A method for trusted intelligent control in an intelligent manufacturing scene

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of trusted intelligent control in intelligent manufacturing scene, comprising: build with intelligent control center as first level, edge computing control node as second level, sensor and intelligent production equipment as third level three-level distributed networking architecture, full equipment deployment trusted intelligent agent component;By intelligent control center, only identification is allocated to three-level equipment, and exclusive intercommunication right is configured, edge node basic token and terminal to be activated token pool are generated, and relevant data is synchronized to edge node local encryption database;Enable edge node authentication agent function to complete terminal authorization agent authentication, realize edge and terminal token linkage distribution and double-end binding record, after binding, linkage token combination is solidified as the only identity of three-level equipment interaction, full process carries out token and check information interaction, and receiver executes operation after completing multidimensional check.This scheme realizes whole-link trusted management and control, and has the characteristics of accurate identity recognition and transmission encryption security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of intelligent manufacturing technology, specifically to a method for reliable intelligent control in intelligent manufacturing scenarios. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of intelligent manufacturing, the integrated application of technologies such as edge computing, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence has promoted the implementation of intelligent control technology in all aspects of production and manufacturing. Using intelligent control centers combined with edge computing control nodes to collect production data and issue control commands has become the mainstream approach to intelligent manufacturing. However, existing intelligent control solutions for intelligent manufacturing still have significant security flaws, making it difficult to meet the reliability and security requirements of the production process. In intelligent manufacturing systems, production data and control commands are mostly transmitted across nodes via networks, making them vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and posing a security risk of data and commands being illegally tampered with. Existing solutions lack a reliability verification mechanism for sensor-collected data and intelligent production equipment receiving control commands. This makes it difficult to effectively identify forged data and commands, which can easily lead to equipment executing operations based on false information and causing production safety accidents.

[0003] Therefore, a reliable intelligent control method for intelligent manufacturing scenarios is needed to achieve reliable verification of production data and control commands and ensure secure transmission, thereby solving the aforementioned problems of existing technologies. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a reliable intelligent control method in intelligent manufacturing scenarios to solve the problems mentioned in the background art.

[0005] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides the following technical solution: a method for reliable intelligent control in an intelligent manufacturing scenario, comprising: A three-tier distributed networking architecture is established, with the intelligent control center as the first tier, edge computing control nodes as the second tier, and sensors and intelligent production equipment as the third tier. Trusted intelligent agent components are deployed in all three tier devices. The intelligent control center assigns a unique identifier to each level 3 device and configures a one-to-one exclusive interoperability permission policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensors and intelligent production equipment. It generates an exclusive basic token for the edge computing control node, pre-generates a token pool to be activated for the terminal devices, and the intelligent control center synchronizes the identifiers of the edge computing control node and its subordinate terminal devices, the interoperability permission policy, the basic token of the edge computing control node, and the token pool data of the terminal devices to be activated to the edge computing control node via an encrypted link and stores them in its local encrypted database. Enable the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function of the edge computing control node to receive encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices, carry the authentication information of the terminal devices to the intelligent control center to complete the authorized proxy authentication; after obtaining the trusted token of the terminal device activated by the intelligent control center from the token pool to be activated, realize the full-link linkage distribution of the basic token of the edge computing control node and the trusted token of the terminal device, as well as the dual-end binding and filing between the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node. The aforementioned dual-end binding linkage token combination is solidified as a unique identifier for data interaction and command transmission of the three-level devices. In the entire process of data acquisition and edge computing control node command issuance, all three-level devices carry linkage tokens and encrypted verification information for interaction. After the receiver completes multi-dimensional trusted verification, it executes the corresponding operation.

[0006] According to the above technical solution, edgeComputerId and login password are assigned to edge computing control nodes, unique sensorId is assigned to sensors, and unique device ID is assigned to intelligent production equipment; A temporary edgeToken, valid for 24 hours and encrypted with SM4-CBC, is generated for the edge computing control node. This temporary edgeToken is a basic token exclusive to the edge computing control node, containing edgeComputerId, timestamp, and control center random code. A pool of tokens to be activated, containing unique device identifiers and reserved verification bits, is pre-generated for sensors and smart production equipment. The token pool adopts a management rule of pre-generating in single batches and automatically replenishing when it expires. Generate a whitelist of sensors and smart production equipment within the jurisdiction of each edge computing control node. The whitelist includes the device ID, physical communication address and deployment workstation. The whitelist is strongly bound to the edgeComputerId of the edge computing control node, limiting the edge computing control node to provide authorized proxy authentication services only to terminal devices within the whitelist. Industrial communication ports and protocols are configured for Level 3 devices. The edge computing control node uses 8899 / TCP as a dedicated port for proxy services, and the intelligent control center uses 9900 / TCP as a dedicated port for encryption and authentication. The trusted intelligent agent components of Level 3 devices establish encrypted communication links based on the industrial MQTT protocol.

