A method and system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise

Abstract

This application provides a method and system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, relating to the field of timestamp generation technology. The method generates a unique environmental fingerprint by collecting signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals. The hash information of the environmental fingerprint is then bound together with the document hash and the precise UTC generation time using a quantum-resistant signature algorithm to generate a timestamp token. A data storage package is then constructed based on the timestamp token and uploaded to a distributed file storage system. During verification, the environmental fingerprint at the generation time is reconstructed by querying historical public radio data, thereby completing independent verification, improving the security of the timestamp, and effectively solving the problems of timestamp technology relying on centralized institutions and being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. This achieves a decentralized, highly secure, and low-cost trusted timestamp service.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of timestamp generation technology, and in particular to a method and system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise. Background Technology

[0002] In the digital age, trusted timestamps are crucial for ensuring the validity of electronic data such as contracts, intellectual property, and financial transaction records. A trusted timestamp can prove that an electronic document existed before a specific point in time and has not been tampered with since. Timestamp generation relies on public key infrastructure timestamp protocols. This involves sending the document's hash value to a trusted timestamp authority, which then uses its private key to sign the hash value and the current authoritative time, generating a timestamp token.

[0003] The trust in the aforementioned timestamp generation system stems from the digital certificates of the timestamp institutions and the reliability of their time sources. However, with the development of quantum computing technology, cryptography based on large integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem faces the threat of being broken by quantum algorithms. This means attackers could potentially forge the signatures of timestamp institutions, generating fake timestamps in bulk, thus jeopardizing the digital trust system.

[0004] To address threats to digital trust systems, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms can be applied to timestamp services. However, PQC algorithms suffer from low computational performance, massive signature data volumes, and high deployment costs, and do not change their inherent centralized dependency. Furthermore, the timestamp generation process relies on a few centralized time servers. When these servers are vulnerable to cyberattacks, manipulation, or single points of failure, the time source can become distorted. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, embodiments of this application provide a method and system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, in order to solve the problem that timestamp generation technology relies on centralized institutions and is vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, resulting in low security.

[0006] According to a first aspect of this application, a method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise is provided, the method comprising: Obtain the target electronic document and the time of its timestamp generation; Based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint; the environmental fingerprint is a feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the signal characteristics. Calculate hash information, which includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value of the target electronic document; the fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value of the environmental fingerprint. The document signature hash information, the fingerprint signature hash information, and the generation time are concatenated into a data block to be signed; The data block to be signed is signed using a stateless hash signing private key to generate a timestamp token; The evidence storage data packet is constructed based on the timestamp token, and the evidence storage data packet is uploaded to the distributed file storage system.

[0007] In some embodiments, the method further includes: Download the evidence storage data package from the distributed file storage system; The evidence storage data packet is decrypted using a stateless hash signature public key to obtain decrypted data, which includes the fingerprint signature hash information and the decryption time. Historical electromagnetic data can be queried based on the decryption time and acquisition frequency band information; Calculate the hash value of the historical electromagnetic data to obtain fingerprint verification hash information; A signature verification result is generated by comparing the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information. If the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are the same, a signature verification result indicating successful signature verification is generated. If the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are different, a signature verification result indicating failed signature verification is generated.

[0008] In some embodiments, the decrypted data further includes document decryption hash information, and the method further includes: Extract the document decryption hash information from the decrypted data; Calculate the hash value of the target electronic document to obtain document verification hash information; If the document verification hash information is the same as the document decryption hash information, query historical electromagnetic data based on the generation time and acquisition frequency band information; If the document verification hash information is different from the document decryption hash information, a document integrity prompt message is generated, which indicates that the document integrity verification has failed.

[0009] In some embodiments, based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: A trigger signal is generated based on the aforementioned generation time; In response to the trigger signal, a sampling window is constructed; According to the sampling window, the instantaneous signal amplitude of the environmental electromagnetic signal at each frequency point is sampled to obtain multiple amplitude sampling results; The multiple amplitude sampling results are combined into an instantaneous amplitude vector; The environmental fingerprint is generated based on the instantaneous amplitude vector.

[0010] In some embodiments, generating the environmental fingerprint based on the instantaneous amplitude vector includes: Based on the network time protocol, multiple synchronized times are obtained from multiple time servers; A clock filtering algorithm is used to control the local clock error based on multiple synchronization times in order to output the generated time. Perform z-value standardization on the instantaneous amplitude vector to obtain a normalized vector; The first-order difference vector of the normalized vector is calculated based on the mean and standard deviation of multiple amplitude sampling results in the instantaneous amplitude vector; The normalized vector and the first-order difference vector are concatenated to form the environmental fingerprint.

[0011] In some embodiments, based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: At the generation time, a predefined broadcast environment electromagnetic signal is received; Record information data frames in the environmental electromagnetic signals, the information data frames including digital information that changes over time; the digital information includes a cyclic redundancy check code, a signal timestamp, and a frame count; Extract key fields from the information data frame, the key fields including the digital information; The environment fingerprint is generated based on the key fields.

[0012] In some embodiments, based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: Multiple fingerprint collection nodes are randomly selected in a distributed network; By using multiple fingerprint acquisition nodes, the signal characteristics of environmental electromagnetic signals are acquired based on the generation time to obtain multiple local environment vectors; According to the consensus algorithm, a target vector is selected from multiple local environment vectors, and the environment fingerprint is generated based on the target vector.

[0013] In some embodiments, the method further includes: Monitoring time anchor point phenomena and events; When a time anchor event exceeding the response threshold is detected, the start time and characteristic parameters of the time anchor event are recorded. The start time and the feature parameters are combined to generate an event information vector; The environmental fingerprint is generated based on the event information vector.

[0014] In some embodiments, constructing a data packet for evidence storage based on the timestamp token and uploading the data packet to a distributed file storage system includes: Obtain the acquisition frequency band information and stateless hash signature public key of the signal characteristics; The evidence storage data packet is constructed, and the evidence storage data packet includes the timestamp token, the generation time, the stateless hash signature public key, and the collection frequency band information; The evidence storage data packet is uploaded to a distributed file storage system to obtain a content identifier; Broadcast the content identifier to a public blockchain network.

