A computer-implemented alerting method

Abstract

A computer-implemented method for alerting a third party (12) when a user (not shown) is coerced into submitting a payment instruction (14), the method including the steps of: - providing the user (not shown) with a plurality of interactions (16) within a banking application (18) to submit the payment instruction (14) to the user's bank; providing the user (not shown) with an optional input (20) during any of the plurality of interactions (16); and alerting the third party (12) when the user (not shown) includes the optional input (20) within the payment instruction (14).

Description

[0001] A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED ALERTING METHOD

[0002] TECHNICAL FIELD

[0003] This invention relates to a computer-implemented alerting method that includes the preservation of funds paid from a bank account. In particular, this invention relates to a computer-implemented method for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, and the preserve the funds purported to be paid under coercion.

[0004] SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0005] According to a first aspect of the invention, there is provided a computer- implemented method for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the method including the steps of: - providing the user with a plurality of interactions within a banking application to submit the payment instruction to the user’s bank; providing the user with an optional input during any of the plurality of interactions; and alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input within the payment instruction.

[0006] The plurality of interactions may include logging into a banking profile. The plurality of interactions may include setting up the payment instruction. Setting up the payment instruction may include any interactions of the group including, but not limited to, navigating to a payment page, selecting a payment method, inserting account details of a recipient, selecting an account from which a payment is to be made, and verifying the payment instruction.

[0007] The banking application may be accessible via any one or more of the group including the internet, a mobile phone, an automated teller machine (ATM), and any other electronic means. Preferably, the banking application may be in the form of a software application downloadable onto a computing device. The computing device may be in the form of a desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet, mobile phone, or any smart device, such as a smart phone or smart watch. The banking application may be a false banking application. The false banking application may mimic a true banking application. It is to be appreciated that a false banking application which mimics a true banking application would give the appearance of a payment being made while in reality, no payment is made to the account of the purported beneficiary as recipient of the funds. The false banking application may be configured to notify the recipient of a payment being made for improving a likelihood of the recipient leaving the user unharmed.

[0008] The optional input may have the appearance of forming part of a conventional interaction within the banking application. It is to be appreciated that having such an appearance would reduce a likelihood of alerting the person coercing the user to make the payment.

[0009] The optional input may form part of the interactions for logging into the banking profile. The optional input may be in the form of any one or more of the group including an alternative username, an alternative password, a specific facial expression used to log in to the banking application biometrically, and a specific fingerprint used to log in to the banking application biometrically. It is to be appreciated that conventionally, an expressionless facial expression may be used to log in to the banking application biometrically. The specific facial expression may be an unconventional facial expression. Examples of unconventional facial expressions may involve the user doing any one or more of the group including closing their eyes, sticking out their tongue, smiling, frowning, and winking. It is to be appreciated that conventionally, a certain fingerprint may be selected to log in to the banking application. The specific fingerprint used as the optional input may be different to the fingerprint used to conventionally log in to the banking application. For example, if a thumb fingerprint is conventionally used to log into the banking application, the optional input may be in the form of an index fingerprint. The specific fingerprint used to log into the banking application may be in the form of a fingerprint on the opposite hand to the fingerprint used to conventionally log into the banking application. For example, if the thumb fingerprint on the right hand is conventionally used to log in to the banking application, the optional input may be in the form of the thumb fingerprint on the left hand.

[0010] The banking application may be configured to change what is displayed to the user when logging in with the optional input. In particular, the banking application may be configured to hide or display certain accounts. More particularly, the banking application may be configured to hide accounts holding relatively substantial sums of money and / or may display only those accounts holding relatively low sums of money. Alternatively, the banking application may be configured to display account balances which are lower than an actual account balance. For example, although R 100 000 may be an actual account balance, the banking application may be configured to display R 1 000 as the account balance when the user logs in using the optional input. As another example, an available balance of zero may be displayed for an account, preferably for a credit card account. As yet another example, funds available in an access bond account may be displayed as minimal or zero. It is to be appreciated that the banking application may change what is displayed so as to give an impression that minimal or no funds are available, thus reducing the amount of money capable of being paid under coercion or reduce the likelihood of any funds being transferred under coercion.

