Ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for space-based computing platform

Abstract

The invention discloses an ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform, and relates to the technical field of space-based information security. Aiming at the problems of weak anti-quantum capability, mismatching between encryption and storage rates, low key management reliability, poor space environment adaptability and the like of the existing space-based storage, a three-layer decoupling architecture of a satellite-borne security storage layer, a space-ground collaborative key management layer and a space-based computing application layer is constructed; high-speed encryption storage is achieved through PQC special ASIC hardware acceleration, secret key distribution and self-healing are carried out through fusion of QKD and PQC, and in-orbit stable operation is guaranteed through anti-radiation reinforcement design. According to the method, quantum attacks can be effectively resisted, the GB / s-level high-speed storage requirement is met, key low-delay negotiation and second-level self-healing are achieved, the system safety, efficiency and reliability are remarkably improved, and the method is suitable for space-based calculation scenes such as remote sensing, navigation and satellite communication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of space-based computing platforms, and in particular to a method for ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management for space-based computing platforms. Background Technology

[0002] Space-based computing platforms are on-orbit computing and data processing systems composed of satellites, constellations, space-to-ground links, and ground control centers. They are widely used in remote sensing and mapping, satellite navigation, space communication, and edge computing. Their core requirement is to achieve ultra-high-speed storage and secure protection of massive amounts of mission data. With the rapid development of quantum computing technology, traditional key management schemes based on public-key cryptography such as RSA and ECC are vulnerable to being cracked by quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm. This poses a serious quantum security threat to data stored on space-based platforms and to keys transmitted between space and ground or between satellites.

[0003] Meanwhile, space-based computing platforms are constrained by the space environment. Onboard equipment must meet the requirements of lightweight, low power consumption, and radiation resistance. Data processing also has the requirements of high concurrency, high bandwidth, and low latency. Traditional ground-based secure storage and key management technologies cannot adapt to the special requirements of space-based scenarios. Existing software encryption throughput is insufficient and cannot meet the ultra-high-speed storage requirements. Centralized key management relies on real-time ground control. When the space-to-ground link is interrupted, the key will become invalid, affecting the normal operation of the platform.

[0004] Under the current circumstances, there are shortcomings such as lack of quantum security capabilities, mismatch between storage and encryption efficiency, poor key management adaptability, and insufficient adaptability to space environment.

[0005] Therefore, there is a need to provide an ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for space-based computing platforms to solve the above problems. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this invention is to provide an ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform, which overcomes the shortcomings of existing technologies. Through PQC hardware acceleration and storage collaboration, it meets the ultra-high-speed storage requirements of space-based GB / s level; the space-ground collaborative key management achieves low-latency distribution and second-level self-healing; the radiation-resistant hardening design ensures the long-term stable operation of spaceborne equipment, improves system availability, adapts to space-based scenarios, and balances security, efficiency and reliability, making it highly practical.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, this invention provides an ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform, comprising the following steps: S1: Based on the space environment constraints, ultra-high-speed storage and low latency requirements of the space-based computing platform, a three-layer decoupled architecture integrating space and ground is constructed. The three-layer decoupled architecture includes a spaceborne secure storage layer, a space-ground collaborative key management layer and a space-based computing application layer. S2: The spaceborne secure storage layer uses radiation-resistant high-speed storage media and integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip to achieve real-time encrypted storage of data through an ultra-high-speed encryption engine. S3: The space-ground collaborative key management layer adopts a dual-link fusion distribution strategy of QKD and PQC, combined with a quantum random number generator (QRNG) to generate keys; S4: The space-based computing application layer achieves seamless application access through the PQC security SDK, adopts a zero-trust architecture, and all access is verified by PQC identity authentication and ML-DSA signature. S5: Through radiation-hardened design and on-orbit key self-healing mechanism, it ensures the stable operation of spaceborne equipment in the space environment and completes ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management. S6: Debug the collaborative operation effect of the three-layer decoupled architecture, and verify the matching between storage and encryption through the calculation formula of storage and encryption collaborative efficiency.