[0015] According to a second aspect of this application, a system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using ambient electromagnetic noise is provided, the system comprising: The data acquisition module is used to acquire the target electronic document and the generation time of the timestamp; An environmental fingerprint acquisition module is used to synchronously trigger the acquisition of signal features of multi-frequency environmental electromagnetic signals based on the target electronic document, so as to generate an environmental fingerprint; the environmental fingerprint is a feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the signal features. A hash calculation module is used to calculate hash information, which includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value of the target electronic document; the fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value of the environmental fingerprint. The data block generation module is used to concatenate the document signature hash information, the fingerprint signature hash information, and the generation time into a data block to be signed; A quantum-resistant signature module is used to sign the data block to be signed using a stateless hash signature private key to generate a timestamp token; The evidence storage module is used to construct an evidence storage data package based on the timestamp token and upload the evidence storage data package to a distributed file storage system.

[0016] According to a third aspect of this application, a computer device is provided, including a storage medium, a processor, and a computer program stored on the storage medium and executable on the processor, wherein the processor, when executing the program, implements the above-described method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using ambient electromagnetic noise.

[0017] According to a fourth aspect of this application, a storage medium is provided that stores a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using ambient electromagnetic noise.

[0018] By employing the above technical solutions, this application provides a method and system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise. The method generates a unique environmental fingerprint by collecting signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals. The hash information of the environmental fingerprint is then bound together with the document hash and the generation time of the precise UTC using a quantum-resistant signature algorithm to generate a timestamp token. A data storage package is then constructed based on the timestamp token and uploaded to a distributed file storage system. During verification, the environmental fingerprint at the generation time is reconstructed by querying historical public radio data, thereby completing independent verification, improving the security of the timestamp, and effectively solving the problems of timestamp technology relying on centralized institutions and being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. This achieves a decentralized, highly secure, and low-cost trusted timestamp service.

[0019] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more obvious and understandable, the following are specific embodiments of this application. Attached Figure Description

[0020] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating the quantum-resistant timestamp generation, storage, and verification process provided in this application embodiment; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the process for collecting raw environmental fingerprint vectors provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the process for generating enhanced feature vectors provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the process for generating timestamp tokens provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the timestamp verification process provided in this application embodiment; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the process for generating environmental fingerprints by monitoring time anchor points, provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 8 A schematic diagram of a quantum-resistant timestamp generation system using environmental electromagnetic noise, provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0021] The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other.

[0022] In this application embodiment, timestamps can be applied to business scenarios such as blockchain transaction time authentication, electronic evidence preservation, intellectual property protection, and financial transaction records. By adding a trusted timestamp to electronic data that needs authentication in business scenarios, the validity of the electronic data is proven.

[0023] For example, trusted timestamps can be used to ensure the validity of electronic data such as contracts, intellectual property, and financial transaction records. Once a trusted timestamp is added to an electronic document, it can be used to prove that the document existed before a specific point in time and has not been tampered with since.

[0024] In some embodiments, timestamp generation may rely on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) timestamp protocol, which generates a timestamp token by sending the document hash value to a trusted timestamp authority, which then uses its private key to sign the hash value and the current authoritative time.

[0025] The trust in the timestamp generation system described in the above embodiments stems from the digital certificates of the timestamp authority and the reliability of its time source. With the development of quantum computing technology, cryptography based on large integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem faces the threat of being broken by quantum algorithms. That is, attackers could potentially forge the signatures of timestamp authorities, generating fake timestamps in bulk, thus threatening the digital trust system.

[0026] To address threats to digital trust systems, some implementations apply Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms to timestamp services. PQC key generation functions (such as Dilithium's KeyGen) generate public-private key pairs for the timestamp service, and the generated public key is distributed to users who need to verify the timestamps. When generating a timestamp, a PQC signature function (such as Dilithium's Sign) is used to sign the timestamp, request message, timestamp value, and other related data. The generated signature is then returned to the requester along with the timestamp. Upon receiving the timestamp and signature, the requester uses a PQC verification function (such as Dilithium's Verify) and the public key to verify the signature. If the verification is successful, the integrity and authenticity of the timestamp are confirmed.

[0027] However, the PQC algorithm suffers from low computational performance, massive signature data volume, and high deployment costs, and it still doesn't change its fundamental centralized dependency. Furthermore, the timestamp generation process relies on a few centralized time servers. When these servers suffer network attacks, manipulation, or single points of failure, the time source can become distorted.

[0028] In some embodiments, verifiable timestamp delay generation can also be based on the spectral characteristics of wireless signals. This involves using the intensity changes or spectral characteristics of a specific radio station signal (such as an FM broadcast) received at a specific location as a random, unpredictable source of common entropy to generate a time proof or delay proof. When generating the timestamp, data acquisition can begin. Specifically, at a specific time T and location L, a radio receiving device captures environmental electromagnetic signals in one or more predefined frequency bands (such as the 88-108MHz FM broadcast band). Then, feature extraction is performed to extract a feature F from the received signal, such as the signal strength vector of all FM stations at time T; the carrier phase or signal-to-noise ratio at a specific frequency; or the signal's spectrum within a specific time window. This feature F or its hash value H(F) is then used as the "environmental fingerprint" or "time assertion" at time T and location L.

[0029] If a verifier wants to prove that an event occurred after time T, they need to reproduce the signal acquisition at the same location L and the same frequency band, and prove that it is impossible to acquire a fingerprint that is exactly the same as H(F), or prove that the fingerprint appeared after T.

[0030] However, this timestamp generation method is highly location-dependent, heavily reliant on a specific geographic location L. Its "time assertion" is only valid at location L, resulting in poor versatility. Once the device moves, or if timestamps need to be generated and verified in different locations, this scheme completely fails, limiting its application scope as a universal timestamp service.

[0031] Furthermore, this generation method relies on the intensity changes of a large-scale broadcast signal, which are slow, resulting in low accuracy of time assertions, only reaching minute or even hourly levels, failing to meet the requirements of most timestamp applications that require second or millisecond accuracy. Moreover, the signal of a single radio station may be interrupted or fluctuate drastically due to weather, obstacles, equipment switching, etc., causing feature F to be extremely unstable, making it difficult to generate reliable and repeatable assertions, thus resulting in poor robustness.

