface control end) is equipped with a high-performance industrial control computer (Intel i7-1185G7, 16GB RAM) responsible for the first layer of encryption and the third layer of reconstruction. The underwater vehicle (underwater execution end) uses a low-power ARM Cortex-M7 MCU (480MHz clock speed, 1MB SRAM, 2MB Flash) responsible for the second layer of deception signal generation and real signal concealment. The communication carrier frequency is 25kHz, the bandwidth is 4kHz, the symbol rate is 2ksym / s, and the maximum operating range is 10km.

[0090] Specifically, the underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection system includes a first security module, a second security module, a third security module, a silent operation module, a key module, a protection module, and an adaptive interference template library.

[0091] The first security module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to encrypt the power command signal of the heat pipe stack to the underwater vehicle using the AES-128 block encryption algorithm when the surface vessel sends the power command signal of the heat pipe stack to the underwater vehicle through the acoustic channel, and generate an encrypted ciphertext signal to prevent the other party from intercepting and parsing the original control command.

[0092] The AES-128 block cipher algorithm includes the following steps:

[0093] The power command signal is converted into a byte stream according to the sampling rate;

[0094] The byte stream is padded using the PKCS7 standard to ensure its length meets the 128-bit block boundary.

[0095] The encryption iteration is performed in 10 rounds, each round consisting of: SubBytes non-linear byte replacement, ShiftRows row shifting, MixColumns column mixing, and AddRoundKey round key XOR operation.

[0096] It outputs a 128-bit encrypted signal and transmits it to the underwater vehicle via an acoustic channel.

[0097] The underwater vehicle (underwater actuator) uses the same key and the reverse process to perform AES decryption and recover the original power command signal.

[0098] The second security module, deployed on the underwater vehicle (underwater actuator), is used to generate a deceptive signal that is highly similar to the real-time measurement signal in the time domain, frequency domain, and code phase when the underwater vehicle transmits the real-time measurement signal of the heat pipe stack back to the surface ship via the acoustic channel. The deceptive signal is generated based on the click sound signal of the Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin and is induced by the other party's hydrophone to lock onto the deceptive signal through power control and code phase traction strategies, thereby protecting the authenticity and concealment of the real-time measurement signal.

[0099] Induced deceptive interference methods include the following steps:

[0100] Phase 1 (Tracking Phase): The hydrophone of the underwater vehicle continuously receives and locks onto the real control signals from the surface vessel, and extracts its power, code phase and carrier frequency parameters;

[0101] Phase 2 (Approach Phase): Generate a deceptive signal with a power 3–6 dB lower than the real signal. The deceptive signal is based on the click signal of the Chinese white dolphin and its code phase is adjusted to gradually approach the real signal.

[0102] Phase 3 (Synchronization Phase): When the phase error between the deception signal code and the real signal is less than 1 / 8 of a chip, the power of the deception signal is gradually increased to 2–4 dB higher than the real signal, making it easier for the other party's hydrophone to capture the deception signal.

[0103] Phase 4 (Traction Phase): Adjust the generation rate of the deception signal code at a rate of 0.1 chip / s, so that its code phase gradually deviates from the real signal, thus tractioning the other party's hydrophone to track the wrong path;

[0104] Phase 5 (Locking Phase): Once the correlation peak of the deceptive signal is completely separated from the correlation peak of the real signal, the other party's hydrophone completely locks onto the deceptive signal, and the real measurement signal is secretly transmitted to the surface vessel.

[0105] The third safety module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to perform multi-resolution analysis on the mixed signal after the surface vessel receives the mixed return signal containing the deception signal and the real-time measurement signal. This analysis is performed using discrete wavelet transform based on the Daubechies-4 wavelet function. By extracting approximation coefficients and detail coefficients through multi-level decomposition, the deception signal component is filtered out, and the real heat pipe stack measurement signal is reconstructed.

[0106] The mixed signal is subjected to multi-resolution analysis using discrete wavelet transform based on the Daubechies-4 wavelet function. The specific steps are as follows:

[0107] The low-pass filter coefficients are constructed using Daubechies-4 wavelet basis functions. With high-pass filter coefficients ;

[0108] The hybrid return signal is decomposed into nine levels of multi-resolution decomposition to obtain the approximation coefficients at each level. With detail coefficient ,in, ;

[0109] Interference components matching the spectral characteristics of the Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin click signal were identified and removed from the detail coefficients at levels 6–9.

