Data security processing method, communication device, communication system, storage medium and program product

Abstract

Provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure are a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product. The method is executed by a first node. The method comprises: generating a second key on the basis of a first key, wherein the first key is a key generated when a first node performs first authentication on a terminal, the second key is a root key used for protecting the communication security between the terminal and a second node, and the second node is deployed within a home network. The technical solution provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure helps to use a first key generated when a first node performs first authentication on a terminal to generate a second key for a second node deployed within a home network, so as to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by means of the second key. Thus, the terminal can directly establish communication security with the second node within the home network.

Description

Data security processing method, communication device, communication system, storage medium and program product TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product. BACKGROUND

[0002] The sixth generation mobile communication system (6 th Generantion, 6G) architecture needs to streamline network functions (Network Function, NF). Streamlining NF has significant advantages in capacity, coverage, signaling overhead, scaling and energy overhead.

[0003] SUMMARY

[0004] The present disclosure provides a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product.

[0005] According to a first aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first node, and the method comprises: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0006] According to a second aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a terminal, and the method comprises: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0007] According to a third aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a second node, and the method comprises: receiving a third message sent by a terminal; the third message is an unprotected message; according to the third message, sending a first message to a first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0008] According to a fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a third node, and the method comprises: sending fifth information to a first node, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store a first key after a first authentication of a terminal is successfully completed; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect a communication security between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0009] According to a fifth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a data security processing method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a communication system, and the method comprises: generating, by a terminal, a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing a first authentication of the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect a communication security between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network; sending, by the terminal, a third message to the second node, the third message being an unprotected message; sending, by the second node, a first message to the first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node; and generating, by the first node, the second key based on the first key.

[0010] According to a sixth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a first node, is provided, and the network device comprises: a first processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing a first authentication of a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect a communication security between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0011] According to a seventh aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a terminal is provided, and the terminal comprises: a second processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing a first authentication of the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect a communication security between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0012] According to an eighth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a second node, is provided, and the network device comprises: a first transceiver module configured to receive a third message sent by a terminal; according to the third message, sending a first message to a first node; the third message is an unprotected message; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing a first authentication of the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect a communication security between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0013] According to a ninth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a network device, such as a third node, is provided, and the network device includes a second transceiver configured to send fifth information to the first node, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store a first key after a first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; the first key is a key generated by the first node when the first authentication of the terminal is performed; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, the third key is used to protect a communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0014] According to a tenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a communication system is provided, and the communication system includes a terminal, a first node, a second node, and a third node; the first node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the first aspect; the terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the second aspect; the second node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the third aspect; and the third node is configured to implement the data security processing method provided in the fourth aspect.

[0015] According to an eleventh aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a communication device, such as the terminal or the network device, is provided, and the communication device includes one or more processors; and the processor is used to invoke instructions to cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, or the fourth aspect.

[0016] According to a twelfth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a storage medium is provided, and the storage medium stores instructions; when the instructions are executed on a communication device, the communication device is caused to perform the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, or the fourth aspect.

[0017] According to a thirteenth aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a computer program is provided, and the computer program includes code; when the code is executed by a processor, the data security processing method provided in the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, or the fourth aspect is implemented.

[0018] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure are beneficial to generating a second key for a second node deployed in a home network by using a first key generated by a first node when the first node performs a first authentication of a terminal, so as to protect a communication between the terminal and the second node by using the second key. Based on this, the terminal can directly establish a secure communication with the second node in the home network, without the need to be forwarded through a specific relay node, thereby reducing the dependence on the relay node, and reducing the communication complexity and the communication delay between the terminal and the second node.

[0019] It should be understood that the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are only exemplary and explanatory, and cannot limit the embodiments of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0020] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated herein and form a part of the specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the description, further serve to explain the principles behind the embodiments of the application.

[0021] FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of an architecture of a communication system according to an example embodiment;

[0022] FIG. 1B is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture according to an example embodiment;

[0023] FIG. 1C is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture according to an example embodiment;

[0024] FIG. 1D is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy in a 5G network according to an example embodiment;

[0025] FIG. 2A is a schematic diagram of interactions of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0026] FIG. 2B is a schematic diagram of interactions of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0027] FIG. 3A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0028] FIG. 3B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0029] FIG. 3C is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0030] FIG. 4A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0031] FIG. 4B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0032] FIG. 4C is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0033] FIG. 5A is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0034] FIG. 5B is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0035] FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a flow of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0036] FIG. 7 is an interaction diagram III illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment;

[0037] FIG. 8A is a key hierarchy diagram II according to an example embodiment;

[0038] FIG. 8B is an interaction diagram illustrating generation and storage of a key K AUSF during a primary authentication process according to an example embodiment;

[0039] FIG. 8C is an interaction diagram of NAS security establishment by AUSF to generate a key according to an example embodiment;

[0040] FIG. 9A is a structure diagram I of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0041] FIG. 9B is a structure diagram of a terminal according to an example embodiment;

[0042] FIG. 9C is a structure diagram II of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0043] FIG. 9D is a structure diagram III of a network device according to an example embodiment;

[0044] FIG. 10A is a structure diagram of a communication device according to an example embodiment;

[0045] FIG. 10B is a structure diagram of a chip according to an example embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium and a program product.

[0047] In a first aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, which can be performed by a first node. The method includes: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0048] In the above embodiments, the first node generates a second key for a second node deployed in a home network by using a first key generated when the first node performs first authentication on a terminal, so as to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the second node by the second key. Based on this, the terminal can directly establish secure communication with the second node in the home network, without forwarding through a specific relay node, reducing the dependence on the relay node, thereby reducing the communication complexity between the terminal and the second node and reducing the communication delay.

[0049] In some embodiments of the first aspect, the second key is generated based on the first key, including: receiving a first message sent by the second node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node; and generating the second key based on the first key according to the first message.

[0050] In the above embodiments, the first node generates the second key for the requested second node by receiving the first message sent by the second node, and generating the second key based on the first key in response to the request of the second node. Since the second key is a root key, the requested second node can generate a key for protecting the communication security between the terminal and the second node by using the second key generated by the first node.

[0051] In some embodiments of the first aspect, the first message includes at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; and second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node.

[0052] In the above embodiments, the first node can obtain the input parameters for generating the first key by carrying the first information and / or the second information in the first message, so as to generate the first key for the second node.

[0053] In some embodiments of the first aspect, the first message carries third information, the third information including at least one of: a type of the second node; and an instance ID of the second node.

[0054] In the above embodiments, the first node obtains the type and / or the instance ID of the second node from the first message after receiving the first message, so as to use the type and / or the instance ID of the second node as input parameters when generating the first key subsequently, thereby making the second keys generated by the first node for different second nodes different, and thus realizing the isolation of the communication security between the terminal and different second nodes.

[0055] In some embodiments of the first aspect, the second key is generated based on the first key, including one of: generating the second key based on the first key, the first information, the second information, and the type of the second node; generating the second key based on the first key, the first information, the second information, and the instance ID of the second node; generating the second key based on the first key, the first information, fourth information, and the type of the second node, the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the second key; and generating the second key based on the first key, the first information, the fourth information, and the instance ID of the second node.

[0056] In the above embodiments, different implementations of generating the second key based on the type or instance ID of the second node, the first key and the first information are given. By introducing the count value of the uplink message sent by the terminal to the second node and the generation period of the second key in the process of generating the second key, the terminal generates different second keys when communicating with the second node at different time periods, thereby further improving the security of communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0057] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the method further includes: sending a second message to the second node, the second message being a response message of the first message, and the second message including the second key.

[0058] In the above embodiments, after generating the second key, the generated second key is sent to the second node by using the second message to respond to the first message sent by the second node. In this way, the second node can generate a key for protecting the security of communication between the terminal and the second node based on the received second key as a root key.

[0059] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the method further includes: storing the first key in a case where the first node successfully completes the first authentication of the terminal.

[0060] In the above embodiments, in a case where the first node successfully completes the first authentication of the terminal, the first node can determine to store the first key by itself, so as to subsequently generate the second key for the second node based on the stored first key, and to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the second node by using the second key.

[0061] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the method further includes: receiving fifth information sent by a third node; and the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0062] In the above embodiments, the first node stores the first key under the triggering of the fifth information by receiving the fifth information sent by the third node, so that in a case where the terminal needs to directly communicate with the second node, the first node can generate the second key for the second node by using the stored first key, and to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the second node by using the second key. In this way, the terminal can directly establish communication security with the second node in the home network.

[0063] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the method further includes: sending sixth information to the terminal according to the fifth information; and the sixth information being used to instruct the terminal to store the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0064] In the above embodiment, after the first node receives the fifth information, the sixth information can be sent to the terminal according to the fifth information to indicate the terminal to store the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed; so that when the terminal needs to communicate directly with the second node, the terminal can generate the second key for the second node by using the stored first key, to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by the second key. In this way, the terminal can directly establish communication security with the second node in the home network.

[0065] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the fifth information is contained in a response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

[0066] In the above embodiment, the fifth information is carried by multiplexing the existing response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message, thereby reducing the signaling overhead.

[0067] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the fifth information includes at least one of the following: first indication information for indicating whether the first node stores the first key; and second indication information for indicating the first purpose of the first node storing the first key.

[0068] In the above embodiment, the first indication information and / or the second indication information can be carried in the fifth information, so that the fifth information can not only indicate whether the first node stores the first key, but also indicate the first purpose of the first node storing the first key; so that the first node stores the first key according to the specific indication of the third node, and determines whether to use the first key according to the use purpose and the first purpose indicated by the third node when the first key needs to be used.

[0069] In combination with some embodiments of the first aspect, the first message further includes seventh information for indicating a second purpose of the first node generating the second key; and the generating the second key based on the first key includes: generating the second key based on the first key in a case where the first purpose and the second purpose are the same.

[0070] In the above embodiment, the seventh information carried by the first message is used to indicate the second purpose of the second node requesting the first node to generate the second key; so that the first node determines whether to generate the second key by determining whether the second purpose is the same as the first target of storing the first key indicated by the third node; so as to reduce unnecessary generation of the second key.

[0071] The second aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, which can be executed by a terminal, and the method includes: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key for protecting the communication security between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0072] In the above embodiment, the terminal generates the second key for the second node deployed in the home network by using the first key generated when the first node performs the first authentication on the terminal, so as to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by the second key. In this way, the terminal can directly establish the communication security with the second node in the home network.

[0073] With reference to some embodiments of the second aspect, the method further includes: storing the first key in a case where the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0074] In the above embodiment, in a case where the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed, the terminal can determine to store the first key by itself, so as to generate the second key for the second node according to the stored first key in the future, and protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by the second key.

[0075] With reference to some embodiments of the second aspect, the method further includes: receiving sixth information sent by the first node, the sixth information being used to instruct the terminal to store the first key of the first node after the first authentication is successfully completed; the sixth information is sent by the first node according to fifth information, and the fifth information is used to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0076] With reference to some embodiments of the second aspect, the second key is generated based on the first key, including one of the following: generating the second key according to the first key, first information, a type of the second node, and second information, the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, an instance ID of the second node, and the second information; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the type of the second node, and fourth information, the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the second key; and generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the instance ID of the second node, and the fourth information.

[0077] With reference to some embodiments of the second aspect, the method further includes: sending a third message to the second node; the third message being an unprotected message, and the third message being used for the second node to determine a first security algorithm, the first security algorithm being used for the terminal to generate a third key, and the third key being used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node.

[0078] In the above embodiments, the terminal sends the unprotected third message to the second node, so that the third message can be interpreted by the second node without a security context between the terminal and the second node, thereby enabling the second node to select the first security algorithm based on the unprotected third message, implementing security algorithm negotiation between the second node and the terminal, so as to generate the third key based on the negotiated first security algorithm, and protecting the communication security between the terminal and the second node by the third key.

[0079] In combination with some embodiments of the second aspect, the third message comprises at least one of: first information for identifying the terminal; second information for indicating a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; and eighth information for indicating a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0080] In the above embodiments, the third message carries at least one of the first information, the second information and the eighth information, so that the second node receiving the third message can determine the first security algorithm and / or obtain an input parameter for generating the second key; thereby facilitating the second node to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node based on the input parameter; and facilitating the second node to generate the third key based on the determined first security algorithm and the second key, and to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by the third key.

[0081] In combination with some embodiments of the second aspect, the method further comprises: receiving a fourth message sent by the second node; determining the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and generating the third key based on the first security algorithm and the second key.

[0082] In the above embodiments, the terminal receives the fourth message sent by the second node, on the one hand, learns the first security algorithm selected by the second node based on the fourth message, and completes the security algorithm negotiation between the terminal and the second node; and on the other hand, generates the third key based on the negotiated first security algorithm and the second key; thereby establishing a shared security context between the terminal and the second node.

[0083] In combination with some embodiments of the second aspect, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the second node using the third key.

[0084] In the above embodiments, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the second node using the third key, so that after generating the third key, the terminal can perform integrity verification on the fourth message by using the generated third key, thereby verifying the establishment of the shared security context between the terminal and the second node; and improving the success of establishing the shared security context between the terminal and the second node.

[0085] In some embodiments of the second aspect, the fourth message comprises at least one of: eighth information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal; and ninth information used to identify the first security algorithm.

[0086] In the above embodiments, by carrying the eighth information and / or the ninth information in the fourth message, the terminal can learn the first security algorithm selected by the second node, and complete the security algorithm negotiation between the terminal and the second node.

[0087] In some embodiments of the second aspect, the method further comprises: protecting the fifth message using the third key; and sending the fifth message to the second node, the fifth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm.

[0088] In the above embodiments, after the terminal generates the third key, the fifth message can be protected using the third key, and the fifth message can be sent to the second node, so that the second node learns that the terminal and the second node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm, and the terminal can subsequently directly communicate with the second node.

[0089] In some embodiments of the second aspect, the fifth message comprises a Non Access Stratum (NAS) message.

[0090] The method further comprises: receiving a sixth message sent by the second node, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; and the sixth message being a message protected by the third key.

