Download terminal, key terminal, and storage server of a storage system for processing encrypted files while keeping a private key secret in the key terminal
The storage system addresses key management challenges by using a key terminal to securely manage private keys and employ proxy re-encryption, ensuring secure decryption of encrypted files without exposing the private key.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023207412
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-12-08
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-07-29
AI Technical Summary
Existing network storage systems face challenges in managing private keys securely, as they often require devices to communicate with storage servers, upload terminals, or download terminals, risking exposure and compromising encryption security.
A storage system comprising a download terminal, a key terminal, and a storage server that enables decryption of encrypted files while keeping the private key hidden in the key terminal, using a key terminal to generate and manage private keys, and employing proxy re-encryption techniques to maintain key secrecy.
Ensures secure decryption of encrypted files without exposing the private key, enhancing security by preventing unauthorized access and maintaining key confidentiality within the key terminal.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present invention relates to a download terminal, a key terminal, and a storage server of a storage system that enables decryption of an encrypted file while keeping a private key secret in the key terminal. [Background technology]
[0002] Network storage (sometimes called online storage or cloud storage) services are available that allow users to back up their desired files to a storage server so that they can be restored later or transmitted to other users (see, for example, Patent Document 1).
[0003] In a network storage service, if a target file is encrypted into an encrypted file and then stored in a storage server, it is possible to prevent a person who does not know the key for decryption from learning the target file.
[0004] Here, public key cryptography can be used to encrypt the file. In public key cryptography, a key pair consisting of a private key and a public key is generated for a user. The public key is a key used to encrypt the file and can be made public to other users. The private key is a key used to decrypt the file and should be managed secretly by the user.
[0005] In the field of public key cryptography, a proxy re-encryption technique has also been researched that enables a user other than user X and user Y to create encrypted file B encrypted with the public key of user Y from encrypted file A encrypted with the public key of user X, without knowing the private keys of user X and user Y. Information for converting encrypted file A into encrypted file B is sometimes called a proxy key (for example, see Non-Patent Document 1).
[0006] When using encryption in a network storage service, a device (upload terminal) is used to encrypt the target file and upload it to the storage server, and a device (download terminal) is used to download the encrypted file from the storage server and decrypt it. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0007] [Patent Document 1] Special Publication No. 2014-507841 [Non-patent literature]
[0008] [Non-Patent Document 1] Sherman SM CHOW, Weng JIAN, Yanjiang YANG, and Robert H. DENG. (2010). Efficient unidirectional proxy reencryption. Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2010: Third International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, May 3-6: Proceedings. vol. 6055, pp. 316-332. Research Collection School Of Information Systems. (https: / / ink.library.smu.edu.sg / sis_research / 1316). May 2010 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0009] In public key cryptography and proxy re-encryption, the management of private keys is extremely important. Therefore, there is a strong demand for a technology that allows users to easily manage private keys by providing a device (key terminal) for secretly managing the private key separately from the above devices, and enables file encryption, decryption, re-encryption, etc., without sending the private key stored in the key terminal to a computer communication network, and without letting the storage server, upload terminal, or download terminal know the private key.
[0010] The present invention is made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and has an object to provide a download terminal, a key terminal, and a storage server of a storage system that enables decryption of encrypted files while keeping the private key secret in the key terminal. [Means for solving the problem]
[0011] The download terminal according to the present invention, the key terminal according to the present invention, and the storage server according to the present invention can be combined with an upload terminal to form the following storage system, in which the key terminal secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key. (a) the upload terminal is: Generate a common key, generating an encrypted file by encrypting the target file with the generated common key; generating a first ciphertext by encrypting the generated common key with the master public key; storing the generated encrypted file and the generated first cipher in the storage server; (b) the download terminal is generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; secretly recording said temporary private key; Transmitting the temporary public key to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server; (c) if the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generating a second cipher by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server; transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal; (e) the download terminal is decrypting the common key from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key; Obtaining the stored encrypted file from the storage server; The target file is decrypted from the obtained encrypted file using the decrypted common key.
[0012] In the above storage system, The key terminal includes: generating a proxy key from the recorded master private key and the transmitted temporary public key; Communicating the generated proxy key to the storage server; The storage server includes: generating a second cipher by re-encrypting the stored first cipher with the communicated proxy key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal. It can be configured as follows.
[0013] In the above storage system, The key terminal includes: Obtaining the stored first cipher from the storage server; decrypting the common key from the first cipher using the recorded master private key; generating the second ciphertext by encrypting the decrypted common key with the transmitted temporary public key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal via the storage server. It can be configured as follows. Effect of the Invention
[0014] According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a download terminal, a key terminal, and a storage server of a storage system that enables decryption of an encrypted file while keeping the private key secret in the key terminal. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0015] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram illustrating a configuration of a storage system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0016] [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram illustrating information exchange in the storage system of the present invention.
[0017] [Diagram 3] FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram illustrating a form in which a key terminal and a storage server cooperate with each other through proxy encryption in a storage system of the present invention.
[0018] [Figure 4] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram illustrating a mode in which a key terminal and a storage server cooperate with each other by performing decryption and encryption in the key terminal in the storage system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0019] The following describes an embodiment of the present invention. Note that the embodiment is for illustrative purposes only and does not limit the scope of the present invention. Therefore, a person skilled in the art can adopt an embodiment in which each or all of the elements are replaced with an equivalent, and such an embodiment is also included in the scope of the present invention.
[0020] (Basic configuration) 1 is an explanatory diagram showing the configuration of a storage system according to one embodiment of the present invention. The following description will be given with reference to this diagram.