[0011] The optional input may form part of the interactions for setting up the payment instruction. The optional input may be made available to the user when navigating to the payment page. The optional input may be a selection of an alternative payment page to be used in cases of coercion. The alternative payment page may be accessible by a button or selection including a discrete indicator. The discrete indicator may include a spelling error, a formatting error, a symbol, or an emoji. The formatting error may be in the form of a bolded, underlined, italicized or capitalized letter. The optional input may be in the form of normal security access, but with the use of an agreed incorrect bank account number be logged to gain access to the account details.

[0012] The optional input may be made available to the user when selecting a payment method. In such a case, the optional input may include an alternative payment method to be used in cases of coercion. The alternative payment method may be accessible by a button or selection including a discrete indicator. The discrete indicator may include a spelling error, a formatting error, a symbol, or an emoji. The formatting error may be in the form of a bolded, underlined, italicized or capitalized letter.

[0013] The optional input may be made available to the user when inserting the recipient’s account details. The optional input may be in the form of an additional letter or number in the account name or account number to be used in cases of coercion.

[0014] The optional input may be made available to the user when selecting the account from which the payment is to be made. The optional input may include selection of an alternative bank account to be used in cases of coercion.

[0015] The optional input may be made available to the user when verifying the payment instruction. The optional input may be in the form of a pseudo-verifier. The pseudo-verifier may be in the form of an alternative pin number. The pseudo-verifier may be in the form of a selection or marker which when selected, gives the appearance that the payment instruction is verified.

[0016] The optional input may include an omitted interaction.

[0017] It is to be appreciated that if the optional input is used by the user, an immediate payment option in the banking application may be disabled. It may be advantageous to disable the immediate payment option to ensure that the user may not be coerced into making a payment instantly.

[0018] The method may include a step of making the payment into a pre-determined bank account when the optional input is used by the user. The predetermined bank account may be in the form of a suspense account. It is to be appreciated that the bank may receive the payment instruction. It is to be appreciated that making the payment into the suspense account may make it seem as if the payment has been made correctly. It is to be appreciated that the payment may seem to have been paid to the account of the beneficiary recipient and shown as a payment deducted from the bank account of the coerced user. This step may be advantageous in that once the money leaves the user’s bank account, the likelihood of harm to the user may be reduced.

[0019] The method may include a step of the user submitting a request to the third party. It is to be appreciated that the request may be in the form of a refund after the event of a coerced payment. The request may include a request to reverse the payment made to the suspense account. It is to be appreciated that reversing the payment made to the suspense account may ensure that user receives back the money that would have been paid to a person coercing the user.

[0020] The method may include a step of notifying the recipient that the payment instruction is successful. This step may be advantageous in that once the recipient receives this notification, the likelihood of harm to the user is reduced.

[0021] The third party may be in the form of any one or more of the group including, the user’s bank, an anti-fraud agency, a police department, a security company, and family members of the user. Alerting may include providing a location pin to the third party. The method may include a step of submitting the recipient’s account details to the third party. This step may be advantageous in that it may provide sufficient information to the third party to permit an investigation into the recipient’s account and the recipient themselves.

[0022] The method may include a step of storing any one or more of the group including, but not limited to, a date, time, and location of the user when submitting the payment instruction. This step may be advantageous in that it may provide statistical information relating to location, time, and frequency of such coerced payments, which in turn would allow authorities to monitor certain locations at times of increased fraudulent behaviour.

[0023] The method may include a step of preserving the funds purported to be paid in terms of any such coerced payment instruction in a suspense account with the bank receiving the payment instruction made under coercion, rather than to make the transfer to the beneficiary account as instructed as per prior agreement with the user’s bank.

[0024] It is to be appreciated that the alert may be sent when the user uses any one or more of the group including false access password, facial expression, fingerprint, wrong bank account number, as agreed with the bank of the user.