[0091] In the above embodiments, in the case where the terminal multiplexes the fifth message to carry the NAS message, the terminal can receive the sixth message sent by the second node, the sixth message being a response message of the second node to the NAS message; in this way, the terminal implements one communication with the second node, and the fifth message and the sixth message are protected by the third key, which is conducive to improving the communication security between the terminal and the second node.

[0092] In a third aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, which can be executed by a second node, and the method comprises: receiving a third message sent by a terminal; the third message being an unprotected message; sending a first message to a first node according to the third message; the first message being used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; the second key being generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key being a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the second key being a root key used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node; and the second node being deployed in a home network.

[0093] In the above embodiments, since the security context between the terminal and the second node in the home network has not been established, the second node can receive the unprotected third message sent by the terminal, to send a first message to the first node according to the unprotected third message, to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node by using the first key generated when the terminal is authenticated for the first time; so that the second node can protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node based on the second key. In this way, the second node in the home network and the terminal directly establish communication security.

[0094] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, the method further includes: determining the first security algorithm according to the third message; the first security algorithm is used by the second node to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node.

[0095] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, the third message includes at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate the number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; and eighth information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0096] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, determining the first security algorithm according to the third message includes: determining the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and tenth information; the tenth information is used to indicate a second capability of the second node, the second capability being used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the second node.

[0097] In the above embodiments, the second node selects a suitable first security algorithm based on the security algorithm supported by itself and the security algorithm supported by the terminal, so as to be able to generate different third keys in adaptation to different security capability matching situations of the terminal and the second node.

[0098] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, the first message includes at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate the number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; and seventh information used to indicate a second purpose of the first node to generate the second key.

[0099] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, the method further includes: receiving a second message sent by the first node; the second message is a response message of the first message, and the second message includes the second key; and generating the third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0100] In combination with some embodiments of the third aspect, the method further includes: sending a fourth message to the terminal; the fourth message is used by the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0101] In some embodiments of the third aspect, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the second node using the third key.

[0102] In some embodiments of the third aspect, the fourth message includes at least one of: eighth information indicating a first capability of the terminal, the first capability indicating a security algorithm supported by the terminal; and ninth information identifying the first security algorithm.

[0103] In some embodiments of the third aspect, the method further includes: receiving a fifth message sent by the terminal, the fifth message indicating that the terminal and the second node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm; and the fifth message is a message that is protected by the terminal using the third key.

[0104] In some embodiments of the third aspect, the fifth message includes a NAS message; and the method further includes: determining a sixth message according to the NAS message, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; protecting the sixth message using the third key; and sending the sixth message to the terminal.

[0105] In a fourth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, which can be executed by a third node, and the method includes: sending fifth information to a first node, the fifth information indicating that the first node stores a first key after successfully completing first authentication of a terminal; wherein the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect communication security between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0106] In the above embodiments, the fifth information is used to indicate that the first node stores the first key after successfully completing the first authentication of the terminal, so that in the case that the terminal needs to directly communicate with the second node, the first node can generate the second key for the second node by using the stored first key, so as to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node by using the second key. In this way, the terminal can directly establish communication security with the second node in the home network.

[0107] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, the method further includes: determining whether to send the fifth information according to subscription information of the terminal; or determining whether to send the fifth information according to local configuration information.

[0108] In the above embodiments, the third node can determine whether the fifth information needs to be sent to the first node to indicate the terminal to store the first key according to the respective subscription information of the terminals; in this way, it is analyzed for each terminal separately whether the fifth information needs to be sent, thereby reducing information overhead. Alternatively, the third node determines whether the fifth information needs to be sent to all terminals in the home network to indicate the terminals to store the first key according to the local configuration information, without analyzing each terminal separately.

[0109] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, the fifth information is included in a response message to the terminal authentication information obtaining request message.

[0110] In some embodiments of the fourth aspect, the fifth information includes at least one of: first indication information indicating whether the first node stores the first key; and second indication information indicating a first purpose for which the first node stores the first key.

[0111] In the fifth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a data security processing method, executed by a communication system, including: generating, by a terminal, a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network; sending, by the terminal, a third message to the second node; the third message is an unprotected message; sending, by the second node, a first message to the first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node; and generating, by the first node, the second key based on the first key.

[0112] In some embodiments of the fifth aspect, the method further includes:

[0113] sending, by the first node, a second message to the second node; the second message is a response message to the first message, and the second message includes the second key;

[0114] determining, by the second node, a first security algorithm according to the third message; the first security algorithm is used by the second node to generate a third key;

[0115] generating, by the second node, the third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm; the third key is used to protect communication security between the terminal and the second node.

[0116] In some embodiments of the fifth aspect, the method further includes:

[0117] sending, by the second node, a fourth message to the terminal; the fourth message is used by the terminal to determine the first security algorithm;

[0118] determining, by the terminal, the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and generating, by the terminal, the third key based on the first security algorithm and the second key;

[0119] The terminal sends a fifth message to the second node, where the fifth message is used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm; and the fifth message is a message protected by the third key used by the terminal.

[0120] In combination with some embodiments of the fifth aspect, the method further includes:

[0121] The third node sends fifth information to the first node; and the fifth information is used to instruct the first node to store the first key after successful completion of the first authentication of the terminal.

[0122] The first node stores the first key in a case where the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0123] In combination with some embodiments of the fifth aspect, the method further includes:

[0124] The first node sends sixth information to the terminal; and the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to store the first key after successful completion of the first authentication.

[0125] The terminal stores the first key in a case where the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0126] In the sixth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a network device, such as a first node, which includes a first processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication of a terminal; and the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0127] In the seventh aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a terminal, which includes a second processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing first authentication of the terminal; and the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0128] In the eighth aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a second node, which includes a first transceiver module configured to receive a third message sent by a terminal; and send a first message to a first node according to the third message; the third message is an unprotected message; and the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication of the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0129] In a ninth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a third node, where the third node includes a second transceiver configured to send fifth information to the first node, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store a first key after a first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; the first key is a key generated by the first node when the first authentication of the terminal is performed; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect a communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

[0130] In a tenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication system, where the communication system includes a terminal, a first node, a second node, and a third node; the first node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect and the embodiments thereof; the terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the second aspect and the embodiments thereof; the second node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the third aspect and the embodiments thereof; and the third node is configured to implement the data security processing method described in any one of the fourth aspect and the embodiments thereof.

[0131] In an eleventh aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a communication device, where the communication device includes one or more processors; and the processor is configured to invoke instructions to cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0132] In a twelfth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a storage medium, where the storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions run on a communication device, cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0133] In a thirteenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer program product, when executed by a communication device, causes the communication device to perform the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0134] In some embodiments of at least one of the above eleventh aspect, the twelfth aspect, and the thirteenth aspect, the communication device can be a terminal or a network device. In an embodiment, the network device can be at least one of the first node, the second node, and the third node.

[0135] In a fourteenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer program, when running on a computer, causes the computer to perform the data security processing method described in any one of the first aspect, the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, and the embodiments thereof.

[0136] In conjunction with some embodiments of the fourteenth aspect above, the computer may be a communication device as described in one or more of the above embodiments.

[0137] Understandably, the aforementioned first node, terminal, second node, third node, communication device, communication system, storage medium, program product, and computer program are all used to execute the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure. Therefore, the beneficial effects that can be achieved can be referred to the beneficial effects in the corresponding methods, and will not be repeated here.

[0138] This disclosure provides a data security processing method, a communication device, a communication system, a storage medium, and a program product. In some embodiments, the terms "data security processing method" and "information processing method," "information transmission method," etc., can be used interchangeably, as can the terms "communication system" and "information processing system."

[0139] This disclosure is not exhaustive, but merely illustrative of some embodiments, and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of this disclosure. Unless otherwise specified, each step in a particular embodiment can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and the steps can be arbitrarily combined. For example, a solution after removing some steps in a particular embodiment can also be implemented as an independent embodiment, and the order of the steps in a particular embodiment can be arbitrarily interchanged. Furthermore, the optional implementation methods in a particular embodiment can be arbitrarily combined; moreover, the embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, for example, some or all steps of different embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and a particular embodiment can be arbitrarily combined with the optional implementation methods of other embodiments.

[0140] In each of the disclosed embodiments, unless otherwise specified or in case of logical conflict, the terminology and / or descriptions of the embodiments are consistent and can be referenced by each other. Technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments based on their inherent logical relationships.

[0141] The terminology used in the embodiments of this disclosure is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of this disclosure.

[0142] In this embodiment of the disclosure, unless otherwise stated, elements expressed in the singular form, such as "a," "an," "the," "the," "the," "the," "the," "the," "this," etc., can mean "one and only one," or "one or more," "at least one," etc. For example, when using articles such as "a," "an," "the," etc. in translation, the noun following the article can be understood as either a singular expression or a plural expression.

[0143] In the embodiments disclosed herein, "multiple" refers to two or more.

[0144] In some embodiments, the terms "at least one of," "one or more of," "a plurality of," "multiple," and the like can be used interchangeably.

[0145] In some embodiments, the recitations "at least one of A, B," "A and / or B," "in one case A, in another case B," "one case A, another case B," and the like can include the following technical solutions according to the situation: in some embodiments, A (A is executed regardless of B); in some embodiments, B (B is executed regardless of A); in some embodiments, A and B are selectively executed (A and B are selectively executed); in some embodiments, A and B (A and B are executed). When there are more branches such as A, B, C, and the like, the above is similar.

[0146] In some embodiments, the recitations "A or B" and the like can include the following technical solutions according to the situation: in some embodiments, A (A is executed regardless of B); in some embodiments, B (B is executed regardless of A); in some embodiments, A and B are selectively executed (A and B are selectively executed). When there are more branches such as A, B, C, and the like, the above is similar.

[0147] The prefix words "first," "second," and the like in the embodiments of the present disclosure are merely used to distinguish different description objects, and do not constitute a limitation on the position, order, priority, quantity, or content of the description objects. The description of the description objects should refer to the description in the context of the claims or embodiments, and should not constitute an unnecessary limitation because of the use of the prefix words. For example, the description objects are "fields," and the ordinal words before "fields" in "first field" and "second field" do not limit the positions or orders between "fields." "First" and "second" do not limit whether the "fields" they modify are in the same message, nor do they limit the order of "first field" and "second field." For another example, the description objects are "levels," and the ordinal words before "levels" in "first level" and "second level" do not limit the priority between "levels." For another example, the quantity of the description objects is not limited by the ordinal words, and can be one or more. For example, "first device," where the quantity of "devices" can be one or more. In addition, the objects modified by different prefix words can be the same or different, for example, the description objects are "devices," and "first device" and "second device" can be the same device or different devices, and their types can be the same or different. For another example, the description objects are "information," and "first information" and "second information" can be the same information or different information, and their contents can be the same or different.

[0148] In some embodiments, "comprising", "including", "to indicate", "carrying", can be interpreted as directly carrying A, or indirectly indicating A.

[0149] In some embodiments, the terms "…", "determining …", "in the case of …", "when …", "when …", "if …", "if …", and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0150] In some embodiments, the terms "greater than", "greater than or equal to", "not less than", "more than", "more than or equal to", "not less than", "higher than", "higher than or equal to", "not lower than", "above", and the like can be replaced with each other, and the terms "less than", "less than or equal to", "not greater than", "less than", "less than or equal to", "not more than", "lower than", "lower than or equal to", "not higher than", "below", and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0151] In some embodiments, the device and the like can be interpreted as physical or virtual, and the name is not limited to the name described in the embodiments. The terms "device", "equipment", "device", "circuit", "network element", "node", "function", "unit", "section", "system", "network", "chip", "chip system", "entity", "subject", and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0152] In some embodiments, "network" can be interpreted as a device (for example, access network device, core network device, etc.) contained in the network.

[0153] In some embodiments, the terms “access network device (AN device),” “radio access network device (RAN device),” “base station (BS),” “radio base station,” “fixed station,” “node,” “access point,” “transmission point (TP),” “reception point (RP),” “transmission / reception point (TRP),” “panel,” “antenna panel,” “antenna array,” “cell,” “macro cell,” “small cell,” “femto cell,” “pico cell,” “sector,” “cell group,” “serving cell,” “carrier,” “component carrier,” “bandwidth part (BWP),” and the like can be used interchangeably.

[0154] In some embodiments, the terms "terminal," "terminal device," "user equipment (UE)," "user terminal," "mobile station (MS)," "mobile terminal (MT)," "subscriber station," "mobile unit," "subscriber unit," "wireless unit," "remote unit," "mobile device," "wireless device," "wireless communication device," "remote device," "mobile subscriber station," "access terminal," "mobile terminal," "wireless terminal," "remote terminal," "handset," "user agent," "mobile client," "client," and so on can be replaced with each other.

[0155] In some embodiments, the access network device, the core network device, or the network device can be replaced with a terminal. For example, the embodiments of the present disclosure can also be applied to a structure in which communication between the access network device, the core network device, or the network device and the terminal is replaced with communication between a plurality of terminals (e.g., device-to-device (D2D), vehicle-to-everything (V2X), etc.). In this case, the terminal can also be configured to have all or part of the functions of the access network device. In addition, the terms "uplink," "downlink," and the like can also be replaced with terms corresponding to the inter-terminal communication (e.g., "side"). For example, the uplink channel, the downlink channel, and the like can be replaced with the side channel, and the uplink, the downlink, and the like can be replaced with the sidelink.

[0156] In some embodiments, the terminal can be replaced with the access network device, the core network device, or the network device. In this case, the access network device, the core network device, or the network device can also be configured to have all or part of the functions of the terminal.

[0157] In some embodiments, obtaining data, information, etc. can comply with laws and regulations of the country where the location is.

[0158] In some embodiments, data, information, etc. can be obtained after obtaining consent from the user.

[0159] In addition, each element, each row, or each column in the table of the embodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and any combination of any element, any row, or any column can also be implemented as an independent embodiment.

[0160] FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram illustrating an architecture of a communication system according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0161] As shown in FIG. 1A, the communication system 100 includes a terminal 101 and a network device 102. In an embodiment, the network device 102 can include at least one of an access network device and a core network device.

