Blockchain-based traceable privacy information retrieval method

By employing a blockchain-based traceable privacy information retrieval method, the issues of privacy protection and data breach accountability in blockchain supply chain finance are addressed. This method enables distributed access control and efficient privacy information retrieval, ensuring data confidentiality and access control.

CN116383874BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10GUANGXI NORMAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310243263.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-03-14
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2043-03-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Blockchain-driven supply chain finance lacks privacy protection mechanisms and data breach accountability mechanisms, making it impossible for data providers to protect privacy information and track down those who leak data.

Method used

It adopts a blockchain-based traceable privacy information retrieval method, which realizes distributed permission granting, data stream key sharing and decentralized controllable supervision through a decentralized authorization system. Combined with searchable encryption algorithms and privacy information retrieval technology, it ensures the confidentiality of data and access control.

Benefits of technology

While meeting security requirements, it achieves confidentiality of keywords, confidentiality of search results, and decentralized management, reduces computational overhead, and improves the efficiency of privacy information retrieval in supply chain finance systems.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a blockchain-based and traceable privacy information retrieval method. It is characterized by comprising multiple entities: an IoT data acquisition device, a data owner, a data retrieval party, a storage node, and a blockchain node. The method includes the following steps: 1) system initialization; 2) owner device registration; 3) data publishing; 4) blockchain retrieval; 5) permission application; 6) access and permission verification; 7) privacy retrieval; and 8) data decryption. This method enables distributed permission granting on the blockchain, data stream key sharing, and decentralized, controllable supervision to effectively protect the original data of IoT devices and ensure the authenticity and integrity of data collaborative transactions.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of blockchain, cryptography, and privacy information retrieval, specifically a blockchain-based method for retrieval of traceable privacy information. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, blockchain-driven supply chain finance faces several challenges. First, it lacks privacy protection mechanisms for data retrieval. For example, in IoT- and blockchain-enabled supply chain finance, when a bank verifies the status of goods assets for a loan from a core enterprise, it requests the status of these assets through a retrieval process. However, the bank does not want the core enterprise to know its retrieval criteria and results. Second, it lacks data breach tracking mechanisms. Once a data breach occurs, the data provider cannot trace the perpetrator. For instance, if the core enterprise cannot access the bank's retrieval criteria and results, it cannot hold the bank accountable if the data is leaked. This highlights the problem of lack of accountability for data breaches.

[0003] A blockchain can be understood as an immutable database, and through Turing-complete smart contracts, any logic on the chain can be executed. However, any action on the blockchain, including transaction transfers and contract execution, not only incurs economic costs but also requires the logic to be executed once by all consensus nodes on the chain, resulting in a significant waste of on-chain resources and affecting the performance of the blockchain itself. Therefore, blockchain is inherently unsuitable for large-scale complex computations.

[0004] Decentralized authorization systems enable data owners to securely and selectively share their encrypted data while ensuring data confidentiality in the presence of unauthorized parties and compromised data servers. The contribution of decentralized authorization systems lies in coupling two key ideas: (i) a cryptographically enforced access control structure for encrypted data streams, enabling users to define fine-grained stream-specific access policies; and (ii) a decentralized authorization service that supports user-defined access policies. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to address the shortcomings of existing technologies in data privacy information retrieval scenarios by proposing a blockchain-based traceable privacy information retrieval method. This method can realize distributed permission granting, data stream key sharing, and decentralized and controllable supervision to effectively protect the original data of IoT devices and access, thereby ensuring the authenticity and integrity of data collaborative transactions.

[0006] The technical solution to achieve the objective of this invention is:

[0007] A blockchain-based method for retrieval of traceable privacy information includes multiple entities such as IoT data acquisition devices, data owners, data retrievers, storage nodes, and blockchain nodes. The method includes the following steps:

[0008] 1) System Initialization: This stage is the initialization phase of the blockchain-based and traceable privacy information retrieval system. It requires completing the blockchain initialization and identity key distribution initialization work necessary before privacy queries. The system uses a searchable encryption algorithm for keyword retrieval of the index and initializes a homomorphic plaintext database (BVF12) on the storage node. All system participants jointly select one set of symmetric encryption / decryption algorithms and one set of asymmetric encryption / decryption algorithms through negotiation; the symmetric encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm are represented by E... SE () and A SE The asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms are represented as E (), respectively. AE () and A AE In addition, system participants also need to negotiate and select a set of cryptographic hash functions, i.e. ;

[0009] 2) Owner Device Registration: The decentralized digital identity verification system relies on public key signatures to identify and verify the principals involved; the hash digest of the public key serves as a unique pseudo-identity in the network and is stored in the blockchain network, enabling IoT devices to interact with the storage service securely and autonomously.

