Information processing method and apparatus, communication device, and storage medium

Abstract

The embodiment of the disclosure provides an information processing method and device, a communication device and a storage medium. The method is executed by a UE, and includes: receiving a system message; and authenticating a cell broadcasting the system message based on whether the system message carrying DS information is received, wherein the system message carrying the DS information is sent by a network device after determining the cell within a preset TA.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to, but is not limited to, the field of communication technology, and in particular to an information processing method, apparatus, communication device, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] System message broadcasting is an essential component of New Radio (NR) systems. A cell needs to periodically broadcast system messages to provide basic information about the serving cell or neighboring cells, or to provide information such as cell selection or reselection, or Public Warning System (PWS) messages to User Equipment (UE). This ensures that the UE can camp normally within the cell and provides the necessary conditions for subsequent Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection establishment; for example, an idle-state RRC UE needs to perform Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) selection, cell selection or reselection, or admission control before accessing the network. The information required for these processes is obtained from the system messages broadcast by the cell.

[0003] System messages are not broadcast to any specific UE, but are periodically sent to all UEs within the cell. Therefore, system messages apply to all UEs within the cell, and obviously do not require extensive security protection. However, if system messages are not protected, attackers can tamper with them to launch attacks, causing UEs to use incorrect system messages.

[0004] In related technologies, some corresponding protection mechanisms have been introduced to protect system messages broadcast over the air interface. For example, a digital signature (DS) authentication mechanism is introduced into the system message. However, considering the evolution of New Radio (NR) versions, enhanced cells and legacy cells may coexist when an enhanced feature is introduced. If a fake base station only broadcasts fields from the system message itself and indicates that the current fake base station's cell is a legacy cell, then this protection mechanism will not be able to prevent attacks from fake base stations. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This disclosure provides an information processing method, apparatus, communication device, and storage medium.

[0006] According to a first aspect of this disclosure, an information processing method is provided, executed by a UE, comprising:

[0007] Receive system messages;

[0008] Cell authentication of broadcast system messages is performed based on whether or not a system message carrying DS information is received; wherein, the system message carrying DS information is sent after a cell within a preset tracking area (TA) determined by the network device.

[0009] According to a second aspect of this disclosure, an information processing method is provided, executed by a base station, comprising:

[0010] When the cell of the base station is located at the preset TA, a system message carrying DS information is broadcast; the DS information is used by the UE to authenticate the cell of the broadcast system message.

[0011] According to a third aspect of this disclosure, an information processing apparatus is provided, applied to a UE, comprising:

[0012] The receiving module is configured to receive system messages;

[0013] The processing module is configured to perform cell authentication of broadcast system messages based on whether a system message carrying DS information is received; wherein, the system message carrying DS information is sent by the network device after determining the cell within the preset TA.

[0014] According to a fourth aspect of this disclosure, an information processing apparatus is provided, applied to a base station, comprising:

[0015] The transmitting module is configured to broadcast a system message carrying DS information when the cell of the base station is located at a preset TA; wherein, the DS information is used by the UE for cell authentication of the broadcast system message.

[0016] According to a fifth aspect of this disclosure, a communication device is provided, comprising:

[0017] processor;

[0018] Memory used to store processor-executable instructions;

[0019] The processor is configured to implement the information processing method of any embodiment of this disclosure when running executable instructions.

[0020] According to a sixth aspect of this disclosure, a computer storage medium is provided, which stores a computer-executable program, wherein the executable program, when executed by a processor, implements the information processing method of any embodiment of this disclosure.

[0021] The technical solutions provided in this disclosure can include the following beneficial effects:

[0022] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the UE can receive system messages and authenticate the cell broadcasting the system messages based on whether it receives the system messages carrying digital signature (DS) information; wherein, the system messages carrying the DS information are sent by the network device after determining the cells within a preset tracking area (TA). Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, the UE can accurately authenticate the cell broadcasting the system messages based on whether it receives the system messages carrying DS information.

[0023] Furthermore, since the system message carrying DS information is sent by a cell within a preset TA determined by the network device, the UE can authenticate the cell within the TA based on the digital signature information corresponding to that TA after receiving the system message. This increases the difficulty for other fake base station cells to impersonate cells within the TA to broadcast system messages, thereby reducing the risk of the UE being attacked by fake base station cells.

[0024] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and are not intended to limit the embodiments of this disclosure. Attached Figure Description

[0025] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a wireless communication system.

[0026] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a digital signature mechanism according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0027] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating an information processing method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0028] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating an information processing method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0029] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating an information processing method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0030] Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating an information processing method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0031] Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating an information processing method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0032] Figure 8 This is a block diagram illustrating an information processing apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0033] Figure 9 This is a block diagram illustrating an information processing apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0034] Figure 10This is a block diagram illustrating a UE according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0035] Figure 11 This is a block diagram illustrating a base station according to an exemplary embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0036] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numerals in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with those of this disclosure. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of the embodiments of this disclosure as detailed in the appended claims.

[0037] The terminology used in this disclosure is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the present disclosure. The singular forms “a” and “the” as used in this disclosure and the appended claims are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used herein refers to and includes any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0038] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc., may be used to describe various information in embodiments of this disclosure, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, first information may also be referred to as second information without departing from the scope of embodiments of this disclosure, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "when," "when," or "in response to a determination."

[0039] Please refer to Figure 1 This illustration shows a schematic diagram of the structure of a wireless communication system provided in an embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the wireless communication system is a communication system based on cellular mobile communication technology. The wireless communication system may include: several user equipment 110 and several base stations 120.

[0040] User equipment 110 can be a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to a user. User equipment 110 can communicate with one or more core networks via a Radio Access Network (RAN). User equipment 110 can be an Internet of Things (IoT) user equipment, such as sensor devices, mobile phones (or "cellular" phones), and computers with IoT user equipment capabilities. For example, it can be a fixed, portable, pocket-sized, handheld, computer-embedded, or vehicle-mounted device. Examples include a station (STA), subscriber unit, subscriber station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, access point, remote terminal, access terminal, user terminal, user agent, user device, or user equipment. Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a device from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a vehicle-mounted device, such as a vehicle computer with wireless communication capabilities, or a wireless user equipment connected to an external vehicle computer. Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a roadside device, such as a street light, traffic light, or other roadside device with wireless communication capabilities.

