A method for issuing a secure encryption card, an electronic device, a storage medium, and a program product.

Abstract

This application provides a method for issuing secure encrypted cards, an electronic device, a storage medium, and a program product. The method includes: performing an encryption operation on a root key dispersion factor to generate a root key; writing the root key into a master card and setting a master card issuance verification hash code to complete the issuance of the master card; and issuing at least one type of sub-encrypted card based on the master card. By generating and issuing master cards and sub-encrypted cards, a highly secure root of trust is created for anti-counterfeiting of air purifier filters, fundamentally solving problems such as weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities and lack of control over the issuance process in related technologies.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of anti-counterfeiting technology for filter cartridges, and more specifically, to a method for issuing a secure encrypted card, an electronic device, a storage medium, and a program product. Background Technology

[0002] Air purifiers are common household appliances that use built-in filters to remove harmful components (such as particulate matter) from the air, thus purifying it. To calculate and display the lifespan of the air purifier's filters, a label is placed on the filter. A card reader is placed near the filter, using NFC technology to operate the filter and read / write its lifespan.

[0003] However, most air purifier filters on the market lack anti-counterfeiting features or have weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities (such as using only low-level encryption software algorithms). These filters are easily cracked and thus fail to provide effective anti-counterfeiting protection. For legitimate suppliers of air purifiers or filters, the lack of oversight in the distribution process makes them vulnerable to counterfeiting and illegal distribution, causing significant economic losses. For consumers, this means the risk of purchasing counterfeit or substandard filters of varying quality, which can be harmful to their use.

[0004] Therefore, there is a need for a solution that can address the anti-counterfeiting issue of filter cartridges at its source and enable control over the distribution process. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this application is to provide a method for issuing a secure encrypted card, an electronic device, a storage medium, and a program product, so as to achieve the technical effect of improving the anti-counterfeiting capability of the filter element.

[0006] The first aspect of this application provides a method for issuing a secure encryption card, the method comprising: The root key dispersion factor is encrypted to generate the root key; the root key dispersion factor is generated through the following steps: obtaining the target length of the root key and the number of departments providing the dispersion factor; determining the length of the dispersion factor required by each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments; wherein each dispersion factor is at least partially composed of a key defined by the corresponding department. Write the root key into the master card and set the master card issuance verification hash code to complete the issuance of the master card; Based on the master card, at least one type of sub-encryption card is issued.

[0007] In the aforementioned implementation process, by introducing a mechanism for multi-department collaborative generation of the root key distribution factor, the control of a single key is decentralized, avoiding the risk of the entire system being compromised due to a single point of leakage. This enhances the overall security of the system from the source of key generation and improves the anti-counterfeiting capabilities of air purifier filters. Simultaneously, by generating and issuing master cards and sub-encryption cards, a highly secure root of trust is created for air purifier filter anti-counterfeiting, fundamentally solving problems such as weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities and lack of control over the issuance process.

[0008] Further, determining the required dispersion factor length for each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is an integer multiple of the target length, the length of the dispersion factor provided by each department is determined as the first length; wherein, the dispersion factor provided by each department is composed of a first part and a second part, the first part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the first length, and the second part is a random number of at least one byte.

[0009] In the above implementation process, when the number of departments matches the target length well, an equal distribution factor generation scheme is provided. By introducing random numbers into the factor of each department, the entropy value is significantly increased, making the root key extremely difficult to deduce even if it is partially leaked.

[0010] Further, determining the required dispersion factor length for each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is not an integer multiple of the target length, it is determined that at least two departments provide different dispersion factor lengths; wherein, for departments with longer dispersion factor lengths, their dispersion factor is composed of a third part and a fourth part, wherein the third part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the length of the dispersion factor of that department, and the fourth part is a random number of at least one byte.

[0011] In the above implementation process, a flexible non-equal distribution strategy is provided for scenarios where the length cannot be evenly divided. While ensuring the accuracy of the total length, a "key + random number" structure is used for departments that contribute longer lengths to ensure data security.

[0012] Furthermore, the issuance of at least one type of sub-encryption card based on the master card includes: If the issuance verification hash code corresponding to the sub-encryption card type is verified as passed, the root key in the mother card is used to generate the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type. The communication root key is written into the corresponding sub-encryption card to complete the issuance of the sub-encryption card; the sub-encryption card includes at least one of an encryption chip sub-encryption card, a main control microcontroller sub-encryption card, and a security encryption tag sub-encryption card.

[0013] The above implementation process enables access control over the issuance of sub-encryption cards. Through type-specific password verification and a root key-based distribution algorithm, the independence and security of different types of sub-encryption cards are ensured, laying a solid foundation for the secure issuance of these cards to downstream devices (tags, chips, MCUs) and achieving initial control over the issuance process.