[0110] The real heat pipe stack power measurement signal is reconstructed by using the remaining approximation coefficients and the purified detail coefficients through wavelet inverse transform.

[0111] The reconstructed signal accurately reproduces the step change from 100%FP to 90%FP at 5s with an error of less than 0.5%.

[0112] The silent operation module is used to control the underwater vehicle to suspend real signal transmission and send only the deception signal when the other party's sonar is detected to be active, so as to achieve zero exposure.

[0113] The key module uses a one-time download and cache method in the tamper-proof security chip to avoid key distribution in an underwater environment and reduce the risk of leakage;

[0114] The protection module disables encryption operations in the second barrier to ensure that the underwater vehicle's backhaul latency is less than 200ms, meeting the rapid response requirements of the heat pipe stack.

[0115] An adaptive interference template library stores various marine animal acoustic signal templates, including click signals from Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins, bottlenose dolphins, and false killer whales. The deception template can be dynamically switched according to the marine biological noise environment.

[0116] This invention provides a remote control communication security protection system for underwater vehicles, applicable to various complex marine environments including deep sea, shallow sea, and polar ice caps. It possesses resistance to multipath fading, Doppler shift, and active sonar detection, achieving a balance between the stealth, security, and real-time performance of remote control communication for heat pipe stacks.

[0117] This invention provides a terminal device comprising a processor and a memory. The memory stores a computer program, which includes program instructions. The processor executes the program instructions stored in the computer storage medium. The processor may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, graphics processing units (GPUs), tensor processing units (TPUs), digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing and control core of the terminal, suitable for implementing one or more instructions, specifically suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions to achieve a corresponding method flow or function. The processor described in this embodiment can be used in the operation of a remote control communication security protection method for underwater vehicles, including:

[0118] The surface control terminal encrypts the control commands sent to the underwater vehicle to obtain encrypted command signals, which are then transmitted. The underwater vehicle receives and decrypts the encrypted command signals to obtain the control commands. Based on the obtained control commands, the underwater vehicle collects operational data and generates a deception signal that accompanies the operational data. A mixed signal containing the operational data and the deception signal is then transmitted to the surface control terminal. The deception signal is generated based on the acoustic characteristics of marine animals. The surface control terminal receives the mixed signal and performs signal decomposition processing on it to separate and remove the deception signal components, thereby reconstructing the operational data.

[0119] Please see Figure 4 The terminal device is a computer device. In this embodiment, the computer device 60 includes a processor 61, a memory 62, and a computer program 63 stored in the memory 62 and executable on the processor 61. When the processor 61 executes the computer program 63, it implements the underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection method of this embodiment. To avoid repetition, these details are not elaborated here. Alternatively, when the processor 61 executes the computer program 63, it implements the functions of each model / unit in the underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection system of this embodiment. To avoid repetition, these details are not elaborated here.

[0120] Computer device 60 can be a desktop computer, laptop, handheld computer, cloud server, or other computing device. Computer device 60 may include, but is not limited to, a processor 61 and a memory 62. Those skilled in the art will understand that... Figure 4 This is merely an example of computer device 60 and does not constitute a limitation on computer device 60. It may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or different components. For example, computer device may also include input / output devices, network access devices, buses, etc.

[0121] The processor 61 may be a central processing unit, or it may be other general-purpose processors, graphics processors, tensor processors, digital signal processors, application-specific integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.

[0122] The memory 62 can be an internal storage unit of the computer device 60, such as a hard disk or memory of the computer device 60. The memory 62 can also be an external storage device of the computer device 60, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, etc. equipped on the computer device 60.

[0123] Furthermore, the memory 62 may include both internal storage units of the computer device 60 and external storage devices. The memory 62 is used to store computer programs and other programs and data required by the computer device. The memory 62 can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

[0124] Please see Figure 5 The terminal device is an electronic device 600, which is manifested in the form of a general-purpose computing device. The components of the electronic device may include, but are not limited to: at least one processing unit 610, at least one storage unit 620, a bus 630 connecting different platform components (including storage unit 620 and processing unit 610), a display unit 640, etc.

[0125] The storage unit stores program code, which can be executed by the processing unit 610 to perform the steps described in the method section of this specification according to various exemplary embodiments of the present invention. For example, the processing unit 610 can perform actions such as... Figure 1 The steps are shown in the figure.

