Navigation anti-spoofing method, apparatus and electronic device

Abstract

The application provides a navigation anti-deception method, device and electronic equipment, wherein the method comprises the following steps: constructing a network topology structure according to a communication topology constraint and a space geometric relation of a formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate conversion; selecting a plurality of nodes from the network topology structure to construct an anti-deception array; calculating distances between array elements in the anti-deception array and a signal source; comparing the calculated distances between the array elements and the signal source with actual height information of satellites to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; constructing a positioning equation based on the anti-deception array and measurement parameters thereof, and solving the positioning equation by using a least square method to obtain position coordinates of the interference signal. The application can adapt to deception interference detection and interference source positioning under different terminal layouts and task requirements, and has lower cost and is efficient and reliable.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of navigation deception and interference detection technology, and in particular to a navigation anti-deception method, device and electronic device. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing prevalence of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), GNSS has become a key component of national infrastructure and is widely used. However, satellite navigation signals, due to their relatively low receiver power, are susceptible to various intentional and unintentional interferences, especially targeted deception interference. Because deceptive interference closely resembles the characteristic parameters of genuine signals compared to traditional suppression interference, it is highly concealed, difficult to detect, and causes greater harm. In recent years, GNSS interference has evolved from a potential issue into a serious reality. Fake GNSS signals are broadcast to receivers, causing position, time, and navigation errors; numerous documented cases of navigation deception interference have emerged.

[0003] As early as 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation, in a technical report on the security risks of GPS (Global Positioning System) satellite navigation signals, pointed out the vulnerability of GPS signals and the hidden spoofing risks in the transmission of civilian GPS satellite navigation signals to ground user receivers, and proposed six anti-spoofing interference methods, including encryption authentication. Subsequently, scholars at home and abroad have also devoted themselves to the research of anti-spoofing technology for satellite navigation systems. Currently, most popular anti-spoofing technologies focus on spoofing detection research at single terminals, while interference signal source localization methods are aimed at static base stations, and anti-spoofing under network cooperation is less discussed.

[0004] The current development of GNSS satellite navigation technology provides technical support for large-scale military and civilian applications of unmanned and automated systems. Various countries also provide strong policy support, driving the explosive development of autonomous driving and drone swarms. Satellite navigation is crucial for maintaining the dynamic configuration of these large-scale unmanned swarms; therefore, there is an urgent need to specifically improve navigation anti-spoofing technology to ensure the navigation information security of large unmanned swarm resources.

[0005] Existing navigation spoofing interference detection methods are often limited by the application scenario and the spoofing strategy. They are not very reliable when used alone, and most methods rely on acquiring observations from a single point. Effective spoofing interference detection technology still faces great challenges in reducing receiver cost, computational load, and implementation difficulty. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by this invention is to provide a navigation anti-spoofing method, device and electronic device for dynamic unmanned formation collaborative application scenarios, which overcomes the problems of high hardware cost, complex algorithm and difficulty in promotion in the existing single-node mode, and is more cost-effective, efficient and reliable.

[0007] To address the aforementioned technical problems, in a first aspect, the present invention provides a navigation anti-spoofing method, comprising: constructing a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of a formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation; selecting several nodes from the network topology structure to construct an anti-spoofing array; calculating the distance between array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source; comparing the calculated distance between the array elements and the signal source with the actual satellite altitude to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; constructing a positioning equation based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and solving the positioning equation using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal.

[0008] Optionally, selecting several nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array includes: forming an anti-spoofing array together with short baseline subarrays and long baseline array elements; wherein the short baseline subarray is a set of nodes corresponding to the selected short baseline clusters, and the long baseline array elements are the two-end nodes where at least one node has an edge of the short baseline subarray.

[0009] Optionally, the number of elements in the anti-spoofing array meets the element requirement needed to determine the location of the interference signal.

[0010] Optionally, calculating the distance between the array element and the signal source in the anti-spoofing array includes: calculating the distance between the array element and the signal source based on the structure and angle parameters of the anti-spoofing array, or calculating the distance between the array element and the signal source based on the distance ratio parameters of the anti-spoofing array.

