Devices, systems, and methods using micro-responders

Abstract

The object can include at least one micro transponder (MTP) configured with an identifier. The identifier of the MTP can be indexed to the object. Index information associated with the MTP and the object can be stored in a database of a security system. The MTP can be read and data reported by the MTP can be processed to determine authenticity of the object.

Description

[0001] Cross-references to related applications

[0002] This application claims U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,812, filed September 1, 2021, entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders"; U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,810, filed September 1, 2021, entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders"; U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,809, filed September 1, 2021, entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders"; and U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,809, filed September 17, 2020, entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods for Associating Biometric Data to...". U.S. Provisional Application No. 63 / 079,763, entitled “Items (Apparatus, Systems, and Methods for Associating Biometric Data with Articles),” filed February 18, 2021, entitled “MTP Protected Integrated Circuits,” U.S. Provisional Application No. 63 / 151,018, entitled “MTP Protected Integrated Circuits,” filed April 12, 2021, entitled “Display Surfaces Embedded with Secure Taggant,” and U.S. Provisional Application No. 63 / 166,753, entitled “Portable Connected Devices with MTP Reader,” filed March 26, 2021, are all incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] This disclosure relates to optimized optically triggered transponders, their applications, and / or systems incorporating them. Background Technology

[0004] As described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394, very small light-triggered transponders (MTPs) can be used to provide identifiers, for example, as identifiers used in conjunction with nucleic acid assays. These MTPs have been shown to be stable under physiological conditions. Therefore, they can be used as implantable tagging devices for animals, as described in more detail in U.S. Patent No. 8,353,917. MTPs can provide output signals as RF or as light (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such MTPs can serve as… The transponder was obtained from PharmaSeq, a company based in Monmouth, Junction, New Jersey. Attached Figure Description

[0005] The various objects, features and advantages of the disclosed subject matter can be more fully understood when considered in conjunction with the following detailed description of the disclosed subject matter, in which the same reference numerals denote the same elements.

[0006] Figure 1 A block diagram illustrating the operation of an MTP sensor system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0007] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of an example MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0008] Figure 3 A side view of an example MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0009] Figure 4 This is a top view of an example MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0010] Figure 5 A functional block diagram of an example MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0011] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0012] Figure 7 A cross-sectional view of a photoconductor according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0013] Figure 8 Some embodiments according to this disclosure are shown. Figure 6 The timing diagram of voltage signals and light intensity at each node.

[0014] Figure 9 A functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0015] Figure 10 illustrates in a simplified form how a string of characters is transmitted in a legacy system, and how characters are transmitted in a reverse antenna system according to some embodiments of this disclosure.

[0016] Figure 11A An example diagram showing the reverse antenna operating direction according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is illustrated.

[0017] Figure 11B Another example diagram showing the reverse antenna operating direction according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0018] Figure 12 A security inlay fitted onto a wine bottle is shown according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0019] Figure 13 This is a cross-sectional view of an example security inlay according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0020] Figure 14 An enlarged view of a safety inlay fitted onto a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0021] Figure 15 This is a flowchart illustrating an example process according to some embodiments of the present disclosure, the example process being configured to utilize a light-triggered transponder with a durable self-destruct function.

[0022] Figure 16 A diagram illustrating the process of implementing a smart paper contract according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown.

[0023] Figure 17 An example system diagram is shown that utilizes blockchain integration to generate secure document smart contracts according to some embodiments of this disclosure.

[0024] Figure 18 An example digital identity creation process according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown.

[0025] Figure 19 An example ownership allocation process according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown.

[0026] Figure 20 A block diagram of a portable device having an MTP reader system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0027] Figure 21 A device for tagging with MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0028] Figure 22 Examples of MTPs attached to a display surface according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are shown.

[0029] Figure 23 Examples of interlayer lamination of a display incorporating MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. Detailed Implementation

[0030] It should be understood that the disclosed subject matter is not limited in its application to the construction details and component arrangements set forth in the following description or shown in the accompanying drawings. The disclosed subject matter can have other embodiments and can be practiced and performed in various ways. Furthermore, it should be understood that the wording and terminology used herein are for descriptive purposes and should not be considered limiting. Therefore, those skilled in the art will understand that the concepts on which this disclosure is based can be readily used as the basis for designing other structures, methods, and systems for achieving several purposes of the disclosed subject matter. Therefore, the claims should be considered to include such equivalent constructions, provided they do not depart from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0031] Although the disclosed subject matter has been described and illustrated in the foregoing exemplary embodiments, it should be understood that this disclosure is by way of example only, and various changes may be made to the implementation details of the disclosed subject matter without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0032] According to some embodiments of this disclosure, a light-triggered transponder is provided, which includes optimized clock recovery circuitry for facilitating MTP signal transmission and MTP ID read enhancement.

[0033] In some embodiments, the light-triggered transponder may include a reverse antenna system that can be configured to provide accurate MTP signal transmission and processing, resulting in an MTPID reader with a greater read distance and simpler processing.

[0034] In some embodiments, a light-triggered transponder may be included in a security inlay for establishing the authenticity of an article. For example, a security inlay may be used to verify high-value articles and / or articles claiming commercial value based on food safety, fair trade, and sustainability claims (e.g., lettuce, coffee beans, etc.). However, the security inlay is not limited to use with any particular article or article category. The security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment; (b) a top inlay segment configured to fit onto or be disposed on the bottom inlay segment; and (c) a light-triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side disposed between the two inlay segments, the bottom side glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side glued to the top inlay segment, wherein the security inlay is configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the light-triggered transponder, rendering the light-triggered transponder unreadable.

[0035] In some embodiments, the light-triggered transponder may be configured with a robust self-destruct function to provide a super anchor for object authentication, object tracking, and tracing.

[0036] In some embodiments, one or more super anchors can be used with various objects to implement smart paper contracts to improve document security.

[0037] In some embodiments, one or more super anchors may be integrated with blockchain technology to generate secure document smart contracts.

[0038] In some embodiments, the system may explicitly, irrevocably, and indestructibly link an individual's biometric identity to a unique digital identity that can be used to explicitly and indestructibly assign ownership or title to a physical object. For example, tangible property may include, but is not limited to: (a) documents, (b) perishable items, (c) samples, (d) objects, and (e) living entities owned by an individual.

[0039] Some embodiments may include an optical identification and sensor system integrated with one or more mobile, wireless, and connected devices (e.g., cellular phones, laptops, tablets, handheld computing devices, or dedicated wireless handheld scanners). Such a sensor system may be integrated within the device or attached externally. Furthermore, such a system may be configured to read multiple security elements (e.g., QR codes, barcodes, RFID, in addition to MTPs) in a single interrogation; or as part of one or more separate security tags. In some embodiments, the sensor system may be used to read (synonymous with "interrogation") multiple security tags simultaneously. Furthermore, a security tag may include a single security element (such as a single MTP) or multiple security elements (such as an MTP embedded in a QR code). Additionally, multiple elements may be combined to form a composite security tag. Security tags may be read sequentially or in parallel. Even further, the order in which the tags are read can itself be a security feature. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, unique QR codes, special inks, and holograms are examples of security elements used to implement security tags. However, these tend to occupy significant surface areas on objects, making them less attractive for tagging smaller objects. Furthermore, security tags containing holograms typically require viewing from multiple angles to observe the holographic effect, which is often time-consuming. Additionally, elements such as security inks are generally not resistant to wear. However, MTP is uniquely suited for this purpose and does not suffer from the aforementioned prominent drawbacks. This is due to their miniature size, ease of detection, and robust authentication system. Their low manufacturing cost combines these advantages and allows them to be easily scaled up.

[0040] In some embodiments, the MTP equipped with memory can be fused to the surface of an integrated circuit. Their miniature size, ease of inspection, low manufacturing cost, and robust authentication system make MTPs particularly advantageous for large-scale deployment. The MTP can be “read” using a reader to retrieve the memory, which allows for verification of both the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit. “Reading” the MTP can be performed while the integrated circuit remains intact within the device and / or while the integrated circuit is running.

[0041] Some embodiments may include an MTP on or within a display. Displays have become an integral part of modern digital communication tools. The display described herein refers to an electronic device capable of visually presenting information or patterns. Such displays can function through the transmission, reflection, or refraction of light. Common examples of displays include screens in laptops, smartphones or tablets, televisions, digital signage, etc. The small size of the MTP makes it uniquely suited for inclusion in or on a display. This inclusion can be performed in various locations within or on the display using a variety of methods.

[0042] It should be understood that this disclosure is not limited in its application to the construction details and arrangements set forth in the following description or shown in the accompanying drawings. This disclosure is also capable of embodiments other than those described and can be practiced and performed in various ways. Furthermore, it should be understood that the wording and terminology used herein and in the abstract are for descriptive purposes and should not be considered limiting.

[0043] It should be understood that the following detailed description is merely illustrative and not a limitation on the subject matter for which protection is claimed.

[0044] Figure 1 A block diagram of an optical microtransponder (MTP) sensor system 100 (“System 100”) according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is depicted. System 100 includes an MTP reader 102 and an MTP 104. In some embodiments, the MTP 104 is bonded or adhered to an object by an adhesive to serve as an identifier for the object. The MTP 104 may be adhered to, implanted within, or otherwise attached to an object 110, which may be any object requiring personally unique identification (ID) data, such as a microscope slide, laboratory animal or insect, clothing, electronic components, etc. Figure 1The exploded view shown depicts an enlarged view of MTP 104 to illustrate the OTMP components of substrate 160, optoelectronic element 150, and optical communication circuitry 155. The height of MTP 104 can be, for example, approximately 20 μm–60 μm, depending on the number of stacked layers and sensors used for a particular MTP 104. MTP 104 can be an integrated circuit that is typically in a continuously dormant, non-powered state until it is energized by an excitation beam 132 from MTP reader 102. Upon energization, MTP 104 can (typically immediately, e.g., much less than 1 second) be energized and transmit a data beam 133 to MTP reader 102 via light or RF. In some embodiments, the data beam 133 can be a transmitter (e.g., from a light-emitting diode (LED)), or in other embodiments, a reflection / absorption mechanism (e.g., via a shutter of an LCD). In alternative embodiments, MTP 104 receives a separate stimulus, such as code modulated onto the excitation beam 132, which initiates the transmission of sensor data. Alternatively, receiving data from internal or linked sensors triggers the transmission of data beam 133. Some embodiments of system 100 may include an onboard power source, such as a battery, and / or one or more subsystems powered by the onboard power source. Such subsystems may include, but are not limited to, volatile memory that can be powered by a battery, one or more sensors and / or other features in addition to optoelectronic element 150.

[0045] In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 is a visible focused light or laser beam, and the data beam 133 is an infrared light beam emitted (e.g., from an infrared emitting diode). The data beam 133 may contain a signal that identifies a specific MTP 104 to the MTP reader 102, for example, using a unique identifier for a specific MTP 104. Using the unique identification information, the MTP reader 102 may send data to a computer (not shown) to uniquely identify the object 110. In some embodiments, a user operates the MTP reader 102 to illuminate the MTP 104 with light or other electromagnetic signals, causing the MTP 104 to transmit the data beam 133 via light or other electromagnetic signals. For example, in some embodiments, the range of the electromagnetic spectrum used by the MTP 104 for this signaling may include one or more subsets of the Asia-Pacific Hertz portion of the spectrum, including infrared and longer wavelengths. The data beam 133 is then received by the MTP reader 102. The MTP reader 102 may then decode the data beam 133 carrying the identification data to definitively identify the object 110.

[0046] "Laser" should be defined herein as coherent, directed light that can be visible light. Light sources include light from light-emitting diodes (LEDs), solid-state lasers, semiconductor lasers, etc., for communication purposes. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may include visible laser light (e.g., a 660 nm wavelength). In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 in operation may illuminate an area larger than the area occupied by the MTP 104, thereby allowing the user to easily locate and read the MTP 104. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may include light of other wavelengths in the desired visible and / or invisible spectrum supplied with sufficient power using a phototube of the MTP 104. The data beam 133 may be emitted at a wavelength different from the excitation beam 132. For example, the data beam 133 may be 1300 nm IR light, while the excitation beam is 660 nm red light. However, other wavelengths, such as the near-infrared (NIR) band, may be used for optical communication, and alternative embodiments may use other communication techniques, such as reflection signaling methods, to return modulated data signals to the MTP reader 102. In some alternative embodiments, OTMP 104 is a micro transponder (MTP) that includes an antenna (e.g., an integrated antenna) for communicating ID information to the corresponding reader via radio waves rather than light-based signals.

[0047] The clock recovery circuit 106 can extract the clock pulse signal from the received modulated light beam, as shown in the following reference. Figures 6-8 Further detailed description. In one embodiment, the light from the excitation beam 132 is amplitude-modulated (e.g., pulsed) at approximately 1 MHz to provide a data clock, which can be used by the MTP 104 to supply operating clock pulses for, for example, transmitted ID data bits. The timing of the pulse group can be configured such that the duty cycle and average power level fall within the requirements for registration as a Class 3R laser device.

[0048] For example, an example MTP for a p-Chip (p-chip) can be a monolithic (single component) integrated circuit (e.g., 600μm × 600μm × 100μm) that can transmit its identification code via radio frequency (RF). Figure 2A schematic diagram of an example MTP according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown. The MTP may include phototubes (202a, 202b, 202c, 202d), clock recovery circuitry 206 (e.g., clock signal extraction circuitry), logic state machine 204, loop antenna 210, and a 64-bit memory (not shown) such as supporting over 1.1 billion possible ID codes. When the phototubes are irradiated by a pulsed laser, the on-chip electronics can be powered with approximately 10% efficiency. The chip can transmit its ID via a modulated current in antenna 210. A changing magnetic field around the chip can be received by a coil in a nearby reader, and the signal can be digitized, analyzed, and decoded. The p-chip can be fabricated on a silicon wafer in a fabrication plant using CMOS processes similar to those used in the manufacture of memory chips and computer processors. The wafer can receive post-fabrication processing, including laser coding, passivation, thinning, and dicing, to produce individual p-chips. The p-chip surface can be made of silicon dioxide, which is deposited as the final passivation layer.

[0049] Figure 3 A side view of an exemplary MTP 104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0050] MTP 104 may comprise a stack of individual integrated circuit layers 300, 302, 304, 306, and 308.

[0051] Layer 302 can support a protective and passivation layer. Layer 304 can include logic, clock, sensor, and transmitter circuitry. Layers 306 and 308 can include storage capacitors; 300 is a substrate. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the functionality of MTP 104 can be organized into layers with other configurations. For example, the stack can include layers of varying thicknesses with uniform coverage, allowing them to be fabricated, for example, in 3D IC processes known in the art.