[0021] The storage system 101 according to this embodiment includes an upload terminal 111, a download terminal 121, a storage server 131, and a key terminal 141. In addition, a key server 161 may be included as an optional element. These devices are communicatively connected via a computer communication network 151. The storage system 101 provides a so-called network storage service.
[0022] In this storage system, a file uploaded by an upload terminal 111 is downloaded by a download terminal 121 .
[0023] The upload terminal 111 and the download terminal 121 may be realized by the same computer or different computers. Furthermore, the upload user who uses the upload terminal 111 and the download user who uses the download terminal 121 may be the same or different.
[0024] When the upload user and the download user are the same, the storage system 101 can be used for file backup. That is, the download terminal 121 can restore files that the upload terminal 111 backed up.
[0025] When the upload terminal 111 and the download terminal 121 are realized by different computers, or when the upload user and the download user are different, the storage system 101 can be used for sending and receiving files between different users or different computers. In other words, a file can be transmitted from the upload terminal 111 to the download terminal 121.
[0026] In this embodiment, the key terminal 141 realizes processing based on public key cryptography and is used by a download user. Here, the download user is assigned a master key pair including a master private key and a master public key. In other words, the download user is the key owner who owns the master key pair.
[0027] The key terminal 141 secretly records the master private key. This embodiment is configured so that the master private key never leaks outside the key terminal 141. That is, in this embodiment, the upload terminal 111, the download terminal 121, and the storage server 131 proceed with the above-mentioned file backup / restore and file transmission processes without ever knowing the master private key.
[0028] When there is an inquiry specifying a user's identification name, the key server 161 responds by specifying the public key assigned to that user based on the information registered in the database. In this embodiment, the main public key assigned to the download user is registered in the key server 161, and the upload terminal 111, the download terminal 121, and the storage server 131 can obtain the main public key of the download user by making an inquiry to the key server 161 using the download user's identification name.
[0029] The storage server 131 and the key server 161 may be configured to be realized by the same server computer.
[0030] In addition, in an aspect in which the key server 161 is omitted, the master public key may be made available to the upload terminal 111, the download terminal 121, and the storage server 131 via communication using various non-transitory information recording media or transitory information transmission media.
[0031] Non-transitory information recording media include: USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory realized by SSD (Solid State Disk) etc. CD-ROM (Compact Disk Read Only Memory), DVD-ROM (Digital Versatile Disk ROM) etc. can be used.
[0032] As temporary information transmission media, Bluetooth (trademark) communication, NFC (Near Field Communication) communication, Wired communication via USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable, Wired communication via network cables, Wi-Fi communication via wireless access points, Mobile communications via mobile phone networks; A communication system that displays one-dimensional barcodes, two-dimensional codes, characters, etc. on a screen and transmits information by performing image and character recognition. etc. can be adopted.
[0033] Examples of user identification names that can be used include email addresses, addresses and names, social security numbers, tax numbers, national identification numbers, and account names used in various public and private services.
[0034] The master key pair is typically generated in key terminal 141 , and of the generated master key pair, the master private key is secretly recorded in key terminal 141 , and the master public key is registered in key server 161 .
[0035] As described below, when an inquiry is made about an unregistered user, key server 161 can generate a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key, register the temporary key pair in a database in association with the unregistered user, and return the temporary public key.
[0036] When an unregistered user generates a master key pair in the key terminal 141 and registers the master public key in the key server 161, the temporary key pair is transmitted from the key server 161 to the key terminal 141 via a secure communication path. After a download process using the temporary key pair is performed, or after a certain period of time has elapsed since the temporary key pair was transmitted to the key terminal 141, it is desirable to invalidate the temporary key pair, generate a new master key pair in the key terminal 141, and register the new master public key in the key server 161.
[0037] The download terminal 121 generates a temporary key pair for temporary use when downloading a file. The generated temporary key pair includes a temporary public key and a temporary private key. Typically, the temporary private key is used secretly within the download terminal 121. Therefore, the temporary private key is not known to external devices such as the upload terminal 111, the storage server 131, the key terminal 141, etc.
[0038] The upload terminal 111, download terminal 121, storage server 131, key terminal 141, and key server 161 according to this embodiment can be realized by executing programs corresponding to their functions on the hardware of various computers.
[0039] Typically, desktop computers, laptop computers, and tablet computers that users use for daily work can be used as the upload terminal 111 and the download terminal 121. These computers may be virtualized using desktop virtualization technology.
[0040] The storage server 131 may be a large-capacity file server computer capable of storing a large number of huge files.
[0041] As the key terminal 141, in addition to a general-purpose computer terminal with excellent portability such as a smartphone or tablet, a dedicated computer terminal capable of implementing processing related to public key cryptography and management of key pairs can also be used.
[0042] The key server 161 may be a web server computer that provides a web API (Application Programming Interface) that has the function of responding by specifying a public key relating to a user in response to a query specifying the user's identification name, or a public key server computer conforming to OpenPKSD for publishing public keys based on OpenPGP technology.
[0043] (computer) The configuration of these computers will be described below. In general, a computer reads various programs recorded on a non-transitory information recording medium into a temporary storage device, a random access memory (RAM), and then a central processing unit (CPU) or processor executes instructions contained in the read programs. However, in an architecture that allows mapping and execution of a read only memory (ROM) and a RAM into a single memory space, the CPU directly reads and executes instructions contained in a program stored in the ROM. The CPU or processor, etc., cooperates with the RAM, etc., to control externally connected devices such as a network interface card (NIC), a Wifi communication module, a mobile communication module, a display, a touch screen, a microphone, a speaker, a headphone, a keyboard, a mouse, a track pad, a touch panel, a global positioning system (GPS) sensor, a geomagnetic sensor, and a posture sensor, which are provided in the hardware.