[0011] Optionally, if there are short-baseline subarrays that meet certain conditions at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array, then the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source are r respectively. A and r B The details are as follows:

[0012]

[0013]

[0014] In the formula, d AB γ1 is the distance between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline, and γ2 is the angle between the incident signal of the array elements at both ends of the long baseline and the long baseline.

[0015] Optionally, if only one end of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array has a short baseline subarray that meets the conditions, the logarithmic difference in received power between the array elements at both ends of the long baseline is measured, and the ratio k of the distances from the interference signal source to the two array elements is calculated using the following formula. 12 :

[0016]

[0017] In the formula, r1 and r2 are the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source, respectively, and ΔP 12,dB This represents the logarithmic difference in received power between the array elements at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array.

[0018] Secondly, the present invention provides a navigation anti-spoofing device, comprising: a first construction module, configured to construct a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of a formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation; a second construction module, configured to select several nodes from the network topology structure to construct an anti-spoofing array; a calculation module, configured to calculate the distance between array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source; a judgment module, configured to compare the calculated distance between the array elements and the signal source with the actual altitude of the satellite to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; and a positioning module, configured to construct a positioning equation based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and solve the positioning equation using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal.

[0019] Thirdly, the present invention provides an electronic device comprising: a processor and a memory, the memory storing a program or instructions executable on the processor, the program or instructions, when executed by the processor, implementing the steps of the navigation anti-spoofing method as described in the first aspect.

[0020] Fourthly, the present invention provides a readable storage medium on which a program or instructions are stored, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the navigation anti-spoofing method as described in the first aspect.

[0021] Compared with existing technologies, this invention has the following advantages: First, a network topology is constructed based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation; then, several nodes are selected from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array; the distance between the array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source is calculated; the calculated distance between the array elements and the signal source is compared with the actual satellite altitude to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; finally, a positioning equation is constructed based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and the positioning equation is solved using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal. This invention can adapt to deception interference detection and interference source localization under different terminal layouts and mission requirements, with lower cost and higher efficiency and reliability. Attached Figure Description

[0022] The accompanying drawings are included to provide a further understanding of this application; they are incorporated into and constitute a part of this application. The drawings illustrate embodiments of this application and, together with this specification, serve to explain the principles of this application. In the drawings:

[0023] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a navigation anti-spoofing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the short baseline subarray direction finding principle in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an anti-spoofing array with two short baseline subarrays and the relationship between its measurement parameters in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of an anti-spoofing array with a short baseline subarray and the relationship between its measurement parameters in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the long baseline array element configuration and positioning principle of the cooperative positioning array in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a navigation anti-spoofing device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0030] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely some examples or embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, these drawings can be applied to other similar scenarios without creative effort. Unless obvious from the context or otherwise specified, the same reference numerals in the drawings represent the same structures or operations.

[0031] As indicated in this application and claims, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the words "a," "an," "an," and / or "the" are not specifically singular and may include plural forms. Generally speaking, the terms "comprising" and "including" only indicate the inclusion of explicitly identified steps and elements, which do not constitute an exclusive list, and the method or apparatus may also include other steps or elements.

[0032] Unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement, numerical expressions, and values ​​of the components and steps described in these embodiments do not limit the scope of this application. It should also be understood that, for ease of description, the dimensions of the various parts shown in the drawings are not drawn to actual scale. Techniques, methods, and devices known to those skilled in the art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, such techniques, methods, and devices should be considered part of the specification. In all examples shown and discussed herein, any specific values ​​should be interpreted as merely exemplary and not as limitations. Therefore, other examples of exemplary embodiments may have different values. It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following drawings denote similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it need not be further discussed in subsequent drawings.

[0033] Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of terms such as "first" and "second" to define components is merely for the purpose of distinguishing the corresponding components. Unless otherwise stated, these terms have no special meaning and therefore should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of this application. In addition, although the terminology used in this application is selected from commonly known and used terms, some terms mentioned in this application's specification may have been chosen by the applicant according to his or her judgment, and their detailed meanings are explained in the relevant sections of this description. Moreover, this application should be understood not only through the actual terms used, but also through the meaning implied by each term.