[0025] According to a second aspect of the invention, there is provided a computer- implemented method for alerting a third party and preserve funds when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the method including the steps of: - providing the user with a plurality of interactions within a banking application to submit the payment instruction to the user’s bank; providing the user with an optional input during any of the plurality of interactions; alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input within the payment instruction; and preserving the funds purported to be paid in terms of any such coerced payment instruction in a suspense account with the bank receiving the payment instruction made under coercion, rather than to make the transfer to the beneficiary account as instructed; as per prior agreement with the user’s bank.

[0026] According to a third aspect of the invention, there is provided an alerting system for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the alerting system including: - a software application accessible to the user via a computing device, the software application providing a plurality of interactions to the user in order to submit a payment instruction to a bank; an optional input forming part of any of the plurality of interactions; and an alerting means for alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input in the payment instruction.

[0027] BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] A computer-implemented method for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction in accordance with the invention will now be described by way of the following, non-limiting examples with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0029] In the drawings: -

[0030] Figure 1 is a flow diagram showing the steps of a computer-implemented method. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0031] Referring now to figure 1 , reference numeral (10) refers generally to a computer-implemented method for alerting a third party (12) when a user (not shown) is coerced into submitting a payment instruction (14), the method including the steps of: - providing the user (not shown) with a plurality of interactions (16) within a banking application (18) to submit the payment instruction (14) to the user’s bank; providing the user (not shown) with an optional input (20) during any of the plurality of interactions (16); and alerting the third party (12) when the user (not shown) includes the optional input (20) within the payment instruction (14).

[0032] The plurality of interactions (16) includes logging into a banking profile (22). The plurality of interactions (16) includes setting up the payment instruction (24). Setting up the payment instruction (24) includes any interactions of the group including, but not limited to, navigating to a payment page (26), selecting a payment method (28), inserting account details of a recipient (30), selecting an account from which a payment is to be made (32), and verifying the payment instruction (34).

[0033] Although not shown in the figure, the banking application is accessible via any one or more of the group including the internet, a mobile phone, an automated teller machine (ATM), and any other electronic means. Preferably, the banking application is in the form of a software application downloadable onto a computing device. The computing device is in the form of a desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet, mobile phone, or any smart device, such as a smart phone or smart watch. The banking application is a false banking application. The false banking application may mimic a true banking application. It is to be appreciated that a false banking application which mimics a true banking application would give the appearance of a payment being made while in reality, no payment is made to the account of the purported beneficiary as recipient of the funds. The false banking application is configured to notify the recipient of a payment being made for improving a likelihood of the recipient leaving the user unharmed. Although not shown in the figure, the optional input has the appearance of forming part of a conventional interaction within the banking application. It is to be appreciated that having such an appearance would reduce a likelihood of alerting the person coercing the user to make the payment.

[0034] The optional input (20) forms part of the interactions for logging into the banking profile. The optional input (20) is in the form of an alternative username (36). The optional input (20) is in the form of an alternative password (38). The optional input may be in the form of false bank account details. The optional input (20) is in the form of a specific facial expression (40) used to log in to the banking application (18) biometrically. It is to be appreciated that conventionally, an expressionless facial expression is used to log in to the banking application biometrically. It is to be appreciated that the specific facial expression is an unconventional facial expression. Examples of unconventional facial expressions involve the user doing any one or more of the group including closing their eyes, sticking out their tongue, smiling, frowning, and winking. The optional input is in the form of a specific fingerprint (42) used to log in to the banking application (18) biometrically. It is to be appreciated that conventionally, a certain fingerprint is selected to log in to the banking application. The specific fingerprint (42) used as the optional input (20) is different to the fingerprint used to conventionally log in to the banking application (18). For example, if a thumb fingerprint is conventionally used to log into the banking application, the optional input is in the form of an index fingerprint. The specific fingerprint (42) used to log into the banking application (18) is in the form of a fingerprint on the opposite hand to the fingerprint used to conventionally log into the banking application. For example, if the thumb fingerprint on the right hand is conventionally used to log in to the banking application, the optional input is in the form of the thumb fingerprint on the left hand.