[0032] Furthermore, the proof generated by the method is a local, relative delayed proof or existence proof, rather than a global, absolute timestamp. It fails to deeply integrate the generated environment assertion with standard digital signature processes, nor does it form a self-contained timestamp token that can be directly adopted by application systems. Since it does not specify the use of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms in generating and binding assertions, it does not explicitly address quantum computing threats, and its overall security remains vulnerable to quantum computers.

[0033] Based on the timestamp generation method described in the above embodiments, the timestamp generation technology relies on centralized institutions. Furthermore, the process of generating timestamps using environmental electromagnetic signals suffers from fundamental flaws such as location dependence, low accuracy, and poor practicality. Moreover, it lacks a complete, quantum-resistant, and universally applicable timestamp service system, making it vulnerable to quantum computing attacks and resulting in low technical security.

[0034] To address the issue of low security caused by the reliance on centralized institutions and vulnerability to quantum computing attacks in timestamp generation technology, some embodiments of this application provide a method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise. The method collects broad-spectrum, readily available environmental electromagnetic noise, transforms its instantaneous state into a unique environmental fingerprint representing a specific point in time, and then uses a quantum-resistant signature algorithm to sign the hash value of the environmental fingerprint together with the hash value of the document to be signed, thereby generating a composite quantum-resistant timestamp that relies on both the physical world's non-cloning property and the security of mathematical computation.

[0035] The method can be applied to electronic devices with data processing capabilities. These electronic devices include, but are not limited to, computers, servers, mobile terminals, smart wearable devices, and industrial control machines. For ease of description, this application embodiment uses an electronic device as the execution subject of the method. It should be understood that the method can also be applied to other types of execution subjects, which are not illustrated in this application embodiment. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes: S101. Obtain the target electronic document and the time of timestamp generation.

[0036] To generate an anti-chaining timestamp, the target electronic document can be obtained first. The target electronic document refers to the electronic document to be signed and verified, and can take on different document formats depending on the specific application scenario. For example, the target electronic document can be a contract, evidence, archive, or other business documents. Furthermore, the target electronic document can be one or more combinations of various file formats such as text, images, videos, audio, and compressed files.

[0037] like Figure 2As shown, when acquiring a target electronic document, the target timestamp generation time can also be synchronized, i.e., the generation time of the timestamp corresponding to the target electronic document can be obtained. The generation time uses Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which is an internationally recognized standard time base and can be used as the final authoritative time for timestamp tracing.

[0038] The generated time can be obtained through a Network Time Protocol (NTP) client. An NTP client is a software program or hardware module that runs on a computer or embedded device. Its core function is to communicate with one or more NTP servers through the Network Time Protocol to obtain accurate time information and adjust the local device's system clock accordingly to keep it synchronized with an authoritative time source.

[0039] When obtaining the generation time, the electronic device can generate a time synchronization command based on the target electronic document after acquiring it, and send the time synchronization command to the NTP client. After receiving the time synchronization command, the NTP client can respond with the current time as the timestamp generation time.

[0040] S102. Based on the target electronic document, synchronously trigger the acquisition of signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals to generate an environmental fingerprint.

[0041] To address the issue of timestamp generation technology relying on centralized institutions, a universal timestamp method can be constructed, enabling users to generate timestamps in any location with a basic electromagnetic signal environment, and allowing any verifier to independently verify the timestamps regardless of the generation location. To this end, after acquiring the target electronic document and the timestamp generation time, environmental fingerprinting can be performed. This involves synchronously triggering the acquisition of signal characteristics from multi-frequency environmental electromagnetic signals based on the target electronic document to generate an environmental fingerprint.

[0042] Environmental fingerprints can serve as a decentralized time source during timestamp generation, relying on ubiquitous environmental electromagnetic noise that cannot be controlled by a single entity. Environmental electromagnetic noise refers to broadband random electromagnetic signals generated in the natural environment by various radio stations, communication equipment, and natural radiation. This noise can include FM radio broadcasts, digital television signals, and cellular network signals. While these signals are spatially multiplexed over a large area, their spectral characteristics are globally perceptible and recordable, thus serving as an unpredictable source of physical entropy.

[0043] In some embodiments, software-defined radio (SDR) can be used to collect ambient electromagnetic noise. SDR is a system that implements radio hardware functions through software and is an ideal hardware foundation for environmental fingerprinting.

[0044] An environmental fingerprint is a digital feature vector that uniquely represents the instantaneous state of environmental electromagnetic noise at a specific moment. During environmental fingerprint acquisition, the original environmental fingerprint vector is first obtained by feature extraction from the electromagnetic signal. This original environmental fingerprint vector is a raw data vector directly output by the environmental fingerprint acquisition module, consisting of the instantaneous signal amplitude values ​​at multiple frequency points. Then, feature enhancement is performed on the original environmental fingerprint vector to obtain an enhanced feature vector. The enhanced feature vector is a feature vector with stronger anti-interference capabilities obtained after normalization and feature enhancement processing of the original environmental fingerprint. In this embodiment, unless otherwise specified, the environmental fingerprint refers to the feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the original signal features, i.e., the enhanced feature vector.

[0045] To generate an environmental fingerprint, in some embodiments, when executing the synchronous triggering of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signal acquisition based on a target electronic document to generate the environmental fingerprint, a trigger signal can be generated first based on the generation time, and then a sampling window can be constructed in response to the trigger signal. Then, according to the sampling window, the instantaneous signal amplitude of the environmental electromagnetic signal at each frequency point is sampled to obtain multiple amplitude sampling results. By combining the multiple amplitude sampling results into an instantaneous amplitude vector, the environmental fingerprint is generated based on the instantaneous amplitude vector.

[0046] The electronic device incorporates an environmental fingerprint acquisition module, which can capture the instantaneous state of a broad-spectrum electromagnetic environment at precise time points and generate an original environmental fingerprint. To this end, the electronic device simultaneously scans multiple predefined frequency bands through the environmental fingerprint acquisition module, opens a sampling window at a precise start time point, and then records the instantaneous amplitude values ​​of the signals in each frequency band to form an amplitude vector.

[0047] For example, such as Figure 3 As shown, before signal feature acquisition, frequency band configuration and scanning can be performed. This can be done by pre-setting a globally universal frequency band list, such as (88.0, 108.0, "FM"), (470.0, 790.0, "DTV"), (925.0, 960.0, "GSM900"), etc. Then, software-defined radio can be used to perform a rapid scan at a rate of at least one frequency point per second.