[0041] Base station 120 can be a network-side device in a wireless communication system. This wireless communication system can be a 4G system (also known as Long Term Evolution, LTE); or it can be a 5G system (also known as a New Radio, 5G NR, or 5G NR system). Alternatively, it can be the next generation after 5G. In this case, the access network in the 5G system can be called a New Generation-Radio Access Network (NG-RAN).

[0042] The base station 120 can be an evolved NB (eNB) used in a 4G system. Alternatively, the base station 120 can also be a gNB (gNB) using a centralized-distributed architecture in a 5G system. When the base station 120 adopts a centralized-distributed architecture, it typically includes a central unit (CU) and at least two distributed units (DUs). The central unit is equipped with a protocol stack of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer, the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, and the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer; the distributed units are equipped with a physical (PHY) layer protocol stack. This disclosure does not limit the specific implementation of the base station 120.

[0043] Base station 120 and user equipment 110 can establish a wireless connection via a wireless air interface. In different implementations, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fourth-generation mobile communication network technology (4G) standard; or, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fifth-generation mobile communication network technology (5G) standard, such as a new air interface; or, the wireless air interface can also be a wireless air interface based on a next-generation mobile communication network technology standard based on 5G.

[0044] In some embodiments, user equipment 110 can also establish E2E (End to End) connections. Examples include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication, and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) communication in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication.

[0045] Here, the user equipment mentioned above can be considered as the terminal equipment in the following embodiments.

[0046] In some embodiments, the wireless communication system described above may further include a network management device 130.

[0047] Several base stations 120 are connected to network management device 130. Network management device 130 can be a core network device in a wireless communication system, such as a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in an Evolved Packet Core (EPC). Alternatively, it can be other core network devices, such as a Serving Gateway (SGW), a Public Data Network Gateway (PGW), a Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), or a Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The implementation of network management device 130 is not limited in this embodiment.

[0048] To facilitate understanding by those skilled in the art, this disclosure provides multiple embodiments to clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this disclosure. Of course, those skilled in the art will understand that the multiple embodiments provided in this disclosure can be executed individually, or in combination with the methods of other embodiments in this disclosure, or individually or in combination with some methods in other related technologies; this disclosure does not limit these aspects.

[0049] To better understand the technical solutions described in any embodiment of this disclosure, firstly, the introduction of digital signature authentication for system messages in related technologies will be explained:

[0050] like Figure 2 As shown, in one embodiment, the system message, digital signature key (K-SIG), and time indication information are used to generate an extended system message through a secure algorithm. The extended system message includes the system message, DS information, and time indication information. The extended system message is then sent. When the UE performs cell reselection, if the UE receives the extended system message, it determines whether the system message is the one that has been attacked, based on the already possessed K-SIG and the DS information in the extended system message.

[0051] like Figure 3 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, including:

[0052] Step S31: Receive system message;

[0053] Step S32: Authentication of the broadcast system message based on whether a system message carrying DS information is received.

[0054] Here, the system message carrying DS information is sent by the network device after determining the cell within the predetermined tracking area (TA).

[0055] In one embodiment, the system message carrying DS information may also be sent by the cell within the TA determined by the network device.

[0056] In one embodiment, the system message carrying DS information may also be sent by the base station after determining that the base station's cell is a cell within a preset TA.

[0057] The network equipment can be either core network equipment or access network equipment. Here, access network equipment can be a base station, etc. Core network equipment can be various functional entities, such as the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF).

[0058] The UE can be of various types; for example, the UE can be, but is not limited to, a mobile phone, tablet computer, wearable device, smart home device, smart office device, wearable device, game control platform or multimedia device, etc.

[0059] Receiving system messages in step S31 can be: receiving system messages sent by the base station. These system messages can be system messages carrying DS (Data Detection and Reliability) or system messages not carrying DS.

[0060] The base station can be of various types, such as 2G base stations, 3G base stations, 4G base stations, 5G base stations or other evolved base stations.

[0061] The system message can be of various types; for example, it can be, but is not limited to, SIB1, SIB2, ..., and / or SIB x.

[0062] In one embodiment, the DS information carried in the system message is DS information specific to a preset TA. For example, a base station broadcasts a system message that carries DS information specific to a preset TA.

[0063] The UE can be one or more UEs in the cell of the base station.

[0064] In some embodiments, the TA can be at least one of the following:

[0065] The TA where the UE is located in the cell;

[0066] A portion of the Registration Area (RA) of a UE; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs;

[0067] All TAs of UE's RA;

[0068] The TA in the TA list; the TA list is the TA list in RA.

[0069] Here, an RA can include one or more TA lists; a TA list includes one or more TAs. Alternatively, an RA can include one or more TAs.

[0070] Here, a TA can include one or more cells.

[0071] In some embodiments, the digital signature information includes: a digital signature key; or,

[0072] Digital signature information includes: digital signature key and time indication information; wherein, the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key.

[0073] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a UE, which may include: determining whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell based on whether a system message carrying DS information is received.

[0074] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the UE can receive system messages and authenticate the cell broadcasting the system messages based on whether it receives the system messages carrying digital signature (DS) information; wherein, the system messages carrying the DS information are sent by the network device after determining the cells within a preset tracking area (TA). Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, the UE can accurately authenticate the cell broadcasting the system messages based on whether it receives the system messages carrying DS information.

[0075] Furthermore, since the system message carrying DS information is sent by a cell within a preset TA determined by the network device, the UE can authenticate the cell within the TA based on the digital signature information corresponding to that TA after receiving the system message. This increases the difficulty for other fake base station cells to impersonate cells within the TA to broadcast system messages, thereby reducing the risk of the UE being attacked by fake base station cells.

[0076] Here, the UE can perform cell authentication based on the digital signature key of the TA where the current cell is located and the DS included in the system message; that is, cell authentication can be performed on cells within the TA based on the digital signature information corresponding to the TA.

[0077] Furthermore, in this embodiment of the disclosure, a single DS information can be used for the entire preset TA cell; thus, the same digital signature information can be used for authentication of the entire preset TA.