[0010] 3) Data Publishing: The data resources are divided into public digests and encrypted data. Public digests are used for data registration and retrieval, and specifically include: data ID, keyword index PEKSIndex, data publisher's public key (Owner), storage node's public key (storage), key materials (Keys), hash verification, and authorization status. Public digests are published in the blockchain ledger by the data publisher for data users to retrieve. Encrypted data is the transaction data itself. After being sliced ​​and lightly symmetric encrypted locally by IoT nodes, it is offloaded to cloud storage nodes to reduce the storage overhead for data owners and increase the throughput efficiency of the retrieval network. At the same time, for data integrity and verifiability, the hash value of this batch of data is also published to the blockchain nodes for transaction verification.

[0011] 4) Blockchain retrieval: This stage mainly involves the process of submitting data retrieval requests to the data retrieval system to obtain data, including two sub-stages: keyword retrieval and generating a secret query vector;

[0012] (i) Keyword retrieval: If a data retrieval party wants to retrieve data with the keyword "keyword", it first synchronizes the latest block of the blockchain, and then generates a trapdoor through the keyword to obtain the retrieval result index;

[0013] (ii) Generate dense query vector: Based on the storage address returned in the index, the data retrieval party generates an n-dimensional 0-1 vector for the query. ,in Position i is 1, and all other positions are 0; retrieve i from the server database. th The data retrieval agent generates an FV plaintext, which encodes the query n-dimensional 0-1 vector to obtain... Then it is sent to the corresponding storage node;

[0014] 5) Permission Request: The system uses the blockchain ledger as the access control state machine for data resources. When a data retrieval party wants to obtain certain specific data but does not want to expose the data details it needs, a trapdoor is generated based on the privacy retrieval scheme in the previous section. The data index is obtained from the blockchain distributed ledger. When the required data ID is retrieved, the data retrieval party will send a PIR vector request vector to the data owner to obtain authorization. If the data owner allows access, the authorization status on the blockchain will be updated and broadcast through the blockchain network.

[0015] 6) Access and Permission Verification: When a storage node receives a request to access data, it queries the blockchain for the corresponding access permissions. To enforce permissions, the storage node verifies the identity of the user requesting the request by providing a signature. The data owner expresses and dynamically adjusts permissions through the blockchain. Data access is enforced through end-to-end encryption in the form of cryptography. The storage node verifies the data access request based on the authorization status in Datashare. The authorization status in Datashare also protects the storage node's network resources from unauthorized users. After checking the access permissions, the storage node terminates malicious sessions.

[0016] 7) Privacy retrieval: This stage mainly involves the data storage node sending privacy retrieval data to the data retrieval party, including two sub-stages: ciphertext inner product and data encryption;

[0017] (i) Ciphertext inner product: After the data provider obtains the ciphertext key, since they do not know which public key the data retrieval user used for encryption, they can only use the private key set. The data provider obtains a set of keys after decrypting the ciphertext in sequence. However, he could not identify which key belonged to the data retriever;

[0018] (ii) Data encryption: After obtaining the key set, the data provider uses the keys in the key set to encrypt the corresponding private data. After encryption, the data provider obtains a set of ciphertext data. And send it to the data retriever;

[0019] 8) Data decryption: The data retriever obtains the encrypted data. Then, M is directly decrypted using the public key. index This allows the retriever to obtain the desired data. However, for encrypted data other than Mindex, the data retriever does not have the private key set. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain the private key other than the key, and thus impossible to decrypt other ciphertext.

[0020] Compared with existing technologies, this technical solution has the following advantages:

[0021] 1. This technical solution, while meeting security requirements, achieves features such as keyword confidentiality, search result confidentiality, and decentralized management.

[0022] 2. While meeting the above requirements, it achieves lightweight and high efficiency. Low computational overhead is achieved in privacy information retrieval within a real supply chain finance system. Attached Figure Description

[0023] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of an embodiment;

[0024] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating decentralized privacy information retrieval of supply chain data as an example. Detailed Implementation

[0025] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, but this is not intended to limit the scope of the invention.