[0048] The environmental fingerprint acquisition module has a built-in high-precision clock synchronized with UTC. At the target timestamp generation time T... sThe module receives a trigger signal and starts a process of length Δ t A sampling window of 100ms (e.g.,) is used to synchronously trigger sampling. Then, within the Δt window, sampling is performed for each frequency point f. i Perform instantaneous signal amplitude A i Sampling. Combine all sampling results into an instantaneous amplitude vector ( V The instantaneous magnitude vector can be represented as: V =[ A f1 , A f2 , A f3 , ..., A fn ],in n This represents the total number of frequency points scanned.

[0049] Then, regarding the acquired instantaneous amplitude vector ( V Feature enhancement processing is performed on the original fingerprint, which involves normalizing and differentially calculating the original fingerprint to enhance its discriminative power. In some embodiments, when generating an environmental fingerprint from the instantaneous amplitude vector, multiple synchronization times can be obtained from multiple time servers based on a network time protocol. A clock filtering algorithm is used to control the local clock error based on the multiple synchronization times to output the generation time. Then, z-value normalization is performed on the instantaneous amplitude vector to obtain a normalized vector. The first-order difference vector of the normalized vector is then calculated based on the mean and standard deviation of the multiple amplitude sampling results in the instantaneous amplitude vector. The normalized vector and the first-order difference vector are then concatenated to form the environmental fingerprint.

[0050] For example, electronic devices can also have a built-in time synchronization and processing module. This module provides a reliable time reference and performs standardization and feature enhancement on the original environmental fingerprint. It can normalize the original amplitude vector, calculate the first-order difference of the normalized vector, and concatenate the normalized vector with the difference vector to form an enhanced feature vector, thus obtaining the enhanced environmental fingerprint.

[0051] like Figure 4 As shown, in the process of generating environmental fingerprints, time synchronization can be performed first, that is, an NTP client can be used to obtain the time from multiple time servers such as pool.ntp.org as the timestamp generation time. Then, a clock filtering algorithm is used to remove outliers, controlling the local clock error within ±10 milliseconds, and outputting an accurate UTC generation time T.

[0052] Then, normalization is performed by standardizing the instantaneous amplitude vector V using the z-score to eliminate device differences. Normalization can be performed according to the following formula:

[0053] in, V norm σ represents the normalized vector; μ represents the mean of multiple eigenvalues ​​in the instantaneous amplitude vector; σ represents the standard deviation of multiple eigenvalues ​​in the instantaneous amplitude vector.

[0054] After normalization, first-order differencing (differentialization) can be performed on the normalized vector to achieve feature enhancement. Electronic devices can perform first-order differencing (differentialization) according to the following formula:

[0055] in, Describes the first-order difference vector. i One eigenvalue; This represents the (i+1)th eigenvalue in the normalized vector; Represents the first normalized vector. i Each feature value.

[0056] After calculating the first-order difference vector, the normalized vector is then... V norm with the first-order difference vector V diff The features are concatenated to form a feature vector with enhanced features. V' This refers to environmental fingerprinting.

[0057] Because it relies on the signal strength variation of a single source (such as an FM radio station), the changes are slow and susceptible to local interference, resulting in low accuracy (on the order of minutes) and poor robustness. Therefore, in some embodiments, multi-band signal fusion can also be performed, that is, by simultaneously scanning electromagnetic signals of multiple different frequency bands, a richer and more stable environmental fingerprint can be constructed.

[0058] Multi-band fusion sensing extracts features by simultaneously scanning multiple frequency bands with different characteristics. Since the signal in one frequency band may be interrupted, but the probability of all frequency bands being interrupted simultaneously is extremely low, multi-band fusion sensing can provide redundancy in the sensing structure, thereby improving robustness.

[0059] Furthermore, the extremely rapid fluctuations in the electromagnetic environment provide millisecond-level time resolution potential for time assertions. Therefore, it is possible to combine this with instantaneous state capture to acquire instantaneous amplitude vectors within an extremely short time window (100ms), rather than slowly changing signal strength.

[0060] In some embodiments, environmental fingerprint extraction can be performed without using analog features such as signal amplitude, instead utilizing digital content based on the spatiotemporal anchor points of public broadcast signal digital content. When generating an environmental fingerprint by synchronously triggering the acquisition of signal features from multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals based on a target electronic document, a predefined broadcast environmental electromagnetic signal can be received at the generation time, and information data frames from the environmental electromagnetic signal can be recorded. These information data frames include time-varying digital information, including cyclic redundancy check codes, signal timestamps, and frame counts. Key fields containing digital information are then extracted from the information data frames, thereby generating the environmental fingerprint based on these key fields.

[0061] For example, the core idea of ​​spatiotemporal anchors based on digital content of public broadcast signals is to capture the content data that changes over time carried in public broadcast signals (such as digital broadcasting DRM, digital television DVB-T, and GPS navigation messages) at a specific moment as spatiotemporal anchors.

[0062] When capturing the spatiotemporal anchor point, a predefined broadcast signal can be received at time T, and a short data frame can be recorded. This data frame contains inherent, time-incrementing or changing digital information such as a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code, a timestamp, and a frame counter. Then, this data frame, or key fields extracted from it, can be used as the original fingerprint, or its hash value can be calculated. H frame To generate environment indicators.

[0063] It is evident that in the process of capturing spatiotemporal anchors using digital content, the signal source can be a public broadcasting tower, not a single timestamp institution, thus achieving decentralization. Furthermore, transforming the entropy source from the physical analog characteristics of the signal to the digital content logic carried by the signal can make the data more organized and easier to process.

[0064] In some embodiments, environmental fingerprint consensus can also be achieved based on distributed node consensus. Specifically, when generating an environmental fingerprint by synchronously triggering the collection of signal features from multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals based on a target electronic document, multiple fingerprint collection nodes can be randomly selected in a distributed network. These nodes collect signal features of the environmental electromagnetic signals at the time of generation to obtain multiple local environmental vectors. Then, according to a consensus algorithm, a target vector is selected from these local environmental vectors, and an environmental fingerprint is generated based on the target vector.