[0078] Furthermore, in this embodiment of the disclosure, the scope of cells that need to provide DS for authentication is specified. For example, it may be the TA where the UE is camped, or one or more TAs in the registration area, or one or more TA lists, etc.

[0079] In one embodiment, when registering a cell, the UE can obtain at least one of the following pieces of information from the core network equipment:

[0080] The TA information of the UE registering the cell's TA;

[0081] The correspondence between the TA information of the TA where the UE is registered and the K-SIG of the TA;

[0082] Identification information of the cell where the UE is registered;

[0083] The correspondence between the UE's registered cell identifier information and the TA's TA information.

[0084] In another embodiment, the UE may also receive at least one of the following information sent by the base station:

[0085] TA information for each TA;

[0086] The correspondence between the TA information of each TA and the K-SIG of the TA;

[0087] Signage information for each residential community;

[0088] The correspondence between the identification information and TA information of each community.

[0089] In one embodiment, the system message included in step S31 may be: a system message carrying first information, wherein the first information includes: TA information of the TA where the base station's cell is located.

[0090] Thus, when the UE receives this system message, it can determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the TA of the current cell (i.e., the cell where the UE is located) based on the TA information carried in the system message and the TA information included in the UE; and / or determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the TA of the current cell based on the DS information carried in the system message and the DS information obtained from the TA-SIG in the UE. If the cell broadcasting the system message is not located within the TA of the current cell, and / or the DS information carried in the system message matches the DS information obtained from the TA-SIG in the UE, the cell broadcasting the system message is determined to be a fake base station cell.

[0091] In this way, the cell for broadcast system messages can be authenticated based on the digital signature key of the TA where the UE's current cell is located, thus increasing the difficulty for fake base station cells to impersonate TA cells and improving the accuracy of authentication.

[0092] In one embodiment, the system information included in step S31 may be: a system message carrying second information, wherein the second information includes: the cell identification information of the base station.

[0093] Thus, when the base station receives this system message, it can determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the current cell's TA based on the cell identification information carried in the system message and the correspondence between the cell identification information and TA information included in the UE. If the cell broadcasting the system message is not located within the current cell's TA, then the cell broadcasting the system message is determined to be a fake base station cell. If the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the current cell's TA, then the DS information carried in the system message is compared with the DS information obtained from the TA-based K-SIG in the UE. If the DS information carried in the system message does not match the DS information obtained from the TA-based K-SIG in the UE, then the cell broadcasting the system message is determined to be a fake base station cell. If the DS information carried in the system message matches the DS information obtained from the TA-based K-SIG in the UE, then the cell broadcasting the system message is determined not to be a fake base station cell.

[0094] In this way, the cell broadcasting system messages can be authenticated based on the TA of the UE's current cell and the digital signature key corresponding to the TA, thus increasing the difficulty for fake base station cells to impersonate TA cells and improving the accuracy of authentication.

[0095] In some embodiments, step S32 includes:

[0096] If the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to not receiving a system message carrying DS information, it identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell;

[0097] If the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, and the authentication of the system message carrying the DS information fails, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0098] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a UE, which may include: if the UE has a digital signature key for a TA, identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell based on the absence of a system message carrying DS information; or, if the UE has a digital signature key for a TA, identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell based on the failure of authentication of a system message carrying DS information.

[0099] Here, if the UE contains the TA's digital signature key, including but not limited to one of the following:

[0100] The UE receives the TA's digital signature key during registration;

[0101] The UE receives the digital signature keys of each TA sent by the base station;

[0102] The UE receives the TA information and the correspondence between the digital signature keys of each TA sent by the base station.

[0103] like Figure 4 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, which may include:

[0104] Step S41: If the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to not receiving a system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or, if the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to the failure of authentication of the received system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0105] Here, when the UE initially registers with the cell, it can obtain the digital signature key of the TA where the cell is located from the core network equipment.

[0106] For example, during the registration process, the UE obtains the K-SIG of the TA where the registered cell is located; if the UE does not receive a system message carrying DS information, the UE determines that the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

[0107] Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, if the UE does not receive a system message carrying DS information when the TA has a K-SIG, it means that the system message has not been digitally signed, thereby accurately identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell.

[0108] For example, during the registration process, the UE obtains the K-SIG of the TA where the registered cell is located; if the UE receives a system message carrying DS information, it compares the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG with the DS information carried in the received system message; if the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG does not match the DS information carried in the system message, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0109] Here, the UE obtains DS information based on K-SIG, including: the UE generates DS information from the K-SIG present in the UE based on the relevant algorithm of digital signature; the relevant algorithm of digital signature can be any kind of security algorithm, as long as the relevant algorithm of digital signature is the same as the algorithm that generates DS information in the system message.

[0110] Here, the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG does not match the DS information carried in the system message, including at least one of the following:

[0111] The DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG is different from the DS information carried in the system message;

[0112] The current time is not within the range of the effective time of K-SIG indicated by the time indication information in the DS information.

[0113] Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, if the UE receives a system message carrying DS information when the TA has a K-SIG, but authentication based on the system message carrying DS information fails, it indicates that the system message does not use the same digital signature as the TA. This allows for accurate identification of the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell.

[0114] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a UE, which may include: if the UE receives a digital signature key for a TA during registration, in response to successful authentication of a system message carrying DS information, identifying that the cell broadcasting the system message is not a fake base station cell.

[0115] For example, during the registration process, the UE obtains the K-SIG of the TA where the registered cell is located; if the UE receives a system message carrying DS information, it compares the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG with the DS information carried in the received system message; if the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG matches the DS information carried in the system message, it is determined that the cell broadcasting the system message is not a fake base station cell.

[0116] Here, the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG is matched with the DS information carried in the system message, including one of the following:

[0117] The DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG is the same as the DS information.

[0118] The DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG is the same as the DS information, and the current time is within the range of the effective time of K-SIG indicated by the time indication information in the DS information.

[0119] Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, when the UE has a K-SIG for the TA, if the UE receives a system message carrying DS information and authentication is successful based on the system message carrying DS information, it indicates that the system message uses the same digital signature as the TA. This allows for accurate identification that the cell broadcasting the system message is not a fake base station cell.

