A Communication Adversarial Simulation Method Based on Stochastic Simulation

Abstract

This invention provides a communication countermeasure simulation method based on random simulation, belonging to the field of electronic countermeasure simulation technology. The method first establishes a probability distribution model of reconnaissance information deviation for key parameters of the communication target; then, based on the probability distribution model of each parameter deviation, independent random sampling is performed to generate instantaneous values ​​of frequency deviation, positioning deviation, and modulation pattern recognition results at each moment, and the guidance parameters of the jammer are determined; next, the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio (ISR) at the target receiver at the current moment is calculated; finally, the ISR calculated at the communication receiver is compared with a preset communication performance degradation ISR threshold to determine whether the jamming is successful. The model of this invention has clear physical meaning and can accurately quantify the impact of reconnaissance information deviation and propagation loss on the jamming effect, significantly improving the credibility and practicality of the simulation evaluation.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of electronic warfare simulation technology, specifically relating to a communication warfare simulation method that considers the uncertainty of reconnaissance information in a combat simulation and deduction system. Background Technology

[0002] In informationized warfare simulations, effective adversarial simulations and accurate assessments of communication countermeasures are fundamental to evaluating electronic warfare system capabilities and conducting tactical research. Traditional simulation systems largely rely on deterministic models for communication countermeasures, assuming that target parameters (such as operating frequency, spatial location, and modulation pattern) obtained by electronic reconnaissance units are absolutely accurate and readily available. Simulations often rely on directly reading target parameter data from the white side's perspective. Under this ideal assumption, jammers can achieve precise frequency targeting, beam pointing, and jamming pattern matching, thus calculating the theoretically optimal jamming effect. However, in actual combat scenarios, reconnaissance information inevitably contains various biases, such as frequency deviations due to receiver measurement accuracy and rapid signal frequency hopping, positioning deviations due to direction finding and ranging errors and high-speed target maneuvering, and erroneous identification results from automatic modulation recognition algorithms in low signal-to-noise ratio or complex electromagnetic environments. These biases lead to a mismatch between the actual jamming parameters of the jamming equipment and the true parameters of the target, making the effect assessment results of traditional deterministic models overly optimistic, deviating from the actual combat performance of jamming equipment, and reducing the credibility and reference value of simulations. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an adversarial simulation method that can quantify and take into account the aforementioned reconnaissance information bias factors, so that the simulation results can better reflect the uncertainties in actual combat. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To address the problem of overly idealistic results in existing communication countermeasure simulations, this invention proposes a communication countermeasure simulation method based on stochastic simulation. This method constructs a stochastic model of reconnaissance information deviation and introduces random sampling of instantaneous deviations at each moment in the simulation process, dynamically calculating the interference effect affected by the deviations, thereby improving the scientific validity and reliability of the simulation results.

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by this invention is achieved by the following technical solution:

[0005] A communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation includes the following steps:

[0006] Step 1: Establish a probability distribution model for reconnaissance information deviation. The probability distribution model for reconnaissance information deviation includes a model for frequency deviation, a model for position deviation, and a model for modulation pattern recognition results.

[0007] Step 2: At each moment in the simulation process, based on the reconnaissance information deviation probability distribution model, the instantaneous values ​​of frequency deviation, target estimated geographical location, and modulation pattern recognition results are generated by independent random sampling. The guidance parameters of the jammer are determined based on these values.

[0008] Step 3: Based on the jammer guidance parameters determined in Step 2 and the actual parameters of the target in the simulation system, calculate the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio at the target receiver at the current moment;

[0009] Step 4: Compare the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio calculated in Step 3 with the preset interference-to-signal ratio threshold required for successful interference to determine whether the interference is successful and complete the communication countermeasure simulation.

[0010] Furthermore, in step 1:

[0011] The frequency deviation follows a mean of 0 and a variance of . normal distribution ;

[0012] Positional deviation includes horizontal deviation and elevation deviation, where the northward component of the horizontal deviation is... and eastward component They each follow a mutually independent zero-mean normal distribution, i.e. , The elevation deviation follows a zero-mean normal distribution, i.e. ;

[0013] Modulation pattern recognition results are based on the probability of correct recognition. and false recognition probability To model.

[0014] Furthermore, in step 2, the specific method of independent random sampling is as follows:

[0015] from Extract an instantaneous frequency deviation sample from As the instantaneous value of frequency deviation;

[0016] from , and Samples of northward and eastward deviations were extracted separately. , and elevation deviation sample Latitude and longitude deviations are obtained through coordinate transformation. , as the instantaneous value of the estimated geographical location of the target;

[0017] Generate a random number that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. ,like The instantaneous value of the modulation pattern recognition result ,otherwise, from From the styles other than those specified, one is randomly selected according to a uniform distribution or a preset preference distribution. This represents the actual modulation pattern of the target signal.

