Proxy signing method based on identity proxy signing protocol

By integrating proxy signature and encryption algorithms, the identity proxy signing protocol solves the problem of low efficiency in traditional methods, achieving more efficient computation and better key management, and is applicable to fields such as e-commerce, e-government, mobile agents, and electronic conferencing.

CN117353907BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17TARIM UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311272002.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-09-28
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2043-09-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing traditional encryption or signature algorithms require certificate authorities, resulting in low execution efficiency and key management issues. Furthermore, there are few identity proxy signature protocols, making it difficult to effectively combine signature and encryption algorithms to improve efficiency.

Method used

A method based on an identity proxy signature protocol is designed, which integrates proxy signature and encryption algorithm into a single logical step. By implementing system settings, key extraction, proxy key generation, proxy signature, and desealing processes, the number of executions and time overhead are reduced.

Benefits of technology

It improves the execution efficiency of proxy signatures, reduces the number of exponential and bilinear pairing operations, increases the total computational overhead, and provides cloud data sharing solutions in complex cloud environments.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a proxy signature method based on an identity proxy signature protocol in the field of network information security technology, including the following steps: (1) System setup: First, input system security parameters to obtain the system master key s and parameter params; (2) Key extraction: Obtain the ID by inputting the user identity. a public and private keys (Q a S a ID p public and private keys (Q p S p ID b public and private keys (Q b S b (3) Proxy key generation: ID a Generate an authorization certificate m w Send to ID p ID p After receiving the certificate, the proxy signature key S is further calculated. ap (4) Proxy signature: Input parameters params, message m, ID b public key Q b and ID p S ap , output the proxy signature encrypted text σ; (5) design and decrypt. This invention solves the confidentiality problem of proxy signature by combining proxy signature and encryption algorithm together, so that it can achieve two functions in a reasonable logical step, reducing the number of exponential operations and bilinear pairing operations, and improving the total computational overhead.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of network information security technology, specifically a proxy signature method based on an identity proxy signature protocol. Background Technology

[0002] The rapid development of information technology has brought great convenience to people's lives and production. At the same time, it has also given rise to many network information security issues. Cryptography is the core technology for maintaining cyberspace security. Traditional encryption or signature algorithms are designed separately, and most of them require a Certificate Authority (CA) to generate a certificate. This inevitably leads to low execution efficiency and key management problems. In order to solve these problems, many scholars have conducted relevant research.

[0003] With the development of public-key cryptography, more and more scholars are combining signature encryption with special properties in their research. Identity proxy signature encryption is widely used in e-commerce, e-government, mobile agents, and e-conference, and provides solutions for cloud data sharing in complex cloud environments. Currently, there are few identity proxy signature encryption protocols that meet the relevant properties, and how to utilize some special properties to construct identity proxy signature encryption protocols is a problem worthy of research. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a proxy signing method based on an identity proxy signing protocol, which mainly solves the problem of confidentiality of proxy signatures. The core idea of ​​the proxy signing protocol is to integrate proxy signing and encryption algorithms into a single logical step. Compared with the original scheme, the execution number and time overhead of the protocol designed in this invention are significantly improved.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows: a proxy signature method based on an identity proxy signature protocol, comprising the following steps:

[0006] (1) System settings:

[0007] First, input the system security parameters to obtain the system master key s and parameters params;

[0008] (2) Key extraction:

[0009] Get ID by entering user identity. a public and private keys (Q a ,S a ID p public and private keys (Q p ,S p ID b public and private keys (Q b ,S b );

[0010] (3) Proxy key generation:

[0011] ID a Generate an authorization certificate m w Send to ID p ID p After receiving the certificate, the proxy signature key S is further calculated. ap ;

[0012] (4) Agent's signature:

[0013] Input parameters params, message m, ID b public key Q b and ID p S ap Output the proxy-signed encrypted text σ;

[0014] (5) Deciphering the divination slip:

[0015] Input σ, parameters params, ID p public key Q p and ID b Private key S b Output m or the decryption symbol ⊥.

[0016] Further, (1) system settings, the specific steps are as follows:

[0017] Let G1 be an additive cyclic group of prime order q, G2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q, P be a generator of G1, and e be a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2.

[0018] PKG selects three secure hash functions H1:{0,1} * →G1, H3:G2×G2→{0,1} l ,

[0019] PKG randomly selects the system master key Computing system public key P pub =sP, and finally PKG publishes the system parameters params = {G1,G2,q,e,l,P} pub ,H1,H2,H3,H4}, but the master key s of the security system.

