Microgrid network attack protection method, device and system based on Istio

Abstract

The present invention discloses a microgrid network attack protection method, device and system based on istio, the method comprising: monitoring the communication link of the server of the distributed power source according to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller, and judging whether the communication link is abnormal; when the data transmission is abnormal, cutting off the communication link of the server; when the communication flow rate drops by more than a first preset value, terminating the service in the server. By adopting the embodiment of the present invention, the communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored as a whole by the central controller; in addition, the central controller can judge the data transmission abnormality caused by FDI attack and the communication flow rate drop caused by DOS attack, and cut off the communication link or terminate the service, so as to realize the protection of the microgrid against multiple network attacks at the same time.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of microgrid security technology, and in particular to an istio-based microgrid attack protection method, device and system. Background Art

[0002] Microgrids integrate renewable energy, energy storage systems and local loads, and can not only coordinate with traditional power grids, but also achieve stable and efficient island mode operation by properly coordinating the third, second and first control layers. At present, distributed control is mainly used in microgrids because it has higher reliability, less computational complexity and sparse communication structure; however, distributed control also lacks security protection. Sensors and control devices are connected to microgrids, and third-party distributed controllers can flexibly access the information system of microgrids, which makes the information system of microgrids have more network attack access points and increases the risk of network attacks; existing technologies can only protect against false data injection (FDI) of microgrids or a specific type of network attack, and it is difficult to protect against multiple types of attacks at the same time as a whole. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present invention provides a microgrid network attack protection method, device and system based on istio to solve the technical problem that the prior art is difficult to simultaneously protect against multiple network attacks against the microgrid.

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, an embodiment of the present invention provides a microgrid network attack protection method based on istio, comprising:

[0005] According to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller, the communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored to determine whether the communication link is abnormal; wherein the abnormality includes: abnormal data transmission, and the reduction of communication traffic exceeds a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller;

[0006] When an abnormality occurs in data transmission, cutting off the communication link of the server;

[0007] When the communication flow rate drops to more than a first preset value, the service in the server is terminated.

[0008] The present invention sets a central controller and a distributed controller through istio, wherein the central controller receives the communication link data uploaded by the distributed controller, and performs overall monitoring on the communication link of the server of the distributed power source, thereby avoiding the problem of lack of security monitoring caused by only having a distributed controller; in addition, the central controller can determine the data transmission anomaly caused by FDI attack and the communication traffic decrease caused by DOS attack, and adopts the method of cutting off the communication link or terminating the service, thereby realizing the protection of the microgrid against multiple network attacks at the same time.

[0009] Further, the communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored according to the communication link data of the central controller and the distributed server to determine whether the communication link is abnormal, specifically:

[0010] The communication link data includes: communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate; the data transmission abnormality includes: the change in data frame length exceeds the second preset value, and the transmission bit error rate exceeds the third preset value;

[0011] Receiving the communication traffic, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller;

[0012] According to the central controller, calculating the reduction amount of communication traffic and the change amount of data frame length;

[0013] When the reduction amount of the communication flow exceeds a first preset value, the change amount of the data frame length exceeds a second threshold, or the transmission bit error rate exceeds a third preset value, it is determined that the communication link is abnormal.

[0014] The present invention calculates the data frame length change according to the communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed server, and can determine the two situations of high data frame length change and high transmission bit error rate caused by FDI attack, so as to more accurately identify various types of network attacks, so as to accurately protect the microgrid.

[0015] Furthermore, the receiving of the communication traffic, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller is specifically:

[0016] Receive the communication traffic, the data frame length and the transmission bit error rate statistics based on the boundary state transceiver service uploaded by the distributed controller; wherein the boundary state transceiver service is an elastic control service sent by the central controller to the distributed controller.

[0017] The present invention sets up a central controller and a distributed controller deployed on a server of a distributed power source through the istio framework. While enabling the distributed controller to flexibly access power grid information, it executes the elastic control service delegated by the central controller and sends the communication link data to the central controller to ensure overall monitoring of the communication link.