[0162] In some embodiments, the terminal 101 includes at least one of a mobile phone, a wearable device, an Internet of Things device, a car with communication function, a smart car, a Pad, a computer with wireless transceiver function, a virtual reality (VR) terminal device, an augmented reality (AR) terminal device, a wireless terminal device in industrial control, a wireless terminal device in self-driving, a wireless terminal device in remote medical surgery, a wireless terminal device in smart grid, a wireless terminal device in transportation safety, a wireless terminal device in smart city, a wireless terminal device in smart home, etc., but is not limited thereto.

[0163] In some embodiments, the access network device, which can be at least one of an eNB, an ng-eNB, a gNB, a node B (NB), an HNB, an HeNB, a wireless backhaul device, a radio network controller (RNC), a base station controller (BSC), a base transceiver station (BTS), a base band unit (BBU), a mobile switching center, a base station in a 6G communication system, an Open RAN, a Cloud RAN, a base station in other communication systems, an access node in a Wi-Fi system, or the like, can access a terminal to a wireless network.

[0164] In some embodiments, the technical solutions of the present disclosure can be applied to an Open RAN architecture, in which the interfaces between or within the access network devices involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can become internal interfaces of the Open RAN, and the processes and information interactions between these internal interfaces can be implemented through software or programs.

[0165] In some embodiments, the access network device can be composed of a central unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU), where the CU can also be referred to as a control unit. The CU-DU structure can split the protocol layers of the access network device, and some of the protocol layers can be controlled by the CU, while the remaining protocol layers or all the protocol layers can be distributed in the DU and controlled by the CU, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto.

[0166] In some embodiments, the core network device can be one device including one or more network elements, or a plurality of devices or device groups each including one or more network elements. The network elements can be virtual or physical. The core network can include at least one of an Evolved Packet Core (EPC), a 5G Core Network (5GCN), and a Next Generation Core (NGC).

[0167] In some embodiments, the core network can include a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) and a home public land mobile network (HPLMN).

[0168] In some embodiments, the public land mobile network (PLMN) to which the terminal subscribes can also be referred to as the HPLMN, i.e., the home network of the terminal. When the terminal leaves the coverage of the HPLMN and enters the coverage of another PLMN due to movement or other reasons, the terminal can access the PLMN and be served by the PLMN. Thus, the PLMN accessed by the terminal can be referred to as the VPLMN.

[0169] In some embodiments, in a non-roaming scenario, i.e., the terminal is in the coverage of the HPLMN and is served by the HPLMN, the serving network and the home network of the terminal are the same PLMN.

[0170] In some embodiments, in a roaming scenario, i.e., the terminal is not in the coverage of the HPLMN and is served by the VPLMN, the serving network and the home network of the terminal are different PLMNs.

[0171] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, and the third node can be core network devices.

[0172] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, and the third node can be different network elements of the core network devices.

[0173] In some embodiments, the first node, the second node, and the third node can be deployed in the HPLMN.

[0174] In some embodiments, the first node can be configured to provide terminal authentication services.

[0175] In some embodiments, the first node is configured to protect configuration parameters or subscription parameters between the HPLMN and the terminal.

[0176] In some embodiments, the name of the first node is not limited, for example, it can be an authentication server function (AUSF), an authentication service function, etc.

[0177] In some embodiments, the second node can be any node in the HPLMN except for an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF). For example, the second node can be a Policy Control Function (PCF), a Unified Data Management (UDM), a Location Management Function (LMF), and the like.

[0178] In some embodiments, the third node can be configured to provide management and storage of data related to a user.

[0179] In some embodiments, the third node can be configured to store information such as a user identifier of a subscriber, a security context, subscription data, and the like of the subscriber in the HPLMN. In an example, the user identifier of the subscriber can be a Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI).

[0180] In some embodiments, the name of the third node is not limited, for example, it can be a Unified Data Management (UDM), a User Data Management, and the like.

[0181] It can be understood that the communication system described in the embodiments of the present disclosure is for more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure, and does not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure. It can be known by those skilled in the art that, as the system architecture evolves and new business scenarios appear, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0182] The following embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to the communication system 100 shown in FIG. 1A or part of the subject, but are not limited thereto. The subjects shown in FIG. 1A are examples, and the communication system can include all or part of the subjects in FIG. 1A, or other subjects other than those in FIG. 1A. The number and form of each subject is arbitrary, and the connection relationship between the subjects is an example. The subjects can not be connected or can be connected, and the connection can be in any manner, can be direct connection or indirect connection, and can be wired connection or wireless connection.

[0183] Embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), LTE-Beyond (LTE-B), SUPER 3G, IMT-Advanced, 4th generation mobile communication system (4G), 5th generation mobile communication system (5G), 6th generation mobile communication system (6G), 5G new radio (NR), Future Radio Access (FRA), New-Radio Access Technology (RAT), New Radio (NR), New radio access (NX), Future generation radio access (FX), Global System for Mobile communications (GSM (registered trademark)), CDMA2000, Ultra Mobile Broadband (UMB), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.20, Ultra-WideBand (UWB), Bluetooth (Bluetooth (registered trademark)), Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) network, Device-to-Device (D2D) system, Machine to Machine (M2M) system, Internet of Things (IoT) system, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), system using other communication methods, next-generation system expanded based on them, and the like. Further, a plurality of systems can be applied in combination (for example, combination of LTE or LTE-A and 5G, and the like).

[0184] In some embodiments, network functions (NFs) in the 6G architecture above are streamlined in order to significantly improve performance in terms of capacity, coverage, signaling overhead, scalability, and energy consumption, etc. Dependencies between NFs can lead to unnecessary complexity and even delays. By redesigning the network functions, the number of dependencies and processing points is reduced.

[0185] In an embodiment, the possibility of direct signaling between enhanced NFs of the 6G system is exploited in order to eliminate potential bottlenecks. For example, many services require information to be transmitted from a fifth generation mobile communication core network (5G Core, 5GC) to a terminal via a New Generation-Radio Access Netork (NG-RAN) node. In the 5GC, the information needs to be passed to the NG-RAN node via the AMF, for example, other NFs (e.g., LMF, PCF, etc.) other than the AMF transmit information via the interface between the NF and the AMF and the interface between the AMF and the NG-RAN node. In this case, the AMF can be considered as a relay node, and the transmitted information rarely needs to even does not need to involve the AMF. In order to simplify such transmission, the introduction of service-based interfaces (SBI) to the NG-RAN will allow this information to be exchanged directly between the NG-RAN and the NFs without going through the AMF. th Generation Core, 5GC) to a terminal via a New Generation-Radio Access Netork (NG-RAN) node. In the 5GC, the information needs to be passed to the NG-RAN node via the AMF, for example, other NFs (e.g., LMF, PCF, etc.) other than the AMF transmit information via the interface between the NF and the AMF and the interface between the AMF and the NG-RAN node. In this case, the AMF can be considered as a relay node, and the transmitted information rarely needs to even does not need to involve the AMF. In order to simplify such transmission, the introduction of service-based interfaces (SBI) to the NG-RAN will allow this information to be exchanged directly between the NG-RAN and the NFs without going through the AMF.

[0186] In some embodiments, if the RAN is developed in a service-oriented direction, it means that the RAN node can be a consumer or producer that provides services for other network functions except for the AMF. In the 5G system, only NAS signaling is supported between the terminal and the AMF of the core network. Generally, the NAS signaling is transparently transmitted through the RAN node. If the RAN can be enhanced to directly communicate with other core NFs without going through the AMF, it means that NAS signaling needs to be supported between the terminal and other core NFs in addition to the AMF. Therefore, a 6G multi-NAS architecture can be enabled so that the RAN node can directly communicate with any NF through a service interface, and the terminal can directly communicate with any NF using NAS signaling. As shown in FIG. IB, FIG. IB is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture I according to an exemplary embodiment. In FIG. IB, the four solid lines circled by the dashed line represent the service interfaces between the RAN node and the four different NFs (for the sake of easy distinction, the four different NFs are defined as NFa, NFb, NFc, and NFx) in the core network; since the service interface is arranged between the RAN node and the NF of the core network, the service interface can be referred to as a RAN-CORE service interface. The four solid lines circled by the solid line represent the transmission paths of the NAS signaling between the terminal and the four different NFs (i.e., NFa, NFb, NFc, and NFx) in the core network. It can be understood that the terminal can directly communicate with any NF in the core network through NAS, without the need to relay through other NFs in the core network.

[0187] Exemplarily, as shown in FIG. 1C, FIG. 1C is a schematic diagram of a 6G network architecture II according to an exemplary embodiment. As can be known from FIG. 1C, the UE has multiple NAS instances, specifically referring to NAS-NFx, NAS-NFy, and NAS-NFz in the UE in FIG. 1C; and the multiple NFs of the core network also have corresponding NAS instances corresponding to the UE, so that the UE can directly communicate with the corresponding NF in the core network through the NAS instance; for example, the UE can directly communicate with NFx in the core network through the NAS-NFx instance; or the UE can directly communicate with NFy in the core network through the NAS-NFy instance.

[0188] However, the NAS security of the NAS signaling is only supported by the terminal and the AMF. As shown in FIG. ID, FIG. ID is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy in a 5G network according to an exemplary embodiment. In FIG. ID, k, CK, and IK are authentication-related keys. CK' and IK' are keys derived based on CK and IK, and CK' and IK' are keys suitable for the EAP-AKA' authentication mode. K AUSF is an authentication key used in a home network; K SEAF is derived from KAUSF The derived key is provided by AUSF to the SEAF in the serving network. The terminal and SEAF are based on K... SEAF Derive the root key (K) used to protect the NAS communication security between the terminal and the core network. AMF ), K AMF NAS integrity key K derived for terminal and AMF NASint and / or NAS confidentiality protection key K NASenc Furthermore, no other core NF can derive the NAS security key. Other keys in Figure 1D, such as the key K between the terminal and the base station, are also relevant. gNB Key K used to protect user plane services UPenc and K UPint Key K used to protect Radio Resource Control (RRC) messages RRCint and K RRCenc and for non-third-generation partnership programs (3 rd The key K for accessing the Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) N3IWF All are directly or indirectly based on K AMF Derived from.

[0189] As shown in Figure 1D, the current key hierarchy design does not support NAS security between the terminal and other NFs, thus failing to protect NAS signaling between the terminal and other core NFs. Without protecting NAS signaling between the terminal and NFs, there is a risk that NAS signaling information will be tampered with or eavesdropped on when the RAN node forwarding NAS signaling is attacked.

[0190] Therefore, it is necessary to study how to provide security protection for 6G multi-NAS architecture.

[0191] In some embodiments, the key hierarchy is based on the root key derived from the SEAF residing in the serving network. However, for signaling between the terminal and NFs residing in the home network, the root key derived in the serving network will no longer be applicable to the NFs in the home network. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how to implement secure protection between the terminal and NFs in a home network.

[0192] Figure 2A is an interactive schematic diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in Figure 2A, this disclosure relates to a data security processing method, which can be applied to a communication system 100. The method includes:

[0193] Step S2101: The terminal generates a second key based at least on the first key.

[0194] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node, the instance ID of the second node, at least one of the first information, the second information, and the fourth information.

[0195] In some embodiments, the first key can be an input key of a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and at least one of the type of the second node, the instance ID of the second node, the first information, the second information, and the fourth information can be a generation parameter of the second key. The input key and the generation parameter are input into the KDF to generate the second key.

[0196] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal. In an example, when the first node is an AUSF, the first key can be K AUSF .

[0197] In some embodiments, the first key is an authentication key used by the first node in a first authentication process of the terminal.

[0198] In some embodiments, the first node can store the first key after successfully completing the first authentication on the terminal.

[0199] In some embodiments, the terminal can store the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0200] In some embodiments, the first authentication of the terminal can be an authentication triggered by the network when the terminal registers the network.

[0201] In some embodiments, in the process of registering the network, the terminal's service AMF triggers a terminal authentication request service provided by the first node; after the terminal authentication request service provided by the first node is triggered, the first node can further trigger a terminal authentication information acquisition request service provided by the third node to request to acquire authentication information of the terminal. The third node determines an authentication mode of the first authentication of the terminal; the third node returns the determined authentication mode as the authentication information of the terminal to the first node, so that the first node generates the first key based on the authentication mode to complete the first authentication of the terminal.

[0202] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key for protecting the security of communication between the terminal and the second node. In an example, when the second node is a PCF, the second key can be K PCF . In an example, when the second node is a UDM, the second key can be K UDM .

[0203] In some embodiments, the second key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect the communication between the terminal and the second node. Illustratively, the third key is used to protect the NAS communication between the terminal and the second node. It can be understood that the third key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the second node.

[0204] In some embodiments, the terminal can determine the type of the second node according to the requested service or function. For example, the terminal requests positioning, at this time, the type of the second node can be LMF. For example, the terminal requests UE subscription information update, at this time, the type of the second node can be UDM.

[0205] In some embodiments, the instance ID of the second node can be used to uniquely identify the second node. For example, the instance ID of the second node can be the device ID of the second node. In some embodiments, there can be one or more second nodes, and the instance ID of the second node can also be one or more.

[0206] In some embodiments, the terminal can be pre-configured with the instance ID of the second node. For example, when the terminal successfully registers to the home network, the network device can configure the terminal with the instance ID of the second node in the home network, so that the terminal directly communicates with the second node.

[0207] In some embodiments, through the information interaction between the terminal and the core network device (such as AMF), the core network device selects the serving second node for the terminal and sends the instance ID of the second node to the terminal, so that the terminal obtains the instance ID of the second node.

[0208] In some embodiments, the first information is used to identify the terminal. In an embodiment, the first information can be any information that can identify the terminal. Illustratively, the International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI), the Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI), the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), the 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI), the Network Access Identifier (NAI), etc. of the terminal can uniquely identify the terminal.

[0209] In some embodiments, the first information can be information pre-stored in the terminal. The terminal can obtain the first information from the pre-stored information.

[0210] In some embodiments, the second information is used for a first count value, the first count value indicating a number of uplink NAS messages sent by the terminal to the second node. For example, if the terminal has not sent any uplink NAS message to the second node, the count value indicated by the second information can be 0. If the terminal has sent 1 uplink NAS message to the second node, the count value indicated by the second information can be 1.