[0007] According to the above technical solution, the method of assigning unique identifiers to level 3 devices by the intelligent control center and configuring a one-to-one exclusive interoperability policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensor and intelligent production equipment terminal devices also includes: The smooth handover process for device migration tokens across edge computing control nodes involves the following steps: When a terminal device needs to be migrated from its original home edge computing control node to a target edge computing control node due to production line changes or workstation adjustments, the original home edge computing control node initiates a device migration application with the device's unique identifier and target workstation information to the intelligent control center. After verifying the matching of the application with the production work order, the intelligent control center freezes the issuance permission of the original linkage token combination for the terminal device and synchronizes the device's identity identifier, historical authentication data, and permission policy to the target edge computing control node's whitelist and local encrypted database. After the target edge computing control node completes the dual-field whitelist verification for device access, the intelligent control center activates a new trusted token for the terminal device, establishes a linkage binding relationship between the new trusted token and the target edge computing control node's basic token, and completes dual-end filing. During the entire device migration process, the original linkage token combination is only frozen and not canceled. If the migration fails, the original binding relationship and communication permissions are automatically restored. After the migration is completed, the original linkage token combination is automatically invalidated and archived.

[0008] According to the above technical solution, enabling the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function of the edge computing control node to receive encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices includes: S1: The edge computing control node enables the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy module, opens port 8899 / TCP to only receive MQTT authentication requests from whitelisted devices in the local encrypted database. After the terminal device is powered on, it sends a standardized authentication request message that is lightly encrypted with a hardware key. If the required fields are missing, the request will be rejected. If no response is received within the time limit, an alarm will be triggered and the information will be reported. The edge computing control node will synchronize with the intelligent control center. S2: The edge computing control node parses the message, extracts the device identifier and physical communication address, and performs a precise two-field match with the local whitelist in the order of device identifier priority and physical address secondary verification. If the match is successful, a temporary verification code strongly bound to the device ID is generated and sent to the terminal device. If the match fails, the request message is discarded, the device address is added to the local blacklist and synchronized to the control center. S3: The edge computing control node aggregates valid authentication requests in batches, organizes authorized proxy authentication request messages to be dynamically encrypted and sent to the intelligent control center via port 9900 / TCP. It has a built-in timeout retransmission mechanism. If the timeout occurs, a fault alarm is triggered and reported to the intelligent control center. S4: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorized agent authentication request message, decrypts it and completes multi-dimensional verification. If the verification fails, a response message is returned. The intelligent control center activates the terminal trusted token encrypted with SM4-CBC from the token pool to be activated, generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table and sends it to the corresponding edge computing control node. S5: After the edge computing control node decrypts the token response message, it links and binds its own token with the terminal device's token. After being double-encrypted and sent out, the terminal device verifies and stores it in the hardware encryption chip. If it fails, it will be retransmitted and marked as abnormal. S6: The edge computing control node generates a linkage binding relationship table between the edge basic token and the terminal trusted token in the local encrypted database, and realizes dual-end filing with the intelligent control center. After the terminal device completes token storage, it returns a binding success confirmation message with hash signature. After verifying the validity of the signature, the edge computing control node summarizes the binding status of all terminal devices, generates logs, and encrypts and reports them to the intelligent control center, thus completing the authorization agent authentication and token binding.

[0009] According to the above technical solution, step S4 includes: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorization agent authentication request message and decrypts it using the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key. It then performs standardized verifications in four dimensions: edge computing control node identifier validity, temporary token validity, authorization agent authentication permission code validity, and digital signature consistency. The edge computing control node identifier validity verification checks whether the identifier is in the intelligent control center's global database, and the temporary token validity verification checks whether the identifier matches and is within its 24-hour validity period. If the verification fails, an encrypted response message containing the specific reason for the failure is generated and sent to the corresponding edge computing control node. The edge computing control node then synchronizes the message to the corresponding terminal device and records the log. Upon successful verification, a 30-day valid terminal trusted token sensorToken and devToken encrypted with SM4-C BC are activated for the device to be authenticated from the token pool to be activated. The token contains the device's unique identifier, timestamp, intelligent control center random code and anti-tampering verification bit. After being strongly bound to the device's unique identifier, it is updated to the global authentication database of the intelligent control center. The intelligent control center generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table, authentication result, token validity period, and millisecond-level response timestamp. After being encrypted with the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key, the message is sent to the edge computing control node.

[0010] According to the above technical solution, step S5 includes: The edge computing control node decrypts the encrypted token response message issued by the intelligent control center, extracts the token mapping table, and the local trusted intelligent agent binds its own temporary edgeToken with the corresponding terminal device's sensorToken and devToken one-to-one to form a linked token combination; Through a dedicated industrial MQTT encrypted link for the terminal device, a dual encryption method combining a temporary verification code and the device's factory hardware key is used to send the linked token combination to the trusted smart agent component of the corresponding terminal device. The trusted smart agent of the terminal device first verifies the validity of the temporary verification code. After the verification is successful, the token combination is stored in the hardware encryption chip built into the terminal device. This hardware encryption chip only assigns a unique access code to the device communication and encryption module. The module needs to verify the access code to access the module. All access operations are recorded in the chip's local log, which prohibits external reading, writing, and tampering. If the token issuance times out by 3 seconds or the verification fails, the terminal device triggers a re-authentication request. The edge computing control node then re-initiates token distribution. If the retransmission exceeds the threshold, the intelligent control center is notified and the device is marked as having an authentication error.

[0011] According to the above technical solution, the step of solidifying the combined linkage tokens after dual-end binding into a unique identifier for device data interaction and command transmission includes: Within the validity period of the linked token combination, each device does not need to undergo full-process authorization and proxy authentication repeatedly; during the interaction process, all Level 3 devices carry a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message. This field includes their own valid token, the valid token of the other party, the message timestamp, and the device signature generated by the SM3 national cryptographic hash algorithm, thereby standardizing the interaction message.