[0120] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0121] In some embodiments, in step S41, in response to not receiving a system message carrying DS information, identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell includes one of the following:

[0122] In response to the failure to authenticate any system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell;

[0123] In response to more than a predetermined number of system messages carrying DS information failing authentication, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0124] like Figure 5 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, which may include:

[0125] Step S51: In response to the failure of authentication for any system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or, in response to the failure of authentication for more than a predetermined number of system messages carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0126] Here, the UE receives multiple system messages carrying DS information. If authentication fails for any system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or, if authentication fails for more than a predetermined number of system messages carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0127] This predetermined quantity can be set by the network side or determined through negotiation with the network side. Here, the network side refers to network equipment, which can be core network equipment or access network equipment. Access network equipment can be, but is not limited to, base stations; core network equipment can be, but is not limited to, entities such as network functions (NFs).

[0128] For example, if a UE receives multiple system messages carrying DS information, such as a Public Warning System (PWS) message, SIB6, and SIB7; and if the UE fails authentication based on any one of these system messages (PWS, SIB6, and SIB7), the cell sending these system messages is identified as a fake base station cell. For instance, even if authentication is successful for both the PWS message and SIB7, if an attacker compromises SIB6, the cell sending these system messages is determined to be a fake base station cell.

[0129] For example, if a UE receives multiple system messages carrying DS information, such as SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, SIB5, and SIB6; and if the network side sets a predetermined number of two; if authentication fails for more than two of these system messages, the cell sending these system messages is identified as a fake base station cell. For instance, if a UE receives five system messages carrying DS information (SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, SIB5, and SIB6); and authentication fails for three or more of these system messages, it indicates that the cell broadcasting these system messages is not highly reliable, and the cell broadcasting the system messages is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0130] In the example above, if the UE receives five system messages SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, SIB5 and SIB6 carrying DS information; and if authentication fails for only one or two of these system messages, then the cell that sent these system messages is identified as not a fake base station cell.

[0131] In some embodiments, the method includes discarding system messages that fail authentication. For example, in the above example, when multiple system messages carrying DS information are received, if authentication fails based on one of the system messages, the system message that failed authentication must be discarded regardless of whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

[0132] In this embodiment of the disclosure, if the UE has K-SIG and receives multiple system messages carrying DS information, it can accurately determine whether the cell that sent these system messages is a fake base station cell based on the number of system messages that failed authentication.

[0133] This disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, which may include at least one of the following:

[0134] Discard system messages;

[0135] Reduce the priority of fake base station cells;

[0136] Reduce the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located;

[0137] Increase the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the TA;

[0138] Increase the priority of frequency bands occupied by cells other than the fake base station cell within the TA;

[0139] The UE is triggered to perform a cell selection operation.

[0140] Here, the priority of a cell or the priority of its frequency band can refer to cell reselection. If cell A has a higher priority than cell B, then when the UE performs cell reselection, it will prioritize reselecting to cell A or prioritize measuring cell A. If the priority of frequency band A, where cell A is located, is higher than the priority of frequency band B, where cell B is located, then when the UE performs cell reselection, it will prioritize reselecting to a cell in frequency band A or prioritize measuring frequency band A.

[0141] In one embodiment, after the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it performs at least one of the following actions: discarding the system message, lowering the priority of the fake base station cell, lowering the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located, raising the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell in the TA, raising the priority of the frequency band where other cells outside the fake base station cell in the TA are located, and triggering the UE to perform a cell selection operation.

[0142] For example, after the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it discards the system message sent by the fake base station cell.

[0143] For example, after the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it reduces the priority of the fake base station cell from the first priority to the second priority; wherein, when the UE performs cell reselection, the cell with the first priority is reselected before the cell with the second priority.

[0144] For example, TA includes cell A, cell B, and cell C; wherein cells A, B, and C are all second-priority cells. If the UE identifies cell A in the broadcast system message as a fake base station cell, the priority of cells B and C in TA (excluding cell A) is increased from second priority to first priority; or the priority of cell A may be decreased from second priority to third priority. When the UE performs cell reselection, cells with first priority are reselected before cells with second priority, and cells with second priority are reselected before cells with third priority.

[0145] For example, after the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it reduces the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located from the first priority to the second priority; wherein, when the UE performs cell reselection measurement, the frequency band with the first priority is measured before the frequency band with the second priority.

[0146] For example, the TA includes cell A, cell B, and cell C; the frequency bands where cells A, B, and C are located are frequency band A, frequency band B, and frequency band C, respectively; the priority of frequency bands A, B, and C is the second priority. If the UE identifies cell A in the broadcast system message as a fake base station, the priority of frequency band B where cell B is located and frequency band C where cell C is located in the TA is raised from the second priority to the first priority; or the priority of frequency band A where cell A is located can be lowered from the second priority to the first priority; wherein, when the UE performs cell reselection measurement, frequency bands with the first priority are measured before frequency bands with the second priority, and frequency bands with the second priority are measured before frequency bands with the third priority.

[0147] For example, after the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it can trigger the UE to perform cell selection. Here, when the UE performs cell selection, it may select the previously identified fake base station cell, or it may select another cell other than the fake base station cell.

[0148] In this embodiment of the disclosure, after identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, the operation of discarding the system message can be performed, thereby reducing the risk of using incorrect system messages.

[0149] And / or, after identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, the priority of the fake base station cell and / or the priority of the frequency band in which the fake base station cell is located can be reduced, thereby reducing the probability that the fake base station cell will be reselected; and / or, the priority of other cells within the TA besides the fake base station cell can be increased and / or the priority of the frequency band in which other cells within the TA besides the fake base station cell is located can be increased, thereby increasing the probability that other cells within the TA besides the fake base station cell will be reselected. In this way, the probability of the reselected cell being a fake base station cell can be reduced, thereby improving the security of system messages.

[0150] And / or, after identifying the broadcast system message cell as a fake base station cell, a cell selection operation can be triggered for the UE; this allows for re-registration of the cell and reduces the probability of selecting a fake base station cell for communication to some extent, thereby improving the security of system messages.

