Unmanned aerial vehicle bus data security record and trusted record storage method and security record storage system

Abstract

A method and system for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data are disclosed. The method includes: capturing raw interactive communication data frames of the UAV's internal core bus in real time through a data acquisition interface; parsing and filtering the captured data frames to extract key information and attach timestamps and serial numbers to form standardized data elements; transmitting the standardized data elements to a hardware security module, generating a device-specific key using a true random number generator and storing it in a one-time programmable storage area, generating a hash digest using a hash algorithm, and digitally signing the hash digest using an asymmetric algorithm with the device's private key; encapsulating the standard data elements, hash digest, and digital signature into a secure data credential, and writing it to different non-volatile storage media according to business priority; during data synchronization, encapsulating the credential using a symmetric encryption algorithm and transmitting it to the ground station, where the ground station performs signature verification and hash comparison to verify the data authenticity.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to information security and data recording technology for low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and in particular to a method and system for secure recording and reliable evidence storage of UAV bus data. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of the low-altitude economy and UAV technology, various types of UAVs are increasingly widely used in different fields. Their internal flight control, navigation and positioning, energy management, and payload communication nodes together constitute a complex UAV bus information network. The secure description and recording of the UAV system's operational status typically relies on conventional flight log systems or simple external encryption methods to store basic telemetry parameters and trajectory information. In recent years, scholars and companies both domestically and internationally have conducted research and discussions on UAV data security and bus networks from different perspectives, covering topics such as the design of communication encryption mechanisms, anti-interference analysis of data links, construction of intrusion detection models, and conventional storage and post-disaster recovery of flight records. However, there are no publicly reported studies that utilize hardware root of trust and cryptographic algorithms to extract, hash, and digitally sign UAV internal bus interaction data in real time, generating immutable security credentials, and thus using this as a basic evidence storage unit for trusted traceability throughout the UAV's flight lifecycle.

[0003] Current mainstream UAV data logging devices (such as the UAV "black box") mainly consist of a bus interface, a microcontroller unit (MCU), and ordinary local storage media. Their main workflow is as follows: First, during the data acquisition phase, the device connects to the UAV's internal bus via a physical interface, passively receiving raw communication data frames from the flight control, navigation, and propulsion subsystems. Second, during the data processing phase, the MCU performs simple protocol parsing and packaging of the received data frames, typically only adding a system timestamp and calculating a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) or a simple checksum to achieve basic transmission error detection.

[0004] Finally, during the data storage and export phase, the packaged data blocks are mostly written to the local medium in plaintext or basic general software encryption. After the drone lands or establishes communication with the ground station, the historical logs are exported to the ground station in batches via physical interface or wireless link, solely for post-event trajectory playback and routine fault analysis.

[0005] Existing technologies for secure data storage in drones suffer from the following significant shortcomings: First, they lack tamper resistance: existing devices mostly rely on simple checks like CRC, which can only detect physical transmission errors and cannot prevent malicious network attacks and data forgery, making data integrity highly vulnerable. Second, they lack a hardware-level root of trust: mainstream recorders mostly use plaintext storage or pure software encryption, lacking underlying hardware isolation protection. Once a drone is illegally hijacked or crashes, the storage medium is easily physically compromised, posing a serious risk of core data leakage. Finally, their traceability and evidentiary effectiveness are insufficient: existing systems do not establish a strong digital signature and timestamp binding mechanism at the source, resulting in a lack of data non-repudiation. In the event of an accident, ordinary logs are easily tampered with and are difficult to use as reliable electronic evidence for determining liability.

[0006] Currently, drone flight data recording mostly adopts a "conventional log + simple CRC check + software-level encryption" model. However, due to the lack of a hardware-level root of trust and strong cryptographic binding, the storage medium is highly vulnerable to physical breaches or malicious tampering when the drone is hijacked, networked, or crashes. In the context of increasingly complex low-altitude flight applications, this fragile evidence storage mechanism makes it difficult to trace historical data after an accident, rendering it unreliable electronic evidence for determining liability.