[0008] Preferably, in S1, the core parameter thresholds of the space-based computing platform and the onboard storage read / write bandwidth are first defined. PQC encryption or decryption throughput Inter-satellite key negotiation delay Based on the above thresholds, the functional boundaries of the three-layer decoupled architecture are defined. The spaceborne secure storage layer is responsible for data encryption and storage, the space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for key lifecycle management, and the space-based computing application layer is responsible for application access and authentication. The three decoupled layers communicate with each other through customized interfaces and operate independently.

[0009] Preferably, S2 specifically includes the following steps: S21: The storage medium is set to a 5D crystal USB flash drive or a radiation-resistant high-speed flash memory array, configured... ; S22: Integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip, which sets the chip's operating frequency. Encryption parallelism The encryption capability is calculated using the PQC encryption throughput calculation formula to determine whether it meets the threshold for PQC encryption or decryption throughput. The calculation formula is as follows: ; In the formula, Indicates the length of a single frame of data; the value range is set to 1024~8192 bits. This indicates the operating frequency of the PQC dedicated ASIC chip; the value range is set to 1~2GHz. This indicates the PQC key length; the ML-KEM key length is 2048 bits; the ML-DSA key length is 256 bits. This indicates the degree of encryption parallelism, with a value range of 8 to 16. Single frame data length ML-KEM key length At that time, the throughput of PQC encryption or decryption is calculated using the formula: ; satisfy Requirements; S23: Debug the encryption engine to ensure encryption / decryption latency <1. s.

[0010] Preferably, S3 specifically includes the following steps: S31: Key generation. The satellite-based terminal generates a truly random PQC key seed using QRNG, while the ground-based terminal generates the root key using a hybrid QKD and PQC method, ensuring a high satellite-to-ground QKD key generation rate. ; S32: Key distribution employs a dual-link strategy: the QKD link distributes the root key, and the PQC link distributes the session key. Efficiency is verified during inter-satellite session key negotiation using the inter-satellite key negotiation delay calculation formula. ; In the formula, This represents the inter-satellite distance; the value range is set to 100~1000km. The speed of inter-satellite signal propagation; its value is... m / s; This represents the execution time of the PQC key negotiation algorithm; its value ranges from 1 to 3 ms. The inter-satellite link transmission error delay is denoted by 0.5~1.5ms; the inter-satellite key negotiation delay is calculated accordingly. The threshold is met; S33: Key rotation, configure the rotation period according to task priority. The value range is set to 1s~24h.

[0011] Preferably, in S4, the following operations are performed: S41: Integrates the PQC security SDK for various space-based computing applications, enabling seamless integration between applications and the three-tier architecture; S42: Configure a zero-trust authentication mechanism. All access requests carry an ML-DSA signature. The signature is verified using the PQC algorithm. At the same time, the PQC identity credentials of the access device are verified to ensure that only authorized devices can access the stored data and keys. S43: Monitor access requests in real time and reject access from unauthenticated devices.

[0012] Preferably, the following operations are performed in S5: S51: Radiation hardening of storage media, PQC encryption engine, and security elements; radiation redundancy factor. Ensure onboard storage Hour; S52: Deploy a key self-healing mechanism. When the key pool is damaged, the root key is redistributed via ground-based QKD, combined with inter-satellite PQC key synchronization. The self-healing effect is verified through a key self-healing success rate calculation formula. ; In the formula, This represents the number of times the key pool has been compromised. This represents the total number of times the key pool has been run. The radiation redundancy factor is set to 3. The criterion for determining the success rate of key self-healing is set as follows: Complete the micro-level key self-healing.

[0013] Preferably, in S6, the following steps are specifically performed: S61: Simulating a massive data processing scenario in space-based computing, the synergistic effect of onboard storage read / write bandwidth and PQC encryption throughput is tested using a collaborative efficiency formula. ; At that time, it was determined that the collaborative requirements for ultra-high-speed storage and encryption of space-based computing were met; S62: Conduct comprehensive testing of system security and reliability to ensure data security validity period ≥ 15 years and key management system availability ≥ 99.999%. After debugging, put the system into actual operation.

