A decentralized trust chain authentication method, system and medium based on trusted computing

Abstract

The present invention relates to a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, comprising the following steps: creating a secure trust root: deploying a number of seed nodes, the seed nodes are provided with devices with onboard TCM modules, and various sub-nodes trust each other to form a trust chain; extending the trust chain: an external node sends an authentication request to a node in the trust chain, and any node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request and performs the authentication step as a verifier; for an external node that passes the authentication, an authorization step is performed and if the external node is a device with an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, added to the trust chain, and has verifier authority. The present invention also relates to a system for decentralized trust chain authentication based on trusted computing. The advantages of the present invention are: the present invention relates to a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, which is a load-balanced, high-availability trust chain authentication method and improves the security of the authentication environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of security platform authentication, and in particular to a decentralized trust chain authentication method, system and medium based on trusted computing. Background Art

[0002] The existing unified authentication system design implements the isolation between the application system and the user; the user's request is verified in the authentication system. After the first verification is passed, the unified authentication system will collect the user's corresponding userID, network card mac and other information, generate a token (with a label) bound to the user, and return it to the client. After the client saves the token information locally, it can achieve that the access terminal does not need to authenticate between application systems within a specific validity period (half an hour) and pass all applications. However, in the process of issuing the authentication token to the access terminal, it is very easy for illegal users to intercept and obtain the key information therein. After the illegal user uses the key to encrypt the information and replay the data, he can access the application system and complete the business process. The existing solution is to add timestamps, increase random numbers and other methods to avoid replay attacks, but this operation also increases the pressure of decryption and verification on the server, and cannot meet the requirements of fast response under high load.

[0003] In addition, the unified authentication system uses the PKI identity authentication system to issue public key certificates to users. The unified authentication system cannot confirm the security of the user environment. Once the user's operating environment is hijacked by a Trojan or virus, the user's login information will be exposed to the attacker's monitoring, and the private key and public key will be leaked to the attacker, posing a huge security risk. Therefore, a trusted computing environment is also an important prerequisite for ensuring user login security.

[0004] How to ensure the security of the trusted computing platform and establish a load-balancing trust chain using the trusted computing platform becomes the main problem to be solved by the present invention. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the above problems, one of the purposes of the present invention is to provide a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, which establishes a trust chain from the hardware platform, operating system to the application system, and measures and authenticates one level at a time, and trusts one level at a time, thereby realizing the step-by-step expansion of trust and building a secure and trusted computing environment.

[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0007] Technical Solution 1

[0008] A decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing comprises the following steps: creating a secure trust root: deploying a plurality of seed nodes, wherein the seed nodes are provided with a device with an onboard TCM module, and after the device is powered on, the device is registered in a white list of an application system on a server, and the server sends the white list to various child nodes, and the white lists between various child nodes form mutual trust to form a trust chain; extending the trust chain: an external node sends an authentication request to a node in the trust chain, and any node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request and performs an authentication step as a verifier; for an external node that passes the authentication, performing an authorization step and if the external node is a device with an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, added to the trust chain, and has verifier authority; the candidate node added to the trust chain is registered in the white list, and the server updates and sends the white list to each node in the trust chain.

[0009] Preferably, when the device with the onboard TCM module is powered on, the TCM module actively measures the integrity of the device's BIOS and OS kernel, generates a measurement value, and determines whether the integrity of the measured object has been tampered with based on the measurement value. If not, the measurement value is stored in the configuration register of the TCM module. Then, the TCM module detects the integrity of the OS service. If the detection passes, the hardware platform and operating system of the device are safe and reliable, and the device system is started.

[0010] More preferably, the authentication step is: the nodes in the trust chain determine the credibility of the external node based on the integrity measurement report provided by the external node, and if it is credible, the authentication is passed; the integrity measurement report includes the measurement value of the external node, the signature of the external node's identity key on the measurement value, and the key certificate of the external node; if the external node is a device without a TCM module onboard, the authentication step is: the nodes in the trust chain verify according to the device hardware and software information provided by the external node.

[0011] More preferably, the authorization step is specifically as follows: for an external node with an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, and the node in the trust chain that responds to its authentication request issues an intermediate certificate to the candidate node and grants re-trust authority, joins the trust chain, and has verifier authority; for an external node without an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to an authenticated node, and the node in the trust chain issues a server certificate KEY for accessing the application system to the authenticated node, which can freely access the application.

[0012] More preferably, the device on the seed node is registered in the whitelist of the application system on the server to achieve the trust of the application system in the seed node; the device on the seed node generates a root certificate using the key stored in the TCM module configuration register.

[0013] More preferably, the seed node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request first. If the seed node has no heartbeat or is busy, other nodes in the trust chain respond to the authentication request.