[0065] For example, in an environmental fingerprint consensus scheme based on distributed node consensus, the credibility of data collected by a single node is enhanced through the collaboration of multiple distributed nodes. The collection process does not rely on data from a single collection point, but rather multiple nodes in a distributed network jointly collect their respective environmental electromagnetic fingerprints at nearly the same generation time T, reaching a consensus on a unified fingerprint.

[0066] like Figure 5 As shown, when generating environmental fingerprints, collaborative collection can be performed first. That is, when a timestamp needs to be generated, the decentralized network randomly selects a group of geographically dispersed nodes. Each node simultaneously collects its local environmental fingerprint and broadcasts the collected local environmental vector (or the hash value after hashing). H env Then, a final valid target vector (or a target hash value after hashing) is determined from the received data using consensus algorithms such as Byzantine fault tolerance. H consensus ), used to use network group private key pairs H consensus , H doc and T Sign it.

[0067] It is evident that distributed node consensus reduces the risk of timestamp invalidation or forgery caused by a single node being deceived or localized signal anomalies. Attackers need to deceive a majority of nodes simultaneously to succeed, thus achieving stronger robustness and credibility. Furthermore, during verification, the model can shift from relying on third-party historical databases to relying on distributed node network consensus. Since the network itself is decentralized, the verifying party can request consensus evidence from the network at that time, achieving decentralization and verifiability, thereby improving security.

[0068] Based on the environmental fingerprint generation method described in the above embodiments, the method can extract stable and precise time features from the inherently chaotic electromagnetic environment through multi-source electromagnetic signal fusion and intelligent signal processing, ensuring the reliability and practicality of the timestamp service. By using the instantaneous state of broad-spectrum environmental electromagnetic noise as a decentralized time source, the globally covered, unpredictable, and uncontrollable electromagnetic environment can be used as a reliable timestamp entropy source, replacing centralized time servers (TSA / NTP). This method not only achieves the uniqueness and instantaneity of environmental fingerprints, ensuring that the electromagnetic features collected at a specific moment are globally unique and irreproducible, but also enables multi-band signal fusion. By scanning multiple frequency bands with different properties, it ensures the richness and anti-interference capability of the environmental fingerprint.

[0069] S103, Calculate hash information.

[0070] After generating the environment fingerprint, a hash calculation can be performed on the environment fingerprint and the target electronic document to obtain hash information. This hash information includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value obtained by hashing the target electronic document. The fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value obtained by hashing the environment fingerprint.

[0071] Electronic devices can incorporate hash algorithms such as SHA3-256, and generate an original environmental fingerprint by collecting environmental electromagnetic signals in a predetermined frequency band. After processing the original environmental fingerprint to generate an enhanced feature vector, the hash value of the enhanced feature vector is calculated using a hash algorithm to obtain the fingerprint hash value (H). env Fingerprint hash value (H) env ) is a fixed-length digital digest obtained by cryptographic hashing of the enhanced feature vector, which serves as the unique representative of the environmental fingerprint.

[0072] In the process of calculating the fingerprint hash value, the hash value of the electronic document to be signed, namely the document hash value (H), is also calculated using a hash algorithm. doc Document hash (H) doc ) is the integrity verification value obtained by performing a hash operation on the electronic document to be signed.

[0073] S104. Concatenate the document signature hash information, fingerprint signature hash information, and generation time into a data block to be signed.

[0074] After calculating the hash information, the document signature hash information, fingerprint signature hash information, and generation time can be concatenated to form a data block to be signed. This data block can be used to create a strong credential with standard temporal meaning and legal effect.

[0075] For example, to alleviate the problem that physical event proofs cannot be directly correlated with standard UTC time and lack the explicit time point required by law, electronic devices can embed an authoritative time in the timestamp generation process. That is, in the time synchronization and processing module, through multi-source NTP and clock filtering algorithms, a precise and reliable UTC time T is forcibly injected into the entire process.

[0076] Then, through strong cryptographic binding, the fingerprint hash value is transferred to the quantum-resistant signature module. H env Document hash value H doc The document hash value, environment fingerprint hash value, and precise UTC time are concatenated together to form a data block to be signed. This data block, a type of time data block, is a data unit composed of the document hash value, environment fingerprint hash value, and precise UTC time concatenated in a specific format. That is, during data concatenation, H... doc (256-bit), H env (256-bit) and T (converted to a 64-bit Unix timestamp) are concatenated in order. This generates a data block to be signed, Data=H. doc ||H env ||T.

[0077] After a data block to be signed is signed, it can form a data storage package, creating a complete set of data required for verification, including a timestamp token, public key, time information, and frequency band configuration. Therefore, when a data block to be signed is signed, the fingerprint hash value can be... H env Document hash value H doc The signature is performed together with the generation time T, so that time T is no longer external metadata, but an intrinsic component of the signature data. Any tampering with T will cause the signature verification to fail.

[0078] It is evident that by creating a triple-binding model of "physical entropy source - standard time - digital document," and through cryptographic signatures, the environmental fingerprint hash, document hash, and precise UTC time are indivisibly fused to generate a composite timestamp with a self-contained chain of evidence, rather than simply generating proof of a physical event.

[0079] S105. Using the stateless hash signing private key, perform a signing operation on the data block to be signed to generate a timestamp token.

[0080] After forming a data block to be signed by concatenating data, the data block can be signed using a stateless hash signing private key to generate a timestamp token. The timestamp token (TST) is a digital credential generated by concatenating and signing the document hash value, the environmental fingerprint hash value, and the precise UTC time using a quantum-resistant signature algorithm.

[0081] Correspondingly, during the signing process, electronic devices can execute quantum-resistant signature algorithms, i.e., cryptographic signature algorithms that can resist quantum computing attacks, such as SPHINCS+ and Dilithium. In some embodiments, during the generation of a timestamp token, the precise UTC time can be obtained first, and then a quantum-resistant signature algorithm can be used to digitally sign the fingerprint hash value, document hash value, and UTC time to generate a timestamp token containing the digital signature.

[0082] Timestamp tokens can contain quantum-resistant timestamps, meaning timestamps generated using quantum-resistant signature algorithms. The security of quantum-resistant timestamps combines the physical uncloning principle with the computational security of mathematics. For example, for digital signatures, the SPHINCS+ quantum-resistant signature algorithm can be used. This involves accessing locally stored secure SPHINCS and the private key SK. sphincs The data block to be signed, Data, is signed to generate the final timestamp token, TST. That is, TS = Sig. sphincs (SK) sphincs Data).