[0052] MTP 104 can be manufactured using mixed-signal manufacturing techniques, which are commonly used to fabricate sensor electronics or analog-to-digital converters that combine both analog and digital devices. In an example embodiment, each layer is approximately 12 μm thick and measures 100 μm × 100 μm. In one embodiment, the MTP 104 measures 100 × 100 × 50 μm. Alternative embodiments may use more or fewer layers depending on the sensor application.

[0053] Figure 4 A top view of an exemplary MTP 104 is shown. Figure 4 The view depicted in the middle is Figure 3The top layer 302. In one embodiment, the top of layer 302 includes transmitting elements, such as an LED array 400, surrounding the periphery of MTP 104. In other embodiments, the LED array may be implemented as a single LED (shown in dashed line as LED 420) in the middle of 410 or other topologies for directional light emission. The placement of the LED array 400 depicts an example of an embodiment emphasizing light generation. Alternative embodiments may include varied topological layouts that facilitate energy harvesting or capturing sensor data, etc. In some embodiments, the LED may include a focusing lens or other optics.

[0054] An array 401 of phototubes 402, 404, 406 and photoconductor 408 is located at the center of the top layer 302. As shown, each phototube in array 401 can be physically sized to generate power for a specific circuit within MTP 104, and one of them can be dedicated to clock / carrier signal extraction, as referenced below. Figure 4 As described. The largest area phototube 402 generates a voltage Vdd (in some embodiments, a negative voltage Vneg) to operate the output transistor 416 to drive an electron radiation transmitter (implemented as an LED in the optical communication circuit 155 in some embodiments). Phototube 404 generates a positive voltage for the logic / sensor circuit 410, and phototube 406 generates a negative voltage Vneg for the logic / sensor circuit block 410. The photoconductor 408 is used to extract clock pulses, for example, for operating the logic / sensor circuit 410. As shown, power transistors are coupled to capacitors, for example, in layers 306 or 308, to store the energy generated by the phototube when irradiated by a laser. In some embodiments, the energy extracted from the clock photoconductor 408 is applied to a differentiator (see below). Figure 6 As described, the differentiator extracts clock edges, which are amplified and used to provide timing signals to logic and sensing circuitry. As shown, multiple identification fuses 418 are located on surface 414. By disconnecting selected fuses, a unique identification code range is provided for the MTP 104, exceeding the default base page of code values ​​that can be hard-coded into chip logic. In an alternative embodiment, electronic antifuse technology can be used to electronically encode the ID values. Furthermore, embodiments exist of electronic memory for data, signal processing, and identification storage.

[0055] Figure 5A functional block diagram of an illustrative MTP 104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention is depicted. The MTP 104 may include an optoelectronic element 150, an energy storage 504, a clock / carrier extraction network 506 (i.e., clock recovery circuit 106), a sensor 508, logic 510, a transmit switching circuit 512, and a transmitting device 155 such as an IR LED. The optoelectronic element 150 may include dedicated phototubes, such as a clock extraction photoconductor 408, an energy harvesting phototube array 404, 406, and a transmitting phototube 402. The energy harvesting phototube arrays 404 and 406 may be coupled to the energy storage 504 and may include phototubes that convert light energy from illumination into current.

[0056] The clock photoconductor 408, being part of the clock recovery circuit and physically located separately from it, can detect clock pulse signals for the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506. In some embodiments, the energy storage 504 consists of multiple capacitors, with at least one capacitor coupled to the phototubes of the phototube arrays 404, 406. The energy stored in the energy storage 504 can be coupled to electronic circuitry. Since the laser is pulsed, energy from the laser can be accumulated, and the MTP 104 can operate using the stored energy. Unlike the phototube arrays 404 and 406, in some embodiments, the energy of the phototube 402 is not stored, and the transmitter switching circuit 512 can "offload" all its energy to the transmitting element 155 via the output transistor 416. When the received laser pulse energy is extracted by the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506, the logic state machine (i.e., logic 510) can form data packets including ID bits and sensor data and provide these data packets to the transmit data switch 512 for forming an optical transmission signal. Logic 510 can directly integrate sensor and ID signals into the composite data frame of the OOK (On / Off Keying) transmitter. Modulation symbols can be applied to transmitter 512 and transmitted along with each energy pulse.

[0057] Sensor 508 (if present) may include one or more sensors for, for example, measuring biological cell characteristics. Any analog data from sensor 508 may be converted into a pulse-width modulated signal or other binary signaling method that encodes the analog quantity in the time domain in a manner suitable for pulsed IR emitting diodes for direct transmission to MTP reader 102, without requiring conventional, power- and area-intensive analog-to-digital conversion techniques. Example sensors include, but are not limited to, dielectric sensors, temperature-to-absolute-temperature (PTAT) sensors, pH sensors, redox potential sensors, and / or optical sensors.

[0058] Clock recovery circuit

[0059] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit 506 according to one or more embodiments of the present invention. The clock recovery circuit 506 may include: a photoconductor 602 (in... Figure 6 (As shown in detail below), it has a resistance R1 that varies with the intensity of the received light; a reference resistor 604 with a fixed resistance R2; an amplifier 606; and an inverter 608. The source terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to the first terminal of the resistor 604 at node A. Node A is coupled to the input of the amplifier 606, and the output of the amplifier 606 is coupled to the inverter 608, which generates a restored clock circuit at its output.

[0060] The series connection of photoconductor 602 and resistor 604 forms a voltage divider R coupled between voltage VDD and ground. Specifically, in this embodiment, the drain terminal of photoconductor 602 is coupled to voltage VDD from energy storage 504, which maintains this voltage when illumination is off, and the second terminal of resistor 604 is coupled to ground. Because the resistance R1 of photoconductor 602 varies with the intensity of the received light, and the voltage at node A is determined by the ratio of resistances R1 and R2, the modulated light input incident on photoconductor 602 generates a modulated voltage signal at the input of amplifier 606.

[0061] In some embodiments, a coupling capacitor 610 is added before amplifier 606. The voltage divider R and coupling capacitor 610 form a differentiator that can extract clock edges at modulation frequencies as low as a few kilohertz (which may be unnecessary at approximately 1 MHz or higher). Inverter 608 digitizes the analog output of amplifier 606, producing an output such as... Figure 8 The example digital waveform shown. Figure 8 It shows Figure 6 Timing diagram of light intensity and voltage signals at each node of the clock recovery circuit 506 with coupling capacitors.

[0062] Figure 7 A cross-sectional view of an example photoconductor 602 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. In some embodiments, the size of the photoconductor 602 may be 5µm × 5µm or larger. Figure 6As shown, the photoconductor 602 can employ a long-channel n-MOSFET within an isolated deep n-well barrel. The n-well and deep n-well (Dn-well) can completely seal the p-well in the p-substrate, as well as the transistor assembly (i.e., the source, drain, and gate confined within the barrel). For example, a gate layer made of polysilicon can be disposed on top of an insulating layer such as silicon dioxide (SiO2). Polysilicon absorbs shorter wavelengths of light, such as blue light, but allows longer wavelengths of light, such as red light, to pass through. When an excitation beam 132 with a longer wavelength, such as a red beam, is used, the polysilicon filter and blocks the shorter wavelengths while allowing the longer wavelengths to pass through. Thus, it suppresses the shorter wavelengths. For example, indoor light flickering at 60 Hz (e.g., a fluorescent lamp) may produce some interference or noise with a wider spectrum in the shorter wavelength (blue wavelength) range, while the polysilicon effectively blocks the flicker from the indoor light and allows only the desired energy beam (e.g., red light) to pass through.

[0063] Furthermore, compared to a photodiode-based clock recovery circuit, the photoconductor 602 (also referred to as a photoresistor) allows the clock recovery circuit 106 to operate under both low and high illumination conditions. For example, under sufficiently high illumination, excessive spillover charge in the photodiode cannot be adequately released, leading to a failure of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. Conversely, the photoconductor 602 can operate in current mode and is less affected by high illumination spillover because the electric field in the photoconductor 602 continuously consumes photocharge. Additionally, the deep n-well barrel of the photoconductor 602 is isolated, such that the n-well physically forms a potential barrier that prevents charges generated outside the barrel from entering the barrel, ensuring that only photons reaching the inside of the barrel can contribute to the conductivity of the photoresistor 602. Thus, excessive photocharge that could cause a failure of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit during high illumination is suppressed in the clock recovery circuit 106.

[0064] Additionally, this FET device can have a very small physical footprint. Inverter 608 can include a static CMOS inverter device, which includes NMOS and PMOS transistors and has both high and low states. If the inverter input is above the reference voltage, it is considered high; if it is below the reference voltage, it is considered low, and the output is then inverted. The static CMOS inverter can also act as an analog amplifier because it has sufficiently high gain in its narrow switching region to amplify the signal, allowing clock recovery circuit 506 to have a very small footprint. In cases where the extracted clock pulse is extremely low, the amplification of amplifier 606 may be insufficient to reach the threshold voltage for flipping the logic state; in these cases, inverter 608 can further increase the overall amplification to reach its threshold.

[0065] Clock recovery systems can be applied to MTPs that emit signals using RF and those that emit signals using light (e.g., via LED), as described in U.S. Serial No. 14 / 631,321 filed February 25, 2015.

[0066] Reverse antenna system

[0067] Each p-chip can have a programmed unique serial number or identifier (ID). P-chips can be read by an MTP reader (e.g., a wand) that does not have duplicate IDs. The MTP reader can be a handheld device connected to a standard Windows PC, laptop, or tablet computer, used to read MTPs and capable of reading the serial number or ID of an individual p-chip.

[0068] Figure 9 A functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. Figure 9 As shown, an example MTP ID reader can be USB powered and may include a USB 2.0 transceiver microcontroller, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a power converter and regulator, a laser diode with a programmable current driver, an optical collimation / focusing module, and a tuned air coil pickup with a high-gain, low-noise differential RF receiver. When reading the p-chip identifier (ID), the laser emits an average of 60mW of optical power, modulated at 1MHz at a wavelength of 658 nm. The ID is read when the p-chip is placed within a suitable distance from the reader (e.g., <10mm). The waveform generated by the p-chip is compared with the data clock (laser modulation) used for synchronous transmission of the ID data bits. The resulting ID read from the p-chip is fast (<0.01 seconds) and reported on a PC or tablet computer. The MTP ID reader can be able to read the p-chip under challenging conditions, such as through a sheet of white paper, blue glass (approximately 1mm thick), or a transparent plastic laminate. Other MTP readers have been developed (e.g., instruments for reading IDs in fluids using p-chips). Another version under development is a battery-powered Bluetooth reader that can be used with PCs or mobile phones.

[0069] Some embodiments can provide an effective means of increasing the signal strength emitted by these small MTPs. p-Chip data can be transmitted using data encoding that causes one-third to two-thirds of the transmit bits to have a value of 1. The average value of all IDs can be half the data with a value of 1. The "1" digital signal is transmitted when the laser is on, while the "0" digital signal is transmitted when the laser is off (the energy stored in the phototube provides a small amount of energy to be transmitted). The signal power tracks the ratio of one to zero in the data. Some embodiments can transmit the same "1" digital signal as currently transmitted, but the "0" digital signal is transmitted with a current flowing in the opposite direction to the current of the "1" digital signal while the laser is on. This results in all IDs being transmitted with the same power. Data can be transmitted when the laser is on. This can cause the power in the transmitted signal to double (on average, the signal in the receiver increases by 6 dB). This method can lead to easier signal processing and easier differentiation of 1s and 0s. This can produce MTP ID readers with greater read distances and simpler processing.

[0070] For example, a lamp with a duty cycle of 50% and a flashing frequency of 1MHz can be used to query... MTP. This can be achieved using lasers or focused LEDs, etc.

[0071] Figure 10 illustrates, in simplified form, how the string "1101" is transmitted in the legacy system and in the reverse antenna system described herein. For each off / on cycle, such as c1, c2, c3, or c4 in Figure 10, the MTP ID reader searches for the radio signal that identifies the transmission of a "1" or "0" digital signal. As shown in the simplified form, for the first illustrative MTP output at the top of Figure 10, which illustrates a prior art system, zero is transmitted when the light source is off. However, the phototube capacitance used to transmit zero is finite. In fact, this finite signal represents "0". The finite energy applicable to zero means that the signal-to-noise ratio at the MTP reader is limited by the SNR of zero. This means that while in principle "1" can be read over a significantly greater distance, the MTP signal can only be read over a shorter distance applicable to the "0" component of the signal. This document provides a method that involves reversing the direction of current in an RF output antenna to transmit a "0" digital signal so that substantially the same current is used for both "1" and "0" digital signals (see bottom of Figure 10). In some embodiments different from Figure 10, Any given position (“1” or “0”) or digital signal in the MTP can be transmitted within 8 consecutive optical cycles.

[0072] One way to reverse the antenna current is to use a switching circuit such as an H-bridge. Figure 11AAn example diagram showing the reverse antenna operating direction according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is illustrated. Figure 11A As shown, antenna 10 can be operated by voltage source Vin and H-bridge 20. Selectively closing switches S1 and S4 can direct current through antenna 10 in the direction indicated by the arrow. Selectively closing switches S2 and S3 can direct current through antenna 10 in the opposite direction.

[0073] Figure 11B Another example diagram illustrating the reverse antenna operating direction according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown. Another means of reversing the antenna current is to use two switches, for example... Figure 11B The antennas are S1A and S2A, and two antennas (e.g., 10A and 10B). Selectively closing switch S1A directs current through antenna 10A in the direction indicated by the arrow. Selectively closing switch S2A directs current through antenna 10B in the opposite direction. If S1A is selectively closed, current moves in direction D1. If S2A is selectively closed, current moves in direction D2, opposite to direction D1. The antennas can be formed in separate metal layers or on the same layer. Only one FET (S1A or S2A) can be closed at any given time. When either FET is open, reverse current may couple to the other antenna. The body diode of the cut-off FET provides a current path for the coupled signal.

[0074] In some embodiments, the antenna options described herein can be implemented on a single integrated circuit. In some embodiments, the size of the single integrated circuit can be approximately 2 mm × 2 mm × 0.2 mm or less.