[0014] Preferably, the space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for the entire lifecycle management of the keys, specifically including setting up a key pool on the satellite, pre-storing PQC key pairs, and supporting millisecond-level key switching; the ground key management center (KMS) performs blockchain-based notation of on-board key operations and key rotation cycles. Configure based on task priority.

[0015] Therefore, the present invention employs the above-mentioned ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform, and the technical effects are as follows: (1) Based on the space environment constraints, ultra-high-speed storage and low latency requirements of the space-based computing platform, this invention addresses the shortcomings of existing technologies such as insufficient quantum security and mismatch between storage and encryption efficiency. It constructs a three-layer decoupled architecture of spaceborne storage layer, space-ground collaborative key layer and application layer, deeply integrates PQC algorithm and QKD technology, and achieves dual protection of algorithm layer against quantum and physical layer unconditional security, solving the data and key security problem under quantum attack. At the same time, it designs a layered key system to take into account key security and distribution efficiency.

[0016] (2) The present invention customizes a dedicated ASIC chip for spaceborne PQC, with a built-in ML-KEM / ML-DSA hardware accelerator, combined with radiation-resistant high-speed storage medium, and customizes a spaceborne NVMe over PQC protocol, embedding PQC encryption into the storage I / O path to achieve ultra-high-speed secure storage with zero additional overhead.

[0017] (3) This invention designs an automated key lifecycle management mechanism, introduces blockchain evidence storage to realize space-ground audit, and proposes an on-orbit key self-healing algorithm to solve the problem of rapid key recovery after star-ground link interruption and key pool damage, thereby improving the reliability and adaptability of key management.

[0018] (4) In response to the strong radiation and high and low temperature environment in space, this invention adopts the "radiation-resistant process + triple redundancy" design for storage media, PQC encryption engine and key storage element to improve the on-orbit stability of the equipment; optimizes the hardware structure to achieve lightweight and low power consumption of the space-borne equipment, ensures the stable operation of the storage and key management system throughout the satellite's life cycle, and improves the system availability. Attached Figure Description

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solution of the present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0021] Unless otherwise defined, the technical or scientific terms used in this invention shall have the ordinary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention pertains.

[0022] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, this invention provides a method for ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management on a space-based computing platform, comprising the following steps: S1: Based on the space environment constraints, ultra-high-speed storage, and low-latency requirements of the space-based computing platform, a three-layer decoupled architecture integrating space and ground is constructed. This three-layer decoupled architecture includes an onboard secure storage layer, a space-ground collaborative key management layer, and a space-based computing application layer. S1 first clarifies the core parameter thresholds of the space-based computing platform, including onboard storage read / write bandwidth. PQC encryption or decryption throughput Inter-satellite key negotiation delay Based on the above thresholds, the functional boundaries of the three-layer decoupled architecture are defined. The spaceborne secure storage layer is responsible for data encryption and storage, the space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for key lifecycle management, and the space-based computing application layer is responsible for application access and authentication. The three decoupled layers communicate with each other through customized interfaces and operate independently.

[0023] S2: The onboard secure storage layer uses radiation-resistant high-speed storage media and integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip. It achieves real-time encrypted data storage through an ultra-high-speed encryption engine. S2 specifically includes the following steps: S21: The storage medium is set to a 5D crystal USB flash drive or a radiation-resistant high-speed flash memory array, configured... ; S22: Integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip, which sets the chip's operating frequency. Encryption parallelism The encryption capability is calculated using the PQC encryption throughput calculation formula to determine whether it meets the threshold for PQC encryption or decryption throughput. The calculation formula is as follows: ; In the formula, Indicates the length of a single frame of data; the value range is set to 1024~8192 bits. This indicates the operating frequency of the PQC dedicated ASIC chip; the value range is set to 1~2GHz. This indicates the PQC key length; the ML-KEM key length is 2048 bits; the ML-DSA key length is 256 bits. This indicates the degree of encryption parallelism, with a value range of 8 to 16. S23: Debug the encryption engine to ensure encryption / decryption latency <1. s enables a real-time mechanism of "computing, encrypting, and writing simultaneously".

