Encryption method and related device
By setting an identification code and generating a key using an encryption algorithm in the frequency converter, the problem of leakage of E2PROM function parameters of the frequency converter is solved, and the secure encryption protection of the frequency converter is realized.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- SHENZHEN HPMONT TECH
- Filing Date
- 2026-03-26
- Publication Date
- 2026-06-19
AI Technical Summary
In the existing technology, the functional parameters stored in the E2PROM of the frequency converter can be easily read by external devices, resulting in the leakage of critical functional parameters.
The inverter's processor is set with a first identifier code, the register is set with a second identifier code, and an initial device key is generated through an encryption algorithm. Identity verification and key comparison are performed to ensure that only original equipment can operate normally.
It effectively prevents unauthorized devices from replacing registers, ensures that the inverter's functional parameters are not leaked, and improves safety and reliability.
Smart Images
Figure CN122247630A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of encryption technology, and in particular to an encryption method and related equipment. Background Technology
[0002] A frequency converter is an electronic device used to control the speed (frequency) and torque of an AC motor. For ease of control, frequency converters contain many functional parameters for human-machine interaction and related equipment control. These functional parameters are usually written by the frequency converter's processor (DSP, Digital Signal Processor) into a specific E2PROM (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Register) device. For example, when the frequency converter is working, the DSP writes the password modified by the user into the E2PROM device. The next time it is used, the DSP reads the password from the E2PROM device by sending the corresponding read command, thereby realizing the relevant control of the frequency converter.
[0003] E2PROM is used to store the function parameters of the frequency converter. These function parameters include important information such as the frequency converter's operating parameters and user passwords. Currently, external devices can easily read the function parameters stored in the E2PROM through the pins of the E2PROM, causing the function parameters of the frequency converter to be leaked. Summary of the Invention
[0004] In view of the above problems, this application provides an encryption method and related equipment to achieve the purpose of encrypting key parameters of frequency converters. The specific solution is as follows:
[0005] This application provides an encryption method for use in a frequency converter, wherein the processor of the frequency converter is configured with a first identifier, the register of the frequency converter is configured with a second identifier, the register stores a preset initial device key, and the initial device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a first encryption algorithm, the encryption method comprising:
[0006] During the power-on phase of the inverter, the validity of the first identifier code of the processor and the second identifier code of the register are verified respectively.
[0007] If the validity check fails, a fault signal is output and the operating privileges of the frequency converter are locked.
[0008] If the verification is successful, the initial device key stored in the register is read, and a temporary device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm.
[0009] Compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent to obtain the comparison result;
[0010] If the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked.
[0011] If the comparison result is consistent, the inverter is controlled to enter normal operation.
[0012] In one possible implementation, verifying the validity of the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier respectively includes:
[0013] The data format, physical authenticity, and / or logical readability of the first and second identifier codes of the processor are verified respectively.
[0014] In one possible implementation, the initial device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a first encryption algorithm, including:
[0015] The initial device key is generated through nonlinear hybrid calculation based on the first identifier and the second identifier code, and incorporates a unique encryption factor.
[0016] Based on the first identifier and the second identifier, a temporary device key is generated using the first encryption algorithm, including:
[0017] The temporary device key is generated through the nonlinear hybrid calculation based on the first identifier and the second identifier, incorporating the exclusive encryption factor.
[0018] In one possible implementation, the encryption method further includes:
[0019] After the inverter enters normal operation, if it is detected that the user has modified the key parameters of the inverter, a dynamic encrypted address is generated based on the first identification code and the second identification code using the second encryption algorithm. The target key parameters obtained after the key parameters are modified are then encrypted based on the dynamic encrypted address.
[0020] In one possible implementation, encrypting the target key parameters obtained by modifying the key parameters based on the dynamic encrypted address includes:
[0021] The target key parameters are written into the storage space of the register corresponding to the dynamic encrypted address according to the distributed storage strategy;
[0022] When a user reads the target key parameters, the dynamic encrypted address is recalculated based on the second encryption algorithm using the first identifier and the second identifier, and the target key parameters are read using the dynamic encrypted address and the distributed storage strategy.
