Building type producer-consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction method considering market force evaluation

Abstract

The application discloses a building type producer-consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction method considering market force evaluation, and aims to solve the optimal transaction decision problem among building type producer-consumers. The model applies the idea of non-cooperative game, and accurately evaluates the market transaction potential of the producer-consumers before transaction, and establishes a multi-producer-consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction model considering market force evaluation. The producer-consumer market transaction potential evaluation model is constructed according to the physical characteristics and operation modes of the producer-consumers; the benefit functions of the seller producer-consumers and market operators are constructed based on the characteristics of the non-cooperative game model; and the optimal transaction strategy is obtained by combining the producer-consumer electric energy transaction process and the definition of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium point. The application can solve the market transaction potential of the producer-consumers in a continuous time period and the optimal transaction strategy, thereby providing effective support for the correct decision of the electric power market staff, and has certain engineering practical value.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application relates to an energy transaction method for a power market, in particular to a building-type producer-consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction method considering market force evaluation. BACKGROUND

[0002] In recent years, the advantages of distributed energy development have gradually emerged, and the transformation of energy supply mode from centralized to distributed has become an inevitable trend. Under this background, a local electricity sharing and trading method, peer-to-peer (P2P) energy transaction method, has emerged, which can effectively reduce the threshold and transaction cost of user-side market transaction, and stimulate the enthusiasm of market participants in distributed transaction. At present, it has been widely used in electricity transaction between producers and consumers. However, distributed energy transaction still faces problems such as random user behavior, random bidding strategy of each subject and market relationship complexity, so it is urgent to accurately evaluate the market transaction potential of each subject and further clarify the game relationship between different market subjects.

[0003] At present, the forms of electricity sharing and distributed transaction between producers and consumers can be divided into the following two types: (1) energy sharing and transaction mechanism based on cooperative game model; (2) energy sharing and transaction mechanism based on non-cooperative game. For the former, the main form is that each producer and consumer participates in market transaction in the form of alliance, and preferentially consumes the internal surplus electricity through energy sharing. However, first of all, in addition to the two variables of electricity price and electricity quantity directly related to the transaction result, the energy use characteristics and controllable potential of terminal users are also important factors affecting the transaction. Although the existing research work also involves the research on load demand response of producer and consumer users, it fails to systematically evaluate the market potential of producer and consumer from the perspective of energy use characteristics. Secondly, the current research on P2P transaction mode based on non-cooperative game mostly focuses on the analysis of transaction strategies and energy management strategies of each producer and consumer at the game equilibrium point, and few studies deeply analyze the conditions and influencing factors of P2P from the perspective of game equilibrium. With the further opening of user-side market and the gradual implementation of decentralized transaction mode, the above conventional methods cannot meet the market potential evaluation demand in the whole process of market transaction, and it is difficult to develop the optimal electricity price strategy. SUMMARY

[0004] The application aims to provide a building-type producer-consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction method capable of solving the market force of producers and consumers and the optimal transaction strategy.

[0005] Technical solution: The multi-producer and consumer non-cooperative game energy transaction method considering market force evaluation of the application is used for market evaluation and solving optimal transaction strategy of the energy using system of a public building system, the building type producer and consumer is a public building user with both power generation and consumption capacity, including a photovoltaic unit for generating power and a running system for consuming power, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0006] (1) Construct a producer and consumer market transaction potential evaluation model according to the energy using equipment contained in the running system of the producer and consumer and the energy consumption thereof;

[0007] (2) Construct the utility function of the seller producer and consumer and the market operator based on a non-cooperative game model;

[0008] (3) Obtain a Nash equilibrium point through enumeration experiment according to an actual transaction process, solve the electricity price at the Nash equilibrium point, and obtain an optimal transaction strategy.

[0009] In the step (1), the running system of the building type producer and consumer is a building air conditioning system composed of N1 water chillers, N2 chilled water pumps, N3 cooling coil fans, N4 cooling water pumps and N5 cooling towers, and the market transaction potential evaluation model thereof is shown in the following formula:

[0010]

[0011] In the formula, P chiller,i , P CHWpump,j , P AHU , P CWpump,m and P tower,n respectively represent the energy consumption of the water chiller, the power of the chilled water pump, the energy consumption of the fan coil, the power of the cooling water pump and the energy consumption of the cooling tower.