[0024] S3: The space-ground collaborative key management layer adopts a dual-link fusion distribution strategy of QKD and PQC, combined with a quantum random number generator (QRNG) to generate keys; S3 specifically includes the following steps: S31: Key generation. The satellite-based terminal generates a truly random PQC key seed using QRNG, while the ground-based terminal generates the root key using a hybrid QKD and PQC method, ensuring a high satellite-to-ground QKD key generation rate. ; S32: Key distribution employs a dual-link strategy: the QKD link distributes the root key, and the PQC link distributes the session key. Efficiency is verified during inter-satellite session key negotiation using the inter-satellite key negotiation delay calculation formula. ; In the formula, This represents the inter-satellite distance; the value range is set to 100~1000km. The speed of inter-satellite signal propagation; its value is... m / s; This represents the execution time of the PQC key negotiation algorithm; its value ranges from 1 to 3 ms. The inter-satellite link transmission error delay is denoted by 0.5~1.5ms; the inter-satellite key negotiation delay is calculated accordingly. The threshold is met; S33: Key rotation, configure the rotation period according to task priority. The value range is set to 1s~24h.

[0025] S4: The space-based computing application layer achieves seamless application access through the PQC security SDK, adopts a zero-trust architecture, and all access is verified by PQC identity authentication and ML-DSA signature. S5: Through radiation-hardened design and on-orbit key self-healing mechanism, it ensures the stable operation of onboard equipment in the space environment and completes ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management; In S4, the following operations are specifically performed: S41: Integrates the PQC security SDK for various space-based computing applications, enabling seamless integration between applications and the three-tier architecture; S42: Configure a zero-trust authentication mechanism. All access requests carry an ML-DSA signature. The signature is verified using the PQC algorithm. At the same time, the PQC identity credentials of the access device are verified to ensure that only authorized devices can access the stored data and keys. S43: Monitor access requests in real time and reject access from unauthenticated devices.

[0026] S6: Debug the collaborative operation effect of the three-layer decoupled architecture, and verify the matching between storage and encryption through the calculation formula of storage and encryption collaborative efficiency.

[0027] S5 performs the following specific operations: S51: Radiation hardening of storage media, PQC encryption engine, and security elements; radiation redundancy factor. Ensure onboard storage Hour; S52: Deploy a key self-healing mechanism. When the key pool is damaged, the root key is redistributed via ground-based QKD, combined with inter-satellite PQC key synchronization. The self-healing effect is verified through a key self-healing success rate calculation formula. ; In the formula, This represents the number of times the key pool has been compromised. This represents the total number of times the key pool has been run. The radiation redundancy factor is set to 3. The criterion for determining the success rate of key self-healing is set as follows: Complete the micro-level key self-healing.

[0028] In S6, the following steps are specifically executed: S61: Simulating a massive data processing scenario in space-based computing, the synergistic effect of onboard storage read / write bandwidth and PQC encryption throughput is tested using a collaborative efficiency formula. ; At that time, it was determined that the collaborative requirements for ultra-high-speed storage and encryption of space-based computing were met; S62: Conduct comprehensive testing of system security and reliability to ensure data security validity period ≥ 15 years and key management system availability ≥ 99.999%. After debugging, put the system into actual operation.

[0029] The space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for the entire lifecycle management of keys, specifically including setting up a key pool on the satellite, pre-storing PQC key pairs, and supporting millisecond-level key switching; the ground-based key management center (KMS) performs blockchain-based notation of on-board key operations and key rotation cycles. Configure based on task priority.

[0030] Example 1 To verify the technical effectiveness of this method, a space-based computing platform simulation test environment was built, simulating a low-Earth orbit constellation (12 satellites), a satellite-to-ground link, and a ground control center. In this embodiment, the values ​​of each parameter in the PQC encryption or decryption throughput calculation process are: single frame data length. ML-KEM key length At that time, the throughput of PQC encryption or decryption is calculated using the formula: ; satisfy Requirements; The QKD key generation rate for satellite-to-ground connections is: The specific parameters for calculating the inter-satellite key negotiation delay are set as follows: , = m / s, =2ms, =1ms, calculated as follows: ; Satisfying interstellar distance The demand.

[0031] During key rotation, in high-priority tasks In low-priority tasks .

