Secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificate

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of secure cross-service platform identity authentication methods based on digital certificate, it is related to electronic information security technical field, including steps: system initialization and issue the public parameter of system;User submits account application related information to certificate center, and service provider registers account for user;User selects trusted device to apply for trusted device authentication to certificate center, and save all account information of user;When user uses trusted device to access service provider, certificate center carries out the authentication of the identity of user by verifying the related information of trusted device with account information, and provides corresponding service after verification;When it is necessary to unbind device, user sends the request of device cancellation authorization to certificate center, and certificate center cancels the authorization to original device.The application not only realizes the fast and convenient cross-service platform identity authentication, but also can protect the information such as access mode of user.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of electronic information security technology, and in particular to a secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates. Background Technology

[0002] Digital certificate-based authentication is a widely used authentication mechanism applied to various network services such as global electronic passports, DNS, and HTTPS. In digital certificate-based authentication, the Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for issuing digital certificates, binding the user's public key and identity information to the certificate through the issuance of the certificate. Furthermore, the CA is responsible for maintaining a list of certificates, including those that have been revoked. When a user requests services from other service providers, the service provider verifies the user's identity by checking the validity of the certificate provided, establishes a secure communication connection with the authenticated user, and provides the service.

[0003] However, existing digital certificate-based authentication schemes still have many efficiency and security issues. First, this authentication method cannot achieve portable service access; users can only authenticate on the device storing their private key. To meet portable access requirements, users must securely maintain their private key on all devices that need to access service providers, increasing the risk of private key leakage. Second, digital certificates can be used to track user behavior, leading to problems such as the leakage of user access patterns. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the shortcomings of existing technologies and provide a secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates. Users bind their identity information to trusted devices, and can quickly complete identity authentication across multiple service providers using only the bound device, without needing to use their private keys, thus achieving portable and secure service access.

[0005] The objective of this invention is achieved through the following technical solution:

[0006] A secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates, applicable to Certificate Authority (CA) and user authentication. and n service providers The process includes the following steps:

[0007] System initialization phase: The system is initialized, the system's public parameters are determined, and the Certificate Authority (CA) generates a public-private key pair for issuing authentication credentials;

[0008] Account registration stage: Users Request to register an account with a service provider. If successful, the Certificate Authority (CA) will issue a certificate to the user. Issue account registration credentials and send them to the user. And forward it to the corresponding service provider, who is the user. Account creation, user-generated account backup, authentication and encryption, storage in a Certificate Authority (CA);

[0009] Device binding phase: User Select a trusted device The device is requested to be authenticated by the Certificate Authority (CA). If successful, the CA issues a device authentication certificate and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device downloads the account backup from the CA, decrypts it, and stores it.

[0010] User authentication phase: User Using the trusted device A request is made to access and log in to a service provider. The service provider randomly generates a session ID and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device sends its authentication credentials to the Certificate Authority (CA) and requests authorization for multiple account login credentials. The CA verifies the device authentication credentials. If the verification is successful, it issues a general account credential and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device generates an account authentication credential and a session credential to authorize the account, and then sends them to the service provider. The service provider verifies the received account authentication credential and session credential. If the verification fails, access is denied; if the verification is successful, the corresponding service is provided.

[0011] Device unbinding phase: The user sends a request to the Certificate Authority (CA) to revoke the authorization of the trusted device, and the CA revokes the authorization of the original trusted device.

[0012] Furthermore, the specific steps of the system initialization phase include:

[0013] 1) Determine the system common parameter set Where l is a safety parameter, p is a prime number, G1 and G2 are both p-order multiplicative cyclic groups, and their generators are g and g, respectively. G T It is also a p-order multiplicative cyclic group, e: G1×G2→G T It is a bilinear mapping, H: {0, 1} * →G1 is a secure hash function, E / D(·) represents a secure authentication encryption / decryption algorithm, and Sig / Vrfy(·) represent secure digital signature / verification algorithms respectively;

[0014] 2) User Select Identity Identifier ID u public and private key pairs for signing Authentication encryption key Request from Certificate Authority (CA) Corresponding user certificate

[0015] 3) The Certificate Authority (CA) generates a public-private key pair (PK) for issuing authentication credentials. CA ,sk CA ), where n+1 elements are selected uniformly. As the private key sk CA ,calculate

[0016]

[0017] Where 1≤i≤n, 1≤i≠j≤n, As the corresponding public key pk CA .