[0012] According to the above technical solution, after the receiver completes the multi-dimensional trust verification, it performs corresponding operations, including: The message receiver performs a three-dimensional standardized trusted verification of the token information in the message, which verifies the token validity, binding relationship, and signature consistency. It verifies in turn whether the token is registered and valid at both the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node, whether its own token and the other party's token are bound together, and whether the device signature is consistent with the recalculated SM3 hash value. If any dimension fails the verification, the interaction is directly rejected, and a local alarm is triggered. At the same time, a verification failure log containing the interaction parties and the reason for the failure is reported to the intelligent control center. The token is managed throughout its entire lifecycle. Before the trusted token of the terminal device expires, the local trusted intelligent agent automatically triggers the re-authentication process to re-complete the authorization agent authentication and token binding. If the token is tampered with, frozen, or the device goes offline and times out, the intelligent control center marks the token as invalid, and the edge computing control node rejects all interaction requests from the device until the device completes re-authentication and generates a new token.

[0013] According to the above technical solution, the step of carrying a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message, which is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device, includes: The fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device. When the edge computing control node issues control commands to the intelligent production device, it needs to attach the production work order number and operation permission range corresponding to the command to the fixed token field. After the intelligent production device completes the three-dimensional trust verification, it also needs to verify whether the command content is within the authorization range of the current production work order. Only if the verification passes can the command be executed. If the command exceeds the work order authorization range, it will directly refuse to execute and trigger an alarm, and simultaneously report the abnormal command, token information, and device status to the intelligent control center.

[0014] According to the above technical solution, the three-dimensional standardized trust verification includes: Based on their functional safety levels during production, the Level 3 equipment is pre-classified into three levels: core control, critical production, and general monitoring. For the core control category (intelligent control center and edge computing control nodes), a full-process, three-dimensional mandatory verification is performed, with a full verification completed for each interaction. For critical production category (intelligent production equipment), a two-dimensional verification of token validity and binding relationship is performed, with a full signature consistency verification performed every interval based on a fixed number of interactions preset according to the equipment's production safety level. For general monitoring category (sensors), a single-dimensional rapid verification of token validity is performed, with a full three-dimensional verification only performed upon initial device access and token renewal. Compared with existing technologies, the beneficial effects achieved by this invention are as follows: This invention achieves precise control over permissions and avoids unauthorized device access from the source by binding a three-level device unique identifier with a whitelist; relying on national cryptographic algorithms for encryption, one-time password dynamic session keys, and dedicated port-directed transmission, it prevents message tampering and interception; batch aggregation authentication also improves the efficiency of multi-device authentication; and timeout retransmission and blacklist mechanisms further enhance the reliability of the authentication process; by using the hardware encryption chip for secure token storage and the edge-control center dual-end filing mechanism, it achieves tamper-proof protection of tokens and traceable management of binding relationships; by solidifying the bound token as a unique identifier for device interaction, and combining three-dimensional verification of token validity, binding relationship, and signature consistency with full lifecycle management of the token, it fundamentally identifies forged messages and prevents the execution of false data and instructions; ultimately, it achieves end-to-end trusted control of data and instruction transmission in intelligent manufacturing scenarios, significantly improving the security and industrial practicality of intelligent control systems, and effectively reducing the probability of the system suffering network attacks and operational anomalies. Attached Figure Description

[0015] The accompanying drawings are provided to further illustrate the invention and form part of the specification. They are used in conjunction with embodiments of the invention to explain the invention and do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings: Figure 1This is a flowchart of a reliable intelligent control method in an intelligent manufacturing scenario provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0016] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0017] Please see Figure 1 The flowchart illustrates a method for trusted intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention. The method includes: A three-tier distributed networking architecture is established, with the intelligent control center as the first tier, edge computing control nodes as the second tier, and sensors and intelligent production equipment as the third tier. Trusted intelligent agent components are deployed in all three tier devices. The intelligent control center assigns a unique identifier to each level 3 device and configures a one-to-one exclusive interoperability permission policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensors and intelligent production equipment. It generates an exclusive basic token for the edge computing control node, pre-generates a token pool to be activated for the terminal devices, and the intelligent control center synchronizes the identifiers of the edge computing control node and its subordinate terminal devices, the interoperability permission policy, the basic token of the edge computing control node, and the token pool data of the terminal devices to be activated to the edge computing control node via an encrypted link and stores them in its local encrypted database. Enable the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function of the edge computing control node to receive encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices, carry the authentication information of the terminal devices to the intelligent control center to complete the authorized proxy authentication; after obtaining the trusted token of the terminal device activated by the intelligent control center from the token pool to be activated, realize the full-link linkage distribution of the basic token of the edge computing control node and the trusted token of the terminal device, as well as the dual-end binding and filing between the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node. The aforementioned dual-end binding linkage token combination is solidified as a unique identifier for data interaction and command transmission of the three-level devices. In the entire process of data acquisition and edge computing control node command issuance, all three-level devices carry linkage tokens and encrypted verification information for interaction. After the receiver completes multi-dimensional trusted verification, it executes the corresponding operation.