[0012] The energy consumption of the water chiller is calculated according to the following formula:

[0013]

[0014] Wherein, Q e is the cooling load on the chilled water circulation side, COP is the energy efficiency ratio of the water chiller, and is calculated according to the following formula:

[0015]

[0016] Wherein, r is the load rate of the water chiller, i.e. the ratio of the cooling load Q e to the rated load Q nom , T e is the evaporation temperature, and T c is the condensation temperature, which is calculated according to the following formula:

[0017]

[0018]

[0019] where T chwr and T cws represent chilled water return temperature and condenser water supply temperature, respectively, Q c represents the load on the condenser water cycle, F chw (m chw ) and F cw (m cw ) are empirical formulas related to chilled water flow m chw and condenser water flow m cw , and are shown in the following equations:

[0020]

[0021]

[0022] Both the chilled water pump and the cooling water pump are provided with a variable frequency system, and the power is calculated according to the following equation:

[0023]

[0024]

[0025]

[0026] where P chw / cw.pump is the chilled / cooling water pump power, m chw / cw is the chilled / cooling water flow, m chw / cw.nom is the rated value of the chilled / cooling water flow, k p and A p are the relevant coefficients.

[0027] The heat exchange process of the fan-coil is shown in the following equation:

[0028]

[0029] where Q room.k is the corresponding area cooling load, m sa,k and m chw,k are the fan speed and the chilled water flow in the coil, respectively; T chws represents the chilled water supply temperature, T ma,k is the mixed temperature of the indoor and outdoor air in the plenum, and can be expressed as At the same time, the sum of the chilled water flow in the coil is equal to the total chilled water flow in the system:

[0030]

[0031] The energy consumption of the fan-coil is calculated according to the following equation:

[0032]

[0033]

[0034] wherein m sa and m sa.nom are the fan speed and its rated value in the fan coil, respectively, k f and A f are the relevant coefficients in the calculation process of the energy consumption of the fan coil, which are determined by the specific model of the fan coil.

[0035] The heat dissipation process of the cooling tower is shown in the following formula:

[0036]

[0037] wherein m ta,n and m cw,n are the fan speed and the cooling water flow in the cooling tower, respectively, T cwr and T wb are the return temperature of the chilled water and the wet bulb temperature of the cooling tower, respectively.

[0038] The energy consumption of the cooling tower is calculated according to the following formula:

[0039]

[0040]

[0041] wherein m ta and m ta.nom are the fan speed and its rated value in the cooling tower, respectively.

[0042] The step (2) comprises the following steps:

[0043] (21) The transaction electricity demand of the producer and consumer at any time is calculated according to the following formula:

[0044]

[0045] wherein, represents the transaction electricity of the zth producer and consumer, and if it is positive, it means that the producer and consumer z is a seller; if it is negative, it means that the producer and consumer z is a buyer, respectively represent the photovoltaic, fixed load and central air conditioning load of the zth producer and consumer at time t;

[0046] (22) The difference between the electricity selling income and the related cost of the seller producer and consumer at time t is calculated according to the following formula:

[0047]

[0048] wherein, P2P electricity sales income of the seller prosumer, transaction income with the operator, P2P service cost and air conditioner load regulation cost, respectively, are calculated as follows:

[0049]

[0050]

[0051] where λ t b is the electricity purchase price of the operator, is the transaction cost between the prosumers, λ t ds is the service cost of P2P transaction between the prosumers, is the transaction electricity quantity between the prosumer m and x, is the electricity sales power of the seller prosumer m to the operator; is the relevant coefficient for quantifying economic cost, T t in represents the indoor temperature, T t ref represents the user's most comfortable room temperature reference temperature;

[0052] (23) The utility function of the market operator is established, and the difference between the income and the wholesale cost of electricity of the retailer market is calculated, as shown in the following formula:

[0053]

[0054] wherein, represents the net profit of the market operator, is the electricity transaction income of the market operator in the retail market; is the service cost collected by the market operator for the P2P transaction between the prosumers; is the wholesale electricity price cost. Each part is calculated as follows:

[0055]

[0056] wherein, represents the electricity sales price of the market operator to the buyer prosumer, is the electricity sales power and the electricity purchase power of the market operator. P t represents the total power sold by the operator to the prosumer; λ t da is the wholesale market electricity price.