[0211] In some embodiments, the terminal can set a NAS counter for each NF in the core network, for recording a number of uplink NAS messages sent by the terminal to the corresponding NF. In this case, the terminal can determine the second information according to the NAS counter corresponding to the second node.

[0212] In some embodiments, the fourth information can be used to indicate a generation period of the second key. In an embodiment, the fourth information can be determined by the network synchronously with the terminal, and the present disclosure does not make specific limitation thereto.

[0213] In some embodiments, the unit of the generation period of the second key indicated by the fourth information can be microsecond, millisecond, second, etc. The unit of the generation period can be greater than a time required for transmitting information from the terminal to the first node, so that a time difference between the generation of the second key by the terminal and the generation of the second key by the first node can be negligible.

[0214] In some embodiments, the fourth information can be a counter value based on Universal Time Coordinated (UTC). In this case, the terminal can determine the fourth information based on the counter value of UTC.

[0215] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node and the second information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the type of the second node and the second information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF, to obtain the second key. In this case, the second keys corresponding to different types of second nodes are different, so as to realize isolation of communication security between the terminal and different second nodes.

[0216] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the second key according to the first key, the instance ID of the second node, and the second information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the second node and the second information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key. In this case, even if multiple different second nodes of the same type, the corresponding second keys are different, thereby further improving the isolation of the security of the communication between the terminal and the different second nodes.

[0217] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node, and the fourth information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the type of the second node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key. In this case, the terminal generates different second keys when communicating with the second node in different time periods, thereby further improving the security of the communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0218] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the second key according to the first key, the instance ID of the second node, and the fourth information. In this case, the terminal can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the second node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key.

[0219] In some embodiments, when generating the second key, the terminal can also input the first information as a generation parameter of the second key. Then, for different terminals, the second keys generated according to the type or instance ID of the second node, the second information, the first information, and the first key are different. In this way, when different terminals communicate with the second node using their respective second keys, the isolation of the security of the communication can be achieved. In an example, the first key is input as an input of the KDF, and the second key is generated in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0 = terminal ID; L0 = length of P0; P1 = type of the second node or instance ID of the second node; L1 = length of P1; P2 = counter value of UTC or count value of the uplink NAS message; L2 = length of P2.

[0220] Step S2102: The terminal sends a third message to the second node.

[0221] In some embodiments, the second node receives the third message sent by the terminal.

[0222] In some embodiments, the third message is an unprotected message. In some embodiments, the third message is an unencrypted message.

[0223] In some embodiments, the third message comprises at least one of: the first information, the second information, the eighth information.

[0224] In some embodiments, the eighth information is used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability is used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal. In an example, the security algorithm can comprise at least one of an integrity algorithm, a confidentiality algorithm, etc.

[0225] In some embodiments, the eighth information is used for the second node to determine a first security algorithm. In an embodiment, the first security algorithm is a security algorithm negotiated between the second node and the terminal.

[0226] In some embodiments, the first security algorithm is used by the second node to generate a third key. The terminal carries the eighth information in the third message so as to facilitate the negotiation of the security algorithm for the NAS communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0227] In some embodiments, since the third message is an unprotected message, the third message can only contain the minimum information required by the second node to generate the third key.

[0228] In some embodiments, the terminal can send the third message to the second node via the access network device.

[0229] In some embodiments, the terminal can send a first RRC message to the access network device, the first RRC message comprising the third message. It can be understood that, in the case that the third message needs to be forwarded to the second node via the access network device, the terminal sends the first RRC message carrying the third message to the access network device. The terminal can send the first RRC message to the access network device, and the access network device obtains the third message from the first RRC message after receiving the first RRC message, and forwards the third message to the second node.

[0230] In some embodiments, the access network device can be various types of base stations, for example, the access network device can be an eNB, a base station in a 6G communication system, etc.

[0231] In an example, the third message can be carried in the first RRC message in the form of a message container.

[0232] In some embodiments, in order to improve the security of the third message, the first RRC message can use an access stratum (AS) security context protection mechanism. Illustratively, the AS security context can comprise a confidentiality key and an integrity key for the communication between the terminal and the access network device, for example, the first RRC message can be encrypted using the confidentiality key in the AS security context, and / or the first RRC message can be integrity protected using the integrity key in the AS security context.

[0233] In some embodiments, the first RRC message can further include third information; wherein the third information includes at least one of the following: a type of the second node; an instance identification ID of the second node.

[0234] In some embodiments, the terminal can carry the type of the second node in the first RRC message; in this way, after the access network device receives the first RRC message, the access network device can select the second node for the terminal according to the type of the second node carried in the first RRC message. For example, the access network device can select the second node for the terminal according to the type of the second node, the location information of the terminal, and / or the second node that the access network device can reach.

[0235] In some embodiments, the first RRC message can further include address information of the second node.

[0236] In some embodiments, the address information of the second node can include, but is not limited to, an Internet Protocol (IP) address of the second node.

[0237] Step S2103: The second node determines the first security algorithm according to the third message.

[0238] In some embodiments, after the second node receives the third message, the second node can select the first security algorithm according to the second capability of the second node itself and the first capability of the terminal.

[0239] In some embodiments, before determining the first security algorithm, the second node can obtain tenth information; the tenth information is used to indicate the second capability of the second node, and the second capability is used to indicate the security algorithm supported by the second node.

[0240] In some embodiments, in the case that the third message includes the eighth information, the second node can determine the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and the tenth information.

[0241] In some embodiments, considering that the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal can be different, or the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are the same but the priority configuration of the security algorithm of the second node and the priority configuration of the security algorithm of the terminal are different. Therefore, in the embodiments of the present disclosure, the first security algorithm needs to be determined before the second node generates the third key.

[0242] Step S2104: The second node sends the first message to the first node.

[0243] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by the second node.

[0244] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node.

[0245] In some embodiments, the first message is not particularly limited, for example, can be a key generation request message, a key request message, a security request message, etc.

[0246] In some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of the first information, the second information, and the seventh information. In an embodiment, the first message comprises a message header and a message body; wherein the message body of the first message can carry at least one of the first information, the second information, and the seventh information.

[0247] In some embodiments, the seventh information is used to indicate a purpose (e.g., a second purpose) for which the first node generates the second key. In an example, the second purpose can be to derive a third key.

[0248] In some embodiments, the first message can further comprise third information. In an embodiment, the third information can be included in the message body of the first message. In an embodiment, the third information can be included in the message header of the first message.

[0249] In some embodiments, the third information included in the message header of the first message can also be used to indicate the sending node of the first message, e.g., the second node.

[0250] Step S2105: The first node generates the second key based at least on the first key.

[0251] In some embodiments, upon receiving the first message, the first node generates the second key based at least on the first key.

[0252] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to at least one of the first key, the type of the second node, the instance ID of the second node, the first information, the second information, and the fourth information.

[0253] In some embodiments, the first node can input the first key as an input key of a KDF, and at least one of the type of the second node, the instance ID of the second node, the first information, the second information, and the fourth information as a generation parameter of the second key into the KDF, to obtain the second key.

[0254] In some embodiments, in the case where the first message comprises the third information, the first node can determine the type of the second node and / or the instance ID of the second node according to the third information.

[0255] In some embodiments, the first node can obtain the first information based on the first message.

[0256] In some embodiments, the first node can further obtain the first information from the access network device, in which case, step S2104 can be omitted. In an embodiment, the first node can obtain the first information from the access network device through IP mapping in a case where the first message does not comprise the first information.

[0257] In some embodiments, the first node can obtain the second information based on the first message.

[0258] In some embodiments, in a case where the first message comprises the second information, the first node can obtain the second information based on the first message and use the second information as a generation parameter of the second key.

[0259] In some embodiments, in a case where the first message does not comprise the second information, the first node can obtain the fourth information and use the fourth information as the generation parameter of the second key. In an example, the fourth information can be a UTC-based counter value. In this case, the first node can determine the fourth information based on the UTC-based counter value.

[0260] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node, and the second information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of a KDF and input the type of the second node and the second information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key. In this case, the second keys corresponding to different types of second nodes are different, thereby realizing isolation of communication security between the terminal and different second nodes.

[0261] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the instance ID of the second node, and the second information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of a KDF and input the instance ID of the second node and the second information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key. In this case, even if multiple different second nodes of the same type, the second keys corresponding thereto are different, thereby further improving isolation of communication security between the terminal and different second nodes.

[0262] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node, and the fourth information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of a KDF and input the type of the second node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key. In this case, the second keys generated by the terminal in different time periods for communication with the second node are different, thereby further improving security of communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0263] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the instance ID of the second node, and the fourth information. In this case, the first node can input the first key as an input key of the KDF, and input the instance ID of the second node and the fourth information as generation parameters of the second key into the KDF to obtain the second key.

[0264] In some embodiments, when generating the second key, the first node can also input the first information as a generation parameter of the second key. In this case, the second key generated by the first node according to the type or instance ID of the second node, the second information, the first information, and the first key is also different for different terminals, so that the isolation of communication security can be achieved when different terminals use respective second keys to communicate with the second node.

[0265] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the process of generating the second key by the first node in step S2105 is similar to the process of generating the second key by the terminal in step S2101, and the terminal in step S2101 can be replaced by the first node. Accordingly, the process of generating the second key by the first node can refer to the process of generating the second key by the terminal in step S2101, which will not be described here.

[0266] Step S2106: The first node sends a second message to the second node.

[0267] In some embodiments, the second node receives the second message sent by the first node.

[0268] In some embodiments, the second message can include the second key. In an example, the first node can carry the second key in a security algorithm configuration message sent to the second node, and the security algorithm configuration message is used to configure the priority of the security algorithm supported by the second node.

[0269] In some embodiments, after generating the second key, the first node can send the second message to the second node to send the generated second key to the second node through the second message, so that the second node generates a third key based on the second key.

[0270] In some embodiments, the second message is a response message of the first message. In an embodiment, the name of the second message is not limited, for example, it can be a key generation response message, a key response message, a security response message, etc.

[0271] Step S2107: The second node generates a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0272] In some embodiments, the third key is used to protect the communication between the terminal and the second node. In some embodiments, the third key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the second node. Exemplarily, in the case that the second node is a PCF, the third key can be a NAS / PCF key.

[0273] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the third key according to the second key and at least one of the related information of the first security algorithm, such as the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm type, and the like.

[0274] In some embodiments, the second node can take the second key as the input key of the KDF, and take one or more of the first security algorithm related information, such as at least one of the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, as the generation parameter of the third key. The second node inputs the input key and the generation parameter into the KDF to generate the third key.

[0275] In some embodiments, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm can be used to uniquely identify the first security algorithm.

[0276] In some embodiments, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm can be used to indicate the type of the first security algorithm. For example, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm can include at least one of the following: a confidentiality algorithm; an integrity algorithm.

[0277] In some embodiments, the second node can pre-store the algorithm identifier and the algorithm type of the security algorithm supported by the second node; after the second node determines the first security algorithm, the algorithm identifier and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm can be obtained from the pre-stored algorithm identifier and the algorithm type of the security algorithm.

[0278] In some embodiments, the second node can generate the third key based on the second key and the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the second node can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm identifier. In some embodiments, the second node can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the second node can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0279] In an example, the second node uses the KDF to generate the third key with the second key as input and in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0 = algorithm type distinguisher, L0 = length of P0; P1 = security algorithm ID; L1 = length of P1.

[0280] Exemplarily, the type of the first security algorithm includes, but is not limited to, an integrity algorithm and / or a confidentiality algorithm.

[0281] Exemplarily, the security algorithm ID can be an ID for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), an ID for ZUC (Zhu Cunyi Algorithm), and the like.

[0282] In some embodiments, the third key includes at least one of: a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

[0283] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is a confidentiality algorithm, the second node generates a confidentiality key (as the third key) based on the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0284] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is an integrity algorithm, the second node generates an integrity key (as the third key) based on the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0285] Step S2108: The second node sends a fourth message to the terminal.

[0286] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fourth message sent by the second node.

[0287] In some embodiments, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third key used by the second node. In an example, the fourth message can be a NAS Security Mode Command (SMC) message.

[0288] In some embodiments, the fourth message includes at least one of: the eighth information, the ninth information.

[0289] In some embodiments, in a case where the first message includes the eighth information, the second node can obtain the eighth information based on the first message, and carry the eighth information in the fourth message to send to the terminal.

[0290] In some embodiments, the eighth information is used to indicate the first capability of the terminal for replay.

[0291] In some embodiments, in case that the security algorithm supported by the second node is the same as the security algorithm supported by the terminal, the second node can re-carry the eighth information in the fourth message for sending to the terminal.

[0292] In some embodiments, the ninth information is used for identifying the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the ninth information is used for the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0293] In some embodiments, the ninth information can be an algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm.

[0294] In some embodiments, the second node can pre-store algorithm identifiers and algorithm types of the security algorithms supported by the second node; after the second node determines the first security algorithm, the second node can obtain the algorithm identifier and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm from the pre-stored algorithm identifiers and algorithm types of the security algorithms. After the second node determines the first security algorithm, the second node can determine the ninth information according to the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm.

[0295] In some embodiments, the second node sends the fourth message to the terminal through the access network device. It can be understood that the second node sends the fourth message to the access network device, and the access network device can encapsulate the fourth message in a second RRC message and send the second RRC message to the terminal to send the fourth message to the terminal.

[0296] In some embodiments, in order to improve the security of the fourth message, the second RRC message is protected using an AS security context. Illustratively, the AS security context can include a confidentiality key and an integrity key for communication between the terminal and the access network device. For example, the second RRC message can be encrypted using the confidentiality key in the AS security context, and / or the second RRC message can be integrity protected using the integrity key in the AS security context.

[0297] Step S2109: The terminal determines the first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0298] In some embodiments, the first security algorithm is a security algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the second node.

[0299] In some embodiments, in case that the fourth message includes the ninth information, the terminal determines the first security algorithm according to the ninth information.

[0300] In some embodiments, the second node and the terminal can support different security algorithms, or the second node and the terminal can support the same security algorithms but the second node and the terminal can have different priority configurations of the security algorithms. Therefore, the second node selects a first security algorithm based on its second capability and the terminal's first capability, and informs the terminal of the selected first security algorithm through the fourth message, so that the terminal and the second node complete the negotiation of the security algorithm.