[0018] Furthermore, the specific steps of the account registration stage include:

[0019] 1) User Select a unique account identifier And generate the corresponding public and private key pairs for the account. user In a certain service provider The steps to register an account on the client include:

[0020] a) User Using user certificates After authenticating your identity through the Certificate Authority (CA), send an account registration request to the CA:

[0021] b) Certificate Authority (CA) provides users with... Issuance of account registration certificate Set the signature of the account registration credential. Where pre_Cert represents the complete certificate except for the certificate issuer's signature;

[0022] c) User Account registration credentials Forwarded to service provider

[0023] d) Service Provider Through calculation Verify account registration credentials Is it valid? If so, the service provider. storage And it returned a success message;

[0024] 2) User Generated in service provider The following is the account information:

[0025]

[0026] Account information is encrypted using an authentication encryption algorithm to obtain an account backup:

[0027]

[0028] Recover the account backup i Send to the Certificate Authority (CA);

[0029] 3) Certificate Authority (CA) securely stores account backups and recovers. i .

[0030] Furthermore, the specific steps of the device binding phase include:

[0031] 1) User Select trusted device The identifier of the trusted device is: And generate the corresponding device public / private key pair (pk td ,sk td );

[0032] 2) User Using user certificates After authenticating your identity through the Certificate Authority (CA), send a device authentication request to the CA:

[0033] 3) Certificate Authority (CA) issues certificates to users Issuance of equipment certification certificate (Certificate), signature of equipment certification certificate (σ) td =Sig(x, pre_Cert) td ), where pre_Cert represents the complete credential excluding the credential issuer's signature and all other content, and the user Certification Certificate for Equipment td Stored in a trusted device middle;

[0034] 4) User Download backups of all your accounts from the Certificate Authority (CA) and decrypt them to obtain the account information:

[0035] 5) User Will Stored in a trusted device middle.

[0036] Furthermore, the specific steps of the user authentication phase include:

[0037] 1) User Use trusted devices to a service provider Send login request;

[0038] 2) The service provider Randomly generate session identifier And send to a trusted device

[0039] 3) Trusted devices Randomly select the service provider mentioned above k service providers Generate a generic account authentication request:

[0040]

[0041] in Generate signature σ (1) =Sig(sk td CSR acc ), and then CSR acc σ (1) and Cert td And send it to the Certificate Authority (CA);

[0042] 4) The Certificate Authority (CA) calculates separately. Vrfy(X,σ td ) and Vrfy(pk td , σ (1) ) value verification CSR acc Cert td and σ (1) The validity of the certificate, where i = 1, 2, ..., k, is determined. If all verifications pass, the Certificate Authority (CA) is considered a trusted device. Issuance of general account credential Cert acc The signature of the general account credential is Where σ1=g,

[0043] 51 Trusted Devices Received general account credential Cert acc Then, account authentication credentials for authorizing the account are generated. Signature of account authentication credentials Random selection

[0044] 6) Trusted devices Generate session public and private keys (pk) ss ,sk ss Then generate session credentials (Cert). ss Signature of session credentials Where pre_Cert represents the complete certificate except for the certificate issuer's signature;

[0045] 71 Trusted Devices Calculate signature σ (2) =Sig(sk ss ID ss ), and will Send to the service provider

[0046] 8) The service provider Through calculation Verify session credentials Cert respectively ss and signature σ (2) Whether it is valid can be determined by the equation: Verify account authentication credentials Is it valid? If so, allow the user. Log in, otherwise the user will be denied access. Log in.