[0014] Further, the step of generating the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type includes: Based on the dispersion factor of the control board microcontroller unit, the dispersion factor of the encryption chip, and the dispersion factor of the security encryption tag, and using the first encryption algorithm, the second encryption algorithm, and the third encryption algorithm respectively to disperse them, the corresponding microcontroller unit communication root key, encryption chip communication root key, and security encryption tag communication root key are generated.

[0015] In the above implementation process, a multi-factor, multi-algorithm parallel distribution mechanism is adopted for the encryption chip sub-encryption card to generate all the necessary communication root keys at once. This not only improves the issuance efficiency, but also achieves superposition of encryption strength and risk isolation through algorithm diversity, so that even if a single algorithm is broken, it will not endanger the entire system.

[0016] Furthermore, the method also includes: When issuing the sub-encryption card, the number of device keys authorized by the sub-encryption card to be issued is subject to an upper limit control.

[0017] In the above implementation process, by setting an upper limit on the number of sub-encryption cards that can be issued, the potential economic losses caused by card loss, theft, or internal misuse are limited to a controllable range. This solves the problem of extremely high economic losses caused by the easy counterfeiting and illegal issuance of filter cartridges in related technologies.

[0018] A second aspect of this application provides an electronic device, the electronic device comprising: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; Wherein, when the processor invokes the executable instructions, it implements any of the methods described in the first aspect.

[0019] A third aspect of this application provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of any of the methods described in the first aspect.

[0020] A fourth aspect of this application provides a computer program product, the computer program product including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements any of the methods described in the first aspect. Attached Figure Description

[0021] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments of this application will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of this application and should not be regarded as a limitation of the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0022] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a method for issuing a secure encryption card, as provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 A flowchart of root key dispersion factor generation and master card issuance is provided for embodiments of this application; Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating the issuance process of an encryption chip sub-encryption card is provided in this application embodiment; Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating the issuance process of a sub-encryption card for a master control microcontroller unit, as provided in this application embodiment; Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating the issuance process of a secure encrypted tag sub-encryption card is provided in this application embodiment; Figure 6 This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0023] The technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0024] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following figures indicate similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures. Furthermore, in the description of this application, terms such as "first," "second," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0025] In related technologies, there are two common methods for testing and monitoring the lifespan of filters used in air purifiers: One approach is to design a filter placement detection device inside the air purifier. These devices can take the form of microswitches, Hall switches, etc. When the filter is installed in place, the state of the detection device (such as a microswitch or Hall switch) inside the purifier changes, indicating that the filter has been installed. After closing the filter compartment door, the air purifier can then start working. Another method involves placing an NFC tag on the air purifier's filter. After installation, the tag is powered by a radio frequency electromagnetic field provided by an internal NFC reader, enabling data communication between the tag and the filter, and facilitating processes such as reading and writing filter lifespan data. However, the communication between the air purifier's NFC tag and the NFC reader is typically unencrypted or only encrypted using software algorithms (such as hash algorithms). This low encryption strength makes it easy to crack, leading to tag forgery and the creation of counterfeit filters.

[0026] Furthermore, the label issuance process is often not subject to restrictions on the issuer's use, nor is there effective control over information such as the number of labels issued and the issuance time. After obtaining the issuance equipment and software, a large number of counterfeit labels are illegally issued. These processes, due to the lack of strict control measures, cause significant economic losses to genuine label or filter suppliers. Counterfeit and substandard filters also bring many adverse effects to consumers (such as poor filter quality, ineffective air purification, or even the generation of harmful gases that endanger health).

[0027] Current air purifier products typically use their filters in the following ways: 1. No lifespan management is implemented for the filter cartridge (i.e., no NFC technology is used to attach a tag to the outside of the filter cartridge).

[0028] This design typically lacks an NFC tag, relying solely on structural anti-counterfeiting measures (microswitches, Hall effect switches, etc.) to detect filter installation. Once a filter is detected, the air purifier motor starts running and operates normally. This design cannot accurately track the lifespan of the air purifier filter or reflect its actual usage. Because it lacks an NFC tag and relies solely on structural anti-counterfeiting measures, it is easily copied and counterfeited, allowing for the use of counterfeit or substandard filters. 2. Place a label with weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities on the filter element.

[0029] This design typically uses generic NFC tags, such as Mifare tags, to perform simple filter life calculations and filter type detection. The entire process is implemented in plaintext or with simple software encryption (such as a hash algorithm). This type of tag, with its fixed encryption method, fixed key, or simple key (such as using a software encryption algorithm), is easily cracked, offering weak protection and failing to provide true anti-counterfeiting functionality for filters. 3. There are no strict control measures in the issuance process; anyone with issuance equipment and software can issue a product.