[0020] Furthermore, (2) key extraction, the specific steps are as follows:

[0021] PKG uses user U's identity ID U Calculate the user's private key S U =sQ U QU =H1(ID) U The user's public key is used to obtain the relevant user ID. U Public and private keys: Original signer ID a The public and private keys are (Q a ,S a ); Agent's ID p The public and private keys are (Q p ,S p ); Recipient ID b The public and private keys are (Q b ,S b ).

[0022] Furthermore, (3) the proxy key is generated, and the specific steps are as follows:

[0023] Original Signer ID a First, generate an authorization certificate. w Used to explain and represent the signer ID p The relationships between them and other restricted content;

[0024] 1) Original signer ID a Random selection Calculate U a =k a Q a , λ=U a S a V1=λH2(m w U a ), then (U a V1) Send the ID to the agent who signed the secret. p ;

[0025] 2) Agent's ID p Received the original signer ID a Sent over (U) a Verify whether the following equations hold true: (V1)

[0026] e(P,V1)=e(P pub U a Q a H2(m w U a ))

[0027] If the equation holds true, then calculate S. ap =S p +V1, here S ap It is the proxy signing key.

[0028] Furthermore, (4) agent signature, the specific steps are as follows:

[0029] Agent Signer ID p Random selection Then calculate U p =k p P pub , c=m⊕H3(R,U p ), μ=H4(m,ID a ID p ID b U p ,R), V2=μS ap Agent's ID p Let σ=(c,V2,U) a U p Send to recipient ID b .

[0030] Furthermore, (5) decryption, the specific steps are as follows:

[0031] Receiver ID b After receiving the ciphertext σ signed by the agent, calculate R = e(U p ,S b Q p Then restore message m = c⊕H3(R,U) p ), and calculate μ = H4(m, ID a ID p ID b U p Finally, verify whether the following equation holds true:

[0032] e(P,V2)=e(P pub H2(m w U a )U a Q a +Q p ) μ

[0033] If the equation holds, the agent's ciphertext σ = (c, V2, U) a U p ) and the ID of the agent signing the secret p If the public key is also authenticated, then the receiver ID... b The ID of the proxy signer is considered to be p The proxy signing of message m is valid, and m is accepted.

[0034] The above approach has the following beneficial effects:

[0035] 1. This invention combines proxy signature and encryption algorithms, enabling the implementation of both functions within a single logical step, while reducing the number of executions and time overhead compared to the original method. Compared to existing technologies, it reduces the number of exponential and bilinear pairing operations and improves overall computational efficiency.

[0036] 2. This invention allows for further research into the security of combining the protocol with other protocols within a general composable framework.

[0037] 3. This invention can be widely applied in e-commerce, e-government, mobile agency and e-conference, and provides solutions for cloud data sharing in complex cloud environments.

[0038] Additional aspects and advantages of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention. Attached Figure Description

[0039] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the identity proxy signing protocol framework of an embodiment of the proxy signing method based on the identity proxy signing protocol of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an embodiment of the proxy signature method based on the identity proxy signature protocol of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0041] Embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below. Examples of these embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

[0042] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the terms "longitudinal", "lateral", "vertical", "up", "down", "front", "back", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inner", and "outer" indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing this invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on this invention.

[0043] In the description of this invention, unless otherwise specified and limited, it should be noted that the terms "installation", "connection" and "linking" should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to mechanical or electrical connections, or internal connections between two components. They can be direct connections or indirect connections through an intermediate medium. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms according to the specific circumstances.

[0044] The following detailed description illustrates the specific implementation method:

[0045] Implementation, for example, attached Figure 1 The following describes a proxy signature method based on an identity proxy signature protocol, which includes the following steps:

[0046] (1) System settings:

[0047] First, input the system security parameters to obtain the system master key s and parameters params;

[0048] (2) Key extraction:

[0049] Get ID by entering user identity. a public and private keys (Q a ,S a ID p public and private keys (Q p ,S p ID b public and private keys (Q b ,S b );

[0050] (3) Proxy key generation:

[0051] ID a Generate an authorization certificate m w Send to ID p ID p After receiving the certificate, the proxy signature key S is further calculated. ap ;

[0052] (4) Agent's signature:

[0053] Input parameters params, message m, ID b public key Q b and ID p S ap Output the proxy-signed encrypted text σ;

[0054] (5) Deciphering the divination slip:

[0055] Input σ, parameters params, ID p public key Q p and IDb Private key S b Output m or the decryption symbol ⊥.