[0007] It should be noted that the information disclosed in the background section above is only for understanding the background of this application, and therefore may include information that does not constitute prior art known to those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The main objective of this invention is to overcome the deficiencies in the aforementioned background technology and provide a method and system for secure recording and reliable evidence storage of UAV bus data.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: A method for secure recording and trusted storage of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) bus data includes the following steps: S1. Real-time extraction of multi-channel bus data: Connect to the internal bus of the UAV through bypass monitoring or direct access to capture the original communication data frames between key nodes in real time; S2. Data Cleaning and Element Standardization: The captured raw data frames are parsed and filtered to extract the data source, destination node, instruction type and core communication content, and hardware-generated timestamps and globally unique serial numbers are added to form standardized data elements. S3. Cryptographic processing based on hardware root of trust: The standardized data elements are transmitted to the hardware security module, which has a built-in device-specific root key generated by a true random number generator and stored in a one-time programmable storage area; the SM3 hash algorithm is called to generate a hash digest for the data elements, and the hash digests of multiple consecutive data elements are constructed into a hash chain or Merkle tree according to time order or logical relationship; the SM2 algorithm is called only for the final root hash value and digital signature is performed using the device private key; S4. Secure data credential encapsulation: The standardized data elements, the corresponding SM3 hash digest, and the SM2 digital signature are concatenated and encapsulated to generate a complete secure data credential; S5. Tiered fault-tolerant storage: Based on the service priority and read / write frequency of the data frame, the security data credentials are written to different types of non-volatile storage media in a tiered manner. Among them, the core flight control data credentials that are updated frequently are stored in ferroelectric memory, and the large-capacity conventional telemetry data credentials are stored in flash memory and protected by error correction codes. S6. Secure Data Synchronization and Trusted Verification: When a data synchronization command is triggered, the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is invoked to encapsulate the selected historical secure data credentials in ciphertext and send them to the ground station through a secure wireless transmission channel. After decryption, the ground station uses the device's public key to perform SM2 signature verification, then calculates the SM3 hash of the original data and compares it with the hash digest in the credentials. If they match, the data is confirmed to be complete and untampered, thus achieving trusted traceability of flight status.

[0010] A secure data recording and storage system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) bus systems includes: The bus acquisition interface is used to connect to the internal bus of the UAV in a bypass listening or direct access manner to capture raw communication data frames in real time. The main control chip MCU is connected to the bus acquisition interface and is used to perform protocol parsing, element standardization, and timestamp and sequence number appending on the captured data frames, as well as to perform data credential encapsulation and hierarchical storage scheduling. The hardware security module is connected to the main control chip MCU via an internal security bus. It has a built-in true random number generator, a one-time programmable storage area, and SM3, SM2, and SM4 algorithm coprocessors. It is used to generate and securely store the device-specific root key, perform hash operations and digital signatures on data elements, and encrypt and decrypt synchronized data. A non-volatile storage module, connected to the main control chip MCU, includes ferroelectric memory and flash memory, and is used to store secure data credentials according to data priority. The wireless communication module is connected to the main control chip MCU and is used to establish a secure transmission channel with the ground station to realize encrypted synchronization and two-way authentication of historical credentials.

[0011] The present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention proposes a method and system for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data. Based on a hardware root of trust and cryptographic algorithms, it extracts, hashes, and securely stores UAV internal bus interaction data in real time, thereby achieving tamper-proof and reliable traceability of flight interaction data. To this end, this invention introduces a hardware security module. Its built-in true random number generator generates a device-specific key and stores it in a one-time programmable storage area. The UAV internal bus interaction data is extracted in real time, hashed, and digitally signed to generate an immutable security credential, which serves as the basic evidence storage unit for reliable traceability throughout the UAV's flight lifecycle. By constructing a physically immutable reliable data chain, this invention provides highly reliable underlying technical support for secure traceability throughout the UAV's flight lifecycle.

[0012] Specifically, this invention establishes a hardware-based root-of-trust data security storage system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), forming an end-to-end hardware-level anti-tampering framework. It extracts and transforms discrete UAV internal interaction data into non-repudiable secure data credentials. Furthermore, this invention designs a hierarchical fault-tolerant physical storage architecture and a data security synchronization and trusted verification mechanism between the UAV and the ground station. By hierarchically writing core flight control data and conventional telemetry data to different non-volatile storage media, and combining encrypted transmission and signature verification processes, the entire lifecycle flight data of the UAV is solidified, providing a legally sound and credible electronic evidence foundation for UAV accident investigation, unauthorized flight tracing, and flight status verification.

