Image Capture Devices for Secure Industrial Control Systems

Image capture devices with integrated security features and authentication protocols strengthen industrial control systems by securing data transmission and preventing unauthorized access, addressing the vulnerability of unsecured edge devices.

JP7579299B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-07BEDROCK AUTOMATION PLATFORMS INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022092303
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2016-12-16
Filing Date
2022-06-07
Publication Date
2024-11-07
Estimated Expiration
2037-12-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Industrial control systems face heightened security risks due to unsecured edge devices, particularly surveillance cameras, which can be exploited by malicious actors for unauthorized access and data tampering.

Method used

Implementing image capture devices with integrated security features, including an image sensor, signal processor, and controller, which utilize security certificates to establish encrypted tunnels and perform authentication sequences with other system components, ensuring authorized data transmission and reception.

Benefits of technology

Enhances the security of industrial control systems by preventing unauthorized access and data tampering through secure communication protocols and authentication processes.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Provides image capture devices and secure industrial control systems. An image capture device for a secure industrial control system includes an image sensor, a signal processor coupled to the image sensor, and a controller that transmits data associated with the processed image signal to at least one of an input / output module or a communication / control module via a communication interface. The communication interface couples the controller to at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module. The controller establishes an encrypted tunnel between the controller and at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module based on a respective security certificate of the at least one image capture device and a respective security certificate of the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] Cross-reference to related applications

[0001] This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 942,304, entitled "SECURE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM," filed Nov. 16, 2015. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 942,304 is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 469,931, entitled "SECURE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM," filed Aug. 27, 2014 (which previously issued as U.S. Patent No. 9,191,203), which is a continuation-in-part of International Application No. PCT / US2013 / 053721, entitled "SECURE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM," filed Aug. 6, 2013. This application is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 14 / 519,066, filed Oct. 20, 2014, and entitled "OPERATOR ACTION AUTHENTICATION IN AN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM." This application is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 15 / 287,937, filed Oct. 7, 2016, and entitled "INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM REDUNDANT COMMUNICATIONS / CONTROL MODULES AUTHENTICATION," which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 14 / 519,047, filed Oct. 20, 2014, and entitled "INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM REDUNDANT COMMUNICATIONS / CONTROL MODULES AUTHENTICATION," which previously issued as U.S. Patent No. 9,467,297. This application is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 597,498, entitled "ELECTROMAGNETIC CONNECTOR," filed Jan. 15, 2015. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 597,498 is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13 / 341,143, entitled "ELECTROMAGNETIC CONNECTOR," filed Dec. 30, 2011.This application is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15 / 247,998, filed Aug. 26, 2016, and entitled “SWITCH FABRIC HAVING A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE.” U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15 / 247,998 is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 501,974, entitled "SWITCH FABRIC HAVING A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE," filed on September 30, 2014 (also issued as U.S. Patent No. 9,436,641), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13 / 341,161, entitled "SWITCH FABRIC HAVING A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE," filed on December 30, 2011 (also issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,862,802). This application is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15 / 289,613, filed Oct. 10, 2016, and entitled "COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL SYSTEM WITH A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE." No. 9,613 was filed on September 30, 2014 and is a complaint filed against "COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL SYSTEM WITH A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE" This is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14 / 502,006 (U.S. Patent No. 9,465,7 62, which was filed on January 1, 2011. This is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13 / 341,176, filed on February 30 and entitled "COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL SYSTEM WITH A SERIAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE AND A PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE" (already issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,868,813).

[0002]

[0002] Each of the cross-referenced patent applications listed above is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

[0003]

[0003] Industrial control systems, such as standard industrial control systems (ICS) or programmable automation controllers (PAC), include various types of control equipment used in industrial production, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and industrial safety systems certified to safety standards such as IEC 61508. These systems are used in industries including electrical, water and wastewater, oil and gas production and refining, chemical, food, pharmaceutical, and robotics. By using information collected from various types of sensors to measure process variables, automated and / or operator-initiated supervisory commands from the industrial control system can be sent to various actuator devices, such as control valves, hydraulic actuators, magnetic actuators, electrical switches, motors, solenoids, etc. These actuator devices collect data from sensors and sensor systems, open and close valves and circuit breakers, regulate valves and motors, monitor alarm conditions of the industrial process, etc.

[0004]

[0004] In another example, SCADA systems can use open loop control at process sites that may be widely separated geographically. These systems use remote terminal units (RTUs) to send monitoring data to one or more control centers. SCADA applications that deploy RTUs include fluid pipelines, power distribution, and large-scale communication systems. DCS systems are typically used for real-time data collection and continuous control with high-bandwidth low-latency data networks and are used in large campus industrial process plants such as oil and gas, refining, chemical, pharmaceutical, food and drinking water, water supply and wastewater, pulp and paper, off-site power, and mining and metals. More typically, PLCs allow Boolean and sequence logic operations, timers, and continuous control, and are often used in standalone machinery and robotics. Additionally, ICE and PAC systems can be used in facility processes for buildings, airports, ships, space stations, etc. (e.g., to monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment and energy consumption). As industrial control systems evolve, new technologies are combining aspects of these different types of control systems. For example, a PAC may include aspects of a SCADA, a DCS, and a PLC. Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005]

[0005] Industrial systems are evolving in a similar way to the "internet of things," but with much higher demands on safety, reliability, and throughput. Security is required at all levels. This includes edge devices, which, if left unsecured, can become systems for malicious actors. [Means for solving the problem]

[0006]

[0006] An implementation of an image capture device (e.g., a camera) for a secure industrial control system is disclosed herein. The image capture device may include an image sensor, a signal processor coupled to the image sensor, and a controller managing the signal processor. The controller may also be configured to transmit data associated with the processed image signal to one or more devices coupled to the image capture device. For example, the controller may transmit data associated with the processed image signal (e.g., encoded image frames, metadata, etc.) to an input / output module and / or a communication / control module via a communication interface. The communication interface couples the controller to the input / output module and / or the communication / control module. In an embodiment, the controller is configured to establish an encrypted tunnel between the controller and the input / output module or the communication / control module based on at least one respective security certificate of the image capture device and at least one respective security certificate of the input / output module and / or the communication / control module. The controller is also configured to perform an authentication sequence with the input / output module and / or the communication / control module using the at least one respective security credential of the image capture device and the at least one respective security credential of the input / output module and / or the communication / control module, such that the image capture device can be authenticated and / or granted permission to transmit and / or receive information from the input / output module and / or the communication / control module and / or other components of the secure industrial control system.

[0007]

[0007] This Summary is provided to introduce in a simplified form a selection of concepts that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

[0008]

[0008] The detailed description will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0008] The use of the same reference numbers in different instances in the description and figures may indicate similar or identical items. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0009] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a secure industrial control system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an image capture device for a secure industrial control system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a switch mechanism for a communication backplane of a secure industrial control system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an action authentication path for a secure industrial control system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a block diagram further illustrating the action authentication path of FIG. 4 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an authentication sequence between an image capture device and an input / output module (IOM) or a communication / control module (CCM) in a secure industrial control system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0010] overview

[0015] Industrial systems are evolving in a similar way to the "Internet of Things," but with much higher demands on safety, reliability, and throughput. Security is needed at all levels. This includes edge devices, which, if left unsecured, can become a system for malicious actors. For example, security cameras, often considered "security devices," can be vulnerable access points to industrial control systems. In some instances, counterfeit or hacked cameras can be used to gain unauthorized entry to industrial control systems, thereby gaining access to video footage or other information, or even to insert fictitious video footage (e.g., for purposes of jamming false alarms). In some instances, camera network connections can be used to worm malware into non-camera network databases, for example, as an entry point for malicious code to gain remote access and use to steal or tamper with control system information.