[0044] The program executed by the computer can be recorded on a computer-readable non-transitory information recording medium such as a compact disk, a flexible disk, a hard disk, a magneto-optical disk, a digital video disk, a magnetic tape, a ROM, an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM), a flash memory, a semiconductor memory, etc. This information recording medium can be distributed and sold independently of each hardware.
[0045] The programs for implementing each device may be divided into functions, each of which may be recorded separately on multiple information recording media, and the multiple information recording media may be compiled into a media set, which may then be distributed or sold independently of each piece of hardware.
[0046] Furthermore, the above-mentioned program can be distributed to each computer from a program distribution server or the like via a temporary transmission medium such as a computer communication network 151, independently of the computer on which the program is executed. For example, when a smartphone is used as the computer, the program can be distributed and sold at an application store for smartphones.
[0047] The above program can also be written in a programming language for describing the behavior level of electronic circuits. In this case, various design drawings, such as wiring diagrams and timing charts of the electronic circuits, are generated from the above program, and the electronic circuits constituting the above image processing device can be created based on the design drawings. For example, the above image processing device can be configured on reprogrammable hardware using FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) technology from the above program, and electronic circuits dedicated to specific applications can also be configured using ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) technology.
[0048] (Exchange of information) 2 is an explanatory diagram for explaining the manner in which information is exchanged in the storage system of the present invention. The following description will be given with reference to this diagram. In this diagram, arrows indicate the manner in which information is exchanged from one device to another device. This exchange of information may be performed by sending and receiving information between the one device and the other device through communication via a computer communication network 151 or the like, or one or more other devices other than the one device and the other device may receive information from the one device and then pass the information to the other device. In the following diagrams, the reference numerals for devices exchanging information are omitted.
[0049] In the following explanation, the key server 161 is also illustrated, but as mentioned above, the key server 161 can be omitted as appropriate.
[0050] In addition, the order of execution of each process in the following description can be changed as appropriate or the processes can be executed in parallel, as long as the dependencies of the information to be processed are maintained.
[0051] (upload) The following describes file uploading: The upload terminal 111 specifies (201) a target file to be backed up or transferred, and the identification name of a download user who is to download the target file.
[0052] An upload user who uses upload terminal 111 is typically the owner of the target file.
[0053] In this figure, the upload user is shown to specify both to the upload terminal 111, but for example, when periodically backing up files stored in a specific folder, the upload user may set his own identification name in the upload terminal 111, and at the time of backup, the set identification name may be specified as the download user's identification name. Also, the upload terminal 111 may scan the files placed in the folder and specify the listed files as the target files.
[0054] Next, the upload terminal 111 acquires a public key (master public key) associated with the identified identifier. In this diagram, the upload terminal 111 sends a query specifying the identified identifier to the key server 161 (202). If a public key associated with the identifier specified in the query has been registered in advance, the key server 161 returns a response specifying the public key to the upload terminal 111 (203).
[0055] The case where the public key associated with the identifier is not registered in the key server 161 will be described later.
[0056] Furthermore, if the public key (master public key) of the download user is set in advance in the upload terminal 111 via an information recording medium or the like, communication with the key server 161 can be omitted.
[0057] Then, the upload terminal 111 generates a common key (204), and encrypts the target file with the common key to generate an encrypted file (205).
[0058] Here, the common key is a key that is used both to encrypt a target file to generate an encrypted file, and to decrypt the encrypted file to generate the original target file, and is sometimes called a symmetric key or shared key.
[0059] Various techniques can be applied to encryption using a common key, including block cipher techniques such as IDEA, AES, and Camellia, and stream cipher techniques such as RC4, FISH, and MUGI.
[0060] Here, for multiple target files, the common key may be the same or may be different for each target file. Also, a new common key may be generated each time a target file is backed up or transferred, or the same common key may be stored for a certain period of time and the stored common key may continue to be used.
[0061] It is desirable for the common key to be generated randomly and to be of sufficient length.
[0062] The upload terminal 111 then encrypts the generated common key with the acquired master public key to generate a first ciphertext (206).
[0063] Encryption using a master public key is performed using public key cryptography, and various techniques such as RSA cryptography, ElGamal cryptography, and elliptic curve cryptography can be applied.
[0064] Then, upload terminal 111 stores the encrypted file and the first cipher in storage server 131 (207). This completes the process of uploading the target file, and there is no need to use upload terminal 111 in the subsequent processes.
[0065] As described above, the upload terminal 111 can obtain the master public key from the key server 161 or the like, and the common key can be generated as necessary, so there is no need for the upload terminal 111 to maintain and manage the master public key and the common key. Moreover, the upload terminal 111 does not need to know the private key (master private key) assigned to the download user.
[0066] (download) The following describes the downloading of a file. As described above, the master private key of the download user is secretly recorded in the key terminal 141, and the upload terminal 111, download terminal 121, and storage server 131 do not need to know the master private key in order to proceed with the process.
[0067] First, the download terminal 121 generates a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key (211), secretly records the temporary private key within the download terminal 121 (212), transmits the temporary public key to the key terminal 141 (213), and attempts to sign in to the storage server 131 (214).
[0068] The temporary key pair generated here may be in the same public key cryptosystem as the primary key pair assigned to the download user, or may be in a different public key cryptosystem.
[0069] The temporary key pair is used temporarily in the download terminal 121, and may be generated each time a download is performed, or may be stored and maintained for a certain period of time.
[0070] Typically, the sign-in attempt transmits the download user's identification name from download terminal 121 to storage server 131, but in an embodiment in which the sign-in state is maintained for a certain period of time using a session ID, the session ID may be transmitted from download terminal 121 to storage server 131, allowing storage server 131 to obtain the download user's identification name.