[0023] In one possible implementation, the encryption method further includes:
[0024] After the frequency converter enters normal operation, if it is detected that the operator has triggered the advanced function activation command of the frequency converter, an authorization key is generated based on the first identification code and the second identification code using the third encryption algorithm, and the operator's authorization is verified based on the authorization key.
[0025] Furthermore, the step of generating an authorization key using the first identifier and the second identifier through a third encryption algorithm, and verifying the operator's permissions based on the authorization key, includes:
[0026] A private authorization key is generated using the first identifier and the second identifier based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The private authorization key is then used to verify permissions against a preset public authorization key. The public authorization key is generated using the first identifier and the second identifier based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
[0027] A second aspect of this application provides an encryption system, characterized in that it comprises:
[0028] The verification unit is used to verify the validity of the first identifier code of the processor and the second identifier code of the register respectively during the power-on phase of the inverter; if the validity verification fails, a fault signal is output and the operating permission of the inverter is locked; if the verification is successful, the initial device key stored in the register is read, and a temporary device key is generated based on the first identifier code and the second identifier code using the first encryption algorithm.
[0029] The comparison unit is used to compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent and obtain the comparison result; if the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked; if the comparison result is consistent, the frequency converter is controlled to enter the normal operating state.
[0030] A third aspect of this application provides an encryption device, characterized in that it comprises:
[0031] Central processing unit, registers, input / output interfaces, wired or wireless network interfaces, and power supply;
[0032] The register is a short-term storage register or a persistent storage register;
[0033] The central processing unit is configured to communicate with the register and execute instructions in the register to perform encryption methods according to the first aspect or any implementation thereof.
[0034] A fourth aspect of this application provides a computer storage medium carrying one or more computer programs, which, when executed by an electronic device, enable the electronic device to use the encryption method described in the first aspect or any implementation thereof.
[0035] By employing the above technical solution, this application sets a first identification code in the inverter's processor, sets a second identification code in the inverter's register, and pre-stores an initial device key in the register. This initial device key is generated based on the first and second identification codes using a first encryption algorithm. Through the above settings, during the inverter's power-on phase, the first identification code of the inverter and the second identification code of the register are verified to determine whether the register is an original manufacturer's register. This allows for timely detection of unauthorized replacement of the register by a thief. Furthermore, after successful verification, a temporary device key is generated and compared with the preset initial device key. Since both the temporary and initial device keys are generated using specific encryption algorithms, this comparison step ensures that even if a thief obtains the identification code illegally, they will be unable to pass the verification due to a lack of knowledge of the specific encryption algorithm, thus locking the inverter's operating permissions and ultimately ensuring that the inverter's functional parameters are not leaked. Attached Figure Description
[0036] The above and other features, advantages, and aspects of the embodiments of this disclosure will become more apparent from the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description. Throughout the drawings, the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements. It should be understood that the drawings are schematic, and the originals and elements are not necessarily drawn to scale.
[0037] Figure 1 A flowchart of an encryption method provided in this application;
[0038] Figure 2 A structural block diagram of an encryption device provided in this application. Detailed Implementation
[0039] The embodiments of this application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The terminology used in the implementation section of this application is for explaining specific embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of this application.
[0040] The embodiments of this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. Those skilled in the art will recognize that, with technological advancements and the emergence of new scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are equally applicable to similar technical problems.
[0041] The terms "first," "second," etc., used in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such terms are interchangeable where appropriate; this is merely a way of distinguishing objects with the same attributes in the embodiments of this application. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of elements is not necessarily limited to those elements, but may include other elements not explicitly listed or inherent to those processes, methods, products, or apparatuses.
[0042] In frequency converters, due to the limited storage space of the processor, the processor can typically only store fixed programs and factory baseline parameters. During the operation of the frequency converter, users often need to modify key functional parameters such as frequency through the human-machine interface based on actual needs. These parameters are generally written by the processor into the frequency converter's specific E2PROM (erasable programmable read-only register) device via the IIC bus (SCL clock line and SDA data line). These key functional parameters contain important information such as user passwords and frequency converter operating parameters. Since the IIC bus protocol is open and transparent, any device that supports IIC master mode (such as microcontrollers, USB to IIC modules, and logic analyzers) can be directly connected to the SCL and SDA lines to simulate the processor issuing read commands, thereby reading the functional parameters stored in the E2PROM (hereinafter referred to as registers), leading to the leakage of the frequency converter's key functional parameters. In view of this, this application provides an encryption method.