[0056] The specific steps are as follows:

[0057] (1) System settings:

[0058] Let G1 be an additive cyclic group of prime order q, G2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q, P be a generator of G1, and e be a bilinear mapping from G1×G1→G2.

[0059] PKG selects three secure hash functions H1:{0,1} * →G1, H3:G2×G2→{0,1} l ,

[0060] PKG randomly selects the system master key Computing system public key P pub =sP, and finally PKG publishes the system parameters params = {G1,G2,q,e,l,P} pub ,H1,H2,H3,H4}, but the master key s of the security system.

[0061] (2) Key extraction:

[0062] PKG uses user U's identity ID U Calculate the user's private key S U =sQ U Q U =H1(ID) U The user's public key is used to obtain the relevant user ID. U Public and private keys: Original signer ID a The public and private keys are (Q a ,S a ); Agent's ID p The public and private keys are (Q p ,S p ); Recipient ID b The public and private keys are (Q b ,S b ).

[0063] (3) Proxy key generation:

[0064] Original Signer ID a First, generate an authorization certificate. w Used to explain and represent the signer ID p The relationships between them and other restricted content;

[0065] 1) Original signer IDa Random selection Calculate U a =k a Q a , λ=U a S a V1=λH2(m w U a ), then (U a V1) Send the ID to the agent who signed the secret. p ;

[0066] 2) Agent's ID p Received the original signer ID a Sent over (U) a Verify whether the following equations hold true: (V1)

[0067] e(P,V1)=e(P pub U a Q a H2(m w U a ))

[0068] If the equation holds true, then calculate S. ap =S p +V1, here S ap It is the proxy signing key.

[0069] (4) Agent's signature:

[0070] Agent Signer ID p Random selection Then calculate U p =k p P pub , c=m⊕H3(R,U p ), μ=H4(m,ID a ID p ID b U p ,R), V2=μS ap Agent's ID p Let σ=(c,V2,U) a U p Send to recipient ID b .

[0071] (5) Deciphering the divination slip:

[0072] Receiver ID b After receiving the ciphertext σ signed by the agent, calculate R = e(U p ,S b Q pThen restore message m = c⊕H3(R,U) p ), and calculate μ = H4(m, ID a ID p ID b U p Finally, verify whether the following equation holds true:

[0073] e(P,V2)=e(P pub H2(m w U a )U a Q a +Q p ) μ

[0074] If the equation holds, the agent's ciphertext σ = (c, V2, U) a U p ) and the ID of the agent signing the secret p If the public key is also authenticated, then the receiver ID... b The ID of the proxy signer is considered to be p The proxy signing of message m is valid, and m is accepted.

[0075] I. Correctness Analysis of the Above Agreement

[0076] The correctness of the proposed protocol is ensured by the following verification equations.

[0077]

[0078] e(P,V1)=e(P,λH2(m w U a ))

[0079] =e(p,H2(m) w U a )U a S a )

[0080] =e(P,H2(m) w U a )U a sQ a )

[0081] =e(P pub H2(m w U a )U a Q a )

[0082] e(P,V2)=e(P,μS ap )

[0083] =e(P,V1+S) p ) μ

[0084] =e(P,H2(m) w U a )U a S a +sQ p ) μ

[0085] =e(P pub H2(m w U a )U a Q a +Q p ) μ

[0086] II. Security Analysis of the Above Protocols

[0087] (1) Confidentiality:

[0088] Theorem 1 states that in a stochastic divination model, if no polynomial-bounded adversary A can win the IND-CCA2 game (by a non-negligible margin ε) (performing q...), then... i H i Query (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), q E Secondary key extraction query, q ap Secondary proxy key query, q SC Sub-agent signature inquiry, q USC (In the second unsigned query), there exists a challenger C who can solve the BDH problem with an ε′ advantage.

[0089]

[0090] e is the base of the natural logarithm.

[0091] Proof: Instantiate a BDH problem (P, aP, bP, cP) with the aim of computing e = (P, P). abc To achieve this goal, A is treated as a subroutine of C, and is the adversary in the IND-CCA2 game, while C is the challenger.