[0034] Flowcharts are used in this application to illustrate the operations performed by the system according to embodiments of this application. It should be understood that the preceding or following operations are not necessarily performed in exact order. Instead, various steps can be processed in reverse order or simultaneously. Furthermore, other operations may be added to these processes, or one or more steps may be removed from these processes.

[0035] Example 1

[0036] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a navigation anti-spoofing method according to an embodiment of the present invention. (Refer to...) Figure 1 The navigation anti-spoofing method 100 shown in this embodiment includes:

[0037] S110. Construct a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation.

[0038] With the development and application of drones, autonomous driving, and IoT technologies, multi-node networking, information sharing, and collaboration are inevitable trends for future development. Providing deception detection methods for formation / array collaboration in new application scenarios is an important component of building an efficient and reliable navigation anti-deception architecture. It is of great significance for solving the bottlenecks and limitations faced by traditional single-terminal independent deception detection technologies in individual soldier combat modes.

[0039] In this embodiment, the formation network can consist of multiple UAVs or unmanned vehicles carrying GNSS receiving antennas, and time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation are established. Based on the basic scenario of information sharing and time synchronization among multiple nodes in a dynamic unmanned formation, the formation network is the main application object. Conventional single-site navigation anti-spoofing methods are generally based on a series of anti-spoofing detection methods based on angle of arrival measurement. This approach has drawbacks such as high cost of array antennas and unsuitability for large-scale deployment.

[0040] The network topology is constructed based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network. Undirected graphs can be used to describe the communication topology constraints of the formation network. For example, assuming the formation network has a hierarchical structure consisting of n+1 nodes, the master node interacts with all other nodes, and other nodes can interact as long as the communication distance condition is met (i.e., the relative distance between nodes is within the communication radius). This communication topology constraint can be described by an undirected graph G(V,E). Let V be a set of nodes, where a node represents a member of a formation network (such as a drone formation), and its cardinality is the number of nodes in the formation network, g. Then |V| = g. Let |E| represent the set of valid communication connections, with its cardinality being the number of edges m, then |E| = m. An undirected graph can be described by an adjacency matrix F, where F = {h...} ij}∈R N×N Defined as:

[0041]

[0042] In the formula, (i,j) represents the communication connection edge between any nodes i and j. Illustratively, if drone i and drone j in the set are within each other's communication range, the corresponding element of the adjacency matrix is ​​1; otherwise, it is 0.

[0043] After describing the communication topology constraints of the formation network, the spatial geometric relationships of the formation are further considered based on these constraints to construct or calculate the network topology. Specifically, a fully connected undirected graph can be used to describe the geometric topology of the distributed nodes in the formation network. The master node of the formation network obtains the position coordinates of each node in the previous solution epoch and calculates the relative distance r between all nodes. ijUsing the weights of the corresponding edges in the adjacency matrix, we can obtain the corresponding adjacency matrix J = {r ij}∈R N×N Of course, considering the communication topology constraints of the formation network, the weights of the edges corresponding to non-communicable nodes in the adjacency matrix J are reset to 0.

[0044] S120. Select several nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array.

[0045] A network topology is used to select several nodes to construct an anti-spoofing array. This array is then used to calculate the relationship between the signal source and the selected array elements, including distance and position, which is then used to determine whether the signal source is an interference signal. The anti-spoofing array contains multiple array elements.

[0046] In some implementations, selecting several nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array can be done by using short baseline subarrays and long baseline array elements to form the anti-spoofing array. The short baseline subarray is a set of nodes corresponding to the selected short baseline clusters, and the long baseline array elements are the two-end nodes where at least one node has an edge of the short baseline subarray.

[0047] For example, for all edges in the adjacency matrix J, according to the weight (i.e., r) ij Starting from the largest to the smallest, check the connection between the nodes at both ends of each edge. For any given edge, find the number q of all other edges connected to that edge whose weight is less than a multiple of the edge's weight u. If q is not less than 4, then the node of that edge can be considered to exist in a short baseline cluster. From the q edges, select the 4 edges with the largest weights in ascending order of weight, and add the nodes corresponding to these 4 edges to the short baseline node set, denoted as u. A short baseline subarray is obtained. In this embodiment, the value of u is less than 1. This is illustrative; depending on the different anti-spoofing array structures, u can take a value between 0.1 and 0.3. The value of q can be determined according to the specific situation and is not specifically limited here.

