Data security processing method, communication device, communication system, storage medium and program product

Abstract

Provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure are a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product. The method is executed by a first node. The method comprises: receiving a first key sent by a second node, wherein the first key is generated by the second node on the basis of a second key, and the first key is used for a first node to generate a third key; and generating the third key, a third node being deployed within a home network. The technical solution provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure enables a terminal to use a generated third key to establish secure communication with a third node, thereby reducing the complexity of communication between the terminal and the third node, and reducing the communication delay; in addition, as a first key is generated by a second node on the basis of a second key used during the first authentication process triggered when the terminal registers with a home network, the generated third key can be applicable to communication between the terminal and the third node deployed within the home network.

Description

Data security processing method, communication device, communication system, storage medium and program product TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product. BACKGROUND

[0002] The sixth generation mobile communication system (6 th Generantion, 6G) architecture needs to streamline network functions (Network Funciton, NF). Streamlining NF has significant advantages in capacity, coverage, signaling overhead, scaling, and energy overhead.

[0003] SUMMARY

[0004] The present disclosure provides a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product.

[0005] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first node, and the method comprises: receiving a first key sent by a second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; generating the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0006] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a second node, and the method comprises: generating a first key based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; sending the first key to a first node; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key, the third key being a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0007] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a terminal, and the method comprises: generating a third key based on a first key; the first key being generated based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by a second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the third key being a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0008] According to a fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a third node, and the method comprises: receiving a fourth message sent by a terminal, the fourth message being an unprotected message; sending, according to the fourth message, a first message to a first node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node; wherein the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

[0009] According to a fifth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a fourth node, and the method comprises: sending fifth information to a second node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for a terminal after successful completion of first authentication on the terminal;

[0010] wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key; the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0011] According to a sixth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a communication system, and the method comprises: generating, by a second node, a first key based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; sending, by the second node, the first key to a first node; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key; generating, by the terminal, the third key based on the first key; sending, by the terminal, a fourth message to a third node, the fourth message being an unprotected message; sending, by the third node according to the fourth message, a first message to the first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node; generating, by the first node, the third key; the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0012] According to a seventh aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a first node, is provided, wherein the network device comprises: a first transceiver module configured to receive a first key sent by a second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; a first processing module configured to generate the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0013] According to an eighth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a second node, is provided, and the network device includes: a second processing module configured to generate a first key based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; and a second transceiver module configured to send the first key to a first node; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0014] According to a ninth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a terminal is provided, and the terminal includes: a third processing module configured to generate a third key based on a first key; the first key is generated based on a second key, and the second key is a key generated by a second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0015] According to a tenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a third node, is provided, and the network device includes: a third transceiver module configured to receive a fourth message sent by a terminal, and the fourth message is an unprotected message; and send a first message to a first node according to the fourth message; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node; the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

[0016] According to an eleventh aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a fourth node, is provided, and the network device includes: a fourth transceiver module configured to send fifth information to a second node, and the fifth information is used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for a terminal after successful completion of first authentication on the terminal; the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the first key is used by a first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0017] According to a twelfth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a communication system is provided, wherein the communication system comprises a terminal, a first node, a second node, a third node and a fourth node, the first node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the second aspect, the terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the third aspect, the third node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the fourth aspect, and the fourth node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the fifth aspect.

[0018] According to a thirteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a communication device, such as the terminal, the network device, comprises one or more processors, wherein the processor is configured to invoke instructions to cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect or the fifth aspect.

[0019] According to a fourteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a storage medium is provided, wherein the storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions run on a communication device, the communication device performs the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect or the fifth aspect.

[0020] According to a fifteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a computer program is provided, the computer program comprises code, and the code is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect or the fifth aspect when executed by a processor.

[0021] In the technical solution provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure, the first node obtains the first key from the second node, and generates the third key for the third node based on the first key, so as to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node by the third key. Based on this, on the one hand, the terminal can directly establish secure communication with the third node, without the need for forwarding through a specific relay node, reducing the dependence on the relay node, reducing the communication complexity between the terminal and the third node, and reducing the communication delay; on the other hand, since the first key is generated by the second node based on the second key used in the first authentication process triggered by the terminal when registering the home network, the third key generated based on the first key can be applied to the communication between the terminal and the third node deployed in the home network.

[0022] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are only exemplary and explanatory, and cannot limit the embodiments of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0023] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated into the specification and constitute a part of the specification, illustrate the embodiments consistent with the present disclosure, and together with the specification, serve to explain the principles of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0024] FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of an architecture of a communication system according to an example embodiment;

[0025] FIG. 1B is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture according to an example embodiment;

[0026] FIG. 1C is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture according to an example embodiment;

[0027] FIG. 1D is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy in a 5G network according to an example embodiment;

[0028] FIG. 2A is a schematic diagram of interactions of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0029] FIG. 2B is a schematic diagram of interactions of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0030] FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0031] FIG. 3B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0032] FIG. 4A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0033] FIG. 4B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0034] FIG. 4C is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0035] FIG. 5A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0036] FIG. 5B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0037] FIG. 5C is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0038] FIG. 6A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0039] FIG. 6B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0040] FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0041] FIG. 8 is an interaction diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0042] FIG. 9A is a key hierarchy diagram according to an example embodiment;

[0043] FIG. 9B is an interaction diagram illustrating generation of a key K NASA during a first authentication process according to an example embodiment;

[0044] FIG. 9C is an interaction diagram illustrating NAS security establishment by NAS AF to generate a key according to an example embodiment;

[0045] FIG. 10A is a structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0046] FIG. 10B is a structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0047] FIG. 10C is a structural diagram of a terminal according to an example embodiment;

[0048] FIG. 10D is a structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0049] FIG. 10E is a structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0050] FIG. 11A is a structural diagram of a communication device according to an example embodiment;

[0051] FIG. 11B is a structural diagram of a chip according to an example embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0052] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium, and a program product.

[0053] In a first aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is performed by a first node, and the method comprises: receiving a first key sent by a second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key being an authentication key used by the second node in a first authentication process of a terminal; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; generating the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0054] In the above embodiments, the first node obtains the first key from the second node, and generates the third key for the third node based on the first key, so as to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node by the third key. Based on this, on one hand, the terminal can directly establish secure communication with the third node, without the need of forwarding through a specific relay node, reducing the dependence on the relay node, reducing the communication complexity between the terminal and the third node, and reducing the communication delay; on the other hand, since the first key is generated by the second node based on the second key used in the first authentication process triggered by the terminal when registering the home network, the third key generated based on the first key can be applied to the communication between the terminal and the third node deployed in the home network.

[0055] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0056] receiving a first message sent by the third node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node.

[0057] In the above embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by the third node, and generates the third key for the requested third node by using the first key in response to the request of the third node. Since the third key is a root key, the requested third node can generate a key applied to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node by the third key generated by the first node.

[0058] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information, the first information being used to identify the terminal; and second information, the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

[0059] In the above embodiments, by carrying the first information and / or the second information in the first message, the first node can obtain the input parameters for generating the third key, so as to generate the third key for the third node.

[0060] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the first message carries third information, the third information comprising at least one of: a type of the third node; and an instance identifier ID of the third node.

[0061] In the above embodiments, after receiving the first message, the first node obtains the type and / or the instance ID of the third node sending the first message according to the third information carried in the first message, so as to take the type and / or the instance ID of the third node as input parameters when generating the third key subsequently, thereby making the third keys generated by the first node for different third nodes different, so as to realize the isolation of the communication security between the terminal and different third nodes.

[0062] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the third key is generated according to one of: the first key, the second information, and a type of the third node; the first key, the second information, and an instance ID of the third node; the first key, the fourth information, and the type of the third node; the fourth information is used to indicate a generation period of the third key; the first key, the fourth information, and the instance ID of the third node.

[0063] In the above embodiments, different implementation manners of generating the third key based on the type or the instance ID of the third node, the first key, the second information, and the fourth information are given. By introducing the count value of the uplink message sent by the terminal to the third node and the generation period of the third key in the process of generating the third key, the third key generated by the terminal and the third node is different at different time periods, thereby further improving the security of the communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0064] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: sending a second message to the third node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message including the third key; the third key is used by the third node to generate a fourth key, the fourth key being used to protect the security of the communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0065] In the above embodiments, after the third key is generated, the generated third key is sent to the third node by using the second message to respond to the first message sent by the third node. In this way, the third node can generate a key used to protect the security of the communication between the terminal and the third node based on the received third key as a root key.

[0066] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: storing the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0067] In the above embodiments, the first node stores the first key and the identification of the terminal corresponding to the first key, so that in subsequent generation of the third key by the first node, the stored first key can be used to generate a root key (i.e., the third key) for the third node to protect the security of the communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0068] In some embodiments of the first aspect, in some embodiments, the first key sent by the second node is received by: receiving a third message sent by the second node, the third message being used to request the first node to store the first key of the terminal; the third message including the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0069] In the above embodiments, the first node obtains the first key and the identity of the terminal corresponding to the first key sent by the second node by receiving the third message sent by the second node, so that the first node can store the first key and the identity of the terminal corresponding to the first key.

[0070] In a second aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is performed by a second node, and the method comprises: generating a first key based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; and sending the first key to a first node; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0071] In the above embodiments, the second node generates the first key for the terminal by using the second key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal, and sends the generated first key to the first node, so that the first node can generate the third key for the third node deployed in the home network based on the first key, thereby protecting the security of communication between the terminal and the third node by using the third key. Based on this, the terminal can directly establish secure communication with the third node in the home network. Moreover, the second node provides the first key to the first node, so that the generation task of the third key can be performed by the first node, thereby protecting the security of communication between the terminal and the third node by using the third key while reducing the impact on the normal work of the second node.

[0072] In combination with some embodiments of the second aspect, in some embodiments, generating the first key based on the second key comprises one of: generating the first key based on the second key and first information; the first information is used to identify the terminal; and generating the first key based on the second key, the first information and a first string; the first string indicates the use of the first key.

[0073] The above embodiments give multiple different implementation manners of generating the first key based on the second key, the first information and the first string. By introducing the first information and the first string in the process of generating the first key, the second node generates different first keys for different terminals and different communication uses of the same terminal, so that the third key generated based on the first key is also different, and thus the communication security can be isolated when the terminal communicates with the third node by using the respective third key.

[0074] In combination with some embodiments of the second aspect, in some embodiments, sending the first key to the first node comprises: sending a third message to the first node, the third message being used to request the first node to store the first key; and the third message comprises the first key and the identity of the terminal.

[0075] In some embodiments of the second aspect, in some embodiments, the generating the first key based on the second key comprises: receiving fifth information sent by the fourth node, the fifth information being used to indicate that the second node generates the first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; and generating the first key based on the second key according to the fifth information.

[0076] In the above embodiments, in the case that the second node receives the fifth information sent by the fourth node, the second node generates the first key for the terminal based on at least the second key in response to the fifth information. In this way, the second node is triggered by the fourth node to generate the first key through the fifth information, thereby reducing the case that the second node does not generate the first key for the terminal when the terminal needs to communicate with the third node.

[0077] In some embodiments of the second aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending sixth information to the terminal, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal generates the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed; and the first key being used by the terminal to generate the third key.

[0078] In the above embodiments, in the case that the second node generates the first key for the terminal, the second node can send the sixth information to the terminal to trigger the terminal to generate the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed, so that the terminal can generate the third key based on the first key to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node by using the third key.

[0079] In some embodiments of the second aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

[0080] In the above embodiments, the fifth information is carried in the response message of the existing terminal authentication information acquisition request message, thereby reducing the signaling overhead.

[0081] In a third aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is executed by a terminal, and the method comprises: generating a third key based on a first key; wherein the first key is generated based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by a second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the third key being a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0082] In the above embodiments, the terminal generates the first key by using the second key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication on the terminal, and generates the third key based on at least the first key, thereby protecting the communication security between the terminal and the third node by using the third key. Based on this, the terminal can directly establish a secure communication with the third node in the home network.

[0083] In some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises one of: generating the first key based on the second key and the first information, the first information being used to identify the terminal; generating the first key based on the second key, the first information, and the first string, the first string indicating a use of the first key.

[0084] In some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, generating the third key based on the first key comprises one of: generating the third key according to the first key, the second information, and a type of the third node, the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, the second information, and an instance ID of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, the fourth information, and a type of the third node, the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the third key; generating the third key according to the first key, the fourth information, and an instance ID of the third node.

[0085] In some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: receiving sixth information sent by the second node, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal generates the first key after a first authentication is successfully completed.

[0086] In some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending, to the third node, a fourth message, the fourth message being an unprotected message, the fourth message being used for the third node to determine a first security algorithm, the first security algorithm being used for the terminal to generate a fourth key, the fourth key being used to protect a communication security between the terminal and the third node.

[0087] In the above embodiments, the terminal sends the unprotected fourth message to the third node, so that the fourth message can be interpreted by the third node without a security context, thereby enabling the third node to select the first security algorithm based on the unprotected fourth message, implementing a security algorithm negotiation between the third node and the terminal, so as to generate the fourth key based on the negotiated first security algorithm, and protecting the communication security between the terminal and the third node by the fourth key.

[0088] In some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the fourth message comprises at least one of: the first information, used to identify the terminal; the second information, used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; and seventh information, used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0089] In the above embodiments, the fourth message carries at least one of the first information, the second information and the seventh information, so that the third node receiving the fourth message can determine the first security algorithm and / or obtain the input parameter for generating the third key; thereby facilitating the third node to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node based on the input parameter; and facilitating the third node to generate the fourth key based on the determined first security algorithm and the third key, and the fourth key is used to protect the security of the communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0090] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a fifth message sent by the third node; determining the first security algorithm according to the fifth message; and generating the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0091] In the above embodiments, the terminal receives the fifth message sent by the third node, and on the one hand, learns the first security algorithm selected by the third node based on the fifth message, and completes the security algorithm negotiation between the terminal and the third node; and generates the fourth key based on the negotiated first security algorithm and the third key; thereby establishing the shared security context between the terminal and the third node.

[0092] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third node using the fourth key.

[0093] In the above embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third node using the fourth key, so that after the terminal generates the fourth key, the terminal can use the generated fourth key to perform integrity verification on the fifth message, and verify the establishment of the shared security context between the terminal and the third node; thereby improving the success of establishing the shared security context between the terminal and the third node.

[0094] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth message includes at least one of the following: the seventh information, used to indicate the first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the terminal; and the eighth information, used to identify the first security algorithm.

[0095] In the above embodiments, by carrying the seventh information and / or the eighth information in the fifth message, the terminal can learn the first security algorithm selected by the third node, and complete the security algorithm negotiation between the terminal and the third node.

[0096] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: protecting a sixth message using the fourth key; and sending the sixth message to the third node, the sixth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm.

[0097] In the above embodiment, after the terminal generates the fourth key, the sixth message can be protected by the fourth key, and the sixth message is sent to the third node, so that the third node knows that the terminal and the third node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm; so that the terminal can directly communicate with the third node subsequently.