[0301] Step S2110: The terminal generates a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0302] In some embodiments, the third key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node. In some embodiments, the third key can be used to protect the NAS message between the terminal and the second node. For example, in the case that the second node is a PCF, the third key can be a NAS / PCF key.

[0303] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key according to the second key, and the related information of the first security algorithm, such as at least one of the algorithm identifier, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0304] In some embodiments, the terminal can use the second key as the input key of the KDF, and use at least one of the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type as the generation parameter of the third key. The terminal inputs the input key and the generation parameter into the KDF to generate the third key.

[0305] In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key based on the second key and the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm identifier. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, and the algorithm type of the first security algorithm. In some embodiments, the terminal can generate the third key based on the second key, the algorithm identifier of the first security algorithm, the length of the algorithm identifier, the algorithm type of the first security algorithm, and the length of the algorithm type.

[0306] In an example, the terminal uses the KDF, uses the second key as the input, and generates the third key in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0=algorithm type distinguisher, L0=length of P0; P1=security algorithm ID; L1=length of P1.

[0307] Exemplarily, the type of the first security algorithm includes, but is not limited to, an integrity algorithm and / or a confidentiality algorithm.

[0308] Exemplarily, the security algorithm ID can be an ID for an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), an ID for ZUC, and the like.

[0309] In some embodiments, the third key includes at least one of a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

[0310] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is a confidentiality algorithm, the terminal generates a confidentiality key based on the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0311] In some embodiments, in a case where the algorithm type of the first security algorithm is an integrity algorithm, the terminal generates an integrity key based on the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0312] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the process of generating the third key by the terminal in step S2110 is similar to the process of generating the third key by the second node in step S2107, the second node in step S2107 can be replaced by the terminal, and correspondingly, the process of generating the third key by the terminal can refer to the process of generating the third key by the second node in step S2107, which will not be described here.

[0313] In some embodiments, after generating the third key, the terminal performs integrity verification on a fourth message using the third key. It can be understood that the fourth message is a message that is integrity-protected by the second node using the third key; therefore, after the terminal generates the third key, the third key can be used to perform integrity verification on the fourth message, to verify the establishment of the shared security context between the terminal and the second node; and to improve the success of establishing the shared security context between the terminal and the second node.

[0314] Step S2111: The terminal sends a fifth message to the second node.

[0315] In some embodiments, the second node receives the fifth message sent by the terminal.

[0316] In some embodiments, the fifth message is used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete the negotiation of the first security algorithm.

[0317] In some embodiments, the fifth message can be an SMC completion message.

[0318] In some embodiments, before sending the fifth message, the terminal can protect the fifth message using the third key.

[0319] In some embodiments, the fifth message can comprise a NAS message. In some embodiments, the NAS message can be a NAS message that the terminal needs to send to the second node.

[0320] In some embodiments, the message content of the NAS message is different for different types of second nodes. For example, the second node is a UDM, the message content of the NAS message can be related to access authorization. For another example, the second node is a PCF, the message content of the NAS message can be related to session management.

[0321] In some embodiments, after the second node receives the fifth message, the second node can use the third key to decode and verify the fifth message.

[0322] Step S2112: The second node sends a sixth message to the terminal.

[0323] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth message sent by the second node.

[0324] In some embodiments, the sixth message is a response message of the NAS message.

[0325] In some embodiments, before sending the sixth message, the second node protects the sixth message using the third key.

[0326] In some embodiments, the term “information” can be mutually replaced with the terms “message”, “signal”, “signaling”, “report”, “configuration”, “indication”, “instruction”, “command”, “channel”, “parameter”, “field”, “data”, and the like.

[0327] In some embodiments, the term “send” can be mutually replaced with the terms “transmit”, “report”, “transport”, and the like.

[0328] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can comprise at least one of steps S2101 to S2112. For example, steps S2101 to S2103 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S2101 to S2111 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0329] In some embodiments, steps S2104 to S2112 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the second node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the second node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the second key.

[0330] In some embodiments, step S2112 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the NAS message is not included in the fifth message, after the second node receives the fifth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the second node does not need to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0331] FIG. 2B is a second interaction diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2B, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which can be used in the communication system 100, and the method comprises:

[0332] Step S2201: The third node sends fifth information to the first node.

[0333] In some embodiments, the first node receives the fifth information sent by the third node.

[0334] In some embodiments, the fifth information can be included in the response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message. It can be understood that the third node can reuse the existing response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message in the first authentication process of the terminal to carry the fifth information, so as to send the fifth information to the first node when the third node sends the response message of the terminal authentication information acquisition request message to the first node, thereby reducing the signaling overhead.

[0335] In some embodiments, the third node determines whether to send the fifth information according to the subscription information of the terminal. It can be understood that due to the different capabilities of different terminals in the home network, there can be a part of terminals that do not support direct communication with the second node; in this case, the first node does not need to store the first key of this part of the terminal. In order to reduce the unnecessary first key stored by the second node, the third node can determine whether to send the fifth information to the first node according to the subscription information of the terminal, so as to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0336] In some embodiments, the third node determines whether to send the fifth information according to the local configuration information. It can be understood that, in order to reduce signaling overhead, the third node can determine whether to send the fifth information to the first node according to the local configuration information, to prompt the first node to store the first key of all terminals in the home network; so that it is not necessary to determine whether to send the fifth information for each terminal separately.

[0337] In some embodiments, the fifth information is used to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0338] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal. In an example, in the case that the first node is an AUSF, the first key can be K AUSF .

[0339] In some embodiments, the first key is an authentication key used by the first node in the first authentication of the terminal.

[0340] In some embodiments, the first authentication of the terminal is an authentication triggered by the network when the terminal registers the network.

[0341] In some embodiments, in the process of the terminal registering the network, the service AMF of the terminal triggers a terminal authentication request service provided by the first node; after the terminal authentication request service provided by the first node is triggered, the first node can further trigger a terminal authentication information acquisition request service provided by the third node to request to acquire authentication information of the terminal. The third node determines an authentication mode of the first authentication of the terminal; the third node returns the determined authentication mode as the authentication information of the terminal to the first node, so that the first node generates the first key based on the authentication mode to complete the first authentication of the terminal.

[0342] In some embodiments, in the case that the first node receives the fifth information, the first node can store the first key after successfully completing the first authentication of the terminal.

[0343] In some embodiments, the first node can send an authentication key to the terminal in the process of the first authentication of the terminal.

[0344] In some embodiments, the fifth information includes at least one of the following: first indication information, second indication information.

[0345] In some embodiments, the first indication information is used to instruct whether the first node stores the first key.

[0346] In some embodiments, the first indication information can include an indication bit, and different bit values of the indication bit are used to indicate whether the first node needs to store the first key.

[0347] In some embodiments, the second indication information is used to indicate that the first node stores the first key for a first purpose.

[0348] Step S2202: The first node sends sixth information to the terminal.

[0349] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth information sent by the first node. In an example, in a case where the first node determines by itself that the first key needs to be stored, the first node can send the sixth information to the terminal to prompt the terminal to store the first key. In this case, step S2201 can be omitted.

[0350] In some embodiments, the first node sends the sixth information to the terminal according to the fifth information.

[0351] In some embodiments, the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to store the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0352] In some embodiments, in a case where the terminal receives the sixth information, the terminal stores the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0353] Step S2203: The terminal generates a second key based at least on the first key.

[0354] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2203 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2101 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0355] Step S2204: The terminal sends a third message to the second node.

[0356] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2204 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2102 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0357] Step S2205: The second node determines a first security algorithm according to the third message.

[0358] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2205 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2103 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0359] Step S2206: The second node sends the first message to the first node.

[0360] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S2206 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2104 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0361] Step S2207: The first node generates a second key based on at least the first key.

[0362] In some embodiments, after receiving the first message, the first node generates the second key based on at least the first key.

[0363] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated when the first node performs a first authentication of the terminal.

[0364] In some embodiments, the first authentication is an authentication triggered when the terminal registers a home network.

[0365] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0366] In some embodiments, the second key is used to generate a third key; the third key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node. Illustratively, the third key is used to protect security of NAS communication between the terminal and the second node. Here, the security of NAS communication can include security of NAS messages.

[0367] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, a type of the second node, and the second information.

[0368] In some embodiments, the second information is used to indicate a first count value, the first count value is used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node. Illustratively, if the terminal has not sent any uplink NAS message to the second node, the count value indicated by the second information can be 0.

[0369] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, an instance ID of the second node, and the second information.

[0370] In some embodiments, the first node takes the type or the instance ID of the second node as a generation parameter of the second key when generating the second key, so that the first node generates different second keys for different second nodes, thereby realizing isolation of security of communication between the terminal and different second nodes.

[0371] In some embodiments, the first node can determine third information according to a sending node of the first message; the third information includes at least one of the type and the instance ID of the second node.

[0372] In some embodiments, the first node determines the third information according to the sending node of the first message when the third information is carried in a message header of the first message.

[0373] In some embodiments, the first node determines the third information according to the first message in a case that the message body of the first message carries the third information.

[0374] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the type of the second node, and the fourth information; wherein the fourth information is used to indicate a generation period of the second key.

[0375] In some embodiments, the unit of the generation period of the second key indicated by the fourth information can be microsecond, millisecond, second, etc. The unit of the generation period should be greater than the time required for the information to be transmitted from the terminal to the first node, so that the time difference between the generation of the third key by the terminal and the generation of the third key by the first node can be ignored.

[0376] In some embodiments, the fourth information can be a counter value based on Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

[0377] In some embodiments, the first node can generate the second key according to the first key, the instance ID of the second node, and the fourth information. In some embodiments, the first node can also use the first information as a generation parameter of the second key when generating the second key. In this case, the second key is generated according to the type or instance ID of the second node, the second information, the first information, and the first key, or the second key is generated according to the type or instance ID of the second node, the fourth information, the first information, and the first key, so that the second keys corresponding to different terminals are different, thereby realizing the isolation of the communication security between different terminals and the second node.

[0378] In some embodiments, the first information can be any information that can identify the terminal. Exemplarily, the IMSI, IMEI, GUTI, NAI, etc. of the terminal can uniquely identify the information of the terminal.

[0379] In some embodiments, the first key is used as the input of a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and the second key is generated in combination with one or more of the following parameters: P0 = terminal ID; L0 = length of P0; P1 = type of the second node or instance ID of the second node; L1 = length of P1; P2 = counter value of UTC or count value of uplink NAS message; L2 = length of P2.

[0380] In some embodiments, in a case that the first purpose and the second purpose are the same, the second key is generated based at least on the first key; wherein the first message comprises seventh information, and the seventh information is used to indicate the second target of the first node to generate the second key.

[0381] Step S2208: The first node sends a second message to the second node.

[0382] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2208 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2106 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0383] Step S2209: The second node generates a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0384] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2209 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2107 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0385] Step S2210: The second node sends a fourth message to the terminal.

[0386] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2210 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2108 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0387] Step S2211: The terminal determines the first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0388] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2211 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2109 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0389] Step S2212: The terminal generates a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0390] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2212 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2110 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0391] Step S2213: The terminal sends a fifth message to the second node.

[0392] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2213 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2111 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0393] Step S2214: The second node sends a sixth message to the terminal.

[0394] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S2214 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2112 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts of the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0395] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can comprise at least one of steps S2201 to S2214. For example, steps S2201 to S2205 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, steps S2201 to S2213 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S2203 to S2214 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0396] In some embodiments, steps S2206 to S2214 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the second node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the second node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the second key.

[0397] In some embodiments, step S2214 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the NAS message is not included in the fifth message, after the second node receives the fifth message indicating that the negotiation of the first security algorithm is completed, the second node does not need to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0398] In some embodiments, steps S2201 and S2202 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the terminal and the first node can determine by themselves whether to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed, without the need for the third node to send the fifth information to the first node to instruct the first node to store the first key, or the need for the first node to send the sixth information to the terminal to instruct the terminal to store the first key.

[0399] FIG. 3A is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3A, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is performed by a first node, and the above method comprises:

[0400] Step S3101: receiving a first message.

[0401] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by a second node.

[0402] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3101 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2104 of FIG. 2A and other related parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not described herein again.

[0403] Step S3102: generating a second key based at least on the first key.

[0404] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3102 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2105 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0405] Step S3103: sending the second message.

[0406] In some embodiments, the first node sends the second message to the second node. In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3103 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2106 of FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which are not repeated here.

[0407] FIG. 3B is a flow diagram illustrating a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3B, the data security processing method according to the embodiments of the present disclosure is performed by a first node, and the method comprises:

[0408] Step S3201: receiving fifth information.

[0409] In some embodiments, the first node receives the fifth information sent by the third node.

[0410] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3201 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2201 of FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which are not repeated here.

[0411] Step S3202: sending sixth information.

[0412] In some embodiments, the first node sends the sixth information to the terminal.

[0413] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3202 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2202 of FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which are not repeated here.

[0414] Step S3203: receiving the first message.

[0415] In some embodiments, the first node receives the first message sent by the second node.

[0416] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3203 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2104 of FIG. 2A and step S2206 of FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not repeated here.

[0417] Step S3204: generating a second key based at least on the first key.

[0418] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3204 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2207 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0419] Step S3205: sending the second message.

[0420] In some embodiments, the first node sends the second message to the second node.

[0421] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S3205 can refer to the optional implementation manners of steps S2106 in FIG. 2A and S2208 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0422] The data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S3201 to S3205. For example, steps S3203 to S3205 can be implemented as independent embodiments, but are not limited thereto.

[0423] In some embodiments, steps S3201 and S3202 are optional, and one or more of the steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the terminal and the first node can determine whether to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed, without the need for the third node to send the fifth information to the first node to instruct the first node to store the first key, or the need for the first node to send the sixth information to the terminal to instruct the terminal to store the first key.

[0424] FIG. 3C is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3C, the data security processing method involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure is executed by a first node, and the above method includes:

[0425] Step S3301: generating a second key based at least on the first key.

[0426] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal.

[0427] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key for protecting the security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in the home network.