[0043] This application provides an encryption method applied to a frequency converter. The frequency converter's processor is configured with a first identifier, and its registers are configured with a second identifier. Both the first and second identifiers can be chip UIDs (Unique Identifiers), meaning the chip UIDs are set in the processor chip and the registers, respectively. After the processor sets the first identifier and the registers set the second identifier, an initial device key is generated based on the first and second identifiers using a first encryption algorithm. This initial device key is pre-stored in the register. The setting of the identifiers and the generation and storage of the initial device key can be completed during the frequency converter manufacturing stage.
[0044] Based on the above inverter settings, see Figure 1 The encryption method provided in this application includes the following steps:
[0045] S101: During the power-on phase of the frequency converter, the validity of the processor's first identifier code and the register's second identifier code are verified respectively;
[0046] When the inverter is powered on and started normally each time, the processor reads its own first identifier code and the register's second identifier code. By verifying the validity of the first and second identifier codes, the identity of the processor and register can be verified to ensure that it is an original manufacturer device.
[0047] S102: If the validity check fails, a fault signal is output and the inverter's operating privileges are locked;
[0048] If the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier fail the validity verification, it indicates that the device identifier is abnormal or the register may have been replaced by a non-original manufacturer's register by a thief. In this case, the processor outputs a fault signal to prompt relevant technical personnel to perform security procedures, and at the same time locks the inverter's operating permissions, preventing the thief from reading any data.
[0049] S103: If the verification is successful, read the initial device key stored in the register and generate a temporary device key based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm;
[0050] If the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier pass the validity verification, it indicates that the identifier is normal and the relevant device is an original manufacturer device. At this time, the initial device key pre-stored in the register can be read, and a temporary device key can be generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm. The temporary device key and the initial device key are then used for the next step of security verification.
[0051] S104: Compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent, and obtain the comparison result;
[0052] The initial device key is usually pre-stored in the register during the inverter production stage. This initial device key is generated during the production stage based on the first identifier code of the processor at the time of production and the second identifier code of the register at the time of production, using the first encryption algorithm. The temporary device key is generated during the inverter power-on stage based on the first identifier code of the processor at the time of power-on and the second identifier code of the register at the time of power-on, using the first encryption algorithm. The comparison result is obtained by comparing the initial device key and the temporary device key byte by byte.
[0053] S105: If the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal will be output and the inverter's operating privileges will be locked.
[0054] If the comparison results are inconsistent, it means that the identification code is inconsistent with the original identification code used by the manufacturer or the encryption algorithm is inconsistent with the original encryption algorithm used by the manufacturer. At this time, the register may have been replaced by a different register produced by the same manufacturer by the thief, or the thief may have obtained the relevant identification code through illegal means but did not master the relevant encryption algorithm. In this case, an alarm signal is output to alert the relevant technical personnel and lock the operation permission of the frequency converter, so that the thief cannot read any data.
[0055] S106: If the comparison result is consistent, control the frequency converter to enter normal operation.
[0056] If the comparison results are consistent, it means that the relevant equipment has not been replaced and the relevant programs have not been stolen. The frequency converter is in normal power-on operation, and at this time the frequency converter can be controlled to enter the normal operation state.
[0057] The aforementioned encryption algorithm verifies the device identity of the processor and registers by verifying the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier. This prevents thieves from maliciously replacing the original registers in the device with non-original ones to obtain the inverter's core parameters. Furthermore, based on the first and second identifiers, the algorithm sets an initial device key and a temporary device key for encryption. This ensures that even if a thief obtains the device's identifier, they will be unable to steal the inverter's key functional parameters due to the lack of relevant encryption algorithms, thus further ensuring that the inverter's functional parameters will not be leaked.