[0013] Compared to existing technologies, current UAV flight data recording primarily employs a "conventional log recording + simple CRC check + software-level encryption" model. This system lacks underlying hardware isolation and physical security protection, making the storage medium highly vulnerable to physical breaches or unauthorized reading. Furthermore, the absence of strong cryptographic signature bindings makes existing flight logs easily susceptible to malicious tampering or forgery, failing to guarantee the non-repudiation of interactive data. This results in difficulties in providing legally valid and credible evidence for tracing the source of UAV safety incidents or violations. This invention introduces a hardware security module with an embedded true random number generator and a one-time programmable storage area, constructing an end-to-end physical-level tamper-proof architecture for UAV bus data. Unlike simple software protection, this solution utilizes a hardware-embedded dedicated key to hash and digitally sign the standardized extracted data, addressing the vulnerability of existing equipment data to forgery and tampering. It transforms all UAV interactive data into non-repudiation secure data credentials for hierarchical fault-tolerant storage, completely establishing a trusted data chain from generation and storage to download and synchronization, effectively improving the security traceability and accident liability determination capabilities of UAV data throughout its entire lifecycle.

[0014] Other beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention will be further described below. Attached Figure Description

[0015] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the overall process of the UAV bus data security recording and trusted evidence storage method of the present invention.

[0016] Figure 2 This is an architecture diagram of a drone bus data security recording and storage system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 3 This is a data frame structure diagram of an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0018] The embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below. It should be emphasized that the following description is merely exemplary and not intended to limit the scope and application of the present invention.

[0019] It should be noted that when a component is referred to as "fixed to" or "set on" another component, it can be directly on or indirectly on that other component. When a component is referred to as "connected to" another component, it can be directly connected to or indirectly connected to that other component. Furthermore, a connection can be used for fixing, coupling, or communication.

[0020] It should be understood that the terms "length", "width", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", and "outer" indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing the embodiments of the present invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on the present invention.

[0021] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of embodiments of the present invention, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0022] This invention addresses the technical shortcomings of drone flight data recording, which lacks hardware-level protection and strong cryptographic binding. It proposes a bus-based data security evidence storage scheme based on a hardware root of trust and a cryptographic algorithm system. A hardware security module with a built-in true random number generator and a one-time programmable storage area generates and embeds a device-specific key. Real-time extracted bus interaction data is hashed and digitally signed to form an irrefutable secure data credential. Data is stored hierarchically according to priority, and combined with encrypted transmission and signature verification mechanisms, a fully traceable and reliable data chain is established from generation and storage to synchronization. This fundamentally solves the pain points of existing technologies where flight logs are easily tampered with and forged, making them unreliable as credible electronic evidence. It provides physical-level legal support for accident liability determination and security traceability throughout the entire lifecycle of drones.

[0023] See Figure 1 This invention provides a method for secure recording and trusted storage of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) bus data, comprising the following steps: Step S1. Real-time extraction of multi-channel bus data: Connect to the internal bus of the UAV through bypass monitoring or direct access to capture the original communication data frames between key nodes in the flight control system, navigation and positioning system, energy management and payload module in real time.

[0024] In some embodiments, in step S1, the UAV internal bus includes one or more of a controller area network bus, a universal asynchronous receiver / transmitter bus, and a serial peripheral interface bus. The bypass monitoring mode may employ a high-impedance input and signal isolation design to ensure that the original bus electrical characteristics and communication timing are not altered.

[0025] Step S2. Data Cleaning and Element Standardization: The captured raw data frames are parsed and filtered to extract the data source, destination node, instruction type and core communication content, and a high-precision timestamp and a globally unique serial number generated by hardware are added to form standardized data elements.

[0026] In some embodiments, step S2, the protocol parsing and filtering specifically includes: identifying the data frame format of different bus protocols and filtering out non-critical or redundant communication messages; the high-precision timestamp is generated by the device's internal hardware clock, and the globally unique sequence number is a counter value that increments frame by frame. The two, together with the extracted data source, destination node, instruction type, and core communication content, constitute structured data elements.

[0027] Step S3. Cryptographic processing based on hardware root of trust: The standardized data elements are transmitted to the hardware security module, which has a built-in device-specific root key generated by a true random number generator and stored in a one-time programmable storage area; a hash algorithm (such as the SM3 hash algorithm) is called to generate a hash digest for the data elements, and the hash digests of multiple consecutive data elements are used to construct a hash chain or Merkle tree according to time order or logical relationship; an asymmetric algorithm (such as the SM2 algorithm) is called only for the final root hash value and digital signature is performed using the device private key.

[0028] In some embodiments, in step S3, the hardware security module integrates a true random number generator conforming to the standards of the State Cryptography Administration, generates a high-entropy device-specific root key during the device's factory initialization phase, and solidifies it in a one-time programmable storage area or a storage unit protected by dedicated security logic through hardware circuitry. Each time the system is powered on, it directly retrieves the key from the secure storage area, and the key never leaves the physical security boundary of the hardware security module. The hash chain or Merkle tree is constructed by concatenating the SM3 hash digests of multiple data elements that arrive consecutively in chronological order and then performing SM3 hashing again, or by constructing a binary tree structure to generate a root hash value. The hardware security module performs an SM2 signature operation only once on the root hash value.