[0151] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0152] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a UE, which may include: if the UE does not have a digital signature key for a TA, determining, based on receiving a system message carrying DS information, not to authenticate the cell broadcasting system message.

[0153] Here, the UE does not have the TA's digital signature key, including but not limited to at least one of the following:

[0154] The UE did not receive the TA's digital signature key during registration;

[0155] The UE did not obtain the digital signature keys for each TA sent by the base station;

[0156] The UE did not obtain the correspondence between the TA information and the digital signature key of each TA sent by the base station.

[0157] like Figure 6 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, including:

[0158] Step S61: If the UE did not receive the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to receiving the system message carrying the DS information, it determines not to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message.

[0159] This disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a UE, which may include: using system messages after determining cell authentication for broadcasting system messages.

[0160] For example, when a UE initially registers with a cell, the TA (Target Area) of that cell does not have a K-SIG; therefore, the UE does not obtain the K-SIG of the TA. If the UE receives a system message carrying DS (Distribution Detection) information, the UE ignores the DS information in the system message and uses the system message itself.

[0161] For example, the cell where the UE is camped may not have a K-SIG for the TA; however, because the AMF in the core network has changed its configuration information to enable the TA to support digital signatures, if the UE does not update its TA to obtain a K-SIG, then the TA's K-SIG will not exist in the UE. If the UE receives a system message carrying DS information, it can also ignore the DS information in the system message and use the system message itself. Thus,

[0162] Thus, in this embodiment, since the UE does not have a K-SIG for the TA, when the UE obtains a system message carrying DS information, it does not need to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message, meaning it does not need to know the authenticity of the system message. Furthermore, the system message can be used, thus adapting to scenarios where the TA did not introduce a digital signature during the UE registration process, but the system message is updated later when the TA introduces a digital signature.

[0163] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0164] The following information processing method is executed by the base station and is similar to the information processing method executed by the UE described above. For technical details not disclosed in the embodiments of the information processing method executed by the base station, please refer to the description of the information processing method example executed by the UE, which will not be described in detail here.

[0165] like Figure 7 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing method, executed by a base station, including:

[0166] Step S71: When the cell of the base station is located at a preset TA, a system message carrying DS information is sent; wherein, the DS information is used by the UE for cell authentication of the broadcast system message.

[0167] In step S71, sending a system message carrying DS information can be: sending first indication information to the UE.

[0168] The system message can be of various types; for example, it can be, but is not limited to, SIB1, SIB2, ..., and / or SIB x.

[0169] In one embodiment, the DS information carried in the system message is DS information specific to a preset TA. For example, a base station broadcasts a system message that carries DS information specific to a preset TA.

[0170] The UE can be one or more UEs in the cell of the base station.

[0171] In some embodiments, the TA can be at least one of the following:

[0172] The TA where the UE is located in the cell;

[0173] Partial TA in UE's RA;

[0174] All TAs in UE's RA;

[0175] The TA in the TA list; the TA list is the TA list in RA.

[0176] Here, an RA can include one or more TA lists; a TA list includes one or more TAs. Alternatively, an RA can include one or more TAs.

[0177] Here, a TA can include one or more cells.

[0178] In one embodiment, the base station sends at least one of the following information:

[0179] TA information for each TA;

[0180] The correspondence between the TA information of each TA and the K-SIG of the TA;

[0181] Signage information for each residential community;

[0182] The correspondence between the identification information and TA information of each community.

[0183] Here, TA information can be TA's identification information, or instruction information that indicates TA's identification information, etc.

[0184] In step S71, sending a system message carrying DS information can be achieved by sending a system message carrying DS information and first information; wherein the first information includes the TA information of the TA where the base station's cell is located. Here, the first information can be carried in predetermined bits of the system message. Thus, when the UE receives this system message, it can determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the TA of the UE's cell based on the TA information in the system message.

[0185] In step S71, sending a system message carrying DS information can be achieved by sending a system message carrying both DS information and second information. The second information includes the cell identifier information of the base station. Here, the second information can be carried in predetermined bits of the system message. Thus, when the UE receives this system message, it can determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is located within the TA of the UE's cell based on the cell identifier information in the system message.

[0186] In this embodiment, when the base station determines that its cell is located within a preset TA, it sends a system message carrying DS information. The DS information is used by the UE for cell authentication when broadcasting system messages. Thus, this embodiment enables the UE to accurately authenticate the cell in the broadcast system message based on the DS information. Furthermore, since the base station broadcasts the system message only after determining that its cell is within the preset TA, the UE, upon receiving the system message, can perform cell authentication based on the digital signature corresponding to the TA. This increases the difficulty for other fake base station cells to impersonate cells within the TA and broadcast system messages, thereby reducing the risk of the UE being attacked by fake base station cells.

[0187] Here, the UE can perform cell authentication based on the digital signature key of the TA where the current cell is located and the DS included in the system message; that is, it can realize cell authentication based on the digital signature corresponding to the TA.

[0188] Furthermore, in this embodiment of the disclosure, a single DS information can be used for the entire preset TA cell; thus, the same digital signature information can be used for authentication of the entire preset TA.

[0189] Furthermore, in this embodiment of the disclosure, the scope of cells that need to provide DS for authentication is specified. For example, it may be the TA where the UE is camped, or one or more TAs in the registration area, or one or more TA lists, etc.

[0190] In some embodiments, the digital signature information includes: a digital signature key (K-SIG);

[0191] or,

[0192] Digital signature information includes: digital signature key and time indication information; wherein, the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key.

[0193] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a base station, comprising: when the base station's cell is located at a preset TA, sending a system message carrying DS information; wherein the DS information is used by the UE to identify whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

[0194] For example, when a base station sends a system message carrying DS information to a UE, if the DS information matches the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG, then it is determined that the cell broadcasting the system message is not a fake base station cell.

[0195] For example, when a base station sends a system message carrying DS information to a UE, if the DS information does not match the DS information obtained by the UE based on K-SIG, then the cell broadcasting the system message is determined to be a fake base station cell.

