A civil aircraft airworthiness safety equivalent evaluation method based on military aircraft historical data

Abstract

A kind of civil aircraft airworthiness safety equivalent evaluation method based on military aircraft historical data, by analyzing and sorting the historical data of military aircraft type identification data and use records and civil aircraft airworthiness safety requirements, based on risk management, establishing aircraft safety risk level matrix, formulating the intervention range and depth criteria of review and confirmation, and the acceptable criteria of military aircraft historical data, to evaluate the equivalence of military aircraft historical data and civil aircraft airworthiness safety, forming a set of evaluation method of military aircraft historical data and civil aircraft airworthiness safety equivalence, providing technical support for aircraft type military-to-civil, which can effectively improve the airworthiness certification efficiency of military aircraft converted to civil use, shorten the type certification time cycle, reduce the economic cost of type certification, and effectively promote the development of aviation industry.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of aircraft airworthiness certification technology, and in particular to a method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness and safety based on historical data of military aircraft. Background Technology

[0002] Although Article 21.21 of my country's Civil Aviation Regulations, "Regulations on the Certification of Civil Aviation Products and Components" (CCAR-21-R5), outlines the airworthiness certification requirements for military aircraft products applying for type certificates for civilian use, there is currently no complete and specific airworthiness certification methodology for military aircraft type conversions to civilian use, both domestically and internationally. This significantly hinders the conversion of military aircraft products to civilian applications in my country. Furthermore, regarding the conversion of aircraft that have completed military certification to civilian use, China issued the "Airworthiness Inspection Procedures for the CJ-6 Military-to-Civilian Aircraft" (AC-21-12) in 2006. However, this procedure only applies to military-to-civilian conversions of used aircraft to obtain special flight permits. It employs a method of document review and on-board inspection confirmation based on the aircraft type design definition and configuration requirements, resulting in a one-aircraft-one-certification approach. This method is inefficient and only yields special flight permits, preventing commercial operation and thus has little impact on the development of the aviation industry. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The technical problem solved by this invention is to provide a method for equivalent assessment of airworthiness and safety of civil aircraft based on historical data of military aircraft, so as to solve the problems in the background art mentioned above.