[0058] In some embodiments of this application, verifying the validity of the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier specifically includes:
[0059] The data format, physical authenticity, and / or logical readability of the processor's first and second identifier codes are verified respectively. The data format verification mainly involves checking the arrangement and encoding format of the identifier code data itself, such as whether the number of bytes in the identifier code is standard (e.g., the identifier code of some models may be 16 bytes or 32 bytes), whether the encoding is valid hexadecimal, and whether the fixed feature bits contain the corresponding encoding, etc. The physical authenticity verification is performed by reading the identifier code of the same target multiple times to avoid misreading caused by external interference. The logical readability verification checks whether the identifier code is an encoded identifier code (e.g., if the identifier code is detected as 0FFFFFFF or 00000000, it indicates that it is a blank identifier code, indicating that the identifier code of the device was not burned in during production and there is an identifier code fault).
[0060] The above validity verification can determine whether the processor's first identifier and the register's second identifier are valid. Corresponding device verification can be performed on the processor and register, thereby preventing thieves from maliciously obtaining the inverter's core parameters by replacing the original register with a non-original one. It also ensures that the read first and second identifiers can be used for subsequent encryption verification.
[0061] In some embodiments of this application, the generation of the initial device key based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a first encryption algorithm includes: generating the initial device key based on the first identifier and the second identifier and incorporating a dedicated encryption factor through nonlinear hybrid calculation; generating the temporary device key based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm includes: generating the temporary device key based on the first identifier and the second identifier and incorporating a dedicated encryption factor through nonlinear hybrid calculation; wherein, the aforementioned first algorithm is to perform nonlinear hybrid calculation by setting a corresponding dedicated encryption factor, and both the initial device key and the temporary device key are generated using the first algorithm (i.e., using the same dedicated encryption factor and the same nonlinear hybrid calculation), and the corresponding algorithm of the dedicated encryption factor and the nonlinear hybrid calculation can be determined when setting the corresponding identifier during device production.
[0062] In the process of generating the initial device key and temporary device key, a unique encryption factor and corresponding algorithm are incorporated. Since the unique encryption factor and corresponding algorithm are proprietary to the manufacturer, even if a thief obtains the relevant equipment, they will not be able to steal the key functional parameters of the frequency converter because they do not have the manufacturer's unique encryption factor and corresponding algorithm, thus further increasing the security of encryption.
[0063] In some embodiments of this application, the provided encryption algorithm further includes:
[0064] After the inverter enters normal operation, if it detects that the user has modified the inverter's key parameters (e.g., a user has issued a modification command request for the inverter's key parameters), a dynamic encrypted address is generated based on the first and second identifier codes and a second encryption algorithm (the generated encrypted address varies depending on the type of parameter being modified). This dynamic encrypted address is random and bound to the device's identifier code. The target key parameter obtained after modifying the key parameter based on the dynamic encrypted address is then encrypted. The aforementioned second encryption algorithm can be performed using the first and second identifier codes for encryption calculation. The type of the second encryption algorithm is selected based on actual needs such as processor computing resources, and is not specifically limited here.
[0065] The aforementioned encryption protection for key parameters is based on the generation of the first and second identification codes using the second encryption algorithm. The first and second identification codes are device-specific and highly reliable. Furthermore, the encryption process utilizes the second encryption algorithm to further strengthen the protection of key parameters. This enables high-strength encryption protection of user-configured key parameters, preventing unauthorized cracking or tampering.
[0066] Furthermore, when a user modifies key parameters (such as when modifying the access password), some embodiments of this application provide an encryption algorithm including: writing the target key parameters into the storage space of the register corresponding to the dynamic encryption address according to a distributed storage strategy; when the user reads the target key parameters, recalculating the dynamic encryption address based on the second encryption algorithm using the first identifier and the second identifier, and reading the target key parameters using the dynamic encryption address and the distributed storage strategy.
[0067] Specifically, taking the modification of the access password as an example, the processor retrieves its own first identifier and the second identifier of the register, and generates multiple dynamic encrypted addresses (such as 16-bit encrypted addresses; the generated encrypted addresses differ depending on the time period and data type, and the encrypted addresses can be dynamically adjusted) through the second encryption algorithm. These 16-bit encrypted addresses are stored in the register. The processor writes the new password entered by the user into the register storage space corresponding to the 16-bit encrypted address according to a distributed storage strategy. The distributed storage strategy involves writing the new password entered by the user into the register storage space corresponding to the 16-bit encrypted address in a specific order. When the user needs to read the new password later, the processor recalculates the 16-bit encrypted address using the first and second identifiers, and derives the storage location of the new password using the distributed storage strategy, thereby reading the new password from the 16-bit encrypted address and feeding it back to the user.