[0075] In some embodiments, combining the bi-phase transmission of the MTP described above increases the signal strength by approximately 6 dB. This increases the reliable read distance of the MTP reader. In some embodiments, the number of cycles used to transmit one bit is 8 data cycles. Each laser cycle is one data cycle. Whenever the number of data cycles is doubled, the signal processing gain is 3 dB. Eight data cycles is three times (2, 4, 8). This results in a signal processing gain of 9 dB. By increasing from 8 to 64 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) or 128 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128), the signal processing gain can be increased from 9 dB to 18 dB (for 64 repetitions) or 21 dB (for 128 repetitions). When using a 1 MHz laser, the current p-chip with 8 repetitions for its 64 data units can transmit IDs at a rate of 2000 times per second. By increasing the repetition rate to 128, the read rate can be reduced to 128 reads per second with a signal gain of 21 dB. This can result in an increased read distance. The laser rate can be increased or decreased (e.g., in the range of 500 kHz to 5 MHz). The repetition rate can be controlled by selecting one of eight repetition rates (3 additional memory bits).

[0076] security inlay

[0077] MTPs can also be used to implement security features. These can be MTPs that emit signals using RF or MTPs that emit signals using light.

[0078] This enhances the security feature by ensuring that the MTP cannot be removed from the object it protects without compromising its functionality. An example object that might require this security feature is a high-end wine bottle. Wine is used herein as an example object to illustrate and explain the structure and function of the security inlay; however, as stated above, the security inlay is not limited to use with wine bottles. An inlay incorporating an MTP is provided herein, which can be designed to break the MTP when the tape or foil seal is breached.

[0079] In some embodiments, light-triggered transponders can be used in security inlays for security purposes. For example, security inlays can provide a reliable method for authenticating wine. In the wine industry, corks or stoppers are sealed with capsules or foils designed to prevent removal of the stopper without peeling off the capsule. This provides a degree of security. However, for high-end wines, it is worthwhile to acquire equipment that replicates these capsules by any means necessary. Additional wax seals may be available, but these all suffer from the same drawbacks as the monetary value of counterfeits increases.

[0080] An example security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment; (b) a top inlay segment configured to be fitted and disposed to the bottom inlay segment; and (c) a light-triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side disposed between the two inlay segments, the bottom side being glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side being glued to the top inlay segment. The security inlay is configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the light-triggered transponder, rendering the light-triggered transponder unreadable.

[0081] Figure 12 The image shows a safety inlay fitted onto a wine bottle. (Example) Figure 12 As shown, inlay 10 is shown below the cover 20 of the bottle 22. Figure 13 This is a cross-sectional view of an example security inlay design according to some embodiments of this disclosure. For example... Figure 13 As shown, the inlay 10 consists of two parts, a top 10A and a bottom 10B, with an MTP 18 mounted between them. These parts can be made of transparent or translucent plastic using one of several techniques, such as 3D printing, molding, or heated pressing. In some embodiments, a specially prepared MTP 18 that is easily mechanically destroyed is used. For example, the structural integrity of the MTP can be reduced by a notch 12 on the back of the MTP or by making the MTP very thin (e.g., about 10 to about 30 micrometers). The MTP can be glued to the inlay to ensure destruction. Similar to the illustration, the adhesion points can be asymmetrical to ensure uneven forces when the top inlay portion separates from the bottom inlay portion. Figure 13 As shown, one half of the MTP can be glued (glue 16) to the bottom 10B of the inlay, while the other half is glued to the top 10A of the inlay. Both the top and bottom of the inlay can have grooves to accommodate the glue. In one embodiment, as... Figure 13 As shown, the bottom insert segment has a bottom groove to accommodate adhesive, thereby adhering to the bottom side of the light-triggered transponder. The top insert segment has a top groove to accommodate adhesive, thereby adhering to the top side of the light-triggered transponder.

[0082] The two halves of the inlay can be held in place by weaker elements, such as mechanical fittings (including slight notches and corresponding protrusions) or properly placed weak adhesive drops (e.g., placed around the perimeter of the inlay (between the two halves)). The inlay design ensures that when the two inlay halves are pulled apart (when the cap is removed from the bottle), the MTP breaks and ceases to function electrically. Adhesive 26 can be chosen to resist solvent erosion (e.g., by polymerization) if a potential counterfeiter cuts the cap around the inlay. Adhesive 26 can also be applied in a clear pattern visible to the human eye or imaging equipment. The adhesive pattern can be on the top, most vulnerable surface, or it can be on both the top and bottom. Utilizing such features, attempts to recycle the inlay will be visually detectable. Simultaneously, provided handled properly, the inlay and the MTP inside can be mechanically stable and easily manipulated by hand or robot.

[0083] Figure 14 An enlarged view is shown of an example security inlay fitted onto a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Figure 14 As shown, an inlay 10, resembling a thin button, can be glued to the stopper / cork 24 and the cap 20 using glue 26. For example, if the bottled wine is original, the MTP ID can be read using a custom ID reader (e.g., a scanning pen) or a phone-based accessory, cover, or app. However, removing the cap from the bottle (before the bottle is opened) splits the inlay in two and permanently damages the MTP placed inside the inlay 10. The MTP can no longer be read. Therefore, verification of this bottle of wine is no longer possible.

[0084] The size of the inlay can be selected to cover all or most of the top surface of the stopper 24. In some embodiments, the inlay spans the opening of the bottle. Potential counterfeiters may not be able to pry out the inlay without disabling the MTP. When the bottle is properly opened, the top 10A peels off along with the seal. The bottom does not substantially interfere with the use of the corkscrew. In some embodiments, the bottom is made thinner to further facilitate the use of the corkscrew.

[0085] Winemakers can receive inlays from specialized facilities. The inlays can be glued to the cork and then to the liner by the winemaker. Gluing can be done sequentially, or the glue can be pre-placed on top and bottom of the inlay. The glue can be cured by a variety of mechanisms, including photopolymerization (because in some embodiments the inlay is at least translucent), chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The liner can be pressed onto the inlay to ensure it is properly glued.

[0086] Alternatively, the liner manufacturer can pre-glu the inlay to the inside of the liner. The winemaker can then glue the inner center portion of the liner to the cork. This can be achieved by having an inlay pre-treated with glue within the liner (possibly protected by removable plastic packaging). In this case, the only thing the winemaker needs to do to certify the wine is remove the packaging before placing the inlay-liner on the bottle.

[0087] If the casing is transparent, the MTP can be read immediately. If an opaque casing is used, an opening can be made in the casing to read the MTP in the inlay. The opening can be small enough that the inlay 10 can still be glued well to the casing.

[0088] In some embodiments, in addition to a small window that allows the MTP photodetector to query, the top of the enclosure also includes a metal foil. This window may be covered with a transparent plastic coating. In some embodiments, the enclosure is a laminate of opaque and transparent materials, with the opaque material not present in the window.

[0089] In some embodiments, MTP can be larger in size than as The transponders are sold in larger sizes. This size ensures good asymmetrical adhesion to the top and bottom inlay sections. The entire chain of custody can be authenticated, from the winemaker through the distribution chain to the consumer. At each step, reading the MTP ID verifies the wine's authenticity.

[0090] If needed, the MTP ID can be provided to a central wine database via the internet, and recorded in the database along with a timestamp and the identifier of the MTP reader device. Therefore, if properly arranged, the data provider can maintain the history of the bottle. If the end consumer wants to verify the authenticity of the wine, several methods are possible. First, the fact that the supplier can read the ID in front of the consumer provides reassurance. Second, the supplier can search the database and present the bottle's history to the consumer. Third, the consumer can use an app on their smartphone to enter the MTP ID and obtain the bottle's historical record. Fourth, if the consumer has their own ID reader, they can verify the information themselves.

[0091] Therefore, a reliable method for authenticating wine or other objects is provided. The disclosed security inlay is flexible to operations involving the entire inlay, extremely sensitive to the separation of the halves, easy to install, and inconspicuous in most cases.

[0092] Although the invention uses a wine bottle as an example, it can be used for any container sealed with a cover or tape, such that the insert containing part of the cover or tape must be separated from the container. This use can include bottles containing medicines, perfume bottles, or similar containers. Other uses can include labels or other elements placed on or incorporated into plastic, metal, and / or composite materials (including CPG consumer packaging). For shipping boxes, the tape can be adhesive enough to be impossible to remove without damaging the box's substrate (e.g., cardboard). Similarly, labels can be adhesive enough to be impossible to remove without damaging the label and / or the container underneath.

[0093] Use screw caps on wine bottles (e.g.) In the case of a closure, a safety insert can be attached to the bottle on the side below the threads and below the closure. In some embodiments, the bottom of the insert can have a curved bottom shape to match the neck of the bottle. In some embodiments, the closure can be glued to the neck of the bottle in the area of ​​the safety insert.

[0094] A casing can refer to a tightly assembled metal or plastic foil that forms part of the enclosure of an object, preventing the object from being opened without breaking the casing. A laminate is a composite material formed by the bonding, fusion, or adhesion between polymer layers or between polymer and fabric layers, making the laminate a monolithic structure within its intended use.

[0095] The disclosure described herein is an MTP with signal transmission enhancement and methods for its formation or use.

[0096] Monolithic security features including MTP

[0097] Monolithic safety features can be produced by casting, embedding, or incorporating an MTP into a substrate via an additive manufacturing process. Such safety features can also be manufactured by attaching the MTP to a substrate after it has been formed. Monolithic safety feature networks are designed to transport the MTP to or through an external feature whose structure and composition cause the MTP to break or otherwise permanently fail. As an example, an MTP can be embedded in a heat-shrinkable tube with a sealed twist-top cap. The MTP can be positioned such that when the cap is unscrewed, it may encounter a ramp, wedge, or other structure on the container. The heat-shrinkable substrate can be designed to deform as it passes through this structure, but not to completely absorb or dissipate the increased forces from the structure. As the MTP encounters and moves through the structure, the resistance can force the MTP or an MTP subassembly to break, thus rendering it incapable.

[0098] Security features of multi-MTP indexes

[0099] This invention can use multiple micro-responders or a combination of micro-responders and tags as matching pairs for authentication to establish a higher level of security. All tags must be present and readable to verify the content. Failure to respond to any micro-responder can indicate that the content is not authentic. At least one micro-responder in the multi-level index sequence can be a fragile chip, which can be physically rendered unresponsive when the container is initially opened. The fragile chip can be manufactured through post-manufacturing processes, i.e., thinning the chip substrate to ensure it is destroyed when attempted to bend or remove from the substrate. In some embodiments, methods for ensuring chip incapacity can be implemented by designing a fracture plane or cutting slots in the chip to disconnect the antenna.

[0100] In one embodiment, a physical object (e.g., a container) can be attached to a legally paired chip A and chip B when both signals respond to an inquiry.

[0101] In one embodiment, if a physical object is only attached to chip A and chip B is not physically present for the reader to query, the reader may not authenticate the product because the database requires responses from both chips. If a physical object is present with both chip A and chip B, but chip B is damaged when opened, the reader may not authenticate the product because chip B is incapacitated.

[0102] In one embodiment, similar to the example of a physical object having chip A and chip B, the physical object can have different paired or valid pairing indices via chip C and chip D. While the pairing of chip C and chip D can be valid, it can be unique and not equal to the pairing of chip A and chip B. If a counterfeiter obtains chip A and chip C and adds them to their packaging, the reader may not authenticate the chips because chip A and chip C do not constitute a valid pairing.

[0103] Light-triggered microtransponder (MTP) with a durable, self-destructing superanchor.

[0104] Physically unclonable features (PUFs) have been identified and can be employed as key elements in physical and digital anti-counterfeiting and authentication systems. A PUF is a physical entity embodied in a physical structure and is easily assessed but difficult to predict, even by an attacker with physical access to it. A key element of a PUF is the use of naturally occurring and randomly occurring features or attributes that can serve as unique distinguishing characteristics for otherwise very similar individual objects. PUFs depend on the uniqueness of their physical microstructure, which typically includes random components inherent in the physical entity or explicitly introduced or generated during the physical entity's manufacturing process. The physical microstructure associated with a PUF is inherently uncontrollable and unpredictable. To assess PUFs, a so-called challenge-response authentication scheme is used. A "challenge" is a physical stimulus applied to the PUF, and a "response" is its response to the stimulus. This response depends on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure and can therefore be used to authenticate the PUF and the physical objects that constitute a part of it. A specific challenge and its corresponding response together form a so-called "challenge-response pair" (CRP).

[0105] In practical applications, the PUF can be questioned in a manner known as a challenge. The PUF responds to the challenge by clearly revealing, identifying, or recording unique random characteristics. This response is then compared to a digital reference. If the PUF's unique random characteristics match the digital reference, the challenge results in positive authentication. If the PUF's unique random characteristics differ from the digital reference, the challenge fails, indicating that the PUF and its attached physical object are not authentic or are counterfeit.

[0106] The definition of a PUF can depend on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of its physical microstructure, and focuses on naturally occurring random physical structures or phenomena to achieve uniqueness, making it exceptionally difficult to replicate or clone the chip. The challenge to reveal the random characteristics of on-chip PUFs is based on ring oscillations and FPGA architectures, both of which can degrade over time and may not be durable in the long term.

[0107] Despite the wide range of design functions and applications of PUFs, several important questions remain to be addressed. While the digital reference of a PUF may be locked at its inception and practically unchanged over time, the physical PUF used to generate the digital reference may begin to degrade immediately. Over time and / or due to handling, environmental conditions, or usage, a legitimate original PUF may eventually have its unique characteristics eroded or modified to the point that it may fail to challenge its digital twin. In such cases, genuine items may be incorrectly identified as counterfeits or imitations. Therefore, a more robust method is needed to guarantee the authenticity of objects.

[0108] This disclosure provides an innovative method for assigning uniqueness by applying an MTP with a unique ID to a large number of similar objects. In some embodiments, a non-random function can be assigned and embedded or incorporated into the object. In some embodiments, non-random features may be difficult to achieve, and any attempt to manipulate or alter a unique feature will result in its failure or damage. Furthermore, embodiments of this disclosure can be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive, with a high level of durability and reliable functionality. The combination of super-durability and tamper-proof structure can produce a super anchor (SA). SA is not a PUF in terms of being based on random physical characteristics and / or degrading over time.

[0109] The main concept of this disclosure is to provide a unique embedding feature for an object (a superanchor) to increase its durability. The super-durable object can be embedded into the chip's matrix. Other attempts to develop durable methods for ICs (i.e., on-chip devices) involve various microstructures within the chip itself.

[0110] In this disclosure, the superanchor can be highly durable because the MTP ID code is a unique, fixed feature that can be integrated into the bulk medium (e.g., a chip structure) but is decoupled from the bulk medium. This unique feature can be isolated from degradation of the bulk medium. The superanchor can provide non-random bus security features. In response to attempts to change the unique ID, the superanchor can be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive. Further applications of the self-destruct design can be used to ensure authentic packaging, preventing containers and utensils from being reused to contain counterfeit items. For example, a final example of the use of a self-destructing superanchor is in a security inlay.