[0004] The technical problem solved by this invention is achieved by the following technical solution: A method for assessing the airworthiness safety equivalence of civil aircraft based on historical military aircraft data analyzes and reviews historical data from military aircraft type identification documents and usage records against civil aircraft airworthiness safety requirements. Based on risk management, an aircraft safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and criteria for the scope and depth of intervention for review and confirmation, as well as acceptance criteria for historical military aircraft data, are formulated to assess the equivalence between historical military aircraft data and civil aircraft airworthiness safety. The specific steps are as follows: S1. Classified by aircraft specialty and data category Historical data on military aircraft type identification and usage records are categorized according to aircraft specialty and data type, as follows: Aircraft specialization is divided into flight performance and characteristics, structural strength, mechanical systems, electrical and electronic systems, power plant, cabin safety, human factors, and continued airworthiness and quality assurance. Data categories are divided into engineering evaluation, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft usage. S2. Determine the basis for certification and applicable airworthiness provisions. Based on the design characteristics and details of military aircraft, and in accordance with the definition of aircraft categories in civil aviation airworthiness regulations, the applicable certification basis is determined. Then, the applicability of each airworthiness clause in the certification basis is analyzed to identify the applicable airworthiness clauses. S3. Analyze the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of each applicable airworthiness provision. Based on the airworthiness provisions determined in step S2, study the airworthiness regulations and related compliance verification guidance documents, analyze and extract the safety details of each applicable airworthiness provision, and analyze the specific requirements of the safety level and compliance methods of each safety detail. S4. Establish a safety risk level matrix and formulate risk level assessment principles. Based on the two risk factors of the likelihood of an event occurring and the severity of its consequences, a safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and principles for assessing safety risk levels are formulated. The probability of events that do not meet the safety criteria is analyzed from four aspects: technological maturity, product complexity, design, manufacturing, use and maintenance capabilities, and application scenarios. The probability is classified into four categories in terms of qualitative probability: extremely unlikely, very unlikely, occasional, possible, and frequent. In terms of quantitative probability, these correspond to no more than 1.0E-9, 1.0E-7, 1.0E-5, 1.0E-3, and 1.0E0 per flight hour, respectively (the quantitative values ​​for possible and frequent are only reference values ​​and may not be subject to quantitative probability requirements). The severity of the consequences of non-compliance with each safety item is analyzed from four aspects: hazards to aircraft, onboard personnel, air and ground facilities and equipment, and ground personnel. The severity of the consequences is divided into catastrophic, dangerous, serious, minor, and no-impact levels. Based on the two risk factors of the likelihood of an event occurring and the severity of its consequences, a safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and safety risk level assessment principles are formulated. The safety risk level is divided into five levels, with the higher the value, the higher the safety risk level. S5. Based on historical military aircraft data, assess the security risk level of each security detail. By organizing the historical data of military aircraft in step S1, and combining the analysis of the specific requirements of the safety level and compliance method for each safety item in step S3, the probability of events that do not meet the safety requirements of each safety item and the severity of the consequences are obtained. Then, the analysis results of each safety item are brought into the safety risk level matrix established in step S4 to conduct a safety risk level assessment. S6. Differentiated review and confirmation of historical data based on hierarchical classification Based on the safety risk level assessment in step S5, the historical data of military aircraft are reviewed and confirmed in a graded and classified manner for each safety item. Each safety item is classified and graded based on four aspects: safety risk level, data category (engineering assessment, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft usage), corresponding historical data of military aircraft to prove the safety level of the safety item, and the aviation development experience and capabilities of the output unit. Safety risk levels are divided into 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating higher safety risk levels. Historical data on military aircraft demonstrates the directness of the safety level of safety details in two ways: those that can directly prove the safety level affecting the safety details qualitatively or quantitatively, and those that indirectly (require further engineering analysis) indicate the safety level affecting the safety details. Engineering assessment data includes declarations of conformity, referenced model design documents, selection methods, coefficients, definitions, design reviews, analysis / calculation, and safety assessments; testing data includes data and information generated from laboratory testing, on-board ground testing of related products, flight testing, and simulator testing; inspection data includes data and information generated from engineering conformity inspections; equipment qualification data includes data and information generated from the design, manufacture, testing, and use of airborne equipment; and aircraft operation data includes data generated from the delivery of aircraft to users for operation and maintenance. Historical data output units are categorized into strong, medium, and weak based on their experience and capabilities in similar aviation products or verification tests. Different levels of security risk and categories of historical data are used to confirm the requirements for the scope and depth of intervention through differentiated review: For the detailed items of Level 1 safety risk level, the applicant shall provide a statement of compliance; For the detailed categories of Level 2 security risk, historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed; For the detailed categories of Level 3 security risk, the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed and the acceptability of the historical data will be confirmed. For the detailed categories of Level 4 security risk, the acceptability of historical military aircraft data will be reviewed and confirmed, and the main processes that generated the historical military aircraft data will be traced. For the detailed categories of Level 5 security risk, the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed, the acceptability and completeness of the historical data will be confirmed, and the entire process of the generation of the historical data will be traced. The acceptability of historical data is assessed from three aspects: consistency with the configuration at the time of military aircraft identification or service and airworthiness certification, validity of data, and degree of impact of differences (differences in test specimen configuration, test conditions, test methods, and qualification criteria, etc.). S7. Assess safety equivalence Analyze and compare historical data with the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of corresponding airworthiness provisions to assess safety equivalence; Based on the classification results of military aircraft historical data in step S1, the military aircraft historical data are analyzed, sorted out and identified from three aspects: the object of data verification, the method of data generation and the safety level indicated by the data. The data is then assigned to the safety sub-items, safety level requirements and compliance method requirements listed in the analysis results of the safety sub-items, safety level requirements and compliance method requirements of each applicable airworthiness clause.