[0026] Example: In an internet-based scenario, School A plans to integrate data resources from multiple related schools in a specific field to share data for research and prediction. School A registers its IoT data acquisition devices under its name. School A then condenses the acquired detailed data into indexes and summaries and stores this data on the blockchain. The IoT data acquisition devices symmetrically encrypt the detailed data and upload it to the storage node. When Schools B and C want to access specific data, they first search the blockchain. If they find that the data they want belongs to School A, they will then use PIR (Private Information Retrieval) technology to request access. After School A authorizes Schools B and C to access the data, it sends the decryption key to them via data stream and grants them permissions on the blockchain. Upon receiving the key stream, Schools B and C can request to download the desired data from the storage node using PIR. After receiving the PIR request, the storage node verifies the permissions on the blockchain; if the verification is successful, the data is sent.

[0027] Reference Figure 1A blockchain-based method for retrieval of traceable privacy information includes multiple entities such as IoT data acquisition devices, data owners, data retrievers, storage nodes, and blockchain nodes. The method comprises the following steps:

[0028] 1) System Initialization: This stage is the system initialization phase. It requires completing initialization tasks such as blockchain initialization and identity key distribution, which are necessary before privacy queries. The system uses a searchable encryption algorithm for keyword retrieval of the index and initializes a homomorphic plaintext database (BVF12) on the storage nodes. All system participants jointly select one set of symmetric encryption / decryption algorithms and one set of asymmetric encryption / decryption algorithms through negotiation. The symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms are represented by E... SE () and A SE The asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms are represented as E (), respectively. AE () and A AE (); In addition, system participants also need to negotiate and select a set of cryptographic hash functions, i.e. Schools A, B, and C first conduct review, registration, and form a blockchain network. Schools A, B, and C are data holders and achieve secure decentralized IoT privacy information retrieval by calling contracts.

[0029] 2) Owner Device Registration: The decentralized digital identity verification system relies on public key signatures to identify and verify the principals involved. The hash digest of the public key serves as a unique pseudo-identity in the network and is stored in the blockchain network. This function enables IoT devices to interact with the storage service securely and autonomously.

[0030] During the new device bootstrapping phase, IoT device A1 will create a public-private key pair locally. The private key is stored locally, and IoT device A1 is bound through an initial two-way multi-signature registration transaction on the blockchain. To data owner A After that, the data owner A can obtain the data and setting permissions of IoT device A1. After IoT device A1 is registered, it can directly trade the locally generated data as a legal resource and complete the corresponding identity authentication on the blockchain.

[0031] 3) Data Release: School A divides the data resources into public digests and encrypted data. The public digest is used for data registration and verification, and specifically includes: data ID, keyword index PEKSIndex, data publisher public key Owner, storage node public key Storage, key materials Keys, hash verification hash, authorization status, etc. The public digest is sent by School A to the blockchain ledger for School B and School C to retrieve. The encrypted data is the data itself being traded. After being sliced ​​and lightly symmetric encrypted locally by IoT node A1, it is offloaded to the cloud storage node, reducing the storage overhead for the data owner and increasing the efficiency of the retrieval network. At the same time, the hash value of this batch of data will be released to the blockchain node for transaction verification to ensure the integrity and verifiability of the data in the future.

[0032] A) Data Slicing: The raw data stream in this step is directly generated by IoT device A1. The data stream generated by the same IoT device has the characteristics of large quantity, strong time sequence, and similar data subjects. Considering the inherent transmission redundancy problem in the private information retrieval scheme, the data stream is divided into blocks with predefined time intervals. After slicing, IoT device A1 uploads the encrypted data to the storage node and can then register the data with the system.

[0033] B) Data Registration: The system treats each data stream slice as a data resource that can be traded and shared. The storage nodes and physical indexes are unique and updatable. The previous year's keyword index serves as the retrieval representation. School A publishes the public summary to the blockchain ledger. The distributed nodes School B and School C jointly maintain the sharing status of the data resources. In addition to providing summary retrieval, the blockchain ledger also needs to serve as important evidence to prove / refute infringement of access rights. The indexed blockchain nodes School A, B, and C jointly provide the system with auditable information about when and with whom the data resources are shared.