[0098] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, in some embodiments, the sixth message comprises a Non Access Stratum (NAS) message; and the method further comprises: receiving a seventh message sent by the third node, the seventh message being a response message of the NAS message; and the seventh message being a message protected by the fourth key.

[0099] In the above embodiment, in the case that the terminal multiplexes the sixth message to carry the NAS message, the terminal can receive the seventh message sent by the third node, the seventh message being a response message of the third node to the NAS message; in this way, the terminal realizes one-time communication with the third node, and the sixth message and the seventh message are protected by the third key, which is conducive to improving the communication security between the terminal and the third node.

[0100] In the fourth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is performed by a third node, and the method comprises: receiving a fourth message sent by a terminal, the fourth message being an unprotected message; and sending a first message to a first node according to the fourth message, the first message being used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node; wherein the third key is a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

[0101] In the above embodiment, since the security context between the terminal and the third node in the home network has not been established, the third node can receive the unprotected fourth message sent by the terminal, and send the first message to the first node according to the unprotected fourth message, to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node by using the first key obtained from the second node; so that the third node can protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node based on the third key. In this way, the third node in the home network directly establishes the communication security with the terminal.

[0102] In combination with some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: determining a first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate the fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node.

[0103] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the fourth message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate the first count value, the first count value used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; and seventh information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0104] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the determining the first security algorithm according to the fourth message comprises: determining the first security algorithm according to the seventh information and ninth information, the ninth information used to indicate a second capability of the third node, the second capability used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the third node.

[0105] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; and second information used to indicate the first count value, the first count value used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

[0106] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: receiving a second message sent by the first node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising a third key; and generating a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0107] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending a fifth message to the terminal, the fifth message used by the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0108] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third node using the fourth key.

[0109] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth message comprises at least one of: seventh information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal; and eighth information used to identify the first security algorithm.

[0110] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: receiving a sixth message sent by the terminal, the sixth message used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm, the sixth message being a message that is protected by the terminal using the fourth key.

[0111] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the sixth message comprises a NAS message; and the method further comprises: determining a seventh message according to the NAS message, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; protecting the seventh message using the fourth key; and sending the seventh message to the terminal.

[0112] In a fifth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is performed by a fourth node, and the method comprises: sending fifth information to a second node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for a terminal after successfully completing first authentication of the terminal; wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0113] In the above embodiment, the fifth information is used to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal after successfully completing the first authentication of the terminal by using the second key used in the first authentication process, so that when the terminal needs to directly communicate with the third node, the first node can generate the third key for the third node by using the first key obtained from the second node, to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node by using the third key. In this way, the terminal can directly establish communication security with the third node in the home network.

[0114] In combination with some embodiments of the fifth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: determining whether to send the fifth information according to subscription information of the terminal; or determining whether to send the fifth information according to local configuration information.

[0115] In the above embodiment, the fourth node can determine whether to send the fifth information to the second node to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal according to the respective subscription information of the terminals, so that it is analyzed for each terminal whether it is necessary to send the fifth information, thereby reducing unnecessary generation of the first key by the second node. Alternatively, the third node determines whether to send the fifth information to the second node to instruct the second node to generate the first key for all terminals in the home network according to the local configuration information, without the need to instruct each terminal individually, thereby reducing information overhead.

[0116] In combination with some embodiments of the fifth aspect, in some embodiments, the fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

[0117] In a sixth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, wherein the method is performed by a communication system, and the method comprises: generating, by a second node, a first key based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; sending, by the second node, the first key to a first node; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key; generating, by the terminal, the third key based on at least the first key; sending, by the terminal, a fourth message to a third node; the fourth message is an unprotected message; sending, by the third node, a first message to the first node according to the fourth message; the first message is used to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node; generating, by the first node, the third key; the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0118] With reference to some embodiments of the sixth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending, by the first node, a second message to the third node; the second message is a response message of the first message, and the second message comprises the third key; determining, by the third node, a first security algorithm according to the fourth message; the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate a fourth key; and generating, by the third node, the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm; the fourth key is used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0119] With reference to some embodiments of the sixth aspect, in some embodiments, the second node generates the first key based on the second key, comprising one of: generating the first key based on the second key and first information; the first information is used to identify the terminal; generating the first key based on the second key, the first information and a first string; and the first string indicates the use of the first key.

[0120] With reference to some embodiments of the sixth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending, by a fourth node, fifth information to the second node; the fifth information is used to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; and generating, by the second node, the first key based on the second key, comprising: generating, by the second node, the first key based on the second key according to the fifth information.

[0121] With reference to some embodiments of the sixth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further comprises: sending, by the second node, sixth information to the terminal; the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to generate the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed; and the first key is used by the terminal to generate the third key.

[0122] In a seventh aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a network device, such as a first node, which includes: a first transceiver configured to receive a first key sent by a second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; a first processing module configured to generate the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0123] In an eighth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a network device, such as a second node, which includes: a second processing module configured to generate a first key based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; and a second transceiver configured to send the first key to a first node; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; the third key being a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0124] In a ninth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a terminal, which includes: a third processing module configured to generate a third key based on a first key; the first key being generated based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by a second node when performing first authentication on the terminal; and the third key being a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0125] In a tenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a network device, such as a third node, which includes: a third transceiver configured to receive a fourth message sent by a terminal, the fourth message being an unprotected message; and according to the fourth message, send a first message to a first node; the first message being used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node; the third key being a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node being deployed in a home network; the third key being generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key being obtained by the first node from a second node; the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

[0126] In a eleventh aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a network device, such as a fourth node, wherein the network device comprises: a fourth transceiver configured to send fifth information to the second node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication on the terminal; and the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0127] In a twelfth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication system, wherein the communication system comprises a terminal, a first node, a second node, a third node, and a fourth node, the first node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect and the embodiments thereof, the second node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the second aspect and the embodiments thereof, the terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the third aspect and the embodiments thereof, the third node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the fourth aspect and the embodiments thereof, and the fourth node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the fifth aspect and the embodiments thereof.

[0128] In a thirteenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication device, comprising: one or more processors; wherein the processor is used to invoke instructions to make the communication device execute the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0129] In a fourteenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a storage medium, wherein the storage medium stores instructions, when the instructions are run on a communication device, the communication device executes the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0130] In a fifteenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer program product, when the computer program product is executed by a communication device, the communication device executes the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0131] In combination with at least one of the thirteenth aspect, the fourteenth aspect, and the fifteenth aspect described above, the communication device can be a terminal or a network device. In an embodiment, the network device can be at least one of the first node, the second node, the third node, and the fourth node.

[0132] In a sixteenth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a computer program which, when running on a computer, causes the computer to execute the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect or the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect, and embodiments thereof.

[0133] In combination with some embodiments of the above sixteenth aspect, the computer can be the communication device in one or more of the above embodiments.

[0134] It can be understood that the terminal, the first node, the second node, the third node, the fourth node, the communication device, the communication system, the storage medium, the program product, and the computer program are all used to execute the method provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure. Therefore, the beneficial effects that can be achieved thereby can refer to the beneficial effects in the corresponding method, which will not be described here again.

[0135] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium, and a program product. In some embodiments, the data security processing method and the information processing method, the information transmission method, and the like can be replaced with each other, and the communication system and the information processing system can be replaced with each other.

[0136] The embodiments of the present disclosure are not exhaustive, but are only a part of the embodiments, and are not specific limitations on the protection scope of the present disclosure. In the case of no contradiction, each step in an embodiment can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and the steps can be combined arbitrarily, for example, the scheme after removing some steps in an embodiment can also be implemented as an independent embodiment, and the order of the steps in an embodiment can be exchanged arbitrarily, in addition, the optional implementation manners in an embodiment can be combined arbitrarily; in addition, the embodiments can be combined arbitrarily, for example, the steps of different embodiments or part or all of the steps of different embodiments can be combined arbitrarily, an embodiment can be combined with the optional implementation manners of other embodiments.

[0137] In each of the embodiments of the present disclosure, the terms and / or descriptions of the embodiments are consistent and can be referred to each other if there is no special description and logical conflict, and the technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form a new embodiment according to their inherent logical relationship.

[0138] The terms used in the embodiments of the present disclosure are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and not as a limitation on the present disclosure.

[0139] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, an element expressed in singular form, such as "a", "an", "the", "said", "above", "preceding", "this", and the like, unless otherwise specified, can represent "one and only one", or can represent "one or more", "at least one", and the like. For example, in the case of using articles such as "a", "an", "the" in English, the noun after the article can be understood as a singular expression, or can be understood as a plural expression.

[0140] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, "plurality" refers to two or more.

[0141] In some embodiments, the terms "at least one of", "one or more of", "a plurality of", "multiple", and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0142] In some embodiments, the description modes such as "at least one of A, B", "A and / or B", "A in one case, B in another case", "one case A, another case B", and the like can include the following technical solutions according to the case: A is executed in some embodiments (A is executed regardless of B); B is executed in some embodiments (B is executed regardless of A); A and B are selectively executed in some embodiments (A and B are selected to be executed); A and B are executed in some embodiments (A and B are both executed). When there are more branches such as A, B, C, and the like, it is similar to the above.

[0143] In some embodiments, the description modes such as "A or B" and the like can include the following technical solutions according to the case: A is executed in some embodiments (A is executed regardless of B); B is executed in some embodiments (B is executed regardless of A); A and B are selectively executed in some embodiments (A and B are selected to be executed). When there are more branches such as A, B, C, and the like, it is similar to the above.

[0144] The prefix words of "first", "second" and the like in the embodiments of the present disclosure are merely used to distinguish different description objects, and do not constitute limitation on the position, order, priority, quantity or content of the description objects. The description objects are described in the claims or embodiments in the context of the description, and should not be construed as redundant limitation because of the use of the prefix words. For example, the ordinal words in front of the description objects "field" in "first field" and "second field" do not limit the position or order between the "fields", and "first" and "second" do not limit whether the "fields" modified thereby are in the same message or not, nor limit the order of "first field" and "second field". For another example, the ordinal words in front of the description objects "level" in "first level" and "second level" do not limit the priority between the "levels". For another example, the quantity of the description objects is not limited by the ordinal words, and can be one or more. For example, "first device", wherein the quantity of "device" can be one or more. In addition, the objects modified by different prefix words can be the same or different, for example, the description objects are "device", and "first device" and "second device" can be the same device or different devices, and the types thereof can be the same or different; for another example, the description objects are "information", and "first information" and "second information" can be the same information or different information, and the contents thereof can be the same or different.

[0145] In some embodiments, "including A", "containing A", "for indicating A", "carrying A" can be interpreted as directly carrying A, or indirectly indicating A.

[0146] In some embodiments, the terms of "…", "determining …", "in the case of …", "when …", "when …", "if …", "if …" and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0147] In some embodiments, the terms of "greater than", "greater than or equal to", "not less than", "more than", "more than or equal to", "not less than", "higher than", "higher than or equal to", "not lower than", "above" and the like can be replaced with each other, and the terms of "less than", "less than or equal to", "not greater than", "less than", "less than or equal to", "not more than", "lower than", "lower than or equal to", "not higher than", "below" and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0148] In some embodiments, the apparatus and the like can be interpreted as physical or virtual, and the name thereof is not limited to the name recorded in the embodiments. The terms of "apparatus", "equipment", "device", "circuit", "network element", "node", "function", "unit", "section", "system", "network", "chip", "chip system", "entity", "subject" and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0149] In some embodiments, “network” can be interpreted as the devices (e.g., access network devices, core network devices, etc.) included in the network.

[0150] In some embodiments, the terms “access network device (AN device),” “radio access network device (RAN device),” “base station (BS),” “radio base station,” “fixed station,” “node,” “access point,” “transmission point (TP),” “reception point (RP),” “transmission / reception point (TRP),” “panel,” “antenna panel,” “antenna array,” “cell,” “macro cell,” “small cell,” “femto cell,” “pico cell,” “sector,” “cell group,” “serving cell,” “carrier,” “component carrier,” “bandwidth part (BWP),” and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0151] In some embodiments, the terms "terminal," "terminal device," "user equipment (UE)," "user terminal," "mobile station (MS)," "mobile terminal (MT)," "subscriber station," "mobile unit," "subscriber unit," "wireless unit," "remote unit," "mobile device," "wireless device," "wireless communication device," "remote device," "mobile subscriber station," "access terminal," "mobile terminal," "wireless terminal," "remote terminal," "handset," "user agent," "mobile client," "client," and so on can be replaced with each other.

[0152] In some embodiments, the access network device, the core network device, or the network device can be replaced with a terminal. For example, the embodiments of the present disclosure can also be applied to a structure in which communication between the access network device, the core network device, or the network device and the terminal is replaced with communication between a plurality of terminals (e.g., device-to-device (D2D), vehicle-to-everything (V2X), etc.). In this case, the terminal can also be configured to have all or part of the functions of the access network device. In addition, the terms "uplink," "downlink," and the like can also be replaced with terms corresponding to the inter-terminal communication (e.g., "side"). For example, the uplink channel, the downlink channel, and the like can be replaced with the side channel, and the uplink, the downlink, and the like can be replaced with the sidelink.

[0153] In some embodiments, the terminal can be replaced with the access network device, the core network device, or the network device. In this case, the access network device, the core network device, or the network device can also be configured to have all or part of the functions of the terminal.

[0154] In some embodiments, the data, information, etc. can be obtained in compliance with the laws and regulations of the country in which the location is situated.

[0155] In some embodiments, the data, information, etc. can be obtained after obtaining the consent of the user.

[0156] In addition, each element, each row, or each column in the table of the embodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and any combination of any element, any row, or any column can also be implemented as an independent embodiment.

[0157] FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of an architecture of a communication system according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0158] As shown in FIG. 1A, the communication system 100 includes a terminal 101 and a network device 102. In an embodiment, the network device 102 can include at least one of an access network device and a core network device.

[0159] In some embodiments, the terminal 101 includes at least one of a mobile phone, a wearable device, an Internet of Things device, a communication-capable automobile, a smart automobile, a Pad, a computer with wireless transceiver function, a virtual reality (VR) terminal device, an augmented reality (AR) terminal device, a wireless terminal device in industrial control, a wireless terminal device in self-driving, a wireless terminal device in remote medical surgery, a wireless terminal device in a smart grid, a wireless terminal device in transportation safety, a wireless terminal device in a smart city, a wireless terminal device in a smart home, etc., but is not limited thereto.

[0160] In some embodiments, the access network device, which can be at least one of an eNB, an ng-eNB, a gNB, a node B (NB), an HNB, an HeNB, a wireless backhaul device, a radio network controller (RNC), a base station controller (BSC), a base transceiver station (BTS), a base band unit (BBU), a mobile switching center, a base station in a 6G communication system, an Open RAN, a Cloud RAN, a base station in other communication systems, an access node in a Wi-Fi system, or the like, can access a terminal to a wireless network.

[0161] In some embodiments, the technical solutions of the present disclosure can be applied to an Open RAN architecture, in which the interfaces between or within the access network devices involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can become internal interfaces of the Open RAN, and the processes and information interactions between these internal interfaces can be implemented through software or programs.