[0071] Furthermore, when attempting to sign in, the download terminal 121 may transmit the temporary public key to the storage server 131 in association with the sign-in. In this embodiment, the temporary public key can be indirectly transmitted from the download terminal 121 to the key terminal 141 via the storage server 131.
[0072] The success or failure of sign-in can be determined by multi-factor authentication in which the use of the key terminal 141 is one of the factors. In this embodiment, when attempting to sign in from the download terminal 121, it is necessary to start a specific application program on the key terminal 141. Therefore, the storage server 131 determines whether or not an application program is running on the key terminal 141, and if it is running, transmits the temporary public key to the application program.
[0073] In addition, the download terminal 121 displays on its screen: Display the temporary public key as text information, or encoding the temporary public key into a displayable and machine-readable code, such as a one-dimensional barcode or a two-dimensional barcode, and displaying the code; The temporary public key may be transmitted by the key terminal 141 scanning the information displayed on the screen for machine recognition.
[0074] This aspect can be used in combination with the above aspect to determine whether or not sign-in using multi-factor authentication is possible.
[0075] That is, the key terminal 141 reports the machine-recognized temporary public key to the storage server 131.
[0076] The storage server 131 makes it a necessary condition for successful sign-in that the temporary public key transmitted from the download terminal 121 in conjunction with the sign-in attempt matches the temporary public key reported from the key terminal 141.
[0077] In this case, it is also possible to further use the master private key recorded in the key terminal 141 to apply an electronic signature to the machine-recognized temporary public key, and then report the temporary public key together with the electronic signature to the storage server 131.
[0078] The storage server 131 verifies the reported electronic signature using the master public key, and makes successful verification a necessary condition for successful sign-in.
[0079] In addition, the temporary public key can also be transmitted from the download terminal 121 to the key terminal 141 via Bluetooth (trademark) communication, NFC (Near Field Communication) communication, wired communication via a USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable, wired communication via a network cable, Wi-Fi communication via a wireless access point, mobile communication via a mobile phone communication network, etc.
[0080] Now, when the sign-in is successful (215), the key terminal 141 and the storage server 131 cooperate to generate a second cipher (216) and transmit the generated second cipher to the download terminal 121 (217).
[0081] Here, the second cipher corresponds to a common key encrypted with a temporary public key. The second cipher is generated from the master private key recorded in the key terminal 141, the temporary public key transmitted from the download terminal 121, and the stored first cipher.
[0082] Here, in this embodiment, in generating the second cipher, it is necessary to keep the common key secret from the storage server 131. With this configuration, even the administrator of the storage server 131 cannot decrypt the encrypted file, improving the security of the file. Possible methods for generating such a second cipher include the following methods.
[0083] The first method is to use proxy re-encryption. Fig. 3 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a form in which the key terminal and the storage server cooperate with each other by proxy encryption in the storage system of the present invention. The following description will be made with reference to this diagram.
[0084] First, the key terminal 141 generates (301) a proxy key from the master private key recorded in the key terminal 141 and the temporary public key transmitted (213) from the download terminal 121, and transmits (302) the generated proxy key to the storage server 131.
[0085] Meanwhile, the storage server 131 generates (303) a second cipher by re-encrypting the first cipher stored in the storage server 131 with the proxy key transmitted (302) from the key terminal 141, and transmits (217) the generated second cipher to the download terminal 121.
[0086] In this embodiment, a public key cryptosystem that allows re-encryption of the public key cryptosystem encryption of the master key pair is utilized in generating the temporary key pair.
[0087] For example, as a public key cryptosystem for a master key pair, it is possible to adopt the technology introduced as AFGH06 in Non-Patent Document 1. In this public key cryptosystem AFGH06, E is an elliptic curve, P is a point on it, e: E×E→G is a symmetric pairing, and g=e(P,P)∈G, where P and g are made public.
[0088] The master private key is a randomly chosen integer a, and let aP be the master public key.
[0089] The temporary private key is a randomly chosen integer b, and let bP be the temporary public key.
[0090] To encrypt a message m using the master public key a, we randomly select an integer r and c a = (mg r ,r(aP) Let be the ciphertext.
[0091] ciphertext c a = (u,V a ) is decoded as follows: u / e(V a ,(1 / a)P) = mg r / e(raP,(1 / a)P) = mg r / e(P,P) r = mg r / g r = m Let us assume that.
[0092] The proxy key s is created using the master private key a and the temporary public key bP as follows: s = (1 / a)(bP) = (b / a)P Let us assume that.
[0093] ciphertext c a = (u,V a ) with the proxy key s is e(V a ,r a→b ) = e(raP,(b / a)P)=e(P,P) rb =g rb Calculate the following: (u,e(V a ,r a→b )) = (u,g rb ) Let be the ciphertext.
[0094] The re-encrypted ciphertext (u,v b ) with your temporary private key, u / v b 1 / b = mg r / (g rb ) 1 / b = mg r / g r = m Let us assume that.
[0095] In this approach, the master key pair is based on a public key cryptosystem over an elliptic curve, but the ephemeral key pair is based on a public key cryptosystem over a finite field, and re-encryption is only possible once.
[0096] In this embodiment, various proxy re-encryption techniques can be applied, including the proxy re-encryption technique disclosed in Non-Patent Document 1. Then, depending on the technique to be adopted, it is sufficient to generate a master key pair or a temporary key pair, encrypt using a public key, and decrypt using a private key.
[0097] The second method is to perform decryption and encryption at the key terminal 141. Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a mode in which the key terminal and the storage server cooperate with each other by performing decryption and encryption at the key terminal in the storage system of the present invention. The following description will be made with reference to this diagram.