[0014] In order to solve the above problems, a second object of the present invention is to provide a decentralized trust chain authentication system based on trusted computing.

[0015] Technical Solution 2

[0016] A decentralized trust chain authentication system based on trusted computing includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be run by the processor. When the processor runs the computer program, the method steps described in technical solution one are implemented.

[0017] In order to solve the above problems, a third object of the present invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium.

[0018] Technical Solution 3

[0019] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that can be executed by a processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the method steps described in technical solution one are implemented.

[0020] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0021] 1. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing. First, a secure trust root is created, and then it is registered in the application system, so as to realize the trust from the hardware platform to the operating system, and then to the application system, to form a trust chain, and then the trust chain is extended by authenticating the external nodes through the nodes in the trust chain, so as to realize the first-level measurement and the first-level trust, and ensure the security of the trusted computing environment. At the same time, any node in the trust chain can verify the authentication request of the external node, so as to realize the decentralization of the trust chain, balance the load of each node in the trust chain, and improve the response speed of the system.

[0022] 2. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing. Nodes with a TCM module can measure their own integrity when the device is started, ensuring the security and reliability of each node in the trust chain.

[0023] 3. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, wherein the authentication step is based on an integrity measurement report to improve the authentication credibility and security.

[0024] 4. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, in which the nodes in the trust chain grant intermediate certificates and re-trust permissions to external nodes that have passed authentication, thereby realizing the step-by-step expansion of the trust chain.

[0025] 5. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, which is a load-balanced, highly available trust chain authentication method and has a high security authentication environment.

[0026] 6. The present invention provides a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing and a readable storage medium having the above-mentioned beneficial effects. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the authentication method of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the trust chain of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] Embodiment 1

[0030] Before describing this embodiment in detail, the TCM module is described as follows.

[0031] TCM standard, namely TCM (Trusted Cryptography Module) standard developed by China. TCM security chip was launched by the National Cryptography Administration and some domestic IT companies. It is a security chip that can effectively protect PCs and prevent illegal users from accessing PCs. The TCM module equipped with TCM security chip serves as the trusted root of the trusted computing platform, providing the foundation for the construction of the entire trusted computing platform and providing cryptographic services for the entire trusted computing platform. Trusted computing is a technical method to fundamentally improve the security of the platform in order to solve the insecurity of computer and network structures. Trusted computing is a technical innovation in logical correctness verification, computing architecture and computing mode, so as to solve the problem of logical defects not being exploited by attackers, form a unity of attack and defense contradictions, ensure that the logical combination of computing tasks is not tampered with or destroyed, and achieve correct computing.

[0032] This embodiment is based on the above-mentioned trusted platform and proposes a decentralized trust chain authentication method for devices accessing the application system. Figure 1 and Figure 2, a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, comprising the following steps: Step 1, creating a secure trust root, specifically: deploying a number of seed nodes, wherein the seed node is provided with a device with an onboard TCM module, and after the device is powered on, it is registered in the white list of the application system on the server, and the server sends the white list to various child nodes, and the white list between various child nodes forms mutual trust, forming a trust chain. The trust chain at this time is the primary trust chain after the deployment of the authentication platform is completed; in the following operation, the extension of the trust chain is automatically completed through step 2 without manual intervention. Step 2, extending the trust chain: an external node sends an authentication request to a node in the trust chain, and any node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request and performs the authentication step as a verifier; for an external node that passes the authentication, an authorization step is performed and if the external node is a device with an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, added to the trust chain, and has verifier authority. The candidate node added to the trust chain is registered in the white list, and the server updates and sends the white list to each node in the trust chain.

[0033] The whitelist maintains the application system ID, device ID, device PCR value, whitelist version number, the corresponding hash value of the application system and device ID, etc. The PCR is the configuration register of the TCM module, the device PCR value is the integrity measurement value stored in the PCR, and the corresponding hash value reflects the relevant permissions of the device on the application system. The whitelist is updated through intranet broadcast, and the version is accumulated synchronously.

[0034] The node authentication request response mode in the trust chain may preferably be: the seed node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request first, and if the seed node has no heartbeat or is busy, other nodes in the trust chain respond to the authentication request.

[0035] The present invention discloses a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, firstly creates a secure trust root, wherein the seed node of the onboard TCM module can start from the BIOS boot area, go to the OS Loader, then to the OS operating system, and apply, and the first level of measurement and authentication is performed at the first level, forming a trust chain from the hardware platform, the operating system to the application system, and along this trust chain, the external nodes of the same onboard TCM module are authenticated, and the first level is trusted at the first level, so as to realize the step-by-step expansion of the trust chain, thereby building a secure and reliable computing environment. Since the whitelists on each node in the trust chain are updated synchronously with the server, any node in the trust chain is damaged or stopped, and the normal operation of the trust chain is not affected. At the same time, the extension of the trust chain can be authenticated by any node in the trust chain to the external node, and decentralized authentication is realized, and any node in the trust chain that is in an idle state can handle external authentication. Therefore, the present invention is not only a highly available, easy to maintain, and highly secure authentication method based on the trust chain, but also a decentralized, load-balanced authentication method based on the trust chain.