[0162] In some embodiments, the access network device can be composed of a central unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU), where the CU can also be referred to as a control unit. The CU-DU structure can split the protocol layers of the access network device, and some of the protocol layers can be controlled by the CU, while the remaining protocol layers or all the protocol layers can be distributed in the DU and controlled by the CU.

[0163] In some embodiments, the core network device can be one device including one or more network elements, or a plurality of devices or device groups each including one or more network elements. The network element can be virtual or physical. The core network can include at least one of an Evolved Packet Core (EPC), a 5G Core Network (5GCN), and a Next Generation Core (NGC).

[0164] In some embodiments, the core network can include a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) and a home public land mobile network (HPLMN).

[0165] In some embodiments, the public land mobile network (PLMN) to which the terminal is subscribed can also be referred to as the HPLMN, i.e., the home network of the terminal. When the terminal leaves the coverage of the HPLMN and enters the coverage of another PLMN due to movement or other reasons, the terminal can access the PLMN and be served by the PLMN. Thus, the PLMN accessed by the terminal can be referred to as the VPLMN.

[0166] In some embodiments, in a non-roaming scenario, i.e., the terminal is in the coverage of the HPLMN and is served by the HPLMN, the serving network and the home network of the terminal are the same PLMN.

[0167] In some embodiments, in a roaming scenario, i.e., the terminal is not in the coverage of the HPLMN and is served by the VPLMN, the serving network and the home network of the terminal are different PLMNs.

[0168] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, the third node, and the fourth node can be core network devices.

[0169] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, the third node, and the fourth node can be different network elements of core network devices.

[0170] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, the third node, and the fourth node can be deployed in the HPLMN.

[0171] In some embodiments, the first node can be configured to configure a root key for protecting the communication between the NFs in the HPLMN and the terminal.

[0172] In some embodiments, the first node can be a standalone node deployed in the HPLMN.

[0173] In some embodiments, the first node can be configured together with a security anchor function (SEAF) in the HPLMN.

[0174] In some embodiments, the name of the first node is not limited, for example, it can be a communication security anchor function, a communication key configuration function, etc. In some embodiments, the second node can be used to provide terminal authentication services.

[0175] In some embodiments, the second node is used to protect the configuration parameters or subscription parameters between the HPLMN and the terminal.

[0176] In some embodiments, the name of the second node is not limited, for example, it can be an authentication service function (AUSF), an authentication service function, etc.

[0177] In some embodiments, the third node can be any node in the HPLMN except the access and mobility management function (AMF). For example, the third node can be a policy control function (PCF), a unified data management (UDM), a location management function (LMF), etc.

[0178] In some embodiments, the fourth node can be used to provide management and storage of data related to users.

[0179] In some embodiments, the fourth node can be used to store user identifiers, security contexts, subscription data, etc. of the subscription users in the HPLMN. In an example, the user identifier of the subscription user can be a subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI).

[0180] In some embodiments, the name of the fourth node is not limited, for example, it can be a unified data management (UDM), a user data management, etc.

[0181] It can be understood that the communication system described in the embodiments of the present disclosure is for more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure, and does not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure. It can be known by those skilled in the art that, with the evolution of system architecture and the appearance of new business scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0182] The following embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to the communication system 100 illustrated in FIG. 1A, or part of the subjects, but are not limited thereto. The subjects illustrated in FIG. 1A are examples, and the communication system can include all or part of the subjects in FIG. 1A, or other subjects other than those in FIG. 1A. The number and form of each subject is arbitrary, and the connection relationship between the subjects is an example. The subjects can not be connected or can be connected, and the connection can be in any manner, can be direct connection or indirect connection, and can be wired connection or wireless connection.

[0183] Embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), LTE-Beyond (LTE-B), SUPER 3G, IMT-Advanced, 4th generation mobile communication system (4G), 5th generation mobile communication system (5G), 6th generation mobile communication system (6G), 5G new radio (NR), Future Radio Access (FRA), New-Radio Access Technology (RAT), New Radio (NR), New radio access (NX), Future generation radio access (FX), Global System for Mobile communications (GSM (registered trademark)), CDMA2000, Ultra Mobile Broadband (UMB), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.20, Ultra-WideBand (UWB), Bluetooth (Bluetooth (registered trademark)), Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) network, Device-to-Device (D2D) system, Machine to Machine (M2M) system, Internet of Things (IoT) system, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), system using other communication methods, next-generation system expanded based on them, or the like. Further, a plurality of systems can be applied in combination (for example, combination of LTE or LTE-A and 5G, or the like).

[0184] In some embodiments, network functions (NFs) in the 6G architecture above are streamlined in order to significantly improve performance in terms of capacity, coverage, signaling overhead, scalability, and energy consumption, etc. Dependencies between NFs can lead to unnecessary complexity and even delays. By redesigning the network functions, the number of dependencies and processing points is reduced.

[0185] In an embodiment, the possibility of direct signaling between enhanced NFs of the 6G system is exploited in order to eliminate potential bottlenecks. For example, many services require information to be transmitted from a fifth generation mobile communication core network (5G Core, 5GC) to a terminal via a New Generation-Radio Access Netork (NG-RAN) node. In the 5GC, the information needs to be passed through the AMF to the NG-RAN node, for example, other NFs than the AMF (e.g. LMF, PCF, etc.) transmit information through the interface between this NF and the AMF and the interface between the AMF and the NG-RAN node. In this case, the AMF can be considered as a relay node, while the transmitted information rarely needs to even does not need to involve the AMF. In order to simplify such transmissions, the introduction of service-based interfaces (SBI) to the NG-RAN will allow this information to be exchanged directly between the NG-RAN and the NFs without going through the AMF. th Generation Core, 5GC) to a terminal via a New Generation-Radio Access Netork (NG-RAN) node. In the 5GC, the information needs to be passed through the AMF to the NG-RAN node, for example, other NFs than the AMF (e.g. LMF, PCF, etc.) transmit information through the interface between this NF and the AMF and the interface between the AMF and the NG-RAN node. In this case, the AMF can be considered as a relay node, while the transmitted information rarely needs to even does not need to involve the AMF. In order to simplify such transmissions, the introduction of service-based interfaces (SBI) to the NG-RAN will allow this information to be exchanged directly between the NG-RAN and the NFs without going through the AMF.

[0186] In some embodiments, if the RAN is developed in a service-oriented direction, it means that the RAN node can be a consumer or producer that provides services for other network functions except for the AMF. In the 5G system, only NAS signaling is supported between the terminal and the AMF of the core network. Generally, the NAS signaling is transparently transmitted through the RAN node. If the RAN can be enhanced to directly communicate with other core NFs without going through the AMF, it means that NAS signaling needs to be supported between the terminal and other core NFs in addition to the AMF. Therefore, a 6G multi-NAS architecture can be enabled so that the RAN node can directly communicate with any NF through a service interface, and the terminal can directly communicate with any NF using NAS signaling. As shown in FIG. IB, FIG. IB is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture I according to an exemplary embodiment. In FIG. IB, the four solid lines circled by the dashed line represent the service interfaces between the RAN node and the four different NFs (for the sake of easy distinction, the four different NFs are defined as NFa, NFb, NFc, and NFx) in the core network; since the service interface is arranged between the RAN node and the NFs in the core network, the service interface can be referred to as a RAN-CORE service interface. The four solid lines circled by the solid line represent the transmission paths of the NAS signaling between the terminal and the four different NFs (i.e., NFa, NFb, NFc, and NFx) in the core network. It can be understood that the terminal can directly communicate with any NF in the core network through NAS, without the need to relay through other NFs in the core network.

[0187] Exemplarily, as shown in FIG. 1C, FIG. 1C is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture II according to an exemplary embodiment. As can be known from FIG. 1C, the UE has multiple NAS instances, specifically referring to NAS-NFx, NAS-NFy, and NAS-NFz in the UE in FIG. 1C; and the multiple NFs in the core network also have corresponding NAS instances corresponding to the UE, so that the UE can directly communicate with the corresponding NF in the core network through the NAS instance; for example, the UE can directly communicate with NFx in the core network through the NAS-NFx instance; or the UE can directly communicate with NFy in the core network through the NAS-NFy instance.

[0188] However, the NAS security of the NAS signaling is only supported by the terminal and the AMF. As shown in FIG. ID, FIG. ID is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy in a 5G network according to an exemplary embodiment. In FIG. ID, k, CK, and IK are authentication-related keys. CK' and IK' are keys derived based on CK and IK, and CK' and IK' are keys suitable for the EAP-AKA' authentication mode. K AUSF is an authentication key used in a home network; K SEAF is an authentication key used in a home network; KAUSF The derived key is provided by AUSF to the SEAF in the serving network. The terminal and SEAF are based on K. SEAF Derivation of the root key (K) for protecting NAS communication security between the terminal and the core network. AMF ), K AMF NAS integrity key K derived for terminal and AMF NASint and / or NAS confidentiality protection key K NASenc Furthermore, no other core NF can derive the NAS security key. Other keys in Figure 1D, such as the key K between the terminal and the base station, are also relevant. gNB Key K used to protect user plane services UPenc and K UPint Key K used to protect Radio Resource Control (RRC) messages RRCint and K RRCenc and for non-third-generation partnership programs (3 rd The key K for accessing the Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) N3IWF All are directly or indirectly based on K AMF Derived from.

[0189] As shown in Figure 1D, because the current key hierarchy design does not support NAS security for other core NFs, it cannot protect NAS signaling between the terminal and other core NFs. Without protecting the NAS signaling between the terminal and the NF, there is a risk that the NAS signaling information will be tampered with or eavesdropped on when the RAN node forwarding the NAS signaling is attacked.

[0190] In some embodiments, the key hierarchy is based on the root key derived from the SEAF residing in the serving network. However, for NAS signaling between the terminal and NFs (e.g., PCF, UDM, etc.) residing in the home network, the root key derived in the serving network will no longer be applicable to the NFs in the home network. Therefore, for 6G multi-NAS architectures, it is necessary to investigate how to implement security protection between the terminal and NFs in the home network.

[0191] Figure 2A is an interactive schematic diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in Figure 2A, this disclosure relates to a data security processing method, which can be applied to a communication system 100. The method includes:

[0192] Step S2101: The second node generates the first key based at least on the second key.

[0193] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the first key according to the second key, and at least one of the first information and the first string.

[0194] In some embodiments, the second key can be an input key of a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and at least one of the first information and the first string can be a generation parameter of the first key, and the input key and the generation parameter are input into the KDF to generate the first key.

[0195] In some embodiments, the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication of the terminal. In an example, in the case that the second node is an AUSF, the second key can be K AUSF .

[0196] In some embodiments, the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication process of the terminal.

[0197] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the first key based at least on the second key after successfully completing the first authentication of the terminal.

[0198] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the first key based at least on the second key after successfully completing the first authentication.

[0199] In some embodiments, the first authentication of the terminal is an authentication triggered by the network when the terminal registers with the network.

[0200] In some embodiments, in the process of registering with the network, the terminal's service AMF triggers a terminal authentication request service provided by the second node; after the terminal authentication request service provided by the second node is triggered, the second node can further trigger a terminal authentication information acquisition request service provided by the fourth node to request to acquire authentication information of the terminal. The fourth node determines an authentication mode of the first authentication of the terminal; the fourth node returns the determined authentication mode to the second node as the authentication information of the terminal, so that the second node generates the second key based on the authentication mode to complete the first authentication of the terminal.

[0201] In some embodiments, the first key can be a NAS anchor key. In an example, in the case that the first node is a NAS AF, the first key can be K NASA .

[0202] In some embodiments, the first key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node. In an example, in the case that the third node is a PCF, the third key can be K PCF . In an example, in the case that the third node is a UDM, the third key can be KUDM .

[0203] In some embodiments, the third key is used to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect the communication between the terminal and the third node. For example, the fourth key is used to protect the NAS communication between the terminal and the third node. It can be understood that the fourth key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the third node.

[0204] In some embodiments, the first information is used to identify the terminal. In an embodiment, the first information can be any information that can identify the terminal. For example, the International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI), the Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI), the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), the 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI), the Network Access Identifier (NAI), etc. can uniquely identify the terminal.

[0205] In some embodiments, the second node can obtain the first information of the terminal when performing the first authentication for the terminal.

[0206] In some embodiments, the first string indicates the use of the first key.

[0207] In some embodiments, the first string can be a fixed string agreed by the protocol. In an example, the first string can be "NASA". In some embodiments, the second node can generate the first key according to the second key and the first information. In this case, the second node can input the second key as the input key of the KDF and the first information as the generation parameter of the first key into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this case, the first key generated according to the first information and the second key is different for different terminals, and the third key generated based on the first key of different terminals is also different. In this way, when the terminal communicates with the third node using the respective third key, the isolation of the communication security can be achieved.

[0208] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the first key according to the second key, the first information and the first string. In this case, the second node can input the second key as an input key of the KDF, and input the first information and the first string as generation parameters of the first key into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this case, the first key generated according to the first string and the second key is different for different communication purposes of the same terminal. In this way, the terminal and the network can generate different communication root keys according to different communication purposes, and isolation of communication security can be achieved.

[0209] In an example, the first key is generated in combination with one or more of the following parameters with the second key as an input of the KDF: P0 = "NASA"; L0 = length of P0; P1 = terminal ID; L1 = length of P1.

[0210] Step S2102: The second node sends a third message to the first node.

[0211] In some embodiments, the first node receives the third message sent by the second node.

[0212] In some embodiments, after the second node generates the first key, the second node sends the third message to the first node.

[0213] In some embodiments, the third message is used to request the first node to store the first key.

[0214] In some embodiments, the name of the third message is not limited, for example, it can be a key registration request message, a key storage request message, etc.

[0215] In some embodiments, the third message can include the first key and the identification of the terminal. It should be noted that the first key generated for different terminals is different, and therefore there is a corresponding relationship between the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0216] In some embodiments, after the first node receives the third message, the first node stores the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0217] In some embodiments, the first node can update the first key stored by the first node according to the third message each time the first node receives a third message.

[0218] Step S2103: The terminal generates a third key based at least on the first key.

[0219] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to at least one of the first key, the type of the third node, the instance ID of the third node, the second information and the fourth information.

[0220] In some embodiments, the first key can be input key of a key derivation function (KDF), and at least one of the type of the third node, the instance ID of the third node, the second information, and the fourth information can be generation parameter of the third key, and the input key and the generation parameter are input into the KDF to generate the third key.

[0221] In some embodiments, the first key can be a NAS anchor key. In an example, in a case that the first node is a NAS AF, the first key can be K NASA .

[0222] In some embodiments, the third key is a root key for protecting security of communication between the terminal and the third node. In an example, in a case that the third node is a PCF, the third key can be K PCF . In an example, in a case that the third node is a UDM, the third key can be K UDM .

[0223] In some embodiments, the third key is used to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node. Illustratively, the fourth key is used to protect security of NAS communication between the terminal and the third node. It can be understood that the fourth key can be used to protect NAS messages between the terminal and the third node.