[0034] like Figure 2 As shown, 4) Blockchain retrieval: When school B and school C want to obtain the relevant data, they first submit a data retrieval request to the data retrieval system to obtain the data index. This process includes two sub-stages: keyword retrieval and generating a dense query vector.

[0035] A) Keyword search: School B and School C want to search for data with the keyword "keyword". They first synchronize the latest block of the blockchain ledger, and then generate a trapdoor through the keyword "keyword" to obtain the search result index.

[0036] B) Generate a dense query vector: School B generates an n-dimensional 0-1 vector for the query based on the storage node A2 returned in the index and the data retrieval method. The index i is 1 at position 1 and 0 at all other positions. The goal is to retrieve index i from the server database. th The school B of the element will generate an FV plaintext, which encodes the query n-dimensional 0-1 vector to obtain... Then send it to storage node A2;

[0037] 5) Permission Request: When School B and School C want to obtain certain specific data without exposing the details of the data they need, School B and School C generate a trapdoor based on the privacy retrieval scheme, obtain the data index Z1 from the distributed ledger on the blockchain, and when the required data dataID is retrieved, School B and School C will send a PIR vector to School A to generate a request for vector access permission. If School A allows access, it will update the authorization status on the blockchain and broadcast it through the blockchain network. Then, the decryption key of the data will be sent to School B and School C through School A's data stream.

[0038] ① School B and School C use keyword search on the blockchain to find the data tags they want;

[0039] ② School B and School C can find information such as the owner's public key and the public key of the storage address in the data tag;

[0040] ③ School B and School C use Private Information Retrieval (PIR) vectors to request access to specific data content. After receiving the PIR vectors, School A grants authorization according to the authorization methods desired by School B and School C.

[0041] (i) If accessing past data ranges, school A sends an internal node containing the decryption key via a data stream, enabling schools B and C to decrypt the data end-to-end. Then, a state update request is sent to the blockchain. Once the nodes on the blockchain reach a consensus, the previous state is corrected. The vector changed the authorization status, granting permissions to School B and School C;

[0042] (ii) Choosing a subscription method, School A sends shared interval hash tokens via data stream, distributing the latest dual-key return tokens in a digitally signed and encrypted lockbox. Authorized users obtain a long-term distribution key KD to unlock the lockbox, and the authorization service shares the decryption key with new users. Within a specified time, School A will continuously distribute keys via data stream. The key will only be updated after permission is revoked, and then a state update request will be sent to the blockchain. Once the nodes on the blockchain reach a consensus, the previous state will be corrected. The vector changed the authorization status, granting permissions to School B and School C;

[0043] 6) Access and Permission Verification: When storage node A2 receives data requests from schools B and C, it queries the blockchain for the corresponding access permissions. To enforce these permissions, storage node A2 verifies the user's identity through signature-based authentication. School A expresses and dynamically adjusts permissions through the blockchain. Data access is enforced end-to-end through symmetric encryption. Storage node A2 determines access permissions based on... The authorization status in the system needs to verify the data access request. The authorization status in the system can also protect the network resources of storage nodes from unauthorized users. Storage nodes can terminate malicious sessions after checking access permissions.

[0044] 7) Privacy retrieval: The process of storage node A2 sending privacy retrieval data to school B and school C includes two sub-stages: ciphertext inner product and data encryption;

[0045] (i) Ciphertext inner product: After obtaining the ciphertext key, school A, not knowing which school used which key for encryption, can only use the private key set. The data provider obtains a set of keys after decrypting the ciphertext in sequence. However, it is impossible to identify which school possesses the key;

[0046] (ii) Data encryption: After obtaining the key set, School A uses the keys in the key set to encrypt the corresponding data that needs to be encrypted. After encryption, School A obtains a set of ciphertext data. And send it to School B and School C;