[0036] The application of the TCM module in this embodiment is now further described.

[0037] The TCM module includes a trusted measurement root, a trusted storage root, and a trusted reporting root, which are respectively used to measure the trustworthiness of the computing platform, store the trusted value of the measurement, and provide a report when the access object inquires about the trusted status. The trusted measurement root is a trusted integrity measurement unit, which is the basis for trusted measurement in the trusted computing platform. The process of using the trusted measurement root to calculate the hash value of the measured object using the cryptographic hash algorithm is called integrity measurement. The trusted storage root is a storage unit for storing the platform integrity measurement value inside the TCM module. The trusted reporting root provides a cryptographic mechanism to digitally sign the status and information of the TCM. When the machine is turned on, the TCM module actively measures the integrity of the BIOS and OS kernel of the device, generates a measurement value, and determines whether the integrity of the measured object has been tampered with according to the measurement value. If not, the measurement value is stored in the configuration register PCR of the TCM module. Then, the TCM module detects the integrity of the OS service. If the detection passes, the hardware platform and operating system of the device are safe and reliable, and the device system is started. Therefore, when the node with the TCM module on board, whether it is an external node or a seed node, has ensured the safety and reliability of the device from the hardware platform to the operating system when the machine is turned on.

[0038] Specifically, the measurement process of the hardware platform by the trusted measurement root is as follows: first, the TCM module combines the trusted measurement root with the memory characteristic value to perform a hash operation to obtain a new measurement value and stores it in the PCR; secondly, the CPU characteristic value, hard disk characteristic value, network card MAC and other components, and so on, after all operations are completed, the measurement value is stored in the PCR; then, the integrity measurement value of the BIOS component is spliced ​​with the existing stored value in the PCR, and a hash operation is performed; if the obtained hash value is consistent with the original hash value (trusted report root) stored in the PCR, the integrity operation is passed, and if the integrity is not destroyed, the BIOS is run; after the BIOS is started, the OS service integrity is detected (after the platform version information is obtained through the script and hashed, it is compared with the version information operation result completed in the last operation), and if there is no error, the OS kernel is run. Through the transmission of trust relationship, it is ensured that the hardware and operating system of the started device are trustworthy.

[0039] The integrity measurement values ​​of each component in a component sequence (which mainly includes four main components: memory, CPU, hard disk, and network card) are stored in the same PCR. A special compression storage method is used, that is, starting from the first component, the integrity measurement value of the component is spliced ​​with the existing storage value of the PCR, a hash operation is performed, and then the result is stored in the PCR, and so on. After the storage operation of the integrity measurement value of the last component is completed, the obtained value is the integrity measurement value of the component sequence stored in the PCR.

[0040] The authentication steps are: the nodes in the trust chain judge the credibility of the external node according to the integrity measurement report provided by the external node, and if it is credible, the authentication is passed; the integrity measurement report includes the measurement value of the external node, the signature of the external node's identity key on the measurement value, and the key certificate of the external node; if the external node is a device without an onboard TCM module, the authentication steps are: the nodes in the trust chain verify according to the device hardware and software information provided by the external node.

[0041] The seed node and the external TCM module on board are connected through a key exchange protocol to update the key. The key exchange protocol is a negotiation process between two devices A and B to establish a shared secret key.

[0042] Specifically, the authentication process of an external node with a TCM module onboard is as follows:

[0043] a) The external node sends an authentication request to the node in the trust chain. At the same time, the external node calls the public key pair generation algorithm to generate a temporary key pair (r1 (private key), R1 (public key)), and sends R1 and the node information of the external node encrypted by r1 to the node in the trust chain that responds to the request. The node information is the measurement value in the PCR of the external node;

[0044] b) The node that responds to the authentication request in the trust chain acts as the verifier. After responding to the authentication request, the verifier calls the public key pair generation algorithm to generate a temporary key pair (r (private key), R (public key)), and sends R and the node information of the node encrypted by r to the external node. The node information is the measurement value in the PCR of the node;

[0045] c) Both the external node and the verifier use the received public key to decrypt the received node information, and then compare the measurement value with the preset integrity reference value. If it meets the reference value requirements, it indicates that the node is in a trusted state. If both are in a trusted state, the authentication is successful.

[0046] d) The verifier performs the authorization step.