[0224] In some embodiments, the terminal generates the first key based on at least the second key before generating the third key.

[0225] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the first key according to the second key, and at least one of the first information and the first string.

[0226] In some embodiments, the second key can be input key of a KDF, and at least one of the first information and the first string can be generation parameter of the first key, and the input key and the generation parameter are input into the KDF to generate the first key.

[0227] In some embodiments, the first information can be information pre-stored in the terminal. The terminal can obtain the first information from the pre-stored information.

[0228] In some embodiments, in a case that the first string indicates the use of the first key, the terminal can determine the first string according to the use of generating the first key.

[0229] In some embodiments, in a case that the first string is a fixed string agreed by a protocol, the terminal can determine the first string according to the agreement of the protocol.

[0230] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the first key according to the second key and the first information. In this case, the terminal can input the second key as an input key of the KDF and input the first information as a generation parameter of the first key into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this case, the first key generated according to the first information and the second key is different for different terminals, and the third key generated based on the first key of different terminals is also different. In this way, the terminal can use the respective third key when communicating with the third node, and the isolation of communication security can be achieved.

[0231] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the first key according to the second key, the first information and the first string. In this case, the terminal can input the second key as an input key of the KDF and input the first information and the first string as a generation parameter of the first key into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this case, the first key generated according to the first string and the second key is different for different communication purposes of the same terminal. In this way, the terminal and the network can generate different communication root keys according to different communication purposes, and the isolation of communication security can be achieved.

[0232] In some embodiments, the terminal can determine the type of the third node according to the requested service or function. For example, the terminal requests positioning, and at this time, the type of the third node can be LMF. For example, the terminal requests authentication, and at this time, the type of the third node can be UDM.

[0233] In some embodiments, the instance ID of the third node can be used to uniquely identify the third node. For example, the instance ID of the third node can be the device ID of the third node. In some embodiments, there can be one or more third nodes, and the instance ID of the third node can also be one or more.

[0234] In some embodiments, the terminal can be pre-configured with the instance ID of the third node. For example, when the terminal successfully registers to the home network, the network device can configure the terminal with the instance ID of the third node in the home network so that the terminal directly communicates with the third node.

[0235] In some embodiments, through the information interaction between the terminal and the core network device (such as AMF), the core network device selects the serving third node for the terminal and sends the instance ID of the third node to the terminal so that the terminal obtains the instance ID of the third node.

[0236] In some embodiments, the second information is used to indicate a first count value, and the first count value is used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node. For example, if the terminal has not sent any uplink NAS message to the third node, the first count value indicated by the second information can be 0. If the terminal has sent 1 uplink NAS message to the third node, the first count value indicated by the second information can be 1.

[0237] In some embodiments, the terminal can set a NAS counter for each NF in the core network, which is used to record a number of uplink NAS messages sent by the terminal to the corresponding NF. In this case, the terminal can determine the second information according to the NAS counter of the third node.

[0238] In some embodiments, the fourth information can be used to indicate a generation period of the third key. In an embodiment, the fourth information can be determined by the network synchronously with the terminal, and the present disclosure does not make specific limitation on this.

[0239] In some embodiments, the unit of the generation period of the third key indicated by the fourth information can be microsecond, millisecond, second, etc. The unit of the generation period should be greater than the time required for the information to be transmitted from the terminal to the first node, so that the time difference between the generation of the third key by the terminal and the generation of the third key by the first node can be ignored.

[0240] In some embodiments, the fourth information can be a counter value based on Universal Time Coordinated (UTC). In this case, the terminal can determine the fourth information based on the counter value of UTC.

[0241] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to the first key, the type of the third node, and the second information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as the input key of the KDF, and input the type of the third node and the second information as the generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, the third keys corresponding to different types of third nodes are different, thereby realizing the isolation of the communication security between the terminal and different third nodes.

[0242] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to the first key, the instance ID of the third node, and the second information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as the input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the third node and the second information as the generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, even if multiple different third nodes of the same type, the third keys corresponding thereto are different, thereby further improving the isolation of the communication security between the terminal and different third nodes.

[0243] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to the first key, the type of the third node, and the fourth information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the type of the third node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, the terminal generates different third keys when communicating with the third node in different time periods, so that the security of the communication between the terminal and the third node can be further improved.

[0244] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to the first key, the instance ID of the third node, and the fourth information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the third node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key.

[0245] In an example, the first key is input as an input of the KDF, and the third key is generated in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0 = the type of the third node or the instance ID of the third node; L0 = the length of P0; P1 = the counter value of UTC or the count value of the uplink NAS message; L1 = the length of P1.

[0246] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the process of generating the first key by the terminal in step S2103 is similar to the process of generating the first key by the second node in step S2101, and the terminal in step S2101 can be replaced by the second node. Accordingly, the process of generating the first key by the terminal can refer to the process of generating the first key by the second node in step S2101, which is not described herein.

[0247] Step S2104: The terminal sends a fourth message to the third node.

[0248] In some embodiments, the third node receives the fourth message sent by the terminal.

[0249] In some embodiments, the fourth message is an unprotected message. In some embodiments, the fourth message is an unencrypted message.

[0250] In some embodiments, the fourth message can include at least one of the following: the first information; the second information; the seventh information.

[0251] In some embodiments, the seventh information is used to indicate the first capability of the terminal, and the first capability is used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal. In an example, the security algorithm can include at least one of an integrity algorithm, a confidentiality algorithm, and the like.

[0252] In some embodiments, the seventh information is used by the third node to determine the first security algorithm. In an embodiment, the first security algorithm is a security algorithm negotiated between the third node and the terminal.

[0253] In some embodiments, the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate a fourth key. The terminal carries the seventh information in the fourth message to facilitate the negotiation of the security algorithm for the NAS communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0254] In some embodiments, since the fourth message is an unprotected message, the fourth message can only contain the minimum information required by the third node to generate the fourth key.

[0255] In some embodiments, the terminal can send the fourth message to the third node through the access network device.

[0256] In some embodiments, the terminal can send the first RRC message to the access network device, and the first RRC message includes the fourth message. It can be understood that, in the case that the fourth message needs to be forwarded to the third node via the access network device, the terminal sends the first RRC message carrying the fourth message to the access network device. After receiving the first RRC message, the access network device obtains the fourth message from the first RRC message and forwards the fourth message to the third node.

[0257] In some embodiments, the access network device can be various types of base stations, for example, the access network device can be an eNB, a base station in a 6G communication system, etc.

[0258] In an example, the fourth message can be carried in the first RRC message in the form of a message container.

[0259] In some embodiments, in order to improve the security of the fourth message, the first RRC message is protected using an access stratum (AS) security context. Illustratively, the AS security context can include a confidentiality key and an integrity key for the communication between the terminal and the access network device, for example, the first RRC message can be encrypted using the confidentiality key in the AS security context, and / or the first RRC message can be integrity protected using the integrity key in the AS security context.

[0260] In some embodiments, the first RRC message can further include third information; wherein the third information includes at least one of the following: a type of the third node; an instance identifier ID of the third node.

[0261] In some embodiments, the terminal can carry the type of the third node in the first RRC message; in this way, the access network device can select the third node for the terminal according to the type of the third node carried in the first RRC message after receiving the first RRC message. For example, the access network node can select the third node for the terminal according to the type of the third node, the location information of the terminal, and / or the information of the third nodes that the access network node can reach. In some embodiments, the fourth message can be carried in the first RRC message in the form of a message container.

[0262] In some embodiments, the first RRC message can further comprise address information of the third node.

[0263] In some embodiments, the address information of the third node can comprise, but is not limited to, an Internet Protocol (IP) address.

[0264] Step S2105: The third node determines the first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0265] In some embodiments, after receiving the fourth message, the third node can select the first security algorithm according to the second capability of the third node itself and the first capability of the terminal.

[0266] In some embodiments, before determining the first security algorithm, the third node can obtain tenth information; the tenth information is used to indicate the second capability of the third node, and the second capability is used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the third node.

[0267] In some embodiments, in the case that the fourth message comprises the eighth information, the third node can determine the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and the tenth information.

[0268] In some embodiments, in the case that the fourth message comprises the first information, the third node can obtain the eighth information from the SEAF and / or the AUSF based on the first information; and determine the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and the tenth information. In an example, the first information of the terminal and the eighth information of the terminal can be stored in the SEAF and / or the AUSF; in the case that the fourth message comprises the first information and does not comprise the eighth information, the third node can obtain the first information from the fourth message, and obtain the corresponding eighth information from the SEAF and / or the AUSF based on the first information; and determine the first security algorithm based on the eighth information and the tenth information.

[0269] In some embodiments, considering that the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal can be different, or the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are the same but the priority configuration of the security algorithm of the third node is different from the priority configuration of the security algorithm of the terminal, the first security algorithm needs to be determined before the fourth key is generated by the third node in the embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0270] Step S2106: The third node sends the first message to the first node.

[0271] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by the third node.

[0272] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node.

[0273] In some embodiments, the first message is not specifically limited, for example, can be a key generation request message, a key request message, a security request message, etc.

[0274] In some embodiments, the first message includes at least one of the first information and the second information. In an embodiment, the first message includes a message header and a message body; wherein the message body of the first message can carry at least one of the first information and the second information.

[0275] In some embodiments, the first message can further include third information, in an embodiment, the third information can be included in the message body of the first message. In an embodiment, the third information can be included in the message header of the first message.

[0276] In some embodiments, the third information included in the message header of the first message can also be used to indicate the sending node of the first message, such as the third node.

[0277] Step S2107: The first node generates a third key based on the first message and at least the first key.

[0278] In some embodiments, after receiving the first message, the first node generates the third key based on at least the first key.

[0279] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the third key based on at least one of the first key, the type of the third node, the instance ID of the third node, the second information, and the fourth information.

[0280] In some embodiments, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and at least one of the type of the third node, the instance ID of the third node, the second information, and the fourth information as a generation parameter of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key.

[0281] In some embodiments, in the case that the first message includes the third information, the first node can determine the type of the third node and / or the instance ID of the third node according to the third information. In some embodiments, in the case that the first message includes the second information, the first node can obtain the second information based on the first message, and input the second information as a generation parameter of the third key.

[0282] In some embodiments, in the case that the first message does not include the second information, the first node can obtain the fourth information and input the fourth information as a generation parameter of the third key. In an example, the fourth information can be a UTC-based counter value. In this case, the first node can determine the fourth information based on the UTC-based counter value.

[0283] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the third key according to the first key, the type of the third node, and the second information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the type of the third node and the second information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, the third keys corresponding to third nodes of different types are different, thereby realizing isolation of communication security between the terminal and different third nodes.

[0284] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the third key according to the first key, the instance ID of the third node, and the second information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the third node and the second information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, even if multiple third nodes of the same type, the third keys corresponding thereto are different, thereby further improving isolation of communication security between the terminal and different third nodes.

[0285] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the third key according to the first key, the type of the third node, and the fourth information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the type of the third node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key. In this case, the third keys generated by the first node for the terminal and the third node to communicate in different time periods are different, thereby further improving security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0286] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the third key according to the first key, the instance ID of the third node, and the fourth information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the third node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the third key into the KDF to obtain the third key.

[0287] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the process of generating the third key by the first node in step S2107 is similar to the process of generating the third key by the terminal in step S2103, and the terminal in step S2103 can be replaced by the first node. Accordingly, the process of generating the third key by the first node can refer to the process of generating the third key by the terminal in step S2103, which is not described herein.

[0288] Step S2108: The first node sends the second message to the third node.

[0289] In some embodiments, the third node receives the second message sent by the first node.

[0290] In some embodiments, the second message can comprise the third key. In an example, the first node can carry the third key in a security algorithm configuration message sent to the third node, the security algorithm configuration message being used to configure the priority of the security algorithms supported by the third node.

[0291] In some embodiments, after generating the third key, the first node can send the second message to the third node, so as to send the generated third key to the third node through the second message, to facilitate the third node to generate the fourth key based on the third key.

[0292] In some embodiments, the second message is a response message of the first message. In an example, the name of the second message is not limited, for example, can be a key generation response message, a key response message, a security response message, etc.

[0293] Step S2109: The third node generates the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0294] In some embodiments, the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node. In some embodiments, the third key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the third node. For example, in the case that the third node is a PCF, the third key can be a NAS / PCF key.

[0295] In some embodiments, the third node can generate the fourth key according to the third key and at least one of the related information of the first security algorithm, such as the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm type, etc.

[0296] In some embodiments, the third node can take the third key as the input key of the KDF, and take one or more of the related information of the first security algorithm, such as the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm type, etc. as the generation parameter of the fourth key. The third node inputs the input key and the generation parameter into the KDF to generate the fourth key.

[0297] In some embodiments, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm can be used to uniquely identify the first security algorithm.

[0298] In some embodiments, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm can be used to indicate the type of the first security algorithm. For example, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm can comprise at least one of the following: a confidentiality algorithm; an integrity algorithm.

[0299] In some embodiments, the third node can pre-store algorithm identifiers and algorithm types of security algorithms supported by the third node; after the third node determines the first security algorithm, the third node can obtain the algorithm identifier and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm from the pre-stored algorithm identifiers and algorithm types of security algorithms.

[0300] In some embodiments, the third node can generate the fourth key based on the third key and the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the third node can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm identifier. In some embodiments, the third node can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the third node can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0301] In an example, the third node uses a KDF, takes the third key as input, and generates the third key in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0=algorithm type distinguisher, L0=length of P0; P1=security algorithm ID; L1=length of P1.

[0302] Exemplarily, the type of the first security algorithm includes, but is not limited to, an integrity algorithm and / or a confidentiality algorithm.

[0303] Exemplarily, the security algorithm ID can be an ID for AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), an ID for ZUC (ZUC), and the like.

[0304] In some embodiments, the fourth key includes at least one of a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

[0305] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is a confidentiality algorithm, the third node generates a confidentiality key (such as the fourth key) based on the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0306] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is an integrity algorithm, the third node generates an integrity key (such as the fourth key) based on the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0307] Step S2110: The third node sends a fifth message to the terminal.

[0308] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fifth message sent by the third node.

[0309] In some embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the fourth key used by the third node. In an example, the fifth message can be a NAS Security Mode Command (SMC) message.

[0310] In some embodiments, the fifth message can comprise at least one of: the seventh information, the eighth information.

[0311] In some embodiments, in a case where the first message comprises the seventh information, the third node can obtain the seventh information based on the first message, and re-carry the seventh information in the fifth message for sending to the terminal.

[0312] In some embodiments, the seventh information is used to indicate the first capability of the terminal.

[0313] In some embodiments, in a case where the security algorithm supported by the third node is the same as the security algorithm supported by the terminal, the third node can re-carry the seventh information in the fifth message for sending to the terminal.

[0314] In some embodiments, the eighth information is used to identify the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the eighth information is used for the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0315] In some embodiments, the eighth information can be an algorithm identification of the first security algorithm.

