Train section protection method and system based on autonomous perception backup operation level

Abstract

The application provides a kind of autonomous perception backup operation level train section protection method and system, the method comprises: in the case where the operation level of train is ABL level, receiving the hazard source information and signal state information sent by ground equipment;According to signal state information and the generating factor of ABL level, the first perception MA of train is calculated;According to the signal type corresponding to the open near road of train and the first perception MA, the perception MA fusion of different train route is carried out, and the second perception MA is obtained;According to different accurate parking scene, the second perception MA is extended, and the third perception MA is obtained;According to the validity of hazard source information, the third perception MA is updated, and the fourth perception MA is obtained;According to the fourth perception MA, the target obstacle protection of train in operation section is controlled.The method of the application improves the automation, intelligentization and reliability of train signal system, and further improves the train section protection efficiency and safety.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of train control technology, and in particular to a method and system for protecting train sections based on autonomous sensing backup operation level. Background Technology

[0002] In the current design and operation of urban rail transit lines, under the condition of good vehicle-to-ground communication, trains can interact with control center equipment, station equipment, trackside equipment, and network communication equipment through onboard controllers, and thus operate in the operating section in various operating modes, such as train BLOC-CM / AM mode and CBTC-CM / AM / CAM / FAM mode. In this operating mode, the train needs to communicate with the trackside equipment responsible for train position correction, granting movement authorization under the backup level, and monitoring the occupancy / idle status of the section in real time to achieve train section protection.

[0003] In existing train section protection schemes, when a train experiences a communication failure with the ground or a failure of ground equipment such as RC / CI, the onboard ATP cannot calculate movement authorization for the CBTC train and the backup train in real time based on ground information. In this case, the train is downgraded and requires manual intervention to operate in RM mode, which can easily affect other trains operating on the line. When the train operates in point-based mode (BLOC), it needs to rely on variable transponders and filler transponders throughout the entire process and cannot operate fully automatically, resulting in low efficiency and safety of the train in section protection. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a train section protection method and system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level, which solves the problems of existing technology. When the train-to-ground communication fails or the ground equipment such as RC / CI fails, manual intervention is required to operate in RM mode, which has a significant impact on other operating trains on the line. When the train operates in point-to-point mode (BLOC), it needs to rely on variable transponders and filler transponders throughout the entire process and cannot operate fully automatically, resulting in low automation, intelligence and reliability of the entire signaling system. This invention improves the efficiency and safety of train section protection.

[0005] This invention provides a train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level, applied to a train signaling system, comprising:

[0006] When the train's operating level is Autonomous Awareness Backup Operation (ABL), it receives hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment; the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary and backup channels;

[0007] The first sensing movement authorization (MA) for the train is calculated based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level. The sensing MAs for different train routes are fused based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA. The second sensing MA is extended based on different precise stopping scenarios to obtain a third sensing MA. The third sensing MA is updated based on the validity of the hazard source information to obtain a fourth sensing MA. The factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrades or downgrades. The different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is outside a turnout section, and the area outside the station is outside a straight track physical section.

[0008] According to the fourth sensing MA control train, the train performs target obstacle protection in the operating section; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

[0009] According to the present invention, a method for protecting train sections based on autonomous sensing backup operation level includes, wherein fusing sensing MAs for different train routes according to the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA, comprising:

[0010] When the signal corresponding to the open shortcut of the train is a virtual signal, the route with the virtual signal as the starting signal is spliced ​​with the route of the train running according to the first sensing MA to obtain a new route;

[0011] If the train's position is determined to be valid, the ground equipment's control area confirms that the train's reverse route sign is invalid, the train's safe position is within the main line or test track, the main channel is interrupted and the backup channel is communicating normally, or the area where the train is located confirms a temporary speed limit for the entire station, the second sensing MA is calculated based on the new route.

[0012] According to the present invention, a train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level is provided, wherein updating the third sensing MA according to the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth sensing MA includes:

[0013] If the hazard source information includes available resources, the validity of the available resources is verified to obtain the verification results;

[0014] Based on the test results, the third sensing MA is shortened or invalidated to obtain the fourth sensing MA;

[0015] The available resources are determined through the following steps:

[0016] The resource range is determined based on the logical section where the rear of the train is located, the logical section at the end of the route where the front of the train is located, the target route, and all protected sections of the target route; wherein, the target route is the route in front of the route where the front of the train is located that is close to being locked and open;

[0017] If the route within the resource range overlaps with the train position determined based on the backup channel, the logical segment information within the resource range is determined as the available resource.

[0018] According to the present invention, a train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level is provided, wherein the ABL level includes fully automated train operation ABL-FAM mode, fully automated train operation crawling ABL-CAM mode based on onboard active perception, manned ATO driving ABL-AM mode based on onboard active perception, and manned driving ABL-CM mode based on onboard active perception.

[0019] The train's operational level, which is the autonomous sensing operational backup operational level, is determined in the following manner:

[0020] In the event of a failure in the primary access channel, a failure in the ground equipment, a failure of the train to complete screening, or an onboard ATP that cannot calculate the movement authorization, the operating level of the train is determined to be the ABL level.

[0021] Alternatively, the ABL-FAM mode, the ABL-AM mode, or the ABL-CM mode can be set via the train's human-machine interface display (MMI).

[0022] The train signaling system is used to maintain communication with the ground equipment via a backup channel in the ABL-FAM mode, ABL-CAM mode, ABL-AM mode, or ABL-CM mode.

[0023] According to the present invention, a train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level is provided, the method further includes:

[0024] When the factors that cause the ABL level include the train's operating level being downgraded from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode, the user's first instruction is received;

[0025] In response to the first instruction, the operating level of the train is adjusted to ABL-CM mode or ABL-RM mode;

[0026] Alternatively, if the factors contributing to the ABL level include a downgrade of the train's operating level from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode, a second instruction from the user is received.

[0027] In response to the second command, the traction brake and steering handles of the train are operated to the zero position, and the key is turned off to await new movement authorization.

[0028] According to the present invention, a train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level is provided. The hazard source information includes at least one of the following: resource status of the logical section where the train is located, the status of the route ahead of the train that is close to open, the status of the turnout in the control area where the train is located, the section closure status, the status of the floodproof door, the status of the emergency stop button, the SPKS status, the platform door status, the speed limit status within the resource range, the rain and snow mode status, the regional / full-line emergency braking status, the status of the signal ahead, the position information of the preceding vehicle, the reverse route sign where the train is located, and the ITE cut-off sign.