[0196] Here, the UE can generate DS information from the K-SIG present in the UE using a digital signature-related algorithm. The digital signature-related algorithm for generating the DS information in the UE can be any security algorithm, as long as it satisfies that the digital signature-related algorithm for generating the DS information in the UE is the same as the algorithm for generating the DS information in the system message.

[0197] For example, when a base station sends a system message carrying DS information to a UE, if the time indication information in the DS information indicates that the effective time of the system message is a first time period, but the current time is a second time period that is not within the first time period, then the cell broadcasting the system message is determined to be a fake base station cell. Here, the second time period can be later or earlier than the first time period.

[0198] Thus, in this embodiment of the disclosure, it is possible to accurately determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell based on the K-SIG included in the DS, or the K-SIG included and time indication information.

[0199] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0200] To further explain any embodiment of this disclosure in detail, a specific example is provided below.

[0201] This disclosure provides an information processing method executed by a communication device, which includes a base station and a UE; the information processing method includes the following steps:

[0202] Step S81: If the base station determines that the network side provides a digital signature authentication mechanism for the preset TA, in response to the cell of the base station being located in the TA, it sends a system message carrying DS information, wherein the DS information is used for the UE to authenticate the cell of the broadcast system message.

[0203] Here, the TA can be the TA of the cell where the UE is camped, or it can be one or more TAs in the RA list, or it can be all or some of the TAs in the RA.

[0204] Step S82a: When the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to not receiving a system message carrying DS information, it identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell;

[0205] Step S82b: When the UE receives the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to the failure of authentication of the system message carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0206] Step S82b includes one of the following:

[0207] Step S82b1: In response to the failure to authenticate any system message carrying DS information, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell;

[0208] For example, a UE receives multiple system messages carrying DS information in its camped cell; for instance, it receives PWS, SIB6, and SIB7 carrying DS information. If the UE fails to authenticate SIB6 carrying DS information, it identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell. Here, the fake base station cell only attacks SIB6 and does not attack PWS and SIB7.

[0209] Step S82b2: In response to more than a predetermined number of system messages carrying DS information failing authentication, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

[0210] For example, the UE and the network can agree on a predetermined number N. When the UE receives multiple system messages carrying DS information in the cell it is camped on, such as SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, and SIB5, the UE authenticates these multiple system messages. If authentication fails for more than N system messages carrying DS information, the cell broadcasting the system messages is identified as a fake base station cell. Here, the fake base station cell may attack one or more of SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, and SIB5, or may not attack any of them. If authentication fails for a system message carrying DS information, the failed system message carrying DS information is discarded.

[0211] Step S82c: If the UE does not receive the digital signature key of the TA during registration, in response to receiving the system message carrying the DS information, it determines that it will not authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message; and uses the system message.

[0212] For example, for a UE initially accessing a cell, the UE does not have any cell digital signature key; therefore, the UE does not perform cell authentication for broadcast system messages; the UE accesses the cell and uses the system messages.

[0213] For example, when the UE is camped on a cell, the cell's digital signature key does not exist; however, because the AMF updates the configuration item information to enable the TA where the cell is located to support the digital signature mechanism, and the UE does not perform Tracking Area Update (TAU) to obtain the digital signature key, the UE does not authenticate the cell in the broadcast system message and uses the system message.

[0214] Step S83a: If the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it discards the system message;

[0215] Step S84b: If the UE identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, it may perform at least one of the following: reduce the priority of the fake base station cell; reduce the priority of the frequency band in which the fake base station cell is located; increase the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell in the TA; increase the priority of the frequency band in which other cells outside the fake base station cell in the TA are located; and trigger the UE to perform a cell selection operation.

[0216] like Figure 8 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a UE, comprising:

[0217] Receiver module 51 is configured to receive system messages;

[0218] Processing module 52 is configured to perform cell authentication of broadcast system messages based on whether a system message carrying DS information is received; wherein the system message carrying DS information is sent by the network device after determining the cell within the preset TA.

[0219] In some embodiments, TA includes at least one of the following:

[0220] The TA where the UE is located in the cell;

[0221] A portion of the TA in the RA of the UE; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs;

[0222] All TAs of UE's RA;

[0223] The TA in the TA list; the TA list is the TA list in RA.

[0224] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include: a processing module 52 configured to, if the UE receives a digital signature key for a TA during registration, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to not receiving a system message carrying DS information.

[0225] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to, if the UE receives a digital signature key for a TA during registration, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to the failure of authentication of the received system message carrying DS information.

[0226] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to the failure of authentication of any system message carrying DS information.

[0227] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to more than a predetermined number of system message authentication failures carrying DS information.

[0228] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to discard system messages.

[0229] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to reduce the priority of fake base station cells.

[0230] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to reduce the priority of the frequency band in which the fake base station cell is located.

[0231] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to prioritize other cells outside of the fake base station cell within the TA.

[0232] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to prioritize the frequency bands of other cells outside the pseudo base station cell within the TA.

[0233] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to trigger the UE to perform a cell selection operation.

[0234] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a UE, which may include: a processing module 52 configured to, after identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell, further configure to: discard the system message; reduce the priority of the fake base station cell; reduce the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located; increase the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the TA; increase the priority of the frequency band where other cells outside the fake base station cell within the TA are located; and trigger the UE to perform a cell selection operation.

[0235] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to determine, in response to receiving a system message carrying DS information, not to authenticate the cell broadcasting system message if the UE does not receive the digital signature key of the TA during registration.

[0236] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to use system messages.

[0237] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to use system messages after determining that cell authentication is not performed on broadcast system messages.

[0238] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus for a UE, which may include a processing module 52 configured to use system messages after identifying that the cell broadcasting the system message is not a fake base station cell.

[0239] In some embodiments, the digital signature information includes: a digital signature key; or, the digital signature information includes: a digital signature key and time indication information; wherein the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key.

[0240] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the apparatus provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some apparatus in the embodiments of this disclosure or some apparatus in related technologies.

[0241] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0242] like Figure 9 As shown, this disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a base station, comprising:

[0243] The sending module 61 is configured to send a system message carrying DS information when the cell of the base station is located at a preset TA; wherein, the DS information is used by the UE for cell authentication of the broadcast system message.