[0316] In some embodiments, the third node can pre-store algorithm identifications and algorithm types of security algorithms supported by the third node; after the third node determines the first security algorithm, the third node can obtain the algorithm identification and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm from the pre-stored algorithm identifications and algorithm types of security algorithms. After the third node determines the first security algorithm, the third node can determine the ninth information according to the algorithm identification of the first security algorithm.

[0317] Step S2111: The terminal determines the first security algorithm according to the fifth message.

[0318] In some embodiments, the first security algorithm is a security algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the third node.

[0319] In some embodiments, in a case where the fifth message comprises the eighth information, the terminal determines the first security algorithm according to the eighth information.

[0320] In some embodiments, in a case where the fifth message comprises the seventh information, the terminal can determine the first security algorithm according to the seventh information. It is to be noted that in a case where the fifth message comprises the seventh information, it indicates that the security algorithm supported by the third node is the same as the security algorithm supported by the terminal, and the terminal can determine the security algorithm supported by the terminal as the first security algorithm.

[0321] In some embodiments, the third node and the terminal can support different security algorithms, or the third node and the terminal can support the same security algorithms but the third node and the terminal can have different priority configurations of the security algorithms. Thus, the third node selects a first security algorithm based on its second capability and the terminal's first capability, and informs the terminal of the selected first security algorithm through the fifth message, so that the terminal and the third node complete the negotiation of the security algorithm.

[0322] Step S2112: The terminal generates a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0323] In some embodiments, the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node. In some embodiments, the third key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the third node. For example, in the case that the third node is a PCF, the third key can be a NAS / PCF key.

[0324] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the fourth key according to the third key and the related information of the first security algorithm, such as at least one of the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0325] In some embodiments, the terminal can use the third key as the input key of the KDF, and use at least one of the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type as the generation parameter of the fourth key. The terminal inputs the input key and the generation parameter into the KDF to generate the fourth key.

[0326] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the fourth key based on the third key and the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm identifier. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the fourth key based on the third key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0327] In an example, the terminal uses the KDF, takes the third key as the input, and generates the fourth key in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0=algorithm type distinguisher, L0=length of P0; P1=security algorithm ID; L1=length of P1.

[0328] Exemplarily, the type of the first security algorithm includes, but is not limited to, an integrity algorithm and / or a confidentiality algorithm.

[0329] Exemplarily, the security algorithm ID can be an ID for an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), an ID for ZUC, and the like.

[0330] In some embodiments, the fourth key includes at least one of a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

[0331] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is a confidentiality algorithm, the terminal generates a confidentiality key based on the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0332] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is an integrity algorithm, the terminal generates an integrity key based on the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0333] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the process of generating the fourth key by the terminal in step S2112 is similar to the process of generating the fourth key by the third node in step S2109, and the third node in step S2109 can be replaced by the terminal, and accordingly, the process of generating the fourth key by the terminal can refer to the process of generating the fourth key by the third node in step S2109, which is not described herein.

[0334] Step S2113: The terminal sends a sixth message to the third node.

[0335] In some embodiments, the third node receives the sixth message sent by the terminal.

[0336] In some embodiments, the sixth message is used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm.

[0337] In some embodiments, the sixth message can be an SMC complete message.

[0338] In some embodiments, before sending the sixth message, the terminal can protect the sixth message using the fourth key.

[0339] In some embodiments, the sixth message can include a NAS message. In some embodiments, the NAS message can be a NAS message that the terminal needs to send to the third node.

[0340] In some embodiments, the message content of the NAS message is different for different types of the third node. For example, the third node is a UDM, and the message content of the NAS message can be related to access authorization. For another example, the third node is a PCF, and the message content of the NAS message can be related to session management.

[0341] In some embodiments, after the third node receives the sixth message, the third node can decode and verify the sixth message using the fourth key.

[0342] Step S2114: The third node sends a seventh message to the terminal.

[0343] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the seventh message sent by the third node.

[0344] In some embodiments, the seventh message is a response message of the NAS message.

[0345] In some embodiments, before sending the seventh message, the third node protects the seventh message using the fourth key.

[0346] In some embodiments, the term “information” can be mutually replaced with the terms “message”, “signal”, “signaling”, “report”, “configuration”, “indication”, “instruction”, “command”, “channel”, “parameter”, “field”, “data”, and the like.

[0347] In some embodiments, the term “send” can be mutually replaced with the terms “transmit”, “report”, “transport”, and the like.

[0348] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S2101 to S2114. For example, steps S2101 to S2105 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S2101 to S2113 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0349] In some embodiments, steps S2106 to S2114 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. In the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal cannot be successfully negotiated, the third node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the third node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the second key.

[0350] In some embodiments, step S2114 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the NAS message is not included in the sixth message, after receiving the sixth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the third node does not need to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0351] In some embodiments, steps S2104, S2105 and S2106 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments.

[0352] FIG. 2B is a second interaction diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2B, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method for the communication system 100, and the method comprises:

[0353] Step S2201: The fourth node sends fifth information to the second node.

[0354] In some embodiments, the second node receives the fifth information sent by the fourth node.

[0355] In some embodiments, the fifth information can be included in the response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message. It can be understood that the fourth node can reuse the response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message in the first authentication process of the terminal to carry the fifth information, so as to send the fifth information to the second node when the fourth node sends the response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message to the second node, thereby reducing the signaling overhead.

[0356] In some embodiments, the fourth node determines whether to send the fifth information according to the subscription information of the terminal. It can be understood that since the capabilities of different terminals in the home network are different, there can be a part of terminals that do not support direct communication with the third node; in this case, the second node does not need to generate the first key for these terminals. In order to reduce the generation of unnecessary first keys by the second node, the fourth node can determine whether to send the fifth information to the second node according to the subscription information of the terminal, to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal.

[0357] In some embodiments, the fourth node determines whether to send the fifth information according to the local configuration information. It can be understood that in order to reduce the signaling overhead, the fourth node can determine whether to send the fifth information to the second node according to the local configuration information, to prompt the second node to generate the first key for all terminals in the home network; thereby it is not necessary to determine whether to send the fifth information for each terminal separately.

[0358] In some embodiments, the fifth information is used to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal after a first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0359] In some embodiments, the first key can be a NAS anchor key. In an example, in a case that the first node is a NAS AF, the first key can be K NASA .

[0360] In some embodiments, the first key can be generated by the second node based at least on the second key.

[0361] In some embodiments, the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing a first authentication of the terminal. In an example, in a case that the second node is an AUSF, the second key can be K AUSF .

[0362] In some embodiments, the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in a first authentication process of the terminal.

[0363] In some embodiments, the second node can store the second key after successfully completing the first authentication of the terminal.

[0364] In some embodiments, the terminal can store the second key after successfully completing the first authentication.

[0365] In some embodiments, the first authentication of the terminal is an authentication triggered by the network when the terminal registers with the network.

[0366] In some embodiments, in a process of the terminal registering with the network, a serving AMF of the terminal triggers a terminal authentication request service provided by the second node; after the terminal authentication request service provided by the second node is triggered, the second node can further trigger a terminal authentication information acquisition request service provided by a fourth node to request to acquire authentication information of the terminal. The fourth node determines an authentication manner of the first authentication of the terminal; and the fourth node returns the determined authentication manner as the authentication information of the terminal to the second node, so that the second node generates the second key based on the authentication manner to complete the first authentication of the terminal.

[0367] Step S2202: The second node generates the first key based at least on the second key.

[0368] In some embodiments, after receiving the fifth information, the second node generates the first key based at least on the second key.

[0369] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the first key according to the second key, and at least one of the first information and the first string.

[0370] In some embodiments, the second key can be an input key of a Key Derivation Function (KDF), at least one of the first information and the first string can be a generation parameter of the first key, and the input key and the generation parameter are input into the KDF to generate the first key.

[0371] In some embodiments, the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication for the terminal. In an example, when the second node is an AUSF, the second key can be K AUSF .

[0372] In some embodiments, the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in a first authentication process for the terminal.

[0373] In some embodiments, the first key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and a third node. In an example, when the third node is a PCF, the third key can be K PCF . In an example, when the third node is a UDM, the third key can be K UDM .

[0374] In some embodiments, the third key is used to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect communication security between the terminal and the third node. Illustratively, the fourth key is used to protect NAS communication security between the terminal and the third node. It can be understood that the fourth key can be used to protect NAS messages between the terminal and the third node.

[0375] In some embodiments, the first information is used to identify the terminal. In an embodiment, the first information can be any information capable of identifying the terminal. Illustratively, the IMSI, SUPI, IMEI, GUTI, NAI, etc. of the terminal can be information capable of uniquely identifying the terminal.

[0376] In some embodiments, the second node can obtain the first information of the terminal when performing first authentication for the terminal.

[0377] In some embodiments, the first string indicates the use of the first key.

[0378] In some embodiments, the first string can be a fixed string agreed by a protocol. In an example, the first string can be "NASA".

[0379] In some embodiments, the second node can generate a first key based on a second key and first information. In this case, the second node can use the second key as the input key to the KDF (Key Definition Array), and input the first information as a generation parameter into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this scenario, the first key generated based on the first information and the second key is different for different terminals, and the third key generated based on the first key of different terminals is also different. Thus, when terminals communicate with the third node using their respective third keys, secure isolation of communication can be achieved.

[0380] In some embodiments, the second node can generate a first key based on a second key, first information, and a first string. In this case, the second node can use the second key as the input key to the KDF, and input the first information and the first string as generation parameters into the KDF to obtain the first key. In this scenario, the first key generated from the first string and the second key will be different for different communication purposes of the same terminal. Thus, the terminal and the network can generate different communication root keys according to different communication purposes, achieving secure isolation of communication.

[0381] In one example, the second key is used as input to the KDF and combined with one or more of the following parameters to generate the first key: P0 = "NASA"; L0 = length of P0; P1 = terminal ID; L1 = length of P1.

[0382] Step S2203: The second node sends a third message to the first node.

[0383] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S2203 can be found in the optional implementations of step S2102 in FIG2A and other related parts in the embodiments involved in FIG2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0384] Step S2204: The second node sends the sixth information to the terminal.

[0385] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth information sent by the second node.

[0386] In some embodiments, the second node sends the sixth information to the terminal based on the fifth information.

[0387] In some embodiments, the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to generate a first key after the first authentication is successful.

[0388] In some embodiments, the sixth information is used to trigger the terminal to generate the first key.

[0389] Step S2205: The terminal generates a third key based at least on the first key.

[0390] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2205 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2103 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0391] Step S2206: The terminal sends a fourth message to the third node.

[0392] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2206 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2104 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0393] Step S2207: The third node determines the first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0394] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2207 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2105 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0395] Step S2208: The third node sends the first message to the first node.

[0396] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2208 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2106 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0397] Step S2209: The first node generates a third key based on at least the first key according to the first message.

[0398] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2209 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2107 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0399] Step S2210: The first node sends a second message to the third node.

[0400] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2210 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2108 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0401] Step S2211: The third node generates a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0402] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2211 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2109 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts of the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0403] Step S2212: The third node sends a fifth message to the terminal.

[0404] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2212 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2110 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0405] Step S2213: The terminal determines a first security algorithm according to the fifth message.

[0406] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2213 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2111 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0407] Step S2214: The terminal generates a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0408] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2214 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2112 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0409] Step S2215: The terminal sends a sixth message to the third node.

[0410] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2215 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2113 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0411] Step S2216: The third node sends a seventh message to the terminal.

[0412] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2216 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2114 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described here again.

[0413] The data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S2201 to S2216. For example, steps S2201 to S2207 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, steps S2201 to S2215 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, steps S2202 in combination with steps S2203, S2205 to S2216 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, steps S2202 in combination with steps S2203 to S2216 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0414] In some embodiments, steps S2208 to S2216 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the third node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the third node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the third key.

[0415] In some embodiments, step S2216 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the NAS message is not included in the sixth message, after the third node receives the sixth message indicating that the negotiation of the first security algorithm is completed, the third node does not need to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0416] In some embodiments, steps S2201 and S2204 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the terminal and the second node can determine by themselves to generate the first key based on the second key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed, without the need for the fourth node to send the fifth information to the second node to instruct the second node to generate the first key, or the need for the second node to send the sixth information to the terminal to instruct the terminal to generate the first key.

[0417] FIG. 3A is a flow diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3A, the data security processing method according to the embodiments of the present disclosure is performed by a first node, and the method comprises:

[0418] Step S3101: receiving a third message.

[0419] In some embodiments, the first node receives the third message sent by the second node.

[0420] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3101 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2102 of FIG. 2A, step S2203 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be described herein again.

[0421] Step S3102: receiving a first message.

[0422] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by the third node.

[0423] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3102 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2106 of FIG. 2A, step S2208 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be described herein again.

[0424] Step S3103: generating, according to the first message, a third key based at least on the first key.

[0425] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3103 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2107 in FIG. 2A, step S2209 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0426] Step S3104: sending a second message.

[0427] In some embodiments, the first node sends the second message to the third node.

[0428] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3104 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2108 in FIG. 2A, step S2210 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0429] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S3101 to S3104. For example, step S3101 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but is not limited thereto.

[0430] In some embodiments, steps S3102 to S3104 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node is different from the security algorithm supported by the terminal, the third node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the third node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the third key, and therefore the first node also does not receive the first message and does not need to generate the third key.

[0431] FIG. 3B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3B, the data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure is executed by a first node, and the above method includes:

[0432] Step S3201: receiving a first key.

[0433] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first key sent by a second node.

[0434] In some embodiments, the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication process of the terminal;

[0435] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3201 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2102 of FIG. 2A, step S2203 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0436] Step S3202: generating a third key based at least on the first key.

[0437] In some embodiments, the third key is a root key for protecting the communication security between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0438] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3202 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2107 of FIG. 2A, step S2209 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0439] FIG. 4A is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4A, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is executed by a second node, and the above method comprises:

[0440] Step S4101: generating a first key based at least on a second key.

[0441] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4101 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2101 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0442] Step S4102: sending a third message.

[0443] In some embodiments, the second node sends the third message to the first node.

[0444] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4102 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2102 of FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0445] FIG. 4B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4B, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is executed by a second node, and the above method comprises:

[0446] Step S4201: receiving fifth information.

[0447] In some embodiments, the second node receives the fifth information sent by a fourth node.

[0448] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4201 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2201 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0449] Step S4202: generating the first key based on at least the second key.

[0450] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4202 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2202 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0451] Step S4203: sending the third message.

[0452] In some embodiments, the second node sends the third message to the first node.

[0453] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4203 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2203 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0454] Step S4204: sending the sixth information.

[0455] In some embodiments, the second node sends the sixth information to the terminal.

[0456] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4204 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2204 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0457] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S4201 to S4204. For example, steps S4202 to S4204 can be implemented as independent embodiments, and steps S4202 to S4203 can be implemented as independent embodiments, but are not limited thereto.

[0458] In some embodiments, step S4201 is optional, and one or more of the steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the second node can determine whether to generate the first key by itself, without the fourth node sending the fifth information to trigger the second node to generate the first key; and after the second node generates the first key, the second node can determine to send the sixth information to the terminal to trigger the terminal to generate the first key.