[0018] Furthermore, when the data transmission is abnormal, the communication link of the server is cut off, which includes:

[0019] Receive the power flow information calculated by the distributed estimator according to the alternating direction multiplier algorithm and the first optimization problem; wherein the distributed estimator is a state estimator set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, which is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor and execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the alternating direction multiplier algorithm is the elastic control service issued by the central controller to the distributed estimator; the expression of the first optimization problem is:

[0020]

[0021] Among them, w I represents the state of region I, z i is the collected measurement value of region i, α I represents the false data injected into region I, τ I is the expected false data, w i [j] The boundary state variables in region i that overlap with region j, w i,j is an intermediate state variable.

[0022] The first optimization problem of the present invention anticipates the injection of false data, so solving the first optimization problem in combination with the alternating direction multiplier algorithm can offset the impact of the false data, achieve accurate estimation of the power flow information, and achieve recovery from FDI attacks.

[0023] Further, the terminating the service in the server is specifically:

[0024] Delete the service in the server, or disconnect the service in the server from the system network.

[0025] Further, after the cutting off of the communication link of the server or the terminating of the service in the server, the method further comprises:

[0026] According to the central controller, a certificate check is performed on the service of the server to determine whether the service can establish a connection with the Citedel security component;

[0027] When the service cannot establish a connection with the Citedel security component, the service is regenerated based on the service backed up by the istio framework.

[0028] The present invention targets possible attacks directly targeting services after the failure of FDI attacks and DOS attacks. After defending against FDI attacks and DOS attacks, the service certificate is verified according to the Citedel security component. If the service is deleted or modified, it will be impossible to establish a connection with the Citedel security component. Therefore, the istio framework is used to restore the backup of the service to achieve protection against network attacks against the service.

[0029] Furthermore, before the central controller performs a certificate check on the service of the server to determine whether the service can establish a connection with the Citedel security component, the method includes:

[0030] Parsing and verifying the parameters of the distributed controller to determine whether the service of the server is running with illegal parameters, or unknown parameters appear;

[0031] When the service of the server runs with legal parameters and no unknown parameters appear, istioCA is established;

[0032] Initialize and run SecretController according to the istioCA, monitor the service of the server and generate a certificate key pair for the service; initialize and run the gRPC server, the gRPC server is used to receive the certificate request file and issue a certificate for the service;

[0033] Initialize the certificate rotator and start the Citedel security component.

[0034] Before executing protection against network attacks on services, the present invention ensures that the distributed controller is in a normal operating environment, then implements certificate issuance through istioCA and gRPC server, and starts the Citedel security component to implement protection against network attacks on services.

[0035] Furthermore, before the central controller configured according to the istio framework monitors the communication link of the server of the distributed power source and determines whether an abnormality occurs in the communication link, the following steps are included:

[0036] Running the pod created by the central controller in a separate namespace and on a node independent of the distributed controller;

[0037] According to the role-based access control, the pod, the node and the namespace are managed for permissions and a preset security policy is set; wherein the security policy includes: prohibiting the pod from sending unencrypted HTTP requests.

[0038] The present invention prevents illegal calls to resources by performing permission management on pods, nodes and namespaces; in addition, it also prevents unsafe HTTP requests from occurring in communications between pods by setting security policies, thereby protecting the microgrid.

[0039] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a microgrid network attack protection device based on istio, including: a monitoring module, an FDI attack protection module, and a DOS attack protection module;

[0040] The monitoring module is used to monitor the communication link of the server of the distributed power source according to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller, and determine whether the communication link is abnormal; wherein the abnormality includes: abnormal data transmission, and the reduction of communication traffic exceeds a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller;

[0041] The FDI attack protection module is used to cut off the communication link of the server when an abnormality occurs in data transmission;

[0042] The DOS attack protection module terminates the service in the server when the communication flow rate drops by more than a first preset value.

[0043] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a microgrid network attack protection system based on istio, including: a cloud server, a distributed server;

[0044] Wherein, the cloud server is used to execute the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method as described in any one of the embodiments of the present invention;

[0045] The distributed server is used to install a distributed controller set up by the istio architecture and a distributed estimator set up by the istio architecture; wherein the distributed controller is used to upload communication link data to the cloud server, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the distributed estimator is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor, and send the measurement values ​​to the distributed controller, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller.