[0111] Figure 15 This is a flowchart illustrating an example process configured to perform physical object authentication using a superanchor according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Under the control of a digital security system including a manufacturer database, the durable, self-destructing superanchor can be used for object authentication, object tracking, and tracing. The digital security system may include one or more computing devices to facilitate object authentication, object tracking, and tracing. The digital security system may include at least a security computing device that communicates with multiple user computing devices via a network. The security computing device may include a processor, memory, and a communication interface for enabling communication over the network. The digital security system may receive and process MTP registration information from an MTP ID security reader (e.g., an ID reader) via the network.

[0112] In step 1501, a superanchor (SA) can be manufactured by embedding or incorporating an MTP with a unique ID into a labeling agent, a labeling agent substrate, or a labeling agent layer. The labeling agent may or may not contain a PUF in its physical structure. The superanchor can be manufactured by incorporating the MTP into the labeling agent structure, either concurrently with or as part of a multilayer manufacturing process. An example of co-manufacturing the labeling agent and the superanchor can be casting a thermoplastic label or marker via in-mold processing. An example of multilayer co-manufacturing can include laminating an MTP into a credit card, label, or tape, whereby the MTP becomes part of a monolithic structure of the label or object. The resulting label or labeling agent can be a label, dot, stack, tape, or any physical structure. The primary purpose of the labeling agent can include: (1) providing a surface for attaching the superanchor to a physical object for tracking the physical object; and / or (2) serving as a passive or active component of a tamper-proof, anti-tampering, or self-destruct mechanism.

[0113] For example, a super anchor can be identified as a light-triggered MTP with a unique ID attached to or embedded in a chip tag that has a physically unclonable (PUF) feature, as well as self-destruct and high durability features.

[0114] In step 1502, the unique ID code of the MTP can be registered in the digital security system and / or the manufacturer's database and indexed to the MTP.

[0115] In step 1503A, the manufactured SA with a unique ID code or unique serial number can be digitally indexed and attached to a physical object. The superanchor may or may not have acceptable means of attaching it to the physical object as part of its structure and composition. The means, methods, and processes for adhering the superanchor to the physical object can vary widely depending on the composition of the physical object receiving the superanchor and the conditions of use. The superanchor can be directly attached to the physical object using known materials and processes, such as adhesives, sealants, waxes, tapes, and films. Adhesives or other adhesives can be cured through a variety of mechanisms, including photopolymerization, chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The materials may have immediate or potential effects. The attachment material may be reactive. Reactive materials can be activated by pressure, chemicals, heat rays, sound, or other radiation sources. These materials and processes are illustrative and not limiting. The superanchor can be sewn or injected into the object.

[0116] In some embodiments, superanchors can be provided and used as unattached objects with reactive sites or substrates that can be modified for specific attraction and binding to chemical and / or biological species, with or without subsequent processing, interrogation, and identification of the attached species. After identification, the bound species can be removed, thereby regenerating the superanchor. Thus, superanchors can be used to form platforms and scaffolds for random or precise growth sequencing in automated or semi-automated processes. Unattached superanchors, with or without reactive sites or substrates, can be dispersed in continuous media such as fluids. The dynamic object information of the superanchor can be identified by capturing its unique ID at one or more sites within a closed container. This dynamic object information can be used to determine the flow characteristics of the continuous medium. Real-time rheological and frictional data can be calculated. Algorithms and software for computational fluid dynamics can be developed for recording flow dynamics and velocity gradients in great detail. Modeling of industrial material flows and reaction conditions, documentation of hybrid equipment capabilities, and design of fluid handling systems can be significantly improved.

[0117] In step 1503B, the data associated with the physical object stored in the digital security system can be updated using the object index information, enabling the physical object to be searched and read using the unique ID code and product data in the digital security system. The product data may include product serialization or identifiers associated with the physical object, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), QR codes, etc.

[0118] In step 1504, when the user receives a physical object with the manufactured SA attached, the user can securely log in to the digital security system via the user's computing device to initiate the authentication process for the physical object.

[0119] In step 1505, a security reader (e.g., an ID reader) can be used to illuminate the SA attached to the physical object and receive the SA signal.

[0120] In step 1506, the security reader can receive the SA signal and decode the received SA signal to obtain a unique ID code or serial number indexed to the SA. The user computing device can execute an application to communicate with the security reader to receive the decoded ID of the SA associated with the physical object.

[0121] In step 1507, the user computing device can communicate with the digital security system via a network and send the decoded ID of the SA to the digital security system. The digital security system can compare the decoded unique ID associated with the physical object with the ID code stored in the digital security system.

[0122] In step 1508A, based on the comparison results, the digital security system can determine whether the decoded unique ID code has been registered.

[0123] In step 1508B, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID has not been registered, the digital security system may generate an "unreal" message for display on the user interface of the user's computing device.

[0124] In step 1508C, the digital security system can update the data associated with the physical object using user and query information to verify the object's authenticity.

[0125] In step 1509A, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID code is registered in the digital security system, the digital security system may further determine whether the decoded unique ID code matches a stored ID code associated with a physical object.

[0126] In step 1509B, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID code does not match the stored ID code associated with the physical object, the digital security system may generate an "unreal" message for display on the user interface of the user's computing device.

[0127] In step 1509C, based on the true result determined in 1509A, the digital security system can update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information to verify the object's authenticity.

[0128] In step 1510A, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID matches a stored ID indexed to a physical object, the digital security system can generate a “real” message for display on the user interface of the user's computing device.

[0129] In step 1510B, based on the true result determined in 1510A, the digital security system can update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information to verify the object's authenticity.

[0130] Embodiments of this disclosure can provide MTP with a super-durable super anchor for tagging, authentication, and anti-counterfeiting of physical objects.

[0131] In some embodiments, the manufactured super anchor (SA) can be combined with RFID or QR code technology and certain encryption technologies to further enhance the tracking and anti-counterfeiting protection of physical objects.

[0132] In some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label on any type of surface of a physical object. In some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label in place of RFID or QR codes for special secure document delivery.

[0133] Embodiments of this disclosure can provide MTP with a super-durable super-anchor in combination or integration into databases, distributed ledgers, blockchains, blockchain interoperability, and interoperability of object- and finance-based blockchains in business systems, digital security systems.

[0134] In some embodiments, secure storage of a unique ID code for a manufactured SA indexed to an attached physical object can be implemented by storing the SA's registered unique ID and associated data with the physical object in a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger. This allows the registered unique ID and associated data to be preserved and stored in a manner that is virtually impossible to tamper with. Furthermore, storing the secure registered unique ID and associated superanchor data in a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger allows for remote verification and tracking of object authenticity, for example, by an authorized receiver along a supply chain of the associated physical object or group of objects.

[0135] In some embodiments, the above process can be applied to analyze the flow properties and / or other characteristics of a continuous medium. For example, in step 1503A, the SA can be dispersed in the continuous medium (e.g., not physically attached to a solid medium). Then, as described above, the SA can be irradiated multiple times and respond accordingly. Each time point can be recorded, and the location of the SA in the medium can also be recorded. As described above, these timestamped SA locations can be processed to determine at least one fluid property of the continuous medium.

[0136] Smart Paper Contracts Based on Micro-responders

[0137] The authenticity of paper-based credentials can be insecure. A significant amount of fraud can occur when authenticating paper-based credentials. For example, diplomas can be ordered online from universities anywhere in the world and printed and sent directly anywhere. Forged credentials can be used for various malicious purposes and sent to doctors, psychologists, or other professionals. Document authentication often takes time and costs consumers a considerable amount of money, which should be avoided. Furthermore, record searches can delay home and real estate transactions by many days, hindering business flow and revenue generation.

[0138] MTPs (e.g., configured in some cases as durable self-destructing super-anchors) can be used to implement MTP-based smart paper contracts. Embodiments of this disclosure describe techniques for MTP-based paper contracts that can provide low-cost registration and authentication of processing equipment while increasing the traceability and security of digital or printed paper articles.

[0139] MTP-based smart paper contracts eliminate the multiple steps and costs associated with creating secure, authentic digital records and smart contracts. They offer low-cost registration and authentication for printers and marking devices, improving the traceability and security of printed items. MTP-based smart paper contracts can also utilize machine tokenization for services such as payment. Unlike watermarks embedded in the backing of paper documents and certificates, or print-based security features derived from special dyes or pigments, and QR codes (such as QR codes and data matrix codes), P-Chip MTP is difficult to copy and provides a completely affordable digital authentication option.

[0140] Adding documents or physical records to digital security systems or similar functional databases, data pools, or computer-based archiving and verification systems requires scanning the documents and adding unique IDs or sequence identifiers. Smart paper contracts based on P-Chip MTP can have low-cost, energy-activated identifiers attached to and / or embedded in the substrate of the MTP, which give the document a unique and physically immutable ID code.

[0141] As used herein, the terms "smart contract," "smart paper contract," "printed item," or "printed object" can include, but are not limited to, all types of printable items, including, but not limited to, contracts, financial transactions, copies, vouchers, checks, security credentials, medical records, quality records, searches for residential contracts, and searches for ownership of vehicles, boats, agricultural equipment, and recreational vehicles. For example, MTP-based smart paper contracts can be used to create documents such as security credentials, contacts, vouchers, quality records, etc. Specific raw material and product characteristics can be recorded by analyzing vouchers, medical records, and genomic certificates (such as those for varieties or certified seeds).

[0142] As used herein, the term "paper" is used as an easily understood but non-limiting embodiment of the invention, and can include all printing-related substrates, such as synthetic paper, films, cardboard, plastics, metals, wood, and composites. Furthermore, the concepts of this disclosure can include printing labels and packaging as novel ways to create secure "smart labels," secure "smart tags," and secure "smart packaging." The invention can include both conventional 2D printing and 3D printing processes for the aforementioned substrates and printed articles.

[0143] Figure 16 A functional diagram illustrating the implementation of smart paper contracts according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown. Figure 16As shown, functional section 16A may include databases and operations associated with the activities of the sender and receiver. A smart contract sender (e.g., a document sender) may register completion or events with a digital security system via a first computing device (in box 1602). The sender's and document's data may be stored as customer records in database 1601 (e.g., DB 1). The sender may create print purchase orders (in box 1603) and store the orders and related financial data as customer financial data in database 1604 (e.g., DB 4). The smart contract sender may securely transmit print data to the smart contract receiver (e.g., document receiver) (in box 1605).

[0144] like Figure 16 As shown, functional section 16B may include a database and operations performed by one or more authorized printers and one or more marking devices associated with the digital security system.

[0145] In box 1613, authorized printers and marking devices can register in the digital security system using their respective assigned security serial numbers. Authorized printers can receive purchase orders from the sender. Authorized printers can convert security print data associated with the purchase order into machine-executable instructions (in box 1614). The received security print data and purchase order can be stored in database 1616 (e.g., DB 2). Authorized printers can obtain a security substrate (in box 1612) and print a security document (in box 1615). The operation of the security substrate (in box 1612) and the printed security document (in box 1615) can be stored in database 1617 (e.g., DB 4). Authorized marking devices can obtain security ink (in box 1618) and be configured to print 2D security markings on the security document (in box 1619). The terms "security substrate" and "security ink" refer to the conventional materials and processes used to produce security documents through printing. Many commercially available substrates and inks are available. Examples of security substrates can be paper with a watermark or embossed structure. Another example could be paper pre-printed with “invisible ink.” Under normal sunlight, this ink does not reflect the visible spectrum. When exposed to ultraviolet light, the pre-printed text or markings convert higher-energy light down into the visible spectrum, making it visible to the observer. The paper can be natural or synthetic, so the more general term “substrate” can be used. Synthetic papers may be more expensive and can be engineered with specific spectral responses in their bulk properties, providing another level of security. Incorporating color-changing (gonio-apparent) fibers into the paper or substrate to be printed can add another layer of security, as the lines exhibit a unique color reflectivity that changes with the viewing angle of the document. Color change is a function of the material. This material is very expensive, and in the case of documents produced in official countries, it may be a controlled substance. Security ink can be a specific physical structure of pigments or dyes that can produce varying reflectivity (observable color) to humans and / or machines. Both security substrates (box 1612) and security inks (box 1618) can be raw materials obtained by the printer. Consumers can specify a security substrate and ink, or any combination thereof, as part of their printing order to obtain secure documentation.

[0146] 2D security marking is currently the most advanced printing technology. In addition to using security inks and combinations of security inks, the printed designs can have intentional structures printed with ultra-high detail. Careful examination or low-magnification magnification can reveal microstructures that simple counterfeiters might not know or be able to manufacture. According to the original definition from Virginia Tech, 2D security markings can also be PUF (Proof of Functionality), as their microstructure is a function of ink droplet splashing, absorption by the printed substrate, and drying variations. 2D structures can be photographed and digitized. Digital features can be identified using edge-finding algorithms that combine shapes with other image factors such as area, color, and brightness. A unique ID can be assigned to the digital document. The unique ID and document image can be archived in a database and indexed to the digital document. Furthermore, digital image captures can be compared with archived images to determine the authenticity of a PUF challenge response sequence.

[0147] Recent developments in attaching or embedding RFID devices in printed paper have provided an additional level of security for printed documents, whereby the RFID tag code becomes part of the printed document's digital identification code or digital ID. RFID-enabled paper can be used on digital printing platforms such as HP Indigo printers. In some cases, RFID tags can be attached to the document after printing. The benefits of using RFID technology to authenticate printed documents are consistent with its use in other secure media. The disadvantages of this security mechanism are that it can be cloned by unauthorized entities, it is not durable, and it is expensive. In addition to, or instead of, the 2D security tags described above, the embodiments described herein can be used with RFID-enabled paper.

[0148] Printed secure documents with 2D security markings and / or embedded RFID tags can be delivered to the document recipient (in box 1620), and related records can be stored in database 1621 (e.g., DB 5). Secure documents with 2D security markings can be sent to smart contract recipients along with invoices (in box 1622). Smart contract recipients can receive digital twins of the secure documents via email or text message over a network, and can also receive printed secure documents with 2D security markings via mail (in box 1606). Smart contract recipients can receive and sign secure documents (in box 1607). Digital twins of the signed documents can be created (in box 1608) and stored in database 1609 (e.g., DB 6). Smart contract recipients can process or pay invoices associated with the received documents via a second computing device over a network, and transaction records are stored in customer financial database 1611 (e.g., DB 7). Financial transaction records for paid bills can be sent via a second computing device to a digital security system (in box 1623) and stored in a database 1624 (e.g., DB8). The MTP-based document security measures described herein can be used in place of traditional 2D security markers and / or embedded RFID tags, or in combination with them. In either case, smart paper contracts formed using the embodiments described herein can be more durable and secure than documents protected solely by traditional 2D security markers and / or embedded RFID tags.

