Internet of vehicles data privacy protection and sharing method

Abstract

Aiming at the problems of data transmission privacy protection and sharing efficiency of an Internet of Vehicles system, the invention provides an Internet of Vehicles data privacy protection method, which comprises the following steps that: a data demander, a data owner and other entities need to register identities in an authorization mechanism, and a user constructs a specific ID (Identity) through Hash by acquiring biological characteristics; the data demander issues a task through the block chain, the data owner verifies the identity and authority of the data demander through the smart contract, and the data owner uploads corresponding data after the verification is passed; the data requester constructs a Circuit C, executes a prof generation instruction and generates a zero-knowledge proof, and the data owner executes a prof verification instruction; the data owner encrypts and uploads data to the cloud center, the cloud center encrypts and transmits the encrypted data to the data demander through a key of an ECC-based lightweight re-encryption algorithm, and the data demander decrypts a ciphertext by using a private key; and recording and storing the data in the block chain by adopting a Tendermint algorithm based on a consensus node. According to the invention, the Internet of Vehicles system is optimized by adopting the technology, the data privacy is further protected, the privacy protection of the system is enabled to better meet the actual Internet of Vehicles defense demand, the data sharing efficiency is obviously improved, and the security defense capability of the system is obviously improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of cybersecurity, and specifically relates to a method for protecting and sharing data privacy in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, the security threats faced by vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems are increasing daily. The conflict between data sharing and privacy protection among vehicles seriously threatens the safety of vehicle users and the security of V2X systems. Because traditional defense technologies cannot withstand diverse and covert cyberattacks, blockchain technology and zero-knowledge proof technology have been increasingly applied in recent years to address the issue of data sharing and privacy protection.

[0003] Blockchain, as a tamper-proof distributed ledger, can build a trusted ledger in an untrusted environment. In a blockchain, all participants can verify and forward transactions, maintaining a consistent ledger across the network through consensus algorithms. Each block of the distributed ledger records a series of transactions and the hash of the previous block, thus linking the current block to the previous one. As the core of second-generation blockchain technology, smart contracts are essentially executable digital protocols. Smart contracts, with their programmability and legitimacy, have been widely applied in finance, digital asset management, and other fields. Considering that vehicle data records are packaged and stored in the blockchain through consensus nodes, this study analyzes and designs a consensus algorithm based on consensus nodes as the most suitable consensus mechanism, which can improve throughput and reduce latency during data transmission.

[0004] To enhance the security and defense capabilities of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, a key focus should be on strengthening the system's data interaction privacy protection capabilities, enabling it to effectively resist malicious attacks when aggregating data. Currently, research on defense decisions for V2X systems primarily concentrates on point-to-point data transmission and data transmission between roadbed units and vehicles. These studies focus on privacy protection through physical entities and do not consider the optimization issues arising from the introduction of blockchain and data sharing.

[0005] Zero-knowledge proof is an encryption protocol that proves an understanding of knowledge to a verifier without disclosing any information outside of that knowledge. Due to the unknown and volatile nature of network attack and defense environments, using fixed control parameters cannot meet the real-time requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks. Therefore, zk-SNARKs (zero-knowledge concise non-interactive knowledge proofs) require only one round of interaction between the prover and verifier. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is chosen as the underlying technology and integrated into proxy re-encryption technology to achieve delegation of permissions in data sharing. Its lightweight nature stems from the efficiency of ECC, avoiding computationally expensive bilinear pairing operations. Therefore, introducing this algorithm into the V2X system enables the system to resist malicious attacks from various entities in complex network environments, effectively improving data privacy protection and the efficiency of data sharing between different entities. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention addresses the issues of data transmission privacy protection and sharing efficiency in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems by providing a method for protecting V2X data privacy. The method includes: data requesters, data owners, and other entities must register their identities with an authorized agency; users construct unique IDs through hashing using biometric data; data requesters publish tasks via blockchain; data owners verify the data requester's identity and permissions via smart contracts, and then upload the corresponding data; the data requester constructs Circuit C, executes proof generation instructions to generate a zero-knowledge proof, and the data owner executes proof verification instructions; the data owner encrypts and uploads the data to a cloud center; the cloud center re-encrypts the data using a key based on a lightweight, heavily encrypted ECC algorithm and transmits it to the data requester; the data requester decrypts the ciphertext using their private key; and a Tendermint algorithm based on consensus nodes is used to store the data records in the blockchain. This invention optimizes V2X systems using these technologies, further protecting data privacy, making the system's privacy protection more aligned with actual V2X defense needs, significantly improving data sharing efficiency, and substantially enhancing the system's security defense capabilities. Here, Circuit C is an execution circuit, ECC is an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, and Tendermint is a consensus algorithm.