[0046] The central controller of the present invention is arranged on a cloud server and is used to perform overall monitoring of the communication links of the distributed servers of each distributed power source, so as to simultaneously identify and protect against different network attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0047] Figure 1 A flow chart of an embodiment of a microgrid network attack protection method based on istio provided by the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 A flow chart of another embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method provided by the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 A flow chart of another embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method provided by the present invention;

[0050] Figure 4 A flowchart of another embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method provided by the present invention;

[0051] Figure 5 A flowchart of another embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method provided by the present invention;

[0052] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the structure of an embodiment of a network attack protection structure based on Istio distributed microgrid provided by the present invention;

[0053] Figure 7 A structural schematic diagram of an embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection system provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0055] Embodiment 1

[0056] Please refer to Figure 1 , which is a flow chart of an embodiment of a microgrid network attack protection method based on istio provided in an embodiment of the present invention, mainly including steps 101 to 103, which are as follows:

[0057] Step 101: Based on the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controllers, the communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored to determine whether an abnormality occurs in the communication link.

[0058] In this embodiment, the anomalies include: abnormal data transmission, and the reduction in communication traffic exceeds a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, which is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller.

[0059] In this embodiment, istio is a cloud-native framework with two plane layers, including: a data plane and a control plane; the data plane is the communication between various services implemented by distributed controllers in the servers of distributed power sources, and a proxy can be used in the data plane to intercept all network traffic, allowing a wide range of distributed controller-aware functions based on the configuration of the settings; the control plane is used to manage the distributed controllers on the servers of the distributed power sources below in the cloud. The istio framework is easy to develop and maintain, and has fast startup speed, easy deployment after local modification, loose coupling, and strong elasticity; the istio framework helps to reduce the complexity of the servers of distributed power sources; this complexity comes from the increased deployment scale of distributed services, and the service grid often solves complex operational requirements, which include: A / B testing, canary deployment, rate limiting, access control, encryption, and end-to-end authentication.

[0060] In addition, the istio framework can also provide a unified and more efficient way to protect, connect and monitor services on servers of various distributed power sources. The functions that can be implemented by the central controller on the cloud server include: using TLS encryption, identity-based authentication and authorization to protect service-to-service communications in the cluster; automatic load balancing of HTTP, gRPC, WebSocket and TCP traffic; fine-grained control of traffic behavior through routing rules, retries, failovers and fault injections; pluggable policy layers and configuration APIs that support access control, rate limiting and quotas; automatic metrics, logs and tracking of all traffic within the cluster, including cluster ingress and cluster egress; and implementation of various deployment requirements based on the scalability of the istio framework.

[0061] In this embodiment, the central controller of the istio framework controls the envoy module through the pilot module and the galley module, and then controls the distributed controller running in the pod; wherein the pod is a computing unit deployed on a server of a distributed power source; the distributed controller includes a voltage controller, which is used to maintain voltage stability and ensure that reactive power is proportionally distributed between distributed power sources. iRepresents the reactive power output of the i-th distributed generation. In steady state, the goal of the voltage controller is to ensure the allowable voltage curve. The expression of the goal is:

[0062]

[0063] in, is the reactive power utilization rate of the ith distributed generation, is the reactive power utilization rate of the jth distributed generation, Π i is the set of neighbors of the ith distributed generation, is the rated reactive power of the i-th distributed generation.

[0064] In this embodiment, the distributed controller further includes a frequency regulator, which is used to compensate for the steady-state frequency deviation and ensure that the distributed power sources share active power in proportion. i represents the active power measurement from the ith distributed generation, then the expression of the frequency controller's objective is:

[0065]

[0066]

[0067] Where ω0 represents the rated frequency, is the active power utilization rate of the i-th distributed generation, is the rated active power of the i-th distributed generation.

[0068] In this embodiment, a distributed controller is used to update a voltage amplitude and a frequency reference point, and to generate a reference voltage for a zero-level controller based on the reference voltage; the zero-level controller with a voltage and current control loop tracks the voltage reference value set by the distributed controller; the output of the zero-level controller is sent to a PWM, which generates the required switching sequence for the IGBT of the three-phase converter.

[0069] Step 102: When an abnormality occurs in data transmission, the communication link of the server is cut off.