[0011]

[0016] An implementation of an image capture device (e.g., a camera) for a secure industrial control system is disclosed herein. In an embodiment, the image capture device for the secure industrial control system may include an image sensor, a signal processor coupled to the image sensor, and a controller managing the signal processor. The controller may also be configured to transmit data associated with the processed image signal to one or more devices coupled to the image capture device. For example, the controller may transmit data associated with the processed image signal (e.g., encoded image frames, metadata, etc.) to an input / output module and / or a communication / control module via a communication interface. The communication interface couples the controller to the input / output module and / or the communication / control module. In an embodiment, the controller is configured to establish an encrypted tunnel between the controller and the input / output module or the communication / control module based on at least one respective security certificate of the image capture device and at least one respective security certificate of the input / output module and / or the communication / control module. The controller is also configured to execute an authentication sequence with the input / output module and / or the communication / control module utilizing the respective security certificates of the image capture device and the respective security certificates of the input / output module and / or the communication / control module, such that the image capture device can be authenticated and / or granted permission to transmit and / or receive information from the input / output module and / or the communication / control module and / or other components of the secure industrial control system. For example, the transmitted information may include, but is not limited to, a captured image, video footage, spectral information (e.g., for fire, gas and / or radiation detection), or a combination thereof.

[0012] Example Implementations

[0017] FIG. 1 illustrates an industrial control system 100 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure. In an embodiment, the industrial control system 100 may include an industrial control system (ICS), a programmable automation controller (PAC), a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, a distributed control system (DCS), a programmable logic controller (PLC), and an industrial safety system certified to safety standards such as IEC 1508, etc. As shown in FIG. 1, the industrial control system 100 uses a communication control architecture to implement a distributed control system including one or more industrial elements (e.g., input / output (I / O) modules, power modules, field devices, image capture devices (e.g., surveillance cameras, physical security cameras, specific spectrum detection cameras (e.g., for fire, gas, and / or radiation detection), etc.), switches, workstations, and / or physical interconnection devices) controlled or driven by one or more control elements or subsystems 102 distributed throughout the system. For example, one or more I / O modules 104 may be connected to one or more communications / control modules 106 (sometimes abbreviated as (CCM)) that make up the control element / subsystem 102 .

[0013]

[0018] The industrial control system 100 is configured to transmit data to and from the I / O modules 104. The I / O modules 104 may include input modules, output modules, and / or input and output modules. For example, the input modules may be used to receive information from input devices 130 (e.g., sensors), while the output modules may be used to transmit instructions to output devices (e.g., actuators). For example, the I / O modules 104 may be connected to process sensors for measuring pressure in piping, such as in a gas plant or refinery, and / or may be connected to process actuators for controlling valves, two-state or multi-state switches, transmitters, and the like. Field devices 130 are communicatively coupled to the I / O modules 104, either directly or via a network connection. These devices 130 may include control valves, hydraulic actuators, magnetic actuators, motors, solenoids, electrical switches, transmitters, input sensors / receivers (e.g., lighting, radiation, gas, temperature, electrical, magnetic and / or acoustic sensors), communication sub-buses, and the like.

[0014]

[0019] The I / O modules 104 can be used in the industrial control system 100 to collect data in applications including, but not limited to, critical infrastructure and / or industrial processes (e.g., product manufacturing and fabrication, utility power generation, oil, gas, and chemical refining), pharmaceuticals, food and drinking water, pulp and paper, metals and mining, and facilities and large industrial processes (e.g., to monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment and energy consumption) for buildings, airports, ships, space stations.

[0015]

[0020] In some implementations, the I / O module 104 may also be used to connect an image capture device 200 (e.g., a camera, such as a surveillance camera, physical security camera, or a specific spectrum detection camera) to the industrial control system 100. In other implementations, the image capture device 200 may be connected to the backplane 116 via the communication / control module 106 or other input means. The backplane 116 facilitates on-site and off-site interconnectivity of the industrial control system elements (e.g., connectivity to the network 120 for enterprise systems / applications, external control systems / applications, design interface control systems / applications, external monitoring systems / applications, and operator / administrator monitoring or control systems / applications, etc.).

[0016]

[0021] As shown in FIG. 2, the image capture device 200 includes an image sensor (e.g., a CMOS image sensor, a CCD image sensor, etc.). The image sensor has a signal processor 206 coupled to the image sensor 204. In an embodiment, the image sensor 204 can include a lens or lens assembly 202. The lens assembly 202 is disposed over the image sensor 204 to focus light toward the image sensor 204. The signal processor 206 can be configured to receive an image signal from the image sensor 204 and can be configured to use one or more filters, adjust gain levels, convert the image signal from an analog format to a digital format, etc. The image capture device 200 can further include a codec 210 for encoding the processed image signal into a data format that can be decoded by an end device in the industrial control system 100. In some embodiments, the image capture device 200 includes a video enhancer 208 for adjusting image attributes (e.g., brightness, contrast, etc.), for example, by boosting the gain of one or more signal components before, after, or during signal processing (i.e., in the signal processor 206). The image capture device 200 further includes a controller 212 (e.g., a microcontroller, microprocessor, ASIC, programmable logic device, etc.) for managing the components, circuits, and / or modules of the signal processor 206. The controller 212 can also be configured to transmit data associated with the processed image to one or more devices coupled to the image capture device 200. For example, the controller 212 can transmit data associated with the processed image signal (e.g., encoded image frames, metadata, etc.) to the input / output module 104 and / or the communications / control module 106 via the communications interface 214 (e.g., a transmitter, receiver, and / or transceiver).The communication interface 214 couples the controller 212 to the input / output module 104 and / or the communication / control module 106. In some embodiments, the input / output module 104 and / or the communication / control module 106 are configured to pre-process or post-process the image signal received from the image capture device 200 before transmitting the processed image signal to other industrial elements or network-connected devices of the secure industrial control system. For example, the input / output module 104 and / or the communication / control module 106 can be configured to perform additional filtering, encoding, or encryption on the processed image signal. In some embodiments, the communication interface 214 includes a port and is configured to receive a wired connection to couple the image capture device 200 to an external device (e.g., the IOM 104, the CCM 106, or other industrial control system elements). In other embodiments, the communication interface 214 can include a wireless transmitter, receiver, and / or transceiver to facilitate wireless connectivity between the image capture device 200 and the external device.

[0017]

[0022] The communication interface 214 includes a Power Over Ethernet (POE) port that receives power provided by an external device. For example, the image capture device 200 may be coupled to a secure Ethernet I / O module with POE capabilities. The I / O module 104 may include a BEDROCKSIO4.E Secure Ethernet module, or the like. In some embodiments, the I / O module 104 (e.g., a BEDROCKSIO4.E Secure Ethernet module) includes a multi-channel secure software configurable Ethernet module. The module may have software configurable protocols on each port, support for Ethernet I / P, ModbusTCP and OPC UA clients, other protocols including planned Profinet and DNP3, POE available on one or more ports for Ethernet powered devices, and / or 10 / 100 Mbps half / full duplex capabilities. In some implementations, image capture device 200 is configured to transmit data associated with processed images at bit rates ranging between approximately 9600 and 10M, with frame rates between 5-60 fps and resolutions between 240-1080p. For example, image capture device 200 may be configured to transmit 720p at 15 fps at less than 2M bit rates. These ranges are provided for illustrative purposes only and should not be considered limiting of the present disclosure.

[0018]

[0023] In an embodiment, the image capture device's controller 212 is configured to establish an encrypted tunnel between the controller 212 and an external device (e.g., the input / output module 104 or the communication / control module 106). The establishment of the encrypted tunnel is based on at least one respective security credential of the image capture device 200 and at least one respective security credential of the external device. The controller 212 may also be configured to perform an authentication sequence with the external device using the respective security credential of the image capture device 200 and the respective security credential of the external device, thereby allowing the image capture device 200 to authenticate and / or grant permission to send and / or receive information from the input / output module 104 and / or the communication / control module 106 and / or other components of the secure industrial control system.

[0019]

[0024] As discussed in more detail below, each security credential of an image capture device 200 may include a unique security credential that is provisioned to the image capture device 200 by a key management entity 124. For example, a unique security credential may be provisioned at each point of manufacture (of image capture device 200) from key management entity 124. In some embodiments, each security credential may be modifiable, revocable, and / or authenticated by key management entity 124 at a site different from each point of manufacture (e.g., when image capture device 200 is installed in industrial control system 100). Additionally or alternatively, each security credential may be modifiable, revocable, and / or authenticated by an external device (e.g., input / output module 104 or communications / control module 106) or by other industrial control system elements in communication with image capture device 200.