[0029] Step S4. Secure data credential encapsulation: The standardized data elements, the corresponding hash digest (such as SM3 hash digest), and the digital signature (such as SM2 digital signature) are concatenated and encapsulated to generate a complete secure data credential.

[0030] In some embodiments, in step S4, the logical structure of the secure data credential is as follows: the starting field is a standardized data element ontology, followed by the SM3 hash digest of the data element and the SM2 digital signature generated based on the device private key, and the three are concatenated and encapsulated to form an indivisible atomic evidence storage unit.

[0031] Step S5. Tiered fault-tolerant storage: Based on the service priority and read / write frequency of the data frame, the security data credentials are written to different types of non-volatile storage media in a tiered manner. Among them, the core flight control data credentials that are updated frequently are stored in ferroelectric memory, and the large-capacity conventional telemetry data credentials are stored in flash memory and protected by error correction codes.

[0032] In some embodiments, in step S5, the hierarchical writing strategy is as follows: security data credentials corresponding to high-frequency updated core data such as flight control commands and attitude parameters are preferentially written to the ferroelectric memory; security data credentials corresponding to large-capacity, low-frequency updated conventional telemetry data such as position coordinates, ambient temperature, and system logs are written to the flash memory, and error correction codes are used for error detection and correction; the two types of storage media are connected to the main control chip through a serial peripheral interface, and the main control chip schedules the writing to the target.

[0033] Step S6. Secure Data Synchronization and Trusted Verification: When the data synchronization command is triggered, a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm) is called to encapsulate the selected historical secure data credentials in ciphertext and send them to the ground station through a secure wireless transmission channel. After decryption, the ground station uses the device's public key to perform asymmetric (such as SM2) signature verification, then calculates a hash (such as the SM3 hash) on the original data and compares it with the hash digest in the credentials. If they match, the data is confirmed to be complete and has not been tampered with, thus achieving trusted traceability of flight status.

[0034] In some embodiments, the conditions for triggering the data synchronization command in step S6 include: establishing a physical connection with the authorized ground station after the UAV returns, automatically triggering the command at a preset time interval after the wireless communication link is established, or the ground station actively initiating a synchronization request. The establishment process of the secure wireless transmission channel is as follows: the ground station sends a challenge word to the device, the device signs the challenge word using the device private key in the hardware security module and returns it, the ground station verifies the signature using the device public key pre-stored in the trust root library, and after successful verification, the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to transmit the encrypted historical secure data certificate. The signature verification and hash comparison on the ground station side are as follows: first, the SM2 signature is verified using the device public key. If it passes, the SM3 hash value is recalculated for the original data element and compared with the hash digest carried in the certificate. Only if the two are consistent can the data be determined to be genuine and valid.

[0035] See Figure 2 This invention also provides a UAV bus data security recording and storage system, comprising: The bus acquisition interface is used to connect to the internal bus of the UAV in a bypass listening or direct access manner to capture raw communication data frames in real time. The main control chip MCU is connected to the bus acquisition interface and is used to perform protocol parsing, element standardization, and timestamp and sequence number appending on the captured data frames, as well as to perform data credential encapsulation and hierarchical storage scheduling. The hardware security module is connected to the main control chip MCU via an internal security bus. It has a built-in true random number generator, a one-time programmable storage area, and SM3, SM2, and SM4 algorithm coprocessors. It is used to generate and securely store the device-specific root key, perform hash operations and digital signatures on data elements, and encrypt and decrypt synchronized data. A non-volatile storage module, connected to the main control chip MCU, includes ferroelectric memory and flash memory, and is used to store secure data credentials according to data priority. The wireless communication module is connected to the main control chip MCU and is used to establish a secure transmission channel with the ground station to realize encrypted synchronization and two-way authentication of historical credentials.

[0036] In some embodiments, the hardware security module also integrates a high-security core, an anti-tamper detection circuit, and a secure boot module; after the true random number generator generates the root key during the factory initialization phase, it is solidified in a one-time programmable storage area through a hardware fuse or locking mechanism; the anti-tamper detection circuit triggers immediate erasure of the sensitive storage area when physical intrusion is detected; the secure boot module is used to verify the firmware signature upon power-on to ensure that the system software has not been tampered with; the SM2 algorithm coprocessor and the acceleration coprocessor work together to perform SM2 signature operations.