[0070] In this embodiment, the FDI attack is mainly an attack on the measurement sensor, including: attacking the voltage measurement value received from the voltage sensor, and attacking the active and reactive power measurement values; wherein the FDI attack is manifested as injecting false data into the voltage measurement value or the power measurement value, causing data transmission abnormalities, including: a large change in the data frame length or a high transmission bit error rate. When the voltage sensor on bus i is damaged, the controlled voltage It can be expressed as:

[0071]

[0072] where v i is the actual measured voltage, It is false data injected.

[0073] In this embodiment, the distributed controller uses active power regulators and reactive power regulators to achieve power sharing between distributed power sources; active power sharing is essential for frequency synchronization, while reactive power sharing prevents circulating currents and overstress of distributed power sources. To ensure proportional power sharing between distributed power sources, the active and reactive power regulators of the i-th distributed power source collect power measurements from local sensors and sensors of adjacent distributed power sources. If the FDI attack corrupts the power measurement data received from the sensor, the distributed controller cannot achieve the power sharing goal, and the active power injected by the false data is and reactive power It can be expressed as:

[0074]

[0075]

[0076] Where P i is the actual measured active power, Q i is the actual measured reactive power, is the false active power data injected. It is the false reactive power data injected.

[0077] In this embodiment, when the data transmission is abnormal, the communication link of the server is cut off, and the method includes: receiving the power flow information calculated by the distributed estimator according to the alternating direction multiplier algorithm and the first optimization problem; wherein the distributed estimator is a state estimator set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor and execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the alternating direction multiplier algorithm is the elastic control service issued by the central controller to the distributed estimator; the expression of the first optimization problem is:

[0078]

[0079] Among them, w i represents the state of region i, z i is the collected measurement value of region i, α i represents the false data injected into region i, τ I is the expected false data, w I [j] The boundary state variables in region i that overlap with region j, w I,Jis an intermediate state variable.

[0080] In this embodiment, the distributed controller and the distributed estimator are implemented based on two independent communication networks. The distributed controller is taken as a node and the communication link of the distributed controller is taken as an edge to model the communication network of the distributed controller; the partition area or the server of the distributed power source is taken as a node and the communication link between the servers is taken as an edge to model the communication network of the distributed estimator, and the communication model of the distributed estimator represented by a graph is obtained, and the expression is:

[0081]

[0082] Where K is the number of regions, and it is assumed that the communication model is connected.

[0083] In this embodiment, before eliminating the impact of FDI attack, the distributed estimator needs to divide the microgrid into several interconnected areas, wherein the areas include: a set of buses, several branches and measurement sensors; the distributed estimator receives measurement data from the local area sensors in area i. v I and θ I is a vector of voltage and current measurements received from sensors in region i. and represents the vector of active and reactive line flow measurements available in the branches of region i. Using local region measurements and boundary state information Φ j =[v j ,θ j ] received from neighboring regions j, the distributed estimator estimates the local region state. It also needs to share information about the boundary state Φ i =[v i ,θ i ] to neighboring areas using communication networks.

[0084] Distributed estimator local sensors collect measurement values, share information with servers of neighboring distributed power sources through sparse communication networks, and perform robust state estimation. The observability of state estimation needs to be guaranteed by analyzing the rank of local and global Jacobian matrices. Considering the active line flow of the linear branch of the power network and the reactive line flow of the linear branch, the following linear equation is established:

[0085]

[0086]

[0087] Among them, P ij and Q ijare the active power flow and reactive power flow from bus i to bus j, θ ij is the phase angle difference between buses i and j; in addition, Ψ ij1 and ij2 The expressions are:

[0088]

[0089] Among them, r ij and x ij Represent the resistance and reactance of the branch between busbars i and j respectively.

[0090] In this embodiment, it is assumed that the collected measurement value of area i is z i , then z i The expression of z is: i =A i w i ; Among them, the collected measurement values ​​include: voltage, phase angle, active line flow and reactive line flow.