[0126] Storage unit 620 may include a readable medium in the form of a volatile storage unit, such as random access memory (RAM) 6201 and / or cache memory 6202, and may further include a read-only memory (ROM) 6203.

[0127] Storage unit 620 may also include a program / utility 6204 having a set (at least one) program module 6205, such program module 6205 including but not limited to: operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules and program data, each or some combination of these examples may include an implementation of a network environment.

[0128] Bus 630 can represent one or more of several types of bus structures, including a memory cell bus or memory cell controller, a peripheral bus, a graphics acceleration port, a processing unit, or a local bus using any of the multiple bus structures.

[0129] Electronic device 600 can also communicate with one or more external devices 700 (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, Bluetooth device, etc.), and with one or more devices that enable a user to interact with electronic device 600, and / or with any device that enables electronic device 600 to communicate with one or more other computing devices (e.g., router, modem). This communication can be performed via input / output interface 650. Furthermore, electronic device 600 can also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., local area network, wide area network, and / or public network, such as the Internet) via network adapter 660. Network adapter 660 can communicate with other modules of electronic device 600 via bus 630. It should be understood that, although not shown in the figures, other hardware and / or software modules can be used in conjunction with electronic device 600, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives, and data backup storage platforms.

[0130] Example 4

[0131] This invention also provides a storage medium, specifically a computer-readable storage medium, which is a memory device in a terminal device for storing programs and data. It is understood that the computer-readable storage medium here can include both built-in storage media in the terminal device and extended storage media supported by the terminal device; it can be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. The computer-readable storage medium provides storage space that stores the terminal's operating system. Furthermore, the storage space also stores one or more instructions suitable for loading and execution by a processor, which can be one or more computer programs (including program code). More specific examples of the computer-readable storage medium include: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, random access memory, read-only memory, erasable programmable read-only memory, optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory, optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0132] Computer-readable storage media also include data signals propagated in baseband or as part of a carrier wave, carrying readable program code. Such propagated data signals can take various forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination thereof. A readable storage medium can also be any readable medium other than a readable storage medium that can send, propagate, or transmit a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. The program code contained on the readable storage medium can be transmitted using any suitable medium, including but not limited to wireless, wired, optical fiber, radio frequency, etc., or any suitable combination thereof.

[0133] Program code for performing the operations of this invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java and C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as C or similar languages. The program code can execute entirely on the user's computing device, partially on the user's computing device, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computing device and partially on a remote computing device, or entirely on a remote computing device or server. In cases involving remote computing devices, the remote computing device can be connected to the user's computing device via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or it can be connected to an external computing device (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0134] One or more instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium can be loaded and executed by a processor to implement the corresponding steps of the underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection method in the above embodiments; one or more instructions in the computer-readable storage medium are loaded and executed by the processor in the following steps:

[0135] The surface control terminal encrypts the control commands sent to the underwater vehicle to obtain encrypted command signals, which are then transmitted. The underwater vehicle receives and decrypts the encrypted command signals to obtain the control commands. Based on the obtained control commands, the underwater vehicle collects operational data and generates a deception signal that accompanies the operational data. A mixed signal containing the operational data and the deception signal is then transmitted to the surface control terminal. The deception signal is generated based on the acoustic characteristics of marine animals. The surface control terminal receives the mixed signal and performs signal decomposition processing on it to separate and remove the deception signal components, thereby reconstructing the operational data.

[0136] The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, etc., and are not limited to these.

[0137] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0138] Key performance simulation experimental data

[0139] AES encryption / decryption performance experiment

[0140] Tests were conducted on the mothership (surface control terminal) using an Intel i7-1185G7 industrial PC (equipped with a MAXQ1065 security chip) and an underwater ARM Cortex-M7 MCU (with a built-in AES-128 hardware module):

[0141] Encryption of a 200B power command frame took 0.8ms with the hardware coprocessor and 15.2ms with the software encryption (comparison group). During decryption, the MCU hardware took 0.9ms and the software took 18.7ms. The total encryption / decryption delay was 1.7ms (far below the 20ms threshold). Bit error rate (BER) testing (SNR=8dB, underwater acoustic channel simulation) showed that after QPSK modulation / RRC filtering, the encrypted command had a BER of 9.2×10⁻⁶. -5 (≤10) -4 This demonstrates the low latency and high reliability.

[0142] Experiment on the effect of inducing deception signals

[0143] A simulated underwater communication environment (10km underwater) was constructed (multipath attenuation + ocean noise) to test the effectiveness of deceptive signal traction.