[0047] Furthermore, the specific steps of the device unbinding stage include:

[0048] 1) User use The identity is authenticated through the Certificate Authority (CA), and then a device unbinding request is generated. Calculate signature And and σ (3) Send to the Certificate Authority (CA);

[0049] 2) The Certificate Authority (CA) calculates... Verify signature σ (3) If valid, the Certificate Authority (CA) will revoke the corresponding certificate. Certification Certificate for Equipment td .

[0050] Furthermore, the contents of the account registration credential, device authentication credential, universal account credential, account authentication credential, and session credential include:

[0051] Basic information: including recipient, sender, certificate serial number and validity period. The certificate becomes invalid after the expiration date and needs to be reapplied for.

[0052] Certificate fingerprint: is the hash value of pre_Cert, which represents the complete certificate except for the certificate issuer's signature;

[0053] Account information: including the mapping between the account identifier and the corresponding public key, and the hash value of the mapping;

[0054] Certificate signing: Different signatures are designed according to different needs.

[0055] Preferably, the user and Certificate Authority (CA) and n service providers They establish a secure channel using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and communicate through that secure channel.

[0056] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0057] 1) By binding trusted devices with user identity information, when authenticating with service providers, users can quickly complete the authentication process using only the bound device without needing to use the user's private key, thus enabling convenient service access.

[0058] 2) Users can use the same trusted device to authenticate their identity across multiple service providers simultaneously, supporting cross-service platform authentication, and the Certificate Authority (CA) cannot obtain users' access patterns by tracking certificates.

[0059] 3) Users can unbind lost devices, which can effectively prevent adversaries from impersonating users and logging in using lost devices, thus enhancing the security of identity authentication; and the loss of the user's bound device will not cause the user's identity authentication to fail, ensuring the reliability of identity authentication. Attached Figure Description

[0060] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the user authentication phase in this invention;

[0061] Figure 2 A diagram illustrating the information contained in account registration credentials;

[0062] Figure 3 A diagram illustrating the information contained in equipment certification credentials;

[0063] Figure 4 This is a diagram illustrating the information contained in a general account credential.

[0064] Figure 5 A diagram illustrating the information contained in account authentication credentials;

[0065] Figure 6 This is a diagram illustrating the information contained in a session credential. Detailed Implementation

[0066] The technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the embodiments. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0067] See Figure 1-6 The present invention provides a technical solution:

[0068] Example:

[0069] This invention relates to a secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates, applicable to Certificate Authority (CA) and user authentication. and n service providers In China, the Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for registration and authentication management, and users... Users can apply for access to the service provider, which will then authenticate the user's credentials based on the Certificate Authority (CA). The system performs identity authentication, sets corresponding access permissions, and provides appropriate services. In this embodiment, the user... and Certificate Authority (CA) and n service providers They establish a secure channel using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and communicate through that secure channel.

[0070] This invention is achieved through the following technical solution:

[0071] System initialization phase: The system is initialized, the system's public parameters are determined, and the Certificate Authority (CA) generates a public-private key pair for issuing authentication credentials.

[0072] Account registration stage: Users Request to register an account with a service provider. If successful, the Certificate Authority (CA) will issue a certificate to the user. Issue account registration credentials and send them to the user. And forward it to the corresponding service provider, who is the user. An account is created, the user generates an account backup, and after authentication and encryption, it is stored in a Certificate Authority (CA).

[0073] Device binding phase: User Select a trusted device The device is requested to be authenticated by the Certificate Authority (CA). If successful, the CA issues a device authentication certificate and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device downloads the account backup from the CA, decrypts it, and stores it.

[0074] User authentication phase: User Using the trusted device A request is made to access and log in to a service provider. The service provider randomly generates a session ID and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device sends its authentication credentials to a Certificate Authority (CA) and requests authorization for multiple account login credentials. The CA verifies the device authentication credentials. If the verification is successful, it issues a general account credential and sends it to the trusted device. The trusted device generates an account authentication credential and a session credential to authorize the account, and then sends them to the service provider. The service provider verifies the received account authentication credential and session credential. If the verification fails, access is denied; if the verification is successful, the corresponding service is provided.