[0020]

[0025] In some embodiments, the image capture device 200 may include a specialty camera. For example, the one or more processed image signals include the spectral data detected by the image sensor 204. The controller 212 may be configured to transmit the spectral data to monitor environmental conditions of one or more industrial control systems. For example, the image capture device 200 may be configured to monitor environmental conditions of one or more industrial control systems, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following environmental presences: fire, dust, smoke, particulates, heat, moisture, high pressure, gas, radiation, etc. In some embodiments, the image sensor 204 may include a thermal image sensor, a night vision image sensor, an ultraviolet sensor, an infrared light sensor, etc. In implementations, the spectral data detected by the image capture device 200 may trigger an alarm / alert (e.g., in response to detecting a fire, a gas leak, etc.).

[0021]

[0026] Referring again to FIG. 1, the I / O modules 104 can be configured to convert analog data received from sensors to digital data (e.g., using analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuitry, etc.). The I / O modules 104 can also be connected to one or more process actuators 220, such as motors or control valves, or electrical relays, and other forms of actuators, and can be configured to control one or more operating characteristics of the motors, such as motor speed, motor torque, or the position of a control valve or the state of an electrical relay, etc. Furthermore, the I / O modules 104 can be configured to convert the digital data to analog data (e.g., using digital-to-analog (DAC) circuitry, etc.) for transmission to the actuators 220. In an implementation, one or more of the I / O modules 104 can include a communication module configured to communicate over a communication sub-bus, such as an Ethernet bus, an H1 field bus, a process field bus (PROFIBUS), a Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) bus, a Modbus, etc. Additionally, two or more I / O modules 100 may be used to provide fault tolerant and redundant connections for various field devices 130 such as control valves, hydraulic actuators, magnetic actuators, motors, solenoids, electrical switches, transmitters, input sensors / receivers (e.g., lighting, radiation, gas, temperature, electrical, magnetic, and / or acoustic sensors), communication sub-buses, and the like.

[0022]

[0027] Each I / O module 104 may be provided with a unique identifier (ID) to distinguish the I / O module 104 from other I / O modules 104. In an implementation, the I / O module 104 is identified by its ID when connected to the industrial control system 100. Multiple I / O modules 104 may be used with the industrial control system 100 to provide redundancy. For example, two or more I / O modules 104 may be connected to process sensors and / or actuators. Each I / O module 104 may include one or more ports 222 that provide physical connections to hardware and circuitry included with the I / O module 104, such as a printed circuit board (PCB) 224. For example, each I / O module 104 may include a cable connection, connecting the cable to a printed wiring board (PWB) within the I / O module 104.

[0023]

[0028] One or more of the I / O modules 104 may include an interface for connecting to other networks, including, but not limited to, wide area cellular telephone networks, such as a 3G cellular network, a 4G cellular network, or a Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network, wireless computer communications networks, such as a Wi-Fi network (e.g., a wireless LAN (WLAN) that operates using the IEEE 802.11 network standard), a personal area network (PAN) (e.g., a wireless PAN (WPAN) that operates using the IEEE 802.15 network standard), a wide area network (WAN), an intranet, an extranet, an internet, the internet, etc. Additionally, one or more of the I / O modules 104 may include a connection for connecting the I / O module 104 to a computer bus, etc.

[0024]

[0029] The communications / control module 106 can be used to monitor and control the I / O modules 104 as well as to connect two or more I / O modules 104 together. In embodiments of the present disclosure, the communications / control module 106 can update a routing table based on the unique ID of the I / O module 104 when the I / O module 104 is connected to the industrial control system 100. Additionally, if multiple redundant I / O modules 104 are used, each communications / control module 106 can implement mirroring of information databases about the I / O modules 104 and update these whenever data is received from and / or sent to the I / O modules 104. In some embodiments, more than one communications / control module 106 is used to provide redundancy. For improved security, the communications / control modules 106 may be configured to perform an authentication sequence or handshake to authenticate each other at prescribed events or times, such as upon startup, reset, installation of a new control module 106, replacement of a communications / control module 106, periodically, at scheduled times, etc.

[0025]

[0030] In some implementations, data transmitted by the industrial control system 100 may be packetized, i.e., separate portions of data may be converted into data packets that include the data portions along with network control information, etc. The industrial control system 100 may use one or more protocols for data transmission. These protocols include bit-oriented synchronous data link layer protocols, such as High Level Data Link Control (HDLC). In some embodiments, the industrial control system 100 may implement HDLC, such as according to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 13239 standard. Furthermore, two or more communication / control modules 106 may be used to implement redundant HDLC. However, it should be noted that HDLC is provided by way of example only and is not intended to limit the present disclosure. That is, the industrial control system 100 may use various other communication protocols in accordance with the present disclosure.

[0026]

[0031] One or more of the communication / control modules 106 may also be configured to exchange information with components used to monitor and / or control the field devices 130 connected to the industrial control system 100 via the I / O modules 104, such as one or more control loop feedback mechanisms / controllers. In an implementation, the controller may be a microcontroller / programmable logic controller. The I / O modules 104 and 106 may be configured as a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), a Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller, or the like. In some embodiments, the communication / control module 104 and the communication / control module 106 include a network interface, for example, to connect one or more I / O modules 104 to one or more controllers via a network. In an implementation, the network interface may be configured as a Gigabit Ethernet interface to connect the I / O modules 104 to a local area network (LAN). Furthermore, two or more communication / control modules 106 may be used to implement redundant Gigabit Ethernet. However, it should be noted that Gigabit Ethernet is provided by way of example only and is not meant to limit the present disclosure. That is, the network interface may be configured to connect the communication / control module 106 to a variety of other networks. Various other networks include, but are not limited to, wide area cellular telephone networks, such as 3G cellular networks, 4G cellular networks, or Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) networks, wireless computer communications networks, such as Wi-Fi networks (e.g., WLANs operated using the IEEE 802.11 network standard), PANs (e.g., WPANs operated using the IEEE 802.15 network standard), WANs, intranets, extranets, an internet, the internet, and the like. In addition, the network interface may be implemented using a computer bus. For example, the network interface may include a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) card interface, such as a mini PCI interface, and the like. Furthermore, the network may be configured to include a single network or multiple networks across different access points.

[0027]

[0032] The industrial control system 100 can receive power from multiple sources. For example, AC power can be provided from the power grid 108 (e.g., using high voltage power from an AC mains supply). AC power can also be provided using local power generation (e.g., on-site turbine or diesel local generators 110). The power sources 112 are used to distribute power from the power grid 108 to the automated equipment of the industrial control system 100, such as the controllers, I / O modules, etc. The power sources 112 can also be used to distribute power from the local generators 110 to the equipment of the industrial control system. The industrial control system 100 can also include additional (backup) power sources configured to store and return DC power using multiple battery modules. For example, the power sources 112 can function as a UPS. In embodiments of the present disclosure, multiple power sources 112 can be distributed (e.g., physically scattered) within the industrial control system 100.

[0028]

[0033] In some embodiments, the control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements (e.g., I / O modules 104, communications / control modules 106, and / or power modules 232) may be connected to one another by one or more backplanes 114. For example, communications / control modules 106 may be connected to I / O modules 104 by communications backplane 116. Additionally, power supplies 112 may be connected to I / O modules 104 and / or communications / control modules 106 by power backplane 118. In some embodiments, physical interconnection devices (e.g., but not limited to, switches, connectors, or cables as described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 446,412, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference) are used to connect the I / O modules 104, communications / control modules 106, power modules 112, and possibly other industrial control system equipment. For example, a cable may be used to connect the communications / control module 106 to the network 120, another cable may be used to connect the power source 112 to the power grid 108, another cable may be used to connect the power source 112 to the local generator 110, etc.