[0091] In this embodiment, the estimator uses the measurement of bus voltage, active line flow and reactive line flow to solve the linear least squares estimation problem. The microgrid deploys inverter-based distributed power sources as power sources that are sensitive to changes in operating conditions. The following optimization problem is established:

[0092]

[0093] Among them, w j [i] is the boundary state of region j overlapping with region i; if the boundary state variables of adjacent regions are considered to achieve a decentralized solution, it is necessary to convert w in region i and region j i [j] and w j [i] is replaced by w i,j To introduce intermediate state variables.

[0094] The first optimization problem of the present invention anticipates the injection of false data, so solving the first optimization problem in combination with the alternating direction multiplier algorithm can offset the impact of the false data, achieve accurate estimation of the power flow information, and achieve recovery from FDI attacks.

[0095] Step 103: When the communication flow rate drops to more than a first preset value, the service in the server is terminated.

[0096] In this embodiment, terminating the service in the server specifically includes: deleting the service in the server, or disconnecting the connection between the service in the server and the system network.

[0097] In this embodiment, most of the terminal users in the microgrid are automatically registered online, and illegal users can automatically access when the system is restarted. The TCP protocol is widely used for data transmission between the distribution terminal equipment and the distribution master station. Due to the design defects of the TCP protocol and the wide distribution of the distribution terminal equipment, the distribution master station is vulnerable to DOS attacks; DOS attacks are a kind of network attacks that consume host or network resources, which can make the target device unable to work normally, or even stop service, or destroy the availability of the communication network. DOS attacks can be initiated by some public attack software, which are simple, difficult to defend and easy to achieve. In the smart grid, DOS attacks mainly cause the unavailability of communication data by blocking and delaying power data. As a resource exhaustion attack, DOS attacks use network protocol vulnerabilities or software defects to initiate a large number of useless requests, consume the resources of the attacked party, and make normal communication impossible to continue, usually manifested as a huge drop in communication traffic. There are many types of DOS attacks, the most common of which are Teardrop attacks, Land attacks, SYNFlood attacks, etc.

[0098] Please refer to Figure 2 , which is a flow chart of another embodiment of the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 and Figure 1 The main difference is that Figure 2 The process includes steps 201 to 203, which are specifically as follows:

[0099] In this embodiment, step 101 is specifically steps 201 to 203 .

[0100] In this embodiment, the communication link data includes: communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate; the data transmission abnormality includes: the change in data frame length exceeds the second preset value, and the transmission bit error rate exceeds the third preset value.

[0101] Step 201: Receive the communication traffic, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller.

[0102] In this embodiment, the receiving of the communication traffic, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller is specifically: receiving the communication traffic, the data frame length and the transmission bit error rate statistics uploaded by the distributed controller according to the boundary state transceiver service; wherein, the boundary state transceiver service is an elastic control service sent by the central controller to the distributed controller.

[0103] The present invention sets up a central controller and a distributed controller deployed on a server of a distributed power source through the istio framework. While enabling the distributed controller to flexibly access power grid information, it executes the elastic control service delegated by the central controller and sends the communication link data to the central controller to ensure overall monitoring of the communication link.

[0104] Step 202: Calculate the reduction in communication traffic and the change in data frame length according to the central controller.

[0105] Step 203: When the reduction in the communication traffic exceeds a first preset value, the change in the data frame length exceeds a second threshold, or the transmission bit error rate exceeds a third preset value, it is determined that an abnormality occurs in the communication link.

[0106] The present invention calculates the data frame length change according to the communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed server, and can determine the two situations of high data frame length change and high transmission bit error rate caused by FDI attack, so as to more accurately identify various types of network attacks, so as to accurately protect the microgrid.

[0107] Please refer to Figure 3 , which is a flow chart of another embodiment of the microgrid network attack protection method based on istio provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 and Figure 1 The main difference is that Figure 3 The process includes step 301 and step 302, which are specifically as follows:

[0108] In this embodiment, after step 102 or step 103, steps 301 to 302 are further included.

[0109] Step 301: According to the central controller, a certificate check is performed on the service of the server to determine whether the service can establish a connection with the Citedel security component.

[0110] Step 302: When the service cannot establish a connection with the Citedel security component, the service is regenerated based on the service backed up by the istio framework.

[0111] In this embodiment, after the microgrid defends against FDI attacks and DOS attacks, attackers may exploit security risks to directly attack the services of distributed power sources; the security risks include: the microgrid performs multiple security checks, resulting in poor performance of the distributed controller; trust issues between different distributed power sources; poor traceability of requests across multiple services; and the distributed nature of services, making shared user sessions more difficult.