[0030] Because of the lack of strict control over the issuing equipment, software, and process, once the issuing equipment and software are illegally obtained, tags or encryption chips can be issued in large quantities. These processes typically occur offline, making them impossible to monitor and control in real time. Since the production of NFC-tagged filters is often handled by filter suppliers, and the filter designers provide the production tools to these suppliers, these tools lack robust control features (such as production quantity control and batch tracking). If the necessary filter production and issuing tools and methods are illegally obtained, it is easy to mass-produce counterfeit filters. This results in significant economic losses for filter designers in their procurement and sales processes, losses that are difficult to trace and mitigate.

[0031] To address any of the issues raised above, this application mainly improves upon them in the following ways: This application designs a root key generation method. This method supports custom key dispersion factors provided by two or more issuing departments. These departmental key dispersion factors collectively form a total key dispersion factor. A hash algorithm is used to generate the root key, which is then written into the master card for issuance. From this master card, different application key daughter cards are generated using different algorithms based on the parameters of the tag, encryption chip, and MCU on the control board. These key daughter cards, along with the issuing MCU, encryption chip, and tag, are written with the corresponding keys, thereby enabling encrypted communication between the tag and encryption chip, and between the encryption chip and the MCU on the control board, achieving anti-counterfeiting for the entire device's filter core. The designed flexible root key generation method is adaptable to different numbers of issuing departments, while also increasing the complexity of the root key and enhancing the overall security of the issuance system.

[0032] Based on this, the embodiments of this application provide a method for issuing a secure encryption card, referring to... Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for issuing a secure encryption card, as provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0033] In this embodiment, the method includes: Step S10: Perform encryption operation on the root key dispersion factor to generate the root key; the root key dispersion factor is generated through the following steps: obtain the target length of the root key and the number of departments providing the dispersion factor; determine the length of the dispersion factor required by each department according to the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments; wherein, each dispersion factor is at least partially composed of a key defined by the corresponding department. It's important to note that the root key dispersion factor is the raw input material used to generate the root key, not the final key. It's a fixed-length data string composed of multiple parts (typically from different departments). Its design philosophy is based on weighted distribution, where multiple entities each contribute a portion of the secret to synthesize a high-entropy (i.e., high randomness and high complexity) original data. For example, it might be composed of data concatenated from three departments: Department 1 provides: [5-byte custom key] + [1-byte random number]; Department 2 provides: [4-byte custom key] + [1-byte random number]; Department 3 provides: [4-byte custom key] + [1-byte random number]; The final result is a 16-byte root key dispersion factor.

[0034] It should be understood that cryptographic operations aim to transform a variable-length input (the root key dispersion factor) into a fixed-length, random output (a hash value). It is very difficult to deduce the input back from the output.

[0035] As an example, the SHA-256 algorithm is used. The hash calculation of the 16-byte dispersion factor yields a 256-bit (32-byte) hash value.

[0036] Understandably, the root key is the highest-level key and the source of all lower-level keys. It consists of the result (or a portion thereof) of the aforementioned encryption operations and is stored in the master card.

[0037] Specifically, the first 16 bytes of the SHA-256 hash value are taken as the final root key, or the first 8 bytes and the last 8 bytes are taken as the final root key.

[0038] It should be noted that the target length of the root key refers to the number of bytes in the final root key to be generated. For example, a target length of 16 bytes (128 bits) meets the requirements of common encryption algorithms such as AES-128.

[0039] The number of departments providing the distribution factor refers to the number of independent entities participating in the root key generation process and contributing their share of the secret information. For example, based on the company's security management strategy, it is decided that three departments will jointly be responsible, i.e., the number of departments N=3.

[0040] Specifically, depending on whether the target length L is divisible by the number of departments N, two different length allocation strategies are triggered to ensure that the final concatenated total length equals the target length L. The required dispersion factor length for each department may be the same (when divisible) or different (when not divisible) across different departments.

[0041] The dispersion factor is the final, complete data block of a specified length submitted by each department. The main part of this data block is a department-defined key, but it may also contain other data (such as random numbers).

[0042] The department-defined key refers to the secret information that each department generates and stores independently. It is the key part of the dispersion factor that contributes to "entropy" (randomness) and "secrecy".

[0043] By introducing a mechanism that involves multiple departments collaboratively generating the root key distribution factor, the control of a single key is decentralized, avoiding the risk of the entire system being compromised due to a single point of leakage. This improves the overall security of the system from the source of key generation and enhances the anti-counterfeiting capabilities of air purifier filters.