[0075] Device unbinding phase: The user sends a request to the Certificate Authority (CA) to revoke the authorization of the trusted device, and the CA revokes the authorization of the original trusted device.

[0076] Specifically, a secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates includes the following steps:

[0077] S1: System initialization phase, the specific steps include steps S11-S13:

[0078] S11: Determine the system common parameter set Where l is a safety parameter, p is a prime number, G1 and G2 are both p-order multiplicative cyclic groups, and their generators are g and g, respectively. G T It is also a p-order multiplicative cyclic group, e: G1×G2→G T It is a bilinear mapping, H: {0, 1} * →G1 is a secure hash function, E / D(·) represents a secure authentication encryption / decryption algorithm, and Sig / Vrfy(·) represent secure digital signature / verification algorithms respectively;

[0079] S12: User Select Identity Identifier ID u public and private key pairs for signing Authentication encryption key Request from Certificate Authority (CA) Corresponding user certificate

[0080] S13: The Certificate Authority (CA) generates a public-private key pair (pk) for issuing authentication credentials. CA ,sk CA ), where n+1 elements are selected uniformly. As the private key sk CA ,calculate:

[0081]

[0082] Where 1≤i≤n, 1≤i≠j≤n, As the corresponding public key pk CA ;

[0083] Based on the security parameters, the system initializes, and the Certificate Authority (CA) determines the system's public parameters and publishes these public parameters to all service providers and users within the system.

[0084] S2: Account registration phase. The specific steps for account registration include:

[0085] S21: User Select a unique account identifier And generate the corresponding public and private key pairs for the account. user In a certain service provider The steps to register an account on the client include:

[0086] S211: User Using user certificates After authenticating your identity through the Certificate Authority (CA), send an account registration request to the CA:

[0087] S212: Certificate Authority (CA) provides users with... Issuance of account registration certificate Account registration certificate Contents such as Figure 2 As shown, the generation methods include:

[0088] S2121: Generation The credentials include basic information, certificate fingerprint, and account information. `pre_Cert` represents the complete credential except for the issuer's signature; the certificate fingerprint is the hash value of `pre_Cert`. `validity_1` is the validity period of the account registration credential; after this period, the credential becomes invalid and requires re-application. To prevent replay attacks, the credential's validity period should be as short as possible, while still allowing users to complete tasks within the specified timeframe. Account registration;

[0089] S2122: Calculate the signature

[0090] S2123: Set certificate signature to

[0091] S213: User Account registration credentials Forwarded to service provider

[0092] S214: Service Provider Through calculation Verify account registration credentials Is it valid? If so, the service provider. storage And it returned a message indicating successful registration.

[0093] S22: User Generated in service provider The following is the account information:

[0094]

[0095] Account information is encrypted using an authentication encryption algorithm to obtain an account backup:

[0096]

[0097] Recover the account backup i Send to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0098] S23: Certificate Authority (CA) securely stores account backups and recovers them. i .

[0099] Users can register at least one account with each service provider. In this embodiment, users register only one account with each service provider. Each time a user registers an account with a service provider, the account information is encrypted to obtain an account backup, which is then sent to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0100] S3: Device binding phase, the specific steps include:

[0101] S31: User Select trusted device The identifier of the trusted device is: And generate the corresponding device public / private key pair (pk td ,sk td ).

[0102] S32: User Using user certificates After authenticating your identity through the Certificate Authority (CA), send a device authentication request to the CA:

[0103] S33: Certificate Authority (CA) provides users with... Issuance of Equipment Certification Certificate td ,user Certification Certificate for Equipment td Stored in a trusted device Chinese; Certification Certificate td Contents such as Figure 3As shown, its generation steps include:

[0104] S331: Generate Cert td The basic information, certificate fingerprint, and device information are included. `pre_Cert` represents the complete credential except for the issuer's signature; the certificate fingerprint is the hash value of `pre_Cert`; `validity 2` specifies the validity period of the device authentication credential. After this period, the user... The certificate needs to be reapplied for from the Certificate Authority (CA). To improve user efficiency and avoid frequent requests for device authentication certificates within a short period, while ensuring security, the validity period is set to a relatively long time.