[0029] The present invention also provides a train section protection system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level, comprising:

[0030] The receiving module is used to receive hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment when the train's operating level is Autonomous Aware Backup Operation (ABL); the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary channel and the backup channel.

[0031] The calculation module is used to calculate the first sensing movement authorization (MA) of the train based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level; to fuse the sensing MAs of different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA; to extend the second sensing MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain a third sensing MA; and to update the third sensing MA according to the validity of the hazard source information to obtain a fourth sensing MA. The factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; the different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is outside a turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section.

[0032] The protection module is used to control the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section according to the fourth sensing MA; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, flood door protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

[0033] The present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level as described above.

[0034] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level as described above.

[0035] The present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level as described above.

[0036] The present invention provides a train section protection method and system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level. When the train's operation level is autonomous sensing backup operation (ABL) and the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary and backup channels, the sensing MA of the train's travel route is updated based on signal status information, factors causing the ABL level, the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut, different precise stopping scenarios, and the effectiveness of hazard source information. Based on the updated sensing MA, the train is controlled to perform various obstacle protections in the operating section, which improves the automation, intelligence, and reliability of the train signaling system, thereby improving the efficiency and safety of train section protection. Attached Figure Description

[0037] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0038] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided by the present invention.

[0039] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the backup channel data flow provided by the present invention.

[0040] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the vehicle-to-ground communication architecture provided by the present invention.

[0041] Figure 4 This is one of the data interaction diagrams between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention.

[0042] Figure 5 This is the second schematic diagram of data interaction between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention.

[0043] Figure 6 This is the third schematic diagram of data interaction between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention.

[0044] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the train section system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided by the present invention.

[0045] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0046] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this invention without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0047] The following is combined Figures 1-7 This invention describes a train section protection method and system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level.

[0048] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided by the present invention, as shown below. Figure 1 As shown, this train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level is applied to the train signaling system and includes the following steps:

[0049] Step 110: When the train's operating level is Autonomous Awareness Backup Operation (ABL), receive hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment; the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary and backup channels.

[0050] In this step, under the Autonomous Backup Level (ABL) condition, the train does not need to rely on direct communication with ground equipment. It can use other existing equipment on the line to open a backup communication channel. Even if the primary communication between the train and the ground equipment is interrupted, the communication between the train and the ground equipment can be maintained without adding line equipment.

[0051] In this embodiment, the ground equipment includes interlocking route control (RC) or computer interlocking (CI).

[0052] In this embodiment, the hazard source information includes the resource status of the logical section where the train is located, the status of routes that are close to being open, the status of turnouts, the status of section closures, and the status of floodgates.

[0053] In this embodiment, signal status information is used to indicate the protection status of the signal. The train queries the nearest main signal based on its current position and sends the information to the RC / CI, recording this signal. This includes the following protection scenarios:

[0054] (1) If the RC responds to the signal, it will indicate whether the train meets the conditions for upgrading to ABL. Before the upgrade, the recorded signal ID will remain unchanged. When the train completes the upgrade, the forward signal ID obtained from the current position of the train will be sent to the RC / CI.

[0055] (2) For trains that have completed the upgrade, when the signal status received from the RC is point-to-point prohibition (normal closure), the train sends the forward signal ID to the RC according to the train's position.

[0056] (3) When the train communicates with multiple RCs / CIs, it simultaneously queries the forward signal IDs of multiple RCs. When the train receives the signal status from multiple RCs, the signal status reported by the RC where the signal protection is located shall prevail.

[0057] (4) When the route ahead of the train is open and the route inside is not occupied, if the route is abnormally closed due to the opening of the platform screen door, pressing of ESB, manual cancellation of the route, etc., it is necessary to protect against the abnormal closure of the signal sent by RC. That is, when the signal status sent by RC is point-type prohibition (abnormal closure), ITP determines that the maximum safety front end has crossed the signal and then sets the sensing MA to invalid; if it has not crossed, the abnormally closed signal will not be processed and the RC / CI resources will protect it.

[0058] Step 120: Calculate the first perception movement authorization (MA) for the train based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level; fuse the perception MAs for different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first perception MA to obtain the second perception MA; extend the second perception MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain the third perception MA; update the third perception MA according to the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth perception MA; wherein, the factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is a turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section.

[0059] In this step, the train's operating mode can be upgraded from the restricted manual driving (RM) level to the ABL level, or downgraded from the communication-based automatic train control system (CBTC) level or the vehicle-to-vehicle communication-based automatic train control system (VBTC) level to the ABL level.

[0060] In this embodiment, the first sensing mobility authorization MA can be the sensing MA1 calculated based on the current route after the train is upgraded to ABL level or downgraded from VBTC level to ABL.

[0061] Specifically, the starting point of MA1 is the minimum safe rear end of the train n seconds ago (e.g., n=1); when the train upgrades from RM mode to ABL level, the endpoint of MA1 is the backup locked resource endpoint moved back m meters (e.g., m=20 meters); when the train downgrades from VBTC level to ABL, the RC replies that the forward signal is a point-based permission and the ABL identification point before the downgrade crosses (including overlaps) the forward signal, and the endpoint of MA1 is the backup locked resource endpoint moved back 20 meters.

[0062] In this embodiment, the first sensing mobility authorization MA can be the sensing MA2 calculated based on the current route after the train is upgraded to the ABL level.

[0063] Specifically, when a train is downgraded to ABL, the perceived MA2 is calculated within the resource range allowed at the CBTC level; the calculation of the resource range allowed at the CBTC level is handled for different scenarios:

[0064] ① The train's position (the distance from the minimum safe front end to the overhang to the wheelset) does not fall within the approach section of any route;

[0065] ② The train position (the distance from the minimum safe front end to the overhang to the wheelset) belongs to the approach section of the next or multiple routes, but the permitted resource endpoint has not crossed the terminal signal of the next route;

[0066] ③ The train position (the distance from the minimum safe front end to the overhang to the wheelset) belongs to the approach section of the next one or more routes, and the allowed resource endpoint crosses (including resource endpoint and signal position coincidence) the terminal signal of the next route;

[0067] ④ Calculation of resource endpoint: If a signal exists within the allowed resource range, the signal closest to the train position (distance from the minimum safe front end to the suspension to the wheelset) shall be taken as the resource endpoint; if no signal exists within the allowed resource range, the resource endpoint before the communication interruption shall be taken directly as the resource endpoint.