[0149] Using blockchain integration to generate secure documents and smart contracts

[0150] In some embodiments, blockchain can be used to apply predetermined anti-collision hash functions to track and monitor smart contract documents. As used herein, an anti-collision hash function refers to a special type of hash function, namely, a mathematical function or algorithm that maps data of arbitrary size to a fixed-size bit string of hash values, designed to be a one-way function, i.e., easy to compute for each input, but difficult to invert given a random image of input. Preferably, the anti-collision hash function is designed such that it is difficult to find two different datasets d1 and d2 such that hash(d1) = hash(d2). These are hash functions whose security level can be mathematically proven to be sufficient. In this security scheme, the security of the encrypted hash function is further enhanced by the fact that the reading of the MTP ID code of the smart anchor (particularly the composite security tag disclosed herein) occurs at a specific location and time, where the physical object carrying the tag actually exists at that location and time. This can be used to increase the absolute level of security that can be achieved, or to allow the use of anti-collision hash functions that work with smaller datasets (e.g., shorter data strings as input and / or output) while still providing the given desired level of security.

[0151] By leveraging blockchain technology, MTP IDs can be used in conjunction with anti-collision hash functions to generate smart contracts. Generating smart contracts may involve a multi-level indexing process for object authentication, object tracking, and tracing. For example, combining a unique MTP ID 1 associated with each printable page in a roll of smart paper and a unique ID 2 associated with the roll containing all the smart papers allows the smart paper to arrive at the printer with a predetermined identifier that can be immediately integrated into the blockchain's anti-collision hash function at print time. Furthermore, in this disclosure, each authorized printer and / or marking device can have its own unique identifier ID 3. The unique MTP ID 1 from the paper can be combined with the unique ID 2 of the roll and the unique sequence ID 3 of the authorized printer or marking device. Additionally, all associated MTP IDs can be applied to the anti-collision hash function to create a similar blockchain-enabled identifier. This identifier can serve as another level of security for registering printers or marking devices for machine-to-device tokenized payments. In some embodiments, the unique MTP ID 1 of the smart paper can be used to register a fax machine and increase the security of the fax machine for data transmission.

[0152] Figure 17An example system diagram is shown for generating secure document smart contracts when integrated with a blockchain. Example system 1700 may include multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, authorized printing device 1706, authorized p-Chip reader 1707 (e.g., p-chip identifier reader), and blockchain secure archive 1710. The multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, and authorized printing device 1706 may embed corresponding superanchors configured with corresponding p-Chip MTPs and superanchors. Authorized p-Chip superanchor readers 1707 may be registered with serial numbers in a digital security system. Authorized p-Chip superanchor readers 1707 and anti-collision hash functions 1708 may be incorporated into the digitally authorized printing device 1706.

[0153] The unique p-Chip serial number of the authorized p-Chip superanchor reader 1707 can be used to generate the corresponding hash value via the anti-collision hash function 1708, thereby adding an additional layer of security. While in some embodiments it can be fully integrated with the printing workflow, the anti-collision hash function 1708 can be executed electronically by the printing entity in real time outside the digitally authorized printing device 1706.

[0154] In some embodiments, the digitally licensed printing device 1706 can be configured to receive secure document content 1701 and print instructions 1702 from a user via a network to generate a secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally licensed printing device 1706 can be configured to load smart paper SP (Ni) 1703 from a smart paper container SPC (Mi) 1705 to create an artifact for printing the secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally licensed printing device 1706 can communicate with and automatically control a licensed p-Chip superanchor reader 1707 to read the loaded smart paper SP (Ni) 1703 and the superanchor ID of the smart paper container SPC (Mi) 1705.

[0155] In one embodiment, the digitally licensed printing device 1706 may embed or incorporate a superanchor, which includes an MTP with an ID code for enhancing the security status of the printing device 1706. This incorporation allows the digitally licensed printing device 1706 and its output to be identified as a verified, trusted source.

[0156] In one embodiment, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 can be registered through a blockchain trust center, allowing all subsequent printing to be secure within the blockchain, thereby eliminating costly and time-consuming steps. A collision-resistant hash function 1708 can be applied to the p-Chip MTP ID associated with the digitally authorized printing device 1706, the print instruction 1702, and the print time and print date stamp generated by the printing device 1706, for the generation of highly secure document smart contracts.

[0157] In one embodiment, incorporating a p-chip into the paper and paper container can provide two additional levels of security, as both levels are associated with a unique superanchor with a corresponding unique ID code. For example, a smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 can be generated by embedding a p-chip MTP with a 2D superanchor into the printing paper and linking it to a 2D p-chip ID code (e.g., first and second IDs). A smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705 can be generated by embedding a third p-chip MTP into the paper container SPC(Mi) 1705 and linking it to a third ID code. A digitally licensed printing device 1706 can embed or incorporate an MTP with a fourth ID code. A collision-resistant hash function 1708 can be applied to the smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and the smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, along with their partners or licenses at the time of manufacture, to create a pre-manufactured smart contract for printing. Thus, existing physical records scanned for digital archiving purposes, or newly created records, can instantly become part of the smart contract data.

[0158] Anti-collision hash functions 1708 can be applied to other entity or document-specific information and can significantly improve security at a very low cost. For example, there are various reasons to improve document security while reducing costs.

[0159] 1) Using more than one print-based superanchor may not be cost-effective.

[0160] 2) Using a 2D security tag and p-Chip ID code from smart paper 1704, a p-Chip ID code from paper container 1705, and a p-Chip ID code from digitally licensed printing device 1706, a single secure document can be provided with a multi-level (e.g., 4 levels) unique identifier.

[0161] 3) Replacing existing 2D security tags with 1 to 3 or more p-chips can significantly reduce the operating costs of printing equipment and the cost of secure printing for end users, while greatly improving document security.

[0162] In some embodiments, p-Chip certification can be applied to individual printing cartridges that can be associated with different brands of security-grade inks. Using a unique p-Chip ID code for the ink cartridge and a different p-Chip ID code for the printing device can be another way to significantly increase the security of existing 2D printing-based systems.

[0163] In some embodiments, the smart paper and smart paper container may be labeled with a material batch number and a container number. The batch number may have a unique Certificate of Analysis (CoA) information that identifies multiple physical constants of the batch of product and / or material. A corresponding p-Chip ID code indexed to or associated with the smart paper and smart paper container may be exchanged with or configured to include the material batch number and container product number of the smart paper container. In one embodiment, any number of unique and variable physical data points of the batch may be used as PUFs. Furthermore, a super anchor as described above may be added to a 3D printing device for generating secure 3D prints.

[0164] Authenticating 3D-printed objects with embedded MTPs by utilizing the process of converting them into smart contracts.

[0165] This disclosure provides a cost-effective method and system for identifying and authenticating parts and assemblies produced by additive manufacturing. The rapid development of additive manufacturing processes, equipment, and technologies has the potential to revolutionize the physical fabrication of objects, increasing speed while reducing equipment capital costs and the cost per unit of printed object. This cost reduction has made the manufacture and sale of non-original counterfeit products feasible. The negative impacts of counterfeiting can be established, including lost revenue and taxes, and increased warranty claims. While these harmful consequences have significant negative impacts globally, there may be even greater problems related to human health and the safety of counterfeit parts, leading to serious injury and death in humans and animals.

[0166] Will Attaching an MTP to a printed object provides that object with a unique identifier, which can be used to prevent forgery by utilizing the challenge-response mechanism described above. MTP can be used to transform printed objects into smart parts and / or smart contracts using the methods outlined in Smart Paper as described above.

[0167] By placing it on the printing table, MTP can be directly incorporated into the printed object. For example, MTP can have an adhesive or tape that is activated by mechanical, thermal, or radiation-based methods to fuse into the object. Sacrificial media can be used to incorporate MTP, which can be destroyed by the printing process, sub-process, or post-printing process. MTP can be directly incorporated into printed objects via tape, asset tags, or markings. Security inlays can be used to prevent MTP substitution.

[0168] In some embodiments, MTPs can be incorporated as sub-components, where the P-Chip is attached or embedded into the matrix via a separate mechanical process or additive manufacturing. For example, one manifestation could be a thin base with embedded MTPs. The base can be made of the same material or be compatible with the material of the object being printed. Printing can occur on top of the thin base. Alternatively, the thin base can be attached using adhesives, coatings, or polymeric materials of organic, inorganic, or mixed compositions. In some embodiments, similar materials and shapes, such as posts, tabs, labels, caps, or any other structural element of a finished part, component, sub-component, or mount, can be used with the embedded MTP. In some embodiments, the structure can be attached or fused to the printed part as an outer surface. MTPs and components containing MTPs can be intentionally overprinted to ensure the MTP's durability as a concealed security feature throughout its service life.

[0169] MTP can be added to specific features of printed articles, providing mechanical protection during service or serving as overt or covert functions for reading during the article's distribution, sale, and service life. Existing robotics technologies can be used to slice objects immediately after printing, as a stand-alone station in the workflow or as a separate process in any way.

[0170] As described above, MTP can be printed or attached to objects and can be combined with 2D security tags, RFID, and other known PUF technologies to add a layer of security to objects. MTP can be manufactured as labels printed on objects. MTP can also be embedded in paper documents as smart contracts.

[0171] Various materials can be used in end-use applications, such as additive manufacturing of metals, ceramics, plastics, polymers, single-component, multi-component mixtures and combinations thereof, including medical and dental implants for humans and animals.

[0172] 3D-printed objects using MTP may require specific usage conditions, performance ranges, or limitations, such as temperature range, flexibility characteristics, etc. The volumetric properties of the printing material, such as flexibility, bending radius, and coefficient of thermal expansion, can be carefully considered to ensure that stresses are not introduced that could disable sub-components, damage the MTP chip, or cause it to pop out of service. For example, MTP tags can be printed on objects with RFID applications to provide flexibility and an additional layer of security. For instance, depending on the materials and methods used to produce the transponder antenna and the chip bonding method and orientation of the transponder on the substrate, each passive RF transponder may have a minimum (e.g., 3-inch diameter) permissible bending radius (radius of curvature). At any point during application, if the completed passive RFID transponder medium flexes or bends to a radius smaller than this minimum radius, it could lead to RFID failure due to antenna breakage or damage to the chip-antenna bond. RFID tag manufacturers can provide values ​​for the minimum bending radius. Objects printed with MTP tags can have additional bending flexibility than ordinary RFID tags. For example, p-chips have been successfully attached to and read from 1 / 4-inch automotive brake lines.

[0173] Specific problems in ceramic and metal additive manufacturing can be addressed. All materials and equipment commonly used in additive manufacturing can be used for 3D printed objects in MTP. For example, laser marking of polymeric materials can be used to create identification and 2D security markings. Laser marking is a commercial process in which laser marking pigments are embedded in a matrix (polymer, coating, adhesive, plastic, etc.).

[0174] Pigments can be randomly dispersed in composite materials. The composite material can be irradiated with high-energy radiation; in response, the pigments heat up and char the surrounding continuous phase of the part or coating, thus changing its color. Controlling the radiation beam can produce symbols, structures, or identification codes embedded in parts or on surfaces. While laser marking may be an affordable way to add part codes to objects, laser marking pigments, radiation sources, and automated controls are ubiquitous. This is not a very secure marking method. If one uses laser marking and characterizes random features as described in printed smart contracts, they can create super-anchors, which can be more secure than simple laser marking. These methods are widely applicable to carbon-based materials and composite materials.

[0175] Another method of laser marking is direct metal ablation. High-power lasers can erode metal surfaces and change their color (anodization), leaving permanent marks.

[0176] Superanchors can replace laser markings and 2D security markings on plastic and organic-based objects. They can be used for defensive security purposes. Ceramic and metal 3D printers can have high-power lasers for sintering. In some embodiments, superanchors can be attached to inorganic 3D-printed articles with 2D laser markings. In some embodiments, superanchors can be attached to inorganic 3D-printed articles to replace 2D laser markings and increase security.

[0177] In some embodiments, the optically activated MTP may include a longer waveform, such as terahertz, developed for IC signaling.

[0178] In some embodiments, acoustic signals can be used instead of light to transmit and read the MTP chip ID. Compatible devices and circuit elements, including modulation and demodulation circuits, encoding and decoding circuits, and MTP readers, can be developed via piezoelectric devices on the MTP chip to be associated with the corresponding acoustic signals.

[0179] In addition, a mobile application compatible with the corresponding MTP reader can be provided for scanning MTPs attached to physical objects. The mobile application can be executed to communicate with a digital security system to register physical objects with attached MTP tags or embedded MTPs. The mobile application can also be executed to communicate with the digital security system to track and authenticate physical objects re-established within the digital security system. Furthermore, the mobile application can be executed to read the MTP ID printed on the object using the corresponding MTP reader and send the read ID directly to the digital security system or a similar functional database for use in [further processing / processing]. Figure 15 The object authentication process described in [the document].

[0180] Enhanced Reading Distance Micro Transponder (MTP)

[0181] Current-generation MTPs may have limited readability when directly attached to a metal substrate. The modulated light required to activate the solar cell of the MTP may interact with the metal substrate, potentially generating eddy currents in the metal. These eddy currents can reduce the RF signal strength response from the MTP. The ability to successfully obtain and decode the RF signal containing the MTP's unique identifier is a function of the signal distance between the MTP and its reader.

[0182] Embodiments of this disclosure describe techniques for enhancing the read distance of an MTP by eliminating eddy currents. The signal distance of a P-Chip directly attached to a metal surface can be reduced by up to 30% compared to a non-metallic substrate. The enhanced read distance MTP can incorporate a robust self-destructing PUF function as described above. It is possible to establish a physical gap between the metal substrate and the object affected by eddy currents. This approach may rely on tapes, gaskets, or filling polymer adhesives, laminates, or films external to the integrated circuit (IC) fabrication and structure. Given the use of... The substrates and attachment methods used in MTP are diverse, and a single high-capacity, affordable solution may not be suitable for post-fabrication isolation of MTP with metal substrates. Achieving resistance to eddy currents from the metal substrate, which is part of the on-chip structure, is highly advantageous.