[0105] S332: Calculate the signature σ td =Sig(x, pre_Cert) td );

[0106] S333: Set certificate signature to σ td .

[0107] S34: User Download all account backups from the Certificate Authority (CA) and decrypt them to obtain the account information:

[0108] S35: User Will Stored in a trusted device middle.

[0109] After a device is designated as a trusted device, that trusted device can obtain not only the device's authentication credentials but also all account information. It enables the binding of trusted devices with account information to prevent the leakage of user information.

[0110] S4: User authentication phase. When a user logs in to the target service provider, the service provider needs to authenticate the user's identity. The user authentication process is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0111] S41: User Use trusted devices to a service provider Send a login request.

[0112] S42: The service provider Randomly generate session identifier And send to a trusted device

[0113] S43: Trusted Device Randomly select the service provider mentioned above k service providers Generate a generic account authentication request:

[0114]

[0115] in Generate signature σ (1) =Sig(sk td CSR acc ), and then CSR acc σ (1) and Cert td And send it to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0116] S44: The Certificate Authority (CA) calculates separately. Vrfy(X,σ td ) and Vrfy(pk td , σ (1) ) value verification CSR acc Cert td and σ (1) The validity of the certificate, where i = 1, 2, ..., k, is determined. If all verifications pass, the Certificate Authority (CA) is considered a trusted device. Issuance of general account credential Cert acc Cert General Account Credentials acc Contents such as Figure 4 As shown, its generation steps include:

[0117] S441: Generate Cert acc The basic information, certificate fingerprint, and account information are included. pre_Cert represents the complete credential except for the credential issuer's signature. The certificate fingerprint is the hash value of pre_Cert. validity_3 is the validity period of the general account credential. To prevent replay attacks, the validity period is set to the shortest time period for a user to complete a single account login.

[0118] S442: Yes Calculate σ1 = g, in

[0119] S443: Set certificate signing to

[0120] S45: Trusted Device Received general account credential Cert acc Then, account authentication credentials for authorizing the account are generated. Contents as follows Figure 5 As shown, the generation steps include:

[0121] S451: Generation The basic information, certificate fingerprint, and account information are included, where pre_Cert represents all the contents of the complete credential except for the signature of the credential issuer, and the certificate fingerprint is the hash value of pre_Cert.

[0122] S452: Randomly select r, Calculate separately in

[0123] S453: Set the certificate to signing

[0124] S46: Trusted Device Generate session public and private keys (pk) ss ,sk ss Then generate session credentials (Cert). ss The content is as follows Figure 6 As shown, the generation steps include:

[0125] S461: Generate Cert ss The basic information, certificate fingerprint, and account information are included. pre_Cert represents the complete credential except for the credential issuer's signature. The certificate fingerprint is the hash value of pre_Cert. validity_4 is the validity period of the session credential. To prevent replay attacks, it is set to the minimum time that can maintain the session after each user login.

[0126] S462: Calculate the signature

[0127] S463: Set certificate signature to σ ss .

[0128] S47: Trusted Device Calculate signature σ (2) =Sig(sk ss ID ss ), and will and σ (2) Send to the service provider

[0129] S48: The service provider Through calculation Vrfy(pk ss , σ (1) Verify the session credentials Cert respectively. ss and signature σ (2) Whether it is valid can be determined by the equation: Verify account authentication credentials Is it valid? If so, allow the user. Log in, otherwise the user will be denied access. Login. When a user logs in to a registered service provider to access its services, user authentication is required. Existing technologies typically rely on a certificate authority (CA) to directly obtain the user's access patterns for authentication. This invention utilizes a single, bound trusted device to quickly authenticate with multiple service providers without using the user's private key. Instead, user account information is stored on the trusted device, enabling portable service access. Furthermore, the same device can be used for simultaneous authentication across multiple service providers, primarily by generating a universal account credential to complete cross-service platform authentication. Moreover, certificate authorities (CAs) cannot obtain user access patterns by tracking certificates.