[0098] First, the key terminal 141 acquires the first cipher stored in the storage server 131 from the storage server 131 (401).
[0099] Then, the key terminal 141 decrypts the first cipher obtained from the storage server 131 with the master private key recorded in the key terminal 141 to obtain the shared key (402).
[0100] Furthermore, the key terminal 141 generates a second cipher by encrypting the decrypted shared key with the temporary public key transmitted from the download terminal 121 (403).
[0101] Then, the key terminal 141 transmits the generated second cipher to the download terminal 121 (217) via the storage server 131 (404). Note that the key terminal 141 may transmit the second cipher directly to the download terminal 121 without passing through the storage server 131.
[0102] In this embodiment, the common key is decrypted from the first cipher using the master private key in the key terminal 141, and then the common key is encrypted using the temporary public key to generate the second cipher.
[0103] Therefore, various public key cryptosystems can be used with the master key pair and the temporary key pair depending on the performance and use of the device or library.
[0104] Returning to Figure 2, the explanation will continue. When the second cipher is transmitted to the download terminal 121 (217), the download terminal 121 decrypts the shared key from the transmitted second cipher using a temporary private key secretly recorded in the download terminal 121 (218).
[0105] Then, the download terminal 121 acquires the encrypted file stored in the storage server 131 from the storage server 131 (219).
[0106] Incidentally, the transmission of the second ciphertext (217) and the acquisition of the ciphertext file (219) may be carried out together.
[0107] Finally, the download terminal 121 decrypts (220) the encrypted file obtained from the storage server 131 with the decrypted common key to obtain the target file (221).
[0108] Here, the relationships between the various pieces of information will be reorganized. An encrypted file is a target file encrypted with a common key. The first cipher is a common key encrypted with a master public key. When the first cipher is decrypted with the master private key, the common key is obtained. The second cipher corresponds to the common key encrypted with the temporary public key. From the temporary public key and the master private key, a proxy key is derived. By applying the proxy key to the first encryption code, the second encryption code is obtained while keeping the common key secret. The second cipher is decrypted with the temporary private key to obtain the common key. By decrypting the encrypted file with the common key, the target file is obtained.
[0109] According to this embodiment, the main private key of the download user is not leaked from the key terminal 141 to the outside, so that the main private key can be managed safely.
[0110] In this embodiment, when a download user installs a dedicated application program in the key terminal 141 and begins using the system, it is desirable for the key terminal 141 to generate a master key pair and register the master public key in the key server 161.
[0111] However, when the upload user attempts to perform an upload, the download user may not have yet started using the system.
[0112] In this case, the key server 161 can generate the master key pair on behalf of the download user, so that the upload user can complete the upload even before the download user starts using the system.
[0113] That is, if the public key associated with the identification name of the download user specified in the inquiry from the upload terminal 111 is not registered in the key server 161, the key server 161 generating a temporary key pair consisting of a temporary public key and a temporary private key; Registering the generated temporary public key in association with the identification; When the user associated with that identifier installs an application program in key terminal 141 and starts using the system, a temporary private key is passed to key terminal 141, which stores this secretly as a master private key.
[0114] In this embodiment, even if the download user has not started using the storage system 101, the upload user can store an encrypted file for the target file in the storage server 131. Furthermore, if the download user starts using the storage system 101 in response to a communication from the upload user to the download user, the download user can obtain the target file.
[0115] After obtaining the encrypted file from the storage server 131 and decrypting the target file, it is desirable for the download user to promptly generate a new master key pair in the key terminal 141 and register it in the key server 161.
[0116] In addition, when an application program is installed in the key terminal 141, a new master key pair may be generated immediately in the key terminal 141, and for a certain period of time after the installation, both a temporary private key based on the temporary key pair and a master private key related to the new master key pair may be used.
[0117] (Multiple download users) In a public key cryptosystem, a single message is encrypted into a single ciphertext using multiple public keys owned by multiple destination users, and each of the multiple destination users can decrypt the original message from the single ciphertext using its own private key and the public keys of the other destination users.
[0118] By using such a public key cryptosystem, it is possible to provide one first cipher and one cipher file to enable multiple download users to obtain the target file.
[0119] In this embodiment, a common key used to encrypt a target file into a cipher file is used to obtain a single first cipher using a plurality of public keys owned by a plurality of download users.
[0120] The master private key owned by each download user is secretly recorded in key terminal 141 used by that download user. In addition, key terminal 141 can obtain the master public keys owned by the other download users from key server 161.
[0121] Therefore, each key terminal 141 decrypts the common key from the first cipher, and then encrypts the decrypted common key with the temporary public key transmitted from each download terminal 121 to create the second cipher, thereby allowing the decryption process of the encrypted file to proceed at each download terminal 121.
[0122] The identifiers of multiple download users may be listed, or a query specifying a common portion of the identifiers (such as a domain name) may be sent to the key server 161. When one or more identifiers are returned together with a public key, the returned identifier becomes the identifier of the download user, and the first cipher is generated using the returned public key.
[0123] (History of Master Key Pair) The key terminal 141 may record a history of master key pairs previously owned by the user of the key terminal 141, allowing the user to select and use any of them as necessary.
[0124] In addition, this history can be encrypted using an encryption method that can be decrypted by the key terminal 141 and then stored in the key server 161.
[0125] When an application program is started on the key terminal 141, if the owner of the key terminal 141 needs to be authenticated, the history can be encrypted using a "password" used for the authentication. This "password" can be a password, a passphrase, a personal identification number, a PIN, or the like.
[0126] In addition, in a configuration in which a random table is presented to a user, elements in the table are extracted based on an ordering rule assigned to the user, and authentication is performed based on whether the ordering rule has been correctly applied, encryption can be performed using a "password" based on the ordering rule.