[0083] As can be seen, by outputting a timestamp token (TST), the question "This document existed at UTC time T" can be explicitly answered. This allows electronic devices to output a standard, cryptographically guaranteed timestamp that meets legal evidentiary requirements, rather than a vague event proof.

[0084] Furthermore, by designing an end-to-end technical path resistant to quantum security threats, a timestamp system that remains secure in the quantum computing era can be systematically constructed from the physical layer (the non-cloning nature of electromagnetic noise) to the algorithmic layer (using PQC signature schemes such as SPHINCS+). This achieves a triple binding of "physical entropy source," "standard time," and "digital signature." It not only proves that an event occurred, but also precisely proves that it occurred at a specific authoritative UTC time, forming a self-contained, verifiable, and strong cryptographic credential. Moreover, by accurately associating physical events with authoritative UTC times, precise time synchronization and compensation can be achieved.

[0085] S106. Construct a data packet for evidence storage based on a timestamp token, and upload the data packet to a distributed file storage system.

[0086] After generating a timestamp token, it can be processed in a decentralized manner through a distributed file storage system. To do this, a data package for evidence storage can be built based on the timestamp token, and then the data package can be uploaded to the distributed file storage system.

[0087] Among them, the distributed evidence storage system is a peer-to-peer network used to store and share data. By storing timestamp data through the distributed evidence storage system, a distributed evidence storage and public verification architecture can be realized, thereby ensuring the immutability and verifiability of timestamp data.

[0088] In some embodiments, when constructing a data packet for evidence storage based on a timestamp token and uploading the data packet to a distributed file storage system, the acquisition frequency band information of the signal characteristics and the stateless hash signature public key can be obtained first, and then the data packet for evidence storage can be constructed. The data packet includes a timestamp token, the generation time, the stateless hash signature public key, and the acquisition frequency band information. The data packet is then uploaded to the distributed file storage system to obtain a content identifier, and finally, the content identifier is broadcast to the public blockchain network.

[0089] For example, electronic devices can have a built-in timestamp storage and verification module. This module can store timestamps and provide a public, verifiable service. When storing evidence, the timestamp storage and verification module can construct a storage data package, where Package = {TST, PK}. sphincsLet F be the frequency band information collected, used to guide verification. Then, by uploading the evidence storage data package to the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), a unique Content Identifier (CID) is obtained. This CID is then broadcast to a public blockchain network (such as Ethereum) to complete the evidence storage.

[0090] It is evident that by storing evidence on the blockchain, key timestamp information can be written into the blockchain, leveraging its immutability to enhance the validity of evidence and create a natively quantum-resistant timestamp service. Its security relies not only on the complexity of mathematical problems but also on the randomness and non-cloning nature of the physical world, and is deeply integrated with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to achieve long-term security for the future.

[0091] By applying the technical solutions of the above embodiments, the method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise described in the above embodiments can address the inherent defects of existing wireless signal-based time proof technologies, such as "position dependence, low accuracy, non-standard output, and incomplete security." It provides a novel, low-cost timestamp method that can be widely applied globally, offers high-precision and reliable time assertions, seamlessly integrates with standard time and cryptographic systems, and is theoretically resistant to quantum computing attacks. Through a decentralized, highly reliable, low-cost, and inherently quantum-resistant next-generation trusted timestamp service, an end-to-end native quantum-resistant security system is constructed. This achieves quantum resistance at the physical layer—the randomness of environmental electromagnetic noise originates from physical laws, and its unpredictable and unclonable characteristics do not depend on any mathematical problems, making it naturally quantum-resistant—and quantum resistance at the algorithmic layer—using standardized quantum-resistant signature algorithms such as SPHINCS+ in the signature process. This forms a complete chain of quantum-resistant physical entropy sources and quantum-resistant digital signatures. Even if SPHINCS+ is cracked in the future, attackers will not be able to forge past electromagnetic environment history, and therefore will not be able to retroactively generate valid timestamps to achieve end-to-end security.

[0092] Through the above reasoning and analysis, it can be seen that the method, by introducing a public historical data verification mechanism, adopting multi-band fusion sensing, deeply integrating authoritative time in the signature process, and systematically selecting quantum-resistant cryptographic components, successfully solves the fundamental defects of non-universality, inaccuracy, non-standardization, and insecurity, and achieves a technological paradigm leap from local event proof to globally trusted timestamps.

[0093] In some embodiments, as a refinement and extension of the specific implementation of the above embodiments, and to fully illustrate the specific implementation process of this embodiment, some embodiments of this application also provide a method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, for timestamp verification. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the method includes: S201. Download the evidence storage data package from the distributed file storage system; S202. Use the stateless hash signature public key to decrypt the evidence storage data packet to obtain the decrypted data; S203. Extract document decryption hash information from the decrypted data; S204. Calculate the hash value of the target electronic document to obtain document verification hash information; S205. If the document verification hash information is different from the document decryption hash information, generate a document integrity prompt message. S206. If the document verification hash information is the same as the document decryption hash information, query the historical electromagnetic data based on the generation time and acquisition frequency band information. S207. Calculate the hash value of historical electromagnetic data to obtain fingerprint verification hash information; S208. Generate a signature verification result by comparing the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information.

[0094] Electronic devices can have a built-in timestamp-based evidence storage and verification module. When performing timestamp verification, this module first downloads the evidence storage data package from a distributed file storage system and then decrypts the data package using a stateless hash signature public key to obtain the decrypted data. The decrypted data includes fingerprint signature hash information, document decryption hash information, and the decryption time.

[0095] Next, the document decryption hash information is extracted from the decrypted data, and the hash value of the target electronic document is calculated to obtain the document verification hash information. Then, the document verification hash information is compared with the document decryption hash information. If the document verification hash information and the document decryption hash information are different, it means that the current document decryption result is inconsistent with the timestamp information related to the generation process. Therefore, a document integrity prompt message can be generated to indicate that the document integrity verification has failed.