[0035] The banking application (18) is configured to change what is displayed (44) to the user (not shown) when logging in (22) with the optional input (20). In particular, the banking application (18) may be configured to hide or display certain accounts (46). More particularly, and although not shown in the figure, the banking application may be configured to hide accounts holding relatively substantial sums of money and / or display only those accounts holding relatively low sums of money. Alternatively, the banking application may be configured to display account balances which are lower than an actual account balance. For example, although R 100000 is an actual account balance, the banking application is configured to display R 1 000 as the account balance when the user logs in using the optional input. As another example, an available balance of zero may be displayed for an account, preferably for a credit card account. As yet another example, funds available in an access bond account are displayed as minimal or zero. It is to be appreciated that the banking application changes what may be displayed so as to give an impression that minimal or no funds are available, thus reducing the amount of money capable of being paid under coercion or reduce the likelihood of any funds being transferred under coercion.

[0036] The optional input (20) forms part of the interactions for setting up the payment instruction (14). The optional input (20) is made available to the user (not shown) when navigating to the payment page (26). The optional input (20) is a selection of an alternative payment page (48) to be used in cases of coercion. Although not shown in the figure, the alternative payment page is accessible by a button or selection including a discrete indicator. The discrete indicator includes a spelling error, a formatting error, a symbol, or an emoji. The formatting error is in the form of a bolded, underlined, italicized or capitalized letter.

[0037] Although not shown in the figure, the optional input may be in the form of normal security access, but with the use of an agreed incorrect bank account number be logged to gain access to the account details.

[0038] The optional input (20) is made available to the user (not shown) when selecting a payment method (28). In such a case, the optional input (20) includes an alternative payment method (50) to be used in cases of coercion. Although not shown in the figure, the alternative payment method is accessible by a button or selection including a discrete indicator. The discrete indicator includes a spelling error, a formatting error, a symbol, or an emoji. The formatting error is in the form of a bolded, underlined, italicized or capitalized letter.

[0039] The optional input (20) is made available to the user (not shown) when inserting the recipient’s account details (30). The optional input (20) is in the form of an additional letter or number (52) in the account name (not shown) or account number (not shown) to be used in cases of coercion.

[0040] The optional input (20) is made available to the user (not shown) when selecting the account from which the payment is to be made (32). The optional input (20) includes selection of an alternative bank account (54) to be used in cases of coercion.

[0041] The optional input (20) is made available to the user (not shown) when verifying the payment instruction (34). The optional input (20) is in the form of a pseudo-verifier (56). Although not shown in the figure, the pseudo-verifier may be in the form of an alternative pin number. The pseudo-verifier may be in the form of a selection or marker which when selected, gives the appearance that the payment instruction is verified.

[0042] The optional input includes an omitted interaction (58).

[0043] Although not shown in the figure, it is to be appreciated that if the optional input is used by the user, an immediate payment option in the banking application is disabled. It is advantageous to disable the immediate payment option to ensure that the user may not be coerced into making a payment instantly.

[0044] The method includes a step of making the payment into a pre-determined bank account (60) when the optional input is used by the user. The predetermined bank account is in the form of a suspense account (62). It is to be appreciated that the bank receives the payment instruction (14). It is to be appreciated that making the payment into the suspense account makes it seem as if the payment has been made correctly. It is to be appreciated that the payment seems to have been paid to the account of the beneficiary recipient and is shown as a payment deducted from the bank account of the coerced user. This step is advantageous in that once the money leaves the user’s bank account, the likelihood of harm to the user is reduced.

[0045] Although not shown in the figure, the method includes a step of the user submitting a request to the third party. It is to be appreciated that the request is in the form of a for a refund after the event of a coerced payment. The request includes a request to reverse the payment made to the suspense account. It is to be appreciated that reversing the payment made to the suspense account ensures that user receives back the money that would have been paid to a person coercing the user.