[0068] ⑤ When the allowed resource endpoint is valid: Scenario ① and ② directly calculate the resource endpoint according to ④. Scenario ③ finds which route or multiple routes the current logical segment belongs to. At this time, the resource endpoint is the resource terminal (terminal signal) of the farthest route allowed by RC.

[0069] ⑥ When the allowed resource endpoint changes from valid to invalid: Scenario ① and ② directly calculate the resource endpoint according to ④. Scenario ③ records the current time T1, starts timing from time T1, and after the train reaches zero speed or after a certain delay time (fixed 10s), the resources maintained across the route are set to unavailable, and the resource endpoint is recalculated according to ④.

[0070] ⑦ Resource endpoint update: For ABL-level trains, when the allowed resource endpoint is valid, the shorter endpoint is processed according to scenario ⑤; after the resource endpoint of each train becomes invalid, after passing scenario ⑥, the allowed resource endpoint is updated, and the update principle is as follows:

[0071] (1) If the primary / backup communication is normal at this time, according to the resource locking information of the primary / backup channel, the permissible resource endpoint is moved to the nearest signal in front;

[0072] (2) If both the primary and backup systems fail, the permissible resource endpoint calculated when vehicle resources are invalid remains unchanged;

[0073] Specifically, when the resource endpoint is the encroachment limit indicator axis, the sensing MA2 endpoint cannot cross the resource endpoint and should be retreated by a fixed encroachment limit distance of 15m. At this time, no precise parking MA extension judgment is performed. If the resource endpoint is not the encroachment limit indicator axis, but the endpoint indicator axis of the protected section is the encroachment limit indicator axis, the endpoint of the protected section should be retreated by 15m as the sensing MA2 endpoint.

[0074] In this embodiment, the signal type includes whether the open shortcut interruption signal identified when the train is traveling in the ABL level is a virtual signal. If a virtual signal is identified, the train's current route and the route corresponding to the virtual signal are spliced ​​together to form a new route, and then the fused sensing MA, i.e. the second sensing MA, is calculated. If no virtual signal is identified, the current MA remains unchanged.

[0075] In this embodiment, the different precise stopping scenarios corresponding to the train traveling at the ABL level specifically include:

[0076] (1) The area outside the parking area is a turnout section; when the turnout section is a protected section, for ABL trains with communication, the onboard system obtains the turnout position and protected section locking information from RC / CI through primary / backup communication.

[0077] In this embodiment, the third sensing MA calculation method includes: shortening the protection section length retreat distance and the MA extension length position of the precise parking condition; if the turnout section is not configured as a protection section, the MA cannot be extended outside the station.

[0078] (2) The area outside the station is a straight track physical section; if the platform access route does not have a protection zone:

[0079] ① If the length of the axle counting section outside the station is greater than M (for example, M=140) meters, then MA can be extended, and the principle of MA extension is: the shorter of the length of the first logical section outside the station and the length of the protection section after retreating and the MA extension length under the precise parking conditions shall be taken as the endpoint of the MA extension outside the station.

[0080] ② For ABLs with communication capabilities, section speed limit information can be obtained from RC / CI through primary / backup communication to protect against section blockades of straight tracks outside the station.

[0081] In this embodiment, if a protected area is configured for the off-site route, an Access Management (MA) must have been established in the protected area before it can be extended to the protected area. The following scenarios exist:

[0082] ① The ABL with communication capabilities obtains the protection zone section locking information from the RC / CI through primary / backup communication to protect the section blocking of straight rail outside the station.

[0083] ② For ABLs with communication, trains are downgraded within the route. The MA calculation principle is to take the shorter of the protected section length retreat distance and the MA extension length under precise stopping conditions.

[0084] In this embodiment, the ground equipment RC / CI can send the train's available resources to the onboard unit through the primary channel interface or the backup channel interface.

[0085] It should be noted that when there is no communication with the ground, ground resource validity information cannot be obtained, so resource validity is not checked; when the train can communicate with ground equipment to obtain ground resource information, resource validity needs to be verified.

[0086] In this embodiment, train section protection or recalculation of available sensing MA can only be performed based on the new sensing MA if the available resources pass validity verification, such as updating the third sensing MA based on the available resources or determining that the current sensing MA is invalid.

[0087] Step 130: Control the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section according to the fourth sensing MA; target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, flood door protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

[0088] In this step, after passing the resource validity verification, the ABL-level train can run on the current route according to the fourth perception MA, and needs to protect against ground obstacles, ground speed limit information, etc.

[0089] The following provides a detailed explanation of the nine scenarios corresponding to target obstacle protection:

[0090] (1) MA validity check; determine the validity of the sensing MA start point and end point, and whether the maximum safe front end of the train has crossed the MA end point.

[0091] (2) Turnout protection: The vehicle obtains turnout status information from the ground and queries the turnout information within the MA range. If no turnout within the MA range is found in the turnout information obtained from the ground, the MA is invalid.

[0092] (3) PSD protection: The vehicle obtains PSD status information from the ground and queries the PSD information within the MA range. If no PSD within the MA range is found in the PSD information obtained from the ground, the MA is invalid.

[0093] (4) ESB protection: The vehicle obtains ESB status information from the ground and queries the ESB information within the MA range. If no ESB within the MA range is found in the ESB information obtained from the ground, the MA is invalid.

[0094] (5) SPKS protection: The vehicle obtains SPKS status information from the ground. When SPKS is pressed, speed limit protection is applied to the SPKS protection zone.

[0095] (6) Section speed limit protection: When there is a temporary speed limit, regional emergency, or section closure within the train's resource area, the ground will send speed limit information to the onboard unit. The speed limit information is sent in units of axle-counting sections. In the event of a regional emergency or section closure, the ground will process the information as a speed limit of 0 and send it. During the operation of the ABL train, the speed-limited sections will be protected.

[0096] (7) Floodgate protection: When the vehicle-mounted communication with the ground primary or backup is normal, the ground sends the status of floodgates in the control area or adjacent control areas to the vehicle-mounted device. When a request for a closed / closed floodgate status is received, protection is performed. The vehicle-mounted device performs floodgate protection within the floodgate intrusion protection distance offset forward from the MA endpoint. If the floodgate status is abnormal, the MA endpoint is moved back a distance from the floodgate intrusion limit based on the position of the floodgate as the new MA endpoint.

[0097] (8) Protection of forward signal status; when a signal sent by ground equipment is abnormally shut down, the vehicle determines that it is safe to pass the signal ahead of time and then sets the sensing MA to invalid.

[0098] (9) Forward vehicle position protection; when the forward vehicle position information sent by the ground equipment is valid, the sensing MA needs to be recalculated based on the positions of the two vehicles.