[0018] Preferably, token identity is solidified: the intelligent control center issues a solidification command, and the three-level devices solidify the combination of local linkage tokens into a unique identity for data interaction and command transmission. The edge computing control node uses its own temporary edgeToken, the sensor uses sensorToken + the edgeToken of its respective edge node, and the intelligent production equipment uses devToken + the edgeToken of its respective edge node. During the token's validity period, the device is exempt from repeated authentication and directly uses this combination as the basis for identity recognition, adapting to the needs of continuous operation and high-frequency interaction of workshop equipment. Standardized Interaction Messages: When all devices initiate data interaction, the local trusted intelligent agent constructs industrial MQTT interaction messages, which must carry a fixed token field containing a combination of its own and the other party's legitimate tokens, a message timestamp, and an SM3 hash signature. The token field is encrypted as an integral part of the message data body, ensuring the binding between identity and transmitted content. This adapts to the standardized management of multiple devices and multiple types of interactions in the workshop, and facilitates rapid parsing and verification by the devices. Token identification scenario application: In workshop production, after the sensor collects monitoring data, it uploads it to the corresponding edge node with a fixed token identifier; the edge node identifies the production line and workstation to which the equipment belongs through the token identifier and processes the data, and then generates control commands with its own token as the identifier, and issues them to the target intelligent production equipment according to the fixed token identifier; the intelligent production equipment only receives commands containing its own legitimate token identifier, which avoids the receipt and execution of forged commands from the root.

[0019] This embodiment deeply integrates the unique identity identifier of the token with the high-frequency interaction scenario of multiple devices in a smart manufacturing workshop. By solidifying the token combination, it achieves accurate traceability of device identity, solving the problem of non-unique device identity identifiers and susceptibility to counterfeiting in traditional scenarios. The standardized token field settings unify the interaction message format of different types of devices, adapting to the needs of rapid parsing and real-time transmission of industrial field devices. At the same time, the integrated encryption of the token identifier and the transmitted data body achieves dual protection of identity authentication and data security, laying the foundation for subsequent multi-dimensional trusted verification and forming a closed loop of identity security for data and command transmission in the smart manufacturing scenario.

[0020] According to the above technical solution, the process of assigning unique identifiers to level 3 devices by the intelligent control center and configuring one-to-one exclusive communication permissions between edge computing control nodes and their subordinate sensor and intelligent production equipment terminal devices includes: Assign a unique edgeComputerId and login password to the edge computing control node, assign a unique sensorId to the sensor, and assign a unique device ID to the smart production equipment; A temporary edgeToken, valid for 24 hours and encrypted with SM4-CBC, is generated for the edge computing control node. This temporary edgeToken is the exclusive basic token of the edge computing control node, containing edgeComputerId, timestamp, and control center random code. An activation token pool containing a unique device identifier and reserved verification bit is pre-generated for sensors and intelligent production equipment. The token pool adopts a management rule of pre-generation in single batches and automatic replenishment when it expires. The number of pre-generated tokens in a single batch matches the total number of terminal devices under the jurisdiction of the corresponding edge computing control node. Generate a whitelist of sensors and smart production equipment within the jurisdiction of each edge computing control node. The whitelist includes the device ID, physical communication address and deployment workstation. The whitelist is strongly bound to the edgeComputerId of the edge computing control node, limiting the edge computing control node to provide authorized proxy authentication services only to terminal devices within the whitelist. Industrial communication ports and protocols are configured for Level 3 devices. The edge computing control node uses 8899 / TCP as a dedicated port for proxy services, and the intelligent control center uses 9900 / TCP as a dedicated port for encryption and authentication. The trusted intelligent agent components of Level 3 devices establish encrypted communication links based on the industrial MQTT protocol.

[0021] According to the above technical solution, the method of assigning unique identifiers to level 3 devices by the intelligent control center and configuring a one-to-one exclusive interoperability policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensor and intelligent production equipment terminal devices also includes: The smooth handover process for device migration tokens across edge computing control nodes involves the following steps: When a terminal device needs to be migrated from its original home edge computing control node to a target edge computing control node due to production line changes or workstation adjustments, the original home edge computing control node initiates a device migration application with the device's unique identifier and target workstation information to the intelligent control center. After verifying the matching of the application with the production work order, the intelligent control center freezes the issuance permission of the original linkage token combination for the terminal device and synchronizes the device's identity identifier, historical authentication data, and permission policy to the target edge computing control node's whitelist and local encrypted database. After the target edge computing control node completes the dual-field whitelist verification for device access, the intelligent control center activates a new trusted token for the terminal device, establishes a linkage binding relationship between the new trusted token and the target edge computing control node's basic token, and completes dual-end filing. During the entire device migration process, the original linkage token combination is only frozen and not canceled. If the migration fails, the original binding relationship and communication permissions are automatically restored. After the migration is completed, the original linkage token combination is automatically invalidated and archived.