[0029]

[0034] The communications backplane 116 includes a switch fabric 300 to facilitate interconnectivity of the industrial control system elements coupled through the communications backplane 116. For example, the communications backplane 116 may physically and communicatively couple the communications / control modules 106 to the I / O modules 104. These industrial control system elements may then be coupled to the network 120 (e.g., providing access to enterprise devices, engineered control interfaces / applications, etc.). The image capture devices 200 (and other devices 130) may be coupled to the communications backplane 116 directly or through the communications / control modules 106 or I / O modules 104, thereby providing enhanced access to high speed secure communications through the switch fabric 300.

[0030]

[0035] In an embodiment, the switch fabric 300 includes a serial communication interface 302 and a parallel communication interface 304 to provide communication between multiple communication / control modules 106, I / O modules 104, image capture devices 200, field devices 130, and / or other elements of the industrial control system 100. The various elements may be connected to the industrial control system 100 using one or more electromagnetic connectors. For example, each I / O module 104 may include or be coupled to one or more electromagnetic connectors or connector assemblies, with a core member extending through the coil. In some embodiments, the coil may be implemented as a planar winding on a circuit board. When included in an I / O module 104, the circuit board may "float" against a partial spring load, allowing vertical movement of the circuit board relative to the plane of the core member, for example, to compensate for tolerances across the circuit board. For example, a self-retaining spring-loaded mechanism can be provided within the module to apply a constant downward pressure to facilitate mating of the electromagnetic connections, compensating for stacked tolerances of the module, PCB, and base plate / support frame, and ensuring consistent mating of the two halves of the electromagnetic connector assembly.

[0031]

[0036] In some embodiments, a "tongue and groove" configuration can be used that provides inherent fastening and support on three sides. For example, I / O module 104 The contained printed circuit board can be configured to slide along and between the two track segments in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the core member. Additionally, the core member can be mechanically isolated (e.g., not in contact) from the circuit board. It should be noted that the implementation with planar primary and secondary windings is provided by way of example only and is not necessarily meant to limit the present disclosure. That is, other implementations can use other coil configurations, such as wire would coils. For example, the primary coil can include a planar winding and the secondary coil can include a wire would coil. Additionally, the primary coil can include a wire would coil and the secondary coil can include a planar winding. In other implementations, both the primary coil and the secondary coil can include a wire would coil.

[0032]

[0037] The switch fabric 300 may be configured for use with any system technology, such as telecommunications network technology, computer network technology, process control system technology, etc. For example, the switch fabric 300 may be used with a distributed control system comprised of controller elements and subsystems, where the subsystems are controlled by one or more controllers distributed throughout the system. The switch fabric 300 includes a serial communication interface 302 and a parallel communication interface 304 to provide communication with multiple slave devices.

[0033]

[0038] The serial communications interface 302 may be implemented using a group of connectors connected in parallel to one another. In some embodiments, the connectors (e.g., as described above) may be configured as electromagnetic connectors / connector assemblies. For example, the serial communications interface 302 may be implemented using a multidrop bus 306, etc. In some implementations, the multi-drop bus 306 may be used for configuration and diagnostic functions of the I / O modules 104 / slave devices. The parallel communication interface 304 allows multiple signals to be transmitted simultaneously over multiple dedicated high-speed parallel communication channels. For example, the parallel communication interface 304 may be implemented using a cross switch 308 or the like.

[0034]

[0039] In the embodiment shown in FIG. 3, the parallel communication interface 304 may be implemented using a four (4)-wire full-duplex cross switch 308 with a dedicated connection for each I / O module 104 / slave device. In an implementation, each connection may be provided using one or more electromagnetic connectors / connector assemblies (e.g., as described above). The cross switch 308 may be implemented as a programmable cross switch that connects point-to-point buses and enables traffic between the I / O modules 104 / slave devices. The cross switch 308 may be configured by a master device, such as the communications / control module 106. For example, the communications / control module 106 / master device may configure one or more registers contained within the cross switch 308 to control traffic between the I / O modules 104 / slave devices. In an implementation, the communications / control module 106 / master device may include a set of rules that dictate how the I / O modules 104 / slave devices are interconnected. For example, the communications / control module 106 / master device may include a set of registers, each of which defines the operation of a particular switch (e.g., with respect to how packets are forwarded, etc.). That is, the cross switch 308 does not necessarily have to auto-configure, but may instead implement a configuration provided by the communications / control module 106 / master device. However, this configuration is provided by way of example only and is not meant to limit the present disclosure. Thus, in other implementations, the cross switch 308 may auto-configure.

[0035]

[0040] The parallel communication interface 304 may be used for data collection from the I / O modules 104 / slave devices. Additionally, since each I / O module 104 / slave device has its own private bus to the communications / control module 106 / master device, each I / O module 104 / slave device can simultaneously communicate with the communications / control module 106. This means that the total response time of the industrial control system 100 (i.e., the switch fabric 300) will be limited to that of the slowest I / O module 104 / slave device, not the sum of all slave devices as in a typical multi-drop bus.

[0036]

[0041] In an implementation, the switch fabric 300, the serial communication interface 302, and the parallel communication interface 304 may be implemented on a single monolithic circuit board, e.g., multiple E-shaped core members of the electromagnetic connectors extend through the circuit board. In an implementation, the core members may be mechanically isolated from the circuit board (e.g., without contacting the circuit board). However, this configuration is provided by way of example only and is not meant to limit the disclosure. That is, the serial communication interface 302 and the parallel communication interface 304 may be implemented using different arrangements of multiple components, such as multiple separate semiconductor devices to separately implement the serial communication interface 302 and the parallel communication interface 304.

[0037]

[0042] The switch fabric 300 may be configured to connect one or more I / O modules 104 (e.g., as slave devices) and transmit data to and from the I / O modules 104. The I / O modules 104 may include input modules, output modules, and / or input and output modules. For example, an input module may be used to receive information from an input instrument in a process or field, while an output module may be used to send instructions to an output instrument in the field. For example, the I / O modules 104 may be connected to an image capture device 200 to detect image signals, spectral signals, etc., or to process sensors, such as sensors for measuring pressure in piping in a gas plant, refinery, etc. In implementations, the I / O modules 104 may be used to collect data in the industrial control system 100 for applications including, but not limited to: namely, product manufacturing and fabrication; utility power generation; critical infrastructure and / or industrial processes such as oil, gas, and chemical refining; pharmaceuticals, food and drinking water, pulp and paper, metals and mining; and installations for buildings, airports, ships, space stations, and large-scale industrial processes (e.g., to monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment and energy consumption).

[0038]

[0043] Data transmitted using the switch fabric 300 may be packetized, i.e., separate portions of data may be converted into data packets that include the data portions along with network control information, etc. The industrial control system 100 / switch fabric 300 may use one or more protocols for data transmission. These protocols include bit-oriented synchronous data link layer protocols, such as High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC). In one specific example, the industrial control system 100 / switch fabric 300 may implement HDLC, such as according to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 13239 standard. Furthermore, two or more communication / control modules 106 may be used to implement redundant HDLC. However, it should be noted that HDLC is provided by way of example only and is not meant to limit the present disclosure. That is, the industrial control system 100 may use various other communication protocols in accordance with the present disclosure.

[0039]

[0044] The industrial control system 100 implements a secure control system as described in U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14 / 469,931 (issued as U.S. Patent No. 9,191,203) and International Application PCT / US2013 / 053721, which are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties. For example, the industrial control system 100 includes a security credential source (e.g., a factory 122) and a security credential implementer (e.g., a key management entity 124). In an embodiment, a device lifetime management system can include the security credential implementer and the key management entity. The security credential source is configured to generate unique security credentials (e.g., keys, certificates such as unique identifiers, etc., and / or security credentials). The security credential implementer is configured to provision control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements (e.g., cables, devices 130, I / O modules 103, communications / control modules 106, and power modules 112, etc.) with unique security credentials generated by a security credential source.