[0046] The method includes a step of notifying the recipient that the payment instruction is successful (64). This step is advantageous in that once the recipient (not shown) receives this notification, the likelihood of harm to the user (not shown) is reduced.

[0047] The third party (12) is in the form of any one or more of the group including, the user’s bank, an anti-fraud agency, a police department, a security company, and family members of the user. Although not shown in the figure, alerting the third party includes providing a location pin to the third party.

[0048] The method includes a step of submitting the recipient’s account details (66) to the third party (12). This step is advantageous in that it may provide sufficient information to the third party (12) to permit an investigation into the recipient’s account and the recipient themselves.

[0049] The method includes a step of storing (68) any one or more of the group including, but not limited to, a date (70), time (72), and location (74) of the user (not shown) when submitting the payment instruction (14). This step is advantageous in that it may provide statistical information relating to location, time, and frequency of such coerced payments, which in turn would allow authorities to monitor certain locations at times of increased fraudulent behaviour.

[0050] The method includes a step of preserving the funds purported to be paid in terms of any such coerced payment instruction in a suspense account (62) with the bank receiving the payment instruction (14) made under coercion, rather than to make the transfer to the beneficiary account as instructed, as per prior agreement with the user’s bank.

[0051] Although not shown in the figure, it is to be appreciated that the alert is sent when the user uses any one or more of the group including false access password, facial expression, fingerprint, wrong bank account number, as agreed with the bank of the user.

[0052] It is, of course, to be appreciated that the computer-implemented method for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction in accordance with the invention is not limited to the precise constructional and functional details as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings and which may be varied as desired.

[0053] Although only certain embodiments of the invention have been described herein, it will be understood by any person skilled in the art that other modifications, variations, and possibilities of the invention are possible. Such modifications, variations and possibilities are therefore to be considered as falling within the spirit and scope of the invention and hence form part of the invention as herein described and / or exemplified. It is further to be understood that the examples are provided for illustrating the invention further and to assist a person skilled in the art with understanding the invention and is not meant to be construed as unduly limiting the reasonable scope of the invention.

[0054] The inventor believes that the computer-implemented method for alerting a third party, showing small balances, hiding account details, and / or making a payment to a suspense account when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction in accordance with the present invention is advantageous in that: - a user’s bank is notified of a fraudulent transaction as it takes place; the method serves as a confirmation that the payment being requested is being done so involuntarily, without the user’s consent; it allows fraudulent and / or criminal behaviour to be addressed quickly in that it alleviates the necessity for the user to contact their bank after having been coerced, which may become problematic or delayed if the person coercing the user steals the user’s phone; it allows high risk locations to be monitored more effectively, which may reduce the likelihood of continued fraudulent or criminal behaviour; it allows investigations into fraudulent behaviour which may increase the likelihood of capturing criminals; and it allows for preservation of funds in a suspense account with the bank of the coerced user, rather than the funds being paid to a recipient beneficiary who coerced the user into making the payment.

[0055] A significant technical advantage of the present invention arises from the provision of an optional duress input that may be introduced at any one of a plurality of interactions within a multi-stage banking application used to prepare and submit a payment instruction. This architecture differs fundamentally from prior systems in which duress signalling is restricted to a single interaction point, such as a login password or a signature or PIN entry step. By distributing the opportunity to provide the optional input across multiple interaction stages — including navigation steps, data- entry phases, account-selection screens and final verification processes — the invention materially increases the probability that a coerced user can safely and covertly signal distress while maintaining the outward appearance of compliance. This multi-interaction design also reduces predictability of the duress mechanism from the perspective of an observing coercer, thereby improving user security, lowering the risk of detection, and enabling more reliable downstream detection by the banking institution. In addition, because the optional input is embedded within the payment instruction itself, the resulting duress indicator remains associated with the instruction throughout its transmission and processing within banking systems. This ensures robust, system-level propagation of the duress signal without requiring specialised hardware or reliance on a single-stage authentication event, thereby improving resilience, interoperability and safety beyond what is achievable in prior duress signalling systems.