[0022] According to the above technical solution, enabling the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function of the edge computing control node to receive encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices includes: S1: The edge computing control node enables the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy module, opens port 8899 / TCP to only receive MQTT authentication requests from whitelisted devices in the local encrypted database. After the terminal device is powered on, it sends a standardized authentication request message that is lightly encrypted with a hardware key. If the required fields are missing, the request will be rejected. If no response is received within the time limit, an alarm will be triggered and the information will be reported. The edge computing control node will synchronize with the intelligent control center. S2: The edge computing control node parses the message, extracts the device identifier and physical communication address, and performs a precise two-field match with the local whitelist in the order of device identifier priority and physical address secondary verification. If the match is successful, a temporary verification code strongly bound to the device ID is generated and sent to the terminal device. If the match fails, the request message is discarded, the device address is added to the local blacklist and synchronized to the control center. S3: The edge computing control node aggregates valid authentication requests in batches, organizes authorized proxy authentication request messages to be dynamically encrypted and sent to the intelligent control center via port 9900 / TCP. It has a built-in timeout retransmission mechanism. If the timeout occurs, a fault alarm is triggered and reported to the intelligent control center. S4: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorized agent authentication request message, decrypts it and completes multi-dimensional verification. If the verification fails, a response message is returned. The intelligent control center activates the terminal trusted token encrypted with SM4-CBC from the token pool to be activated, generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table and sends it to the corresponding edge computing control node. S5: After the edge computing control node decrypts the token response message, it links and binds its own token with the terminal device's token. After being double-encrypted and sent out, the terminal device verifies and stores it in the hardware encryption chip. If it fails, it will be retransmitted and marked as abnormal. S6: The edge computing control node generates a linkage binding relationship table between the edge basic token and the terminal trusted token in the local encrypted database, and realizes dual-end filing with the intelligent control center. After the terminal device completes token storage, it returns a binding success confirmation message with hash signature. After verifying the validity of the signature, the edge computing control node summarizes the binding status of all terminal devices, generates logs, and encrypts and reports them to the intelligent control center, thus completing the authorization agent authentication and token binding.

[0023] For example, the edge computing control node, relying on the trusted intelligent agent security encryption layer, enables a dedicated authentication proxy module to perform localized filtering of authentication requests, directly intercepting requests from non-whitelisted devices and recording them in the local encrypted log. The production line terminal device encapsulates the required fields using the local trusted intelligent agent, generates an authentication request message through Base64 encoding combined with a hardware key, and sends it to its respective edge node. If any field is missing, the request is rejected directly. If no response is received within a timeout period, the device triggers a local alarm, which is then synchronized to the intelligent control center by the edge node. After parsing the legitimate message, the edge node matches it against the local whitelist according to the rules of identifier priority and physical address secondary verification. If a match is successful, a temporary verification code strongly bound to the device ID is issued; otherwise, the device address is added to the blacklist and synchronized to the global blacklist in the intelligent control center. Edge nodes aggregate legitimate requests in batches according to the power-on batches of production line equipment. The trusted intelligent agent organizes the authorization proxy authentication request messages, encrypts them using the SM4-CBC dynamic session key (one-time key), and sends them to the dedicated encryption authentication port of the intelligent control center via the industrial MQTT encrypted link. After decryption, the intelligent control center completes the four-dimensional standardized verification, activates the sensorToken and devToken and strongly binds them with the device identifier, and sends an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table. If the verification fails, a response message containing a specific reason is returned. After decryption, the edge node binds its own temporary edgeToken to the terminal device token one-to-one. The token combination is issued with dual encryption using a temporary verification code and a hardware key. After verification, the terminal device stores the token combination in the hardware encryption chip of the core control module. This chip can only be accessed by the communication and encryption modules through a dedicated permission code. The operation log is synchronized to the local encrypted database. The edge node generates a token binding relationship table with edgeComputerId and terminal device ID as the joint primary key, and achieves dual-end filing with the intelligent control center. The terminal device sends an acknowledgment message with an SM3 hash signature. After verifying the signature validity, the edge node summarizes the binding status of all devices, generates an encrypted authentication log, and stores it on both ends, completing the authorized agent authentication process. This embodiment deeply integrates edge authorization proxy authentication with intelligent manufacturing workshop production line management. Through localized authentication filtering at edge computing control nodes, it not only reduces the computational pressure on the intelligent control center but also lowers the transmission load on the industrial network, avoiding congestion at the central node. This adapts to the real-time requirements of industrial scenarios and the actual needs of limited industrial network bandwidth. Batch aggregation authentication is automatically triggered according to the power-on batches of production line equipment, highly adapting to the actual production situation of multiple devices powering on and starting up simultaneously in the workshop, significantly improving the authentication efficiency of large-scale equipment. The combination of one-to-one token linkage binding and dual binding of identity identifiers and physical addresses in the production line whitelist enables refined control of device permissions, eliminating cross-production line permission overreach issues. At the same time, the physical-level protection of the hardware encryption chip and the encryption-level protection of the dynamic session key form a dual security guarantee, fundamentally solving the industry pain points of centralized authentication, insecure transmission, and easy identity forgery in existing technologies, perfectly adapting to the equipment security and data security management needs of intelligent manufacturing workshops.

[0024] According to the above technical solution, step S4 includes: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorization agent authentication request message and decrypts the message using the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key; it then performs a four-dimensional standardized verification of the edge computing control node identifier validity, temporary token validity, authorization agent authentication permission code validity, and digital signature consistency. If the verification fails, an encrypted response message containing the specific reason for the failure is generated and sent to the corresponding edge computing control node. The edge computing control node then synchronizes the message to the corresponding terminal device and records the log. If the verification is successful, a 30-day valid terminal trusted token sensorToken and devToken encrypted with SM4-BC will be activated for the device to be certified from the token pool to be activated. The token contains the device's unique identifier, timestamp, smart control center random code and anti-tamper verification bit. After being strongly bound to the device's unique identifier, it will be updated to the smart control center's global authentication database. The intelligent control center generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table, authentication result, token validity period, and millisecond-level response timestamp. After being encrypted with the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key, the message is sent to the edge computing control node.