[0044] Step S20: Write the root key into the master card and set the master card issuance verification hash code to complete the issuance of the master card; It should be noted that the master card is a high-security hardware security module, which can take the form of a smart card or a dedicated encryption chip. The master card is used to securely store the root key and to issue lower-level keys (i.e., sub-encryption cards).

[0045] For example, a smart card that is initially blank has its generated 16-byte root key written into its protected storage area by an issuance tool.

[0046] The master card issuance verification hash code is a key used to verify the permissions to operate the master card, ensuring that only authorized security administrators can use the master card to perform subsequent issuance operations.

[0047] Specifically, before the issuing system performs the action of writing the root key to the master card, the master card issuance verification hash code must be entered correctly.

[0048] The completion of the master card issuance is a milestone, signifying that the master card has transformed from a blank card into a functional, secure device containing the system's top secrets (root key) and protected by cryptography. Thereafter, it will serve as the sole source for issuing all sub-encrypted cards.

[0049] Step S30: Based on the master card, issue at least one type of sub-encryption card.

[0050] It should be noted that the generation of all sub-encryption cards must use the root key stored in the master card as the computational material. Without the master card, it is impossible to legally issue sub-encryption cards.

[0051] Sub-encryption cards are secondary security encryption cards issued from the master card for specific purposes. They do not store the root key itself, but rather communication root keys generated from the root key and applied to different scenarios. For example, the sub-encryption cards include the following types: Encryption chip sub-encryption card: Used to issue encryption chips, usually placed together with NFC radio frequency chips; Main control microcontroller unit (MCU) sub-encryption card: used to issue the main control MCU of the air purifier; Secure Encryption Tag Sub-Encryption Card: Used to issue NFC tags that are affixed to the filter element.

[0052] As an example, the issuance process for a sub-encryption card includes: Access verification: Verify whether the hash code issued by the sub-encryption control matches the set value; Key distribution: Using the root key in the master card, combined with a specific distribution factor (such as MCU distribution factor, tag distribution factor) and a specific encryption algorithm, cryptographic calculations are performed to generate a new and unique communication root key; Write and lock: Write the communication root key into a blank sub-encryption card and complete the card initialization and security configuration, which means that the issuance of this type of sub-encryption card is completed.

[0053] In this embodiment, by generating and issuing a master card and a sub-encryption card, a highly secure root of trust is created for the anti-counterfeiting of air purifier filter cartridges, which can fundamentally solve the problems of weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities and lack of control over the issuance process in related technologies.

[0054] Based on any of the above embodiments, determining the required dispersion factor length for each department according to the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is an integer multiple of the target length, the length of the dispersion factor provided by each department is determined as the first length; wherein, the dispersion factor provided by each department is composed of a first part and a second part, the first part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the first length, and the second part is a random number of at least one byte.

[0055] Optionally, when the number of departments is an integer multiple of the target length, it means that the target length L is divisible by the number of departments N. In this case, an equal allocation strategy is needed, where each department is assigned the exact same distribution factor length, the value of which is equal to the target length L divided by the number of departments N. For example, if the first length K = L / N = 16 / 4 = 4 bytes, then each of the four departments needs to provide a distribution factor of length 4 bytes.

[0056] The dispersion factor provided by each department consists of a first part and a second part, which means that the dispersion factor is formed by concatenating two data segments with different functions and sources end to end.

[0057] In this embodiment, the department-defined key does not fill the entire dispersion factor length (first length). Assuming the first length is K, the length of the first part is KM (where M≥1).

[0058] Specifically, random numbers are unpredictable numbers generated by a random number generator (true random or pseudo random). The introduction of random numbers increases the randomness (entropy) of the dispersion factor, so that even if two departments accidentally use the same custom key, their final dispersion factors will be completely different due to the different random numbers.

[0059] The random number can be 1 byte, 2 bytes, etc., as long as it can fill the first length together with the first part.

[0060] In this embodiment, when the number of departments matches the target length well, an equal distribution factor generation scheme is provided. By introducing random numbers into the factor of each department, the entropy value is significantly increased, making the root key extremely difficult to deduce even if it is partially leaked.

[0061] Based on any of the above embodiments, determining the required dispersion factor length for each department according to the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is not an integer multiple of the target length, it is determined that at least two departments provide different dispersion factor lengths; wherein, for departments with longer dispersion factor lengths, their dispersion factor is composed of a third part and a fourth part, wherein the third part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the length of the dispersion factor of that department, and the fourth part is a random number of at least one byte.

[0062] It should be noted that when the number of departments is not an integer multiple of the target length, it means that the target length L cannot be divided by the number of departments N, which requires an unequal allocation strategy.

[0063] Because the distribution cannot be even, the system calculates a set of length values, where at least two values ​​are different. This typically manifests as most departments being assigned a longer length, a few departments being assigned a shorter length, or the existence of a length gradient.