[0244] In some embodiments, the TA can be at least one of the following:

[0245] The TA where the UE is located in the cell;

[0246] A portion of the TA in the RA of the UE; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs;

[0247] All TAs in UE's RA;

[0248] The TA in the TA list; the TA list is the TA list in RA.

[0249] In some embodiments, DS information is used by the UE to identify whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

[0250] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a base station, which may include: a sending module 61 configured to broadcast a system message carrying DS information when the cell of the base station is located at a preset TA; wherein the DS information is used by the UE to identify whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

[0251] In some embodiments, the digital signature information includes: a digital signature key; or,

[0252] Digital signature information includes: digital signature key and time indication information; wherein, the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key.

[0253] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a base station, which may include: a transmitting module 61 configured to broadcast a system message carrying a digital signature key when the base station's cell is located at a preset TA.

[0254] This disclosure provides an information processing apparatus applied to a base station, which may include: a transmitting module 61 configured to broadcast a system message carrying a digital signature key and time indication information when the cell of the base station is located at a preset TA.

[0255] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the apparatus provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some apparatus in the embodiments of this disclosure or some apparatus in related technologies.

[0256] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0257] This disclosure provides a communication device, including:

[0258] processor;

[0259] Memory used to store processor-executable instructions;

[0260] The processor is configured to implement the information processing method of any embodiment of this disclosure when running executable instructions.

[0261] In one embodiment, the communication equipment may include, but is not limited to, at least one of: core network equipment, access network equipment, and UE. Here, access network equipment includes: base station.

[0262] The processor may include various types of storage media, which are non-transitory computer storage media that can continue to store information after the user equipment loses power.

[0263] The processor can connect to memory via a bus or similar means to read executable programs stored in memory, for example... Figures 3 to 7 At least one of the methods shown.

[0264] This disclosure also provides a computer storage medium storing a computer-executable program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the information processing method of any embodiment of this disclosure. For example, such as... Figures 3 to 7 At least one of the methods shown.

[0265] Regarding the apparatus or storage medium in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0266] Figure 10This is a block diagram illustrating a user equipment 800 according to an exemplary embodiment. For example, user equipment 800 may be a mobile phone, computer, digital broadcast user equipment, messaging device, game console, tablet device, medical device, fitness equipment, personal digital assistant, etc.

[0267] Reference Figure 10 User equipment 800 may include one or more of the following components: processing component 802, memory 804, power supply component 806, multimedia component 808, audio component 810, input / output (I / O) interface 812, sensor component 814, and communication component 816.

[0268] Processing component 802 typically controls the overall operation of user equipment 800, such as operations associated with display, telephone calls, data communication, camera operation, and recording. Processing component 802 may include one or more processors 820 to execute instructions to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described above. Furthermore, processing component 802 may include one or more modules to facilitate interaction between processing component 802 and other components. For example, processing component 802 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between multimedia component 808 and processing component 802.

[0269] Memory 804 is configured to store various types of data to support the operation of user equipment 800. Examples of this data include instructions for any application or method operating on user equipment 800, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, videos, etc. Memory 804 can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic storage, flash memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk.

[0270] Power supply component 806 provides power to various components of user equipment 800. Power supply component 806 may include a power management system, one or more power supplies, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power to user equipment 800.

[0271] Multimedia component 808 includes a screen that provides an output interface between the user equipment 800 and the user. In some embodiments, the screen may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) and a touch panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touchscreen to receive input signals from the user. The touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensors may sense not only the boundaries of the touch or swipe action but also the duration and pressure associated with the touch or swipe operation. In some embodiments, multimedia component 808 includes a front-facing camera and / or a rear-facing camera. When the user equipment 800 is in an operating mode, such as a shooting mode or a video mode, the front-facing camera and / or the rear-facing camera may receive external multimedia data. Each front-facing camera and rear-facing camera may be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capabilities.

[0272] Audio component 810 is configured to output and / or input audio signals. For example, audio component 810 includes a microphone (MIC) configured to receive external audio signals when user equipment 800 is in an operating mode, such as call mode, recording mode, and voice recognition mode. The received audio signals may be further stored in memory 804 or transmitted via communication component 816. In some embodiments, audio component 810 also includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.

[0273] I / O interface 812 provides an interface between processing component 802 and peripheral interface modules, such as keyboards, click wheels, buttons, etc. These buttons may include, but are not limited to, home buttons, volume buttons, power buttons, and lock buttons.

[0274] Sensor assembly 814 includes one or more sensors for providing status assessments of various aspects of user equipment 800. For example, sensor assembly 814 may detect the on / off state of user equipment 800, the relative positioning of components such as the display and keypad of user equipment 800, changes in position of user equipment 800 or a component of user equipment 800, the presence or absence of user contact with user equipment 800, orientation or acceleration / deceleration of user equipment 800, and temperature changes of user equipment 800. Sensor assembly 814 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects without any physical contact. Sensor assembly 814 may also include a light sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications. In some embodiments, sensor assembly 814 may also include an accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, pressure sensor, or temperature sensor.

[0275] Communication component 816 is configured to facilitate wired or wireless communication between user equipment 800 and other devices. User equipment 800 can access wireless networks based on communication standards, such as WiFi, 4G, or 5G, or combinations thereof. In one exemplary embodiment, communication component 816 receives broadcast signals or broadcast-related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel. In one exemplary embodiment, communication component 816 also includes a near-field communication (NFC) module to facilitate short-range communication. For example, the NFC module may be implemented based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, Infrared Data Association (IrDA) technology, ultra-wideband (UWB) technology, Bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.

[0276] In an exemplary embodiment, the user equipment 800 may be implemented by one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components to perform the methods described above.

[0277] In an exemplary embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions is also provided, such as a memory 804 including instructions, which can be executed by a processor 820 of a user device 800 to perform the above-described method. For example, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be a ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage device, etc.

[0278] like Figure 11 As shown, one embodiment of this disclosure illustrates the structure of a base station. For example, base station 900 can be provided as a network-side device. (Refer to...) Figure 11 The base station 900 includes a processing component 922, which further includes one or more processors, and memory resources represented by a memory 932 for storing instructions, such as application programs, that can be executed by the processing component 922. The application programs stored in the memory 932 may include one or more modules, each corresponding to a set of instructions. Furthermore, the processing component 922 is configured to execute instructions to perform any of the methods described above applied to the base station.