[0025] According to the above technical solution, step S5 includes: The edge computing control node decrypts the encrypted token response message issued by the intelligent control center, extracts the token mapping table, and the local trusted intelligent agent binds its own temporary edgeToken with the corresponding terminal device's sensorToken and devToken one-to-one to form a linked token combination; Through a dedicated industrial MQTT encrypted link for the terminal device, a dual encryption method combining a temporary verification code and the device's factory hardware key is used to send the linked token combination to the trusted smart agent component of the corresponding terminal device. The trusted smart agent of the terminal device first verifies the validity of the temporary verification code. After the verification is successful, the token combination is stored in the hardware encryption chip built into the terminal device. This hardware encryption chip only assigns a unique access code to the device communication and encryption module. The module needs to verify the access code to access the module. All access operations are recorded in the chip's local log, which prohibits external reading, writing, and tampering. If the token issuance times out by 3 seconds or the verification fails, the terminal device triggers a re-authentication request. The edge computing control node then re-initiates token distribution. If the retransmission exceeds the threshold, the intelligent control center is notified and the device is marked as having an authentication error.

[0026] According to the above technical solution, the step of solidifying the combined linkage tokens after dual-end binding into a unique identifier for device data interaction and command transmission includes: The linkage token combination after the three-level devices are bound together through the entire link serves as the unique identity identifier for each device in the entire process of data interaction and instruction transmission, including data collection, instruction issuance, and status feedback. The linkage token combination is a binding combination of the basic token of the edge computing control node and the trusted token of the corresponding terminal device. Each device does not need to be re-authenticated within the validity period of the token. During the interaction process, all Level 3 devices carry a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message. This field includes their own valid token, the other party's valid token, the message timestamp, and the device signature generated by the SM3 national cryptographic hash algorithm, thus standardizing the interaction message.

[0027] According to the above technical solution, after the receiver completes the multi-dimensional trust verification, it performs corresponding operations, including: The message receiver performs a three-dimensional standardized trusted verification on the token information in the message. It verifies whether the token is registered and valid at both the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node, whether its own token and the other party's token are bound together, and whether the device signature is consistent with the recalculated SM3 hash value. If any dimension fails the verification, the interaction is rejected directly, and a local alarm is triggered. The intelligent control center is also notified of the verification failure log containing the interaction parties and the reason for the failure. The token is managed throughout its entire lifecycle. Before the trusted token of the terminal device expires, the local trusted intelligent agent automatically triggers the re-authentication process to re-complete the authorization agent authentication and token binding. If the token is tampered with, frozen, or the device is offline beyond the limit, the intelligent control center marks the token as invalid and the edge computing control node rejects all interaction requests from the device until the device completes re-authentication and generates a new token. According to the above technical solution, the step of carrying a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message, which is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device, includes: The fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device. When the edge computing control node issues control commands to the intelligent production device, it needs to attach the production work order number and operation permission range corresponding to the command to the fixed token field. After the intelligent production device completes the three-dimensional trust verification, it also needs to verify whether the command content is within the authorization range of the current production work order. Only if the verification passes can the command be executed. If the command exceeds the work order authorization range, it will directly refuse to execute and trigger local hardware alarms and remote platform alarms, and simultaneously report the abnormal command, token information, and device status to the intelligent control center.

[0028] According to the above technical solution, the three-dimensional standardized trust verification includes: Based on the functional safety level of the equipment in production, the three-level equipment is pre-classified into three levels: core control, critical production, and general monitoring. For the intelligent control center and edge computing control nodes of the core control category, a full-process three-dimensional mandatory verification is performed, with a full verification completed for each interaction. For the intelligent production equipment of the critical production category, a two-dimensional verification of token validity and binding relationship is performed, with a full signature consistency verification performed every interval according to a fixed number of interactions preset according to the equipment's production safety level. For the sensors of the general monitoring category, a one-dimensional fast verification of token validity is performed, with a full three-dimensional verification performed only when the device first connects or when the token is renewed. If the one-dimensional verification fails, the interaction is directly rejected, triggering a local alarm and synchronizing it to the corresponding edge computing control node.

[0029] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.

[0030] Finally, it should be noted that the above descriptions are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario, characterized in that, include: A three-tier distributed networking architecture is established, with the intelligent control center as the first tier, edge computing control nodes as the second tier, and sensors and intelligent production equipment as the third tier. Trusted intelligent agent components are deployed in all three tier devices. The intelligent control center assigns a unique identifier to each level 3 device and configures a one-to-one exclusive communication permission policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensors and intelligent production equipment. A dedicated basic token is generated for the edge computing control node, and a token pool to be activated is pre-generated for the terminal device. The intelligent control center then synchronizes the identity identifiers of the edge computing control node and its subordinate terminal devices, the interoperability permission policy, the basic token of the edge computing control node, and the token pool data to be activated for the terminal device to the edge computing control node via an encrypted link and stores them in its local encrypted database. Enable the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function of the edge computing control node to receive encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices, carry the authentication information of the terminal devices to the intelligent control center to complete the authorized proxy authentication; after obtaining the trusted token of the terminal device activated by the intelligent control center from the token pool to be activated, realize the full-link linkage distribution of the basic token of the edge computing control node and the trusted token of the terminal device, as well as the dual-end binding and filing between the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node. The aforementioned dual-end binding linkage token combination is solidified as a unique identifier for data interaction and command transmission of the three-level devices. In the entire process of data acquisition and edge computing control node command issuance, all three-level devices carry linkage tokens and encrypted verification information for interaction. After the receiver completes multi-dimensional trusted verification, it executes the corresponding operation.

2. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system, which assigns unique identifiers to Level 3 devices by the intelligent control center and configures a one-to-one exclusive communication permission policy between edge computing control nodes and their subordinate sensor and intelligent production equipment terminal devices, includes: Assign a unique edgeComputerId and login password to the edge computing control node, assign a unique sensorId to the sensor, and assign a unique device ID to the smart production equipment; A temporary edgeToken, valid for 24 hours and encrypted with SM4-CBC, is generated for the edge computing control node. This temporary edgeToken is a unique basic token for the edge computing control node, containing edgeComputerId, timestamp, and control center random code. When the temporary edgeToken of the edge computing control node expires, the trusted tokens of all terminal devices under its jurisdiction simultaneously enter the re-authentication state. After the edge computing control node completes the generation of a new basic token, the terminal devices under its jurisdiction automatically trigger the token update and rebinding process. A token pool containing a unique device identifier and reserved verification bits is pre-generated for the terminal devices. The token pool adopts a management rule of pre-generation in single batches and automatic replenishment upon expiration. Generate a whitelist of sensors and smart production equipment within the jurisdiction of each edge computing control node. The whitelist includes the device ID, physical communication address and deployment workstation. The whitelist is strongly bound to the edgeComputerId of the edge computing control node, limiting the edge computing control node to provide authorized proxy authentication services only to terminal devices within the whitelist. Industrial communication ports and protocols are configured for Level 3 devices. The edge computing control node uses 8899 / TCP as a dedicated port for proxy services, and the intelligent control center uses 9900 / TCP as a dedicated port for encryption and authentication. The trusted intelligent agent components of Level 3 devices establish encrypted communication links based on the industrial MQTT protocol.

3. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 2, characterized in that, The method of assigning unique identifiers to Level 3 devices by the intelligent control center and configuring a one-to-one exclusive communication permission policy between the edge computing control node and its subordinate sensor and intelligent production equipment terminal devices also includes: The smooth handover process for device migration tokens across edge computing control nodes involves the following steps: When a terminal device needs to be migrated from its original home edge computing control node to a target edge computing control node due to production line changes or workstation adjustments, the original home edge computing control node initiates a device migration application with the device's unique identifier and target workstation information to the intelligent control center. After verifying the matching of the application with the production work order, the intelligent control center freezes the issuance permission of the original linkage token combination for the terminal device and synchronizes the device's identity identifier, historical authentication data, and permission policy to the target edge computing control node's whitelist and local encrypted database. After the target edge computing control node completes the dual-field whitelist verification for device access, the intelligent control center activates a new trusted token for the terminal device, establishes a linkage binding relationship between the new trusted token and the target edge computing control node's basic token, and completes dual-end filing. During the entire device migration process, the original linkage token combination is only frozen and not canceled. If the migration fails, the original binding relationship and communication permissions are automatically restored. After the migration is completed, the original linkage token combination is automatically invalidated and archived.

4. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 2, characterized in that, The enabled edge computing control node's trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy function receives encrypted standardized authentication requests from subordinate terminal devices, including: S1: The edge computing control node enables the trusted intelligent agent authentication proxy module, opens port 8899 / TCP to only receive MQTT authentication requests from whitelisted devices in the local encrypted database. After the terminal device is powered on, it sends a standardized authentication request message that is lightly encrypted with a hardware key. If the required fields are missing, the request will be rejected. If no response is received within the time limit, an alarm will be triggered and the information will be reported. The edge computing control node will synchronize with the intelligent control center. S2: The edge computing control node parses the message, extracts the device identifier and physical communication address, and performs a precise two-field match with the local whitelist in the order of device identifier priority and physical address secondary verification. If the match is successful, a temporary verification code strongly bound to the device ID is generated and sent to the terminal device. If the match fails, the request message is discarded, the device address is added to the local blacklist and synchronized to the control center. S3: The edge computing control node aggregates valid authentication requests in batches, organizes authorized proxy authentication request messages to be dynamically encrypted and sent to the intelligent control center via port 9900 / TCP. It has a built-in timeout retransmission mechanism. If the timeout occurs, a fault alarm is triggered and reported to the intelligent control center. S4: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorized agent authentication request message, decrypts it and completes multi-dimensional verification. If the verification fails, a response message is returned. The intelligent control center activates the terminal trusted token encrypted with SM4-CBC from the token pool to be activated, generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table and sends it to the corresponding edge computing control node. S5: After the edge computing control node decrypts the token response message, it links and binds its own token with the terminal device's token. After being double-encrypted and sent out, the terminal device verifies and stores it in the hardware encryption chip. If it fails, it will be retransmitted and marked as abnormal. S6: The edge computing control node generates a linkage binding relationship table between the edge basic token and the terminal trusted token in the local encrypted database, and realizes dual-end filing with the intelligent control center. After the terminal device completes token storage, it returns a binding success confirmation message with hash signature. After verifying the validity of the signature, the edge computing control node summarizes the binding status of all terminal devices, generates logs, and encrypts and reports them to the intelligent control center, thus completing the authorization agent authentication and token binding.

5. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 4, characterized in that, Step S4 includes: The intelligent control center receives the encrypted authorization agent authentication request message and decrypts the message using the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key; it then performs a four-dimensional standardized verification of the edge computing control node identifier validity, temporary token validity, authorization agent authentication permission code validity, and digital signature consistency. If the verification fails, an encrypted response message containing the specific reason for the failure is generated and sent to the corresponding edge computing control node. The edge computing control node then synchronizes the message to the corresponding terminal device and records the log. After verification, the intelligent control center activates a 30-day valid terminal trusted token sensorToken and devToken encrypted with SM4-CBC for the device to be authenticated from the token pool. The token contains the device's unique identifier, timestamp, intelligent control center random code and anti-tamper verification bit. After strongly binding it with the device's unique identifier, it is updated to the intelligent control center's global authentication database. The intelligent control center generates an encrypted response message containing a token mapping table, authentication result, token validity period, and millisecond-level response timestamp. After being encrypted with the original 128-bit SM4-CBC dynamic session key, the message is sent to the edge computing control node.

6. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 5, characterized in that, Step S5 includes: The edge computing control node decrypts the encrypted token response message issued by the intelligent control center, extracts the token mapping table, and the local trusted intelligent agent binds its own temporary edgeToken with the corresponding terminal device's sensorToken and devToken one-to-one to form a linked token combination; Through a dedicated industrial MQTT encrypted link for the terminal device, a dual encryption method combining a temporary verification code and the device's factory hardware key is used to send the linked token combination to the trusted intelligent agent component of the corresponding terminal device. The trusted intelligent agent of the terminal device first verifies the validity of the temporary verification code. After successful verification, the token combination is stored in the hardware encryption chip built into the terminal device. This hardware encryption chip only assigns a unique access code to the device communication and encryption module. Module access requires verification of the access code. All access operations are recorded in the chip's local log, which prohibits external reading, writing, and tampering. If an unauthorized access is detected, a local hardware alarm is immediately triggered, and the time and address of the unauthorized access are synchronized to the relevant edge computing control node and intelligent control center. If the token issuance times out by 3 seconds or the verification fails, the terminal device triggers a re-authentication request. The edge computing control node then re-initiates token distribution. If the retransmission exceeds the threshold, the intelligent control center is notified and the device is marked as having an authentication error.

7. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of solidifying the combined linkage tokens after dual-end binding into a unique identifier for device data interaction and command transmission includes: Within the validity period of the linkage token combination, each device does not need to undergo full-process authorization proxy authentication repeatedly; during the interaction process, all Level 3 devices carry a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message. The fixed token field includes its own valid linkage token, the other party's valid linkage token, the message generation timestamp, and the device signature generated by the SM3 national cryptographic hash algorithm.

8. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 7, characterized in that, After completing the multi-dimensional trust verification, the receiver performs corresponding operations, including: The message receiver performs a three-dimensional standardized trusted verification of the token information in the message, which verifies the token validity, binding relationship, and signature consistency. It verifies in turn whether the token is registered and valid at both the intelligent control center and the edge computing control node, whether its own token and the other party's token are bound together, and whether the device signature is consistent with the recalculated SM3 hash value. If any dimension fails the verification, the interaction is directly rejected, and a local alarm is triggered. At the same time, a verification failure log containing the interaction parties and the reason for the failure is reported to the intelligent control center. The linked token combination and the trusted token of the terminal device are subject to full lifecycle management. Before the trusted token of the terminal device expires, the local trusted intelligent agent automatically triggers the re-authentication process to re-complete the authorization agent authentication and binding of the trusted token. If the trusted token is tampered with, frozen, or the device is offline for more than a preset threshold, the edge computing control node will synchronize the device status to the intelligent control center in real time. The intelligent control center will mark the trusted token as invalid, and the edge computing control node will reject all interaction requests from the device until the device completes re-authentication and generates a new trusted token.

9. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 8, characterized in that, The method of carrying a fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message, which is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device, includes: The fixed token field in the industrial MQTT message is also bound to the current production work order authorization range of the corresponding device. When the edge computing control node issues control commands to the intelligent production device, it needs to attach the production work order number and operation permission range corresponding to the command to the fixed token field. After the intelligent production device completes the three-dimensional trust verification, it also needs to verify whether the command content is within the authorization range of the current production work order. Only if the verification passes can the command be executed. If the command exceeds the work order authorization range, it will directly refuse to execute and trigger an alarm, and simultaneously report the abnormal command, token information, and device status to the intelligent control center.

10. The method for reliable intelligent control in a smart manufacturing scenario according to claim 9, characterized in that, The three-dimensional standardized trust verification includes: Based on the functional safety level of the equipment in production, the three-level equipment is pre-classified into three levels: core control, critical production, and general monitoring. For the intelligent control center and edge computing control nodes of the core control category, a full-process three-dimensional mandatory verification is performed, with full verification completed for each interaction. For the intelligent production equipment of the critical production category, a two-dimensional verification of token validity and binding relationship is performed, with a full signature consistency verification performed every interval according to a fixed number of interactions preset according to the equipment's production safety level. For the sensors of the general monitoring category, a single-dimensional fast verification of token validity is performed, with full three-dimensional verification only performed when the device is first connected or when the token is renewed.

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