[0018] Furthermore, in step 2, the jammer guidance parameters include the jamming frequency, jamming beam direction, and jamming pattern, calculated as follows:

[0019] Interference frequency: ,

[0020] Interference beam direction: ,

[0021] Select interference style: ,

[0022] in, Let be the true center frequency of the target signal, and let be the true geographical location of the target. , Longitude Latitude For elevation, Interference patterns for interference signals Recognition patterns of the identified communication signals The preset performance coefficients are set as follows:

[0023]

[0024] In the table, when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are the same, The value is 1; when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to the same modulation family, The value is 0.8; when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to different families but have some similarities, The value is 0.6; when the interference signal and the communication signal have orthogonal modulation patterns, The value is 0.4; when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are completely mismatched, The value is 0.2.

[0025] Furthermore, in step 3, the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio is calculated as follows:

[0026]

[0027] in, The equivalent isotropic radiated power of the interference signal. This represents the equivalent isotropic radiated power of the communication signal. , , These are the frequency deviation loss factor, spatial pointing loss factor, and modulation matching loss factor, respectively. , These represent the antenna gain of the target receiver in the direction of the interference signal and the direction of the communication signal, respectively. , These are the transmission path losses for interference signals and communication signals, respectively.

[0028] Furthermore, The overlap ratio between the interference signal spectrum and the target receiver passband is calculated as follows:

[0029]

[0030] in, This refers to the jammer's transmission power. This indicates the power of the interference signal falling within the bandwidth of the target receiver; For the target receiver bandwidth, For the spectrum of the interference signal, The center frequency;

[0031] The calculation method is as follows:

[0032] First, based on the actual geographical location of the jammer and reconnaissance to estimate target location Calculate the pointing angle of the interfering beam, including the azimuth angle. and pitch angle ;

[0033] Then, based on the actual geographical location of the jammer and the target's actual geographical location Calculate the true relative direction, including azimuth. and pitch angle ;

[0034] Finally, check the radiation pattern of the jammer's transmitting antenna. The space pointing loss factor was calculated. ;

[0035] The calculation method is as follows:

[0036] Based on the actual modulation pattern of the target signal Interference pattern in jammer guidance parameters The style performance coefficient is obtained by looking up the table. .

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0038] 1. This invention introduces a random bias model for reconnaissance information, breaking the ideal closed loop of reconnaissance interference in traditional deterministic simulations and greatly improving the realism of the simulation environment.

[0039] 2. By adjusting the parameters of the deviation model, this invention can quantitatively assess the impact of different reconnaissance accuracies on the final jamming effect, providing a quantitative basis for the demonstration of equipment technical indicators. Attached Figure Description

[0040] Figure 1 This is an overall flowchart of an embodiment of the present invention.

[0041] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of link calculation in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0042] The present invention will be further explained below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0043] A communication countermeasure simulation method based on stochastic simulation is proposed. This method first establishes a probability distribution model of reconnaissance information deviations for key parameters of the communication target, where frequency and positioning deviations both follow a normal distribution, and a probability model is constructed for modulation pattern recognition. Then, during the simulation, based on the probability distribution models of each parameter deviation, independent random sampling is performed to generate instantaneous values ​​of frequency deviation, positioning deviation, and modulation pattern recognition results at each moment, and the guidance parameters of the jammer are determined accordingly. Next, based on the biased jammer guidance parameters and the actual target parameters in the simulation system, the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio (ISR) at the target receiver at the current moment is calculated. The calculation requires incorporating a frequency deviation loss factor caused by frequency deviation, a spatial pointing loss factor caused by positioning deviation, and a modulation pattern matching loss factor determined by the modulation pattern recognition results. Finally, the ISR calculated at the communication receiver is compared with a preset communication performance degradation ISR threshold to determine whether the jamming was successful.

[0044] like Figure 1 As shown, the method specifically includes the following steps:

[0045] Step 1: Establish a probability distribution model for the bias of multidimensional reconnaissance information.

[0046] For key target parameters in communication countermeasure simulation, deviation distribution functions of reconnaissance values ​​relative to true values ​​are established based on the frequency measurement accuracy of the reconnaissance receiver, the target positioning accuracy, and the performance of the modulation recognition algorithm in the simulation.

[0047] Step 1-1: Establish a frequency deviation model, assuming the true center frequency of the target signal is... The reconnaissance measurement frequency is Frequency deviation The deviation follows a mean of 0 and a variance of . normal distribution Among them, variance The frequency measurement accuracy is determined by the simulation settings of the reconnaissance receiver.