[0047] Data Decryption: Schools B and C Obtain the Ciphertext Then you can directly decrypt using the public key. In order to obtain the desired data, for all but one Other encrypted data, because school B and school C do not have corresponding private key sets. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain the private key other than the key, and thus impossible to decrypt other ciphertext.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based method for retrieving traceable privacy information, characterized in that, The method comprises multiple entities, including IoT data acquisition devices, data owners, data retrieval parties, storage nodes, and blockchain nodes, and includes the following steps: 1) System Initialization: This stage is the initialization phase of the blockchain-based and traceable privacy information retrieval system. It requires completing the blockchain initialization and identity key distribution initialization work necessary before privacy queries. The system uses a searchable encryption algorithm for keyword retrieval of the index and initializes a homomorphic plaintext database (BVF12) on the storage node. All system participants jointly select one set of symmetric encryption / decryption algorithms and one set of asymmetric encryption / decryption algorithms through negotiation; the symmetric encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm are represented by E... SE () and A SE The asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms are represented as E (), respectively. AE () and A AE In addition, system participants also need to negotiate and select a set of cryptographic hash functions, i.e. ; 2) Owner Device Registration: The decentralized digital identity verification system relies on public key signatures to identify and verify the principals involved; the hash digest of the public key serves as a unique pseudo-identity in the network and is stored in the blockchain network, enabling IoT devices to interact with the storage service securely and autonomously. 3) Data Publishing: The data resources are divided into public digests and encrypted data. Public digests are used for data registration and retrieval, and specifically include: data ID, keyword index PEKSIndex, data publisher's public key (Owner), storage node's public key (storage), key materials (Keys), hash verification, and authorization status. Public digests are published on the blockchain ledger by the data publisher for data users to retrieve. Encrypted data is the transaction data itself. After being sliced ​​and lightly symmetric encrypted locally by IoT nodes, it is offloaded to cloud storage nodes to reduce the storage overhead for data owners and increase the throughput efficiency of the retrieval network. At the same time, for data integrity and verifiability, the hash value of this batch of data is also published to the blockchain nodes for transaction verification. 4) Blockchain retrieval: This stage mainly involves the process of submitting data retrieval requests to the data retrieval system to obtain data, including two sub-stages: keyword retrieval and generating a secret query vector; (i) Keyword retrieval: If a data retrieval party wants to retrieve data with the keyword "keyword", it must first synchronize the latest block of the blockchain, and then generate a trapdoor through the keyword to obtain the retrieval result index; (ii) Generate dense query vector: Based on the storage address returned in the index, the data retrieval party generates an n-dimensional 0-1 vector for the query. ,in Position i is 1, and all other positions are 0; retrieve i from the server database. th The data retrieval method for the element generates an unencrypted, sorted sequence of inscriptions, which encodes the query's n-dimensional 0-1 vector to obtain... Then it is sent to the corresponding storage node; 5) Permission Request: The system uses the blockchain ledger as the access control state machine for data resources. When a data retrieval party wants to obtain certain specific data but does not want to expose the data details it needs, a trapdoor is generated based on the privacy retrieval scheme in the previous section. The data index is obtained from the blockchain distributed ledger. When the required data ID is retrieved, the data retrieval party sends a PIR vector to the data owner to request authorization. If the data owner allows access, the authorization status on the blockchain will be updated and broadcast through the blockchain network. 6) Access and Permission Verification: When a storage node receives a request to access data, it queries the blockchain for the corresponding access permissions. To enforce permissions, the storage node verifies the identity of the requesting user by providing a signature. The data owner expresses and dynamically adjusts permissions through the blockchain. Data access is enforced through end-to-end encryption in the form of cryptography. The storage node verifies the data access request based on the authorization status in Datashare. The authorization status in Datashare also protects the storage node's network resources from unauthorized users. After checking the access permissions, the storage node terminates malicious sessions. 7) Privacy retrieval: This stage mainly involves the data storage node sending privacy retrieval data to the data retrieval party, including two sub-stages: ciphertext inner product and data encryption; (i) Ciphertext inner product: After the data provider obtains the ciphertext key, since they do not know which public key the data retrieval user used for encryption, they can only use the private key set. The data provider obtains a set of keys after decrypting the ciphertext in sequence. However, he could not identify which key belonged to the data retriever; (ii) Data encryption: After obtaining the key set, the data provider uses the keys in the key set to encrypt the corresponding private data. After encryption, the data provider obtains a set of ciphertext data. And send it to the data retriever; 8) Data decryption: The data retriever obtains the encrypted data. Then, M is directly decrypted using the public key. index This allows the retriever to obtain the desired data. However, for encrypted data other than Mindex, the data retriever does not have the private key set. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain the private key other than the key, and thus impossible to decrypt other ciphertext.

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