[0459] In some embodiments, steps S4201 and S4204 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the second node can determine whether to generate the first key by itself without the fourth node sending the fifth information to trigger the second node to generate the first key, and the second node can not send the sixth information to the terminal without receiving the fifth information, and the terminal can determine whether to generate the first key by itself.

[0460] FIG. 4C is a flowchart illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4C, the data security processing method according to the embodiment of the present disclosure is performed by the second node, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0461] Step S4301: generating the first key based at least on the second key.

[0462] In some embodiments, the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication of the terminal, and the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication of the terminal.

[0463] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4301 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2101 in FIG. 2A, step S2202 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be described herein.

[0464] Step S4302: sending the first key.

[0465] In some embodiments, the second node sends the first key to the first node.

[0466] In some embodiments, the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node, and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0467] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4302 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2102 in FIG. 2A, step S2203 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be described herein.

[0468] FIG. 5A is a flowchart illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 5A, the data security processing method according to the embodiment of the present disclosure is performed by the terminal, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0469] Step S5101: generating the third key based at least on the first key.

[0470] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5101 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2103 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0471] Step S5102: sending a fourth message.

[0472] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the fourth message to the third node.

[0473] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5102 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2104 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0474] Step S5103: receiving a fifth message.

[0475] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fifth message sent by the third node.

[0476] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5103 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2110 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0477] Step S5104: determining a first security algorithm according to the fifth message.

[0478] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5104 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2111 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0479] Step S5105: generating a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0480] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5105 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2112 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0481] Step S5106: sending a sixth message.

[0482] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the sixth message to the third node.

[0483] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5106 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2113 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0484] Step S5107: receiving a seventh message.

[0485] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the seventh message sent by the third node.

[0486] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5107 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2114 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0487] The data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S5101 to S5107. For example, steps S5101 to S5102 can be implemented as independent embodiments, and steps S5101 to S5106 can be implemented as independent embodiments, but are not limited thereto.

[0488] In some embodiments, steps S5103 to S5107 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the third node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; the third node cannot generate the fourth key, and thus the third node does not need to send the fifth message to the first node.

[0489] In some embodiments, step S5107 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the sixth message does not include the NAS message, after the third node receives the sixth message indicating that the negotiation of the first security algorithm is completed, the third node does not need to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0490] FIG. 5B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 5B, the data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure is performed by a terminal, and the above method includes:

[0491] Step S5201: receiving sixth information.

[0492] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth information sent by the second node.

[0493] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5201 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2204 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0494] Step S5202: generating a third key based on at least the first key.

[0495] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5202 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2205 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0496] Step S5203: sending a fourth message.

[0497] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the fourth message to the third node.

[0498] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5203 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2206 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0499] Step S5204: receiving a fifth message.

[0500] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fifth message sent by the third node.

[0501] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5204 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2212 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0502] Step S5205: determining a first security algorithm according to the fifth message.

[0503] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5205 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2213 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0504] Step S5206: generating a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0505] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5206 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2214 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0506] Step S5207: sending a sixth message.

[0507] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the sixth message to the third node.

[0508] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5207 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2215 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0509] Step S5208: receiving a seventh message.

[0510] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the seventh message sent by the third node.

[0511] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S5208 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2216 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0512] The data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S5201 to S5208. For example, steps S5201 to S5203 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, steps S5201 to S5207 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S5202 to S5208 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0513] In some embodiments, steps S5204 to S5208 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the third node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; the third node cannot generate the fourth key, and in this case, the third node does not need to send the fifth message to the first node.

[0514] In some embodiments, step S5208 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the sixth message does not include the NAS message, after the third node receives the sixth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the third node does not need to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0515] In some embodiments, step S5201 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the terminal can determine whether to generate the first key by itself, and the second node does not need to send the sixth information to the terminal.

[0516] FIG. 5C is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 5C, the data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure is executed by a terminal, and the above method includes:

[0517] Step S5301: generating a third key based at least on the first key.

[0518] In some embodiments, the first key is generated based on a second key, the second key is a key generated when the second node first authenticates the terminal, and the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication process of the terminal; the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0519] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S5301 can refer to the optional implementations of step S2103 in FIG. 2A, step S2205 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIGS. 2A and 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0520] FIG. 6A is a flowchart of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 6A, the data security processing method according to the embodiments of the present disclosure is performed by a third node, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0521] Step S6101: receiving a fourth message. In some embodiments, the third node receives a fourth message sent by the terminal.

[0522] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S6101 can refer to the optional implementations of step S2104 in FIG. 2A, step S2206 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIGS. 2A and 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0523] Step S6102: determining a first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0524] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S6102 can refer to the optional implementations of step S2105 in FIG. 2A, step S2207 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIGS. 2A and 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0525] Step S6103: sending a first message.

[0526] In some embodiments, the third node sends the first message to the first node.

[0527] In some embodiments, other optional implementations of step S6103 can refer to the optional implementations of step S2106 in FIG. 2A, step S2208 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIGS. 2A and 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0528] Step S6104: receiving a second message.

[0529] In some embodiments, the third node receives a second message sent by the first node.

[0530] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S6104 can refer to step S2108 of FIG. 2A, optional implementation of step S2210 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0531] Step S6105: generating a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0532] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S6105 can refer to step S2109 of FIG. 2A, optional implementation of step S2211 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0533] Step S6106: sending a fifth message.

[0534] In some embodiments, the third node sends the fifth message to the terminal.

[0535] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S6106 can refer to step S2110 of FIG. 2A, optional implementation of step S2212 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0536] Step S6107: receiving a sixth message.

[0537] In some embodiments, the third node receives the sixth message sent by the terminal.

[0538] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S6107 can refer to step S2113 of FIG. 2A, optional implementation of step S2215 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0539] Step S6108: sending a seventh message.

[0540] In some embodiments, the third node sends the seventh message to the terminal.

[0541] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S6108 can refer to step S2114 of FIG. 2A, optional implementation of step S2216 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0542] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S6101 to S6108. For example, steps S6101 to S6102 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S6101 to S6107 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0543] In some embodiments, steps S6103 to S6108 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the third node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal cannot be successfully negotiated, the third node does not need to send the first message to the first node.

[0544] In some embodiments, step S6108 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the sixth message does not contain the NAS message, after receiving the sixth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the third node does not need to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0545] FIG. 6B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 6B, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is performed by a third node, and the above method includes:

[0546] Step S6201: receiving a fourth message.

[0547] In some embodiments, the third node receives the fourth message sent by the terminal.

[0548] In some embodiments, the fourth message is an unprotected message.

[0549] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S6201 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2104 of FIG. 2A, step S2206 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be described here.

[0550] Step S6202: sending a first message according to the fourth message.

[0551] In some embodiments, the third node sends the first message to the first node according to the fourth message.

[0552] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node;

[0553] In some embodiments, the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on the first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from the second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on the second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when the terminal is first authenticated; and the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication process of the terminal.

[0554] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S6202 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2106 in FIG. 2A, step S2208 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0555] FIG. 7 is a flowchart XI of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 7, the data security processing method is performed by a fourth node, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0556] Step S7101: sending fifth information.

[0557] In some embodiments, the fourth node sends the fifth information to the second node.

[0558] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S7101 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2201 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which will not be repeated here.

[0559] FIG. 8 is an interaction diagram III of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 8, the data security processing method is used in the communication system 100, and the method comprises one of the following steps:

[0560] Step S8101: the second node generates a first key based on at least a second key.

[0561] In some embodiments, the second key is a key generated by the second node when the terminal is first authenticated; and the second key is an authentication key used by the second node in the first authentication process of the terminal.

[0562] Step S8102: the second node sends the first key to the first node.

[0563] Step S8103: the terminal generates a third key based on at least the first key.

[0564] Step S8104: the terminal sends a fourth message to the third node.

[0565] In some embodiments, the fourth message is an unprotected message.

[0566] Step S8105: The third node sends the first message to the first node according to the fourth message.

[0567] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node.

[0568] Step S8106: The first node generates the third key based on at least the first key.

[0569] In some embodiments, the third key is a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

[0570] In some embodiments, the above method can include the methods of the above-mentioned communication system side, terminal side, first node side, second node side, third node side, and fourth node side, and the like, which will not be repeated here.

[0571] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present disclosure, the present disclosure will be further described below through some exemplary embodiments.

[0572] In some embodiments, the current 5G security key hierarchy does not support the protection of NAS signaling between the UE and the NFs other than the AMF. And the NAS security mode command (SMC) for NAS security algorithm (terminal and AMF) negotiation only supports execution between the terminal and the AMF, and other NFs do not support the NAS SMC message.

[0573] In some embodiments, the key hierarchy is based on the root key derived by the SEAF residing in the serving network, which is not applicable to the NAS signaling between the terminal and the NFs (e.g., PCF, UDM, etc.) residing in the home network. In some embodiments, the 5G security key hierarchy is enhanced to support the protection of the 6G multi-NAS network architecture between the terminal and the core NFs residing in the home network.

[0574] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. 1D, in the 5G system, the key of the NAS signaling is derived by the terminal and the AMF based on the key hierarchy.

[0575] The key of the AMF in the serving network (i.e., K AMF ) is the key derived by the terminal and the SEAF from K SEAF . When performing horizontal key derivation, K AMF is further derived by the terminal and the source AMF.

[0576] The key of the NAS signaling can include: K NASint and K NASenc ; wherein K NASintK is a key derived by the terminal and the AMF from K AMF for integrity protection of NAS signaling based on a specific integrity algorithm. NASenc K is a key derived by the terminal and the AMF from K AMF for confidentiality protection of NAS signaling based on a specific encryption algorithm.

[0577] In some embodiments, in order to be able to protect NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and core NFs other than the AMF residing in the home network, the present disclosure proposes that K AUSF needs to be derived from K NASA as the NAS anchor key for NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and a specific NF in the HPLMN. K NASA is derived by the terminal and the AUSF, respectively, during the primary authentication; and after K NASA is derived by the AUSF, K NASA may be passed to the NASAF in the HPLMN by the AUSF. Here, the NASAF can be a standalone network function in the HPLMN; or the NASAF can be configured together with the SEAF in the HPLMN.

[0578] Based on K NASA , the terminal and the NASAF further derive a key K NF for each specific target NF. While the NAS / NF security key, i.e., K NFint for integrity protection of NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and the target NF and K NFenc for confidentiality protection of NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and the target NF, are derived by the terminal and the NF from K NF . As shown in FIG. 9A, which is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy two according to an example embodiment, the procedure of 5G primary authentication is performed during UE registration to authenticate the terminal; K AUSF is stored in the AUSF and the terminal after the 5G primary authentication is successful. And K AUSF is derived by the AUSF and the terminal, respectively, based on K NASA after the 5G primary authentication is successfully completed.

[0579] As shown in FIG. 9B, which is a schematic diagram of interactions for generating the key K NASA during the primary authentication procedure according to an example embodiment.

[0580] 1. In the first authentication procedure, AUSF and UDM interact using the terminal authentication information retrieval request message (e.g. Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request) to retrieve the authentication information of the terminal, e.g. subscription credentials (AKA authentication vector) and authentication method.

[0581] 2. In the terminal authentication information retrieval response message (e.g. Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response), based on the local configuration for all terminals or per terminal subscription of the terminal, the UDM can indicate to the AUSF whether to generate a NAS anchor key K NASA for the terminal.

[0582] 3. If the AUSF receives the NASA indication from the UDM, the AUSF generates K AUSF based on K NASA after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0583] In the first authentication procedure, the AUSF sends the NASA indication to the terminal through the AMF; if the terminal receives the indication, the terminal generates K AUSF based on K NASA after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0584] 4. After the AUSF generates K NASA , the AUSF sends K NASA together with the terminal identity to the NASAF using the NAS anchor key registration request (e.g. Nnasaf_NASAnchorKey_Register Request). The NASAF stores the set of {K NASA , terminal identity} sent by the AUSF.

[0585] 5. The NASAF sends the NAS anchor key registration response to the AUSF.

[0586] In some embodiments, when the AUSF and the terminal derive K NASA from K AUSF , the following parameters are used to form the input of the KDF.

[0587] FC = To Be Determined (TBD);

[0588] P0 = “NASA”;

[0589] L0 = length of P0;

[0590] P1 = terminal ID, e.g. the terminal ID can be SUPI;

[0591] L1 = length of P1;

[0592] Input key is 256-bit K AUSF .

[0593] Figure 9C is an interaction diagram illustrating NAS security establishment by NASAF to generate a key, according to an example embodiment.

[0594] 1. Before the terminal initiates a NAS message (e.g. NAS / PCF message) to the PCF via the RAN node, the terminal derives K NASA from the stored K NF using its own ID, the type or instance ID of the target NF (i.e. PCF) and the uplink NAS / PCF COUNT. PCF .

[0595] 2. The terminal encapsulates the unprotected NAS message in a RRC message.

[0596] In some embodiments, the RRC message can also include the security capabilities of the terminal.

[0597] In some embodiments, the terminal can also include the type or instance ID of the target NF (i.e. PCF) in the RRC message.

[0598] Note: Since the terminal cannot determine the NAS / NF security context at this step without agreeing on a security algorithm, the terminal cannot protect the NAS message at this step. The NAS message should only include the minimum required information, i.e. subscription identifier (e.g. SUCI or GUTI), security capabilities of the terminal, etc.

[0599] 3. The RAN node forwards the unprotected NAS / PCF message and the security capabilities of the terminal to the PCF based on the type of the received NAS / PCF message or the type of the target NF indicated by the terminal.

[0600] 4. Upon receiving the unprotected NAS / NF message, the PCF sends a key generation request to the NASAF. The key generation request can include the terminal ID (e.g. IMSI, SUPI, etc.), the purpose of the key generation (e.g. derivation of NAS / PCF key) and the NAS / PCF COUNT.

[0601] 5. The NASAF retrieves the key K NASA based on the terminal identity received from the PCF and derives K NASA from K PCF using the received terminal identity, the NAS / PCF COUNT and the type or instance ID of the requesting NF (i.e. PCF).

[0602] In some embodiments, when NASAF and the terminal are from K NASA Derivation of K NF When using KDF, the following parameters are used to form the input.

[0603] FC = To Be Dertermined (TBD);

[0604] P0 == NF type, for example, NF type can be PCF, UDM, and this NF type can also be NF instance ID.

[0605] L0 = the length of P0;

[0606] P1 = UTC-based counter or uplink NAS / NF counter;

[0607] L1 = the length of P2;

[0608] The input key is a 256-bit key. NF .

[0609] P0 can be an NF type or an NF instance ID. For example, the NF instance ID may be available on a terminal or RAN node. P1 can be a UTC-based K NF The exported time point can also be the uplink NAS / NF count in the terminal. For example, assume that the terminal maintains a separate NAS counter for each NF, such as the uplink NAS / PCF count and the uplink NAS / UDM count.

[0610] The input key is a 256-bit K AUSF .