[0099] The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided in this invention updates the sensing MA of the train's travel route when the train's operation level is autonomous sensing backup operation (ABL) and the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary and backup channels. This is done based on signal status information, factors that generate the ABL level, the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut, different precise stopping scenarios, and the effectiveness of hazard source information. The updated sensing MA is then used to control the train to perform various obstacle protections within the operating section, improving the automation, intelligence, and reliability of the train signaling system, thereby enhancing the efficiency and safety of the train's section protection.

[0100] Furthermore, based on the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA, the sensing MAs of different train routes are fused to obtain the second sensing MA. This includes: when the signal corresponding to the open shortcut of the train is a virtual signal, the route with the virtual signal as the starting signal is spliced ​​with the route run by the train according to the first sensing MA to obtain a new route; when the train's position is determined to be valid, the control area of ​​the ground equipment confirms that the train's reverse route sign is invalid, the train's safe position is within the main line or test line, the main channel is interrupted and the backup channel communication is normal, or the area where the train is located confirms a temporary speed limit for the entire station, the second sensing MA is calculated based on the new route.

[0101] It should be noted that once the recorded ABL (Automatic Vehicle Block) identification point has passed a certain distance from the main open signal, it will then operate according to Sensing MA1. If the identified signal is not in the sequence of permitted resources, Sensing MA cannot cross Sensing MA2 regardless of the signal's state.

[0102] In this embodiment, when an ABL-level identification signal is used for train operation, if the terminal signal of an open route is identified as a virtual signal, the route with the virtual signal as the starting signal of the route is spliced ​​together as a new route to calculate the sensing MA, thereby realizing the fusion of sensing MA of different train routes and obtaining the corresponding second sensing MA.

[0103] Specifically, the area controller ZC determines at least one of the following situations: when the train position is valid, when the ground equipment RC / CI control area where the train's maximum safe front end and minimum safe rear end are located reports that the train's "reverse route sign is not valid", when the train's safe position is within the range of the main line or test track, when the "station-wide temporary speed limit confirmation sign" in the area where the train's maximum safe front end and minimum safe rear end are located is confirmed, or when the main channel is interrupted and the backup channel communication is normal, the corresponding second sensing MA is calculated based on the new route.

[0104] The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided in this embodiment of the invention can update the current route by splicing the route with the virtual signal as the starting signal with the route operated by the train according to the first sensing MA when the signal corresponding to the open shortcut of the train is a virtual signal. This allows for the calculation of a more accurate sensing MA and further improves the efficiency and safety of ABL train operation.

[0105] Furthermore, updating the third sensing MA based on the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth sensing MA includes: when the hazard source information includes available resources, verifying the validity of the available resources and obtaining the verification result; processing the third sensing MA by shortening the calculation or determining invalidity based on the verification result to obtain the fourth sensing MA; wherein, the available resources are determined through the following steps: determining the resource range based on the logical section where the rear of the train is located, the logical section at the end of the route where the front of the train is located, the target route, and all protected sections of the target route; wherein, the target route is the route in front of the route where the front of the train is located that is close to being locked and open; if the route within the resource range overlaps with the train position determined based on the backup channel, the logical section information within the resource range is determined to be available resources.

[0106] In this embodiment, when the train can obtain available resources sent by ground equipment from either the primary or backup channel, it is also necessary to verify the validity of the available resources; the verification of the validity of available resources in different scenarios includes:

[0107] (1) During the process of train downgrading from non-zero speed to zero speed, the resources before downgrading need to be used to stop the train. The validity of resources is not checked during the emergency braking of the train. After the train is at zero speed due to emergency braking, the validity of ground resources is checked every cycle. The backup resource calculation endpoint and MA2 are shortened to calculate the final MA endpoint.

[0108] (2) When the RM train is upgraded to ABL, if there is communication with the ground RC / CI, the RC / CI will reply that the forward signal status is point-to-point permission; when the backup locked resource endpoint is valid, the sensing MA1 calculation is valid and outputs permission to upgrade to ABL; if there is no communication with the ground RC, it cannot be upgraded from RM mode to ABL level.

[0109] (3) When the section is downgraded, the resource endpoint is not the protection of the signal. For ABL with communication, the availability of the resources ahead can be queried through RC / CI information. When VBTC is downgraded, the position of the nearest main signal ahead is directly taken as the resource endpoint before the downgrade, and then the shortest is taken according to whether the RC / CI information ahead is available. For ABL trains without communication, after the train is downgraded, the resource endpoint of the train will not exceed the resources before the downgrade.

[0110] It should be noted that if the train is downgraded while running in the section, and the train resource endpoint is not the signal ahead of this route, the train will be unable to run after stopping at the resource endpoint because it cannot obtain the resources ahead. In this case, it can be run in RM mode.

[0111] In this embodiment, when the train stops and stabilizes in the turnaround logic section to turn around, since MA1 and MA2 are invalid after the turnaround, the resource endpoint calculated by the backup resources needs to be used as the sensing MA to maintain the ABL level after the turnaround. In addition, when sensing MA1 and MA2 are invalid, even if the RC sends valid resources, the sensing MA will eventually be set to invalid.

[0112] The train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level provided in this embodiment of the invention verifies the validity of available resources when the hazard source information includes available resources, and performs a shortening calculation or invalidation judgment on the third perception MA according to the verification result to obtain the fourth perception MA. The current perception MA is updated again by the available resources provided by the ground equipment to the ABL level train, which further improves the accuracy of the current perception MA and thus improves the driving safety of ABL trains.

[0113] Furthermore, the ABL level includes the fully automated train ABL-FAM mode, the fully automated train crawling mode based on onboard active perception ABL-CAM mode, the manned ATO-controlled driving ABL-AM mode based on onboard active perception, and the manned driving ABL-CM mode based on onboard active perception. The train's operating level is determined as an autonomous perception operation backup operating level in the following ways: in the event of a primary channel failure, ground equipment failure, the train not completing screening, or the onboard ATP being unable to calculate the movement authorization, the train's operating level is determined to be ABL level; or, the ABL-FAM mode, ABL-AM mode, or ABL-CM mode is set through the train's human-machine interface display (MMI). The train signaling system is used to maintain communication with ground equipment through a backup channel in ABL-FAM mode, ABL-CAM mode, ABL-AM mode, or ABL-CM mode.