[0048] Step 1-2: Establish a spatial location deviation model, assuming the target's true geographical location is represented as... ,in Longitude Latitude The elevation is [elevation value]. The estimated geographical location from reconnaissance is [geographical value]. The geographical location deviation is modeled as follows:

[0049] Horizontal deviation (longitude / latitude): Assume the northward component of the horizontal deviation. and eastward component They each follow a mutually independent zero-mean normal distribution, i.e. , .parameter , The horizontal positioning accuracy of the reconnaissance unit is determined by the simulation settings. Through coordinate transformation, it can be... Convert to latitude and longitude deviation .

[0050] Elevation deviation: Elevation deviation It follows a zero-mean normal distribution, that is .parameter The altitude measurement accuracy is determined by the reconnaissance unit set in the simulation.

[0051] Steps 1-3: Establish a modulation pattern recognition probability model, assuming the true modulation pattern of the target signal is... The reconnaissance and identification process relies on the probability of correct identification. and false recognition probability To model. When an error is identified, the reconnaissance output is, except... One of the other possible styles in the set can be assumed to be a uniformly random selection or a selection based on a preset error recognition preference distribution.

[0052] Step 2: Perform random sampling based on the bias model.

[0053] At each moment (or event trigger point) during the simulation process where the effectiveness of the adversarial action needs to be calculated, a round of random sampling is performed independently based on the distribution model established in step 1.

[0054] Step 2-1: From Extract an instantaneous frequency deviation sample from .

[0055] Step 2-2: From , and Samples of northward and eastward deviations were extracted separately. , and elevation deviation sample Latitude and longitude deviations are obtained through coordinate transformation. :

[0056]

[0057]

[0058] in, , These are the radii of curvature of the east-west circle and the meridian circle, respectively. , Earth's semi-major axis meters, the square of the first eccentricity .

[0059] Steps 2-3: Perform modulation recognition sampling. First, generate a random number that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. .like Then the instant recognition result ;like ,but from From the set of styles other than those in the standard set, one style is randomly selected according to a uniform distribution or a preset preference distribution.

[0060] Steps 2-4: Based on the sampling results and the actual state of the target, determine the jamming guidance parameters of the jammer at that moment:

[0061] Interference frequency:

[0062] Interference beam direction:

[0063] Select interference style: ,in For interference style For identifying styles The preset efficiency coefficients are shown in the table below. The preset efficiency coefficients of common modulation interference signals on communication signals are listed below:

[0064]

[0065] In the table, the coefficient is 1 when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are the same; the coefficient is 0.8 when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to the same modulation family (such as BPSK, QPSK); the coefficient is 0.6 when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to different families but have some similarities (such as QAM, PSK); the coefficient is 0.4 when the interference signal and the communication signal are orthogonal / mismatched modulations (such as FSK, PSK); and the coefficient is 0.2 when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are completely mismatched (such as FM, digital modulation).

[0066] Step 3: Calculate the instantaneous received interference-to-signal ratio affected by the deviation.

[0067] Based on the biased interference parameters and the target's true parameters determined in step 2, calculate the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio (J / S) at the receiver at the current moment.

[0068] Step 3-1: Calculate the effective interference transmission EIRP.

[0069] Calculate the frequency deviation loss factor Calculate the overlap ratio between the interference signal spectrum and the target receiver passband:

[0070]

[0071] in, This refers to the jammer's transmission power. For the target receiver bandwidth, The spectrum of the interference signal (center frequency is) ).

[0072] Computational space pointing to loss factor First, based on the actual geographical location of the jammer... and reconnaissance to estimate target location Calculate the pointing angle (azimuth) of the interfering beam Pitch angle (Generally, the direction of the jamming beam's center axis), and then based on the jammer's geographical location. and the target's actual geographical location Calculate the true relative direction (azimuth) Pitch angle Finally, we checked the radiation pattern of the jammer's transmitting antenna. The space pointing loss factor was calculated. .

[0073] Calculate the modulation matching loss factor Based on the actual style The style selected based on the reconnaissance and identification results The style performance coefficient is obtained by looking up the table. .

[0074] The overall effective interference transmission EIRP is ,in The equivalent omnidirectional radiation power in the direction of the center axis of the interference beam.

[0075] Step 3-2: According to... Figure 2 Given the spatial relationships, calculate the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio at the communication receiver:

[0076]

[0077] in, For communication signals EIRP, , These represent the antenna gain of the communication receiver in the direction of the interference signal and the direction of the communication signal, respectively. , These are the transmission path losses for interference signals and communication signals, respectively.

[0078] Step 4: Interference successful determination.

[0079] Preset a threshold for communication link performance degradation ,like If the instantaneous interference is successful, it is considered successful; otherwise, it is considered a failure.

[0080] This completes the instantaneous communication countermeasure simulation based on stochastic simulation. Based on this, statistical analysis of the interference effect over a simulation period can be conducted.