[0611] 6. NASAF returns a key generation response to PCF, which includes the derived K. PCF .

[0612] 7. Based on its own ability to support security algorithms and the security capabilities of the received terminal, PCF selects the integrity algorithm and encryption algorithm to be applied to NAS / PCF security protection. Based on the selected integrity algorithm, encryption algorithm, and the received K... PCF PCF from K PCF The NAS / PCF key (i.e., the key K used for integrity protection of NAS / PCF signaling) is derived from this. PCFint and the key K used for confidentiality protection of NAS / PCF signaling PCFenc At this point, the PCF establishes the NAS / PCF security context. Before sending the NAS / PCF SMC message, the PCF uses K... PCFint Activate integrity protection for NAS / PCF signaling.

[0613] 8. PCF sends a NAS / PCF SMC message to the terminal.

[0614] Here, the NAS / PCF SMC message includes at least the endpoint security capabilities for replay and the selected security algorithm (i.e., integrity algorithm and encryption algorithm). The NAS / PCF SMC message uses K... PCFint Perform integrity protection.

[0615] 9. The RAN node encapsulates the integrity-protected NAS / PCF SMC message in an RRC message and sends it to the terminal.

[0616] 10. The terminal, based on the security algorithm in the received NAS / PCF SMC message, selects from K... PCF Derive the key for NAS / PCF signaling (i.e., the key K used for integrity protection of NAS / PCF signaling). PCFint and the key K used for confidentiality protection of NAS / PCF signaling PCFenc At this point, the terminal establishes the NAS / PCF security context. From this step onwards, the shared NAS / PCF security context between the terminal and the PCF is established.

[0617] In some embodiments, when NF and terminal are based on K NF Export NAS / NF integrity key K NFint and NAS / NF confidentiality key K NFenc When using this parameter, the string S needs to be composed of the following parameters.

[0618] FC = To Be Dertermined (TBD);

[0619] P0 = Algorithm type distinguisher. For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is different for integrity algorithms and encryption algorithms.

[0620] L0 = Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0621] P1 = Algorithm identifier, typical algorithm identifiers may include, but are not limited to, the ID of AES, the ID of ZUC, etc.

[0622] L1 = Length of the algorithm identifier;

[0623] The input key is a 256-bit key. NF .

[0624] 11. The terminal uses the NAS / PCF security context to verify the integrity protection of the NAS / PCF SMC message.

[0625] 12. The terminal protects the NAS / PCF SMC complete message using the NAS / PCF security context and carries the NAS / PCF SMC complete message in an RRC message. Here, the NAS / PCF SMC complete message includes the complete initial NAS / PCF message.

[0626] 13. The RAN node sends the protected NAS / PCF SMC complete message to the PCF.

[0627] In some embodiments, the PCF decodes and verifies the received NAS / PCF SMC complete message using the NAS / PCF security context derived in step 7.

[0628] 14. The PCF sends a response message of the initial NAS / PCF message.

[0629] Here, the response message is protected by the NAS / PCF security context.

[0630] 15. The RAN node encapsulates the protected response message in an RRC message and sends to the UE.

[0631] In some embodiments, the operations executable by the terminal include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0632] The terminal derives K AUSF from K NASA based on the NAS A indication from the network after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0633] The terminal derives K NASA from K NF as a root key to protect NAS / NF signaling sent to NFs in the HPLMN.

[0634] In some embodiments, the operations executable by the AUSF include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0635] The AUSF derives K AUSF from K NASA based on the NAS A indication from the network after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0636] The AUSF is capable of registering the derived K NASA and the corresponding terminal ID to the NASAF.

[0637] In some embodiments, the operations executable by the NASAF include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0638] The NASAF is capable of receiving and storing the K NASA and the corresponding terminal ID sent by the AUSF.

[0639] The NASAF can send the derived K NASA derive K NF ;

[0640] The NASAF sends the derived K NF to the NF in the HPLMN.

[0641] In some embodiments, the operations that the NF in the HPLMN can perform include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0642] The NF sends a key generation request to the NASAF after receiving the NAS / NF message sent by the terminal;

[0643] The NF receives K NF from the NASAF.

[0644] The NF sends an acknowledgement message to the NASAF after receiving K NF .

[0645] Embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a device for implementing any of the above methods, for example, a device is provided, which includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by the terminal in any of the above methods. For another example, another device is provided, which includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by the network device (for example, an access network device, or a core network device, etc.) in any of the above methods.

[0646] It should be understood that the division of each unit or module in the above apparatus is only a logical function division, and all or part of them can be integrated into a physical entity or physically separated in actual implementation. In addition, the units or modules in the apparatus can be implemented in the form of processor calling software: for example, the apparatus includes a processor connected with a memory, the memory stores instructions, and the processor calls the instructions stored in the memory to implement any of the above methods or realize the functions of each unit or module of the above apparatus, wherein the processor is, for example, a general processor such as a central processing unit (CPU) or a microprocessor, and the memory is a memory in the apparatus or a memory outside the apparatus. Alternatively, the units or modules in the apparatus can be implemented in the form of hardware circuit, and the functions of part or all of the units or modules can be realized by the design of hardware circuit. The above hardware circuit can be understood as one or more processors; for example, in one implementation, the above hardware circuit is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), and the functions of part or all of the above units or modules are realized by the design of the logical relationship of elements in the circuit; for example, in another implementation, the above hardware circuit is a programmable logic device (PLD), and a field programmable gate array (FPGA) is taken as an example, which can include a large number of logic gate circuits, and the connection relationship between the logic gate circuits is configured by a configuration file, so as to realize the functions of part or all of the above units or modules. All units or modules of the above apparatus can be implemented in the form of processor calling software, or all units or modules can be implemented in the form of hardware circuit, or part of the units or modules are implemented in the form of processor calling software, and the remaining part is implemented in the form of hardware circuit.

[0647] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the processor is a circuit with signal processing capability. In one implementation, the processor can be a circuit with instruction reading and running capability, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, a graphics processing unit (GPU) (which can be understood as a microprocessor), a digital signal processor (DSP), and the like. In another implementation, the processor can implement certain functions through a logical relationship of a hardware circuit, and the logical relationship of the hardware circuit is fixed or reconfigurable. For example, the processor is a hardware circuit implemented by an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a programmable logic device (PLD), such as an FPGA. In the reconfigurable hardware circuit, the processor loads a configuration document to implement the configuration of the hardware circuit. It can be understood that the processor loads an instruction to implement the functions of the above part or all units or modules. In addition, the hardware circuit can also be designed for artificial intelligence, which can be understood as an ASIC, such as a neural network processing unit (NPU), a tensor processing unit (TPU), a deep learning processing unit (DPU), and the like.

[0648] FIG. 10A is a structural schematic diagram I of a network device according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 10A, the network device 1100 includes a first transceiver module 1101 and a first processing module 1102. The first transceiver module 1101 is configured to receive a first key sent by a second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; and the first key being used by a first node to generate a third key. The first processing module 1102 is configured to generate the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node being deployed in a home network.

[0649] Optionally, the first transceiver module 1101 is configured to perform the steps related to information receiving and sending performed by the network device (for example, the first node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which will not be described herein again. Optionally, the first processing module 1102 is configured to perform the steps related to information processing performed by the network device (for example, the first node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which will not be described herein again.

[0650] In some embodiments, the first transceiving module 1101 is configured to receive a first message sent by a third node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node.

[0651] In some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; and second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

[0652] In some embodiments, the first message carries third information, the third information comprising at least one of: a type of the third node; and an instance identification ID of the third node.

[0653] In some embodiments, the first processing module 1102 is configured to perform one of: generating the third key according to the first key, the second information, and the type of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, the second information, and the instance ID of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, fourth information, and the type of the third node; the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the third key; and generating the third key according to the first key, the fourth information, and the instance ID of the third node.

[0654] In some embodiments, the first transceiving module 1101 is configured to send a second message to the third node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the third key; the third key being used by the third node to generate a fourth key, the fourth key being used to protect a communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0655] In some embodiments, the first processing module 1102 is configured to store the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0656] In some embodiments, the first transceiving module 1101 is configured to receive a third message sent by a second node, the third message being used to request the first node to store a first key of the terminal; the third message comprising the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0657] FIG. 10B is a schematic structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 10B, the network device 1200 includes a second processing module 1201 and a second transceiver module 1202. The second processing module 1201 is configured to generate a first key based on a second key. The second key is a key generated when the second node performs first authentication on the terminal. The second transceiver module 1202 is configured to send the first key to a first node. The first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, and the third key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the third node. The third node is deployed in a home network. Optionally, the second processing module 1201 is configured to perform the steps related to information processing performed by the network device (e.g., the second node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the second transceiver module 1202 is configured to perform the steps related to information receiving and sending performed by the network device (e.g., the second node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again.

[0658] In some embodiments, the second processing module 1201 is configured to perform one of the following: generate the first key based on the second key and first information; the first information is used to identify the terminal; generate the first key based on the second key, the first information, and a first string.

[0659] In some embodiments, the second transceiver module 1202 is configured to send a third message to the first node, the third message being used to request the first node to store the first key; the third message includes the first key and the identification of the terminal.

[0660] In some embodiments, the second transceiver module 1202 is configured to receive fifth information sent by a fourth node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate the first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; the second processing module is configured to generate the first key based on at least the second key according to the fifth information.

[0661] In some embodiments, the second transceiver module 1202 is configured to send sixth information to the terminal, the sixth information being used to instruct the terminal to generate the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed; the first key is used by the terminal to generate the third key.

[0662] In some embodiments, the fifth information is included in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

[0663] FIG. 10C is a schematic diagram of a structure of a terminal according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 10C, the terminal 1300 includes a third processing module 1301 configured to generate a third key based on a first key, wherein the first key is generated based on a second key, the second key is a key generated when a second node performs first authentication on the terminal, and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node, and the third node is deployed in a home network. Optionally, the third processing module 1301 is configured to perform steps related to information processing performed by the terminal in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the terminal 1300 further includes a transceiver module configured to perform steps related to information receiving and sending performed by the terminal in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again.

[0664] In some embodiments, the third processing module 1301 is configured to perform one of the following: generating the first key based on the second key and first information, wherein the first information is used to identify the terminal; and generating the first key based on the second key, the first information, and a first string.

[0665] In some embodiments, the third processing module 1301 is configured to perform one of the following: generating the third key based on the first key, second information, and a type of the third node, wherein the second information is used to indicate a first count value, and the first count value is used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; generating the third key based on the first key, the second information, and an instance ID of the third node; generating the third key based on the first key, fourth information, and the type of the third node, wherein the fourth information is used to indicate a generation period of the third key; and generating the third key based on the first key, the fourth information, and the instance ID of the third node.

[0666] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to receive sixth information sent by the second node, wherein the sixth information is used to indicate that the terminal generates the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0667] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to send a fourth message to the third node, wherein the fourth message is an unprotected message, and the fourth message is used by the third node to determine a first security algorithm, and the first security algorithm is used by the terminal to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0668] In some embodiments, the fourth message includes at least one of the following: the first information used to identify the terminal; the second information used to indicate the first count value, and the first count value is used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; and seventh information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, and the first capability is used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0669] In some embodiments, the transceiving module is configured to receive a fifth message sent by the third node; and the third processing module 1301 is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the fifth message, and generate the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0670] In some embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the fourth key by the third node.

[0671] In some embodiments, the fifth message includes at least one of the following: seventh information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate security algorithms supported by the terminal; and eighth information used to identify the first security algorithm.

[0672] In some embodiments, the third processing module 1301 is configured to protect a sixth message using the fourth key; and the transceiving module is configured to send the sixth message to the third node, the sixth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm.

[0673] In some embodiments, the sixth message includes a non-access stratum (NAS) message; the transceiving module is configured to receive a seventh message sent by the third node, the seventh message being a response message of the NAS message; and the seventh message is a message that is protected by the fourth key.

[0674] FIG. 10D is a structural schematic diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 10D, the network device 1400 includes a third transceiving module 1401 configured to receive a fourth message sent by a terminal, the fourth message being an unprotected message; send a first message to a first node according to the fourth message, the first message being used to request the first node to generate a third key for a third node; and the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal. Optionally, the third transceiving module 1401 is configured to perform steps related to information receiving and sending performed by a network device (e.g., the third node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the network device 1400 further includes a processing module configured to perform steps related to information processing performed by the network device (e.g., the third node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again.

[0675] In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate the fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node. In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate the fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

[0676] In some embodiments, the fourth message comprises at least one of: first information for identifying the terminal; second information for indicating the first count value, the first count value being used to indicate the number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; and seventh information for indicating the first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0677] In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the seventh information and the ninth information, the ninth information being used to indicate the second capability of the third node, the second capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the third node.

[0678] In some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information for identifying the terminal; and second information for indicating the first count value, the first count value being used to indicate the number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

[0679] In some embodiments, the third transceiver module 1401 is configured to receive a second message sent by the first node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the third key; and the processing module is configured to generate a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

[0680] In some embodiments, the third transceiver module 1401 is configured to send a fifth message to the terminal, the fifth message being used for the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0681] In some embodiments, the fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the fourth key used by the third node.

[0682] In some embodiments, the fifth message comprises at least one of: seventh information for indicating the first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the terminal; and eighth information for identifying the first security algorithm.

[0683] In some embodiments, the third transceiver module 1401 is configured to receive a sixth message sent by the terminal, the sixth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm; and the sixth message is a message that is protected by the fourth key used by the terminal.

[0684] In some embodiments, the sixth message comprises a NAS message; the processing module is configured to determine the seventh message according to the NAS message; the sixth message is a response message of the NAS message; the seventh message is protected by the fourth key; and the third transceiver module 1401 is configured to send the seventh message to the terminal.

[0685] FIG. 10E is a structural diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 10E, the network device 1500 includes a fourth transceiver module 1501 configured to send fifth information to the second node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, the third key being a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network. Optionally, the fourth transceiver module 1501 is configured to perform the steps related to information receiving and sending performed by the network device (e.g., the fourth node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the network device 1500 further includes a processing module configured to perform the steps related to information processing performed by the network device (e.g., the fourth node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again.

[0686] In some embodiments, the fourth transceiver module 1501 is configured to perform one of the following: determining whether to send the fifth information according to the subscription information of the terminal; and determining whether to send the fifth information according to local configuration information.

[0687] In some embodiments, the fifth information is contained in a response message of the terminal authentication information obtaining request message.

[0688] FIG. 11A is a structural diagram of a communication device according to an example embodiment. The communication device 1600 can be a network device (e.g., an access network device or a core network device, etc.), a terminal (e.g., a user equipment, etc.), a chip, a chip system, or a processor supporting the network device to implement any of the above methods, or a chip, a chip system, or a processor supporting the terminal to implement any of the above data security processing methods. The communication device 1600 can be used to implement the data security processing method described in the above method embodiments, and specific implementation can be referred to the description in the above method embodiments.