[0064] For example, the first R departments (i.e., the first department) are allocated a length of K = 6 bytes. The remaining NR = 2 departments (i.e., the second and third departments) equally divide the remaining LR. K = 16 - 6 = 10 bytes, which is 5 bytes each. That is, Department 1 length = 6 bytes; Department 2 length = 5 bytes; Department 3 length = 5 bytes. It is clear that the dispersion factor lengths of Department 1, Department 2, and Department 3 are different.

[0065] Understandably, a sector with a longer dispersion factor length refers to those sectors that, in unequal allocation, are assigned to sectors with a length greater than the minimum. For example, sector 1 has a length of 6 bytes, which is greater than the lengths of sectors 2 and 3 (5 bytes). Therefore, in this context, a sector with a longer dispersion factor length refers to sector 1.

[0066] The dispersion factor of departments with longer dispersion factors is also composed of two data segments: one part is the department's custom key segment, and the other part is a random number.

[0067] In addition, the dispersion factor of the shorter dispersion factor section can consist of only a custom key, or it can consist of a custom key plus a random number.

[0068] In this embodiment, a flexible non-equal distribution strategy is provided for scenarios where the length cannot be evenly divided. While ensuring the accuracy of the total length, a "key + random number" structure is used for the parts that contribute longer lengths, thus ensuring data security.

[0069] Based on any of the above embodiments, step S30 includes: If the issuance verification hash code corresponding to the sub-encryption card type is verified as passed, the root key in the mother card is used to generate the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type. The communication root key is written into the corresponding sub-encryption card to complete the issuance of the sub-encryption card; the sub-encryption card includes at least one of an encryption chip sub-encryption card, a main control microcontroller sub-encryption card, and a security encryption tag sub-encryption card.

[0070] It's important to note that the issuance verification hash code for a sub-encryption card type is different from the issuance verification hash code for the master card. It's a separate password specifically designed for issuing a particular type of sub-encryption card. This means that even if you possess the master card, you cannot issue a sub-card without knowing its issuance password. For example, issuing a "encryption chip sub-encryption card" has a unique password A, and issuing a "master control MCU sub-encryption card" has a unique password B.

[0071] Specifically, after selecting the type of sub-card to be issued in the issuance software, the system will pop up a password input box, requiring the operator to enter the specific issuance verification hash code for that type of sub-card.

[0072] The purpose of the target dispersion factor is to uniquely generate a communication root key for that type of daughter card when combined with the root key for cryptographic calculations. For example, the dispersion factor of the encryption chip, the dispersion factor of the MCU, and the dispersion factor of the tag achieve a single key serving multiple purposes, but with different security effects.

[0073] The encryption algorithm refers to the specific cryptographic algorithm (such as AES, SM4, DES, etc.) used in this distributed computing. Different types of sub-cards can use the same or different algorithms.

[0074] It should be understood that generating the corresponding communication root key through dispersion means combining the root key with a dispersion factor to generate a new, derived key. This process is unidirectional; it is impossible to deduce the root key from the communication root key.

[0075] The communication root key is a key generated and stored in the sub-encryption card. It is no longer the system's overall root key, but a secondary master key specifically used for authentication and session key generation in a particular communication link (such as between the encryption chip and the MCU).

[0076] For example, the issuing tool securely transmits and stores one or more generated communication root keys into the secure storage area of ​​a blank, specific type of sub-encryption card via a communication interface (such as USB or a smart card reader). This blank card, initialized with a valid communication root key usable for its specific function, becomes a usable, valid security element. For instance, a blank card, after having "encryption chip communication root key," "MCU communication root key," and "tag communication root key" written into it, completes its issuance and becomes an "encryption chip sub-encryption card (SE Card)."

[0077] Encryption chip sub-encryption card: Used to issue working keys for the encryption chip on the air purifier motherboard that is responsible for NFC communication.

[0078] Main control microcontroller unit sub-encryption card: Used to issue its working key for the air purifier's main control MCU.

[0079] Secure Encryption Tag Sub-Encryption Card: Used to issue working keys for NFC tags on the filter element.

[0080] In this embodiment, access control for the issuance process of sub-encryption cards is implemented. Through type-specific password verification and a root key-based distribution algorithm, the independence and security of different types of sub-encryption cards are ensured, laying a solid foundation for the secure issuance of sub-encryption cards to downstream devices (tags, chips, MCUs) and achieving initial control over the issuance process.