[0428] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S3301 can refer to optional implementation of step S2105 in FIG. 2A and step S2207 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, not described herein again.

[0429] FIG. 4A is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4A, the data security processing method is performed by the terminal 101, and the method comprises:

[0430] Step S4101: generating a second key based on at least a first key.

[0431] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4101 can refer to optional implementation of step S2101 in FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, not described herein again.

[0432] Step S4102: sending a third message.

[0433] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the third message to the second node.

[0434] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4102 can refer to optional implementation of step S2102 in FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, not described herein again.

[0435] Step S4103: receiving a fourth message.

[0436] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fourth message sent by the second node.

[0437] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4103 can refer to optional implementation of step S2108 in FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, not described herein again.

[0438] Step S4104: determining a first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0439] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4104 can refer to optional implementation of step S2109 in FIG. 2A, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, not described herein again.

[0440] Step S4105: generating a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0441] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4105 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2110 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0442] Step S4106: sending a fifth message.

[0443] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the fifth message to the second node.

[0444] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4106 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2111 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0445] Step S4107: receiving a sixth message.

[0446] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth message sent by the second node.

[0447] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4107 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2112 in FIG. 2A and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, which will not be repeated here.

[0448] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S4101 to S4107. For example, steps S4101 to S4102 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S4101 to S4106 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but not limited thereto.

[0449] In some embodiments, steps S4103 to S4107 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the second node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the second node does not need to send the fourth message to the first node.

[0450] In some embodiments, step S4107 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the fifth message does not contain the NAS message, after the second node receives the fifth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the second node does not need to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0451] FIG. 4B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4B, the data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure is executed by the terminal 101, and the above method includes:

[0452] Step S4201: receiving the sixth information.

[0453] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth information sent by the first node.

[0454] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4201 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2202 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0455] Step S4202: generating the second key based on at least the first key.

[0456] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4202 can refer to the optional implementation manners of steps S2101 in FIG. 2A and S2203 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0457] Step S4203: sending the third message.

[0458] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the third message to the second node.

[0459] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4203 can refer to the optional implementation manners of steps S2102 in FIG. 2A and S2204 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0460] Step S4204: receiving the fourth message.

[0461] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the fourth message sent by the second node.

[0462] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4204 can refer to the optional implementation manners of steps S2108 in FIG. 2A and S2210 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0463] Step S4205: determining the first security algorithm according to the fourth message.

[0464] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4205 can refer to the optional implementation manners of steps S2109 in FIG. 2A and S2211 in FIG. 2B and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0465] Step S4206: generating the third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0466] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4206 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2110 in FIG. 2A and step S2212 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0467] Step S4207: sending a fifth message.

[0468] In some embodiments, the terminal sends the fifth message to the second node.

[0469] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4207 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2111 in FIG. 2A and step S2213 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0470] Step S4208: receiving a sixth message.

[0471] In some embodiments, the terminal receives the sixth message sent by the second node.

[0472] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S4208 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2112 in FIG. 2A and step S2214 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0473] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S4201 to S4208. For example, steps S4201 to S4203 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, for example, steps S4201 to S4207 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, for example, steps S4202 to S4203 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, for example, steps S4202 to S4208 can be implemented as an independent embodiment. For example, steps S4201 to S4202 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, and steps S4202 to S4203 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but not limited thereto.

[0474] In some embodiments, steps S4204 to S4208 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the second node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the second node does not need to send the fourth message to the terminal.

[0475] In some embodiments, step S4208 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that, in the case where the NAS message is not included in the fifth message, after receiving the fifth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the second node does not need to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0476] In some embodiments, step S4201 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that the terminal can determine by itself whether to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed, and the first node does not need to send the sixth information to the terminal to instruct the terminal to store the first key. FIG. 4C is a flow diagram of a data security processing method six according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4C, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is performed by the terminal 101, and the above method comprises:

[0477] Step S4301: generating a second key based at least on the first key.

[0478] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal.

[0479] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key for protecting the security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in the home network.

[0480] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S4301 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2101 of FIG. 2A and step S2203 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0481] FIG. 5A is a flow diagram of a data security processing method seven according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 5A, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is performed by the second node, and the above method comprises:

[0482] Step S5101: receiving a third message.

[0483] In some embodiments, the second node receives the third message sent by the terminal.

[0484] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5101 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2102 of FIG. 2A and step S2203 of FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein again.

[0485] Step S5102: determining a first security algorithm according to the third message.

[0486] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5102 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2103 in FIG. 2A and step S2205 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0487] Step S5103: sending a first message.

[0488] In some embodiments, the second node sends the first message to the first node.

[0489] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5103 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2104 in FIG. 2A and step S2206 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0490] Step S5104: receiving a second message.

[0491] In some embodiments, the second node receives the second message sent by the first node.

[0492] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5104 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2106 in FIG. 2A and step S2208 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0493] Step S5105: generating a third key according to the second key and a first security algorithm.

[0494] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5105 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2107 in FIG. 2A and step S2209 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0495] Step S5106: sending a fourth message.

[0496] In some embodiments, the second node sends the fourth message to the terminal.

[0497] In some embodiments, other optional implementation of step S5106 can refer to the optional implementation of step S2108 in FIG. 2A and step S2210 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A, FIG. 2B, which are not described here again.

[0498] Step S5107: receiving a fifth message.

[0499] In some embodiments, the second node receives the fifth message sent by the terminal.

[0500] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5107 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2111 in FIG. 2A and step S2213 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein.

[0501] Step S5108: sending a sixth message.

[0502] In some embodiments, the second node sends the sixth message to the terminal.

[0503] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5108 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2112 in FIG. 2A and step S2214 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments related to FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described herein.

[0504] The data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure can include at least one of steps S5101 to S5108. For example, steps S5101 to S5102 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, for example, steps S5101 to S5107 can be implemented as an independent embodiment, but are not limited thereto.

[0505] In some embodiments, steps S5103 to S5108 are optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the security algorithm supported by the second node and the security algorithm supported by the terminal are different, the second node and the terminal cannot successfully negotiate the security algorithm; at this time, the second node does not need to send the first message to the first node to request the first node to generate the second key.

[0506] In some embodiments, step S5108 is optional, and one or more of these steps can be omitted or replaced in different embodiments. It can be understood that in the case where the fifth message does not contain the NAS message, after the second node receives the fifth message indicating that the first security algorithm negotiation is completed, the second node does not need to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0507] FIG. 5B is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 5B, the data security processing method related to the embodiments of the present disclosure is executed by a second node, and the above method includes:

[0508] Step S5201: receiving a third message.

[0509] In some embodiments, the second node receives the third message sent by the terminal.

[0510] In some embodiments, the third message is an unprotected message.

[0511] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5201 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2102 in FIG. 2A and step S2203 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described here.

[0512] Step S5202: transmitting a first message according to the third message.

[0513] In some embodiments, the second node transmits the first message to the first node according to the third message.

[0514] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node.

[0515] In some embodiments, the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication on the terminal.

[0516] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in the home network.

[0517] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S5202 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2104 in FIG. 2A and step S2206 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B, which are not described here.

[0518] FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 6, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is performed by a third node, and the above method comprises the following steps:

[0519] Step S6101: transmitting fifth information.

[0520] In some embodiments, the third node transmits the fifth information to the first node.

[0521] In some embodiments, other optional implementation manners of step S6101 can refer to the optional implementation manners of step S2201 in FIG. 2B, and other associated parts in the embodiments involved in FIG. 2B, which are not described here.

[0522] FIG. 7 is an interaction diagram three of a data security processing method according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 7, the embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a data security processing method, which is used in a communication system 100, and the method comprises one of the following steps:

[0523] Step S7101: The terminal generates a second key based on at least the first key.

[0524] In some embodiments, the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal.

[0525] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key for protecting security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in the home network.

[0526] Step S7102: The terminal sends a third message to the second node.

[0527] In some embodiments, the third message is an unprotected message.

[0528] Step S7103: The second node sends the first message to the first node according to the third message.

[0529] In some embodiments, the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node;

[0530] Step S7104: The first node generates a second key based on at least the first key.

[0531] In some embodiments, the second key is a root key for protecting security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in the home network.

[0532] In some embodiments, the above method can include the methods of the above communication system side, terminal side, access network device side, core network device side, etc. embodiments, which are not described here.

[0533] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present disclosure, the present disclosure is further illustrated by some exemplary embodiments.

[0534] In some embodiments, the current 5G security key hierarchy does not support protecting NAS signaling between the UE and NFs other than AMF. And the NAS security mode command (SMC) for NAS security algorithm (terminal and AMF) negotiation only supports execution between the terminal and AMF, and other NFs do not support the NAS SMC message.

[0535] In some embodiments, the key hierarchy is based on the root key derived by the SEAF residing in the serving network, which is not applicable to NAS signaling between the terminal and NFs (e.g., PCF, UDM, etc.) residing in the home network. In some embodiments, the 5G security key hierarchy is enhanced to support protection of 6G multi-NAS network architecture between the terminal and core NFs residing in the home network.

[0536] In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. ID, in a 5G system, the key for NAS signaling is derived by the terminal and the AMF based on a key hierarchy. The key (i.e., K AMF ) in the serving network is a key derived by the terminal and the SEAF from K SEAF . When performing horizontal key derivation, K AMF is further derived by the terminal and the source AMF.

[0537] The key for NAS signaling can include: K NASint and K NASenc ; wherein K NASint is a key derived by the terminal and the AMF from K AMF for integrity protection of NAS signaling based on a specific integrity algorithm. K NASenc is a key derived by the terminal and the AMF from K AMF for confidentiality protection of NAS signaling based on a specific encryption algorithm.

[0538] In some embodiments, in order to be able to protect NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and core NFs residing in the home network other than the AMF, the disclosure proposes that K AUSF needs to be derived from K NF as the security root for NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and a specific NF in the HPLMN. During primary authentication, K AUSF is derived by the terminal and the AUSF, respectively; based on K AUSF , the terminal and the AUSF further derive the key K NF for each specific target NF. The NAS / NF security key, i.e., K NFint for integrity protection of NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and the target NF and K NFenc for confidentiality protection of NAS / NF signaling between the terminal and the target NF, are derived by the terminal and the NF from K NF . As shown in FIG. 8A, FIG. 8A is a schematic diagram of a key hierarchy two, according to an exemplary embodiment. For example, the process of 5G primary authentication is performed during UE registration to authenticate the terminal; after the success of 5G primary authentication, K AUSF is stored in the AUSF and the terminal.

[0539] As shown in FIG. 8B, FIG. 8B is a schematic diagram of interactions for generating and storing the key K AUSF during the primary authentication process, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0540] 1. In the first authentication procedure, AUSF and UDM interact using the terminal authentication information retrieval request message (e.g. Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request) to retrieve the authentication information of the terminal, e.g. subscription credentials (AKA authentication vector) and authentication method.

[0541] 2. In the terminal authentication information retrieval response message (e.g. Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response), based on the local configuration for all terminals or per terminal subscription of the terminal, the UDM can indicate to the AUSF the key K AUSF derived based on the first authentication procedure whether it needs to be stored for further purposes (e.g. derivation of NAS / NF keys).

[0542] 3. If the AUSF receives the K AUSF storage indication from the UDM, the AUSF stores the K AUSF after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0543] In the first authentication procedure, the AUSF sends the K AUSF storage indication to the terminal via the AMF; if the terminal receives the indication, the terminal stores the K AUSF after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0544] As shown in FIG. 8C, FIG. 8C is a schematic diagram illustrating an interaction of NAS security establishment by AUSF generating a key according to an example embodiment.

[0545] 1. Before the terminal initiates a NAS message (e.g. NAS / PCF message) to the PCF via the RAN node, the terminal derives the K AUSF from the stored K NF using its own ID, the type or instance ID of the target NF and the uplink NAS / PCF COUNT. For example, K PCF when the NF is PCF.

[0546] 2. The terminal encapsulates the unprotected NAS message in a RRC message.

[0547] In some embodiments, the RRC message can also include the security capabilities of the terminal.

[0548] In some embodiments, the terminal can also include the type or instance ID of the target NF (i.e. PCF) in the RRC message.

[0549] NOTE: As the terminal cannot determine the NAS / NF security context at this step without having agreed on a security algorithm, the terminal cannot protect the NAS message at this step. The NAS message shall only include the minimum required information, i.e. subscription identifier (e.g. SUCI or GUTI), security capabilities of the terminal, etc.

[0550] 3. The RAN node forwards the unprotected NAS / PCF message and the security capabilities of the terminal to the PCF based on the type of the received NAS / PCF message or the type of the target NF indicated by the terminal.

[0551] 4. Upon reception of the unprotected NAS / NF message, the PCF sends a key generation request to the AUSF. The key generation request can include the terminal ID (e.g. IMSI, SUPI, etc.), the purpose of the key generation (e.g. derivation of the NAS / PCF key) and the NAS / PCF COUNT.

[0552] 5. The AUSF retrieves the key K AUSF from the terminal identifier received from the PCF and derives K AUSF from K PCF using the received terminal identifier, the NAS / PCF COUNT and the type or instance ID of the requesting NF (i.e. PCF).

[0553] In some embodiments, when the AUSF and the terminal derive K AUSF from K NF , the following parameters are used to form the input of the KDF.

[0554] FC = To Be Determined (TBD);

[0555] P0 = Terminal ID, e.g. the terminal ID can be the SUPI;

[0556] L0 = Length of P0;

[0557] P1 = Type of NF, e.g. the type of NF can be PCF, UDM, the type of NF can also be the NF instance ID.

[0558] L1 = Length of P1;

[0559] P2 = UTC-based counter or uplink NAS / NF COUNT;

[0560] L2 = Length of P2.

[0561] P0 can be any type of terminal ID shared between the terminal and the AUSF and the target NF. P1 can be an NF type, or an NF instance ID. For example, the NF instance ID can be available on the terminal or RAN node. P2 can be a UTC-based K NF The derivation point can also be an uplink NAS / NF count in the terminal. Exemplarily, it is assumed that the terminal maintains a separate NAS counter for each NF, such as an uplink NAS / PCF count, an uplink NAS / UDM count.

[0562] The input key is a 256-bit K AUSF .