[0040]

[0045] Many (e.g., each) device 130, I / O module 104, communication / control module 106, power supply 112, physical interconnect devices, etc. in the industrial control system 100 can be provisioned with security credentials to provide security at many (e.g., all) levels of the industrial control system 100. Furthermore, control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements, including sensors and / or actuators, etc. can be provisioned with unique security credentials (e.g., keys, certificates, etc.) during manufacturing (e.g., at the time of production) and managed by a key management entity 124 of the industrial control system 100 from the time of production to enhance security of the industrial control system 100. For example, the key management entity 124 can provision unique security credentials for components (e.g., image capture devices 200 and other industrial control system elements) at each manufacturing site. Additionally, the key management entity 124 may be further configured to certify, revoke, or modify security credentials when multiple components are implemented at a site other than each component's respective manufacturing site (e.g., when the components are installed / used within the industrial control system 100).

[0041]

[0046] In some embodiments, communication between control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements, including sensors and / or actuators, etc., in the industrial control system 100 includes an authentication process. The authentication process may be performed to authenticate the control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements, including sensors and / or actuators, etc., implemented within the industrial control system 100. Additionally, the authentication process may utilize security credentials associated with the elements and / or physical interconnect devices to authenticate the elements and / or physical interconnect devices. For example, the security credentials may include cryptographic keys, certificates (e.g., public key certificates, digital certificates, identity certificates, security certificates, asymmetric certificates, standard certificates, non-standard certificates), and / or identification numbers.

[0042]

[0047] In an implementation, the multiple control elements / subsystems and / or industrial elements of the industrial control system 100 are provisioned with their own unique security credentials. For example, each element of the industrial control system 100 may be provisioned with its own unique set(s) of certificates, encryption keys, and / or identification numbers when the element is manufactured (e.g., an individual set of keys and certificates is defined at the time of production of the element). These sets of certificates, encryption keys, and / or identification numbers are configured to provide / support strong encryption. The encryption keys can be implemented by standard (e.g., commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)) cryptographic algorithms, such as National Security Agency (NSA) algorithms, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) algorithms, etc.

[0043]

[0048] Based on the results of the authentication process, the authenticated element may be activated, partial functionality of the element may be enabled or disabled within the industrial control system 100, full functionality of the element may be available within the industrial control system 100, and / or the element's functionality may be completely disabled within the industrial control system 100 (e.g., not facilitating communications between the element and other elements of the industrial control system 200). In this regard, each element (e.g., communications / control module 102, I / O module 104, etc.) may be configured to authenticate, disable, or modify the security credentials of other industrial control system elements (e.g., device 130, image capture device 200, etc.) based on the success or failure of the authentication sequence using the industrial control system element's respective security credentials.

[0044]

[0049] In embodiments, industrial control system elements may establish a secure communication path or "tunnel" for securely transmitting information based on their respective security credentials. For example, a communication may be signed or encrypted by a first (sending) element and authenticated (e.g., verified or decrypted) by a second (receiving) element based on their respective security credentials. In embodiments, image capture device 200 may be configured to communicate data associated with a processed image signal (e.g., image frames, spectral data, metadata, etc.) to communication / control module 106 or I / O module 104 (or other components of industrial control system 100) via the secure tunnel. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 only communicates information to communication / control module 106 or I / O module 104 (or other components of industrial control system 100) after successfully authenticating or being authenticated by the receiving device.

[0045]

[0050] In an embodiment, a key, certificate, and / or identification number associated with an element of the industrial control system 100 may specify an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of that element. As used herein, an "original equipment manufacturer" or "OEM" may be defined as an entity that physically manufactures a device (e.g., an element) and / or a supplier of the device, such as an entity that purchases the device from the physical manufacturer and sells the device. That is, in an embodiment, a device may be manufactured and distributed (sold) by an OEM that is both the physical manufacturer and supplier of the device. However, in other embodiments, a device may be distributed by an OEM that is a supplier but not the physical manufacturer. In such an embodiment, an OEM may have a device manufactured by a physical manufacturer (e.g., an OEM may purchase, contract, order, etc., a device from a physical manufacturer).

[0046]

[0051] Additionally, if an OEM includes a supplier that is not the actual manufacturer of the device, the device may bear the brand of the supplier instead of the brand of the actual manufacturer. For example, in embodiments where an element (e.g., communication / control module 106) is associated with a particular OEM that is the supplier but not the actual manufacturer, the element's key, certificate, and / or identification number may identify its origin. During authentication of an element of industrial control system 100, when a determination is made that the element being authenticated was manufactured or supplied by an entity different from the OEM of one or more other elements of industrial control system 100, the functionality of the element may be at least partially disabled within industrial control system 100. For example, restrictions may be placed on communications (e.g., data transfer) between the element and other elements of industrial control system 100 such that the element cannot operate / function within industrial control system 100. When one of the elements of the industrial control system 100 needs replacing, this feature can prevent a user of the industrial control system 100 from unknowingly replacing the element with a foreign element (e.g., an element having a different origin (different OEM) than the rest of the elements of the industrial control system 100) and installing the element within the industrial control system 100. Thus, the techniques described herein can prevent substitution of elements of other OEMs within the secure industrial control system 100. In one example, substitution of an element provided by an originating OEM with an element providing similar functionality can be prevented because the replaced element cannot be authenticated and operated within the originating OEM system. In another example, a first reseller can be provided with an element having a first set of physical and cryptographic labels by the originating OEM and the first reseller's element can be installed within the industrial control system 100.In this example, the second distributor may be provided with elements having a second set of (e.g., different) physical and cryptographic labels by the same underlying OEM. In this example, the second distributor's elements may be prevented from operating within the industrial control system 100 because they cannot authenticate and operate with the first distributor's elements. However, it should be noted that the first distributor and the second distributor may enter into a mutual agreement, in which case the first and second elements may be configured to authenticate and operate within the same industrial control system 100. Additionally, in some embodiments, an agreement between distributors allowing interoperation may be implemented such that the agreement applies only to a particular customer, group of customers, plant, etc.

[0047]

[0052] In another example, a user may attempt to implement a misspecified (e.g., mismarked) element within the industrial control system 100. For example, the mismarked element may be marked with physical indicators that erroneously indicate that the element is associated with the same OEM as other elements of the industrial control system 100. In such an example, the authentication process performed by the industrial control system 100 may alert the user that the element is a counterfeit. This process may also facilitate improved security for the industrial control system 100, since counterfeit elements often serve as vehicles that can introduce malicious software into the industrial control system 100. In an embodiment, the authentication process provides a secure air gap for the industrial control system 100, ensuring that a secure industrial control system is physically isolated from an insecure network.

[0048]

[0053] In an implementation, the secure industrial control system 100 includes a key management entity 124. The key management entity 124 can be configured to manage cryptographic keys (e.g., encryption keys) in a cryptographic system. This management of cryptographic keys (e.g., key management) can include key generation, exchange, storage, use, and / or replacement. For example, the key management entity 124 is configured to act as a security credential source and generate unique security credentials (e.g., public security credentials, private security credentials) for elements of the industrial control system 100. Key management pertains to keys at the user and / or system level (e.g., either between users or systems).

[0049]

[0054] In an embodiment, the key management entity 124 comprises a secure entity, such as an entity located within a secure facility. The key management entity 124 may be located remotely from the I / O module 104, the communication / control module 106, and the network 120. For example, a firewall 126 may separate the key management entity 124 from the control element or subsystem 102 and the network 120 (e.g., an enterprise network). In an implementation, the firewall 126 may be a software and / or hardware based network security system that controls incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing data packets and determining whether or not the data packets should be allowed to pass based on a set of rules. That is, the firewall 126 creates a barrier between a trusted and secure internal network (e.g., the network 120) and other networks 128 (e.g., the cloud and / or the Internet) that are assumed to be secure and not trusted. In an embodiment, firewall 126 enables selective (e.g., secure) communication between key management entity 124 and one or more of control elements or subsystems 102 and / or network 120. For example, one or more firewalls may be implemented at various locations within industrial control system 100. For example, firewalls may be integrated into switches and / or workstations of network 120.