[0057] The electricity price at the Nash equilibrium point in the step (3) is calculated as follows:

[0058]

[0059] In the formula, The electricity price of the seller producer and consumer agent, λ t ds The service price of the market operator, λ t b The electricity purchase price of the market, The electricity sale price of the market.

[0060] Beneficial effects: compared with the prior art, the present application has the following remarkable advantages: in view of the characteristics of the building type producer and consumer, the market potential evaluation and the game competition relationship in the market transaction process are considered, a non-cooperative game energy transaction model considering market force evaluation and suitable for the building type producer and consumer is constructed, the market transaction potential of the building type producer and consumer can be evaluated and the optimal transaction strategy can be selected, thereby providing effective support for the correct decision of the power market staff, and the present application has strong engineering practical value. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0061] Figure 1 The flowchart of the present application;

[0062] Figure 2 The market transaction demand curve of the three producers and consumers;

[0063] Figure 3 The market transaction potential evaluation results of each building;

[0064] Figure 4 The change diagram of the utility function of the seller producer and consumer when the market force evaluation is considered;

[0065] Figure 5 The change diagram of the utility function of the seller producer and consumer when the market force evaluation is not considered;

[0066] Figure 6 The change diagram of the Nash equilibrium solution when the air conditioning cost coefficient is increased;

[0067] Figure 7 The change diagram of the Nash equilibrium solution when the upper limit of the service offer is reduced. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] The technical solutions of the present application will be further described below with reference to the drawings.

[0069] In the specific transaction process, the different behaviors of the producer and consumer will have an influence on the electricity price, but even if there is the above influence, the electricity price at the Nash equilibrium point in the present application is still the optimal pricing strategy, and the proof process is as follows:

[0070] Step 301: an arbitrary seller producer and consumer reduces the P2P offer:

[0071] Suppose that the offer of a certain seller producer and consumer l is reduced to Therefore, there is If the rest of the sellers-consumers keep their prices unchanged, and the market operator keeps its service price unchanged, then we have:

[0072]

[0073] Since the market operator keeps its service price unchanged, the regulation cost of the air conditioning load is unchanged, and the sellers-consumers have the following power balance equation: Therefore, we have:

[0074]

[0075] Therefore, when the sellers-consumers reduce their prices, it will not lead to an increase in their utility functions.

[0076] Step 302: Any sellers-consumer increases its P2P price:

[0077] When any sellers-consumer l increases its P2P transaction price, we have Any buyers-consumer's electricity purchase cost from sellers-consumer l is higher than that from the rest of the consumers:

[0078]

[0079] Therefore, any buyers-consumer's electricity purchase cost from sellers-consumer l is also higher than that from the market operator, so no consumer will choose to trade with sellers-consumer l, i.e. Referring to the above simplification process, we have:

[0080]

[0081] Therefore, we have That is, any sellers-consumer increasing its price will not lead to an increase in its utility function, satisfying the game equilibrium condition.

[0082] Step 303: The market operator reduces its service price:

[0083] When the market operator reduces its service price, we have Therefore, we have:

[0084]

[0085]

[0086] Therefore, The market operator reducing its service price will not lead to an increase in its utility function;

[0087] Step 304: The market operator increases its service price: When the market operator increases its service price, we have Therefore, the buyers-consumers will not trade with the sellers-consumers, so we have Subtracting the utility functions, we have:

[0088]

[0089] Therefore, The market operator will not increase its utility function by raising its service price.