[0130] S5: Also includes a device unbinding phase, the specific steps of which are:

[0131] S51: User use The identity is authenticated through the Certificate Authority (CA), and then a device unbinding request is generated. Calculate signature And and σ (3) Send to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0132] S52: The Certificate Authority (CA) calculates... Verify signature σ (3) If valid, the Certificate Authority (CA) will revoke the corresponding certificate. Certification Certificate for Equipment td .

[0133] If a trusted device is lost, the user can directly request the Certificate Authority (CA) to unbind the device, effectively preventing adversaries from impersonating the user and logging in using the lost device, thus enhancing the security of identity authentication. Furthermore, the user's signing private key is only used when binding or unbinding a device, effectively reducing the risk of private key leakage.

[0134] This invention provides a highly privacy-protected, secure, reliable, loss-resistant, and cross-service platform identity authentication scheme that can prevent Certificate Authority (CA) from obtaining a user's access patterns, and even if an adversary has obtained the user's bound device, they cannot impersonate the user to pass authentication.

[0135] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the forms disclosed herein and should not be construed as excluding other embodiments. It can be used in various other combinations, modifications, and environments, and can be altered within the scope of the concept described herein through the above teachings or related technologies or knowledge. Modifications and variations made by those skilled in the art that do not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be within the protection scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A secure cross-service platform identity authentication method based on digital certificates, applicable to Certificate Authority (CA) and user authentication. and n service providers In, the characteristic is that, The method comprises the following steps: System initialization stage: the system is initialized, the public parameters of the system are determined, and a certificate center CA generates a pair of public and private keys for issuing authentication credentials; Account registration stage: User requests to register an account with a service provider, if successful, the certificate center CA issues an account registration certificate to the user sends the account registration certificate to the user and forwards it to the corresponding service provider, the service provider creates an account for the user, the user generates an account backup, and the authentication is encrypted and stored in the certificate center CA; Device binding phase: user Select a trusted device Request device authentication from the certificate center CA, if successful, the certificate center CA issues device authentication credentials and sends them to the trusted device, the trusted device downloads the account backup from the certificate center CA, decrypts and stores it; User authentication phase: user Using the trusted device Requesting access to log into a service provider, the service provider randomly generates a session ID and sends it to the trusted device, the trusted device sends the device authentication credential to the certificate center CA and requests account credentials for authorizing multiple account logins, the certificate center CA verifies the device authentication credential, and if the verification is passed, it issues a general account credential and sends it to the trusted device, the trusted device generates account authentication credentials and session credentials for authorizing the authentication of the account, and then sends them to the service provider, the service provider verifies the received account authentication credentials and session credentials, and if the verification fails, access is denied, and if the verification is passed, the corresponding service is provided; Device unbundling stage: the user sends a request for canceling the authorization of the trusted device to the certificate center CA, and the certificate center CA revokes the authorization of the original trusted device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: The system initialization stage comprises the following specific steps: 1) Determine the system public parameter set where l is a security parameter, p is a prime number, G1, G2 are both p-order multiplicative cyclic groups, and the generators are g and g respectively G T is also a p-order multiplicative cyclic group, e: G1x G2→ G T is a bilinear mapping, H: {0, 1} * → G1is a secure hash function, E / D(·) represents a secure authentication encryption / decryption algorithm, and Sig / Vrfy(·) represents a secure digital signature / verification algorithm respectively; 2) user selecting an identity identifier ID u , a signature public-private key pair authentication encryption key and requesting from a certificate authority CA a corresponding user certificate 3) the certificate authority CA generates a pair of public and private keys (pk CA , sk CA ) for signing authentication credentials, wherein n+1 elements are chosen uniformly and consistently as private keys sk CA , and X = g x , where 1 < i < n, 1 < i≠j < n, as the respective public key pk CA .