[0048] If at least one end of the selected edge has a short baseline subarray, the edge is selected as the long baseline. The nodes at both ends can be denoted as long baseline array element A and array element B, respectively. The long baseline array element and the short baseline subarray together form an anti-spoofing array.

[0049] In some implementations, the number of elements in the anti-spoofing array meets the requirement for determining the location of the interference signal. For example, generally, when determining whether a signal source is interference, there are few requirements on the number of nodes selected; two nodes (or long-baseline elements) can determine the distance of the interference signal. However, when it is necessary to locate the position of the interference signal, three or more nodes are required. Illustratively, based on the selected anti-spoofing array, one additional node can be added to form a deception positioning array, ensuring that it forms a long baseline with the elements at both ends of the selected long baseline, thus creating a geometrically well-structured positioning array.

[0050] S130. Calculate the distance between the array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source.

[0051] Navigation satellites are artificial Earth satellites that continuously transmit radio signals to provide navigation and positioning for users on the ground, at sea, in the air, and in space. They are generally located in medium to high orbits. The distance from the navigation satellite to the array element usually differs significantly from the estimated distance of the interfering signal. Therefore, by comparing the actual altitude information of the satellite with the estimated distance, it is easy to determine whether the received signal is an interfering signal. This method is applicable to both deception and suppression interference; interference detection can be performed as long as interfering signals (including repeater-based deception interference) are received from the same source.

[0052] The distance between the array elements and the signal source in an anti-spoofing array can be calculated based on the structure and angle parameters of the anti-spoofing array, or based on the distance ratio parameters of the anti-spoofing array.

[0053] In some implementations, if there are short-baseline subarrays that meet certain conditions at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array, then the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source are r1 and r2, respectively, as follows:

[0054]

[0055]

[0056] In the formula, d AB Let γ be the relative distance between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline, and let γ1 and γ2 be the angles between the incident signals of the array elements at both ends of the long baseline and the long baseline.

[0057] For example, if there are short-baseline subarrays that meet certain conditions at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array, such as Figure 4 As shown, the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source are r1 and r2, respectively. Therefore, it is only necessary to measure the relative distance d between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline. ABThe distances r1 and r2 between array elements A and B and the long baseline, and the incident signals at array elements A and B, can be estimated using the following formulas:

[0058]

[0059]

[0060] Among them, the relative distance d between array element A and array element B at both ends of the long baseline AB The distance can be measured using a time difference-based ranging method via a wireless communication link between long-baseline array elements. However, to obtain the angles γ1 and γ2 between the incident signals at array elements A and B and the long baseline, it is necessary to measure the incident azimuth and elevation angles of the signals at array elements A and B. Therefore, the incident azimuth α and elevation angle β of the signals at the long-baseline array elements in the coordinate system O-XYZ are measured using a short-baseline subarray.

[0061] The short baseline subarray is equivalent to an angle measurement array, used to measure the incident azimuth angle α and elevation angle β of the signal. Combined with... Figure 2 and Figure 3 For antennas at short baseline nodes, the interference signal source can be considered as a far-field radiation source. The phase difference ΔΦ between the radiated signal and the path difference ΔL between the two antennas has the following relationship:

[0062]

[0063] In the spatial coordinate system O-XYZ, the angle between the projection of the incident signal S onto the XOY plane and the X-axis is the azimuth angle, denoted as α. The angle between the incident signal and the XOY plane is defined as the elevation angle, denoted as β. Based on the relationship between phase difference and path difference, combined with spatial geometric relationships, the following set of equations can be obtained:

[0064]

[0065]

[0066]

[0067] in This represents the phase difference between the incident signal and array elements A1 and A2. This represents the phase difference between the incident signal and array elements A1 and A3. This represents the phase difference between the incident signal and array elements A2 and A3. The coordinates of array elements A1, A2, and A3 in the spatial coordinate system O-XYZ are respectively...