[0144] The initial spoofing power was -5dB (lower than the operating data), and the code NCO approached at 0.05 chip / s. After 3.2s, the code phase error decreased to 1 / 10 chip (<1 / 8 chip). The power was increased to +3dB (higher than the operating data), and linear adjustment was completed within 200ms. The code phase was moved away by 0.1 chip / s, and after 5s, the correlation peak time difference reached 2.1 chip (≥2 chip), indicating that the other party had locked the spoofing signal. The entire process had an additional delay of 44.8ms (≤45ms). The real signal was transmitted at a low power of -10dB, and the mother ship (surface control end) could still receive it stably (reception success rate of 99.6%).

[0145] Wavelet reconstruction accuracy experiment

[0146] A db4 wavelet 9-level decomposition was performed on the mixed signal containing dolphin click interference (the running data was a step signal from 100%FP to 90%FP).

[0147] Decomposing a single frame takes 11.8ms (≤12ms); the accuracy rate for identifying interference at D6-D9 levels is 99.2% (threshold 3×10). -5 The correlation coefficient between the reconstructed signal and the original signal was 0.986 (≥0.98), and the maximum error of the 5s step segment was 0.38 (≤0.4). After 1000 consecutive frames of testing, 3 frames failed the CRC check. After automatically switching to high-gain reception, the retransmission success rate was 100%, proving the reconstruction accuracy and system robustness.

[0148] Please see Figure 3The figure shows the 9-level multi-resolution decomposition coefficients of the hybrid signal transmitted back by an underwater vehicle based on the db4 wavelet. The horizontal axis represents time (unit: s, range 0-10s), and the vertical axis represents the coefficient amplitude (range -0.05-0.05). The figure contains one set of approximation coefficients (A9) and nine sets of detail coefficients (D1-D9).

[0149] Approximation coefficient A9 (level 9): Located in the upper part of the figure, the waveform is smooth and the amplitude is stable (approximately 0-0.02), reflecting the overall trend of heat pipe stack operation data (such as the step segment from 100%FP to 90%FP, the A9 waveform clearly shows a smooth transition from 1.00 to 0.90). This coefficient retains the core characteristics of the signal and is the basis for reconstructing the authenticity of the data.

[0150] Detail coefficients D1-D5 (levels 1-5): Located in the middle of the figure, with small amplitude (-0.01-0.01) and no obvious peaks, containing high-frequency useful components of the operational data (such as small fluctuations in core temperature). This frequency band is free from spoofing signal interference and does not need to be removed, ensuring that the reconstructed data contains complete details.

[0151] Detail coefficients D6-D9 (levels 6-9): Located in the lower part of the image, these show distinct high-amplitude spikes (maximum amplitude 0.05), corresponding to the induced deception signal (Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin click signal). The timing of these spikes perfectly matches the transmission period of the deception signal. This was achieved by setting an energy threshold of 3×10⁻⁶. -5 This allows for precise labeling and zeroing of these spikes, thus eliminating interference.

[0152] The decomposition results demonstrate that the db4 wavelet level 9 decomposition can accurately separate the useful components of the running data from the interference of deceptive signals, without losing the true data features and completely eliminating interference, providing key support for the high accuracy of subsequent signal reconstruction, and reflecting the technical advantages of this invention in underwater complex signal processing.

[0153] In summary, this invention provides a method and system for secure remote control communication of underwater vehicles. Addressing the inherent limitations of open broadcasting and easy interception of underwater acoustic channels, as well as the stringent requirements of real-time and covert communication for nuclear-powered platforms, this invention constructs a three-layer collaborative protection system: encryption, deception induction, and signal reconstruction. First, AES encryption ensures the confidentiality of control commands, while hardware acceleration meets millisecond-level latency requirements. Second, when the underwater vehicle transmits data back, a deception induction signal based on the acoustic characteristics of marine animals is generated. Through intelligent power and code phase control, this signal actively misleads potential eavesdroppers, achieving covert transmission of the true data. Finally, the surface control terminal employs wavelet multi-resolution analysis technology to accurately separate and filter out deception components from the mixed signal, reconstructing the true operational data with high fidelity. This method effectively solves the problems of prolonged latency in traditional single encryption, high power consumption in suppression-based interference, and high exposure risk. It achieves a balance between low latency, high covertness, and strong anti-interference in remote control communication, significantly improving the mission safety and survivability of underwater vehicles in complex marine environments.