[0114] In this embodiment, the ABL level corresponds to four train driving modes: ABL-FAM, ABL-CAM, ABL-AM, and ABL-CM, which are described below:

[0115] (1) ABL-FAM mode: This mode is the highest operating mode that can be maintained based on the perception backup operation. In this mode, the train needs to maintain communication with the interlocking main channel / backup channel. The system protects the train operation by obtaining the hazard source information.

[0116] (2) ABL_CAM mode: The system protects train operation by obtaining hazard information.

[0117] (3) ABL_AM mode: The system protects train operation by obtaining hazard information.

[0118] (4) ABL_CM mode: The system and the driver jointly protect the train operation.

[0119] In this embodiment, for CBTC-FAM / CAM mode trains, after the train-to-ground communication is interrupted, the train center dispatch interface pops up a prompt asking whether to authorize the train to enter ABL level operation. If authorized, the train continues to operate in ABL-FAM / CAM mode.

[0120] In this embodiment, for trains in non-fully automatic mode, the "Confirmation Information Display" area on the MMI prompts the operator to confirm entry into ABL level. After pressing the confirmation button, the train enters ABL-CM mode. After meeting the AM upgrade conditions, the AM confirmation indicator flashes. Pressing the button again will allow the train to operate in CBTC / ABL-AM mode.

[0121] In this embodiment, a train that enters the ABL due to the failure of the Movement Authorization (MA) in the route can run to the end of the route based on the hazard source information, sensing MA, resource availability, and obstacle protection in the above steps. When the VOBC receives a report from the backup channel RC that the forward signal status is open, similar to the traditional point-to-point level, the train can enter the route with the open signal, continuously check the above information, and finally run forward.

[0122] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the backup channel data flow provided by the present invention. Figure 2In the illustrated embodiment, when the train is running with backup sensing, in order to ensure the safe operation of the ABL_FAM / AM train to the next station, when the onboard and ground equipment communicate using a backup channel, backup wireless communication establishes a continuous communication channel between the train and the ground equipment, while also employing independent wireless channels such as PIS. The backup channel data stream includes the on-site real vehicle data stream, the indoor real vehicle data stream, and the indoor simulated vehicle data stream. Specifically, the on-site real vehicle data stream includes: the recording board software on the onboard equipment adds a channel connecting to the external network, connecting to the onboard workgroup bridge WGB via the onboard PIS network; the onboard workgroup bridge WGB and the corresponding workgroup bridge WGB of the ground equipment achieve data interaction via wireless communication; the corresponding workgroup bridge WGB of the ground equipment connects to the backup channel gateway via the ground PIS network, and then transmits interactive data to the RC device (or CI and ZC devices) and the ATS device through the ATS network where the backup channel gateway is located, thereby achieving the purpose of backup communication; the indoor real vehicle data stream includes: the onboard recording board communicating via VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network). The ATP (Network) performs backup communication with the vehicle-mounted switch, and the vehicle-mounted switch performs backup communication with the ATS interface unit through the large system switch; the indoor simulation vehicle data stream includes: the ATP's backup communication network card performs backup communication with the large system switch through VLAN, and the large system switch performs backup communication with the ATS interface unit through VLAN.

[0123] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the vehicle-to-ground communication architecture provided by the present invention. Figure 3 In the illustrated embodiment, the primary vehicle-to-ground communication channel is the signal system's self-built LTE vehicle-to-ground communication system, and the backup channel is the vehicle-to-ground WLAN communication system professionally provided by PIS; the switching mechanism between the primary and backup channels is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, according to the principle of single device, primary communication data takes priority, and in the event of primary communication failure, the backup channel is used for vehicle-to-ground data interaction. Specifically, the backup channel gateway interacts with the computer interlocking system (CI) and the signal gateway computer through the ATS network, while the VOBC system interacts with the signal gateway computer through the primary channel of the ATC network and with the backup channel gateway through the PIS network.

[0124] In this embodiment, data exchange occurs between VOBC, ATS, and ground equipment (RC, CI, ZC) in the following manner:

[0125] (1) During the VOBC cycle, the information of the interlocking is sent to the backup channel gateway, and the backup channel gateway switches to the ATS network to pass through the corresponding interlocking.

[0126] (2) During the interlocking cycle, the information sent to the backup channel gateway to the VOBC is dereduplicated and then transferred to the PIS network to be transparently transmitted to the corresponding VOBC.

[0127] (3) The VOBC periodically sends the train status information frame to the backup channel gateway and then the backup channel is transferred to the ATS network and transparently transmitted to the signal gateway. The signal gateway host determines whether to use the backup channel information (when the signal gateway host determines that the communication between the primary channel and VOBC is interrupted, the signal gateway host will transfer the train information received from the backup channel into the ATS).

[0128] (4) The signal gateway periodically receives the VOBC control command packet from the ATS station extension and sends it to the VOBC and the backup channel gateway. The backup channel gateway then passes the packet through to the corresponding train after removing redundancy.

[0129] (5) When the signal gateway receives a remote manual command or emergency braking command sent by the application server, it packages and sends it to the VOBC and the backup channel gateway, and the backup channel gateway transmits it to the corresponding train.

[0130] Figure 4 This is one of the data interaction diagrams between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention. Figure 4 In the illustrated embodiment, data interaction between VOBC, the backup channel, the gateway computer, and the station extension unit is performed in the following manner: VOBC periodically sends train information frames to the backup channel (period 1 second). The backup channel determines the target device in the header information and sends the train information frame to the gateway computer according to the target device. The gateway computer determines whether the primary channel is interrupted. If the primary channel is interrupted, the train information frame is forwarded into the station extension unit. After receiving the train information frame, the station extension unit sends a control command frame to the gateway computer (period 1 second). The gateway computer uses the backup channel's external interface to convert the control command frame into a train control command and forwards the train control command to VOBC according to the target device in the header.

[0131] Figure 5 This is the second schematic diagram of data interaction between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention. Figure 5In the illustrated embodiment, the user terminal (User), scheduling workstation, application server, gateway computer, backup channel gateway, and VOBC interact with each other in the following way: The User sends a remote manual operation command to the gateway computer through the scheduling workstation and application server. The gateway computer assembles the remote manual operation command into packets according to the backup channel and VOBC interface, obtains the packet header, and sends the packet header to the corresponding VOBC through the backup channel gateway. The VOBC takes an emergency braking response based on the packet header and sends the emergency braking response back to the gateway computer through the backup channel gateway. The gateway computer converts the emergency braking response into internal information and sends it to the application server. The application server controls the scheduling workstation to process the response information based on the internal information, obtains the response result, and sends the response result to the User for display.