[0081] Based on any of the above embodiments, the step of generating the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type includes: Based on the dispersion factor of the control board microcontroller unit, the dispersion factor of the encryption chip, and the dispersion factor of the security encryption tag, and using the first encryption algorithm, the second encryption algorithm, and the third encryption algorithm respectively to disperse them, the corresponding microcontroller unit communication root key, encryption chip communication root key, and security encryption tag communication root key are generated.

[0082] It should be noted that the encryption chip dispersion factor, the control board microcontroller dispersion factor, and the security encryption tag dispersion factor are three different, predefined data blocks (which can be strings or byte sequences). They are concrete instances of the target dispersion factor. Specifically, the encryption chip dispersion factor is used to generate the encryption chip's own authentication root key. The control board microcontroller dispersion factor is used to generate the root key for communication with the main control MCU. The security encryption tag dispersion factor is used to generate the root key for communication with the security encryption tag. These three factors ensure that even using the same master card root key, completely different and independent communication root keys can be generated for different communication peers, achieving key isolation.

[0083] During the distribution process, three different encryption algorithms are used for each of the three distribution factors. The second encryption algorithm is used to combine the encryption chip's distribution factor to generate the encryption chip's communication root key. The first encryption algorithm is used to combine the control board's microcontroller's distribution factor to generate the microcontroller's communication root key. The third encryption algorithm is used to combine the security encryption tag's distribution factor to generate the security encryption tag's communication root key. Using different algorithms further increases the system's complexity and resistance to attacks. Even if one algorithm is cracked in the future, it will only affect one communication link and will not endanger the entire system.

[0084] Specifically, using the root key in the master card, cryptographic calculations are performed with three dispersion factors and corresponding algorithms to generate the corresponding encryption chip communication root key, microcontroller unit communication root key, and secure encryption tag communication root key. The encryption chip communication root key is written to the SE card for the encryption chip's authentication or internal secure storage. The microcontroller unit communication root key is written to the SE card as the root key for establishing a secure communication channel between the SE card and the main control MCU. The secure encryption tag communication root key is written to the SE card as the root key for establishing a secure communication channel between the SE card (via the NFC chip) and the filter tag.

[0085] In this embodiment, a multi-factor, multi-algorithm parallel distribution mechanism is adopted for the encryption chip sub-encryption card to generate all necessary communication root keys at once. This not only improves issuance efficiency but also achieves superposition of encryption strength and risk isolation through algorithm diversity, ensuring that even if a single algorithm is compromised, the entire system will not be jeopardized.

[0086] Based on any of the above embodiments, the method further includes: When issuing the sub-encryption card, the number of device keys authorized by the sub-encryption card to be issued is subject to an upper limit control.

[0087] It should be noted that one of the purposes of controlling the number of cards issued is to reduce security risks and economic losses. Even if a single encrypted card and its password are illegally obtained, the damage that an attacker could cause can be limited to a predetermined, acceptable range.

[0088] The device key issued by the sub-encryption card refers to the final product components, namely the security encryption tag, encryption chip, and main control microcontroller chip. The device key is the communication key written into these final product components. This key is generated by the corresponding sub-encryption card based on the device's UID.

[0089] Authorized issuance means that a single encryption chip sub-encryption card is authorized to issue device keys for multiple encryption chips.

[0090] The number of issuances refers to the maximum number of times a specific sub-encryption card can successfully perform a device key issuance operation during its lifetime.

[0091] In the specific implementation, the root key dispersion factor is generated as follows: Set the root key dispersion factor and rootKey length to 0. The unit is bytes. satisfy: ;in, And N is an integer.

[0092] To improve encryption strength, and considering practical considerations, it is required that the root key dispersion factor be defined by personnel from at least two departments, each with their own defined dispersion factor. Here, the number of departments is defined as X. .

[0093] When the number of departments or units X that need to provide the dispersion factor is different, in order to ensure that these dispersion factors can still be combined to satisfy the root key length... The requirement is to design a root key dispersion factor generation scheme as follows: 1) When When divisible, set ,here yes The result of divisibility.

[0094] The provider of the first dispersion factor provides a key length of... The dispersion factor is composed of the following: (length is () ) bytes of custom key (+1 byte of random number) .here It is a random number with a length of 1 byte generated by a random number generator.

[0095] The provider of the second dispersion factor provides a key length of... The dispersion factor is composed of the following: (length is () ) bytes of custom key (+1 byte of random number) ,here It is a random number with a length of 1 byte generated by a random number generator.

[0096] And so on, the first The provider of the dispersion factor provides a key length of [number]. The dispersion factor is composed of the following: (length is () ) bytes of custom key A random number of length 1 byte; Finally, length The root key dispersion factor is composed as follows: (length is () ) bytes of custom key (+1 byte of random number) + (length is ( ) bytes of custom key (+1 byte of random number) +…+(length is ( ) bytes of custom key (+1 byte of random number) .