[0092] The game begins, and Challenger C first runs Setup(1) k ), generating parameters params={G1,G2,q,e,l,P,P pub = aP, H1, H2, H3, H4}, and send params to A. In the game, tables L1~L4 and L ap(These five tables are initially empty) and are all maintained by Challenger C. H1 to H4 are recorded in L1 to L4, and the response values ​​of the proxy authorization query are recorded in L. ap .

[0093] Phase 1: A can perform a finite number of polynomial queries.

[0094] H1 query: C selects the i-th identity from q1 identities as the target identity for the challenge, and A is about ID. i For each query in the range (1≤i≤q1), if A queries C for ID. i If the hash function value already exists in L1, then return the corresponding value to A; otherwise, C selects f1∈ R If f1 = 1, return Q (0, 1). i =H1(ID) i =bP, then (ID) i Q i ,-,f i Record the data in table L1; otherwise, select... Return to Q i =H1(ID) i )=α i P, then (ID) i Q i ,α i f1) is recorded in the L1 table. Here, the probability of f1 = 0 is ρ, that is, ρ = Pr[f1 = 0].

[0095] H2 query: If C receives an H2 query from A, then C will check (m w U a If β is in the L2 list, return β; otherwise, C randomly selects β. Then send β to A, and add (m) w U a Write β) into the L2 table.

[0096] H3 query: If C receives an H3 query from A, C checks the tuple (R, U) p If γ exists in the L3 table, return γ; otherwise, select C. Then send γ to A, and (R,U) p ,γ) are recorded in the L3 table.

[0097] H4 Query: If C receives a query from A regarding H4, C checks (m, ID) a ID p ID b U p If C(R,μ) exists in the L4 table, return μ; otherwise, C randomly selects a value. Send μ to A, and set (m, ID) a ID p ID b U p Write R, μ) into the L4 table.

[0098] Key extraction query: A asks about identity ID i If the H1 oracle has already been queried and f1 = 0, then C calculates S. i =α i aP=α i P pub , will (ID) i Q i ,S i Write (f1) to the L1 table and return (Q) i ,S i Otherwise, abandon the game.

[0099] Proxy Key Query: If adversary A performs a proxy key generation operation and has already performed hash value and key extraction queries, and f1 = 0, then challenger C randomly selects... Calculate U a =k′ a Q a V 1i =H2(m wi U a )U a S a =βα i P pub S api =α i P pub +βα i Q a P pub and (m wi ,S api U a V 1i f1) Write to table L ap Otherwise, stop the game.

[0100] Proxy signature query: Adversary A can query any message m and authorization certificate m wi and ID a ID p and ID b Perform a proxy signature query. If a hash function value query, key extraction query, and proxy key query have already been performed, and f1 = 0, then proceed with the proxy signature algorithm; otherwise, perform the following calculation:

[0101] C selects a random number. Calculate U p =k′ p P, c=m⊕H3(R i U p V 2i =μS api +k p Q p .

[0102] 2) C returns the proxy signature σ = (c, m wi V 2i U a U p Give to A.

[0103] Deciphering the cipher: Opponent A chooses the ciphertext σ = (c, V) 2i U a U p Once adversary A inquires (m) wi ,σ i Whether it is legal or not, C will first check L. ap Find m in the table wi Then search table L1. If f1 = 0, the decryption algorithm runs normally; otherwise, C calculates: R i =e(U p ,S b ), m=c⊕H3(R i U p H3(R) can be found through the L3 table. i U p The value of ) and (R) i If the proxy signature is valid, send it to the oracle. Otherwise, it is invalid.

[0104] Challenge Phase: After the above queries, if f1 = 0, the game stops; otherwise, C chooses δ ∈ {0, 1} and sets... calculate And further submit the agent's signed encrypted document

[0105] Phase 2: A, like in Phase 1, performs a finite number of polynomial queries. Here, the identity is required to be ID. b The private key cannot be queried, and σ * Inquiries about deciphering the secrets are not allowed.

[0106] Conjecture: Finally, output δ′∈{0,1}, using δ′ as a conjecture about δ. If there exists δ=δ′, then challenger C further calculates... In other words, C solved the BDH problem; otherwise, it did not.

[0107] Probability Analysis: The probability that Challenger C will not give up the game in either Phase 1 or Phase 2 is... That is, during the key extraction phase, at least one identity is an ID. b Private key S b The probability of not being asked by A and not giving up the game during the challenge phase is: At the same time, A to R * The probability of performing query H3 is Therefore, challenger C will succeed. So the probability that challenger C solves the BDH problem is...