[0007] The technical solution adopted by this invention to solve its technical problem is as follows:

[0008] A method for protecting privacy and improving sharing efficiency in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) includes the following steps:

[0009] a. The authorizing agency reviews the relevant qualification information of data requesters and owners, and grants access rights (ACC). i Access Level GRADE iAnd select the hash function Hash() to calculate the anonymous identity AID. i = Hash(RID i )

[0010] Authorizing agencies based on AID i Calculate the public key PK of the participants i

[0011] Authorized agencies will RE user registration information i = {AID i RID i ACC i GRADE i PK i Upload to blockchain

[0012] Participants obtain their registration information RE through blockchain. i ;

[0013] Where the superscript 'i' represents the user ID, RID i It is the real identity ID, AID i It is the anonymous identity ID, and Hash() is the hash transformation function;

[0014] b. Data requester applies to obtain vehicle data from the owner.

[0015] Data owners can access the anonymous identity of data requesters and obtain access rights via smart contracts. i and grant access to GRADE i ;

[0016] The data owner transmits vehicle data;

[0017] c. Verifying data compliance through zk-SNARKs: The data requester constructs a circuit C, the data owner executes the GenProof() algorithm to generate a reliable zero-knowledge proof and submits it, and the requester compares the zk-SNARKs calculation result R' and the data owner's hash value H' with the calculation result R and hash value H using the VerProof() algorithm. The specific mechanisms are as follows:

[0018] Choose a generator g and a password pair e. For a function f(u) = y, there are n variables, where m are input / output variables. Transpose the function into a quadratic arithmetic program of degree d (equivalent to the number of operations) and size n+1 in polynomial form ({l i (x), r i (x), o i (x)}, i∈{0,...,n} , t(x) ), sampling random number s, ρl , ρ r , α l ,α r , α o Let , β, γ, and ρ o = ρ l · ρ r operand generator g l = g ρl , g r = g ρr , g o = g ρo Let the proof key be: , Set the verification key: For input u, perform the calculation of f(u) to obtain the values ​​of all intermediate variables in the iteration {v}. i} i∈{m+1,...,n} ; Assign all values ​​to the unencrypted variable polynomial L(x) = l0(x) + , random number of samples δ l , δ r and δ o Find h(x) = L(x)R(x) ⇒ + δ l R(x) + δ l δ r t(x) - δ o Assign the prover's variable values ​​to the encrypted variable polynomial and apply zero-knowledge delta-shift. ,and , Similarly; assigning his α-shifted pairs, ,and , Similarly; consistent polynomials for assigning variable values ; Calculation proof Assign the input / output values ​​to the verifier's cryptographic polynomial and substitute them into l: Similarly and Yes; check for consistency of variable values: Check valid values: If they are equal, then the zero-knowledge proof condition is satisfied;

[0019] The data owner submits a data verification request to the data requester and records it on the blockchain. The data owner's anonymous identity is represented by AID. i The vehicle operation data D and timestamp T are used to generate extended information u = (D, T, AID).i This is sent as a challenge to those who require data; if the verification is successful, a response will be provided.