[0050]

[0055] Additionally, the secure industrial control system 100 may include one or more manufacturing entities (e.g., factories). The manufacturing entities may be associated with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for the elements of the industrial control system 100. The key management entity 124 may be communicatively coupled to the manufacturing entities through a network (e.g., cloud). In an implementation, the key management entity 124 may be communicatively coupled to (e.g., have an encrypted communication pipeline to) the elements of the industrial control system 100 as they are manufactured at one or more manufacturing entities. The key management entity 124 may utilize the communication pipeline to provision the elements with security credentials (e.g., insert keys, certificates, and / or identification numbers into the elements) at the manufacturing location.

[0051]

[0056] Additionally, when an element is put into use (e.g., commissioned), the key management entity 124 may be communicatively coupled (e.g., by an encrypted communications pipeline) to each individual element globally to verify and sign the use of the specific codes and to disable (e.g., remove) and / or enable the use of any specific codes. That is, the key management entity 124 may communicate with each element at the factory where the element was originally manufactured (e.g., produced) so that the element may be tagged with the managed key. A master database and / or table containing all cryptographic keys, certificates, and / or identification numbers for each element of the industrial control system 100 may be maintained by the key management entity 124. The key management entity 124 may be configured to disable keys through communications with the element, thereby enhancing the ability of the authentication mechanism to combat component theft and reuse.

[0052]

[0057] In implementations, the key management entity 124 may be communicatively coupled to the control elements / subsystems, industrial elements, and / or network 120 through other networks (e.g., the cloud and / or the Internet) and firewalls. For example, in embodiments, the key management entity 124 may be a centralized system or a distributed system. Further, in embodiments, the key management entity 124 may be managed locally or remotely. In some implementations, the key management entity 124 may be located within (e.g., integrated with) the network 120 and / or the control elements or subsystems 102. The key management entity 124 may provide management and / or may be managed in a variety of ways. For example, the key management entity 124 may be implemented / managed by a customer at a central location, by a customer at an individual factory location, by an external third-party management company, and / or by a customer at different layers of the industrial control system 100 and in different locations depending on the layer.

[0053]

[0058] The authentication process can provide various levels of security (e.g., a scalable, user-configurable amount of security). For example, a baseline level of security can be provided that authenticates the element and protects the code within the element. Other layers of security can be added as well. For example, security can be implemented to the extent that a component, such as the communications / control module 106, cannot be powered up unless proper authentication is performed. In an implementation, security proofs (e.g., keys and certificates) are implemented on the element while encryption of the code is implemented at the element. Security can be distributed (e.g., flowing) throughout the industrial control system 100. For example, security can flow all the way through the industrial control system 100 to the end user, who at that point knows what the module was designed to control. In an embodiment, the authentication process provides encryption, device identification for secure communications, and authentication of system hardware or software components (e.g., by digital signatures).

[0054]

[0059] In implementations, the authentication process can be implemented to provide and / or enable interoperability of elements manufactured and / or supplied by different manufacturers / vendors / suppliers (e.g., OEMs) within the secure industrial control system 100. For example, selective (e.g., partial) interoperability between elements manufactured and / or supplied by different manufacturers / vendors / suppliers can be enabled. In embodiments, the unique security credentials (e.g., keys) implemented during authentication can form a hierarchy, thereby enabling different functions to be performed by different elements of the industrial control system 100.

[0055]

[0060] Additionally, communication links connecting components of the industrial control system 100 may employ and place (e.g., inject and / or stuff) data packets, such as runt packets (e.g., packets smaller than 64 bytes), therein to provide an increased level of security. The use of runt packets increases the difficulty of injecting external information (e.g., spurious messages, malicious content such as malware (viruses), data mining applications, etc.) into the communication link. For example, runt packets may be injected into the communication link within gaps between data packets transmitted between the action originator 204 and the communications / control module 106 or any other industrial element / controller 206 to impede the ability of an external entity to inject malicious content into the communication link.

[0056]

[0061] As shown in FIGS. 4 and 5, an I / O module 104, a communication / control module 106, or other industrial element / controller 406 operates, at least in part, according to requests / commands from an action originator 402. For example, the action initiator 402 can access data from the IOM 104 or CCM 106 and / or send commands / requests associated with setting or adjusting one or more variables for the image capture device 200 or field device 130 coupled thereto. In an implementation, the action initiator 402 can include an operator interface 408 (e.g., SCADA or HMI), a design interface 410 including an editor 412 and a compiler 414, a local application 320, a remote application 416 (e.g., communicating via a local application 420 over a network 418), etc. In the authentication pathway 400 shown in Figures 4 and 5, an industrial element / controller 406 (e.g., IOM 104 or CCM 106) processes an operator action (e.g., data, instructions to change / adjust one or more system variables, design interface commands, control commands, requests for firmware / software updates, set point control, downloading application images, etc.) only if the operator action is signed and / or encrypted by the action authenticator 404 or if the communication accompanying the operator action (e.g., authentication message) is signed and / or encrypted. This prevents unauthorized operator actions from valid user profiles and further secures the system from unauthorized action requests coming from invalid (e.g., hacked) profiles. In an embodiment, the action authentication process is implemented as described in U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14 / 519,066, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

[0057]

[0062] The action authenticator 344 includes a storage medium on which a private key is stored and a processor configured to sign and / or encrypt action requests generated by the action initiator 402 using the private key. The private key is stored in memory that is not accessible by standard operator login. For example, the secure workstation 426 may require a physical key, a portable encryption device (e.g., a smart card, RFID tag, etc.), and / or a biometric input for access. In an embodiment, the private key (e.g., security credentials) may be provisioned by an on-site or off-site key management entity (e.g., an on-site device life management system ("DLM") 422 or a remotely located DLM 422 connected through the network 418).

[0058]

[0063] In some embodiments, the action authenticator 404 includes a portable cryptographic device such as a smart card 424 (which may include a secure microprocessor). The advantage of using a portable cryptographic device is that the entire device (including the secretly stored key and the processor communicating with it) can be carried with an operator or user who has authorized access to the action initiator 402 interface. Whether the action authenticator 404 accesses the authentication path 400 through a secure or insecure workstation, the action request from the action initiator 402 can be securely signed and / or encrypted within the architecture of the portable cryptographic device instead of a potentially less secure workstation or cloud-based architecture. This secures the industrial control system 100 from unauthorized actions. For example, an unauthorized person must have physical possession of the smart card 424 before they can authenticate any action request sent through the action initiator 402.

[0059]

[0064] Furthermore, multiple layers of security may be employed. For example, the action authenticator 404 may include a secure workstation 426. The secure workstation 426 may only be accessible to sign and / or encrypt the action request, such as via smart card access. Additionally, the secure workstation 426 may be accessible via a biometric or multi-factor cryptographic device 428 (e.g., a fingerprint scanner, an iris scanner, and / or a facial recognition device). In some embodiments, the multi-factor cryptographic device 428 requires a valid biometric input before allowing the smart card 424 or other portable cryptographic device to sign the action request.

[0060]

[0065] The industrial element / controller 406 driven by the action initiator 402 is configured to receive the signed action request, verify the authenticity of the signed action request, and perform the requested action when the authenticity of the signed action request is verified. In some embodiments, the industrial element / controller 406 includes a storage medium 430 (e.g., SD / microSD card, HDD, SSD, or any other non-transitory storage device) configured to store the action request (e.g., application image, control command, and / or any other data sent by the action initiator). The industrial element / controller 406 further includes a processor 432 (e.g., a microcontroller, microprocessor, ASIC, etc.) that executes / implements code associated with the operator action (i.e., performs the requested action) after authenticating the operator action or a communication associated therewith. In some embodiments, an operator action is encrypted by the action initiator 402 and / or the action authenticator 432 and must also be decrypted by the processor 432 before the requested action can be performed. In some implementations, the industrial element / controller 406 includes a virtual key switch 434 (e.g., a software module executing on the processor 432). The virtual key switch 434 allows the operator action to be performed by the processor 432 only after the operator action or its associated communication has been verified. For example, the virtual key switch 434 may be configured to selectively enable / disable one or more operating modes of the processor 432 (e.g., a safe mode, a standard operating mode, a secure operating mode, etc.). In some embodiments, any action or each selection of a critical action must clear an authentication path before it can be run on by the industrial element / controller 406. For example, this may include any change in a parameter / process variable or a data request sent to the image capture device 200 or the field device 130.