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method further comprises: The account registration stage comprises the following specific steps: 1) User Selects a unique account identifier And generates a corresponding account public-private key pair User At a service provider The steps to register an account at a service provider include: a) user With user credentials Identity authentication through a certificate authority CA, and then send an account registration request to the certificate authority CA: b) the certificate center CA gives the user issuing account registration credentials setting the signature of the account registration credentials where pre_Cert denotes everything in the full credential except the signature of the credential issuer. c) user registering account credentials forwarding to service provider d) service provider by calculating verifying the account registration credentials are valid, the service provider stores and returns a registration success; 2) User generating account information at a service provider under which the user is registered. Encrypt the account information using an authentication encryption algorithm to obtain account backup: Recover the account and backup i Send to the certificate center CA; 3) Certificate Authority CA securely stores account backup Recover i .

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the method further comprises: The device binding stage comprises the following specific steps: 1) User Selecting a trusted device An identifier of the trusted device is And generate a corresponding device public-private key pair (pk td , sk td ); 2) User With user credentials Identity authentication by the certificate authority CA, and then sending a device authentication request to the certificate authority CA: 3) the certificate center CA gives the user an equipment authentication credential Cert td , the signature σ of the equipment authentication credential td = Sig(x, pre_Cert td ), where pre_Cert denotes everything in the credential except the credential issuer's signature, the user stores the equipment authentication credential Cert td in a trusted device ; 4) User Download own account backup from the certificate authority CA and decrypt the account information: 5) User Will be stored in a trusted device .

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises: The user authentication stage comprises the following specific steps: 1) user using a trusted device to a service provider sending a login request; 2) the service provider randomly generating a session identification and sending to a trusted device 3) trusted device randomly selected from the k service providers including the service provider generating a generic account authentication request: wherein generating a signature σ (1) = Sig(sk td , CSR acc ), then sending CSR acc , σ (1) , and Cert td to the certificate center CA; 4) The Certificate Authority (CA) calculates separately. Vrfy(X,σ td ) and Vrfy(pk td , σ (1) ) value verification CSR acc Cert td and σ (1) The validity of the certificate, where i = 1, 2, ..., k, is determined. If all verifications pass, the Certificate Authority (CA) is considered a trusted device. Issuance of general account credential Cert acc The signature of the general account credential is Where σ1=g, 5) Trusted device Upon receiving the generic account credential Cert acc After, the account authentication credential that authorizes authentication of the account is generated Signature of the account authentication credential wherein the random selection 6) Trusted device A session public-private key (pk ss , sk ss ) is generated, and then a session credential Cert ss is generated, the signature of the session credential where pre_Cert denotes everything in the full credential except the credential issuer's signature; 7) Trusted device Computing signature σ (2) = Sig(sk ss , ID ss ), and sending Cert Cert ss and σ (2) to the service provider 8) The service provider Through calculation Vrfy(pl ss , σ (1) Verify the session credentials Cert respectively. ss and signature σ (2) Whether it is valid can be determined by the equation: Verify account authentication credentials Is it valid? If so, allow the user. Log in, otherwise the user will be denied access. Log in.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises: The device unbundling stage comprises the following specific steps: 1) User With Identity authentication by the certificate center CA, then generate a device unbinding request Calculate signature And And σ (3) Send to the certificate center CA; 2) the certificate center CA verifies the signature σ by computing (3) whether it is valid, and if so, the certificate center CA revokes the device authentication credential Cert td corresponding to the device.​​ 7. The method of claim 5, wherein the method further comprises: The contents of the account registration credential, the device authentication credential, the general account credential, the account authentication credential and the session credential comprise: Basic information: including the receiver, the sender, the certificate serial number and the validity period, the credential is invalid after the validity period, and it needs to be re-applied for use again; Certificate fingerprint: the hash value of pre_Cert, pre_Cert represents all contents of the complete credential except the signature of the credential issuer; Account information: including the identifier of the account and the corresponding public key, and the hash value of the mapping; Certificate signature: different signatures are designed according to different requirements.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: The user and a certificate authority CA and n service providers establishes a secure channel using the secure transport layer protocol TLS and communicates using the secure channel.

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