[0563] 6. The AUSF returns a key generation response to the PCG, which includes the derived K PCF .

[0564] 7. The PCF selects an integrity algorithm and an encryption algorithm to be applied to the NAS / PCF security protection based on its own capability to support security algorithms and the received security capability of the terminal. Based on the selected integrity algorithm, encryption algorithm, and received K PCF , the PCF derives the NAS / PCF key (i.e., the key K PCF for integrity protection of the NAS / PCF signaling and the key K PCFint for confidentiality protection of the NAS / PCF signaling) from K PCFenc At this time, the PCF establishes a security context for the NAS / PCF. The PCF activates integrity protection for the NAS / PCF signaling using K PCFint before sending the NAS / PCF SMC message.

[0565] 8. The PCF sends the NAS / PCF SMC message to the terminal.

[0566] Here, the NAS / PCF SMC message includes at least the replayed terminal security capability, the selected security algorithm (i.e., the integrity algorithm and the encryption algorithm). The NAS / PCF SMC message is integrity protected using K PCFint .

[0567] 9. The RAN node encapsulates the integrity-protected NAS / PCF SMC message in an RRC message and sends it to the terminal.

[0568] 10. The terminal derives the keys for the NAS / PCF signaling (i.e., the key K PCF for integrity protection of the NAS / PCF signaling and the key K PCFint for confidentiality protection of the NAS / PCF signaling) from K PCFencAt this point, the terminal establishes the NAS / PCF security context. From this step onwards, the shared NAS / PCF security context between the terminal and the PCF is established.

[0569] In some embodiments, when NF and terminal are based on K NF Export NAS / NF integrity key K NFint and NAS / NF confidentiality key K NFenc When using this parameter, the string S needs to be composed of the following parameters.

[0570] FC = To Be Dertermined (TBD);

[0571] P0 = Algorithm type distinguisher. For example, the value of the algorithm type distinguisher is different for integrity algorithms and encryption algorithms.

[0572] L0 = Length of the algorithm type distinguisher;

[0573] P1 = Algorithm identifier, typical algorithm identifiers may include, but are not limited to, the ID of AES, the ID of ZUC, etc.

[0574] L1 = Length of the algorithm identifier;

[0575] The input key is a 256-bit key. NF .

[0576] 11. The terminal uses the NAS / PCF security context to verify the integrity protection of the NAS / PCF SMC message.

[0577] 12. The terminal uses the NAS / PCF security context to protect the NAS / PCF SMC completion message and carries the NAS / PCF SMC completion message in the RRC message. Here, the NAS / PCF SMC completion message includes the complete initial NAS / PCF message.

[0578] 13. The RAN node sends the protected NAS / PCF SMC completion message to the PCF.

[0579] In some embodiments, the PCF uses the NAS / PCF security context derived in step 7 to decode and verify the received NAS / PCF SMC completion message.

[0580] 14. PCF sends a response message to the initial NAS / PCF message.

[0581] Here, the response message is protected by the NAS / PCF security context.

[0582] 15. The RAN node encapsulates the protected response message in an RRC message and sends it to the UE.

[0583] In some embodiments, the operations that the terminal can perform include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0584] The terminal stores K AUSF based on an indication from the network after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0585] The terminal derives K AUSF from K NF as a root key to protect NAS / NF signaling sent to NFs in the HPLMN.

[0586] In some embodiments, the operations that the AUSF can perform include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0587] The AUSF stores K AUSF based on an indication from the UDM after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0588] The AUSF derives K AUSF from K NF based on a key generation request from an NF in the HPLMN.

[0589] The AUSF sends the derived K NF to the NFs in the HPLMN.

[0590] In some embodiments, the operations that the NF in the HPLMN can perform include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following:

[0591] The NF sends a key generation request to the AUSF after receiving a NAS / NF message sent by the terminal.

[0592] The NF receives K NF from the AUSF.

[0593] The NF sends an acknowledgement message to the AUSF after receiving K NF .

[0594] The embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a device for implementing any of the above methods, for example, a device is provided, which includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by the terminal in any of the above methods. For another example, another device is provided, which includes units or modules for implementing the steps performed by the network device (for example, an access network device, or a core network device, etc.) in any of the above methods.

[0595] It should be understood that the division of each unit or module in the above apparatus is only a logical function division, and all or part of them can be integrated into a physical entity or physically separated in actual implementation. In addition, the units or modules in the apparatus can be implemented in the form of processor calling software: for example, the apparatus includes a processor, the processor is connected with a memory, the memory stores instructions, and the processor calls the instructions stored in the memory to implement any of the above methods or realize the functions of the units or modules of the above apparatus, wherein the processor is a general processor such as a central processing unit (CPU) or a microprocessor, and the memory is a memory in the apparatus or a memory outside the apparatus. Alternatively, the units or modules in the apparatus can be implemented in the form of hardware circuit, and the functions of part or all of the units or modules can be realized by the design of hardware circuit. The above hardware circuit can be understood as one or more processors; for example, in one implementation, the above hardware circuit is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), and the functions of part or all of the units or modules are realized by the design of the logical relationship of elements in the circuit; for another example, in another implementation, the above hardware circuit is a programmable logic device (PLD), and a field programmable gate array (FPGA) is taken as an example, which can include a large number of logic gate circuits, and the connection relationship between the logic gate circuits is configured by a configuration file, so as to realize the functions of part or all of the units or modules. All units or modules of the above apparatus can be implemented in the form of processor calling software, or all units or modules can be implemented in the form of hardware circuit, or part of the units or modules are implemented in the form of processor calling software, and the remaining part is implemented in the form of hardware circuit.

[0596] In the embodiments of the present disclosure, the processor is a circuit with signal processing capability. In one implementation, the processor can be a circuit with instruction reading and running capability, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, a graphics processing unit (GPU) (which can be understood as a microprocessor), a digital signal processor (DSP), or the like. In another implementation, the processor can implement certain functions through a logical relationship of a hardware circuit, and the logical relationship of the hardware circuit is fixed or reconfigurable. For example, the processor is a hardware circuit implemented by an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a programmable logic device (PLD), such as an FPGA. In the reconfigurable hardware circuit, the processor loads a configuration document to implement the configuration of the hardware circuit. It can be understood that the processor loads instructions to implement the functions of the above part or all units or modules. In addition, the hardware circuit can also be designed for artificial intelligence, which can be understood as an ASIC, such as a neural network processing unit (NPU), a tensor processing unit (TPU), a deep learning processing unit (DPU), or the like.

[0597] FIG. 9A is a structural schematic diagram I of a network device according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 9A, the network device 9100 includes a first processing module 9101 configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when a first node performs first authentication on a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect the security of communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network. Optionally, the first processing module 9101 is configured to perform the steps related to information processing performed by the network device (such as the first node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which will not be described herein again. Optionally, the network device 9100 further includes a transceiver module, which is configured to perform the steps related to sending and receiving performed by the network device (such as the first node) in any of the above methods, which will not be described herein again.

[0598] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to receive a first message sent by the second node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node; and the first processing module is configured to generate the second key based on at least the first key according to the first message.

[0599] In some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; and second information used to indicate the first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node.

[0600] In some embodiments, the first message carries third information, the third information comprising at least one of: a type of the second node; and an instance identification ID of the second node.

[0601] In some embodiments, the first processing module is configured to perform at least one of: generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the second information, and the type of the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the second information, and the instance ID of the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, fourth information, and the type of the second node, the fourth information being used to indicate a time period for generating the second key; and generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the fourth information, and the instance ID of the second node.

[0602] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to send, to the second node, a second message, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the second key.

[0603] In some embodiments, the first processing module is configured to store the first key in a case where the first node successfully completes the first authentication of the terminal.

[0604] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to receive fifth information sent by a third node, the fifth information being used to indicate that the first node stores the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0605] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to send, to the terminal, sixth information according to the fifth information, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal stores the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

[0606] In some embodiments, the fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

[0607] In some embodiments, the fifth information comprises at least one of: first indication information used to indicate whether the first node stores the first key; and second indication information used to indicate a first purpose for which the first node stores the first key.

[0608] In some embodiments, the first message further comprises seventh information used to indicate a second purpose for which the first node generates the second key; and the first processing module is configured to generate the second key based at least on the first key in a case where the first purpose and the second purpose are the same.

[0609] FIG. 9B is a schematic diagram of a structure of a terminal according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in FIG. 9B, the terminal 9200 includes a second processing module 9201 configured to generate a second key based at least on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network. Optionally, the second processing module 9201 is configured to perform steps related to information processing performed by the terminal in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the terminal 9200 further includes a transceiver module configured to perform steps related to sending and receiving performed by the terminal in any of the above methods, which are not described herein again.

[0610] In some embodiments, the second processing module is configured to store the first key in a case where the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0611] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to receive sixth information sent by the first node, the sixth information being used to instruct the terminal to store the first key of the first node after the first authentication is successfully completed; the sixth information is sent by the first node according to fifth information, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

[0612] In some embodiments, the second processing module is configured to perform one of the following: generate the second key according to the first key, the first information, a type of the second node, and second information; the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; generate the second key according to the first key, the first information, an instance ID of the second node, and the second information; generate the second key according to the first key, the first information, the type of the second node, and fourth information; the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the second key; generate the second key according to the first key, the first information, the instance ID of the second node, and the fourth information.

[0613] In some embodiments, the transceiver module is configured to send a third message to the second node; the third message being an unprotected message, the third message being used by the second node to determine a first security algorithm, the first security algorithm being used by the terminal to generate a third key, the third key being used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node.

[0614] In some embodiments, the third message includes at least one of the following: the first information being used to identify the terminal; second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; eighth information being used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal.

[0615] In some embodiments, the transceiving module is configured to receive a fourth message sent by the second node; and the second processing module is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the fourth message, and generate the third key based on the first security algorithm and the second key.

[0616] In some embodiments, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third key by the second node.

[0617] In some embodiments, the fourth message includes at least one of: eighth information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate security algorithms supported by the terminal; and ninth information used to identify the first security algorithm.

[0618] In some embodiments, the second processing module is configured to protect a fifth message using the third key; and the transceiving module is configured to send the fifth message to the second node, the fifth message being used to indicate that the terminal completes negotiation of the first security algorithm with the second node.

[0619] In some embodiments, the fifth message includes a non-access stratum (NAS) message; the transceiving module is configured to receive a sixth message sent by the second node, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; and the sixth message is a message that is protected by the third key.

[0620] FIG. 9C is a schematic diagram of a structure of a network device according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 9C, the network device 9300 includes a first transceiving module 9301 configured to receive a third message sent by a terminal, and send a first message to a first node according to the third message, the third message being an unprotected message, the first message being used to request the first node to generate a second key for a second node, the second key being generated by the first node based on a first key, the first key being a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on the terminal, the second key being a root key used to protect communication security between the terminal and the second node, the second node being deployed in a home network. The first transceiving module 9301 is configured to perform steps related to information sending and receiving performed by a network device (e.g., the second node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which are not described herein again. Optionally, the network device 9300 further includes a processing module configured to perform steps related to information processing performed by the network device (e.g., the second node) in any of the above methods, which are not described herein again.

[0621] In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to determine a first security algorithm according to the third message, the first security algorithm being used by the second node to generate the third key, the third key being used to protect communication security between the terminal and the second node.

[0622] In some embodiments, the third message comprises at least one of: first information for identifying the terminal; second information for indicating the first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; and eighth information for indicating the first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate security algorithms supported by the terminal.

[0623] In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to determine the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and the tenth information, the tenth information being used to indicate a second capability of the second node, the second capability being used to indicate security algorithms supported by the second node.

[0624] In some embodiments, the first message comprises at least one of: first information for identifying the terminal; second information for indicating the first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; and seventh information for indicating a second purpose of the second key generated by the first node.

[0625] In some embodiments, the first transceiver module is configured to receive a second message sent by the first node, the second message being a response message of the first message, the second message comprising the second key; and the processing module is configured to generate a third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm.

[0626] In some embodiments, the first transceiver module is configured to send a fourth message to the terminal, the fourth message being used for the terminal to determine the first security algorithm.

[0627] In some embodiments, the fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the third key used by the second node.

[0628] In some embodiments, the fourth message comprises at least one of: eighth information for indicating the first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate security algorithms supported by the terminal; and ninth information for identifying the first security algorithm.

[0629] In some embodiments, the first transceiver module is configured to receive a fifth message sent by the terminal, the fifth message being used to indicate that the terminal completes negotiation of the first security algorithm with the second node; and the fifth message is a message that is protected by the third key used by the terminal.

[0630] In some embodiments, the fifth message comprises a NAS message; the processing module is configured to determine a sixth message according to the NAS message, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; the sixth message is protected by the third key; and the first transceiver module is configured to send the sixth message to the terminal.

[0631] FIG. 9D is a structural schematic diagram of a network device according to an example embodiment. As shown in FIG. 9D, the network device 9400 includes a second transceiver module 9401 configured to send fifth information to the first node, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed; wherein the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, and the third key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network. The second transceiver module 9401 is configured to perform the steps related to information sending and receiving performed by the network device (such as the third node) in any of the above data security processing methods, which will not be repeated here. Optionally, the network device 9400 further includes a processing module, which is configured to perform the steps related to information processing performed by the network device (such as the third node) in any of the above methods, which will not be repeated here.

[0632] In some embodiments, the processing module is configured to perform one of the following: determining whether to send the fifth information according to the subscription information of the terminal; and determining whether to send the fifth information according to the local configuration information.

[0633] In some embodiments, the fifth information is contained in a response message of the terminal authentication information obtaining request message.

[0634] In some embodiments, the fifth information includes at least one of the following: first indication information used to indicate whether the first node stores the first key; and second indication information used to indicate a first purpose of the first node storing the first key.

[0635] FIG. 10A is a structural schematic diagram of a communication device according to an example embodiment. The communication device 1100 can be a network device (such as an access network device or a core network device, etc.), a terminal (such as a user equipment, etc.), a chip, a chip system, or a processor supporting the network device to implement any of the above methods, or a chip, a chip system, or a processor supporting the terminal to implement any of the above data security processing methods. The communication device 1100 can be used to implement the data security processing method described in the above method embodiments, and specific implementation can be referred to the description in the above method embodiments.