[0096] If the document verification hash information is the same as the document decryption hash information, it means that the current document decryption result is consistent with the timestamp information of the generation process, thus passing the document integrity verification. At this point, historical electromagnetic data can be queried based on the generation time and acquisition frequency band information. The hash value of the historical electromagnetic data is then calculated to obtain the fingerprint verification hash information. Finally, by comparing the fingerprint verification hash information with the fingerprint signature hash information, a signature verification result is generated.

[0097] Specifically, when the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are the same, a signature verification result indicating successful signature verification is generated; when the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are different, a signature verification result indicating failed signature verification is generated.

[0098] For example, electronic devices can verify timestamps based on public radio historical databases and post-verification mechanisms. The public radio historical database, maintained by a third-party organization, is a service platform that continuously records and stores historical electromagnetic environment data and is a key infrastructure for independent verification. The post-verification mechanism refers to a verification method where the verifying party queries the corresponding record in the public radio historical database to reproduce and verify the environmental fingerprint.

[0099] During timestamp verification, the verifier can obtain the CID from the blockchain and then download the evidence storage data package from IPFS. Then, the PK is used... sphincs Decrypt the timestamp token TST to obtain the fingerprint signature hash information H. env Document decryption hash information H doc 'And the decryption time T'.

[0100] Then, document verification is performed by calculating the document verification hash H of the document to be verified. doc_current and the document decryption hash information H doc A comparison is performed. After the document verification is passed, environmental fingerprint verification is performed, that is, based on the decryption time T' and the collected frequency band information F, a query request is initiated to a third-party public radio historical database to obtain the electromagnetic environment data V at that time. archive Then for V archive Perform the same processing flow as in the timestamp generation process to generate fingerprint verification hash information V. archive ', and calculate its hash H archive Then, by comparing H... env 'with H archive Generate signature verification results in H env 'with H archive If the signatures are identical, a signature verification result indicating successful signature verification will be generated.

[0101] By applying the technical solutions of the above embodiments, the method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise described in the above embodiments, based on the ex-post verification mechanism of public historical electromagnetic data, allows the verifier to reproduce the environmental fingerprint at that time through a third-party radio history database, achieving public and independent verification of the timestamp without relying on the original timestamp generator. Furthermore, by having the third-party public radio history database act as an "objective world recorder" in the verification process, electromagnetic environment data V at time T is obtained from the third-party public radio history database.archive This mechanism allows the verifier to complete verification independently anywhere, without needing to be located at the original signing location, as long as they have access to the historical database. This transforms the mechanism from "location-bound" to "service-universal," making it a potential global infrastructure.

[0102] In some embodiments, as a refinement and extension of the specific implementation of the above embodiments, and to fully illustrate the specific implementation process of this embodiment, some embodiments of this application also provide a method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise. The difference between this method and the above embodiments is that, during the environmental fingerprint collection process, unconventional, globally synchronous physical phenomena such as geomagnetic disturbances or cosmic ray pulses can be used as entropy sources. Figure 7 As shown, the method includes: S301, Monitoring time anchor point phenomenon event; S302. When a time anchor event exceeding the response threshold is detected, record the start time and characteristic parameters of the time anchor event. S303. Combine the start time and feature parameters to generate an event information vector; S304. Generate an environmental fingerprint based on the event information vector.

[0103] To generate environmental fingerprints, globally detectable natural phenomena such as rapid disturbances in the geomagnetic field caused by solar activity or wide-area cosmic ray pulses, which are almost simultaneous, can be used as high-value time anchors. By monitoring these time anchor events, the start time and characteristic parameters of the events are recorded when they exceed a response threshold.

[0104] For example, an environmental fingerprinting module can deploy sensors such as magnetometers and muon detectors to monitor phenomena such as geomagnetic disturbances or cosmic ray pulses. When an event exceeding a threshold is detected, the precise start time T of the event is recorded. event and characteristic parameter F event .

[0105] The start time and feature parameters are then combined to generate an event information vector, from which an environmental fingerprint is generated. For example, by combining the start time T... event and characteristic parameter F event Combine to generate hash H event Then H event With H doc Bind signature.

[0106] By applying the technical solutions of the above embodiments, the method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise described in the above embodiments, since the monitored events are global, T eventThe data itself possesses extremely high authority; therefore, generating environmental fingerprints based on event information vectors yields exceptionally strong unforgeability. Furthermore, the natural global synchronization—these phenomena occur simultaneously across vast areas of the Earth—perfectly resolves the location-dependent problem. Multiple research institutions worldwide (such as geomagnetic observatories and particle physics observatories) continuously and publicly record this data, making it verifiable.

[0107] In some embodiments, as a specific implementation of the method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise described in the above embodiments, some embodiments of this application also provide a system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, such as... Figure 8 As shown, the system includes: The data acquisition module is used to acquire the target electronic document and the generation time of the timestamp; An environmental fingerprint acquisition module is used to synchronously trigger the acquisition of signal features of multi-frequency environmental electromagnetic signals based on the target electronic document, so as to generate an environmental fingerprint; the environmental fingerprint is a feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the signal features. A hash calculation module is used to calculate hash information, which includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value of the target electronic document; the fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value of the environmental fingerprint. The data block generation module is used to concatenate the document signature hash information, the fingerprint signature hash information, and the generation time into a data block to be signed; A quantum-resistant signature module is used to sign the data block to be signed using a stateless hash signature private key to generate a timestamp token; The evidence storage module is used to construct an evidence storage data package based on the timestamp token and upload the evidence storage data package to a distributed file storage system.

[0108] By applying the technical solutions of the above embodiments, the quantum-resistant timestamp generation system utilizing environmental electromagnetic noise described in the above embodiments can acquire the target electronic document and the generation time of the timestamp through a data acquisition module, and use an environmental fingerprint acquisition module to collect the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals to generate a unique environmental fingerprint. A hash calculation module then calculates hash information, enabling a data block generation module to concatenate the document signature hash information, fingerprint signature hash information, and generation time into a data block to be signed. A quantum-resistant signature module then uses a quantum-resistant signature algorithm to bind the data, generating a timestamp token. An evidence storage module then constructs an evidence storage data package based on the timestamp token and uploads the evidence storage data package to a distributed file storage system. During verification, the environmental fingerprint of the generation time is reconstructed by querying historical public radio data, thereby completing independent verification, improving the security of the timestamp, and effectively solving the problems of timestamp technology relying on centralized institutions and being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, achieving a decentralized, highly secure, and low-cost trusted timestamp service.