[0032] In the key self-healing mechanism, =1, =10000, =3, substituting into the formula for calculating the success rate of key self-healing, we get: That is, the success rate of self-healing is... ;satisfy Complete the micro-level key self-healing.

[0033] In this embodiment =10 , =12 The synergistic effect between onboard storage read / write bandwidth and PQC encryption throughput was calculated using the synergistic efficiency formula. ;satisfy The need for collaboration.

[0034] Comparative Example The advantages of this method are verified through four categories of test indicators: security, storage performance, key performance, and reliability. The security test indicators are evaluated based on whether it can resist quantum attacks and the validity period of data security; the storage performance is evaluated based on read / write bandwidth, encryption or decryption throughput, and coordination efficiency. Evaluation is conducted based on QKD key generation rate, inter-satellite key negotiation latency, and key self-healing success rate. The evaluation was conducted; reliability was assessed based on onboard storage MTBF, key management system availability, and radiation resistance.

[0035] Option 1: Traditional RSA encryption + centralized key management; Option 2: Single PQC encryption + satellite-to-ground one-way key distribution; Option 3: QKD single key distribution + ordinary hardware encryption; Option 4: This option; The test results are shown in Table 1.

[0036] Table 1 The tests conducted in this embodiment demonstrate that all indicators in this method meet the target requirements, and compared with the three existing schemes, it has the following significant advantages: The use of PQC+QKD dual-engine fusion protection effectively resists quantum attacks such as Shor's algorithm, achieving a data security validity period of 15 years, far exceeding existing schemes; read / write bandwidth reaches 12Gbps, encryption / decryption throughput reaches 10Gbps, and collaborative efficiency is 83.3%, meeting the ultra-high-speed storage requirements of space-based computing and solving the defect of "mismatch between storage and encryption efficiency" in existing schemes; inter-satellite key negotiation latency is only 3ms, QKD key generation rate is 1.2Gbps, and key self-healing success rate is 99.995%, achieving automated management and control of the entire key lifecycle, solving the problem of "poor key management adaptability" in existing schemes; stronger adaptability to the space environment: onboard storage MTBF reaches... The key management system has an availability of 99.9992% and excellent radiation resistance, meeting the stable operation requirements throughout the satellite's entire life cycle and solving the defect of "insufficient adaptability to the space environment" in existing solutions.

[0037] Therefore, this invention adopts the above-mentioned ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform. Through PQC hardware acceleration and storage collaboration, it meets the ultra-high-speed storage requirements of space-based GB / s level; the space-ground collaborative key management realizes low-latency distribution and second-level self-healing; and the radiation-resistant hardening design ensures the long-term stable operation of spaceborne equipment and improves system availability.

[0038] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can still be made to the technical solutions of the present invention, and these modifications or equivalent substitutions cannot cause the modified technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management on a space-based computing platform, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1: Based on the space environment constraints, ultra-high-speed storage and low latency requirements of the space-based computing platform, a three-layer decoupled architecture integrating space and ground is constructed. The three-layer decoupled architecture includes a spaceborne secure storage layer, a space-ground collaborative key management layer and a space-based computing application layer. S2: The spaceborne secure storage layer uses radiation-resistant high-speed storage media and integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip to achieve real-time encrypted storage of data through an ultra-high-speed encryption engine. S3: The space-ground collaborative key management layer adopts a dual-link fusion distribution strategy of QKD and PQC, combined with a quantum random number generator (QRNG) to generate keys; S4: The space-based computing application layer achieves seamless application access through the PQC security SDK, adopts a zero-trust architecture, and all access is verified by PQC identity authentication and ML-DSA signature. S5: Through radiation-hardened design and on-orbit key self-healing mechanism, it ensures the stable operation of spaceborne equipment in the space environment and completes ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management. S6: Debug the collaborative operation effect of the three-layer decoupled architecture, and verify the matching between storage and encryption through the calculation formula of storage and encryption collaborative efficiency.

2. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 1, characterized in that, S1 first clarifies the core parameter thresholds of the space-based computing platform, including onboard storage read / write bandwidth. PQC encryption or decryption throughput Inter-satellite key negotiation delay Based on the above thresholds, the functional boundaries of the three-layer decoupled architecture are defined. The spaceborne secure storage layer is responsible for data encryption and storage, the space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for key lifecycle management, and the space-based computing application layer is responsible for application access and authentication. The three decoupled layers communicate with each other through customized interfaces and operate independently.

3. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, S2 specifically includes the following steps: S21: The storage medium is set to a 5D crystal USB flash drive or a radiation-resistant high-speed flash memory array, configured... ; S22: Integrates a dedicated PQC ASIC chip, which sets the chip's operating frequency. Encryption parallelism The encryption capability is calculated using the PQC encryption throughput calculation formula to determine whether it meets the threshold for PQC encryption or decryption throughput. The calculation formula is as follows: ； In the formula, Indicates the length of a single frame of data; the value range is set to 1024~8192 bits. This indicates the operating frequency of the PQC dedicated ASIC chip; the value range is set to 1~2GHz. This indicates the PQC key length; the ML-KEM key length is 2048 bits; the ML-DSA key length is 256 bits. This indicates the degree of encryption parallelism, with a value range of 8 to 16. S23: Debug the encryption engine to ensure encryption / decryption latency <1. s.

4. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, S3 specifically includes the following steps: S31: Key generation. The satellite-based terminal generates a truly random PQC key seed using QRNG, while the ground-based terminal generates the root key using a hybrid QKD and PQC method, ensuring a high satellite-to-ground QKD key generation rate. ; S32: Key distribution employs a dual-link strategy: the QKD link distributes the root key, and the PQC link distributes the session key. Efficiency is verified during inter-satellite session key negotiation using the inter-satellite key negotiation delay calculation formula. ； In the formula, This represents the inter-satellite distance; the value range is set to 100~1000km. The speed of inter-satellite signal propagation; its value is... m / s; This represents the execution time of the PQC key negotiation algorithm; its value ranges from 1 to 3 ms. The inter-satellite link transmission error delay is denoted by 0.5~1.5ms; the inter-satellite key negotiation delay is calculated accordingly. The threshold is met; S33: Key rotation, configure the rotation period according to task priority. The value range is set to 1s~24h.

5. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, In S4, the following operations are performed: S41: Integrates the PQC security SDK for various space-based computing applications, enabling seamless integration between applications and the three-tier architecture; S42: Configure a zero-trust authentication mechanism. All access requests carry an ML-DSA signature. The signature is verified using the PQC algorithm. At the same time, the PQC identity credentials of the access device are verified to ensure that only authorized devices can access the stored data and keys. S43: Monitor access requests in real time and reject access from unauthenticated devices.

6. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, S5 performs the following specific operations: S51: Radiation hardening of storage media, PQC encryption engine, and security elements; radiation redundancy factor. Ensure onboard storage Hour; S52: Deploy a key self-healing mechanism. When the key pool is damaged, the root key is redistributed via ground-based QKD, combined with inter-satellite PQC key synchronization. The self-healing effect is verified through a key self-healing success rate calculation formula. ； In the formula, This represents the number of times the key pool has been compromised. This represents the total number of times the key pool has been run. The radiation redundancy factor is set to 3. The criterion for determining the success rate of key self-healing is set as follows: Complete the micro-level key self-healing.

7. The ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management method for a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, In S6, the following steps are specifically executed: S61: Simulating a massive data processing scenario in space-based computing, the synergistic effect of onboard storage read / write bandwidth and PQC encryption throughput is tested using a collaborative efficiency formula. ； At that time, it was determined that the collaborative requirements for ultra-high-speed storage and encryption of space-based computing were met; S62: Conduct comprehensive testing of system security and reliability to ensure data security validity period ≥ 15 years and key management system availability ≥ 99.999%. After debugging, put the system into actual operation.

8. A method for ultra-high-speed secure storage and post-quantum key management of a space-based computing platform according to claim 2, characterized in that, The space-ground collaborative key management layer is responsible for the entire lifecycle management of keys, specifically including setting up a key pool on the satellite, pre-storing PQC key pairs, and supporting millisecond-level key switching; the ground-based key management center (KMS) performs blockchain-based notation of on-board key operations and key rotation cycles. Configure based on task priority.

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