[0112] Among them, the microgrid performs multiple security checks, resulting in poor performance of the distributed controller. Specifically, each service in the microgrid deployment must perform an independent security check, and when processing a verification request, it is necessary to connect to a remote security token service (STS). These security checks and remote connections may increase network latency and reduce system performance, and a large amount of network latency will seriously reduce the convergence effect of distributed control. The trust problem between different distributed power sources is specifically that the services of distributed power sources need to communicate continuously, and each service in the channel must be protected, so a certificate and a corresponding key must be provided for each service; in the process of service-to-service interaction, it will be used to verify its identity to another service, and the service recipient must know how to verify the certificate; in addition, in order to prevent the corresponding private key from being damaged, it is also necessary to be able to cancel the certificate, or, and rotate the certificate; the rotating certificate is specifically: changing the certificate regularly to minimize the risk of losing the key unknowingly. The traceability of the request across multiple services is poor, specifically: the distributed controller requires each distributed power source to analyze the historical data of the servers of its neighboring power sources, that is, to analyze the logs to evaluate their trust; aggregating a set of logs can generate indicators, and the indicators reflect the state of the system; tracking is also based on logs, but provides different perspectives of the system for tracking requests from other distributed power sources. The associated requests between the services of distributed power sources need to rely on distributed tracking systems such as Jaeger and Zipkin. The distributed characteristics of the services make it difficult to share user sessions, specifically: nothing is shared between the services of distributed power sources, and the user context must be explicitly passed from one service to another; the difficulty lies in the need to establish trust between the two services in order to receive the user context passed from another service.

[0113] In this embodiment, in order to prevent direct attacks on services that may occur after the failure of FDI attacks and DOS attacks, the service certificate is verified according to the Citedel security component after the FDI attacks and DOS attacks are defended. If the service is deleted or modified, it will be impossible to establish a connection with the Citedel security component. Therefore, the istio framework is used to restore the backup of the service to protect against network attacks on the service.

[0114] Please refer to Figure 4 , which is a flow chart of another embodiment of the microgrid network attack protection method based on istio provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 and Figure 3 The main difference is that before step 301, steps 401 to 404 are included, which are as follows:

[0115] Step 401: parse and verify the parameters of the distributed controller to determine whether the service of the server is running with illegal parameters, or unknown parameters appear.

[0116] Step 402: When the service of the server runs with legal parameters and no unknown parameters occur, istioCA is established.

[0117] Step 403: According to the istioCA, initialize and run SecretController, monitor the service of the server and generate a certificate key pair for the service; initialize and run the gRPC server, the gRPC server is used to receive the certificate request file and issue a certificate for the service.

[0118] Step 404: Initialize the certificate rotator and start the Citedel security component.

[0119] In this embodiment, before executing the protection against network attacks on the service, ensure that the distributed controller is in a normal operating environment, then implement certificate issuance through istioCA and gRPC server, and start the Citedel security component to implement protection against network attacks on the service.

[0120] Please refer to Figure 5 , which is a flow chart of another embodiment of the microgrid network attack protection method based on istio provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 and Figure 1 The main difference is that Figure 5 The process includes step 501 and step 502, which are specifically as follows:

[0121] In this embodiment, before step 101, steps 501 to 502 are also included.

[0122] Step 501: Run the pod created by the central controller in an independent namespace and on a node independent of the distributed controller.

[0123] Step 502: According to role-based access control, permission management is performed on the pod, the node, and the namespace, and a preset security policy is set; wherein the security policy includes: prohibiting the pod from sending unencrypted HTTP requests.

[0124] In this embodiment, the Kubernetes RBAC of the istio framework can be called to implement namespace permission management.

[0125] In this embodiment, the main way that the Istio framework solves DOS attacks is to securely control egress traffic. Secure control of egress traffic means monitoring egress traffic and enforcing preset security policies about egress traffic. Monitoring egress traffic enables the cloud to analyze it online or offline and detect attacks, even if the cloud cannot block them in real time; another way to reduce the possibility of attacks is to specify policies that restrict access based on the need-to-know principle: only distributed controllers that need external services should be allowed to access the external services they need.