Claims

CLAIMS1. A computer-implemented method for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the method including the steps of: - providing the user with a plurality of interactions within a banking application to submit the payment instruction to the user’s bank; providing the user with an optional input during any of the plurality of interactions; and alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input within the payment instruction.

2. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 wherein the plurality of interactions includes logging into a banking profile and setting up the payment instruction.

3. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 1 or 2 wherein the plurality of interactions includes setting up the payment instruction.

4. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of claims 1 to 3 wherein the banking application is accessible via any one or more of the group including the internet, a mobile phone, an automated teller machine (ATM), and any other electronic means.

5. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the banking application is in the form of a software application downloadable onto a computing device.

6. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the banking application is a false banking application which mimics a true banking application.

7. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input has the appearance of forming part of a conventional interaction within the banking application.

8. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 2 wherein the optional input forms part of the interactions for logging into the banking profile.

9. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is in the form of any one or more of the group including an alternative username, an alternative password, a specific facial expression used to log in to the banking application biometrically, and a specific fingerprint used to log in to the banking application biometrically.

10. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 9 wherein the specific facial expression is an unconventional facial expression.

11. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the banking application is configured to change what is displayed to the user when logging in with the optional input.

12. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 11 wherein the banking application is configured to hide or display certain accounts.

13. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 12 wherein the banking application is configured to hide accounts holding relatively substantial sums of money and display only those accounts holding relatively low sums of money.

14. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 12 wherein the banking application is configured to display account balances which are lower than an actual account balance.

15. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input forms part of the interactions for setting up the payment instruction16. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is a selection of an alternative payment page to be used in cases of coercion.

17. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is in the form of normal security access, but with the use of an agreed incorrect bank account number be logged to gain access to the account details.

18. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is made available to the user when selecting a payment method.

19. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 18 wherein the optional input includes an alternative payment method to be used in cases of coercion.

20. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is made available to the user when inserting the recipient’s account details.

21. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is made available to the user when selecting the account from which the payment is to be made.

22. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input is made available to the user when verifying the payment instruction.

23. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 22 wherein the optional input is in the form of a pseudo-verifier.

24. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 23 wherein the pseudoverifier is in the form of an alternative pin number.

25. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 22 wherein the pseudoverifier is in the form of a selection or marker which when selected, gives the appearance that the payment instruction is verified.

26. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the optional input includes an omitted interaction.

27. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of making the payment into a pre-determined bank account when the optional input is used by the user.

28. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 27 wherein the predetermined bank account is in the form of a suspense account.

29. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of the user submitting a request to the third party.

30. The computer-implemented method as claimed in claim 29 wherein the request includes a request to reverse the payment made to the suspense account.

31. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of notifying the recipient that the payment instruction is successful.

32. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of submitting the recipient’s account details to the third party.

33. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of storing any one or more of the group including, but not limited to, a date, time, and location of the user when submitting the payment instruction.

34. The computer-implemented method as claimed in any one or more of the preceding claims wherein the method includes a step of preserving the funds purported to be paid in terms of any such coerced payment instruction in a suspense account with the bank receiving the payment instruction made under coercion, ratherthan to make the transfer to the beneficiary account as instructed as per prior agreement with the user’s bank.

35. A computer-implemented method for alerting a third party and preserve funds when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the method including the steps of: - providing the user with a plurality of interactions within a banking application to submit the payment instruction to the user’s bank; providing the user with an optional input during any of the plurality of interactions; alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input within the payment instruction; and preserving the funds purported to be paid in terms of any such coerced payment instruction in a suspense account with the bank receiving the payment instruction made under coercion, rather than to make the transfer to the beneficiary account as instructed; as per prior agreement with the user’s bank.

36. An alerting system for alerting a third party when a user is coerced into submitting a payment instruction, the alerting system including: - a software application accessible to the user via a computing device, the software application providing a plurality of interactions to the user in order to submit a payment instruction to a bank; an optional input forming part of any of the plurality of interactions; and an alerting means for alerting the third party when the user includes the optional input in the payment instruction.

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