[0183] In some embodiments, eddy currents can be successfully eliminated using active or passive materials and / or combinations thereof. Active materials can absorb, scatter, disrupt, or reflect eddy currents away from the chip and its signals. Known filler materials such as ferrites are also used as active materials. Passive materials may not interact with eddy currents at all and provide physical isolation between the substrate and IC signals. Glass, ceramics, and inorganic dielectrics are known materials for providing passive isolation and are compatible with IC fabrication.

[0184] In some embodiments, the substrate or near-substrate layer of the IC design can be fabricated using passive materials or filled with active materials. The substrate layer is formed after processing by attaching a passive or active substrate to the MTP chip.

[0185] Various methods or techniques can be used for the base layer of IC design, including but not limited to these methods or techniques:

[0186] 1) Physical fabrication process via vapor phase or chemical deposition. While most passivation layers are constructed to eliminate corrosion of ICs and components, extending the thickness of the back side of the chip by depositing a non-conductive inorganic layer acts as a physical insulator, thereby isolating the IC and its circuitry from the interfering metal substrate.

[0187] 2) Physical layer construction is performed from a liquid medium, followed by thermal or radiation curing in a polysilazane / polysiloxane chemical field. The two described chemicals enable the fabrication of durable, non-conductive films and structures with excellent adhesion to other inorganic surfaces. This sol-gel system can be applied as a liquid coating to precision films using casting, spraying, dip coating, or spin coating methods.

[0188] 3) Active or passive monolayers are attached to the wafer using a liquid, gel, or solid medium, followed by thermal or radiation curing in a polysilazane / polysiloxane chemical field. The same sol-gel system can be used as an adhesive to bond other structures, such as glass sheets, to the back side of the IC wafer. In some embodiments, the passive monolayer may be glass or a glass-filled structure.

[0189] 4) Hybrid organic-inorganic polymer matrices can be considered due to their greater flexibility and potential as an organic pathway to low-temperature applications. One drawback of sol-gel films is their potential brittleness. Adding small amounts of organic materials to inorganic sol-gel systems can reduce brittleness. The trade-off for producing hybrid sol-gels is a decrease in high-temperature performance.

[0190] All end-use applications can be applied to metals or contain metal fillers or particles.

[0191] This disclosure can identify known or perceived conditions of use, scope of effectiveness, or limitations. Although high-temperature service conditions are... While MTPs are characterized by their low-temperature or ambient-temperature properties, the use of metallic objects (such as asset tags) in low-temperature or ambient-temperature applications is equally important. Therefore, organic-based eddy current elimination schemes can also be used for applications down to ambient temperatures. Various materials can be used in the manufacturing process of MTPs with enhanced signal distance, but are not limited to inorganic films, coatings and adhesives, high-temperature organic-inorganic hybrid matrices and materials, and high-temperature organic insulating materials.

[0192] MTP and biometric data

[0193] Some embodiments may cover the acquisition and integration of digital data from a microtransponder specific to tangible property to form a digital connection with any of: (a) an individual's biometric data and / or (b) that individual's personal metadata. Such embodiments may include, for example, a computing device including an interface for interacting with a unique digital information packet on a tangible article that indelibly and indestructibly links the information to the owner's biometric data at the point of issuance.

[0194] While some examples in this document discuss the case where ownership of an object is linked to a single owner, embodiments may support options for more than one owner, custodian, provisional owner, temporary custodian, etc., where transfer of ownership is possible. Digital linking can be performed at the time and point of issuance or collection of the tangible property. In other embodiments, digital linking may be performed separately from the issuance or collection of the tangible property and subsequently linked in the presence of an authorized individual or entity. These embodiments may also provide subsequent verification and authentication of an individual's ownership of the tangible property (these verifications and authentications are performed concurrently or independently of the point of issuance or collection). In some embodiments, the digital identity of the tangible property and the individual's biometrics and / or metadata can be jointly used as a query for a database of verified links between the digital identity, biometrics, and / or metadata. Querying a database of jointly coupled digital identities and biometrics and / or metadata can return results that definitively determine an individual's ownership of the tangible property. In other embodiments, such authentication can be performed remotely. Some embodiments of the invention will perform such a link only once during an individual's lifetime. In other preferred embodiments, the present invention enables the transfer of ownership and title of tangible property to a new authorized owner of the tangible property by a duly authorized individual or entity.

[0195] MTPs and light-triggered optical microtransponders (OMTPs), which wirelessly transmit unique and indestructible digital identities, can be used for the purpose of linking tangible property to an individual, where such linking information is transferred and stored at a remote digital trust center. Their miniature size, ease of detection, durability, and robust authentication systems make MTPs and OMTPs suitable for attachment to any tangible property. Furthermore, their low manufacturing cost highlights their advantages and allows them to be easily scaled and attached, embedded, or associated with any tangible property item. They are highly durable and can even be placed inside the body, as described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394. OMTPs can provide output signals as RF or as light (see, for example, U.S. Patent Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such OMTPs can be used as… The transponder was commercially purchased from PharmaSeq, Inc. (Monmouth Junction, NJ).

[0196] Digital identities (including their association with an individual's biometrics and / or metadata) can be securely stored in a trust center. Verification of digital identities can be performed by accessing the trust center. Access to the trust center can be performed using a variety of computing devices, such as cellular phones, laptops, and tablets equipped with software interfaces or applications from multiple locations (e.g., business premises, document issuing agencies, government checkpoints), and can be performed frequently or simultaneously as needed.

[0197] In other embodiments, an individual's digital identity can be associated with a tangible object (e.g., physical property) to definitively identify the owner of that property. When the aforementioned property is sold, the trust center can be updated to associate the new owner's identity with the property, thereby creating an indestructible tracking and transfer of ownership.

[0198] Another embodiment of the same invention is used to determine the presence of an individual at a time in an event (such as a sporting event, a conference, etc.).

[0199] The above section describes in detail a light-triggered transponder (MTP) that can be used with biometric association systems and methods. To achieve the association between biometric data and items, biometric data can be collected and digital identities created. Ownership of the item can then be assigned to a given digital identity. (See reference...) Figure 18 An example implementation of creating a digital identity is described.

[0200] Figure 18 An example digital identity creation process 1800 according to some embodiments of this disclosure is illustrated. Process 1800 provides an example manner of creating digital identities for use with the MTP described herein. In some embodiments, process 1800 or modifications thereof may be used to form some or all digital identities, although in other embodiments digital identities may be obtained or created in other ways.

[0201] In 1802, users can begin by accessing a web-based application specific to a company or authorized entity through which they need to create an account. This application allows them to create an account, fill in the required personal data, and store the information in a trust center. The entire process can be completed by an individual from anywhere with an internet connection and can be provided, for example, by a combination of hardware, software, firmware, and / or network components known to those skilled in the art.

[0202] Alternative processes for data import may include having individuals register in front of or on devices such as self-service terminals (kiosks) owned and secured by trusted institutions (such as government agencies, banks, or retail stores).

[0203] In 1804, the system can receive a scanned or submitted image of at least one government-issued authentication card (such as a driver's license or passport) to create an account in 1806. Fraud prevention security is a feature the system may require for the type of government-issued credential. The image can be stored in a trust center. Data from the government can be used to populate the relevant personal data fields of the account. Known technologies like Optical Character Recognition (OCR) can be used to convert information collected from scanning government-issued authentication cards into text. In 1808, specific software can be applied to deliver the text information to the correct personal information fields in the trust center.

[0204] Some embodiments may perform verification (if needed) that the individual submitting the document is actually the person represented on the document, and not someone who stole or found the document. For example, Daon performs this verification during the verification process by performing a live check on facial movements, etc., to ensure that the user is indeed the person and that it is not a picture or other impersonation / representation of the person making the submission. Similar steps may be performed in some embodiments of the methods described herein. These and / or other KYC (Know Your Customer) protocols may be implemented to add a layer of security to the process.

[0205] In 1810, the system could receive fields filled in by users with their own personal information that were not populated by government data. In 1812, this data could be merged with previous entries to form a composite personal data record in the trust center.

[0206] In step 1814, applications can allow individuals to record single or multiple biometric data using their mobile devices. This can send data such as fingerprints, retinal scans, voice, and walking (movement) patterns. Users can register their mobile devices or the devices they wish to use to input their personal biometric data at this step. If a user wishes to use their personal hardware to access the Trust Center or submit biometric information at a point of sale as a challenge-response verification, they may need to register their personal device as an authorized access device in the Authorization Center in step 1816. In step 1818, personal biometric data can be stored separately in the Trust Center but linked to composite personal data records, thus forming a complete digital identity for the individual within the Trust Center.

[0207] The definition of a complete digital identity can vary depending on the entity and the required level of security. For example, a low-security digital identity may have minimal personal data in the application, such as address, email, and status (Advanced, Gold, Platinum). This information can be entered by the user in 1810. A low-security digital identity may also have information from a government-issued certificate 1804, as well as a minimal single piece of personal biometric information (such as fingerprint, facial, or retinal scan) entered in 1814.

[0208] Higher-security digital identities can utilize more difficult-to-copy credentials in 1804, such as passports, driver's licenses, and birth certificates or marriage certificates. The triangulation of multiple government-issued credentials makes it more difficult for criminals to create false identities. The amount of personal information an individual enters in 1810 can also increase. Software in applications and trust centers can be used to cross-check scanned data received in 1804 and user input data received in 1810. The amount of biometric data required for high-security digital identities may also be greater. Using multi-level biometric information for challenge-response verification can make it particularly difficult for anyone other than the actual user to successfully prove a match with the digital identity in the trust center. An example of such a system could have five distinctly separate biometric inputs: fingerprint, voice recording, facial scan, retinal scan, and simple mechanical movements (e.g., walking). For verification, the user would choose three from five stored biometric challenges and perform them against a camera or video input device. Tolerances for physical matching of each of the above biometric examples may already exist and can be applied to the purposes of this document. Comparisons of input images and / or videos can be made against archived data in the trust center. All three challenges must be matched with the preset tolerances of the Trust Center to establish trust.

[0209] In 1820, digital identities can be archived in systems that are based on networks, the cloud, or distributed ledgers. In 1822, timestamps and IP addresses of signals can be recorded for each instance accessing a digital identity.

[0210] With the digital identity established as a result, ownership can be allocated, such as Figure 19 As shown in the image. Figure 19 An example ownership allocation process 1900 according to some embodiments of this disclosure is shown.

[0211] In 1902, the user opens the software application to begin their session. They may be required to verify themselves by recording one or more individual biometric data points on their mobile device, at a self-service terminal, or in front of an audiovisual capture environment at a trusted facility. Their on-site biometric information can then be compared at the trusted facility with the information received through the aforementioned process 1800.

[0212] In 1904, users acquired tagged physical objects (e.g., tagged by MTPs such as p-Chip). MTPs could assign a unique serial number to each item they tagged.

[0213] In 1906, physical objects could be scanned using an MTP (e.g., p-Chip) reader. The reader could be a standalone device or integrated into a point of sale. Examples could include tickets, badges, wristbands, and cards. The reader could have a unique serial number and could be registered as an authenticated reader with a trust center. As a trusted device, it could be hardwired to the entity and directly connected to the trust center. Data output format and routing could be managed by application-specific software to accurately and automatically share information with the trust center. Authorized users or trust institutions could operate the reader but did not have any control over or ability to modify the acquired data. The reader could be configured to interact with enterprise data systems and associated trust centers housing individual digital identities.

[0214] Once scanned, in 1908, metadata related to the object (such as production date, place of origin, etc.) stored in the business data system became accessible, and in 1910, real-time transaction data of the user's purchase of the physical object became accessible. In 1912, the data accessed in 1908 and 1910 could be linked to the individual's digital identity in a trust center. The p-Chip was able to instantly link different datasets that were separate and should have remained separate before the purchase.

[0215] In 1914, a digital record of the purchase / transaction could be created for an individual at a trust center, and a copy of the digital record could be stored in the sales entity's warranty and service data system. In some embodiments, the digital record may include and / or may be replaced by a digital warranty for the purchase / transaction. If warranty service related to the purchase / transaction is required in the future, the information in the warranty and service data system can be retrieved and used as the basis for determining warranty eligibility, without requiring the user to take additional steps for explicit warranty registration in some embodiments.

[0216] In 1916, if necessary, a physical certificate of ownership or proof of purchase could be printed.

[0217] The methods and systems described above for linking biometric information to objects can have various applications. For example, any physical object, including property (such as handbags, paintings, handicrafts, etc.), can be tagged with OMTP and linked to its owner's digital identity upon purchase. This serves as a certificate of true ownership of the property and can be verified using a reader capable of reading the tag's OMTP and accessing a trust center.

[0218] Property that is similar to, analogous to, substantially similar to, or identical to the items described above, but is not tagged with an OMTP label, may be identified as counterfeit. Property that is similar to, analogous to, substantially similar to, or identical to the items described above, but in which the digital identity of the owner obtained when reading the OMTP and accessing the Trust Center differs from that of the individual holding the item, may be considered stolen or misappropriated.

[0219] When property tagged with the aforementioned tags is sold or exchanged, the digital identity linked to the new owner can be enforced in the presence of a notary or individual. If items tagged with MTP or OMTP are lost, stolen, or destroyed, the disposal of the items can be changed at the Trust Center to reflect the new status, preventing resale of the objects or prosecution of individuals and entities in the event of criminal activity.

[0220] As described above, an automatic digital record can be created from the acquired information. This record can serve as a factual record of the purchase of the item by the owner and guarantor. In some cases, the automatic digital record may include or be replaced by an automatic digital warranty. Warranty terms, obligations, and disclaimers (if applicable) can be recorded in a location accessible to the owner on an immediate mobile basis.

[0221] The above system has the ability to store a virtually unlimited number of purchase / ownership records for individuals or groups of individuals who have created the necessary digital identities within the system, regardless of the brand, date, or location of the purchase. The system can function as a virtual locker or safe deposit box for ownership and can interoperate across multiple trust center platforms.

[0222] Portable connectivity devices with MTP readers

[0223] Security tags are frequently used in commerce and can be affixed to, placed inside, or on the surface of physical objects. Examples of such tags can include QR codes, holograms, or RFID tags. Related to this are tamper-evident shrink wrap for bottles (attached to the cap), security inlays placed inside objects (as disclosed above), or holographic stickers affixed to the edge of packaging. Furthermore, security tags can be designed for single use, meaning the tag becomes invalid, incapacitated, or destroyed after a single authentication.

[0224] Authenticating security tags through visual inspection alone is a slow and tedious process. Furthermore, detecting evidence of tampering becomes challenging when new, similar security tags are placed in the same location as a tampered tag. In some cases, despite the presence of the security tag, evidence of tampering may not be found.