[0127] In addition, in the history stored in the key terminal 141 The latest public key, All public keys, A public key whose private key has not been found to be compromised, or A public key randomly selected from public keys whose private keys have not been found to be compromised The history may be encrypted and stored in the key server 161 by the above method.
[0128] By adopting such an embodiment, even if the upload terminal 111 generates and sends a first cipher and an encrypted file by again using a master public key that was used and saved in the past, the key terminal 141 can generate a second cipher by obtaining from the history a past master private key that corresponds to the past master public key and using that, and the download terminal 121 can decrypt the target file from the encrypted file.
[0129] At this time, the upload terminal 111 stores the following information to indicate which master public key was used in the past: First encryption, the encrypted file, together with the master public key used, A distinguished name assigned to that master public key; The distinguished name of the owner of the master public key (the download user assumed by the upload user), etc. may be stored in the storage server 131 in association with each other.
[0130] In the key terminal 141, this information stored in the storage server 131 is used as a search key to search for the corresponding master public key from the history stored in the key terminal 141, and the master private key corresponding to the master public key can be obtained.
[0131] In actual operation, it is considered that the master public key is unique and will not be duplicated, so in an embodiment in which the master public key used for encryption by the upload terminal 111 is also stored in the storage server 131, the history can be searched using only the master public key as a key. However, it is also possible to further check the identifier of the master public key and information on the owner and notify the user of the key terminal 141 of this, thereby enabling strict confirmation of which master private key should be used.
[0132] In addition, in a case where the upload terminal 111 does not store the master public key itself in the storage server 131 but stores information such as the identifier of the master public key and the identifier of the owner of the master public key, this information can be used to determine whether or not it is permissible to download the first cipher or the encrypted file.
[0133] Furthermore, in the case where the storage server 131 stores the download user's identification name (the identification name of the master public key) together with the first cipher and the encrypted file, it is possible to search for files that the download user can download from the storage server 131 using the download user's identification name when the download user signs in from the download terminal 121, generate a list, and display the list on the download terminal 121. In other words, the first cipher and the encrypted file can be downloaded only by a user who owns the master public key associated with them.
[0134] (Multiple download users) This embodiment can be applied to a mode in which an arbitrary number of download users are designated and a target file is sent to them.
[0135] For example, when uploading by specifying the identification names of three download users, aaa@example.com, bbb@example.com, and ccc@example.com, the first cipher encrypts the shared key using the three public keys assigned to the three download users, aaa@example.com, bbb@example.com, and ccc@example.com.
[0136] The storage server 141 manages the files so that the first cipher and the cipher file can be obtained only by the download terminals 121 that have signed in as aaa@example.com, bbb@example.com, or ccc@example.com.
[0137] On the download user aaa@example.com side, the shared key can be decrypted from the first cipher using the private key of the download user aaa@example.com (and the public keys of the other download users bbb@example.com and ccc@example.com), or the shared key can be re-encrypted to the second cipher. The same applies to the other download users.
[0138] Also, when domain@example.com is specified as the download user, the key server 161 is used to search for users who have domain@example.com, and the shared key is encrypted into the first cipher using the public keys of all users found.
[0139] A user having an identification name that matches the domain @exmaple.com can use the download terminal 121 to obtain the first cipher and the encrypted file from the storage server 131. After that, the user can use his / her own private key recorded in the key terminal 141 and the public key of another user that matches the domain to decrypt the shared key from the first cipher and re-encrypt it to the second cipher.
[0140] Alternatively, a domain master key pair for the domain @example.com may be generated in the key server 161 or the key terminal 141, and a domain master public key included in the domain master key pair for the domain @example.com may be registered in the key server 161. The upload terminal 111 may then encrypt the shared key into the first cipher using the domain master public key.
[0141] In this embodiment, the domain master private key included in the domain master key pair may be shared by the key terminal 141 used by a user who matches the domain (or a user with specific authority among them) as one of the private keys available to the user, or the domain master private key may be managed only by the key server 161.
[0142] In this way, using the domain master private key physically shared by key terminal 141 or logically shared by key server 161, key server 161 and key terminal 141 work together to re-encrypt from encryption using the domain public key to encryption using a temporary public key.
[0143] As described above, in this embodiment, multiple download users or users matching a certain domain (or users among them who can use the domain's master private key) can obtain the target file.
[0144] (summary) As described above, the download terminal according to the present embodiment, the key terminal according to the present embodiment, and the storage server according to the present embodiment can configure the storage system according to the present embodiment together with the upload terminal according to the present embodiment. Here, the key terminal secretly records the master private key included in the master key pair together with the master public key, and in the storage system according to the present embodiment, (a) the upload terminal is: Generate a common key, generating an encrypted file by encrypting the target file with the generated common key; generating a first ciphertext by encrypting the generated common key with the master public key; storing the generated encrypted file and the generated first cipher in the storage server; (b) the download terminal is generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; secretly recording said temporary private key; Transmitting the temporary public key to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server; (c) if the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generating a second cipher by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server; transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal; (e) the download terminal is decrypting the shared key from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key; Obtaining the stored encrypted file from the storage server; The target file is decrypted from the obtained encrypted file using the decrypted common key. It can be configured as follows.
[0145] In the storage system of this embodiment, The key terminal includes: generating a proxy key from the recorded master private key and the transmitted temporary public key; Communicating the generated proxy key to the storage server; The storage server includes: generating a second cipher by re-encrypting the stored first cipher with the communicated proxy key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal. It can be configured as follows.