[0126] In addition, to implement secure control of egress traffic in the Istio framework, the cloud must direct the TLS traffic of the data plane to external services through the egress gateway, or the cloud can direct HTTP traffic through the egress gateway and have the egress gateway initiate the TLS handshake protocol. The choice of the above two solutions mainly depends on whether the distributed controller can send unencrypted HTTP requests and whether the organization's security policy allows the sending of unencrypted HTTP requests. For example, if a secondary controller encrypts the sent message and cannot cancel the encryption, unencrypted HTTP protocol messages cannot be sent at this time. If the cloud organization's security policy does not allow unencrypted HTTP requests to be sent between pods (outside the pod, the traffic is encrypted by Istio), unencrypted HTTP protocol messages cannot be sent either.

[0127] In addition, if the distributed controller sends an HTTP request and the egress gateway performs the initiation of the TLS handshake protocol, the cloud can monitor HTTP information such as HTTP methods, headers, and URL paths. The central controller of the cloud can also define security policies based on the HTTP information. If the distributed controller performs TLS initiation, the cloud can monitor the SNI and service account of the TLS traffic of the source pod, and define security policies based on the SNI and service account. The cloud must ensure that traffic from the cluster to the outside cannot bypass the egress gateway, and must also ensure that the central controller and egress gateway of the Istio framework are not compromised. The cloud focuses on protecting the pods and gateways in the control plane.

[0128] Please refer to Figure 6 , which is a structural diagram of an embodiment of a network attack protection structure based on an Istio distributed microgrid provided by the present invention, mainly including: a monitoring module 601, an FDI attack protection module 602 and a DOS attack protection module 603.

[0129] In this embodiment, the monitoring module 601 is used to monitor the communication link of the server of the distributed power source according to the communication link data of the central controller and the distributed controller, and determine whether there is an abnormality in the communication link; wherein the abnormality includes: abnormality in data transmission, reduction in communication traffic exceeding a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller.

[0130] The FDI attack protection module 602 is used to cut off the communication link of the server when an abnormality occurs in data transmission.

[0131] The DOS attack protection module 603 is used to terminate the service in the server when the communication flow rate drops by more than a first preset value.

[0132] Please refer to Figure 7 , which is a structural diagram of an embodiment of a network attack protection structure based on Istio distributed microgrid provided by the present invention, mainly including: a cloud server 701 and a distributed server 702.

[0133] In this embodiment, the cloud server 701 executes the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method as described in any one of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0134] The distributed server 702 is used to install the distributed controller set up by the istio architecture and the distributed estimator set up by the istio architecture; wherein the distributed controller is used to upload communication link data to the cloud server, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the distributed estimator is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor, and send the measurement values ​​to the distributed controller, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller.

[0135] In this embodiment, the central controller is arranged in the cloud server, and is used to perform overall monitoring of the communication links of the distributed servers of each distributed power source, so as to simultaneously identify and protect against different network attacks.

[0136] The present invention sets a central controller and a distributed controller through istio, wherein the central controller receives the communication link data uploaded by the distributed controller, and performs overall monitoring on the communication link of the server of the distributed power source, thereby avoiding the problem of lack of security monitoring caused by only having a distributed controller; in addition, the central controller can determine the data transmission anomaly caused by FDI attack and the communication traffic decrease caused by DOS attack, and adopts the method of cutting off the communication link or terminating the service, thereby realizing the protection of the microgrid against multiple network attacks at the same time.

[0137] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. It is particularly pointed out that for those skilled in the art, any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A microgrid network attack protection method based on istio, characterized in that: include: According to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller, the communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored to determine whether the communication link is abnormal; wherein the abnormality includes: abnormal data transmission, and the reduction of communication traffic exceeds a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; When an abnormality occurs in data transmission, cutting off the communication link of the server; When the communication flow rate drops to more than a first preset value, the service in the server is terminated.