[0037] In some embodiments, the main control chip MCU is internally divided into a hardware abstraction layer and an application layer. The application layer includes a business logic layer and a service layer. The business logic layer includes a data filtering module, a power and clock management module, and a format adjustment module, which are used to filter data frames, control system power consumption, and unify data formats. The service layer includes a data reporting module, a read / write storage module, and a command downlink module, which are used to coordinate data transmission with the hardware security module and the non-volatile storage module. The ferroelectric memory is used to store core flight control data credentials that are updated frequently, and the flash memory is used to store large-capacity conventional telemetry data credentials. Both are connected to the main control chip MCU through a serial peripheral interface.

[0038] This invention proposes a method and system for secure recording and reliable evidence storage of UAV bus data. Addressing the shortcomings of existing UAV flight data recording devices—namely, the lack of hardware-level trust roots and reliance on CRC checks and software encryption leading to data susceptibility to tampering and forgery, and difficulty in serving as reliable electronic evidence—this invention introduces a hardware security module with a built-in true random number generator and a one-time programmable storage area. By hardware-embedded device-specific keys, it performs hash operations and asymmetric digital signatures on real-time extracted bus interaction data, transforming discrete raw data into non-repudiable secure data credentials containing hash digests and digital signatures. This fundamentally solves the problems of easily compromised data integrity and the vulnerability of storage media to physical attacks. Furthermore, based on data priority and read / write frequency, credentials are hierarchically written to different non-volatile storage media. Combined with symmetric encryption transmission and ground station signature verification mechanisms, this establishes a complete trusted closed loop for data generation, storage, and synchronization. This solidifies the entire lifecycle of UAV flight data into a legally valid reliable evidence unit, providing physical-level tamper-proof underlying technology support for accident investigation, black flight tracing, and flight status verification.

[0039] The following further describes the implementation methods and advantages of specific embodiments of the present invention.

[0040] A secure data recording and storage system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) bus, its hardware architecture mainly includes: a bus acquisition interface, a main control chip (MCU), a hardware security module (HSM) with a built-in true random number generator (TRNG) and one-time programmable memory (OTP), and a non-volatile storage module. The architecture of the UAV bus data secure recording and storage system is as follows: Figure 2As shown, the antenna interacts bidirectionally with the RF front-end, and the RF front-end is bidirectionally connected to the UAV bus. The UAV bus transmits data to the main control chip (MCU) via a UART interface. The MCU, as the core processing unit of the system, is internally divided into a hardware abstraction layer and an application layer. The application layer is further divided into a business logic layer and a service layer. The business logic layer includes data filtering, power / clock, and format adjustment modules, while the service layer includes data reporting, read / write storage, and command downlink modules. The MCU interacts with the hardware security module (HSM) and the non-volatile memory via an SPI interface. The hardware security module (HSM) integrates a true random number generator (TRNG), a secure boot (SE), an SM3 algorithm module, and an SM4 algorithm module. The system comprises a security module, an SM2 algorithm module, an acceleration coprocessor, a high-security core, and an anti-tamper detection circuit. The TRNG is used to generate a high-entropy device-specific root key during the device's factory initialization phase and is permanently stored in the OTP storage area via hardware circuitry. Each time the system powers on, it directly retrieves the key from this secure storage area, and the key never leaves the physical security boundary of the HSM. The SM2 algorithm module works in conjunction with the acceleration coprocessor, and the SM3 and SM4 algorithm modules communicate with the SM2 algorithm module. The non-volatile memory includes two storage media: ferroelectric memory (FRAM) and flash memory (FLASH), which are connected to the MCU via an SPI interface and are used to store secure data credentials hierarchically according to data priority and read / write frequency.

[0041] The specific data processing and trusted evidence preservation methods and procedures of this solution are as follows: 1. Real-time extraction of multi-channel bus data: The device connects to the UAV's internal core bus through the data acquisition interface in either bypass monitoring or direct access mode, and captures the original interactive communication data frames of key nodes such as the flight control system, navigation and positioning system, energy management and payload module in real time and without loss.

[0042] 2. Data Cleaning and Element Standardization: The MCU performs protocol parsing and filtering on the captured raw data frames, extracting the data source, destination node, instruction type, and core communication content. Subsequently, the MCU adds a high-precision timestamp generated by the device hardware and a globally unique data frame sequence number to the extracted information, transforming the discrete communication messages into structured standard data elements, laying the foundation for subsequent cryptographic processing.