[0068] The azimuth angle α and elevation angle β can be solved by simultaneously solving any two of the above equations. Considering the ambiguity in direction finding when the baseline distance is greater than the wavelength of the radiated signal, the true direction finding value is found by comparing the solutions of multiple sets of antenna array elements and finding the true value that is common to each set. Therefore, the incident angle of the signal at the long baseline element can be obtained by using the short baseline arrays at both ends of the long baseline.

[0069] Furthermore, based on geometric relationships, the angle γ between the incident signal at the long baseline element and the long baseline can be obtained according to the following relationship.

[0070] cosγ=cos(α-α0)cosβ

[0071] Where α0 is the angle between the long baseline and the OX axis in the coordinate system O-XYZ, assuming that all array elements are located on the same horizontal plane.

[0072] In some implementations, if a short baseline subarray that meets certain conditions exists only at one end of the long baseline in the navigation anti-spoofing array, such as... Figure 4 As shown, it is necessary to measure the relative distance d between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline. AB The angle γ1 between the incident signal at the endpoint element A of the short-baseline subarray and the long-baseline, and the ratio k of the distances from the signal source to elements A and B. 12 Based on geometric relationships, the following equations can be obtained to solve for the distances r1 and r2 between array elements A and B and the signal source:

[0073]

[0074]

[0075] Among them, the relative distance d between array element A and array element B at both ends of the long baseline AB The distance γ1 between the incident signal at array element A and array element B and the long baseline is measured using a distance measurement method based on the time difference of arrival (TDOA) via a wireless communication link between long-baseline array elements. The method for measuring this angle γ1 is the same as described above. The distance ratio k from the signal source to array element A and array element B is... 12 This can be obtained by measuring the relative power of the array elements. The logarithmic difference in the received power of the two array elements is measured, and the ratio k of the distances from the interfering signal source to the two array elements is determined using the following formula. 12 .

[0076]

[0077] In the formula, d AB Let r1 be the relative distance between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline, and r2 be the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source, respectively. Let ΔP be the distance between the array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline. 12,dB This represents the logarithmic difference in received power between the array elements at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array.

[0078] Based on the electromagnetic wave free-space propagation model, the distance relationship between the radiation source and the two array elements can be calculated by measuring the signal power received by the two array elements from the same radiation source. Assume the jammer's transmission power is P. T The transmit antenna gain is G T The receiving antenna gain is G R The signal wavelength is λ. If only path loss and atmospheric loss are considered (atmospheric loss L... A Using an electromagnetic wave transmission model with a power of 0.5 dB, the received power P can be obtained. R for:

[0079]

[0080] The logarithmic form is:

[0081] P R,dB =P T,dB +G T,dB +G R,dB +20lgλ-22-20lgR-L A

[0082] For a swarm network, assuming that the receiving antennas of different nodes have the same gain, the logarithmic difference ΔP of the received power between two elements in the anti-spoofing array is... 12,dB for:

[0083]

[0084] S140. Compare the measured distance with the actual altitude of the satellite to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal.

[0085] Considering that navigation satellites are located in medium to high orbits, the distance from the satellite to the array element is usually much different from the estimated distance from the interference signal to the array element. Therefore, what is received is the interference signal, which can be easily identified by estimating the distance.

[0086] S150. Based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, a positioning equation is constructed, and the positioning equation is solved using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal.

[0087] like Figure 5 As shown, A and B are selected long-baseline array elements, and C is a long-baseline array element that communicates with long-baseline array elements A and B in the selected anti-spoofing array. Based on the measured distances r1 and r2 from the interference signal S to array elements A and B, the ratio k of the distance r3 from the interference signal S to array element C to its distance to array elements A and B is further obtained using a signal power measurement method. CA k CBTherefore, the distance r3 from the interference signal S to array element C can be obtained based on geometric relationships. The average of the measurement results at points A and B is then used to obtain...