2. The microgrid network attack protection method based on istio according to claim 1, characterized in that: The communication link of the server of the distributed power source is monitored according to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller to determine whether the communication link is abnormal, specifically: The communication link data includes: communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate; the data transmission abnormality includes: the change in data frame length exceeds the second preset value, and the transmission bit error rate exceeds the third preset value; Receiving the communication traffic, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller; According to the central controller, calculating the reduction amount of communication traffic and the change amount of data frame length; When the reduction amount of the communication flow exceeds a first preset value, the change amount of the data frame length exceeds a second threshold, or the transmission bit error rate exceeds a third preset value, it is determined that the communication link is abnormal.

3. The microgrid network attack protection method based on istio as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The receiving of the communication flow, data frame length and transmission bit error rate uploaded by the distributed controller is specifically: Receive the communication traffic, the data frame length and the transmission bit error rate statistics based on the boundary state transceiver service uploaded by the distributed controller; wherein the boundary state transceiver service is an elastic control service sent by the central controller to the distributed controller.

4. The microgrid network attack protection method based on istio according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the data transmission is abnormal, the communication link of the server is cut off, including: Receive the power flow information calculated by the distributed estimator according to the alternating direction multiplier algorithm and the first optimization problem; wherein the distributed estimator is a state estimator set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, which is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor and execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the alternating direction multiplier algorithm is the elastic control service issued by the central controller to the distributed estimator; the expression of the first optimization problem is: Among them, w i represents the state of region i, z i is the collected measurement value of region i, α i represents the false data injected into region i, τ i is the expected false data, w i [j] is the boundary state variable in region i that overlaps with region j, w i,j is an intermediate state variable.

5. The microgrid network attack protection method based on istio as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The terminating the service in the server specifically includes: Delete the service in the server, or disconnect the service in the server from the system network.

6. The istio-based microgrid network attack protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: After the communication link of the server is cut off, or the service in the server is terminated, the method further comprises: According to the central controller, a certificate check is performed on the service of the server to determine whether the service can establish a connection with the Citedel security component; When the service cannot establish a connection with the Citedel security component, the service is regenerated based on the service backed up by the istio framework.

7. The istio-based microgrid network attack protection method according to claim 6, characterized in that: Before the central controller performs a certificate check on the service of the server to determine whether the service can establish a connection with the Citedel security component, the method includes: Parsing and verifying the parameters of the distributed controller to determine whether the service of the server is running with illegal parameters, or unknown parameters appear; When the service of the server runs with legal parameters and no unknown parameters appear, istioCA is established; Initialize and run SecretController according to the istioCA, monitor the service of the server and generate a certificate key pair for the service; initialize and run the gRPC server, the gRPC server is used to receive the certificate request file and issue a certificate for the service; Initialize the certificate rotator and start the Citedel security component.

8. The istio-based microgrid network attack protection method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: Before monitoring the communication link of the server of the distributed power source according to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller and determining whether the communication link is abnormal, the method includes: Running the pod created by the central controller in a separate namespace and on a node independent of the distributed controller; According to the role-based access control, the pod, the node and the namespace are managed for permissions and a preset security policy is set; wherein the security policy includes: prohibiting the pod from sending unencrypted HTTP requests.

9. A microgrid network attack protection device based on istio, characterized in that: include: Monitoring module, FDI attack protection module, DOS attack protection module; The monitoring module is used to monitor the communication link of the server of the distributed power source according to the communication link data from the central controller and the distributed controller, and determine whether the communication link is abnormal; wherein the abnormality includes: abnormal data transmission, and the reduction of communication traffic exceeds a first preset value; the distributed controller is a controller set on the server of the distributed power source according to the istio framework, and is used to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; The FDI attack protection module is used to cut off the communication link of the server when an abnormality occurs in data transmission; The DOS attack protection module terminates the service in the server when the communication flow rate drops by more than a first preset value.

10. A microgrid network attack protection system based on istio, characterized in that: include: Cloud servers, distributed servers; Wherein, the cloud server is used to execute the istio-based microgrid network attack protection method as described in any one of claims 1-8; The distributed server is used to install a distributed controller set up by the istio architecture and a distributed estimator set up by the istio architecture; wherein the distributed controller is used to upload communication link data to the cloud server, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller; the distributed estimator is used to receive the collected measurement values ​​of the sensor, and send the measurement values ​​to the distributed controller, and to execute the elastic control service issued by the central controller.

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