[0020] d. Lightweight proxy-based re-encryption and data integrity verification using ECC

[0021] The elliptic curve E is defined on the finite field Fp; the base point G is a generator on the elliptic curve of order w; the public key of the data owner A is pk. A =sk A ⋅G, The public key of data requester B is pk B =sk B ⋅G, where sk A ,sk B It is the private key;

[0022] Implementation steps:

[0023] 1. System Initialization: Select elliptic curve parameters (such as curve type, base point G, order w); generate system public key and master private key.

[0024] 2. User Key Generation: Generate a public-private key pair for A and B; A's private key is sk. A The public key is pk A =sk A ⋅G;

[0025] 3. Re-encryption key generation: A generates a re-encryption key from A to B: rk A →B=sk A ⋅pk B =sk A ⋅sk B ⋅G;

[0026] 4. Encryption: A encrypts message m using its public key: selects a random number r∈Zw; calculates the ciphertext: C A =(C1,C2)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅pk A ), where H is the hash function;

[0027] 5. Re-encryption: The agent uses a re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext: C B =(C1,C2´)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅rk A →B))

[0028] 6. Decryption: Data requester B uses their private key to decrypt the ciphertext: m = C2´−H(sk) B ⋅C1);

[0029] e. Consensus

[0030] Vehicle records are stored on the blockchain via consensus nodes. Combining PBFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance and PoS Proof-of-Stake mechanism, a Tendermint consensus mechanism based on consensus nodes is designed to improve throughput and reduce latency during data transmission, as shown below:

[0031] 1: Propose Phase: The proposer of the current round proposes a new block. The proposer is determined by the weight in the validator set (usually related to the amount of tokens staked).

[0032] 2: Prevote Phase: Validators prevote on the proposed block. If validators receive more than 2 / 3 of the prevote votes, the next phase begins.

[0033] 3: Precommit phase: Validators precommit blocks. If more than 2 / 3 of the validators receive precommits, the block is committed.

[0034] 4. Commit Phase: The block is committed and added to the blockchain. Once committed, the block is final and irreversible. Attached Figure Description

[0035] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation schemes:

[0036] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method for protecting privacy in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Detailed Implementation

[0037] To make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the embodiments and accompanying drawings, but this application is not limited to these embodiments.

[0038] The technical solution adopted by this invention to solve its technical problem is as follows:

[0039] A method for protecting privacy and improving sharing efficiency in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) includes the following steps:

[0040] a. The authorizing agency reviews the relevant qualification information of data requesters and owners, and grants access rights (ACC). i Access Level GRADE i And select the hash function Hash() to calculate the anonymous identity AID. i = Hash(RID i )

[0041] Authorizing agencies based on AID iCalculate the public key PK of the participants i

[0042] Authorized agencies will RE user registration information i = {AID i RID i ACC i GRADE i PK i Upload to blockchain

[0043] Participants obtain their registration information RE through blockchain. i ;

[0044] Where the superscript 'i' represents the user ID, RID i It is the real identity ID, AID i It is the anonymous identity ID, and Hash() is the hash transformation function;

[0045] b. Data requester applies to obtain vehicle data from the owner.

[0046] Data owners can access the anonymous identity of data requesters and obtain access rights via smart contracts. i and grant access to GRADE i ;

[0047] The data owner transmits vehicle data;

[0048] c. Verifying data compliance through zk-SNARKs: The data requester constructs a circuit C, the data owner executes the GenProof() algorithm to generate a reliable zero-knowledge proof and submits it, and the requester compares the zk-SNARKs calculation result R' and the data owner's hash value H' with the calculation result R and hash value H using the VerProof() algorithm. The specific mechanisms are as follows:

[0049] Choose a generator g and a password pair e. For a function f(u) = y, there are n variables, where m are input / output variables. Transpose the function into a quadratic arithmetic program of degree d (equivalent to the number of operations) and size n+1 in polynomial form ({l i (x), r i (x), o i (x)}, i∈{0,...,n} , t(x) ), sampling random number s, ρ l , ρ r , α l ,α r , α o Let , β, γ, and ρ o = ρl · ρ r operand generator g l = g ρl , g r = g ρr , g o = g ρo Let the proof key be: , Set the verification key: For input u, perform the calculation of f(u) to obtain the values ​​of all intermediate variables in the iteration {v}. i} i∈{m+1,...,n} ; Assign all values ​​to the unencrypted variable polynomial L(x) = l0(x) + , random number of samples δ l , δ r and δ o Find h(x) = L(x)R(x) ⇒ + δ l R(x) + δ l δ r t(x) - δ o Assign the prover's variable values ​​to the encrypted variable polynomial and apply zero-knowledge delta-shift. ,and , Similarly; assigning his α-shifted pairs, ,and , Similarly; consistent polynomials for assigning variable values ; Calculation proof Assign the input / output values ​​to the verifier's cryptographic polynomial and substitute them into l: Similarly and Yes; check for consistency of variable values: Check valid values: If they are equal, then the zero-knowledge proof condition is satisfied;

[0050] The data owner submits a data verification request to the data requester and records it on the blockchain. The data owner's anonymous identity is represented by AID. i The vehicle operation data D and timestamp T are used to generate extended information u = (D, T, AID). i This is sent as a challenge to those who require data; if the verification is successful, a response will be provided.

[0051] d. Lightweight proxy-based re-encryption and data integrity verification using ECC

[0052] The elliptic curve E is defined on the finite field Fp; the base point G is a generator on the elliptic curve of order w; the public key of the data owner A is pk. A =sk A ⋅G, The public key of data requester B is pk B =sk B ⋅G, where sk A ,sk B It is the private key;

[0053] Implementation steps:

[0054] 1. System Initialization: Select elliptic curve parameters (such as curve type, base point G, order w); generate system public key and master private key.

[0055] 2. User Key Generation: Generate a public-private key pair for A and B; A's private key is sk. A The public key is pk A =sk A ⋅G;

[0056] 3. Re-encryption key generation: A generates a re-encryption key from A to B: rk A →B=sk A ⋅pk B =sk A ⋅sk B ⋅G;

[0057] 4. Encryption: A encrypts message m using its public key: selects a random number r∈Zw; calculates the ciphertext: C A =(C1,C2)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅pk A ), where H is the hash function;

[0058] 5. Re-encryption: The agent uses a re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext: C B =(C1,C2´)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅rk A →B))

[0059] 6. Decryption: Data requester B uses their private key to decrypt the ciphertext: m = C2´−H(sk) B ⋅C1);

[0060] e. Consensus

[0061] Vehicle records are stored on the blockchain via consensus nodes. Combining PBFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance and PoS Proof-of-Stake mechanism, a Tendermint consensus mechanism based on consensus nodes is designed to improve throughput and reduce latency during data transmission, as shown below:

[0062] 1: Propose Phase: The proposer of the current round proposes a new block. The proposer is determined by the weight in the validator set (usually related to the amount of tokens staked).

[0063] 2: Prevote Phase: Validators prevote on the proposed block. If validators receive more than 2 / 3 of the prevote votes, the next phase begins.

[0064] 3: Precommit phase: Validators precommit blocks. If more than 2 / 3 of the validators receive precommits, the block is committed.

[0065] 4. Commit Phase: The block is committed and added to the blockchain. Once committed, the block is final and irreversible.