[0088]

[0089] Therefore, the following system of positioning equations can be established:

[0090]

[0091]

[0092]

[0093] Where (x) A ,y A ,z A (x) represents the coordinates of array element A. B ,y B ,z B (x) represents the coordinates of array element B, (x) C ,y C ,z C Let (x, y, z) be the coordinates of the array element C. Let (x, y, z) be the coordinates of the interference signal S, which can be obtained by solving the above equation using Newton's iteration and the least squares method.

[0094] The navigation anti-spoofing method provided in this embodiment first constructs a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation; then, several nodes are selected from the network topology structure to construct an anti-spoofing array; next, the distance between the array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source is calculated; then, the calculated distance between the array elements and the signal source is compared with the actual satellite altitude to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; finally, a positioning equation is constructed based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and the positioning equation is solved using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal. This method can adapt to deception interference detection and interference source localization under different terminal layouts and mission requirements, and is lower in cost, more efficient and reliable.

[0095] Example 2

[0096] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a navigation anti-spoofing device according to an embodiment of the present invention, for reference. Figure 6 The apparatus 600 shown includes:

[0097] The first construction module 601 is used to construct a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation.

[0098] The second construction module 602 is used to select several nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array.

[0099] In some implementations, selecting several nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-spoofing array includes: forming an anti-spoofing array together with short baseline subarrays and long baseline array elements; wherein the short baseline subarray is a set of nodes corresponding to the selected short baseline clusters, and the long baseline array elements are the two-end nodes where at least one node has an edge of the short baseline subarray.

[0100] In some implementations, the number of elements in the anti-spoofing array meets the element requirement needed to determine the location of the interference signal.

[0101] The measurement module 603 is used to calculate the distance between the array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source.

[0102] In some implementations, calculating the distance between an array element and a signal source in an anti-spoofing array includes: calculating the distance between the array element and the signal source based on the structure and angle parameters of the anti-spoofing array, or calculating the distance between the array element and the signal source based on the distance ratio parameters of the anti-spoofing array.

[0103] In some implementations, if there are short-baseline subarrays that meet certain conditions at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array, then the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source are r respectively. A and r B The details are as follows:

[0104]

[0105]

[0106] In the formula, d AB Let γ be the distance between array elements A and B at both ends of the long baseline, and let γ1 and γ2 be the angles between the incident signals of the array elements at both ends of the long baseline and the long baseline.

[0107] In some implementations, if a short-baseline subarray meeting the conditions exists only at one end of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array, the logarithmic difference in received power between the array elements at both ends of the long baseline is measured, and the ratio k of the distances from the interference signal source to the two array elements is calculated using the following formula. 12 :

[0108]

[0109] In the formula, r1 and r2 are the distances from the array elements at both ends of the long baseline to the signal source, respectively, and ΔP 12,dB This represents the logarithmic difference in received power between the array elements at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-spoofing array.

[0110] The judgment module 604 is used to compare the calculated distance between the array element and the signal source with the actual altitude of the satellite to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal.

[0111] The positioning module 605 is used to construct a positioning equation based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and to solve the positioning equation using the least squares method to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal.

[0112] Details of other operations performed by each module in this embodiment can be found in the foregoing embodiments, and will not be elaborated here.

[0113] The navigation anti-spoofing device provided in this embodiment first constructs a network topology structure based on the communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relationships of the formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate transformation; then, it selects several nodes from the network topology structure to construct an anti-spoofing array; it then calculates the distance between the array elements in the anti-spoofing array and the signal source; it then compares the calculated distance between the array elements and the signal source with the actual satellite altitude to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; finally, it constructs a positioning equation based on the anti-spoofing array and its measurement parameters, and uses the least squares method to solve the positioning equation to obtain the position coordinates of the interference signal. It can adapt to deception interference detection and interference source localization under different terminal layouts and mission requirements, with lower cost and higher efficiency and reliability.

[0114] The navigation anti-spoofing device in this application embodiment can be a device, or a component, integrated circuit, or chip in a terminal. The navigation anti-spoofing device in this application embodiment can be a device with an operating system. This operating system can be Android, iOS, or other possible operating systems; this application embodiment does not specifically limit the specific operating system.

[0115] This application also provides an electronic device, including: a memory for storing programs or instructions executable by a processor; and a processor for executing the programs or instructions to implement the various processes of the above-described navigation anti-spoofing method embodiments, and achieving the same technical effects. To avoid repetition, these will not be described again here.