[0005] The data verification objects and safety details, data generation methods and compliance methods, and the equivalence or equivalentity between the safety level indicated by the data and the airworthiness safety level are analyzed and compared. Only when all three aspects are equivalent or equivalent can the historical data of military aircraft and the airworthiness safety of civil aircraft have an equivalent safety level. If the data verification object is inconsistent with or cannot cover the safety details, it is necessary to conduct configuration difference impact analysis and risk assessment, and develop avoidance / mitigation / restriction measures; or supplement compliance verification to prove that it meets the configuration requirements of the corresponding safety details; If the data generation method is inconsistent with or does not match the compliance method requirements, military aircraft service flight data can be used to conduct supplementary evaluations of flight test categories by selecting flight data for the corresponding flight subjects; or supplementary compliance verification can be performed to prove that it meets the compliance method requirements of the corresponding safety sub-items. If the data indicates that the safety level does not meet the airworthiness safety level requirements, a risk assessment needs to be conducted, and avoidance / mitigation / restriction measures need to be developed, or supplementary compliance verification needs to be performed to prove that it meets the safety level requirements of the corresponding safety sub-items.

[0006] Beneficial effects: This invention analyzes and sorts out historical data of military aircraft and civil airworthiness safety requirements, establishes a safety risk level matrix based on risk management, formulates risk level assessment principles, confirms the scope and depth of intervention criteria for review and confirmation, and the acceptable criteria for historical data of military aircraft. It forms a set of assessment methods for the equivalence of historical data of military aircraft and civil aircraft airworthiness safety, providing airworthiness certification technical support for the conversion of military aircraft models to civilian use. It can effectively improve the efficiency of airworthiness certification for the conversion of military aircraft to civilian use, shorten the time cycle for model certification, reduce the economic cost of model certification, and effectively promote the development of the aviation industry. Attached Figure Description

[0007] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0008] To make the technical means, creative features, objectives and effects of this invention easier to understand, the invention will be further described below with reference to specific illustrations.