[0132] Figure 6 This is the third schematic diagram of data interaction between VOBC, ATS and ground equipment provided by the present invention. Figure 6 In the illustrated embodiment, VOBC, the backup channel gateway, and CI interact with each other in the following manner: VOBC periodically sends RC status information frames to the backup channel (period 200ms). The backup channel determines the destination in the packet header information and sends the RC status information frame to CI according to the destination. CI feeds back RC control information frames to the backup channel gateway (period 300ms). The backup channel gateway removes redundant information from both networks, determines the destination in the packet header, and then sends the RC control information frame to VOBC.

[0133] In this embodiment, if the train-to-ground ATC network communication fails during train operation, it can seamlessly switch to backup communication without the train being downgraded in an emergency. No manual intervention is required, and the failure does not have a significant impact on the entire operation.

[0134] The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided in this embodiment of the invention provides an ABL-level mode for CBTC-FAM / CAM mode trains and non-fully automatic mode trains respectively. It can operate in CM / AM / CAM / FAM through backup communication without relying on the ATC network, making the operation more flexible and the fault handling capability of the entire signal system higher.

[0135] Furthermore, the method also includes: receiving a first instruction from the user when the factors causing the ABL level include a downgrade of the train's operating level from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode; responding to the first instruction, adjusting the train's operating level to ABL-CM mode or ABL-RM mode; or, when the factors causing the ABL level include a downgrade of the train's operating level from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode, receiving a second instruction from the user; responding to the second instruction, operating the train's traction brake and steering handles to the zero position and turning off the key to await new movement authorization.

[0136] In this embodiment, the ABL operating level is the backup operating level of the signal system, and the ABL level is not sampled when the CBTC operating level is available.

[0137] In this embodiment, when a CBTC-FAM / CAM train automatically degrades to ABL-FAM / CAM mode due to a fault and arrives at the platform, it is prompted to turn on the key and wait for the driver to board and handle the situation. At this time, a technician needs to open the train doors and platform doors using the first command, board the train, and degrade it to ABL-CM or RM mode. If the train needs to continue in ABL-FAM / CAM mode, the technician needs to operate the traction brake and steering handle to the zero position using the second command, turn off the key, and authorize the start of the train from the central control. When the train arrives at the next station, it will again prompt to turn on the key and wait for the driver to board and handle the situation. Therefore, when the train arrives at the first platform in ABL-FAM / CAM mode, the driver must board and handle the situation, and the train will subsequently operate in ABL-AM, ABL-CM, or RM mode.

[0138] In this embodiment, when the train is running at ABL-CM level, after a restart due to an interlocking equipment failure, it is necessary to confirm that the train route information is correct and that there is no hostile risk before the train can be moved.

[0139] In this embodiment, the central dispatcher or driver needs to constantly monitor any abnormalities on the ABL train's operating line. If an equipment malfunction or line fault occurs ahead of the train, it must be stopped immediately via remote / local emergency braking. The train can only be moved after the central dispatcher confirms that the fault has been resolved. The specific details are as follows:

[0140] (1) When an ABL-level train runs to the front of the signal with the signal open, it cannot take effective protective measures when the signal position changes suddenly in the signal blind spot.

[0141] (2) ABL level trains do not support functions such as hibernation, wake-up, train turnaround, remote door opening and closing, skipping, passenger clearing, stop time management, departure reminder, etc.

[0142] (3) ABL-level trains do not support linkage scenarios caused by external professional faults such as section fires, station fires, and section floods;

[0143] (4) ABL-level trains monitor vehicle-related equipment through the vehicle interface and only alarm the center; when an obstacle / derailment or abnormal status of an escape door / passenger compartment door is detected, they cannot establish a protection zone and cannot identify the protection zones established by other trains ahead.

[0144] In this embodiment, when equipment such as the area controller ZC and the metro signaling system RRU malfunctions, causing multiple CBTC-FAM trains to apply for ABL level due to unavailable primary channel information, the following actions can be taken:

[0145] (1) Due to the inconsistency of the position and speed information of multiple trains, the order of emergency braking and stopping of the trains is also different. According to the order in which the trains stop, apply to the central ATS to enter the ABL level, and the ATS workstation will pop up a window to prompt in turn.

[0146] (2) The dispatcher can click on the application dialog box of the corresponding train to authorize access to the ABL level according to the operational needs;

[0147] (3) If you need to confirm whether the train information is met, you can first click to cancel the dialog box. After verifying the train conditions, right-click the train number window to issue an ABL level authorization command.

[0148] The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operating level provided in this embodiment of the invention adjusts the train's operating level to ABL-CM mode or ABL-RM mode through a user's first command; or, through a user's second command, operates the train's traction, braking and steering handles to the zero position and turns off the key to wait for new movement authorization, thereby improving the train's abnormal handling capability when performing section protection, and thus improving the safety of train operation.

[0149] Furthermore, the hazard source information includes at least one of the following: the resource status of the logical section where the train is located, the status of the route ahead of the train that is approaching an open route, the status of the turnout in the control area where the train is located, the section closure status, the status of the floodproof door, the status of the emergency stop button, the SPKS status, the status of the platform door, the speed limit status within the resource range, the rain and snow mode status, the regional / entire line emergency braking status, the status of the signal ahead, the position information of the preceding vehicle, the reverse route sign where the train is located, and the ITE cut-off sign.

[0150] In this embodiment, the ground equipment (RC / CI) needs to periodically send hazard source information to the vehicle-mounted equipment, and the specific sending principle is as follows:

[0151] (1) Principles for calculating the resource range: All logical segments between the logical segment where the rear of the train is located and the logical segment at the end of the route where the front of the train is located, plus the routes that are close to being locked and open in front of the route of the front of the train (the route level is backup and not a reverse route) and the protection sections of the routes within this range (the directions are consistent and continuous). If the route where the front of the train is located is not locked, then the resource range is all logical segments between the position of the rear of the train and the position of the front of the train (if there are routes locked in the resource range, then the protection sections are also included in the resource range).

[0152] It should be noted that if the train's locomotive is on a turnaround route, the forward route information is not queried; instead, the information for the turnaround route is queried. If the turnaround route is open, it must also be included in the resource scope. If the open route ahead belongs to an adjacent interlocking system, it is only included in the resource scope if the first section outside the route belongs to this interlocking system. In this case, if the route belongs to an adjacent control area, the protected section of that route is not within the resource scope. If the route the train is on has a reverse route, the open route ahead is not included in the resource scope, and a reverse route signal is sent to the train.