[0116] Figure 7This is a schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The electronic device 700 may include an internal communication bus 701, a processor 702, a read-only memory (ROM) 703, a random access memory (RAM) 704, and a communication port 705. When applied to a personal computer, the electronic device 700 may also include a hard disk 706. The internal communication bus 701 enables data communication between components of the electronic device 700. The processor 702 can perform judgments and issue prompts. In some embodiments, the processor 702 may consist of one or more processors. The communication port 705 enables data communication between the electronic device 700 and external devices. In some embodiments, the electronic device 700 can send and receive information and data from a network through the communication port 705. The electronic device 700 may also include different forms of program storage units and data storage units, such as the hard disk 706, the read-only memory (ROM) 703, and the random access memory (RAM) 704, capable of storing various data files used for computer processing and / or communication, as well as possible programs or instructions executed by the processor 702. The results processed by processor 702 are transmitted to the user equipment via communication port 705 and displayed on the user interface.

[0117] The above-described navigation anti-spoofing method can be implemented as a computer program, stored in the hard disk 706, and recorded in the processor 702 for execution, so as to implement any of the navigation anti-spoofing methods in this application.

[0118] This application also provides a readable storage medium storing a program or instructions. When the program or instructions are executed by a processor, they implement the various processes of the above-described navigation anti-spoofing method embodiments and achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, they will not be described again here.

[0119] The processor is the processor in the electronic device described in the above embodiments. The readable storage medium includes computer-readable storage media, such as computer read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0120] A computer-readable medium may contain a propagated data signal containing computer program code, for example, on baseband or as part of a carrier wave. This propagated signal may take various forms, including electromagnetic, optical, and so on, or suitable combinations thereof. A computer-readable medium can be any computer-readable medium other than a computer-readable storage medium, which can be connected to an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device to enable communication, propagation, or transmission of a program for use. The program code located on the computer-readable medium can be propagated through any suitable medium, including radio, cable, fiber optic cable, radio frequency signals, or similar media, or any combination of the above media.

[0121] Obviously, the above-described invention disclosure is merely illustrative and does not constitute a limitation of this application. Although not explicitly stated herein, various modifications, improvements, and corrections may be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Such modifications, improvements, and corrections are suggested in this application and therefore remain within the spirit and scope of the exemplary embodiments of this application.

[0122] Furthermore, this application uses specific terms to describe embodiments of the application. For example, "an embodiment," "one embodiment," and / or "some embodiments" refer to a particular feature, structure, or characteristic related to at least one embodiment of the application. Therefore, it should be emphasized and noted that "an embodiment," "one embodiment," or "an alternative embodiment" mentioned twice or more in different locations in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, certain features, structures, or characteristics in one or more embodiments of the application can be appropriately combined.

[0123] Some aspects of this application can be executed entirely by hardware, entirely by software (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.), or by a combination of hardware and software. The aforementioned hardware or software may be referred to as a "data block," "module," "engine," "unit," "component," or "system." The processor may be one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DAPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), processors, controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or combinations thereof. Furthermore, aspects of this application may manifest as computer products residing in one or more computer-readable media, including computer-readable program code. For example, computer-readable media may include, but are not limited to, magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disks, floppy disks, magnetic tapes, etc.), optical discs (e.g., compressed CDs, digital multifunction DVDs, etc.), smart cards, and flash memory devices (e.g., cards, sticks, key drives, etc.).

[0124] Similarly, it should be noted that, in order to simplify the description of the present application and thus aid in the understanding of one or more embodiments of the invention, the foregoing description of the embodiments of the present application sometimes combines multiple features into a single embodiment, drawing, or description thereof. However, this disclosure method does not imply that the subject matter of the application requires more features than those mentioned in the claims. In fact, the embodiments contain fewer features than all the features of the single embodiments disclosed above.