[0090] In summary, the electricity price of the seller producer-consumer agent at the game equilibrium point is: And the service price of the market operator is:

[0091] The technical effects of the present application will be introduced below by taking a three-producer-consumer example system as an example:

[0092] In this simulation example, there is one market operator and three producer-consumers aggregating different public buildings, among which, the building resources aggregated by producer-consumer 1 are two shopping malls, the building resources aggregated by producer-consumer 2 are two hotels, and the building resources aggregated by producer-consumer 3 are two office buildings.

[0093] First, the market transaction potential of the producer-consumers is evaluated, and the potential evaluation results shown in Table 1 are obtained. Figure 3 It can be seen that the load reduction of the two office buildings aggregated by producer-consumer 3 is the largest, and the load reduction of shopping mall 1 aggregated by producer-consumer 1 and hotel 2 aggregated by producer-consumer 2 is smaller. This is because, on the one hand, the two office buildings are equipped with higher unit capacity and larger adjustable space; on the other hand, the reference temperature of the two office buildings is higher, so the temperature regulation range is larger, and therefore the transaction potential is larger.

[0094] Combining Figure 4 and Figure 5 it can be seen that the overall revenue of the seller producer-consumer 1 is higher when the market force is considered. This is mainly because under the flexible regulation strategy, the market force of each producer-consumer is improved, the electricity sales of the seller producer-consumer is significantly increased, and therefore the overall revenue of the seller producer-consumer is also improved.

[0095] Due to the competitive relationship between the seller producer-consumers and the market operator, and the interference of various influencing factors, P2P transactions between producer-consumers do not always occur, and combining Figure 6 and Figure 7 it can be seen that when the air conditioning quantification cost coefficient gradually increases, from Figure 6It can be seen that the transaction behavior of the producer-consumer and the distribution of the Nash equilibrium point have no effect, and only the benefit function of the seller producer-consumer is affected. This is mainly because in the equilibrium point of the game, the quantitative economic cost coefficient of air conditioning load is not a variable affecting the Nash equilibrium point, so it does not affect the form of P2P transaction. Secondly, when the upper limit of the service price of the market operator is reduced, it can be seen that the P2P transaction behavior of the producer-consumer changes obviously, so the market operator can quantitatively formulate the upper limit of the service charge, thereby being able to limit or promote the transaction between the producer-consumers.

[0096] The above proof and simulation results verify the effectiveness and practicability of the model constructed by the application. It is shown that through the market force evaluation model and the non-cooperative game model, the market transaction potential evaluation result of the producer-consumer and the optimal P2P transaction strategy can be obtained, and the result has good economy, thereby being able to provide effective support for the correct decision of the market staff, and having certain engineering practical value.

Claims

1. A non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type prosumers that considers market power assessment, used for market assessment and solving for optimal trading strategies in the energy-consuming systems of public building systems, characterized in that, The building-type prosumer is a public building user with both electricity production and consumption capabilities, including photovoltaic units that produce electricity and operating systems that consume electricity. The method includes the following steps: (1) Based on the energy-consuming equipment and energy consumption included in the producer-consumer's operating system, a market transaction potential assessment model for the producer-consumer is constructed. Specifically, the operating system of a building-type producer-consumer consists of a building air conditioning system composed of N1 chiller units, N2 chilled water pumps, N3 cooling coil fans, N4 cooling water pumps, and N5 cooling towers. Its market transaction potential assessment model is shown in the following formula: In the formula, P chiller,i P CHWpump,j P AHU P CWpump,m and P towerfan,n These represent the energy consumption of the chiller unit, the power of the chilled water pump, the energy consumption of the fan coil unit, the power of the cooling water pump, and the energy consumption of the cooling tower, respectively. (2) Construct utility functions for sellers (prosumers) and market operators based on a non-cooperative game theory model; specifically including: (21) Calculate the electricity demand of producers and consumers at any given time using the following formula: In the formula, This represents the transaction volume of the z-th producer-consumer. A positive value indicates that producer-consumer z is the seller; a negative value indicates that producer-consumer z is the buyer. Let represent the photovoltaic load, fixed load, and central air conditioning load at time t for the z-th producer-consumer; (22) Establish the seller's producer-consumer utility function and calculate the difference between its electricity sales revenue and related costs at time t, as shown in the following formula: In the formula, The breakdown is as follows: P2P electricity sales revenue for sellers (prosumers and consumers), transaction revenue with operators, P2P service fees, and air conditioning load control costs. The specific calculations for each component are as follows: In the formula, The electricity purchase price for operators, For transaction costs between producers and consumers, The service fee for P2P transactions between producers and consumers. For the electricity traded between producers and consumers m and x, The electricity sold by the seller (prosumer m) to the operator; To quantify the correlation coefficient of economic costs, Indicates indoor temperature. This indicates the most comfortable room temperature reference temperature for the user. (23) Establish the utility function of the market operator and calculate the difference between the revenue of the retail market and its wholesale electricity cost, as shown in the following formula: In the formula, This represents the net profit of the market operator. For its revenue from electricity trading in the retail market; The service fees it charges for P2P transactions between producers and consumers; The wholesale electricity cost is calculated as follows: In the formula, This indicates the electricity price that market operators sell to buyers (producers and consumers). Power sold and purchased by market operators; P t This represents the total power sold by the operator to consumers; For wholesale market electricity prices; (3) Based on the actual trading process, the Nash equilibrium point is obtained through enumeration experiments. The electricity price at the Nash equilibrium point is solved to obtain the optimal trading strategy.