[0225] Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been identified as a solution to this problem. A PUF is a physical entity embodied in a physical structure whose authenticity is easily assessed but cannot be replicated (even with access to the PUF). A key element of a PUF is a feature or property that uses naturally occurring and randomly occurring characteristics to distinguish it from other very similar single objects. An overview and examples of PUFs can be found in the commentary article Gao, Y., Al-Sarawi, SF & Abbott, D. Physical unclonable functions. Nature Electronics 3, 81-91 (2020). https: / / doi.org / 10.1038 / s41928-020-0372-5; and on the website https: / / en.wikipedia.org / wiki / Physical_unclonable_function (accessed August 29, 2020), and in the references cited therein.

[0226] To assess the PUF (Personalized Functional Factor), a so-called challenge-response certification scheme is used. A “challenge” is a tangible stimulus applied to the PUF, and a “response” is the response to that stimulus. A specific challenge and its corresponding response together constitute a so-called “challenge-response pair.”

[0227] In practical applications, a PUF can be challenged in a manner known as a challenge. The PUF responds to the challenge, and this response clearly exposes, identifies, or archives unique random characteristics. These unique random characteristics (also called the “response”) are collected by a supporting device called a “reader.” The reader, either independently or in conjunction with a computing device, compares the response to a digital reference. If the PUF’s response matches the digital reference, the challenge results in positive authentication. If the PUF’s response differs from the digital reference, the challenge may fail. In such a mismatch, the PUF and / or the corresponding physical object to which it is attached are considered counterfeit or fake.

[0228] PUF identification is accomplished by a reader, such as reader 102 described above. The reader is an optical sensor system that both emits a light beam (“challenge”) and receives data from the PUF (“response”). The response can be in the form of a radio frequency (RF) signal, such a process may be “light in - RF out”; or the response can be in the form of a light beam, such a process may be “light in - light out”.

[0229] The process of reading a PUF (Programmable Array of Light) occurs as follows: Light from the reader is used by the PUF to power its circuitry. The PUF responds with an RF burst or a second beam, encodes the data, and sends it back to the reader. The reader collects this response and decodes it for the information from the PUF. Therefore, the reader is crucial for forming challenge-response pairs. The reader can emit light (the challenge) at one or more frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum and capture the response from the PUF at one or more frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum.

[0230] The reader can be connected to the computing device via cable or wireless technology. Furthermore, it is conceivable that such a reader can read multiple PUFs simultaneously. In this case, responses from multiple PUFs are decoded separately to prevent confusion. The decoding process from the PUF responses can occur simultaneously or sequentially. The process of matching the decoded information with the record can occur in real time or after a period of time, or it can occur directly from the reader or in conjunction with another computing device.

[0231] Mobile communication devices (such as cellular phones, smartphones, tablets, handheld microcomputers, and electronic computing devices) have become ubiquitous and can easily connect to other devices via local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), and / or the Internet. This connection can be established via wired cables or wireless technologies. Examples of such wireless connectivity standards and protocols include, but are not limited to, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Long Term Evolution (LTE), WiMAX, and multiple generations of cellular communication technology standards (4G, 5G, etc.).

[0232] A system for optical identification of MTPs using a sensor system was previously disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224A1, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Such a sensor system can be embedded in mobile wireless communications, enabling unit devices to scan and verify MTPs by communicating with an external trust center. Such sensors are conceivably integrated into the flash and camera of mobile communication devices. For example, Figure 20 A block diagram of a portable device 2000 having an MTP reader system 102 integrated therein and / or connected thereto, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure, is shown. The features and functions of the MTP reader system 102 are similar to those described above. Figure 1 The description, and Figure 20 The same reference numerals are used in the figures.

[0233] exist Figure 20In this embodiment, portable device 2000 (e.g., a mobile communication device as described above) includes an MTP reader system 120. In some embodiments, the MTP reader system 120 may utilize built-in features of portable device 2000 (e.g., using standard sensors, light emitters, and hardware / software elements of portable device 2000). The mobile communication device may embed a reader for challenging the MTP. Alternatively, such a reader may be attached to the mobile communication device via a port within the device or via a connection cable. Additionally, such a reader may be integrated into the housing, casing, or superstructure of the mobile communication device such that the reader is enabled when the mobile communication device is placed within the housing. In some embodiments, the reader's capabilities may be integrated into the existing hardware infrastructure of the mobile communication device. Examples of this include, but are not limited to, a flash on the mobile communication device as a source of light for challenging. In other examples, the camera of the mobile communication device may act as a receiver of the light beam (response) from the MTP. These examples, combined, can constitute a challenge-response pair.

[0234] In other embodiments, as described above, the MTP reader system 120 may be communicatively coupled to the portable device 2000 (e.g., wired or wireless) and may therefore include some or all of the hardware and software for providing MTP interrogation functionality.

[0235] Multiple MTPs can be placed on, inside, or attached to an object to enhance the security of the labeled object. These MTPs can be placed at different locations on the surface of the object or inside the object. In some embodiments, the MTPs can be placed in such a way that they are camouflaged by the packaging of the physical object or its surroundings. In other examples, the MTPs can be included within the structure of the physical object (e.g., a thermoplastic container or a 3D-printed object). This can be achieved by inserting the MTP into a casting of the thermoplastic container while it is blow-molded, injection-molded, or inserted during the curing process of the 3D-printed object. The latter can be done in a variety of ways. In one embodiment, the MTP can be placed on the surface of the platform where the 3D printing takes place, so that the MTP is incorporated into the surface of the 3D-printed object. In other embodiments, the MTP can be placed on the most recently printed layer of a multi-layer 3D printing process and sandwiched between the layers before printing a new layer above the MTP. When doing so, care can be taken to ensure that the orientation of the MTP is desirable for the selected function. In other embodiments, the MTP can be added to one of the components of a multi-component thermoset 3D printing process.

[0236] "Identification" occurs when the reader and MTP engage in a challenge-response sequence, and the data from the MTP is correctly registered. Authentication occurs when the data from the MTP matches a record at the Trust Center. Authentication also occurs when data received from the MTP does not perfectly match a record, but the data falls within a pre-defined set of parameters considered acceptable.

[0237] Counterfeiting can be further prevented by incorporating multiple security tags in combination with the MTP. Examples of such security tags include QR codes, barcodes, holograms, and RFID tags. One or more tags can be placed next to the MTP or at different locations on the object relative to the MTP. Alternatively, security tags can be stacked together to form a composite security tag.

[0238] MTP-protected integrated circuits

[0239] Counterfeit electronics, especially counterfeit integrated circuits, pose a challenge that permeates various industries. Besides malfunctions caused by poor manufacturing quality, counterfeit circuits often serve as nodes that introduce malware, spyware, or other malicious software into devices, leading to damage, malfunction, or communication breaches. Detecting counterfeit circuits is challenging due to their tiny size, their placement (often inside devices), and the lack of universal methods for verifying the authenticity of various circuit components.

[0240] Some certification techniques for integrated circuits involve performing various diagnostic tests on the test circuit (e.g., measuring the circuit's impedance, resistance, temperature, or other parameters in a controlled test environment) and comparing the results with known real circuits or with the results of previous tests on the same circuit. This requires controlled conditions and expert testers.

[0241] Other techniques may include embedding high-energy ions (such as boron or phosphorus) into integrated circuits, causing the circuit to produce regions of purposeful, unique, and random defects. These defect regions can be uniquely characterized by electrical or optical methods, and a catalog of these defects serves as a certified physically unclonable function (PUF). This technique alters manufacturing processes that suffer from the lack of persistence or durability of random functions and does not allow for the cataloging of previously manufactured, genuine integrated circuits (“reverse certification”) to enable harmonious implementation across devices.

[0242] To address these and / or other issues, memory-supporting memory devices (such as those mentioned above) can be integrated onto the surface of integrated circuits. Their miniature size, ease of inspection, low manufacturing cost, and robust authentication systems make MTPs particularly advantageous for widespread deployment. MTPs can be "read" using a reader to retrieve memory, thus allowing authentication of both the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit. "Reading" the MTP can be performed while the integrated circuit is intact in the device and / or while the device is running. Furthermore, this technology requires no modification to existing integrated circuit manufacturing facilities, eliminating the need for steps involving integrating the MTP with the circuitry.

[0243] The ability to quickly read, identify, and authenticate MTPs offers a significant advantage when multiple objects need to be rapidly identified and authenticated. Non-limiting examples of this include assembly lines, warehouses, retail stores, sorting facilities, and inventory rooms.

[0244] Reading MTP can be achieved using a laser-enabled reader (e.g., a wand) connected via a chord connection or wirelessly to a computing device—such as a laptop, desktop computer, mobile phone, tablet, or a specially designed handheld reader. The device can then compare the information collected by the reader with data stored on a computer or at a trusted external location (“trust center”).

[0245] In some embodiments, multiple MTPs can be integrated into different components of a circuit board. Authentication of the entire circuit can be linked to the authentication of multiple individual components present on the circuit board. Furthermore, this provides a non-destructive way to identify whether components have been swapped between circuit boards.

[0246] In some embodiments, the directory of MTPs may be stored on a secure server (“trust center”). The reader compares the information recovered from the MTP (i.e., information recovered from reading the MTP) with the information retrieved from the trust center. If these two pieces of information are concatenated using a predetermined function, then the read MTP is considered authentic. Access to the trust center may be encrypted via, for example, blockchain technology.

[0247] In some embodiments, a genuine integrated circuit that has been deemed satisfactory to the user by any means known in the prior art can be coordinated by incorporating an appropriate MTP into the circuit and cataloging the MTP to a trust center. Therefore, the solution described herein offers a unique opportunity to coordinate and protect chronologically generated integrated circuits.

[0248] MTPs can provide a tamper-proof and indestructible security label for integrated circuit applications. Their miniature size (e.g., 600μm x 600μm x 100μm), durability across a wide temperature range (e.g., -200°C to 500°C), ease of inspection, and robust, indestructible authentication make them a proven candidate for use as security labels for integrated circuits. Their low manufacturing cost further highlights their advantages and allows for easy scaling.

[0249] Furthermore, because MTPs do not communicate with the integrated circuit electronics, they can be identified and authenticated independently of the nature of the integrated circuit, thus allowing for general-purpose applications. Therefore, they can be used in a wide variety of devices or devices that include multiple integrated circuits. An example of the former is during the manufacturing process of a laptop motherboard, where each component of the motherboard can be serialized using an MTP. Examples of the latter can include complex electronic devices (such as communication satellites) that withstand heat dissipation, electrical and mechanical stress, and are durable over many operating cycles. There are multiple circuit boards, and the various components of each circuit board can be "tagged".

[0250] MTP can be certified while the device carrying the integrated circuit is in operation. This is particularly advantageous because it eliminates the need for skilled technicians to remove the integrated circuit or component from the device for testing. Therefore, with a suitable reader, multiple circuits in complex devices can be read simultaneously – saving time and effort.

[0251] Because MTPs can be used to label a wide variety of components, and because they generally do not interfere with component functionality, they can be used across various circuits within the same or multiple devices. Furthermore, the uniquely miniature size of MTPs allows for the serialization and labeling of individual integrated circuit chips or components on a circuit board in a non-destructive manner. This makes it possible to record details of each individual component via a trusted central authority. These details could include manufacturing date, component specifications, component location on the circuit board, etc. Additionally, the chronologically compiled stored information about each component can serve as a digital service record for the component. It is conceivable that this information could be used to authenticate component warranty claims.

[0252] MTPs can be tagged (also known as "fused") onto integrated circuits through several methods, the choice of which can be adapted to the application.

[0253] In some methods, the MTP can be directly bonded to the surface of an integrated circuit using a suitable adhesive. This adhesive can help shield the MTP from the thermal, electrical, or mechanical stresses of the underlying integrated circuit, or help dissipate those stresses. Furthermore, this adhesive will not cause the MTP to separate under the standard operating conditions of the integrated circuit. This type of adhesive may contain a suitable thermal filler and may be thermally and / or electrically conductive. In this method, the MTP can be placed in different locations on the circuit or board to allow for easy future access to “read” the MTP. Additionally, this method allows for the labeling (“reverse authentication”) of integrated circuits and boards previously identified as genuine by other technologies using the MTP.

[0254] In some methods, the MTP can be included within a housing covering the integrated circuit. In a practical demonstration of this embodiment, the MTP can be bonded, fused, or cast into the housing covering the integrated circuit. The housing can be transparent to the incident and response energy of the MTP. Such a housing can be made of a polymeric material, such as epoxy, polyurethane, or acrylic resin. Another example of the same embodiment includes metals and other inorganic-based and / or filler-based housing materials. A further example of the same embodiment can include the MTP between multiple conformal coatings covering the integrated circuit. Similarly, multiple MTPs can be included concurrently with the packaging of a circuit board. This approach can be useful when “reverse authenticating” previously manufactured circuits or circuit boards.

[0255] In some methods, during chip manufacturing, the MTP can be embedded into the surface of a polymer casing. As the polymer cures, the MTP is fused to the surface of the integrated circuit. During this process, appropriate care is taken to ensure that the orientation of the MTP can be read by a reader.

[0256] In some methods, MTPs can be placed in recesses within the circuit board during the board manufacturing process. This allows the entire board to be authenticated against integrated circuits present on the board. In practical examples of this method, multiple MTPs can be placed in different locations on the circuit, such that the entire board is considered authentic based on the authentication of a pre-determined set of placed MTPs. The placement of each MTP can be recorded in an assembly (called a "trust center"). Access to the trust center can be controlled and restricted to a selected set of access nodes.

[0257] In some methods, the MTP can be attached to or layered into a tag, which in turn is attached to an integrated circuit, electrical component, or mounting device.

[0258] In some methods, the MTP can be incorporated into a housing, a component of the housing, or a structure to be preserved by the additive manufacturing process. A practical embodiment of this method may include a housing of an integrated chip being printed while the MTP is placed into an additively printed matrix. As the matrix cures, the MTP is fused into the housing. Care should be taken to ensure the MTP is placed with proper orientation.

[0259] Figure 21 Device 2100 using MTP tags according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is illustrated. Device 2100 includes multiple circuit boards 2110, 2120, 2130 and their components to demonstrate various ways in which MTP can be used for tagging. Some devices 2100 can tag entirely as shown, but it is understood that other devices may have other configurations and / or may use subsets or various combinations of the MTP tagging technologies shown herein for tagging.