[0125] In some embodiments, numbers describing the quantity of components and attributes are used. It should be understood that such numbers used in the description of embodiments are modified in some examples with the terms "approximately," "approximately," or "generally." Unless otherwise stated, "approximately," "approximately," or "generally" indicates that the numbers are allowed to vary by ±20%. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the numerical parameters used in the specification and claims are approximate values, which may be changed depending on the characteristics required by individual embodiments. In some embodiments, numerical parameters should take into account specified significant digits and employ a general method of digit reservation. Although the numerical ranges and parameters used to confirm their breadth of scope in some embodiments of this application are approximate values, in specific embodiments, such values ​​are set as precisely as feasible.

[0126] Although this application has been described with reference to specific embodiments, those skilled in the art should recognize that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate this application, and various equivalent changes or substitutions can be made without departing from the spirit of this application. Therefore, any changes or modifications to the above embodiments within the essential spirit of this application will fall within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A method of navigating anti-deception, characterized by, The method comprises the following steps: constructing a network topology according to communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relations of a formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate conversion; selecting a plurality of nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-deception array, comprising: jointly forming the anti-deception array by a short baseline subarray and a long baseline element; wherein the short baseline subarray is a set of nodes corresponding to a selected short baseline cluster, and the long baseline element is a node existing at both ends of an edge of the short baseline subarray; calculating distances between elements in the anti-deception array and a signal source; comparing the calculated distances between the elements and the signal source with an actual height of a satellite to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; constructing a positioning equation based on the anti-deception array and its measurement parameters, and solving the positioning equation by using a least square method to obtain position coordinates of the interference signal.

2. The method of navigation anti-deception of claim 1, wherein, The number of elements in the anti-deception array meets the requirement of the number of elements needed to determine the position of the interference signal.

3. The method of navigation anti-deception of claim 1, wherein, The step of calculating distances between elements in the anti-deception array and a signal source comprises: calculating the distances between the elements and the signal source according to the structure and angle parameters of the anti-deception array, or calculating the distances between the elements and the signal source according to distance proportion parameters of the anti-deception array.

4. The method of navigation anti-deception of claim 3, wherein, If there are qualified short baseline sub-arrays at both ends of the long baseline in the anti-fraud array, the distances from the long baseline end array elements to the signal source are r A and r B , specifically as follows: In the formula, d AB is the distance between the two ends of the long baseline, and γ1 and γ2 are the angles between the incident signals of the two ends of the long baseline and the long baseline, respectively.

5. The method of navigation anti-deception of claim 3, wherein, If there is only one short baseline subarray that meets the conditions at one end of the long baseline in the anti-fraud array, the logarithmic difference of the received power of the two end array elements of the long baseline is measured, and the ratio k of the distance of the interference signal source to the two array elements is calculated by the following formula 12 : where r1 and r2 are the distances from the two end elements of the long baseline to the signal source, ΔP 12,dB is the logarithmic difference of received power between the two end elements of the long baseline in the anti-deception array.

6. A navigation anti-deception device characterized by comprising: The method comprises the following steps: a first constructing module for constructing a network topology according to communication topology constraints and spatial geometric relations of a formation network, wherein the formation network establishes time-frequency synchronization and unified coordinate conversion; a second constructing module for selecting a plurality of nodes from the network topology to construct an anti-deception array, comprising: jointly forming the anti-deception array by a short baseline subarray and a long baseline element; wherein the short baseline subarray is a set of nodes corresponding to a selected short baseline cluster, and the long baseline element is a node existing at both ends of an edge of the short baseline subarray; a calculating module for calculating distances between elements in the anti-deception array and a signal source; a judging module for comparing the calculated distances between the elements and the signal source with an actual height of a satellite to determine whether the received signal is an interference signal; a positioning module for constructing a positioning equation based on the anti-deception array and its measurement parameters, and solving the positioning equation by using a least square method to obtain position coordinates of the interference signal.

7. An electronic device, comprising: The method comprises the following steps: a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores programs or instructions executable on the processor, and the programs or instructions are executed by the processor to implement the steps of the navigation anti-deception method according to any one of claims 1-5.

8. A readable storage medium, characterized by, The programs or instructions are stored on the readable storage medium, and the programs or instructions are executed by the processor to implement the steps of the navigation anti-deception method according to any one of claims 1-5.

Images