[0061]

[0066] As described above, for additional security, the image capture device 200 may be configured to perform an authentication sequence or handshake to authenticate with an external device (e.g., IOM 104 or CCM 106) to which the image capture device 200 is connected. Authentication may occur at predefined events or times, such as upon power-up, reset, installation of the image capture device 200, replacement of the image capture device 200, periodically or at scheduled times, etc. By causing the image capture device 200 to authenticate with an external device to which the image capture device 200 is coupled, counterfeiting or malicious tampering of the image capture device 200 may be avoided. In an implementation, the external device may at least partially disable features of the image capture device 200 or may prevent communication with the image capture device 200 when authentication fails.

[0062]

[0067] 8 illustrates an example datagram 500 transmitted between the image capture device 200 and an external device (e.g., the IOM 104 or the CCM 106) in performing an authentication sequence. To initiate the authentication sequence, the external device is configured to transmit a request datagram 502 to the image capture device 200. In an implementation, the request datagram 502 includes a first plaintext nonce (NonceA), a first device authentication key certificate (CertDAKA) containing a first device authentication key (DAKA), and a first identity attribute certificate (IACA). In some embodiments, the external device is configured to generate the first nonce (NonceA) by a true random number generator (hereinafter referred to as “TRNG”) and to concatenate, or otherwise combine, the first nonce (NonceA), the first device authentication key certificate (CertDAKA), and the first identity attribute certificate (IACA) to generate the request datagram 502. In some embodiments, the first device authentication key certificate (CertDAKA) and the first identity attribute certificate (IACA) are stored locally by the external device, for example, the certificates may be stored in local memory (e.g., ROM, RAM, flash memory, or other non-transitory storage media) of the I / O module 104 or the communications / control module 106.

[0063]

[0068] The image capture device 200 is configured to determine the validity of the request datagram by verifying a first device authentication key certificate (CertDAKA) and a first identity attribute certificate (IACA) with a public key. The public key may be generated by a device lifecycle management system (DLM) or derived using cryptographic library functions. In this regard, the public key may be stored in the SRAM or other local memory of the image capture device 200 and may also be shared between external devices and the image capture device. Such certificates may be used in conjunction with cryptographic library functions to verify or cryptographically sign data exchanged between image capture devices 200, such as nonces exchanged between image capture devices 200. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 may verify certificates using an Elliptic Curve Digital Signing Algorithm (ECDSA) or other verification process. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 may be further configured to determine the validity of the certificate values ​​from the cleartext values ​​by verifying that the certificate type is a Device Authentication Key (DAK) or Identity Attribute Certificate (IAC) for each certificate, that the IAC names match and the DAK certificate module type matches the module type argument, and / or that the Microprocessor Serial Numbers (MPSNs) for each certificate in the message payload match each other. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 may be further configured to verify that the DAK and IAC certificates are not on a local revocation list (e.g., a list or database that contains revoked and / or invalid certificates). If image capture device 200 is unable to determine the validity of the request datagram, image capture device 200 may generate an error message, partially or completely disable the external device, and / or block or limit communications to / from the external device.

[0064]

[0069] In response to a valid request datagram 502, the image capture device 200 is configured to send a response datagram 504 to the external device. In some implementations, the response datagram 504 includes a second plaintext nonce (NonceB), a first signature (SigB[NonceA||NonceB]) associated with the first and second nonce, a second device authentication key certificate (CertDAKB) that provides a second device authentication key (DAKB), and a second identity attribute certificate (IACB). In some embodiments, the image capture device 200 is configured to generate the second nonce (NonceB) with a TRNG, concatenate or otherwise combine the first nonce (NonceA) and the second nonce (NonceB), and sign the concatenated / combined nonce with a private key (e.g., DAK) that is stored locally by the image capture device 200. Image capture device 200 is further configured to concatenate, or otherwise combine, the second nonce (NonceB), the first signature associated with the first and second nonces (SigB[NonceA||NonceB]), the second device authentication key certificate (CertDAKB), and the second identity attribute certificate (IACB) to generate response datagram 504. In some embodiments, the second device authentication key certificate (CertDAKB) and the second identity attribute certificate (IACB) are stored locally by image capture device 200. For example, these certificates may be stored in local memory (e.g., ROM, RAM, flash memory, or other non-transitory storage medium) of image capture device 200.

[0065]

[0070] The external device is configured to determine the validity of the response datagram by verifying the second device authentication key certificate (CertDAKB) and the second identity attribute certificate (IACB) with a public key stored locally or derived from a cryptographic library using ECDSA or other validation processes. In some embodiments, the external device may be further configured to determine the validity of the certificate values ​​from the cleartext values ​​by verifying that the IAC and DAK certificates have matching MPSN, the IAC names match, the certificate type is correct for both certificates (IAC and DAK), the correct issuer name is in both certificates, and the DAK module type is the correct type (e.g., checking to see if module type = communications / control module). In an embodiment, the external device may be further configured to verify that the DAK and IAC certificates are not on a local revocation list.

[0066]

[0071] To determine the validity of the response datagram, the external device may be further configured to verify a first signature (SigB[NonceA||NonceB]) associated with the first and second nonce. In one embodiment, the external device is configured to verify the first signature (SigB[NonceA||NonceB]) by concatenating a locally stored first nonce (NonceA) with a second plaintext nonce (NonceB) received from the image capture device 200, verifying the first cryptographic signature (SigB[NonceA||NonceB]) with a public device authentication key (e.g., using a DAKB from CertDAKB), and comparing the locally generated concatenation of the first and second nonce with the cryptographically verified concatenation of the first and second nonce. If the external device is unable to determine the validity of the response datagram, the external device may generate an error message, partially or completely disable image capture device 200, and / or block or limit communications to / from image capture device 200.

[0067]

[0072] Additionally, the external device is configured to send an authentication datagram 506 to the image capture device 200 when the response datagram 504 is valid. In an implementation, the authentication datagram 506 includes a second signature (sigA[NonceA||NonceB]) associated with the first and second nonces. In some embodiments, the external device is configured to sign a concatenation of the locally generated first and second nonces with a private key (e.g., a DAK) that is stored locally by the external device. If the response datagram is not valid, the authentication datagram 506 may be replaced with a “failure” authentication datagram 506 that includes a signature associated with the second nonce and an error report (e.g., “failure”) message (sigA[NonceA||Error]) generated by the external device.

[0068]

[0073] In response to authentication datagram 506, image capture device 200 may be further configured to send a reply authentication datagram 508 to the external device. In an implementation, reply authentication datagram 508 includes a signature associated with the first nonce and an error report (e.g., “success” or “failure”) message (SigB[NonceA||Error]) generated by image capture device 200. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 is configured to validate authentication datagram 506 by verifying a second signature (sigA[NonceA||NonceB]) associated with the first and second nonces. In some embodiments, image capture device 200 is configured to verify the second signature (sigA[NonceA||NonceB]) by concatenating the first plaintext nonce (NonceA) received from the external device and a locally stored second nonce (NonceB), verifying the second cryptographic signature (sigA[NonceA||NonceB]) with a public device authentication key (e.g., using DAKA from CertDAKA), and comparing the locally generated concatenation of the first nonce and the second nonce with the cryptographically verified concatenation of the first nonce and the second nonce. In addition to the error reporting message, image capture device 200 may partially or completely disable the external device and / or block or limit communications to / from the external device when image capture device 200 is unable to determine the validity of the authentication datagram.

[0069]

[0074] In implementations, the roles of image capture device 200 and external device can be reserved, as described above. In some implementations, the external device and the image capture device are arranged according to a "master-slave" configuration, where the master (e.g., an external device) may be configured to authenticate the slave (e.g., image capture device 200). In case of authentication failure, the master may at least partially disable or limit communication to / from the unauthenticated slave. Alternatively, authentication failure may result in partial or complete disablement of both the device or pseudo secondary device. For example, to increase security, the external device (e.g., IOM 104 or CCM 106) and the image capture device 200 may be disabled if they successfully complete an authentication sequence.