[0009] See Figure 1The method shown is a civil aircraft airworthiness safety equivalence assessment method based on military aircraft historical data. It analyzes and sorts historical data from military aircraft type identification documents and usage records against civil aircraft airworthiness safety requirements. Based on risk management, it establishes an aircraft safety risk level matrix, formulates criteria for the scope and depth of intervention for review and confirmation, and establishes acceptance criteria for military aircraft historical data, in order to assess the equivalence between military aircraft historical data and civil aircraft airworthiness safety. The specific steps are as follows: S1. Classified by aircraft specialty and data category Historical data on military aircraft type identification and usage records are categorized according to aircraft specialty and data type, as follows: When classifying aircraft specialties, the CJ-6 aircraft category and design characteristics are considered, and the aircraft specialties are divided into flight performance and flight characteristics, structural strength, mechanical systems, electronic and electrical systems, power plant, cabin safety, human factors, continued airworthiness and quality assurance. When classifying data, the historical data of the CJ-6 aircraft's usage records are combined to classify the data into engineering evaluation, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft usage categories. The classification of aircraft specialties corresponds to the framework of the Civil Aviation Airworthiness Regulations CCAR-23-R3, and the classification of data categories matches the conformity type classification of the Civil Aviation Airworthiness Procedures AP-21-AA-2023-R1, which facilitates the connection between the applicant and the Civil Aviation Administration during the type certification process. S2. Determine the basis for certification and applicable airworthiness provisions. Based on the design characteristics and details of military aircraft, and in accordance with the definition of aircraft categories in civil aviation airworthiness regulations, the applicable certification basis is determined. Then, the applicability of each airworthiness clause in the certification basis is analyzed to identify the applicable airworthiness clauses. This embodiment is based on the design features of the CJ-6 military aircraft, which is a two-seat, single-engine, low-wing, tricycle landing gear, and has a maximum takeoff weight of 1418 kg. It is determined to be a normal category aircraft and the certification basis is the airworthiness regulation CCAR-23-R3. Based on the design details shown in the CJ-6 aircraft model design data, it was determined that 282 of the applicable clauses of the CCAR-23-R3 airworthiness regulations are applicable, while 91 clauses are not applicable. Applicable clauses for each specialty: 36 clauses for flight performance and flight characteristics, 63 clauses for structural strength, 32 clauses for mechanical systems, 32 clauses for electronic and electrical systems, 53 clauses for power plants, 19 clauses for cabin safety, 18 clauses for human factors, 26 clauses for continued airworthiness, and 3 clauses for quality assurance. Clauses not applicable to each specialty: 12 clauses on flight performance and flight characteristics, 33 clauses on structural strength, 18 clauses on mechanical systems, 4 clauses on electrical and electronic systems, 9 clauses on power plant, 6 clauses on cabin safety, 2 clauses on human factors, and 7 clauses on continued airworthiness. S3. Analyze the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of each applicable airworthiness provision. Based on the airworthiness provisions determined in step S2, study the airworthiness regulation CCAR-23-R3 and its related compliance verification guidance documents, analyze and extract 835 safety details of each applicable airworthiness provision, and analyze the specific requirements of the safety level and compliance method of each detail. S4. Establish a safety risk level matrix and formulate risk level assessment principles. Based on the two risk factors of the likelihood of an event occurring and the severity of its consequences, a safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and principles for assessing safety risk levels are formulated. The probability of events that do not meet the safety criteria is analyzed from four aspects: technological maturity, product complexity, design, manufacturing, use and maintenance capabilities, and application scenarios. The probability is classified into four categories in terms of qualitative probability: extremely unlikely, very unlikely, occasional, possible, and frequent. In terms of quantitative probability, these correspond to no more than 1.0E-9, 1.0E-7, 1.0E-5, 1.0E-3, and 1.0E0 per flight hour, respectively (the quantitative values ​​for possible and frequent are only reference values ​​and may not be subject to quantitative probability requirements). The severity of the consequences of non-compliance with each safety item is analyzed from four aspects: hazards to aircraft, onboard personnel, air and ground facilities and equipment, and ground personnel. The severity of the consequences is divided into catastrophic, dangerous, serious, minor, and no-impact levels. Based on the two risk factors of the likelihood of an event occurring and the severity of its consequences, a safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and safety risk level assessment principles are formulated. Safety risk levels are divided into 5 levels, with higher values ​​indicating higher safety risk levels. The specific classification is shown in Table 1 below: Table 1 Safety Risk Level Matrix No impact level Slight Severity Danger level Disaster level Frequent Level 1 Level 2 Level 4 Level 4 Level 5 Possible Level 1 Level 2 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Occasionally Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 4 Very unlikely Level 1 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Highly unlikely Level 1 Level 1 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 S5. Based on historical military aircraft data, assess the security risk level of each security detail. By organizing the historical data of the CJ-6 aircraft in step S1, and combining the analysis of the safety level and specific requirements of the compliance method for each safety item in step S3, the probability of events that do not meet the safety requirements of each safety item and the severity of the consequences are obtained. Then, the analysis results of each safety item are brought into the safety risk level matrix established in step S4 to conduct a safety risk level assessment. Based on the safety risk level assessment principles established in step S4, the risk levels of 835 safety items for the CJ-6 aircraft were assessed, resulting in 302 Level 1 safety risk items, 332 Level 2 safety risk items, 139 Level 3 safety risk items, 59 Level 4 safety risk items, and 3 Level 5 safety risk items. The Level 4 safety risk items include flight stability, vibration and flutter, emergency landing dynamic impact, structural damage tolerance and fatigue assessment, flutter, engine, propeller, fuel system lightning protection and fire prevention, onboard safety equipment, and communication equipment. The Level 5 risk items include spin, flight manual (use restrictions), and continuing airworthiness documents. S6. Differentiated review and confirmation of historical data based on hierarchical classification Based on the safety risk level assessment in step S5, a graded and classified differentiated approach is adopted for each safety item to review and confirm historical data. Each safety item is classified and graded based on four aspects: safety risk level, data category (engineering assessment, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft usage), corresponding historical data of military aircraft to prove the safety level of the safety item, and the aviation development experience and capabilities of the output unit. Safety risk levels are divided into 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating higher safety risk levels. Engineering assessment data includes declarations of conformity, referenced model design documents, selection methods, coefficients, definitions, design reviews, analysis / calculation, and safety assessments; testing data includes data and information generated from laboratory testing, on-board ground testing of related products, flight testing, and simulator testing; inspection data includes data and information generated from engineering conformity inspections; equipment qualification data includes data and information generated from the design, manufacture, testing, and use of airborne equipment; and aircraft operation data includes data generated from the delivery of aircraft to users for operation and maintenance. The directness of proving the safety level of safety details from historical data of military aircraft can be divided into two categories: those that can directly prove the safety level affecting the safety details from a qualitative or quantitative perspective, and those that indirectly (require further engineering analysis) indicate the safety level affecting the safety details. Historical data output units are categorized into strong, medium, and weak based on their experience and capabilities in similar aviation products or verification tests. Different levels of security risk and categories of historical data are used to confirm the requirements for the scope and depth of intervention through differentiated review: For the 302 detailed items of Level 1 safety risk level, the applicant shall provide a statement of compliance; For the 332 detailed items of Level 2 security risk, historical data of military aircraft were reviewed; For the 139 detailed items of Level 3 security risk, the historical data of military aircraft was reviewed and the acceptability of the historical data of military aircraft was confirmed; For the 59 detailed items of Level 4 security risk, the acceptability of the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed and confirmed, and the main process of the generation of the historical data of military aircraft will be traced. For the three detailed categories of Level 5 security risk, the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed, the acceptability and completeness of the historical data will be confirmed, and the entire process of the generation of the historical data will be traced. The acceptability of historical data is assessed from three aspects: consistency with the configuration at the time of military aircraft identification or service and airworthiness certification, validity of data, and degree of impact of differences (differences in test specimen configuration, test conditions, test methods, and qualification criteria, etc.). S7. Assess safety equivalence Analyze and compare historical data with the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of corresponding airworthiness provisions to assess safety equivalence; Taking the CJ-6 military trainer aircraft as an example, historical data was traced and confirmed for 201 safety items at safety risk levels 3 to 5. An equivalent safety assessment was conducted, comparing these items with their safety substance and objectives. 198 items met the equivalent safety level, while 3 items—23.221 "Spin," 23.1529 "Continuing Airworthiness Documents," and 23.1581 "Flight Manual"—did not. It was identified that the quantity and content of user data for the CJ-6 aircraft significantly differed from civil aircraft management requirements. Key data and specific requirements, such as usage restrictions, were incomplete in the user data. The completeness and accuracy of user data directly affect whether operating units can maintain the safety of aircraft use. To achieve an equivalent safety level, safety mitigation measures were formulated, requiring that user data be fully compiled and approved by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) before the first civilian CJ-6 aircraft is delivered to the user, in accordance with civil aircraft management requirements.