[0279] Base station 900 may also include a power supply component 926 configured to perform power management of base station 900, a wired or wireless network interface 950 configured to connect base station 900 to a network, and an input / output (I / O) interface 958. Base station 900 can operate on an operating system stored in memory 932, such as Windows Server™, Mac OS X™, Unix™, Linux™, FreeBSD™, or similar.

[0280] Other embodiments of the invention will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. This disclosure is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the invention that follow the general principles of the invention and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein. The specification and examples are to be considered exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of the invention are indicated by the following claims.

[0281] It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the precise structure described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of the invention is limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. An information processing method, wherein, Performed by the user equipment (UE), including: Receive system messages; The system authenticates the cell broadcasting the system message based on whether or not the system message carrying digital signature (DS) information is received; wherein the system message carrying the DS information is sent by the network device after determining the cell within a preset tracking area (TA); the DS information is specific to the preset TA; wherein the DS information includes: a digital signature key and time indication information; wherein the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key; The cell authentication based on whether the system message carrying digital signature (DS) information is received includes: If the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, in response to not receiving the system message carrying the DS information, it identifies the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell; or If the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, in response to the failure of authentication of the system message carrying the DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The preset TA includes at least one of the following: The TA of the cell where the UE is camped; The UE's registration area RA includes a portion of the TAs; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs; All TAs of the RA of the UE; The TA in the TA list; wherein, the TA list is the TA list in RA.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The step of identifying the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to the failure to receive the system message carrying the DS information includes: In response to the failure of authentication for any system message carrying the DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or In response to more than a predetermined number of system messages carrying the DS information failing authentication, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The method further includes at least one of the following: Discard the system message; Lower the priority of the fake base station cell; Reduce the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located; Increase the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the preset TA; Increase the priority of the frequency bands of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the preset TA; The UE is triggered to perform a cell selection operation.

5. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The method further includes: If the UE does not receive the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, in response to receiving the system message carrying the DS information, it determines not to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein, The method further includes: Use the system message.

7. An information processing method, wherein, Performed by the base station, including: When the cell of the base station is located in a preset tracking area (TA), a system message carrying digital signature (DS) information is broadcast; wherein, the DS information is used by the user equipment (UE) to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message; the DS information is specific to the preset TA; wherein, the DS information includes: a digital signature key and time indication information; wherein, the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key; Wherein, if the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and the UE does not receive the system message carrying the DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or If the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and the authentication of the system message carrying the DS information received by the UE fails, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein, The preset TA includes at least one of the following: The TA of the cell where the UE is camped; A portion of the TAs in the UE's registration area RA; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs; All TAs in the RA of the UE; The TA in the TA list; wherein, the TA list is the TA list in RA.

9. The method according to claim 7 or 8, wherein, The DS information is used by the UE to determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

10. An information processing apparatus, wherein, Applied to User Equipment (UE), including: The receiving module is configured to receive system messages; The processing module is configured to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message based on whether the system message carrying digital signature (DS) information is received; wherein the system message carrying the DS information is sent by the network device after determining the cell within a preset tracking area (TA); the DS information is specific to the preset TA; wherein the DS information includes: a digital signature key and time indication information; wherein the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key; The processing module is configured to: if the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and in response to not receiving the system message carrying the DS information, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell; or if the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and in response to the authentication failure of the received system message carrying the DS information, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell.

11. The apparatus according to claim 10, wherein, The preset TA includes at least one of the following: The TA of the cell where the UE is camped; The UE's registration area RA includes a portion of the TAs; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs; All TAs of the RA of the UE; The TA in the TA list; wherein, the TA list is the TA list in RA.

12. The apparatus according to claim 10 or 11, wherein, The processing module is configured to, in response to authentication failure of any system message carrying the DS information, identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell; or The processing module is configured to identify the cell broadcasting the system message as a fake base station cell in response to more than a predetermined number of system message authentication failures carrying the DS information.

13. The apparatus according to claim 10 or 11, wherein, The processing module is configured to include at least one of the following: Discard the system message; Lower the priority of the fake base station cell; Reduce the priority of the frequency band where the fake base station cell is located; Increase the priority of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the preset TA; Increase the priority of the frequency bands of other cells outside the fake base station cell within the preset TA; The UE is triggered to perform a cell selection operation.

14. The apparatus according to claim 10 or 11, wherein, The processing module is configured to, if the UE does not receive the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, determine not to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message in response to receiving the system message carrying the DS information.

15. The apparatus according to claim 14, wherein, The processing module is configured to use the system message.

16. An information processing apparatus, wherein, Applied to base stations, including: The transmitting module is configured to broadcast a system message carrying digital signature (DS) information when the cell of the base station is located in a preset tracking area (TA); wherein the DS information is used by the user equipment (UE) to authenticate the cell broadcasting the system message; the DS information is specific to the preset TA; wherein the DS information includes: a digital signature key and time indication information; wherein the time indication information is used to indicate the effective time of the digital signature key; Wherein, if the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and the UE does not receive the system message carrying the DS information, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell; or If the UE receives the digital signature key of the preset TA during registration, and the authentication of the system message carrying the DS information received by the UE fails, the cell broadcasting the system message is identified as a fake base station cell.

17. The apparatus according to claim 16, wherein, The preset TA includes at least one of the following: The TA of the cell where the UE is camped; A portion of the TAs in the UE's registration area RA; wherein, an RA includes one or more TAs; All TAs in the RA of the UE; The TA in the TA list; wherein, the TA list is the TA list in RA.

18. The apparatus according to claim 16 or 17, wherein, The DS information is used by the UE to determine whether the cell broadcasting the system message is a fake base station cell.

19. A communication device, wherein, The communication device includes: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to implement the information processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 or claims 7 to 9 when running the executable instructions.

20. A computer storage medium, wherein, The computer storage medium stores a computer-executable program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the information processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 or claims 7 to 9.

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