[0146] In the storage system of this embodiment, The key terminal includes: Obtaining the stored first cipher from the storage server; decrypting the shared key from the first cipher with the recorded master private key; generating the second cipher by encrypting the decrypted shared key with the transmitted temporary public key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal via the storage server. It can be configured as follows.
[0147] In the storage system of this embodiment, The success or failure of the sign-in is determined by multi-factor authentication in which the use of the key terminal is one of the factors. It can be configured as follows.
[0148] In the storage system of this embodiment, the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal receives the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt from the storage server. It can be configured as follows.
[0149] In the storage system of this embodiment, the download terminal displays on a screen a code obtained by encoding the generated temporary public key in a machine-readable manner; The key terminal scans the displayed code for machine recognition, thereby transmitting the temporary public key. It can be configured as follows.
[0150] In the storage system of this embodiment, the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal reports the machine-recognized temporary public key to the storage server; A necessary condition for the sign-in to be successful is that the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt matches the temporary public key reported from the key terminal. It can be configured as follows.
[0151] In the storage system of this embodiment, the key terminal digitally signs the machine-recognized temporary public key using the recorded master private key, and reports the temporary public key together with the digital signature to the storage server; The storage server verifies the reported digital signature with the master public key; Successful verification is a prerequisite for successful sign-in. It can be configured as follows.
[0152] In the storage system of this embodiment, the upload terminal and the download terminal are realized by a same computer used by a key owner who owns the master key pair; The storage system allows the key owner to back up and restore the target file. It can be configured as follows.
[0153] In the storage system of this embodiment, the upload terminal is realized by a computer used by a file owner who owns the target file; the download terminal is realized by another computer used by a key owner who owns the master key pair; The storage system enables communication of the target file from the file owner to the key owner. It can be configured as follows.
[0154] The storage method of the present embodiment is executed by an upload terminal, a download terminal, a storage server, and a key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, (a) the upload terminal is: Generate a common key, generating an encrypted file by encrypting the target file with the generated common key; generating a first ciphertext by encrypting the generated common key with the master public key; storing the generated encrypted file and the generated first cipher in the storage server; (b) the download terminal is generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; secretly recording said temporary private key; Transmitting the temporary public key to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server; (c) if the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generating a second cipher by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server; transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal; (e) the download terminal is decrypting the shared key from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key; Obtaining the stored encrypted file from the storage server; The target file is decrypted from the obtained encrypted file using the decrypted common key. Configure it as follows.
[0155] The system program according to the present embodiment includes an upload program executed in an upload terminal, a download program executed in a download terminal, a storage program executed in a storage server, and a key program executed in a key terminal for secretly recording a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key; (a) the upload program is installed in the upload terminal; Generate a common key, generating an encrypted file by encrypting the target file with the generated common key; generating a first ciphertext by encrypting the generated common key with the master public key; The generated encrypted file and the generated first cipher are stored in the storage server. Execute the process, (b) the download program is installed in the download terminal, generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; secretly recording said temporary private key; Transmitting the temporary public key to the key terminal; Attempt to sign in to the storage server Execute the process, (c) when the sign-in is successful, the key program and the storage program are respectively transmitted to the key terminal and the storage server. generating a second cipher by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal. execute the process in cooperation with each other; (e) the download program is installed in the download terminal, decrypting the shared key from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key; Obtaining the stored encrypted file from the storage server; The target file is decrypted from the obtained encrypted file using the decrypted common key. Execute the process It can be configured as follows.
[0156] The non-transitory computer-readable information recording medium according to the present embodiment is a recording medium having at least one of the above-mentioned upload program, download program, key program, and storage program recorded thereon. It can be configured as follows.
[0157] The present invention allows various embodiments and modifications without departing from the broad spirit and scope of the present invention. The above-described embodiments are for the purpose of explaining the present invention and do not limit the scope of the present invention. That is, the scope of the present invention is indicated by the claims, not the embodiments. Various modifications made within the scope of the claims and the scope of the invention equivalent thereto are considered to be within the scope of the present invention. [Industrial Applicability]
[0158] According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a download terminal, a key terminal, and a storage server of a storage system that enables decryption of an encrypted file while keeping the private key secret in the key terminal. [Explanation of symbols]
[0159] 101 Storage System 111 Upload Terminal 121 Download Devices 131 Storage Server 141 Key Terminal 151 Computer Communication Network 161 Key Server
Claims
1. A key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a download terminal that communicates with a storage server that stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; transmitting the temporary public key included in the generated temporary key pair to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication; When the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generate a second cipher based on the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key, and the second cipher is transmitted from either the key terminal or the storage server; The common key is decrypted from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key included in the generated temporary key pair. A download terminal characterized by:
2. The key terminal includes: generating a proxy key from the recorded master private key and the transmitted temporary public key; Communicating the generated proxy key to the storage server; The storage server includes: generating the second cipher by re-encrypting the stored first cipher with the communicated proxy key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal.
2. The download terminal according to claim 1,
3. The key terminal includes: Obtaining the stored first cipher from the storage server; decrypting the common key from the first cipher using the recorded master private key; generating the second ciphertext by encrypting the decrypted common key with the transmitted temporary public key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal via the storage server.
2. The download terminal according to claim 1,
4. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal receives the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt from the storage server.
2. The download terminal according to claim 1,
5. the download terminal displays on a screen a code obtained by encoding the generated temporary public key in a machine-readable manner; The key terminal scans the displayed code for machine recognition, thereby transmitting the temporary public key.
2. The download terminal according to claim 1,
6. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal reports the machine-recognized temporary public key to the storage server; A necessary condition for the sign-in to be successful is that the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt matches the temporary public key reported from the key terminal.