[0153] (2) Principles for calculating resource availability: If the route within the resource range overlaps with the train position in the train backup channel information, then the available logical segment information is sent; otherwise, the open route information is sent. The resource availability information and the protected segment availability information flag use the results of the logical segment interlocking condition check and the protected segment interlocking condition check.

[0154] In this embodiment, the RC / CI system sends all switches within its control area and switches within the transmission range of adjacent control areas to the onboard subsystem; it also sends emergency closing and platform screen door information within the resource range, activated SPKS information of the control area and adjacent control areas that intersect with the control area, speed limit information within the resource range, turnaround logic section information within the resource range (the logic section contained in the last physical section of the turnaround route), rain and snow mode information, section rain and snow mode information, emergency braking information for the entire line, temporary speed limit information for the entire line, signal status calculation principles, and preceding vehicle position calculation principles to the onboard subsystem.

[0155] Specifically, during the process of the RC / CI system sending speed limit information within the resource range to the on-board subsystem, if the last route has no protected section and the last section is a parking area and the departure section is a non-intersection section, then this information is also included in the section speed limit information. The speed limit information includes temporary speed limits, calculated as the lowest speed limit value within the physical section to which the section belongs. In particular, if the section is manually blocked or includes area emergency braking, the speed limit value is 0. (The RC / CI system sends speed limit information for axle-counting sections that conform to the topological relationship within the physical section. If all axle-counting sections within a physical section do not conform to the topological relationship, then it sends speed limit information for all axle-counting sections associated with that physical section.)

[0156] Specifically, the principles for calculating signal status are as follows:

[0157] Default signal status: (1) No matching route for the signal (2) The signal ID sent by the train is 0 (3) All routes starting from this signal have not been processed or have been locked after processing but have not yet been opened (4) The route level is CBTC (the route supervision level is determined according to the signal at the beginning of the route, so as long as a route supervision level is not a backup, it will return to the default) (5) The open route is a reverse route (6) Partial route (7) Guided route.

[0158] Signal permitted: The signal has been opened after route approval and the route supervision level is backup;

[0159] Signal prohibition signal (normally closed): The signal is closed due to the normal entry of a train after the route has been opened (this function is not used for automatic route passage); Prohibition signal (abnormally closed): The signal is abnormally closed after the route has been opened (including total release and total cancellation).

[0160] Specifically, the principles for calculating the position of the vehicle in front are as follows:

[0161] (1) When the RCoCI communicates normally with the main channel of the train, the RCoCI feeds back to the train the position of the preceding train in both the main channel and the backup channel using the preceding train ID queried from the main channel;

[0162] (2) When the RCoCI communicates normally with the train via the backup channel, the RCoCI sends feedback to the train on the position of the train ahead via the backup channel and the ID of the train ahead queried via the backup channel;

[0163] (3) If the queried train ID is invalid, a default value is sent back to the train;

[0164] (4) When the queried train main channel position is valid, the train is fed back the position of the train main channel ahead (the default value is fed back when the NVRAM flag is valid).

[0165] (5) When the queried train backup lane position is valid (the primary lane is invalid), the train is fed back the backup lane position of the train ahead (the default value is fed back when the NVRAM flag is valid).

[0166] (6) When only the ITE position of the queried train is valid, if ITE 1 is valid, then use the 1 position; otherwise, use the 2 position and send the ITE position of the train ahead back to the train.

[0167] The train section protection system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided by the present invention is described below. The train section protection system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level described below can be referred to in correspondence with the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level described above.

[0168] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the train section protection system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level provided by the present invention, as shown below. Figure 7 As shown, the system includes: a receiving module 710, a computing module 720, and a protection module 730.

[0169] The receiving module 710 is used to receive hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment when the train's operating level is Autonomous Aware Backup Operation (ABL); the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary channel and the backup channel.

[0170] The calculation module 720 is used to calculate the first sensing movement authorization (MA) of the train based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level; to fuse the sensing MAs of different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA to obtain the second sensing MA; to extend the second sensing MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain the third sensing MA; and to update the third sensing MA according to the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth sensing MA. Among them, the factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; and the different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is a turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section.

[0171] The protection module 730 is used to control the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section according to the fourth sensing MA; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

[0172] The train section protection system based on autonomous perception backup operation level provided in this invention updates the perception MA of the train's travel route when the train's operation level is autonomous perception backup operation (ABL) and the ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary and backup channels. This is done based on signal status information, factors that generate the ABL level, the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut, different precise stopping scenarios, and the effectiveness of hazard source information. The updated perception MA is then used to control the train to perform various obstacle protections within the operating section, improving the automation, intelligence, and reliability of the train signaling system, thereby enhancing the efficiency and safety of the train's section protection.

[0173] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention, such as... Figure 8 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 810, a communication interface 820, a memory 830, and a communication bus 840, wherein the processor 810, the communication interface 820, and the memory 830 communicate with each other through the communication bus 840. The processor 810 can call logical instructions in the memory 830 to execute an autonomous sensing backup operation level train section protection method, applied to the train signaling system. This method includes: when the train's operation level is autonomous sensing backup operation (ABL), receiving hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment; the ground equipment communicating with the train signaling system through at least one of a primary channel and a backup channel; calculating the train's first sensing movement authorization (MA) based on the signal status information and the factors generating the ABL level; fusing sensing MAs for different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA; and based on different precision... The parking scenario extends the second sensing MA to obtain the third sensing MA; the third sensing MA is updated based on the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth sensing MA; among them, the factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; different precise parking scenarios include at least one of the following: the parking area is outside the turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section; the fourth sensing MA controls the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section; target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection, and forward vehicle position protection.

[0174] Furthermore, the logical instructions in the aforementioned memory 830 can be implemented as software functional units and, when sold or used as independent products, can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0175] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program that can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer can execute the autonomous sensing backup operation level train section protection method provided by the above methods, applied to a train signaling system. The method includes: receiving hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment when the train's operation level is autonomous sensing backup operation (ABL); the ground equipment communicating with the train signaling system through at least one of a primary channel and a backup channel; calculating the train's first sensing movement authorization (MA) based on the signal status information and the factors causing the ABL level; and calculating the first sensing movement authorization (MA) based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first sensing MA. A performs fusion of sensing MAs from different train routes to obtain a second sensing MA; extends the second sensing MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain a third sensing MA; updates the third sensing MA according to the validity of hazard source information to obtain a fourth sensing MA; wherein, the factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is outside a turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section; the fourth sensing MA controls the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section; target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection, and forward vehicle position protection.