[0154] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the above-described division of functional units and modules is merely an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiments can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. Furthermore, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for easy differentiation and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above system can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0155] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0156] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed in this invention can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this invention.

[0157] In the embodiments provided by this invention, it should be understood that the disclosed devices / terminals and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / terminal embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0158] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0159] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present invention can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0160] If the integrated module / unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can also be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording media, USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, optical disks, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media, etc. It should be noted that the content included in the computer-readable medium can be appropriately added or removed according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media do not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunication signals.

[0161] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus, and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0162] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0163] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0164] The above content is only for illustrating the technical concept of the present invention and should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications made to the technical solution based on the technical concept proposed in this invention shall fall within the scope of protection of the claims of this invention.

Claims

1. A method for ensuring secure communication during remote control of an underwater vehicle, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. The surface control terminal encrypts the control commands sent to the underwater vehicle to obtain an encrypted command signal and sends it; the underwater vehicle receives and decrypts the encrypted command signal to obtain the control commands. S2. Based on the acquired control commands, the underwater vehicle collects operational data and generates a deception signal accompanying the operational data. A mixed signal containing the operational data and the deception signal is then sent to the surface control terminal. The deception signal is generated based on the acoustic characteristics of marine animals, and the generation of the deception signal specifically includes: Call the pre-stored marine animal click signal template and adjust its power and code phase to make it have a set time-frequency domain similarity with the running data; Adjusting power and code phase includes: In the initial stage, the power of the induced deception signal is controlled to be lower than the operating data, and its code phase is gradually brought closer to the code phase of the operating data; after the code phase error is less than a set threshold, the power of the induced deception signal is increased to be higher than the operating data, and then its code phase is gradually deviated from the code phase of the operating data. S3. The water surface control terminal receives the mixed signal, performs signal decomposition processing on the mixed signal, separates and removes the inducing deception signal component, and reconstructs the operating data.

2. The method for ensuring secure remote control communication of underwater vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the encryption and decryption are implemented using the AES encryption algorithm.

3. The UUV remote control communications security method of claim 1, wherein, In step S3, the signal decomposition process is implemented using a multi-resolution analysis method based on wavelet transform.

4. The UUV remote control communication security method of claim 3, wherein, The wavelet transform-based multi-resolution analysis method includes: The mixed signal is subjected to multi-level discrete wavelet decomposition to obtain approximation coefficients and detail coefficients; components matching the spectral characteristics of marine animal click signals are identified and removed from the high-level detail coefficients; and the signal is reconstructed using inverse wavelet transform with the retained coefficients.

5. The UUV remote control communications security method of claim 1, wherein, Before step S1 begins, the encryption and decryption keys are injected and stored once in the security chip of the surface control terminal and the underwater vehicle.

6. The UUV remote control communications security method of claim 1, wherein, When the underwater vehicle detects that the other party's sonar is active, it controls the underwater vehicle to suspend the transmission of the operational data and only transmit the deception signal.

7. An underwater vehicle remote control communication security protection system, characterized by, include: The first safety module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to encrypt the power command signals sent to the underwater vehicle. The second safety module, deployed at the underwater actuator, is used to generate an induced deception signal modeled based on marine animal click signals when transmitting real-time measurement signals from the heat pipe stack. This induced deception signal is then mixed with the real-time measurement signal and transmitted. The generation of the induced deception signal specifically includes: Call the pre-stored marine animal click signal template and adjust its power and code phase to make it have a set time-frequency domain similarity with the running data; Adjusting power and code phase includes: In the initial stage, the power of the induced deception signal is controlled to be lower than the operating data, and its code phase is gradually brought closer to the code phase of the operating data; after the code phase error is less than a set threshold, the power of the induced deception signal is increased to be higher than the operating data, and then its code phase is gradually deviated from the code phase of the operating data. The third safety module, deployed at the surface control terminal, is used to perform multi-resolution analysis based on discrete wavelet transform on the received mixed feedback signal in order to filter out the induced deception signal components and reconstruct the real real-time measurement signal.

8. The UUV remote control communications security system of claim 7, wherein, Also includes: The key module is used to manage encryption keys using a one-time download method; The silent operation module is used to control the underwater vehicle to suspend real signal transmission and send only the deception signal when the other party's sonar is detected to be active. An adaptive interference template library for storing various click sound signal templates for marine animals.

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