[0109] It should be noted that other corresponding descriptions of the functional units involved in the system for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using ambient electromagnetic noise provided in the embodiments of this application can be found in the corresponding descriptions in the method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using ambient electromagnetic noise provided in the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0110] This application also provides a computer device, specifically a personal computer, server, network device, etc. The computer device includes a bus, processor, memory, and communication interface, and may also include input / output interfaces and a display device. The processor of the computer device provides computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, computer programs, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device stores location information. The network interface of the computer device is used for communication with external terminals via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps in the various method embodiments.

[0111] Those skilled in the art will understand that the structure of the computer device described above is only a partial structure related to the solution of this application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of this application is applied. A specific computer device may include more or fewer components, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0112] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, which may be non-volatile or volatile, and a computer program is stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0113] In one embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0114] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties.

[0115] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods.

[0116] Any references to memory, database, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc.

[0117] Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0118] The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, distributed databases based on blockchain. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be, but are not limited to, general-purpose processors, graphics processors, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, etc.

[0119] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0120] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this patent application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for generating quantum-resistant timestamps using environmental electromagnetic noise, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain the target electronic document and the time of its timestamp generation; Based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint; the environmental fingerprint is a feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the signal characteristics. Calculate hash information, which includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value of the target electronic document; the fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value of the environmental fingerprint. The document signature hash information, the fingerprint signature hash information, and the generation time are concatenated into a data block to be signed; The data block to be signed is signed using a stateless hash signing private key to generate a timestamp token; The evidence storage data packet is constructed based on the timestamp token, and the evidence storage data packet is uploaded to the distributed file storage system.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Download the evidence storage data package from the distributed file storage system; The evidence storage data packet is decrypted using a stateless hash signature public key to obtain decrypted data, which includes the fingerprint signature hash information and the decryption time. Historical electromagnetic data can be queried based on the decryption time and acquisition frequency band information; Calculate the hash value of the historical electromagnetic data to obtain fingerprint verification hash information; A signature verification result is generated by comparing the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information. If the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are the same, a signature verification result indicating successful signature verification is generated. If the fingerprint verification hash information and the fingerprint signature hash information are different, a signature verification result indicating failed signature verification is generated.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The decrypted data also includes document decryption hash information, and the method further includes: Extract the document decryption hash information from the decrypted data; Calculate the hash value of the target electronic document to obtain document verification hash information; If the document verification hash information is the same as the document decryption hash information, query historical electromagnetic data based on the generation time and acquisition frequency band information; If the document verification hash information is different from the document decryption hash information, a document integrity prompt message is generated, which indicates that the document integrity verification has failed.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: A trigger signal is generated based on the aforementioned generation time; In response to the trigger signal, a sampling window is constructed; According to the sampling window, the instantaneous signal amplitude of the environmental electromagnetic signal at each frequency point is sampled to obtain multiple amplitude sampling results; The multiple amplitude sampling results are combined into an instantaneous amplitude vector; The environmental fingerprint is generated based on the instantaneous amplitude vector.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Generating the environmental fingerprint based on the instantaneous amplitude vector includes: Based on the network time protocol, multiple synchronized times are obtained from multiple time servers; A clock filtering algorithm is used to control the local clock error based on multiple synchronization times in order to output the generated time. Perform z-value standardization on the instantaneous amplitude vector to obtain a normalized vector; The first-order difference vector of the normalized vector is calculated based on the mean and standard deviation of multiple amplitude sampling results in the instantaneous amplitude vector; The normalized vector and the first-order difference vector are concatenated to form the environmental fingerprint.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: At the generation time, a predefined broadcast environment electromagnetic signal is received; Record information data frames in the environmental electromagnetic signals, the information data frames including digital information that changes over time; the digital information includes a cyclic redundancy check code, a signal timestamp, and a frame count; Extract key fields from the information data frame, the key fields including the digital information; The environment fingerprint is generated based on the key fields.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the target electronic document, the signal characteristics of multi-band environmental electromagnetic signals are synchronously triggered to generate an environmental fingerprint, including: Multiple fingerprint collection nodes are randomly selected in a distributed network; By using multiple fingerprint acquisition nodes, the signal characteristics of environmental electromagnetic signals are acquired based on the generation time to obtain multiple local environment vectors; According to the consensus algorithm, a target vector is selected from multiple local environment vectors, and the environment fingerprint is generated based on the target vector.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Monitoring time anchor point phenomena and events; When a time anchor event exceeding the response threshold is detected, the start time and characteristic parameters of the time anchor event are recorded. The start time and the feature parameters are combined to generate an event information vector; The environmental fingerprint is generated based on the event information vector.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Constructing a data packet for evidence storage based on the timestamp token, and uploading the data packet to a distributed file storage system, includes: Obtain the acquisition frequency band information and stateless hash signature public key of the signal characteristics; The evidence storage data packet is constructed, and the evidence storage data packet includes the timestamp token, the generation time, the stateless hash signature public key, and the collection frequency band information; The evidence storage data packet is uploaded to a distributed file storage system to obtain a content identifier; Broadcast the content identifier to a public blockchain network.

10. A quantum-resistant timestamp generation system utilizing environmental electromagnetic noise, characterized in that, The system includes: The data acquisition module is used to acquire the target electronic document and the generation time of the timestamp; An environmental fingerprint acquisition module is used to synchronously trigger the acquisition of signal features of multi-frequency environmental electromagnetic signals based on the target electronic document, so as to generate an environmental fingerprint; the environmental fingerprint is a feature vector formed by concatenating the normalized vector and the first-order difference vector of the signal features. A hash calculation module is used to calculate hash information, which includes document hash information and fingerprint hash information. The document signature hash information is the hash value of the target electronic document; the fingerprint signature hash information is the hash value of the environmental fingerprint. The data block generation module is used to concatenate the document signature hash information, the fingerprint signature hash information, and the generation time into a data block to be signed; A quantum-resistant signature module is used to sign the data block to be signed using a stateless hash signature private key to generate a timestamp token; The evidence storage module is used to construct an evidence storage data package based on the timestamp token and upload the evidence storage data package to a distributed file storage system.

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