[0260] The following examples are provided by Figure 21 The following structure is explained with reference to the following structure. Device 2100 includes a circuit board 1 2110 having two integrated circuits (ICs). In this example, IC1 2112 is not labeled to show its contrast with IC2 2114 (which is labeled with MTP M1). Device 2100 also includes a circuit board 2 2120 equipped with an optical module 2122 and a chipset 2124. Chipset 2124 then includes IC3 2126 and IC4 2128. Optical module 2122 is labeled with MTP M2, IC3 2126 with MTP M3, IC4 2128 with MTP M4, chipset 2124 with MTP M5, and circuit board 2 2120 with MTP M6. Device 2100 also includes a circuit board 32130 equipped with a controller 2132, a CPU 2134, and a memory 2136. The controller 2132 is tagged with MTP M7, the CPU 2134 with MTP M8, the memory 2136 with MTP M9, and the circuit board 3 2130 with MTP M10. The device 2100 itself is tagged with MTP M11.

[0261] In the first example, an MTP with supporting memory is fused to the surface of an actual integrated circuit chip using adhesive on the manufacturing site. This chip is now considered a "label". The manufactured chip is used by a device manufacturer, who incorporates it into a printed circuit board for manufacturing selected devices, such as transistor radios. The device manufacturer catalogs the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit using a trust center. IC 22114 is certified by M1 throughout the entire lifecycle of electronic device 2100 and circuit board 1 2110.

[0262] To verify the authenticity of a chip later, inspectors can use an MTP reader to scan the surface of the circuit board. When the reader passes the tagged integrated circuit IC2 2114, the information stored in the MTP M1 memory is released and received by the reader. The information received from the MTP is compared with the information retrieved from the trust center. If a match is found, the chip is considered genuine.

[0263] In the second example, assume that IC1 2112 is tagged with MTP at the factory and is subsequently replaced with a tagless counterfeit device that does not have the MTP tag shown in the figure. For the counterfeit device, similar to that described in the first example embodiment, an inspector scans the surface of circuit board 1 2110. When the reader passes over integrated circuit IC1 2112, the reader does not receive any information. Therefore, the current device occupying the location of IC1 2112 is considered counterfeit.

[0264] In the third example, targeting counterfeit devices, similar to the description in the first example, the inspector scans the surface of circuit board 22120. When the reader passes over integrated circuit IC4 2128, information stored in the MTP M4 memory is released and received by the reader. When the information received from M4 is compared with the information retrieved from the trust center, a mismatch is found. Therefore, the chip occupying the location of IC4 2128 is considered counterfeit. The data in the trust center can be updated to reflect that components associated with the MTP have been identified as counterfeit or otherwise tampered with.

[0265] In the fourth example, during the manufacturing of the electronic device, multiple components on the circuit board are tagged using MTPs that support memory. The manufacturer uses a trust center to catalog the MTPs of the devices, components, and tags. Figure 21 For example, the trust center record for electronic device 2100 would contain eleven MTPs, each with a unique serial number. The relationship between each MTP and individual circuit boards 2110, 2120, 2130, and electronic device 2100 can be archived in the trust center record. Such devices can be deployed in a service. The digital component authentication process and workflow can be performed as follows: When an inspector scans the individual circuit boards of device 2100, information stored in the memory of each MTP is received. This information is compared with information retrieved from the trust center. If a perfect match is found, device 2100 is considered authentic.

[0266] In the fifth example, if the inspector scans the surface of any circuit board as described in the fourth example but does not receive any information from the MTP, then device 2100 is determined to be counterfeit or has been serviced with non-genuine replacement parts.

[0267] In the sixth example, targeting counterfeit devices, similar to what is described in the fourth example, an inspector scans the surface of a circuit board. As the reader passes over the board, information stored in the memory of each MTP is released and received by the reader. When the information received from a set of MTPs is compared with the information retrieved from the Trust Center, mismatches exist between the information groups. Therefore, some components are considered counterfeit, or have been intentionally mixed up among other circuit boards. The Trust Center data can be updated to reflect whether components associated with an MTP are considered counterfeit or tampered with.

[0268] In the seventh example, when an authorized user repairs / modifies the circuit board supporting the memory MTP as described in the fourth example, the user updates the Trust Center with information about the new set of MTPs. This enables proper authentication in the future. As an example, if a service technician upgrades memory module 2136 with a factory-authorized part memory module containing a new MTP (M9b), the record will indicate the time and date of the service, the serial number of the new memory module contained on the M9b, and all associated data related to the new memory module. The disposal of the previous memory module 2136 will be updated to a separate record in the Trust Center using (M9). All historical information linking memory module 2136 to circuit board 3 2130 and electronics 2100 will be retained in the Trust Center. The current record of the former memory module 2136 will indicate that it is no longer part of circuit board 3 2130 and electronics 2100.

[0269] In the eighth example, all service actions performed on the hardware tagged with MTP are recorded and archived as a digital service record, detailing the services performed and the origin, performance capabilities, and diagnostic results of the hardware as a unit and each component of the hardware (whether electronic or not). The digital service record is permanently linked to the hardware identification number indicated by the most recent entry in the records of the electronic device 2100 in the Trust Center and is transferred along with ownership.

[0270] In the ninth example, the insurance agent uses the digital service records described in the eighth example to determine the service / maintenance of components tagged with MTP. He / she can then use this information to determine warranty claims.

[0271] Display surface with embedded security label

[0272] The displays described in this article refer to electronic devices capable of visually presenting information or images. Such displays can function through the transmission, reflection, or refraction of light. Common examples of displays include the screens of laptops, smartphones or tablets, televisions, digital signs, and so on.

[0273] A display can selectively interact with the user or their external environment, such as by accepting input or responding to stimuli. Input can take the form of touch, sound, vibration, gesture, incident light, or electrical signals. Responses to the environment can include dimming the display in response to incident light, adaptive hue, etc. (photochromism).

[0274] A display capable of accepting tactile input is commonly referred to as a "touchscreen." Touchscreens are typically transparent, but can also be translucent or even opaque. Touchscreen displays can be found in a wide variety of devices, such as smartphones, laptops or tablets, "smart" home appliances (e.g., refrigerators, ovens), cars, ships, airplanes, etc. Touchscreens are widely deployed as human-machine interfaces (HMIs) in industrial process control applications. These devices can optionally interconnect via the "Internet of Things" (IoT). The touchscreens described in this article are not limited to flat surfaces—but can be curved, bent, or capable of being repeatedly bent / folded to various angles.

[0275] Displays are typically constructed by stacking multiple independent layers of material, each with a specific function. The most common construction of such displays includes a liquid crystal layer, an optional polarizing layer, a sensing layer, one or more optional optically clear adhesive layers, and a protective layer. The touchscreens described herein can function via resistive or capacitive technology.

[0276] Displays (such as, but not limited to, touchscreens) are frequently replaced due to structural damage or malfunction. In some cases, counterfeit screens or replacements not authorized by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) are used. Such screens can lead to a poor user experience, shorten the product's lifespan, damage the product, or void the warranty.

[0277] As discussed above, wirelessly transmitted, unique, and indestructible digital identity transponders (MTPs) and optically triggered optical microtransponders (OMTPs) can be used to link tangible objects (such as displays) to personal or unique device identifiers, where this linking information is transmitted and stored in a remote digital trust center. Their low manufacturing cost highlights their advantages and allows them to be easily scaled and attached, embedded, or associated with any tangible property item. Furthermore, the small size of MTPs makes them uniquely suitable for inclusion in or on a display. This inclusion can be performed via various methods and at different locations within or on the display.

[0278] For example, in some embodiments, one or more MTPs may be attached to the display at one or more surface points. Figure 22Examples of MTP 2202 attached to display surface 2200 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. In this example, the MTP is OMTP 2202 (e.g., OMTP 1A, OMTP 1B, and OMTP 1C), which are attached to the transparent object and / or touchscreen 2200 (e.g., transparent object / touchscreen 1A, transparent object / touchscreen 1B, and transparent object / touchscreen 1C) by non-deformable attachments. Attachment can occur in various locations, as shown in the side and top views of the transparent object / touchscreen 2200 example. Attachment can be performed by any method or system that maintains the engagement between the transparent object / touchscreen 2200 and the OMTP 2202, i.e., a non-deformable attachment, even when the transparent object / touchscreen 2200 is folded (e.g., due to being touched by a user).

[0279] In some embodiments, one or more MTPs may be embedded within the display. For example, many displays are composed of multiple structural and / or functional layers, and the MTPs may be placed between the layers. Figure 23 An example of interlayer lamination of a display 2200 including MTP 2202 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. In this example, interlayer lamination 2300 is between transparent / touchscreen layer 2A 2302 and transparent / laminate layer 2B 2304. MTP 2202 (specifically, OMTP 2 in this example) is placed in interlayer lamination 2300, and thus between transparent / touchscreen layer 2A 2302 and transparent / laminate layer 2B 2304.

[0280] in conclusion

[0281] The foregoing description presents certain products or technologies that can be used in conjunction with the publicly disclosed MTP. Various components, devices, modules, and circuits have been described above in conjunction with their respective functions. These components, devices, modules, and circuits are considered as parts for performing their respective functions as described herein.

[0282] While the foregoing describes embodiments of the present invention, other and further embodiments of the present invention can be devised without departing from the basic scope of the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is determined by the appended claims.

[0283] Publications and references cited in this specification, including but not limited to patents and patent applications, are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety, as if each individual publication or reference were specifically and individually incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Any patent application claiming priority to this application is also incorporated herein by reference in the manner described above for publications and references.

[0284] While some embodiments have been discussed above, other implementations and applications are also within the scope of the following claims. Although the invention has been described herein with reference to specific embodiments, it should be understood that these embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles and applications of the invention. Therefore, it should be understood that various modifications can be made to the illustrative embodiments, and other arrangements can be designed, without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. More specifically, those skilled in the art will recognize that any embodiment described herein that, as they will recognize, may advantageously have a sub-feature of another embodiment is described as having that sub-feature.

Claims

1. A method for protecting an object, comprising: One or more microtransponders (MTPs) are embedded in a tag, multiple tags, a package, or the object or a combination thereof, each of the one or more MTPs being configured with a corresponding identifier; Biometric information of an individual associated with the object is received by at least one biometric input device; The corresponding identifier of the MTP and the biometric information are indexed to the object; Index information associated with the MTP, the biometric information, and the object is stored in the database of the digital security system; Each of the corresponding identifiers is read via an identifier reader, and individual authentication for each of the corresponding identifiers is obtained in response to the read; Receive subsequently input biometric information via the at least one biometric input device; as well as The index information is verified based on a combination of individual authentication of each of the corresponding identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information to determine whether both the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Each MTP includes: One or more phototubes are configured to receive light during the reading; The circuit is configured to generate a response to light received by the one or more phototubes; and A transmitter is configured to send the response, thereby enabling the reading.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The reading includes: The identifier reader transmits the optical signal to the one or more MTPs; and Receive and decode corresponding signals transmitted from the one or more MTPs.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Determining whether the corresponding identifier and the subsequently input biometric information are both associated with the object further includes, in response to determining that the corresponding identifier and the subsequently input biometric information are both associated with the object, displaying a real message on the identifier reader.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Determining whether both the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object further includes, in response to determining that at least one of the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information is not associated with the object, displaying a false message on the identifier reader.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Receiving the biometric information and receiving the subsequently input biometric information include at least one of the following: Receive a unique security code; Receives input with a unique screen pattern; Read fingerprint; Receive documents; Perform optical character recognition on the document; Perform facial recognition; Perform speech recognition; Perform body movement; Perform a retinal scan; Or a combination thereof.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The storage includes applying at least one encryption algorithm to the index information.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein, The verification includes decrypting at least a portion of the index information.

9. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: The at least one biometric input device receives updated biometric information of the individual associated with the object; Index the updated biometric information to the object; Update the stored index information in the database of the digital security system that is associated with the MTP, the biometric information and the object to include the updated biometric information.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The object storing the biometric information includes an additional MTP; and Receiving the biometric information includes reading data from the attached MTP via the identifier reader.

11. A system for protecting an object, comprising: At least one biometric input device is configured to receive biometric information of an individual associated with an object; At least one identifier reader is configured to read a corresponding identifier of one or more microresponders (MTPs) embedded in a label, multiple labels, a package, or the object or a combination thereof; At least one processor that communicates with the at least one biometric input device and the at least one identifier reader; as well as At least one non-transitory memory, which communicates with the processor and stores instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform processes including: The corresponding identifier of the MTP and the biometric information are indexed to the object; Index information associated with the MTP, the biometric information, and the object is stored in the database of the digital security system; Each of the corresponding identifiers is read via the identifier reader, and individual authentication for each of the corresponding identifiers is obtained in response to the read; Receive subsequently input biometric information via the at least one biometric input device; as well as The index information is verified based on a combination of individual authentication of each of the corresponding identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information to determine whether both the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object.

12. The system according to claim 11, wherein, Each MTP includes: One or more phototubes are configured to receive light during the reading; The circuit is configured to generate a response to light received by the one or more phototubes; and A transmitter is configured to send the response, thereby enabling the reading.

13. The system according to claim 11, wherein, The reading includes: The identifier reader transmits the optical signal to the one or more MTPs; and Receive and decode corresponding signals transmitted from the one or more MTPs.

14. The system according to claim 11, wherein, Determining whether the corresponding identifier and the subsequently input biometric information are both associated with the object further includes, in response to determining that the corresponding identifier and the subsequently input biometric information are both associated with the object, displaying a real message on the identifier reader.

15. The system according to claim 11, wherein, Determining whether both the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object further includes, in response to determining that at least one of the corresponding identifier and the subsequently entered biometric information is not associated with the object, displaying a false message on the identifier reader.

16. The system according to claim 11, wherein: The at least one biometric input device includes at least one of a user interface, a scanner, a camera, a fingerprint reader, a microphone, or a combination thereof; and Receiving the biometric information and receiving the subsequently input biometric information include at least one of the following: Receive a unique security code; Receives input with a unique screen pattern; Read fingerprint; Receive documents; Perform optical character recognition on the document; Perform facial recognition; Perform speech recognition; Perform body movement; Perform a retinal scan; Or a combination thereof.

17. The system according to claim 11, wherein, The storage includes applying at least one encryption algorithm to the index information.

18. The system according to claim 17, wherein, The verification includes decrypting at least a portion of the index information.

19. The system according to claim 11, wherein, The process also includes: The at least one biometric input device receives updated biometric information of the individual associated with the object; Index the updated biometric information to the object; Update the stored index information in the database of the digital security system that is associated with the MTP, the biometric information and the object to include the updated biometric information.

20. The system according to claim 11, wherein: The object storing the biometric information includes an additional MTP; and Receiving the biometric information includes reading data from the attached MTP via the identifier reader.

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