[0043] 3. Cryptographic Processing Based on Hardware Trust Root: The MCU transmits standardized data elements to the HSM via its internal secure bus. The HSM retrieves the device-specific root key from its internal OTP secure storage area. Subsequently, the HSM calls the built-in SM3 hash algorithm coprocessor to perform hash operations on the data elements, generating a fixed-length hash digest. It then constructs a hash chain or Merkle tree from the hash digests of multiple consecutive data elements according to chronological order or logical relationships. Only the final root hash value is digitally signed using the device's private key within the secure isolation area, thereby establishing the tamper-proof and non-repudiable properties of batch data while ensuring real-time performance.

[0044] 4. Secure Data Credential Encapsulation and Hierarchical Fault-Tolerant Storage: The MCU concatenates and encapsulates the original standard data elements, SM3 hash digest, and SM2 digital signature to generate a complete "secure data credential." Its specific logical structure is as follows: Figure 3 As shown. During the storage phase, based on the service priority and read / write frequency of the data frames, the system hierarchically writes credentials to different non-volatile storage media. For example, the security data credentials corresponding to the frequently updated core flight control commands and flight attitude parameters are written to ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) with high write cycle durability, while large-capacity conventional telemetry data and system logs are stored in Flash memory, supplemented by error correction code verification protection, to adapt to the complex physical and electromagnetic environment in the operation of low-altitude UAVs.

[0045] 5. Secure Data Synchronization and Trusted Verification: When the UAV returns to base or establishes communication with an authorized ground station and triggers a data synchronization command, the device invokes the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm to encapsulate the selected historical security credentials in the storage area into encrypted form, establishing a secure wireless transmission channel to transmit them to the ground station. The establishment process of the secure wireless transmission channel is as follows: the ground station sends a challenge word to the device; the device signs the challenge word using its private key within the HSM and returns it; the ground station verifies the signature using the device's public key pre-stored in the trust root library; after successful verification, it uses the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm to transmit the historical security credentials in encrypted form. Upon receiving the encrypted form, the ground station first decrypts it, then performs SM2 signature verification using the corresponding device public key. After successful verification, it recalculates the SM3 hash value of the original data and compares it with the hash digest in the credentials. If the signature verification passes and the hash values ​​match, a complete reconstruction and authenticity traceability of the UAV's historical flight status is achieved; if the verification fails, it is determined that the data has been damaged or tampered with during storage or transmission.

[0046] In summary, this invention proposes a method and system for secure recording and reliable evidence storage of UAV bus data. By introducing a hardware security module with a built-in true random number generator and a one-time programmable storage area, and combining hash and asymmetric algorithms, a hash chain or Merkle tree batch signature strategy is adopted to perform hash operations and digital signatures on the bus interaction data extracted in real time, forming a secure data certificate with non-repudiation. The data is then written to ferroelectric memory and flash memory according to data priority. Finally, through a challenge-response based two-way authentication and symmetric encrypted transmission and ground station signature verification and comparison mechanism, a reliable closed loop of the entire data chain from generation and storage to synchronization is established.

[0047] The key innovative contributions and technical points of this invention include: establishing a hardware-based root of trust UAV bus data security storage system, forming an end-to-end hardware-level anti-tampering framework, which uniformly extracts and transforms discrete UAV internal interaction data into secure data credentials with non-repudiation; and designing a hierarchical fault-tolerant physical storage architecture and a data security synchronization and trusted verification mechanism between the UAV and the ground station, which solidifies the UAV's entire lifecycle flight data, providing a legally sound and credible electronic evidence foundation for UAV accident investigation, unauthorized flight tracing, and flight status verification.

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the significant technical advantages of the present invention are reflected in the following aspects: Currently, drone flight data recording mainly adopts the model of "conventional log recording + simple CRC check + software-level encryption". The system lacks underlying hardware isolation and physical security protection. The storage medium is easily physically cracked or illegally read. Furthermore, due to the lack of high-strength cryptographic signature binding, existing flight logs are easily maliciously tampered with or forged, and the non-repudiation of interactive data cannot be guaranteed. As a result, it is difficult to provide legally valid and credible traceability evidence in the event of drone safety accidents or violations. This invention introduces a hardware security module with an embedded true random number generator and a one-time programmable key storage, constructing an end-to-end physical-level anti-tampering architecture for UAV bus data. Unlike simple software protection, this solution uses a dedicated key embedded in the hardware security module to hash and digitally sign the standardized extracted data, solving the pain point of existing equipment data being easily forged and tampered with. It also transforms all UAV interaction data into non-repudiable secure data credentials for hierarchical fault-tolerant storage. Batch signing through hash chains or Merkle trees significantly reduces computational overhead, ensures real-time performance, and completely establishes a trusted data chain from data generation, storage to downlink synchronization, effectively improving the security traceability and accident liability determination capabilities of UAV data throughout its entire lifecycle.