[0068] The dynamic encrypted address generated by the first and second identifiers based on the second encryption algorithm, combined with a specific distributed storage strategy, can build multi-layered encryption protection for key parameters, achieving high-strength encryption protection for users' key configuration data and preventing passwords from being illegally cracked or tampered with.
[0069] In some embodiments of this application, the frequency converter also includes advanced function controls (such as appropriate control high-performance algorithms, multi-motor collaborative control strategies, etc.). These functional modules require operation by corresponding professional technicians and involve the core control technology of the frequency converter. Therefore, to provide authorized encryption protection for these advanced functions, the encryption algorithm provided in some embodiments of this application further includes: after the frequency converter enters normal operation, if an operator triggers an advanced function activation command, an authorization key is generated based on a third encryption algorithm using a first identifier and a second identifier. The operator's permissions are then verified based on this authorization key. The specific permission verification process is determined based on the type of the third encryption algorithm used. If the third encryption algorithm uses a symmetric encryption algorithm (i.e., generates a single key), authorization verification is performed directly using this key. If the third encryption algorithm uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm (i.e., generates a pair of keys, a private key and a public key), authorization verification is performed by matching the private key and the public key. The third encryption algorithm can use the first identifier and the second identifier for authorization encryption. The algorithm type is selected based on the device's computing resources and encryption requirements, and is not specifically limited here.
[0070] An authorization key is generated based on a third encryption algorithm using a first and a second identifier. This authorization key is highly reliable and can be used to encrypt and protect the advanced functions of the frequency converter.
[0071] Furthermore, the advanced function authorization encryption protection specifically generates a private authorization key based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm using a first identifier and a second identifier. Mathematically, the asymmetric encryption algorithm generates a pair of mathematically related but mutually exclusive keys (i.e., a private authorization key and a public authorization key). The public authorization key can be pre-stored in a register or processor. During authorization, the processor reads this public authorization key and simultaneously requests the specific asymmetric algorithm from the manufacturer via network connection. Based on the first and second identifiers and this asymmetric algorithm, the processor generates a private authorization key (or relevant technical personnel obtain the private authorization key generated by the first and second identifiers based on this asymmetric algorithm from a third party). The private authorization key and the public authorization key pre-stored in the device are used for authorization verification. If the private authorization key and the public authorization key match successfully, the advanced function control permissions of the frequency converter can be unlocked.
[0072] The private and public authorization keys generated by the first and second identifiers based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm are highly reliable, ensuring that each frequency converter has a unique dedicated authorization key. This improves operational security and facilitates refined control over equipment functions.
[0073] In embodiments of this application, an encryption device is also provided, comprising:
[0074] The verification unit is used to verify the validity of the processor's first identifier code and the register's second identifier code during the inverter's power-on phase. If the validity verification fails, a fault signal is output and the inverter's operating authority is locked. If the verification is successful, the initial device key stored in the register is read, and a temporary device key is generated based on the first identifier code and the second identifier code using the first encryption algorithm.
[0075] The comparison unit is used to compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent and obtain the comparison result. If the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked. If the comparison result is consistent, the frequency converter is controlled to enter the normal operating state.
[0076] See Figure 2 This application embodiment also provides an encryption device 200, including:
[0077] Central processing unit 201, power supply 202, wired or wireless network interface 203, input / output interface 204 and register 205;
[0078] Power supply 202 is used to provide power to encryption device 200, and register 205 is a short-term storage register or a persistent storage register;
[0079] The central processing unit 201 can be connected to the frequency converter through the input / output interface 204. The central processing unit 201 also communicates with the register 205, thereby controlling the frequency converter according to the instructions in the register to realize the above-mentioned encryption method.
[0080] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which includes instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the above-described encryption method.
[0081] It should also be noted that the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs. In addition, in the device embodiment drawings provided in this application, the connection relationship between modules indicates that they have a communication connection, which can be implemented as one or more communication buses or signal lines.