[0097] 2) When If not divisible, set ,Right now yes The quotient is an integer.

[0098] set up ,Right now yes The remainder after taking the remainder when X is equal to X.

[0099] In this case, the first dispersion factor ~ the second The length of each dispersion factor is , No. ( The length of each dispersion factor is ,in, ; The provider of the first dispersion factor provides a key length of... The dispersion factor is composed of the following: (length is) Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) ,in, It is a random number with a length of 1 byte generated by a random number generator.

[0100] The provider of the second dispersion factor provides a key length of... The dispersion factor is composed as follows: (length is...) Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) ,in, It is a random number with a length of 1 byte generated by a random number generator.

[0101] And so on, the first The provider of the dispersion factor provides a key length of [number]. The dispersion factor is composed as follows: (length is...) Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) .in, It is a random number with a length of 1 byte generated by a random number generator.

[0102] The provider of the Xth dispersion factor provides a key of length X. The dispersion factor is composed as follows: (length is...) Byte's custom key ).

[0103] Finally, length The root key dispersion factor is composed as follows: (length is) Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) + (length is Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) +…+ (length is Byte's custom key (+1 byte of random number) + (length is Byte's custom key ).

[0104] For the two situations mentioned above, the following advantages are available: 1. Based on actual application conditions, a reasonable number X of departments that need to generate root key distribution factors can be set, and these departments can be given relatively average distribution factor permissions to jointly form the root key distribution factor, which improves the reliability of the root key distribution factor and ensures that the issuance of tag keys is decided jointly by all issuing departments. 2. Each user department can define its own key and keep it safe, and a random number factor has been introduced.

[0105] Only by obtaining the custom keys of all departments and acquiring the corresponding random numbers can the composition of the root key dispersion factor be determined, increasing the difficulty of cracking the root key dispersion factor acquisition. This, in turn, enhances the security of the entire issuance system.

[0106] For the issuance of master cards and sub-encrypted cards: After the root key composition method of the above-mentioned master card issuance constitutes the root key dispersion factor, when using the root key dispersion factor to generate the master card with the encryption algorithm, the verification hash code of the master card issuance is set.

[0107] like Figure 2 As shown, the root key dispersion factor is composed of X dispersion factors.

[0108] The root key dispersion factor is composed of dispersion factors 1 to dispersion factor X, totaling X dispersion factors. The root key dispersion factor is hashed to obtain a hash value. The first 16 bytes of the hash value are taken as the root key and written into the mother card, or the first 8 bytes and the last 8 bytes of the hash value are taken as the root key and written into the mother card. This embodiment does not limit this. Before hashing, a master card issuance verification hash code needs to be entered. This hash code is used to verify the user when issuing sub-encrypted cards (encryption chip sub-encrypted cards, MCU sub-encrypted cards, and tag sub-encrypted cards) using the master card. That is, only by correctly entering the master card issuance verification hash code can the issuance of each sub-encrypted card be executed, preventing the master card from being used illegally to issue sub-encrypted cards and improving the security of the master card.

[0109] like Figure 3As shown, for the encryption card used in the issuance of the encryption chip, three dispersion factors are required: a custom encryption chip dispersion factor, a custom control board MCU dispersion factor, and a custom security encryption tag dispersion factor. These three dispersion factors are dispersed using encryption algorithm 1, encryption algorithm 2, and encryption algorithm 3, respectively, to obtain the encryption chip communication root key, the MCU communication root key, and the security encryption tag communication root key. Finally, these three root keys are written into the unissued encryption chip sub-encryption card to obtain the issued encryption chip sub-encryption card (SE Card).

[0110] In addition, before distributing, a verification hash code for the encryption chip issuance needs to be entered. This code is used to generate the communication key for the encryption chip using the encryption chip sub-encryption card (SE Card) later, preventing the encryption chip sub-encryption card from being used illegally and improving security.

[0111] When issuing sub-encryption cards using the issued master card, the number of keys for each sub-encryption card, such as encryption chips and encryption tags, is limited after issuance (keys cannot be issued if the limit is exceeded). This limits and controls the number of chips authorized for issuance by a single sub-encryption card. Furthermore, if the issuance tool and verification hash code of the sub-encryption card are illegally obtained, the number of illegally counterfeited encryption chips or encryption tags is limited, thus improving security.

[0112] like Figure 4 As shown, for the sub-encryption card issued by the main control board MCU, a custom control board MCU dispersion factor is used, and encryption algorithm 2 is used to disperse the main control MCU to obtain the communication root key of the main control MCU. The mother card writes the communication root key into the unissued main control MCU sub-encryption card to obtain the issued main control MCU sub-encryption card.