[0689] As shown in FIG. 11A, the communication device 1600 includes one or more processors 1601. The processor 1601 can be a general-purpose processor or a special-purpose processor, etc., for example, a baseband processor or a central processing unit. The baseband processor can be used to process communication protocols and communication data, and the central processing unit can be used to control the communication device (e.g., a base station, a baseband chip, a terminal device, a terminal device chip, a DU or a CU, etc.), execute programs, and process data of the programs. The processor 1601 is used to invoke instructions to enable the communication device 1600 to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0690] In some embodiments, the communication device 1600 further includes one or more memories 1602 for storing instructions. Optionally, all or part of the memories 1602 can also be outside the communication device 1600.

[0691] In some embodiments, the communication device 1600 further includes one or more transceivers 1603. When the communication device 1600 includes one or more transceivers 1603, the communication steps such as transmitting and receiving in the above methods are performed by the transceivers 1603, and other steps are performed by the processor 1601.

[0692] In some embodiments, the transceiver can include a receiver and a transmitter, which can be separate or integrated together. Optionally, the terms transceiver, transceiving unit, transceiver, transceiving circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other, the terms transmitter, transmitting unit, transmitter, transmitting circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other, and the terms receiver, receiving unit, receiver, receiving circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other.

[0693] Optionally, the communication device 1600 further includes one or more interface circuits 1604, which are connected with the memories 1602, and can be used to receive signals from the memories 1602 or other devices, and can be used to send signals to the memories 1602 or other devices. For example, the interface circuit 1604 can read the instructions stored in the memories 1602 and send the instructions to the processor 1601.

[0694] The communication device 1600 described in the above embodiments can be a network device or a terminal, but the scope of the communication device 1600 described in the present disclosure is not limited thereto, and the structure of the communication device 1600 can not be limited by FIG. 11A. The communication device can be a standalone device or can be part of a larger device. For example, the communication device can be: (1) a standalone integrated circuit (IC), or a chip, or a chip system or subsystem; (2) a set of one or more ICs, optionally, the set of ICs can also include storage components for storing data, programs; (3) an ASIC, such as a Modem; (4) a module that can be embedded in other devices; (5) a receiver, a terminal device, a smart terminal device, a cellular phone, a wireless device, a handset, a mobile unit, a vehicle-mounted device, a network device, a cloud device, an artificial intelligence device, etc.; (6) others, etc.

[0695] FIG. 11B is a structural schematic diagram of a chip according to an exemplary embodiment. For the case where the communication device 1600 can be a chip or a chip system, the structural schematic diagram of the chip 1700 shown in FIG. 11B can be referred to, but is not limited thereto.

[0696] The chip 1700 comprises one or more processors 1701 configured to invoke instructions to cause the chip 1700 to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0697] In some embodiments, the chip 1700 further comprises one or more interface circuits 1702 connected with the memory 1703, which can be configured to receive signals from the memory 1703 or other devices, and can be configured to send signals to the memory 1703 or other devices. For example, the interface circuit 1702 can read instructions stored in the memory 1703 and send the instructions to the processor 1701. Alternatively, the terms interface circuit, interface, transceiver pin, transceiver, etc. can be replaced by each other.

[0698] In some embodiments, the chip 1700 further comprises one or more memories 1703 configured to store instructions. Alternatively, all or part of the memory 1703 can be outside the chip 1700.

[0699] The present disclosure also provides a storage medium having instructions stored thereon, which, when executed on the communication device 1600, cause the communication device 1600 to perform any of the above methods. Alternatively, the storage medium is an electronic storage medium. Alternatively, the storage medium is a computer-readable storage medium, but can also be a storage medium readable by other devices. Alternatively, the storage medium can be a non-transitory storage medium, but can also be a transitory storage medium.

[0700] The present disclosure also provides a program product, which, when executed by the communication device 1600, causes the communication device 1600 to perform any of the above communication methods. Alternatively, the program product is a computer program product.

[0701] The present disclosure also provides a computer program, which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0702] Other embodiments of the present application will be apparent to those skilled in the art from consideration of the specification and practice of the application disclosed herein. The present disclosure is intended to cover any and all variations of the present application which become apparent to those skilled in the art from this specification and which fall within the generic scope of the application. The specification and examples are illustrative of the application and are not intended to limit the scope of the application. The true scope of the application is set forth in the claims.

[0703] It should be understood that the application is not limited to the precise construction which has been described above and which shown in the drawings, and that various modifications and changes can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the application. The scope of the application should be limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a first node, and comprises the following steps: receiving a first key sent by a second node, wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; and the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key; generating the third key; the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises the following steps: receiving a first message sent by the third node, wherein the first message is used to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first message comprises at least one of the following: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, wherein the first count value is used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The first message carries third information, and the third information comprises at least one of the following: a type of the third node; and an instance identifier ID of the third node.

5. The method of claim 3 or 4, wherein, The step of generating the third key comprises one of the following: generating the third key according to the first key, the second information and the type of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, the second information and the instance ID of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, fourth information and the type of the third node; and the fourth information is used to indicate a generation period of the third key; generating the third key according to the first key, the fourth information and the instance ID of the third node.

6. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 5, wherein, The method further comprises the following steps: sending a second message to the third node, wherein the second message is a response message of the first message, and the second message comprises the third key; and the third key is used by the third node to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein, The method further comprises the following steps: storing the first key and an identifier of the terminal.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein, The step of receiving the first key sent by the second node comprises the following steps: receiving a third message sent by the second node, wherein the third message is used to request the first node to store the first key of the terminal; and the third message comprises the first key and the identifier of the terminal.

9. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a second node, and comprises the following steps: generating a first key based on a second key; the second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on a terminal; sending the first key to a first node; and the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, wherein the third key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein, The step of generating the first key based on the second key comprises one of the following: generating the first key based on the second key and first information; and the first information is used to identify the terminal; generating the first key based on the second key, the first information and a first string; the first string indicates a use of the first key.

11. The method of claim 9 or 10, wherein, The sending of the first key to the first node comprises: sending a third message to the first node, the third message being used to request the first node to store the first key of the terminal; the third message comprising the first key and an identity of the terminal.

12. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 11, wherein, The generating of the first key based on the second key comprises: receiving fifth information sent by a fourth node, the fifth information being used to indicate that the second node generates the first key for the terminal after successful completion of the first authentication of the terminal; generating the first key based on the second key according to the fifth information.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein, The method further comprises: sending sixth information to the terminal, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal generates the first key after successful completion of the first authentication; the first key being used by the terminal to generate a third key.

14. The method of claim 12 or 13, wherein, The fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

15. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a terminal, and the method comprises: generating a third key based on a first key; wherein the first key is generated based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by a second node when performing first authentication of a terminal, and the third key being a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a third node; the third node being deployed in a home network.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein, The method further comprises one of the following: generating the first key based on the second key and first information; the first information being used to identify the terminal; generating the first key based on the second key, the first information and a first string; The first string indicates a use of the first key.

17. The method of claim 15 or 16, wherein, The generating of the third key based on the first key comprises one of the following: generating the third key according to the first key, second information and a type of the third node; the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, the second information and an instance ID of the third node; generating the third key according to the first key, fourth information and a type of the third node; the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the third key; generating the third key according to the first key, the fourth information and an instance ID of the third node.

18. The method of any one of claims 15 to 17, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving sixth information sent by a second node, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal generates the first key after successful completion of the first authentication.

19. The method of any one of claims 15 to 18, wherein, The method further comprises: sending a fourth message to the third node, the fourth message being an unprotected message, and the fourth message being used by the third node to determine a first security algorithm, the first security algorithm being used by the terminal to generate a fourth key, the fourth key being used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein, The fourth message comprises at least one of the following: first information, used to identify the terminal; second information, used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; The seventh information is used for indicating a first capability of the terminal, and the first capability is used for indicating a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

21. The method of claim 19 or 20, wherein, The method further includes: receiving a fifth message sent by the third node; determining the first security algorithm according to the fifth message; generating the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

22. The method of claim 21, wherein, The fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the fourth key by the third node.

23. The method of claim 21 or 22, wherein, The fifth message includes at least one of: the seventh information is used for indicating a first capability of the terminal, and the first capability is used for indicating a security algorithm supported by the terminal; the eighth information is used for identifying the first security algorithm.

24. The method of any one of claims 21 to 23, wherein, The method further includes: protecting a sixth message by using the fourth key; sending the sixth message to the third node, and the sixth message is used for indicating that the terminal and the third node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm.

25. The method of claim 24, wherein, The sixth message includes a non-access stratum (NAS) message. The method further includes: receiving a seventh message sent by the third node, and the seventh message is a response message of the NAS message; and the seventh message is a message that is protected by the fourth key.

26. A data security processing method, wherein, The method performed by the third node further includes: receiving a fourth message sent by the terminal, and the fourth message is an unprotected message; sending a first message to a first node according to the fourth message; and the first message is used for requesting the first node to generate a third key for the third node; The third key is a root key used for protecting security of communication between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; and the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key. The second key is a key generated by the second node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

27. The method of claim 26, wherein, The method further includes: determining a first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and the first security algorithm is used for the third node to generate a fourth key, and the fourth key is used for protecting security of communication between the terminal and the third node.

28. The method of claim 27, wherein, The fourth message includes at least one of: first information used for identifying the terminal; second information used for indicating a first count value, and the first count value is used for indicating a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node; the seventh information is used for indicating a first capability of the terminal, and the first capability is used for indicating a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

29. The method of claim 28, wherein, The determining the first security algorithm according to the fourth message includes: determining the first security algorithm according to the seventh information and ninth information; and the ninth information is used for indicating a second capability of the third node, and the second capability is used for indicating a security algorithm supported by the third node.

30. The method of any one of claims 27 to 29, wherein, The first message includes at least one of: first information used for identifying the terminal; second information used for a first count value, and the first count value is used for indicating a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the third node.

31. The method of any one of claims 27 to 30, wherein, The method further includes: receiving a second message sent by the first node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the third key; generating the fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm.

32. The method of any one of claims 27 to 31, wherein, The method further comprises: sending a fifth message to the terminal, the fifth message being used for the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

33. The method of claim 32, wherein, The fifth message is a message that is integrity protected by the fourth key by a third node.

34. The method of claim 32 or 33, wherein, The fifth message comprises at least one of: seventh information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal; eighth information used to identify the first security algorithm.

35. The method of any one of claims 32 to 34, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving a sixth message sent by the terminal, the sixth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the third node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm; the sixth message being a message that is protected by the fourth key by the terminal.

36. The method of claim 35, wherein, The sixth message comprises a NAS message; The method further comprises: determining a seventh message according to the NAS message; the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; protecting the seventh message by using the fourth key; sending the seventh message to the terminal.

37. A data security processing method, wherein, The method performed by a fourth node further comprises: sending fifth information to a second node, the fifth information being used to indicate that the second node generates a first key for a terminal after a first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; wherein the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key being used by a first node to generate a third key, the third key being a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and a third node; the third node being deployed in a home network.

38. The method of claim 37, wherein, The method further comprises: determining whether to send the fifth information according to subscription information of the terminal; or determining whether to send the fifth information according to local configuration information.

39. The method of claim 37 or 38, wherein, The fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

40. A data security processing method, wherein, The method performed by a communication system comprises: a second node generates a first key based on a second key; the second key being a key generated by the second node when performing a first authentication of a terminal; the second node sends the first key to a first node; the first key being used by the first node to generate a third key; a terminal generates the third key based on the first key; the terminal sends a fourth message to a third node, the fourth message being an unprotected message; the third node sends a first message to the first node according to the fourth message; the first message being used to request the first node to generate the third key for the third node; the first node generates the third key; the third key being a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and the third node; the third node being deployed in a home network.

41. The method of claim 40, wherein, The method further comprises: the first node sends a second message to the third node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the third key; The third node determines a first security algorithm according to the fourth message; the first security algorithm is used by the third node to generate a fourth key; The third node generates a fourth key according to the third key and the first security algorithm; the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node.

42. The method of claim 40 or 41, wherein, The second node generates a first key based on a second key, including one of the following: generate the first key based on the second key and first information; the first information is used to identify the terminal; generate the first key based on the second key, the first information and a first string; the first string indicates the use of the first key.

43. The method of any one of claims 40 to 42, wherein, The method further comprises: The fourth node sends fifth information to the second node, the fifth information is used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; The second node generates a first key based on a second key, including: The second node generates the first key based on the second key according to the fifth information.

44. The method of claim 43, wherein, The method further comprises: The second node sends sixth information to the terminal, the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to generate the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed; the first key is used by the terminal to generate the third key.

45. A network device, wherein, comprise: The first transceiver module is configured to receive the first key sent by the second node, the first key being generated by the second node based on a second key; The second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication on the terminal; The first key is used by the first node to generate a third key; The first processing module is configured to generate a third key; The third key is a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; The third node is deployed in a home network.

46. A network device, wherein, comprise: The second processing module is configured to generate a first key based on a second key; The second key is a key generated by the second node when performing the first authentication on the terminal; The second transceiver module is configured to send the first key to the first node; The first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, the third key being a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; The third node is deployed in a home network.

47. A terminal, wherein, comprise: The third processing module is configured to generate a third key based on a first key; wherein the first key is generated based on a second key, and the second key is a key generated by a second node when performing the first authentication on a terminal; The third key is a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network.

48. A network device, wherein, comprise: The third transceiver module is configured to receive a fourth message sent by a terminal, the fourth message being an unprotected message; According to the fourth message, a first message is sent to a first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a third key for the third node; The third key is a root key used for protecting the communication security between the terminal and the third node; the third node is deployed in a home network; the third key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is obtained by the first node from a second node, and the first key is generated by the second node based on a second key; and the second key is a key generated by the second node when the terminal is authenticated for the first time.

49. A network device, wherein, The fourth transceiver module is configured to send fifth information to the second node, the fifth information being used to instruct the second node to generate a first key for the terminal after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed. The first key is generated by the second node based on a second key, the second key being a key generated by the second node when the terminal is authenticated for the first time; and the first key is used by the first node to generate a third key, the third key being a root key used for protecting the communication security between the terminal and a third node; and the third node is deployed in a home network. The communication system includes a terminal, a first node, a second node, a third node, and a fourth node; wherein 50. A communication system, wherein, The first node is configured to implement the data security processing method in any one of claims 1 to 8; The second node is configured to implement the data security processing method in any one of claims 9 to 14; The terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method in any one of claims 15 to 25; The third node is configured to implement the data security processing method in any one of claims 26 to 36; The fourth node is configured to implement the data security processing method in any one of claims 37 to 39. The communication device includes:

51. A communications device, comprising: one or more processors; The processor is used to call instructions to cause the communication device to execute the data security processing method in any one of claims 1 to 8, 9 to 14, 15 to 25, 26 to 36, and 37 to 39. The storage medium stores instructions, which, when executed on the communication device, cause the communication device to execute the data security processing method in any one of claims 1 to 8, 9 to 14, 15 to 25, 26 to 36, and 37 to 39.

52. A storage medium, wherein, 53. A computer program product comprising a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the data security processing method in any one of claims 1 to 8, 9 to 14, 15 to 25, 26 to 36, and 37 to 39. ​

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