6. A download terminal as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that
7. the key terminal digitally signs the machine-recognized temporary public key using the recorded master private key, and reports the temporary public key together with the digital signature to the storage server; The storage server verifies the reported digital signature with the master public key; Successful verification is a prerequisite for successful sign-in.
7. A download terminal as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that
8. A key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and communicates with a download terminal and a storage server that stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, A temporary public key included in a temporary key pair generated by the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal; A sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the storage server, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A key terminal comprising:
9. The key terminal includes: generating a proxy key from the recorded master private key and the transmitted temporary public key; Communicating the generated proxy key to the storage server; The storage server includes: generating the second cipher by re-encrypting the stored first cipher with the communicated proxy key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal.
9. The key terminal according to claim 8.
10. The key terminal includes: Obtaining the stored first cipher from the storage server; decrypting the common key from the first cipher using the recorded master private key; generating the second ciphertext by encrypting the decrypted common key with the transmitted temporary public key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal via the storage server.
9. The key terminal according to claim 8.
11. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal receives the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt from the storage server.
9. The key terminal according to claim 8.
12. the download terminal displays on a screen a code obtained by encoding the generated temporary public key in a machine-readable manner; The key terminal scans the displayed code for machine recognition, thereby transmitting the temporary public key.
9. The key terminal according to claim 8.
13. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal reports the machine-recognized temporary public key to the storage server; A necessary condition for the sign-in to be successful is that the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt matches the temporary public key reported from the key terminal.
13. A key terminal according to claim 12.
14. the key terminal digitally signs the machine-recognized temporary public key using the recorded master private key, and reports the temporary public key together with the digital signature to the storage server; The storage server verifies the reported digital signature with the master public key; Successful verification is a prerequisite for successful sign-in.
14. A key terminal according to claim 13.
15. A key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a storage server that communicates with a download terminal and stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, A temporary public key included in the temporary key pair generated at the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal to the key terminal, and a sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the key terminal, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A storage server comprising:
16. The key terminal includes: generating a proxy key from the recorded master private key and the transmitted temporary public key; Communicating the generated proxy key to the storage server; The storage server includes: generating the second cipher by re-encrypting the stored first cipher with the communicated proxy key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal.
16. The storage server according to claim 15.
17. The key terminal includes: Obtaining the stored first cipher from the storage server; decrypting the common key from the first cipher using the recorded master private key; generating the second ciphertext by encrypting the decrypted common key with the transmitted temporary public key; Transmitting the generated second cipher to the download terminal via the storage server.
16. The storage server according to claim 15.
18. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal receives the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt from the storage server.
16. The storage server according to claim 15.
19. the download terminal displays on a screen a code obtained by encoding the generated temporary public key in a machine-readable manner; The key terminal scans the displayed code for machine recognition, thereby transmitting the temporary public key.
16. The storage server according to claim 15.
20. the sign-in attempt to the storage server is accompanied by the temporary public key; The key terminal reports the machine-recognized temporary public key to the storage server; A necessary condition for the sign-in to be successful is that the temporary public key associated with the sign-in attempt matches the temporary public key reported from the key terminal.
20. The storage server according to claim 19,
21. the key terminal digitally signs the machine-recognized temporary public key using the recorded master private key, and reports the temporary public key together with the digital signature to the storage server; The storage server verifies the reported digital signature with the master public key; Successful verification is a prerequisite for successful sign-in.
21. The storage server according to claim 20.
22. A method executed by a key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a download terminal that communicates with a storage server that stores a first cipher in which a common key used to decrypt a file is encrypted with the master public key, comprising: generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; transmitting the temporary public key included in the generated temporary key pair to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication; When the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generate a second cipher based on the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key, and the second cipher is transmitted from either the key terminal or the storage server; The common key is decrypted from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key included in the generated temporary key pair. A method comprising:
23. A method executed by a key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and communicates with a download terminal and a storage server that stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, the method comprising: A temporary public key included in a temporary key pair generated by the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal; A sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the storage server, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A method comprising:
24. A method is executed by a key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a storage server that communicates with a download terminal and stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, the method comprising: A temporary public key included in the temporary key pair generated at the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal to the key terminal, and a sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the key terminal, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A method comprising:
25. A key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a computer that communicates with a storage server that stores a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, generating a temporary key pair including a temporary public key and a temporary private key; transmitting the temporary public key included in the generated temporary key pair to the key terminal; Attempting to sign in to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication; When the sign-in is successful, the key terminal and the storage server cooperate to generate a second cipher based on the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key, and the second cipher is transmitted from either the key terminal or the storage server; The common key is decrypted from the transmitted second cipher using the temporary private key included in the generated temporary key pair. A program characterized by executing a process.
26. A program for causing a computer to function as a key terminal, the computer secretly recording a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and communicating with a download terminal and a storage server storing a first cipher in which a common key used for decrypting a file is encrypted with the master public key, the program including: A temporary public key included in a temporary key pair generated by the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal; A sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the storage server, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A program characterized by executing a process.
27. A program for causing a key terminal that secretly records a master private key included in a master key pair together with a master public key, and a computer that communicates with a download terminal and stores a first cipher in which a common key used to decrypt a file is encrypted with the master public key, to function as a storage server, the program including: A temporary public key included in the temporary key pair generated at the download terminal is transmitted from the download terminal to the key terminal, and a sign-in attempt is made from the download terminal to the storage server using the use of the key terminal as one of the elements of multi-factor authentication, and if the sign-in is successful, in cooperation with the key terminal, a second cipher generated from the recorded master private key, the transmitted temporary public key, and the stored first cipher, while keeping the common key secret from the storage server, is transmitted to the download terminal, the second cipher being obtained by encrypting the common key with the temporary public key. A program characterized by executing a process.
Citation Information
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