Claims

1. A method for protecting privacy and improving sharing efficiency in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), the method comprising the following steps: a. The authorizing agency reviews the relevant qualification information of data requesters and owners, and grants access rights (ACC). i With access level GRADE i And choose the hash function Hash() to calculate the anonymous identity AID. i = Hash(RID i ) Authorizing agencies based on AID i Calculate the public key PK of the participants i Authorized institutions will RE user registration information i = {AID i RID i ACC i GRADE i PK i Upload to blockchain Participants obtain their registration information RE through blockchain. i ; Where the superscript 'i' represents the user ID, RID i It is a real identity ID, AID i It is the anonymous identity ID, and Hash() is the hash transformation function; b. Data requester applies to obtain vehicle data from the owner. Data owners can access the anonymous identity of data requesters and obtain access rights via smart contracts. i and grant access to GRADE i ; The data owner transmits vehicle data; c. Verifying data compliance through zk-SNARKs: The data requester constructs a circuit C, the data owner executes the GenProof() algorithm to generate a reliable zero-knowledge proof and submits it, and the requester compares the zk-SNARKs calculation result R' and the data owner's hash value H' with the calculation result R and hash value H using the VerProof() algorithm. The specific mechanisms are as follows: Choose a generator g and a password pair e. For a function f(u) = y, there are n variables, where m are input / output variables. Transpose the function into a quadratic arithmetic program of degree d (equivalent to the number of operations) and size n+1 in polynomial form ({l i (x), r i (x), o i (x)}, i∈{0,...,n} , t(x) ), sampling random number s, ρ l , ρ r , α l , α r , α o ,β, γ, let ρ o = ρ l · ρ r operand generator g l = g ρl , g r = g ρr , g o = g ρo Let the proof key be: , Set the verification key: For input u, perform the calculation of f(u) to obtain the values ​​of all intermediate variables in the iteration {v}. i } i∈{m+1,...,n} ; Assign all values ​​to the unencrypted variable polynomial L(x) = l0(x) + , random number of samples δ l , δ r and δ o Find h(x) = L(x)R(x) ⇒ + δ l R(x) + δ l δ r t(x) - δ o Assign the prover's variable values ​​to the encrypted variable polynomial and apply zero-knowledge delta-shift. ,and , Similarly; assigning his α-shifted pairs, ,and , Similarly; consistent polynomials for assigning variable values ; Calculation proof Assign the input / output values ​​to the verifier's cryptographic polynomial and substitute them into l: Similarly and Yes; check for consistency of variable values: Check valid values: If they are equal, then the zero-knowledge proof condition is satisfied; The data owner submits a data verification request to the data requester and records it on the blockchain. The data owner's anonymous identity is represented by AID. i The vehicle operation data D and timestamp T are used to generate extended information u = (D, T, AID). i This is sent as a challenge to those who require data; if the verification is successful, a response will be provided. d. Lightweight proxy-based encryption and data integrity verification using ECC The elliptic curve E is defined on the finite field Fp; the base point G is a generator on the elliptic curve of order w; the public key of the data owner A is pk. A =sk A ⋅G, The public key of data requester B is pk B =sk B ⋅G, where sk A ,sk B It is the private key; Implementation steps: (1) System initialization: Select elliptic curve parameters (such as curve type, base point G, order w); generate system public key and master private key; (2) User key generation: Generate a public-private key pair for A and B; A's private key is sk A The public key is pk A =sk A ⋅G; (3) Re-encryption key generation: A generates a re-encryption key from A to B: rk A →B=sk A ⋅pk B =sk A ⋅sk B ⋅G; (4) Encryption: A encrypts message m using its public key: selects a random number r∈Zw; calculates the ciphertext: C A =(C1,C2)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅pk A ), where H is the hash function; (5) Re-encryption: The agent uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext: C B =(C1,C2´)=(r⋅G, m+H(r⋅rk A →B)); (6) Decryption: Data requester B uses his private key to decrypt the ciphertext: m = C2´−H(sk B ⋅C1); e. Consensus Vehicle records are stored on the blockchain via consensus nodes. Combining PBFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance and PoS Proof-of-Stake mechanism, a Tendermint consensus mechanism based on consensus nodes is designed to improve throughput and reduce latency during data transmission, as shown below: (1): Propose phase: The current round's leader (Proposer) proposes a new block. The leader is determined by the weight in the validator set (usually related to the amount of tokens staked). (2): Prevote phase: Validators prevote on the proposed block. If the validators receive more than 2 / 3 of the prevote votes, the next phase begins. (3): Precommit phase: Validators precommit blocks. If a validator receives more than 2 / 3 of the precommits, it enters the commit phase. (4): Commit phase: The block is committed and added to the blockchain. Once committed, the block is final and irreversible.

Images