[0113] Before distributing, a verification hash code issued by the main control MCU needs to be entered. This code is used to generate the MCU key using the main control MCU sub-encryption card (MCU Card) later, to prevent the main control MCU sub-encryption card from being used illegally and to improve security.

[0114] like Figure 5 As shown, for the sub-encryption card used for issuing the security encryption tag chip, a custom security encryption tag dispersion factor is used, and encryption algorithm 3 is used to disperse the data to obtain the root key of the security encryption tag chip, which is then written into the security encryption tag sub-encryption card.

[0115] Before distributing, a security encryption tag issuance verification hash code needs to be entered. This code is used to generate the key for the tag using the security encryption tag chip sub-encryption card (TAG Card) later, preventing the security encryption tag sub-encryption card from being used illegally and improving security.

[0116] In this embodiment, by setting an upper limit on the number of sub-encryption cards that can be issued, the potential economic losses due to card loss, theft, or internal misuse are limited to a controllable range. This solves the problem in related technologies where the filter cartridges are easily counterfeited and illegally issued, leading to extremely high economic losses.

[0117] Based on the methods described in any of the above embodiments, this application also provides, as follows: Figure 6 The diagram shows the structure of an electronic device. Figure 6 At the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor, an internal bus, a network interface, memory, and non-volatile memory, and may also include other hardware required for business operations. The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into memory and then runs it to implement the methods described in any of the above embodiments.

[0118] Based on the methods described in any of the above embodiments, this application also provides a computer storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, can be used to perform the methods described in any of the above embodiments.

[0119] Based on the methods described in any of the above embodiments, this application also provides a computer program product, which includes one or more computer programs or instructions. The computer program or instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another. When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the methods described in any of the above embodiments.

[0120] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can also be implemented in other ways. The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of apparatus, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of this application. In this regard, each block in a flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, segment, or portion of code containing one or more executable instructions for implementing a specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the blocks may occur in a different order than those marked in the drawings. For example, two consecutive blocks may actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each block in a block diagram and / or flowchart, and combinations of blocks in block diagrams and / or flowcharts, can be implemented using a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or action, or using a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0121] In addition, the functional modules in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module can exist independently, or two or more modules can be integrated to form an independent part.

[0122] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional modules and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0123] The above description is merely an embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following figures indicate similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.

[0124] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

[0125] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

Claims

1. A method for issuing a secure encrypted card, characterized in that, The method includes: The root key dispersion factor is encrypted to generate the root key; the root key dispersion factor is generated through the following steps: obtaining the target length of the root key and the number of departments providing the dispersion factor; determining the length of the dispersion factor required by each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments; wherein each dispersion factor is at least partially composed of a key defined by the corresponding department. Write the root key into the master card and set the master card issuance verification hash code to complete the issuance of the master card; Based on the master card, at least one type of sub-encryption card is issued.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the required dispersion factor length for each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is an integer multiple of the target length, the length of the dispersion factor provided by each department is determined as the first length; wherein, the dispersion factor provided by each department is composed of a first part and a second part, the first part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the first length, and the second part is a random number of at least one byte.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the required dispersion factor length for each department based on the mathematical relationship between the target length and the number of departments includes: When the number of departments is not an integer multiple of the target length, it is determined that at least two departments provide different dispersion factor lengths; wherein, for departments with longer dispersion factor lengths, their dispersion factor is composed of a third part and a fourth part, wherein the third part is a key customized by the corresponding department, the length of which is less than the length of the dispersion factor of that department, and the fourth part is a random number of at least one byte.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The issuance of at least one type of sub-encryption card based on the master card includes: If the issuance verification hash code corresponding to the sub-encryption card type is verified as passed, the root key in the mother card is used to generate the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type. The communication root key is written into the corresponding sub-encryption card to complete the issuance of the sub-encryption card; the sub-encryption card includes at least one of an encryption chip sub-encryption card, a main control microcontroller sub-encryption card, and a security encryption tag sub-encryption card.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of generating the corresponding communication root key based on the target dispersion factor and encryption algorithm corresponding to the sub-encryption card type includes: Based on the dispersion factor of the control board microcontroller unit, the dispersion factor of the encryption chip, and the dispersion factor of the security encryption tag, and using the first encryption algorithm, the second encryption algorithm, and the third encryption algorithm respectively to disperse them, the corresponding microcontroller unit communication root key, encryption chip communication root key, and security encryption tag communication root key are generated.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: When issuing the sub-encryption card, the number of device keys authorized by the sub-encryption card to be issued is subject to an upper limit control.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; Wherein, when the processor invokes the executable instructions, it implements the method according to any one of claims 1-6.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, It stores computer instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of any of the methods described in claims 1-6.

9. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any one of claims 1-6.

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