[0049] This invention also provides a storage medium for storing a computer program, which, when executed, performs at least the methods described above.

[0050] This invention also provides a control device, including a processor and a storage medium for storing a computer program; wherein the processor executes the computer program by performing at least the method described above.

[0051] This invention also provides a processor that executes a computer program, at least performing the methods described above.

[0052] The storage medium can be implemented by any type of non-volatile storage device, or a combination thereof. The non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), magnetic random access memory (FRAM), flash memory, magnetic surface memory, optical disc or CD-ROM; magnetic surface memory can be disk storage or magnetic tape storage. The storage media described in the embodiments of this invention are intended to include, but are not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0053] In the several embodiments provided by this invention, it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods can be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as: multiple units or components can be combined, or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the various components shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0054] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0055] In addition, in the various embodiments of the present invention, each functional unit can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can be a separate unit, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit; the integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.

[0056] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the above method embodiments can be implemented by hardware related to program instructions. The aforementioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it performs the steps of the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as mobile storage devices, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0057] Alternatively, if the integrated units of this invention are implemented as software functional modules and sold or used as independent products, they can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this invention, or the parts that contribute to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the methods described in the various embodiments of this invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as mobile storage devices, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0058] The methods disclosed in the several method embodiments provided by this invention can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new method embodiments.

[0059] The features disclosed in the several product embodiments provided by this invention can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new product embodiments.

[0060] The features disclosed in the several method or device embodiments provided by the present invention can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new method or device embodiments.

[0061] The above description, in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, provides a further detailed explanation of the present invention. It should not be construed that the specific implementation of the present invention is limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art, various equivalent substitutions or obvious modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and all such modifications, achieving the same performance or application, should be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for secure recording and reliable storage of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) bus data, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Real-time extraction of multi-channel bus data: Connect to the internal bus of the UAV through bypass monitoring or direct access to capture the original communication data frames between key nodes in real time; S2. Data Cleaning and Element Standardization: The captured raw data frames are parsed and filtered to extract the data source, destination node, instruction type and core communication content, and hardware-generated timestamps and globally unique serial numbers are added to form standardized data elements. S3. Cryptographic processing based on hardware root of trust: The standardized data elements are transmitted to the hardware security module, which has a built-in device-specific root key generated by a true random number generator and stored in a one-time programmable storage area; a hash algorithm is called to generate a hash digest of the data elements, and the hash digests of multiple consecutive data elements are constructed into a hash chain or Merkle tree according to time order or logical relationship; only the final root hash value is used to call the asymmetric algorithm and digitally signed using the device private key; S4. Secure data credential encapsulation: The standardized data elements, corresponding hash digests, and digital signatures are concatenated and encapsulated to generate a complete secure data credential; S5. Tiered fault-tolerant storage: Based on the service priority and read / write frequency of the data frame, the security data credentials are written to different types of non-volatile storage media in a tiered manner. Among them, the core flight control data credentials that are updated frequently are stored in ferroelectric memory, and the large-capacity conventional telemetry data credentials are stored in flash memory and protected by error correction codes. S6. Secure Data Synchronization and Trusted Verification: When a data synchronization command is triggered, a symmetric encryption algorithm is invoked to encapsulate the selected historical secure data credentials in ciphertext and send them to the ground station through a secure wireless transmission channel. After decryption, the ground station uses the device's public key to perform asymmetric signature verification, then calculates a hash on the original data and compares it with the hash digest in the credentials. If they match, the data is confirmed to be complete and untampered, thus achieving trusted traceability of flight status.

2. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the UAV internal bus includes one or more of the following: controller local area network bus, universal asynchronous transceiver bus, and serial peripheral interface bus.

3. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, the protocol parsing and filtering specifically includes: identifying the data frame format of different bus protocols and filtering out non-critical or redundant communication messages; the high-precision timestamp is generated by the device's internal hardware clock, and the globally unique sequence number is a counter value that increments frame by frame. Together with the extracted data source, destination node, instruction type, and core communication content, they constitute structured data elements.

4. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, the hardware security module integrates a true random number generator conforming to the standards of the State Cryptography Administration. During the device's factory initialization phase, it generates a high-entropy device-specific root key, which is then solidified in a one-time programmable storage area or a storage unit protected by dedicated security logic through hardware circuitry. Each time the device is powered on, the system directly retrieves the key from this secure storage area, and the key never leaves the physical security boundary of the hardware security module. The hash chain or Merkle tree is constructed by concatenating the SM3 hash digests of multiple data elements that arrive consecutively in chronological order and then performing SM3 hashing again, or by constructing a binary tree structure to generate a root hash value. The hardware security module performs an SM2 signature operation only once on the root hash value.

5. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4, the logical structure of the secure data credential is as follows: the starting field is the standardized data element ontology, followed by the SM3 hash digest of the data element and the SM2 digital signature generated based on the device private key, and the three are concatenated and encapsulated to form an indivisible atomic evidence storage unit.

6. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, the hierarchical writing strategy is as follows: the security data credentials corresponding to the core data updated frequently, such as flight control commands and attitude parameters, are preferentially written to the ferroelectric memory; the security data credentials corresponding to the conventional telemetry data updated frequently, such as position coordinates, ambient temperature, and system logs, are written to the flash memory, and error correction codes are used for error detection and correction; the two types of storage media are connected to the main control chip through a serial peripheral interface, and the main control chip schedules the writing to the target.

7. The method for secure recording and reliable storage of UAV bus data according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S6, the conditions for triggering the data synchronization command include: establishing a physical connection with the authorized ground station after the UAV returns, automatically triggering the synchronization at a preset time interval after the wireless communication link is established, or the ground station actively initiating a synchronization request; the establishment process of the secure wireless transmission channel is as follows: the ground station sends a challenge word to the device, the device signs the challenge word using the device private key in the hardware security module and returns it, the ground station verifies the signature using the device public key pre-stored in the trust root library, after verification, the SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to transmit the historical secure data certificate in encrypted form; the signature verification and hash comparison on the ground station side are as follows: first, the SM2 signature is verified using the device public key, if it passes, the SM3 hash value of the original data element is recalculated and compared with the hash digest carried in the certificate, and the data is determined to be true and valid only if the two are consistent.

8. A secure data recording and storage system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), used to implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, include: The bus acquisition interface is used to connect to the internal bus of the UAV in a bypass listening or direct access manner to capture raw communication data frames in real time. The main control chip MCU is connected to the bus acquisition interface and is used to perform protocol parsing, element standardization, and timestamp and sequence number appending on the captured data frames, as well as to perform data credential encapsulation and hierarchical storage scheduling. The hardware security module is connected to the main control chip MCU via an internal security bus. It has a built-in true random number generator, a one-time programmable storage area, and SM3, SM2, and SM4 algorithm coprocessors. It is used to generate and securely store the device-specific root key, perform hash operations and digital signatures on data elements, and encrypt and decrypt synchronized data. A non-volatile storage module, connected to the main control chip MCU, includes ferroelectric memory and flash memory, and is used to store secure data credentials according to data priority. The wireless communication module is connected to the main control chip MCU and is used to establish a secure transmission channel with the ground station to realize encrypted synchronization and two-way authentication of historical credentials.

9. The UAV bus data security recording and storage system according to claim 8, characterized in that, The hardware security module also integrates a high-security core, an anti-tamper detection circuit, and a secure boot module; after the true random number generator generates the root key during the factory initialization phase, it is solidified in a one-time programmable storage area through a hardware fuse or locking mechanism; the anti-tamper detection circuit triggers immediate erasure of the sensitive storage area when physical intrusion is detected; The secure boot module is used to verify the firmware signature upon power-on to ensure that the system software has not been tampered with; the SM2 algorithm coprocessor works in conjunction with the acceleration coprocessor to perform SM2 signature calculations.

10. The UAV bus data security recording and storage system according to claim 8, characterized in that, The main control chip MCU is internally divided into a hardware abstraction layer and an application layer. The application layer includes a business logic layer and a service layer. The business logic layer includes a data filtering module, a power and clock management module, and a format adjustment module, which are used to filter data frames, control system power consumption, and unify data formats. The service layer includes a data reporting module, a read / write storage module, and a command downlink module, which are used to coordinate data transmission with the hardware security module and the non-volatile storage module. The ferroelectric memory is used to store core flight control data credentials that are updated frequently, and the flash memory is used to store large-capacity conventional telemetry data credentials. Both are connected to the main control chip MCU through a serial peripheral interface.

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