[0636] As shown in FIG. 10A, the communication device 1100 includes one or more processors 1101. The processor 1101 can be a general processor or a special-purpose processor, etc., such as a baseband processor or a central processor. The baseband processor can be used to process communication protocols and communication data, and the central processor can be used to control a communication device (e.g., a base station, a baseband chip, a terminal device, a terminal device chip, a DU or a CU, etc.), execute programs, and process data of the programs. The processor 1101 is configured to invoke instructions to cause the communication device 1100 to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0637] In some embodiments, the communication device 1100 further includes one or more memories 1102 configured to store instructions. Optionally, all or part of the memory 1102 can also be outside the communication device 1100.

[0638] In some embodiments, the communication device 1100 further includes one or more transceivers 1103. When the communication device 1100 includes one or more transceivers 1103, the communication steps in the above methods, such as sending and receiving, are performed by the transceiver 1103, and the other steps are performed by the processor 1101.

[0639] In some embodiments, the transceiver can include a receiver and a transmitter, which can be separate or integrated together. Optionally, the terms transceiver, transceiving unit, transceiver, transceiving circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other, the terms transmitter, transmitting unit, transmitter, transmitting circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other, and the terms receiver, receiving unit, receiver, receiving circuit, etc. can be replaced by each other.

[0640] Optionally, the communication device 1100 further includes one or more interface circuits 1104 connected with the memory 1102. The interface circuit 1104 can be used to receive signals from the memory 1102 or other devices, and can be used to send signals to the memory 1102 or other devices. For example, the interface circuit 1104 can read instructions stored in the memory 1102 and send the instructions to the processor 1101.

[0641] The communication device 1100 described in the above embodiments can be a network device or a terminal, but the scope of the communication device 1100 described in the present disclosure is not limited thereto, and the structure of the communication device 1100 can not be limited by FIG. 10A. The communication device can be a standalone device or can be part of a larger device. For example, the communication device can be: (1) a standalone integrated circuit (IC), or a chip, or a chip system or subsystem; (2) a set of one or more ICs, which can optionally also include storage components for storing data, programs; (3) an ASIC, such as a modem; (4) a module that can be embedded in other devices; (5) a receiver, a terminal device, a smart terminal device, a cellular phone, a wireless device, a handset, a mobile unit, a vehicle-mounted device, a network device, a cloud device, an artificial intelligence device, and the like; (6) other devices, and the like.

[0642] FIG. 10B is a structural diagram of a chip according to an example embodiment. For the case where the communication device 1100 can be a chip or a chip system, reference can be made to the structural diagram of a chip 1200 shown in FIG. 10B, but not limited thereto.

[0643] The chip 1200 includes one or more processors 1201 for invoking instructions to cause the chip 1200 to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0644] In some embodiments, the chip 1200 further includes one or more interface circuits 1202 connected with the memory 1203, which can be used to receive signals from the memory 1203 or other devices, and can be used to send signals to the memory 1203 or other devices. For example, the interface circuit 1202 can read instructions stored in the memory 1203 and send the instructions to the processor 1201. Alternatively, the terms interface circuit, interface, transceiver pin, transceiver, and the like can be replaced with each other.

[0645] In some embodiments, the chip 1200 further includes one or more memories 1203 for storing instructions. Alternatively, all or part of the memory 1203 can be outside the chip 1200.

[0646] The present disclosure also provides a storage medium having instructions stored thereon, which, when executed on the communication device 1100, cause the communication device 1100 to perform any of the above methods. Alternatively, the storage medium is an electronic storage medium. Alternatively, the storage medium is a computer-readable storage medium, but can also be a storage medium readable by other devices. Alternatively, the storage medium can be a non-transitory storage medium, but can also be a transitory storage medium.

[0647] The present disclosure also provides a program product which, when executed by the communication device 1100, causes the communication device 1100 to perform any of the above communication methods. Optionally, the program product is a computer program product.

[0648] The present disclosure also provides a computer program which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform any of the above communication methods.

[0649] Other embodiments of the application will be apparent to those skilled in the art from consideration of the specification and practice of the application disclosed herein. It is intended that the present disclosure cover any and all variations of the present application which come within the scope of the following claims and their equivalents. It is intended that the specification and examples be considered exemplary only, with the true scope and spirit of the application being indicated by the following claims.

[0650] It is to be understood that the application is not limited to the precise details of design and construction set forth above and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, but that various modifications and changes can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the application. The scope of the application should, therefore, be determined not with reference to the above description, but instead with reference to the appended claims, along with their full scope of equivalents.

Claims

1. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a first node, and the method comprises: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when the first node performs first authentication on a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving a first message sent by the second node, the first message being used to request the first node to generate the second key for the second node.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The first message carries third information, and the third information comprises at least one of: a type of the second node; an instance identifier ID of the second node.

5. The method of claim 3 or 4, wherein, The generating the second key based on the first key comprises one of: generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the second information and the type of the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the second information and the instance ID of the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, fourth information and the type of the second node; the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the second key; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the fourth information and the instance ID of the second node.

6. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 5, wherein, The method further comprises: sending a second message to the second node, the second message being a response message of the first message, and the second message comprising the second key.

7. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 6, wherein, The method further comprises: storing the first key in a case where the first node successfully completes the first authentication on the terminal.

8. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 7, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving fifth information sent by a third node; the fifth information being used to indicate that the first node stores the first key after the first authentication on the terminal is successfully completed.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein, The method further comprises: sending sixth information to the terminal according to the fifth information; the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal stores the first key after the first authentication is successfully completed.

10. The method of claim 8 or 9, wherein, The fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

11. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, wherein, The fifth information comprises at least one of: first indication information used to indicate whether the first node stores the first key; second indication information used to indicate a first purpose for which the first node stores the first key.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein, The first message further comprises seventh information used to indicate a second purpose for which the first node generates the second key. The generating the second key based on the first key comprises: generating the second key based on the first key in a case where the first purpose and the second purpose are the same.

13. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a terminal, and the method comprises: generating a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated when a first node performs first authentication on a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein, The method further comprises: storing the first key in a case that the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed.

15. The method of claim 13 or 14, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving sixth information sent by the first node, the sixth information being used to indicate that the terminal stores the first key of the first node after the first authentication is successfully completed; the sixth information is sent by the first node according to fifth information, the fifth information being used to indicate that the first node stores the first key after the first authentication of the terminal is successfully completed. The generating of the second key based on the first key comprises one of the following:

16. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 15, wherein, generating the second key according to the first key, first information, a type of the second node and second information; the second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, an instance ID of the second node and the second information; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the type of the second node and fourth information; the fourth information being used to indicate a generation period of the second key; generating the second key according to the first key, the first information, the instance ID of the second node and the fourth information. The method further comprises:

17. The method of any one of claims 13 to 16, wherein, sending a third message to the second node; the third message being an unprotected message, the third message being used for the second node to determine a first security algorithm, the first security algorithm being used for the terminal to generate a third key, the third key being used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node. The third message comprises at least one of the following:

18. The method of claim 17, wherein, first information being used to identify the terminal; second information being used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; eighth information being used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal. The method further comprises:

19. The method of claim 17 or 18, wherein, receiving a fourth message sent by the second node; determining the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; generating the third key based on the first security algorithm and the second key. The fourth message is a message that is integrity protected by the second node using the third key.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein, The fourth message comprises at least one of the following:

21. The method of claim 19 or 20, wherein, eighth information being used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal; ninth information being used to identify the first security algorithm. The method further comprises:

22. The method of any one of claims 19 to 21, wherein, protecting a fifth message using the third key; sending the fifth message to the second node, the fifth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm. ​ 23. The method of claim 22, wherein, The fifth message comprises a non-access stratum (NAS) message. The method further comprises: receiving a sixth message sent by the second node, the sixth message being a response message of the NAS message; the sixth message being a message protected by the third key.

24. A data security processing method, wherein, The method performed by the second node further comprises: receiving a third message sent by the terminal; the third message being an unprotected message; sending, to the first node, a first message according to the third message; the first message being used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; wherein the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication on the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network.

25. The method of claim 24, wherein, The method further comprises: determining a first security algorithm according to the third message; the first security algorithm being used by the second node to generate a third key, the third key being used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node.

26. The method of claim 25, wherein, The third message comprises at least one of: first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; eighth information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal. The determining of the first security algorithm according to the third message comprises:

27. The method of claim 26, wherein, determining the first security algorithm according to the eighth information and tenth information; the tenth information being used to indicate a second capability of the second node, the second capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the second node. The first message comprises at least one of:

28. The method of any one of claims 25 to 27, wherein, first information used to identify the terminal; second information used to indicate a first count value, the first count value being used to indicate a number of uplink messages sent by the terminal to the second node; seventh information used to indicate a second purpose of the first node to generate the second key. The method further comprises:

29. The method of any one of claims 25 to 28, wherein, receiving a second message sent by the first node; the second message being a response message of the first message, and the second message comprising the second key; generating the third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm. The method further comprises:

30. The method of any one of claims 26 to 29, wherein, sending, to the terminal, a fourth message; the fourth message being used by the terminal to determine the first security algorithm. The fourth message is a message integrity protected by the third key used by the second node.

31. The method of claim 30, wherein, The fourth message comprises at least one of:

32. The method of claim 30 or 31, wherein, eighth information used to indicate a first capability of the terminal, the first capability being used to indicate a security algorithm supported by the terminal; ninth information used to identify the first security algorithm. The method further comprises:

33. The method of any one of claims 30 to 32, wherein, receiving a fifth message sent by the terminal, the fifth message being used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm; and the fifth message being a message protected by the third key used by the terminal. ​ 34. The method of claim 33, wherein, The fifth message comprises a NAS message; The method further comprises: determining a sixth message according to the NAS message; the sixth message is a response message of the NAS message; protecting the sixth message using the third key; sending the sixth message to the terminal.

35. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a third node, and the method comprises: sending fifth information to a first node, the fifth information being used to instruct the first node to store a first key after a first authentication of a terminal is successfully completed; wherein the first key is a key generated by the first node when the first node performs the first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, the third key is used to protect a communication between the terminal and a second node, and the second node is deployed in a home network.

36. The method of claim 35, wherein, The method further comprises: determining whether to send the fifth information according to subscription information of the terminal; or determining whether to send the fifth information according to local configuration information.

37. The method of claim 35 or 36, wherein, The fifth information is contained in a response message of a terminal authentication information acquisition request message.

38. The method of any one of claims 35 to 37, wherein, The fifth information comprises at least one of: first indication information used to indicate whether the first node stores the first key; and second indication information used to indicate a first purpose for which the first node stores the first key.

39. A data security processing method, wherein, The method is performed by a communication system, and the method comprises: generating, by a terminal, a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when the first node performs a first authentication of the terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect a communication between the terminal and a second node; and the second node is deployed in a home network; sending, by the terminal, a third message to the second node; the third message is an unprotected message; sending, by the second node, a first message to the first node; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for the second node; generating, by the first node, the second key based on the first key.

40. The method of claim 39, wherein, The method further comprises: sending, by the first node, a second message to the second node; the second message is a response message of the first message, and the second message comprises the second key; determining, by the second node, a first security algorithm according to the third message; the first security algorithm is used by the second node to generate a third key; generating, by the second node, the third key according to the second key and the first security algorithm; the third key is used to protect the communication between the terminal and the second node.

41. The method of claim 40, wherein, The method further comprises: sending, by the second node, a fourth message to the terminal; the fourth message is used by the terminal to determine the first security algorithm; determining, by the terminal, the first security algorithm according to the fourth message; and generating the third key based on the first security algorithm and the second key; sending, by the terminal, a fifth message to the second node; the fifth message is used to indicate that the terminal and the second node complete negotiation of the first security algorithm; and the fifth message is a message protected by the terminal using the third key.

42. The method of claim 40 or 41, wherein, The method further comprises: The third node sends fifth information to the first node; the fifth information is used to instruct the first node to store a first key after successful completion of first authentication of a terminal; The first node stores the first key in the case of successful completion of the first authentication of the terminal.

43. The method of claim 42, wherein, The method further comprises: The first node sends sixth information to the terminal; the sixth information is used to instruct the terminal to store the first key after successful completion of the first authentication; The terminal stores the first key in the case of successful completion of the first authentication.

44. A network device, wherein, Comprise: A first processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; The first key is a key generated by a first node when performing first authentication of a terminal; The second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

45. A terminal, wherein, The terminal comprises: A second processing module configured to generate a second key based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by a first node when performing first authentication of a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

46. A network device, wherein, Comprise: A first transceiver module configured to receive a third message sent by a terminal; According to the third message, a first message is sent to a first node; The third message is an unprotected message; the first message is used to request the first node to generate a second key for a second node; wherein the second key is generated by the first node based on a first key; the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication of a terminal; the second key is a root key used to protect security of communication between the terminal and the second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

47. A network device, wherein, Comprise: A second transceiver module configured to send fifth information to a first node; the fifth information is used to instruct the first node to store a first key after successful completion of first authentication of a terminal; wherein the first key is a key generated by the first node when performing first authentication of the terminal; the first key is used by the first node to generate a second key, the second key is used to generate a third key, the third key is used to protect security of communication between the terminal and a second node; the second node is deployed in a home network.

48. A communication system, wherein, The communication system comprises a terminal, a first node, a second node and a third node; wherein, The first node is configured to implement the data security processing method of any one of claims 1 to 12; The terminal is configured to implement the data security processing method of any one of claims 13 to 23; The second node is configured to implement the data security processing method of any one of claims 24 to 34; The third node is configured to implement the data security processing method of any one of claims 35 to 38.

49. A communications device, comprising: The communication device comprises: One or more processors; The processor is configured to invoke instructions to cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method in any one of claims 1-12, 13-23, 24-34, 35-38.

50. A storage medium, wherein, The storage medium stores instructions that, when executed on the communication device, cause the communication device to perform the data security processing method in any one of claims 1-12, 13-23, 24-34, 35-38.

51. A computer program product comprising a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the data security processing method in any one of claims 1-12, 13-23, 24-34, 35-38.

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