[0081] This invention addresses the problem that the calculation results of deterministic simulation models in traditional communication countermeasures simulations are overly optimistic and deviate significantly from actual combat performance. It proposes a probabilistic simulation method that considers reconnaissance information deviation. By establishing a stochastic model of reconnaissance information deviation and introducing instantaneous deviations from random sampling during the simulation process, the interference effectiveness affected by the deviation is dynamically calculated. The model of this invention has a clear physical meaning and can accurately quantify the impact of reconnaissance information deviation and propagation loss on the interference effect, significantly improving the credibility and practicality of simulation evaluation.

Claims

1. A communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Establish a probability distribution model for reconnaissance information deviation. The probability distribution model for reconnaissance information deviation includes a model for frequency deviation, a model for position deviation, and a model for modulation pattern recognition results. Step 2: At each moment in the simulation process, based on the reconnaissance information deviation probability distribution model, the instantaneous values ​​of frequency deviation, target estimated geographical location, and modulation pattern recognition results are generated by independent random sampling. The guidance parameters of the jammer are determined based on these values. Step 3: Based on the jammer guidance parameters determined in Step 2 and the actual parameters of the target in the simulation system, calculate the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio at the target receiver at the current moment; Step 4: Compare the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio calculated in Step 3 with the preset interference-to-signal ratio threshold required for successful interference to determine whether the interference is successful and complete the communication countermeasure simulation.

2. The communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 1: The frequency deviation follows a mean of 0 and a variance of . normal distribution ; Positional deviation includes horizontal deviation and elevation deviation, where the northward component of the horizontal deviation is... and the eastward component They each follow a mutually independent zero-mean normal distribution, i.e. , The elevation deviation follows a zero-mean normal distribution, i.e. ; Modulation pattern recognition results are based on the probability of correct recognition. and false recognition probability To model.

3. The communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation according to claim 2, characterized in that, In step 2, the specific method of independent random sampling is as follows: from Extract an instantaneous frequency deviation sample from the data. As the instantaneous value of frequency deviation; from , and Samples of northward and eastward deviations were extracted separately. , and elevation deviation sample Latitude and longitude deviations are obtained through coordinate transformation. , as the instantaneous value of the estimated geographical location of the target; Generate a random number that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. ,like The instantaneous value of the modulation pattern recognition result ,otherwise, from From the styles other than those specified, one is randomly selected according to a uniform distribution or a preset preference distribution. This represents the actual modulation pattern of the target signal.

4. The communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation according to claim 3, characterized in that, In step 2, the jammer's guidance parameters include the jamming frequency, jamming beam direction, and jamming pattern, calculated as follows: Interference frequency: , Interference beam direction: , Select interference style: , in, Let be the true center frequency of the target signal, and let be the true geographical location of the target. , Longitude Latitude For elevation, Interference patterns for interference signals Recognition patterns of the identified communication signals The preset performance coefficients are set as follows: In the table, when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are the same, The value is 1; when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to the same modulation family, The value is 0.8; when the interference signal and the communication signal belong to different families but have some similarities, The value is 0.6; when the interference signal and the communication signal have orthogonal modulation patterns, The value is 0.4; when the modulation patterns of the interference signal and the communication signal are completely mismatched, The value is 0.

2.

5. The communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation according to claim 4, characterized in that, In step 3, the instantaneous interference-to-signal ratio is calculated as follows: in, The equivalent isotropic radiated power of the interference signal. This represents the equivalent isotropic radiated power of the communication signal. , , These are the frequency deviation loss factor, spatial pointing loss factor, and modulation matching loss factor, respectively. , These represent the antenna gain of the target receiver in the direction of the interference signal and the direction of the communication signal, respectively. , These are the transmission path losses for interference signals and communication signals, respectively.

6. The communication adversarial simulation method based on stochastic simulation according to claim 5, characterized in that, The overlap ratio between the interference signal spectrum and the target receiver passband is calculated as follows: in, This refers to the jammer's transmission power. This indicates the power of the interference signal falling within the bandwidth of the target receiver; For the target receiver bandwidth, For the interference signal spectrum, The center frequency; The calculation method is as follows: First, based on the actual geographical location of the jammer and reconnaissance to estimate target location Calculate the pointing angle of the interfering beam, including the azimuth angle. and pitch angle ; Then, based on the actual geographical location of the jammer and the target's actual geographical location Calculate the true relative direction, including azimuth. and pitch angle ; Finally, check the radiation pattern of the jammer's transmitting antenna. The space pointing loss factor was calculated. ; The calculation method is as follows: Based on the actual modulation pattern of the target signal Interference pattern in jammer guidance parameters The style efficiency coefficient is obtained by looking up the table. .

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