[0176] Furthermore, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When executed by a processor, the computer program performs the autonomous sensing backup operation level (ABL) train section protection method provided by the above methods, applied to a train signaling system. The method includes: receiving hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment when the train's operation level is autonomous sensing backup operation (ABL); the ground equipment communicating with the train signaling system through at least one of a primary channel and a backup channel; calculating a first sensing movement authorization (MA) for the train based on the signal status information and factors contributing to the ABL level; and fusing sensing MAs for different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first sensing MA. The system combines the two perceptions to obtain the second perception MA; it extends the second perception MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain the third perception MA; it updates the third perception MA according to the effectiveness of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth perception MA; the factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the section outside the stopping area is a turnout section and the physical section outside the station is a straight track section; the fourth perception MA controls the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA effectiveness check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection, and forward vehicle position protection.

[0177] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without any creative effort.

[0178] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0179] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level, applied to a train signaling system, characterized in that, include: When the train's operating level is Autonomous Awareness Backup Operation (ABL) level, it receives hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment. The ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary channel and the backup channel; The first sensing movement authorization (MA) for the train is calculated based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level. The sensing MAs for different train routes are fused based on the signal type corresponding to the train's open shortcut and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA. The second sensing MA is extended based on different precise stopping scenarios to obtain a third sensing MA. The third sensing MA is updated based on the validity of the hazard source information to obtain a fourth sensing MA. The factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrades or downgrades. The different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is outside a turnout section, and the area outside the station is outside a straight track physical section. The starting point of the first sensing MA is the minimum safety rear end of the train n seconds ago; when the train upgrades from RM mode to the ABL level, the ending point of the first sensing MA is the backup lock resource endpoint moved back m meters; when the train downgrades from VBTC level to the ABL level, and the ground equipment replies that the forward signal is a point-based permission and the ABL identification point before the downgrade crosses the forward signal, the ending point of the first sensing MA is the backup lock resource endpoint moved back m meters. According to the fourth sensing MA control train, the train performs target obstacle protection in the operating section; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, floodgate protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

2. The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of fusing the sensing MAs of different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA to obtain the second sensing MA includes: When the signal corresponding to the open shortcut of the train is a virtual signal, the route with the virtual signal as the starting signal is spliced ​​with the route of the train running according to the first sensing MA to obtain a new route; If the train's position is determined to be valid, the ground equipment's control area confirms that the train's reverse route sign is invalid, the train's safe position is within the main line or test track, the main channel is interrupted and the backup channel is communicating normally, or the area where the train is located confirms a temporary speed limit for the entire station, the second sensing MA is calculated based on the new route.

3. The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of updating the third sensing MA based on the validity of the hazard source information to obtain the fourth sensing MA includes: If the hazard source information includes available resources, the validity of the available resources is verified to obtain the verification results; Based on the test results, the third sensing MA is shortened or invalidated to obtain the fourth sensing MA; The available resources are determined through the following steps: The resource range is determined based on the logical section where the rear of the train is located, the logical section at the end of the route where the front of the train is located, the target route, and all protected sections of the target route; wherein, the target route is the route in front of the route where the front of the train is located that is close to being locked and open; If the route within the resource range overlaps with the train position determined based on the backup channel, the logical segment information within the resource range is determined as the available resource.

4. The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level according to claim 1, characterized in that, The ABL levels include fully automated train operation ABL-FAM mode, fully automated train operation crawling ABL-CAM mode based on onboard active perception, manned ATO driving ABL-AM mode based on onboard active perception, and manned driving ABL-CM mode based on onboard active perception. The train's operational level, which is the autonomous sensing operational backup operational level, is determined in the following manner: In the event of a failure in the primary access channel, a failure in the ground equipment, a failure of the train to complete screening, or an onboard ATP that cannot calculate the movement authorization, the operating level of the train is determined to be the ABL level. Alternatively, the ABL-FAM mode, the ABL-AM mode, or the ABL-CM mode can be set via the train's human-machine interface display (MMI). The train signaling system is used to maintain communication with the ground equipment via a backup channel in the ABL-FAM mode, ABL-CAM mode, ABL-AM mode, or ABL-CM mode.

5. The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the factors that cause the ABL level include the train's operating level being downgraded from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode, the user's first instruction is received; In response to the first instruction, the operating level of the train is adjusted to ABL-CM mode or ABL-RM mode; Alternatively, if the factors contributing to the ABL level include a downgrade of the train's operating level from CBTC-FAM mode or CBTC-CAM mode to ABL-FAM mode or ABL-CAM mode, a second instruction from the user is received. In response to the second command, the traction brake and steering handles of the train are operated to the zero position, and the key is turned off to await new movement authorization.

6. The train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level according to claim 1, characterized in that, The hazard source information includes at least one of the following: the resource status of the logical section where the train is located, the status of the route ahead of the train that is close to being open, the status of the turnout in the control area where the train is located, the section closure status, the status of the floodproof door, the status of the emergency stop button, the SPKS status, the status of the platform door, the speed limit status within the resource range, the rain and snow mode status, the regional / full-line emergency braking status, the status of the signal ahead, the position information of the preceding vehicle, the reverse route sign where the train is located, and the ITE cut-off sign.

7. A train section protection system based on autonomous sensing backup operation level, applying the train section protection method based on autonomous sensing backup operation level as described in claim 1, characterized in that, include: The receiving module is used to receive hazard source information and signal status information sent by ground equipment when the train's operating level is Autonomous Awareness Backup Operation (ABL). The ground equipment communicates with the train signaling system through at least one of the primary channel and the backup channel; The calculation module is used to calculate the first sensing movement authorization (MA) of the train based on the signal status information and the factors that generate the ABL level; to fuse the sensing MAs of different train routes based on the signal type corresponding to the open shortcut of the train and the first sensing MA to obtain a second sensing MA; to extend the second sensing MA according to different precise stopping scenarios to obtain a third sensing MA; and to update the third sensing MA according to the validity of the hazard source information to obtain a fourth sensing MA. The factors that generate the ABL level include the train reaching the ABL level through upgrading or downgrading; the different precise stopping scenarios include at least one of the following: the stopping area is outside a turnout section and the area outside the station is a straight track physical section. The protection module is used to control the train to perform target obstacle protection in the operating section according to the fourth sensing MA; the target obstacle protection includes at least one of the following: MA validity check, turnout protection, platform screen door PSD protection, ESB protection, SPKS protection, section speed limit protection, flood door protection, forward signal status protection and forward vehicle position protection.

8. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the train section protection method based on autonomous perception backup operation level as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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