[0082] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that this application can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware, or it can be implemented by special-purpose hardware including application-specific integrated circuits, special-purpose CPUs, special-purpose registers, special-purpose components, etc. Generally, any function performed by a computer program can be easily implemented by corresponding hardware, and the specific hardware structure used to implement the same function can also be diverse, such as analog circuits, digital circuits, or special-purpose circuits. However, for this application, software program implementation is more often the preferred implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, training equipment, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments of this application.
[0083] In the above embodiments, the implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, it can be implemented, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product.
[0084] The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, training device, or data center to another website, computer, training device, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can store or a data storage device such as a training device or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available media may be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state drives (SSDs)).
Claims
1. An encryption method, characterized in that, This is applied in a frequency converter, wherein the processor of the frequency converter is configured with a first identifier, the register of the frequency converter is configured with a second identifier, the register stores a preset initial device key, and the initial device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a first encryption algorithm, wherein the encryption method includes: During the power-on phase of the frequency converter, the validity of the first identifier code of the processor and the second identifier code of the register are verified respectively. If the validity check fails, a fault signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked. If the verification is successful, the initial device key stored in the register is read, and a temporary device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm. Compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent to obtain the comparison result; If the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked. If the comparison result is consistent, the inverter is controlled to enter normal operation.
2. The encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification of the validity of the first identifier of the processor and the second identifier of the register includes: The data format, physical authenticity, and / or logical readability of the processor's first and second identifier codes are verified respectively.
3. The encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The initial device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using a first encryption algorithm, including: The initial device key is generated through nonlinear hybrid calculation based on the first identifier and the second identifier code, and incorporates a unique encryption factor. Based on the first identifier and the second identifier, a temporary device key is generated using the first encryption algorithm, including: The temporary device key is generated through the nonlinear hybrid calculation based on the first identifier and the second identifier, incorporating the exclusive encryption factor.
4. The encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: After the inverter enters normal operation, if it is detected that the user has modified the key parameters of the inverter, a dynamic encrypted address is generated based on the first identification code and the second identification code using the second encryption algorithm. The target key parameters obtained after the key parameters are modified are then encrypted based on the dynamic encrypted address.
5. The encryption method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Encrypting the target key parameters obtained by modifying the key parameters based on the dynamic encrypted address includes: The target key parameters are written into the storage space of the register corresponding to the dynamic encrypted address according to the distributed storage strategy; When a user reads the target key parameters, the dynamic encrypted address is recalculated based on the second encryption algorithm using the first identifier and the second identifier, and the target key parameters are read using the dynamic encrypted address and the distributed storage strategy.
6. The encryption method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: After the frequency converter enters normal operation, if it is detected that the operator has triggered the advanced function activation command of the frequency converter, an authorization key is generated based on the first identification code and the second identification code using the third encryption algorithm, and the operator's authorization is verified based on the authorization key.
7. The encryption method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of generating an authorization key using the first and second identifiers through a third encryption algorithm, and verifying operator permissions based on the authorization key, includes: A private authorization key is generated using the first identifier and the second identifier based on an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The private authorization key is then used to verify permissions against a preset public authorization key. The public authorization key is generated using the first identifier and the second identifier based on the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
8. An encryption system, characterized in that, include: The verification unit is used to verify the validity of the first identifier code of the processor and the second identifier code of the register respectively during the power-on phase of the frequency converter. If the validity check fails, a fault signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked. If the verification is successful, the initial device key stored in the register is read, and a temporary device key is generated based on the first identifier and the second identifier using the first encryption algorithm. The comparison unit is used to compare whether the initial device key and the temporary device key are consistent and obtain the comparison result; if the comparison result is inconsistent, an alarm signal is output and the operating permission of the frequency converter is locked; if the comparison result is consistent, the frequency converter is controlled to enter the normal operating state.
9. An encryption device, characterized in that, include: Central processing unit, registers, input / output interfaces, wired or wireless network interfaces, and power supply; The register is a short-term storage register or a persistent storage register; The central processing unit is configured to communicate with the register and execute instructions in the register to perform the encryption method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, characterized in that, When the instructions are executed on a computer, the computer performs the encryption method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.