[0070]

[0075] Each of the industrial control module elements described herein may include circuitry and / or logic enabled to perform the functions described herein. For example, each industrial control system element (e.g., IOM 104, CCM 106, image capture device 200, etc.) may include a processor configured to execute program instructions stored persistently, semi-persistently, or temporarily on a non-transitory machine-readable medium 108, such as a hard disk drive (HDD), solid state disk (SDD), optical disk, magnetic storage device, flash drive, etc. Furthermore, as noted above, the industrial control system elements described herein may be provisioned with unique security credentials when deployed at birth (e.g., at the manufacturing site) or at the time of use by a key management entity 124 (which may be the same key management entity for all industrial control system elements). These security credentials may be stored within each device (e.g., in encrypted memory). Furthermore, authentication of any operator actions, requests, datagrams, etc. should be performed within the confines of each industrial control system element (e.g., through built-in security mechanisms rather than via an external authenticator). In this regard, intrinsic security can be provided at each level of the industrial control system 100. It can be implemented in layers.

[0071]

[0076] It should be understood that any of the functions described herein may be implemented by hardware (e.g., fixed logic circuitry such as integrated circuits), software, firmware, manual processing, or a combination thereof. That is, the blocks, operations, functions, or steps discussed in the disclosure above generally represent hardware (e.g., fixed logic circuitry such as integrated circuits), software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In an example hardware configuration, the various blocks discussed in the disclosure above may be implemented as an integrated circuit along with other functionality. Such an integrated circuit may include all of the functionality of a given block, system, or circuit, or a portion of the functionality of such blocks, systems, or circuits. Furthermore, elements of a block, system, or circuit may be implemented across multiple integrated circuits. Such integrated circuits may include various integrated circuits, including, but not necessarily limited to, monolithic integrated circuits, flip-flop integrated circuits, multi-chip module integrated circuits, and / or mixed signal integrated circuits. In an example software implementation, the various blocks discussed in the disclosure above represent executable instructions (e.g., program code) that, when executed on a processor, perform specified tasks. These executable instructions may be stored on one or more tangible computer-readable media. In some such instances, the entire system, block, or circuit may be implemented using its software or firmware equivalents, In other instances, portions of a given system, block, or circuit may be implemented in software or firmware, while other portions may be realized in hardware.

[0072]

[0077] Although the subject matter has been described above in language specific to structural features and / or process acts, it should be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features and acts described above. Rather, the specific features and acts described above are disclosed as example forms of implementing the claims.

Claims

1. 1. An image capture device for a secure industrial control system, comprising: A sensor; a signal processor coupled to the sensor; a controller that manages the signal processor to transmit packetized data associated with the processed signal via a communication interface to at least one of an input / output module (IOM) or a communication / control module (CCM); the communications interface couples the controller to the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module; the controller is configured to establish an encrypted tunnel between the controller and the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module based on a unique security credential of the image capture device and a unique security credential of the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module. A controller; during an authentication sequence of the image capture device, functionality of the image capture device may be at least partially disabled within the secure industrial control system upon a determination that at least a portion of the image capture device being authenticated was manufactured or supplied by an entity other than an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the image capture device; An image capture device, wherein runt data packets are injected into gaps between the packetized data transmitted between the sensor and the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module.

2. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein the controller is further configured to perform the authentication sequence with the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module using the unique security certificate of the image capture device and the unique security certificate of the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

3. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein the unique security credentials are provisioned to the image capture device at each manufacturing location from a key management entity.

4. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein the unique security credentials of the image capture device are at least one of modifiable, revoked, or certifiable by a key management entity at a site different from the respective manufacturing location of the image capture device.

5. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein the unique security credential of the image capture device is at least one of modifiable, revocable, or verifiable by at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

6. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein the communication interface is configured to connect the controller, via the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module, to a communication backplane including a serial communication interface and a parallel communication interface.

7. 7. An image capture device as recited in claim 6, wherein the communications interface comprises a Power over Ethernet (POE) port for receiving power supplied by said at least one of said input / output module or said communications / control module.

8. 2. The image capture device of claim 1, wherein one or more of the processed signals comprises spectral data detected by the sensor.

9. 10. The image capture device of claim 8, wherein the controller is configured to transmit the spectral data for monitoring environmental conditions of one or more industrial control systems, including the environmental presence of one or more of fire, dust, smoke, particulates, heat, moisture, high pressure, gas, or radiation.

10. 1. A secure industrial control system, comprising: a communications / control module provisioned with a first unique security credential; an input / output module provisioned with a second unique security credential; a communications backplane that physically and communicatively couples the communications / control modules to the input / output modules; an image capture device provisioned with a third unique security credential, comprising: An image sensor; a signal processor coupled to the image sensor; a controller for managing the signal processor to transmit packetized data associated with a processed image signal via a communications interface to at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module; the communications interface couples the controller to the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module; the controller is configured to establish an encrypted tunnel between the controller and the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module based on the third unique security credential of the image capture device and at least one of the first and second unique security credentials associated with the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module. A controller; an image capture device comprising: during an authentication sequence of the image capture device, functionality of the image capture device may be at least partially disabled within the secure industrial control system upon a determination that at least a portion of the image capture device being authenticated was manufactured or supplied by an entity other than an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the image capture device; A secure industrial control system, wherein runt data packets are injected into gaps between the packetized data transmitted between the image sensor and the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

11. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein the controller is further configured to perform the authentication sequence with the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module based on the third unique security credential of the image capture device and the at least one of the first and second unique security credential associated with the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

12. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein each of the security credentials of at least one of the image capture devices includes a unique security credential provisioned to the image capture device at each manufacturing location from a key management entity.

13. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein the third unique security credential of the image capture device is at least one of modifiable, revocable, or certifiable by a key management entity at a site different from each of the manufacturing locations.

14. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein the third unique security credential of the image capture device is at least one of modifiable, revocable, or verifiable by the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

15. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein the communication interface is configured to connect the controller to the communication backplane via the at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module, the communication backplane including a serial communication interface and a parallel communication interface.

16. 16. The secure industrial control system of claim 15, wherein the communications interface comprises a Power over Ethernet (POE) port for receiving power supplied by the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

17. The secure industrial control system of claim 10 , wherein one or more of the processed image signals comprises spectral data detected by the image sensor.

18. 20. The secure industrial control system of claim 17, wherein the controller is configured to transmit the spectral data to monitor one or more environmental conditions of the industrial control system including the environmental presence of one or more of fire, dust, smoke, particulates, heat, moisture, high pressure, gas, or radiation.

19. 11. The secure industrial control system of claim 10, wherein at least one of the input / output module or the communication / control module is configured to pre-process or post-process the image signal received from the image capture device prior to transmitting the image signal to other industrial elements or network-connected devices of the secure industrial control system.

20. 1. A secure industrial control system, comprising: a communications / control module provisioned with a first unique security credential; an input / output module provisioned with a second unique security credential; a communications backplane physically and communicatively coupling the communications / control modules to the input / output modules, a serial communication interface connecting said input / output module to said communication / control module; a parallel communication interface for separately connecting said input / output modules to said communication / control module; a communications backplane including: an image capture device provisioned with a third unique security credential, comprising: An image sensor; a signal processor coupled to the image sensor; a controller that manages the signal processor to transmit packetized data associated with a processed image signal to at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module via a communications interface, the communications interface coupling the controller to the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module based on the third unique security credential and at least one of the first and second unique security credential associated with the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module; an image capture device comprising: during an authentication sequence of the image capture device, functionality of the image capture device may be at least partially disabled within the secure industrial control system upon a determination that at least a portion of the image capture device being authenticated was manufactured or supplied by an entity other than an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the image capture device; A secure industrial control system, wherein runt data packets are injected into gaps between the packetized data transmitted between the image sensor and the at least one of the input / output module or the communications / control module.

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