[0010] This method was applied to the airworthiness certification of the CJ-6 aircraft for military-to-civilian conversion. It identified three safety details of the CJ-6 aircraft that did not have equivalent safety for military-to-civilian conversion, and formulated safety mitigation measures as required to achieve the goal of equivalent safety. This provided technical support for the airworthiness certification of the CJ-6 aircraft for military-to-civilian conversion, enabling the CJ-6 aircraft to obtain the type certificate (TC0035A) issued by the Civil Aviation Administration of China on February 2, 2019. This saved the company certification costs and time, making the CJ-6 aircraft the first aircraft model in my country to be converted from military to civilian use.

[0011] The foregoing has shown and described the basic principles, main features, and advantages of the present invention. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above, and that the invention can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from its spirit or essential characteristics. Therefore, the embodiments should be considered illustrative and non-limiting in all respects, and the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description. Thus, all variations falling within the meaning and scope of equivalents of the claims are intended to be included within the scope of the invention. No reference numerals in the claims should be construed as limiting the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for equivalent assessment of airworthiness and safety of civil aircraft based on historical data of military aircraft, characterized in that, By analyzing and reviewing historical data from military aircraft type identification documents and usage records against civil aircraft airworthiness and safety requirements, and based on risk management, an aircraft safety risk level matrix is ​​established. Criteria for the scope and depth of intervention in review and confirmation are formulated, along with acceptance criteria for historical military aircraft data. This aims to assess the equivalence between historical military aircraft data and civil aircraft airworthiness and safety. The specific steps are as follows: S1. Classified by aircraft specialty and data category Historical data on military aircraft type identification and usage records are categorized according to aircraft specialty and data type. S2. Determine the basis for certification and applicable airworthiness provisions. Based on the design characteristics and details of military aircraft, and in accordance with the definition of aircraft categories in civil aviation airworthiness regulations, the applicable certification basis is determined. Then, the applicability of each airworthiness clause in the certification basis is analyzed to identify the applicable airworthiness clauses. S3. Analyze the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of each applicable airworthiness provision. Based on the airworthiness provisions determined in step S2, study the airworthiness regulations and related compliance verification guidance documents, analyze and extract the safety details of each applicable airworthiness provision, and analyze the specific requirements of the safety level and compliance methods of each safety detail. S4. Establish a safety risk level matrix and formulate risk level assessment principles. Based on the two risk factors of the likelihood of an event occurring and the severity of its consequences, a safety risk level matrix is ​​established, and principles for assessing safety risk levels are formulated. S5. Based on historical military aircraft data, assess the security risk level of each security detail. By organizing the historical data of military aircraft in step S1, and combining the analysis of the specific requirements of the safety level and compliance methods of each safety item in step S3, the probability of events that do not meet the safety requirements of each safety item and the severity of the consequences are obtained. Then, the analysis results of each safety item are brought into the safety risk level matrix established in step S4 to establish a 5-level safety risk level assessment. S6. Differentiated review and confirmation of historical data based on hierarchical classification Based on the safety risk level assessment in step S5, the historical data of military aircraft are reviewed and confirmed in a graded and classified manner for each safety item. S7. Assess safety equivalence Analyze and compare historical data with the safety details, safety levels, and compliance method requirements of the corresponding airworthiness provisions to assess safety equivalence.

2. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1), the aircraft specialty is divided into flight performance and flight characteristics, structural strength, mechanical systems, electronic and electrical systems, power plant, cabin safety, human factors, and continued airworthiness and quality assurance. Data categories are divided into engineering evaluation, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft usage.

3. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4), the probability of events that do not meet each safety item is analyzed from four aspects: technology maturity, product complexity, design, manufacturing, use and maintenance capabilities, and application scenarios. The probability is classified into extremely unlikely, very unlikely, occasional, possible and frequent in terms of qualitative probability, and corresponds to no more than 1.0E-9, 1.0E-7, 1.0E-5, 1.0E-3 and 1.0E0 per flight hour in terms of quantitative probability. The severity of the consequences of non-compliance with each safety item is analyzed from four aspects: hazards to aircraft, onboard personnel, air and ground facilities and equipment, and ground personnel. The severity of the consequences is divided into four levels: catastrophic, dangerous, serious, minor, and no impact.

4. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S6), each safety item is classified and graded from four aspects: safety risk level, data category, corresponding military aircraft historical data to prove the safety level of the safety item, and the aviation research and development experience and capability of the output unit.

5. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 4, characterized in that, The engineering categories include engineering evaluation, testing, inspection, equipment qualification, and aircraft operation.

6. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 5, characterized in that, Engineering assessments include declarations of conformity, referenced model design documents, selection methods, coefficients, definitions, design reviews, analysis / calculation, and safety assessments; testing includes data and information generated from laboratory testing, on-board ground testing of related products, flight testing, and simulator testing; inspections include data and information generated from engineering conformity inspections; equipment qualification includes data and information generated from the design, manufacture, testing, and use of airborne equipment; and aircraft operation includes data generated from the delivery of aircraft to users for operation and maintenance.

7. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 1, characterized in that, Differential review confirms the requirements for the scope and depth of intervention: For the detailed items of Level 1 safety risk level, the applicant shall provide a statement of compliance; For the detailed categories of Level 2 security risk, historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed; For the detailed categories of Level 3 security risk, the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed and the acceptability of the historical data will be confirmed. For the detailed categories of Level 4 security risk, the acceptability of historical military aircraft data will be reviewed and confirmed, and the main processes that generated the historical military aircraft data will be traced. For the five levels of security risk, the historical data of military aircraft will be reviewed, the acceptability and completeness of the historical data will be confirmed, and the entire process of the generation of the historical data will be traced.

8. The method for equivalent assessment of civil aircraft airworthiness safety based on historical military aircraft data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S7), based on the classification results of the military aircraft historical data in step S1, the military aircraft historical data is analyzed, sorted out and identified from three aspects: the object of data verification, the method of data generation and the safety level indicated by the data. The data is then assigned to the safety sub-items, safety level requirements and compliance method requirements listed in the analysis results of the safety sub-items, safety level and compliance method requirements of each applicable airworthiness clause.

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