2. The non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type producer-consumer entities that takes market power assessment into account, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The energy consumption of the chiller unit is calculated according to the following formula: Among them, Q e The cooling load is the chilled water circulation side, and the COP is the energy efficiency ratio of the chiller unit, calculated using the following formula: Where r is the chiller unit load rate, i.e., the cooling load Q. e With rated load Q nom The ratio of T e T is the evaporation temperature. c The condensation temperature is calculated using the following formula: In the formula, T chwr and T cws Q represents the chilled water return temperature and the condensate supply temperature, respectively. c F represents the load on the condensate circulation side. chw (m chw ) and F cw (m cw () is related to chilled water flow rate (m) chw and condensate flow rate (m) cw The empirical formula is shown below:

3. The non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type producer-consumer entities that takes market power assessment into account, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... Both the chilled water pump and the cooling water pump are equipped with variable frequency systems, and their power is calculated using the following formula: In the formula: P chw / cw.pump For chilled / cooling water pump power, m chw / cw The chilled / cooling water flow rate is expressed in m. chw / cw.nom k is the rated flow rate of chilled / cooling water. p and A p The correlation coefficient.

4. The non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type producer-consumer entities that takes market power assessment into account, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The heat exchange process of the fan coil unit is shown in the following formula: In the formula: Q room.k For the corresponding area's cooling load, m sa,k and m chw,k These are the fan speed and the chilled water flow rate in the coil, respectively; T chws T represents the chilled water supply temperature. ma,k The mixed temperature of indoor and outdoor air inside the bellows can be expressed as: At the same time, the sum of the chilled water flow rates in the coils equals the total chilled water flow rate in the system: The energy consumption of a fan coil unit is calculated using the following formula: Where: m sa m sa.nom These are the fan speed and its rated value in the fan coil unit, k. f A f The relevant coefficients in the calculation of fan coil unit energy consumption are determined by the specific fan coil unit model.

5. The non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type producer-consumer entities that takes market power assessment into account, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The heat dissipation process of the cooling tower is shown in the following formula: In the formula, m ta,n and m cw,n These represent the wind speed and cooling water flow rate in the cooling tower, respectively; T cwr and T wb These are the chilled water return temperature and the cooling tower wet-bulb temperature, respectively. The energy consumption of a cooling tower is calculated using the following formula: Where: m ta m ta.nom These are the fan speeds and their rated values ​​in the cooling tower, k. f A f The correlation coefficient.

6. The non-cooperative game-theoretic energy trading method for building-type producer-consumer entities that takes market power assessment into account, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The electricity price at the Nash equilibrium point in step (3) is calculated using the following formula: In the formula, The electricity price sold by the seller's production and consumption agent. The service electricity price for market operators, Electricity purchase price is based on market demand. The market price for electricity.

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