[0047] The authorization step is specifically as follows: for the external node of the onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, the node in the trust chain that responds to its authentication request issues an intermediate certificate to the candidate node and grants re-trust authority, joins the trust chain, and has verifier authority. At the same time, the device on the candidate node is also registered in the white list of the application system, so that it also has the authority to access the application system. The server updates the white list and sends it to each node in the trust chain. When deploying the authentication platform, the device on the seed node has a root certificate. When authorizing the external node, the root certificate and the node information of the external node are used to generate an intermediate certificate. For the candidate node in the trust chain, when authorizing the external node, the intermediate certificate of this node and the node information of the external node are used to generate an intermediate certificate authorized to the external node. For the external node without the onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to an authenticated node, and the node in the trust chain issues a server certificate KEY for accessing the application system to the authenticated node, which can freely access the application.

[0048] The present invention discloses a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing. First, a secure trust root is created. Starting from the BIOS boot area, to the OS Loader, and then to the OS and the application, one level is measured and authenticated at a level, forming a trust chain from the hardware platform, the operating system to the application system. Along this trust chain, one level trusts another level, thereby realizing the step-by-step expansion of trust, thereby building a secure and trusted computing environment. At the same time, the extension of the trust chain can be achieved by any node in the trust chain authenticating an external node. Therefore, the present invention is not only a highly available trust chain authentication method, but also a decentralized and load-balanced trust chain authentication method.

[0049] Embodiment 2

[0050] See also Figure 1 and Figure 2 A decentralized trust chain authentication system based on trusted computing includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the method steps described in Example 1 are implemented.

[0051] Embodiment 3

[0052] See also Figure 1 and Figure 2 , a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that can be executed by a processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the method steps described in embodiment 1 are implemented.

[0053] Embodiment 2 and embodiment 3 are respectively a system and a device for executing the authentication method described in embodiment 1, and have the same beneficial effects as embodiment 1.

[0054] The above description is only a specific implementation mode of the present invention, and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent structural transformation made by using the contents of the present invention description and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing, characterized in that: The steps include: Create a secure root of trust: deploy several seed nodes, each of which is equipped with a device with an onboard TCM module. After the device is powered on, it is registered in the whitelist of the application system on the server. The server sends the whitelist to various child nodes. The whitelists between various child nodes form mutual trust and form a trust chain. The TCM module is a trusted cryptographic module; Extended trust chain: an external node sends an authentication request to a node in the trust chain. Any node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request and performs authentication steps as a verifier. For external nodes that pass the authentication, an authorization step is performed and if the external node is a device with an onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node and added to the trust chain with verifier authority. The candidate node added to the trust chain is registered in the whitelist, and the server updates and sends the whitelist to each node in the trust chain.

2. According to claim 1, a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing is characterized in that: When the device with the onboard TCM module is powered on, the TCM module actively measures the integrity of the BIOS and OS kernel of the device, generates a measurement value, and determines whether the integrity of the measured object has been tampered with based on the measurement value. If not, the measurement value is stored in the configuration register of the TCM module. Then, the TCM module detects the integrity of the OS service. If the detection passes, the hardware platform and operating system of the device are safe and reliable, and the device system is started.

3. According to claim 2, a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing is characterized in that: The authentication steps are: the nodes in the trust chain judge the credibility of the external node according to the integrity measurement report provided by the external node, and if it is credible, the authentication is passed; the integrity measurement report includes the measurement value of the external node, the signature of the external node's identity key on the measurement value, and the key certificate of the external node; if the external node is a device without an onboard TCM module, the authentication steps are: the nodes in the trust chain verify according to the device hardware and software information provided by the external node.

4. A decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing according to claim 3, characterized in that: The authorization step is specifically as follows: for an external node of the onboard TCM module, the external node is upgraded to a candidate node, and the node in the trust chain that responds to its authentication request issues an intermediate certificate to the candidate node and grants re-trust authority, joins the trust chain, and has verifier authority; For an external node without a TCM module onboard, the external node is upgraded to an authenticated node, and the nodes in the trust chain issue a KEY of a server certificate for accessing an application system to the authenticated node, so that the node can freely access the application.

5. According to claim 2, a decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing is characterized in that: Register the device on the seed node to the whitelist of the application system on the server to achieve the application system's trust in the seed node; The device on the seed node generates a root certificate using the key stored in the TCM module configuration register.

6. A decentralized trust chain authentication method based on trusted computing according to claim 1, characterized in that: The seed node in the trust chain responds to the authentication request first. If the seed node has no heartbeat or is busy, other nodes in the trust chain respond to the authentication request.

7. A decentralized trust chain authentication system based on trusted computing, characterized in that: The method comprises a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the method steps as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6 are executed.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that can be executed by a processor. When one or more processors of the device execute the computer program, the method steps as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6 are executed.

Images