[0108]

[0109] (2) Unforgeability:

[0110] Theorem 2: If the advantage of any polynomial-bounded adversaries A1 and A2 in winning UF-CMA-I and UF-CMA-II games is negligible, then the IBPSC protocol is said to be unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (at most q...). i H i Query (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), q E Secondary key extraction query, q ap Secondary proxy key query, q SC Sub-agent signature inquiry, q USC In the UF-CMA-I game, there exists a challenger C who can unlock the secrets of the game. The advantage lies in solving the CDH problem; in the UF-CMA-II game, there exists a challenger C who can... Its advantages solve the CDH problem.

[0111] Proof: Given a random CDH problem instance (P, aP, bP), the goal is to compute abP ∈ G1. To achieve this goal, A acts as a subroutine of challenger C in the UF-CMA game, while C acts as the challenger of challenger A.

[0112] After the game starts, C runs Setup(1) k ), obtain the parameters: params={G1,G2,q,e,l,P,P pub = aP, H1, H3, H4}, and send params to A. In the game, challenger C maintains tables L1~L4 and L ap (These five tables are initially empty), and they record the query and response values ​​for H1 to H4 and the proxy authorization, respectively.

[0113] Inquiry phase: Same as Theorem 1.

[0114] Forgery: The forgery process varies depending on the adversary, as detailed below.

[0115] 1) A1 outputs forged proxy signature σ * If A1 has not been done... The private key and proxy signature query, at the same time σ * If the signature is decrypted and verified, A1 wins the game as defined.

[0116] Assume A1 outputs a valid forged proxy signature ciphertext. Here is C calls oracles H1, H2, and H4 to obtain α. p and μ. This can be obtained from table L1. (C output) The response to this CDH problem instance is because:

[0117]

[0118] Next, we analyze the probability that C successfully solves the CDH problem. A1 has not been analyzed. The probability of querying the private key and proxy key is: σ * The probability of passing the decryption verification is Therefore, the probability that C solves the CDH problem is ε′, where

[0119]

[0120] 2) A2 outputs forged proxy signature σ * If A2 has not been done. Private key query, and σ * If the signature is decrypted and verified, A2 wins the game as defined.

[0121] Assume A2 outputs a valid forged proxy signature ciphertext. Here settings C calls oracles H1 and H4 to obtain... and μ. This can be obtained from table L1. (C output) As an example of a CDH issue, the question and answer are as follows:

[0122]

[0123] The following analysis examines the probability of challenger C successfully solving the CDH problem. A2 has not been analyzed. The probability of querying the private key is σ *The probability of passing the decryption verification is Therefore, the probability that C solves the CDH problem is ε′, where

[0124]

[0125] (3) Undeniable:

[0126] As an identity proxy signing agreement, its non-repudiation means that when there is a dispute among the participating parties regarding the proxy signing, the ID... p The proxy signing of the message cannot be denied. This is because the verification equation includes m. w And ID p U p It is also part of the verification equation, as long as the ID p Regarding m w If the message is signed by a valid proxy, then the ID p That is undeniable.

[0127] (4) Can be publicly verified:

[0128] Publicly verifiable means that any third party can effectively verify the proxy signature result and determine whether the signature is an ID. a The authorized signature is valid. It can be verified by any third party.

[0129] e(P,V2)=e(P pub H2(m w U a )Q a +Q p ) μ

[0130] If the equation holds, σ=(c,V2,U a U p ) and ID p The public key is authenticated simultaneously, and the ID is also authenticated. b I believe ID p The proxy signature of message m is valid, and m is received.

[0131] III. Performance Analysis of the Above Protocols

[0132] The computational overhead of the identity proxy signature protocol mainly lies in the bilinear pairing, scalar multiplication, and exponentiation operations on G1. Here, E represents one exponentiation operation, M represents one scalar multiplication operation on G1, P represents one bilinear pairing operation on G1, and H represents one hash function operation. Let the time of one hash function operation be t. H Based on the literature summary, the following relationship exists: P≈1440t H M≈29t H E≈21tH H≈t H .

[0133] Table 1 Efficiency Comparison

[0134]

[0135] As can be seen from Table 1, compared to the total overhead of Protocol 1, it is 13247t. H Compared to Protocol 2, it is 8956t. H The comparison protocol 3 is 8927t. H This agreement is for 7432t H All the protocols compared above utilize bilinear pairing and have been proven semantically safe in stochastic oracle models. Compared to Comparison Protocol 1, this protocol has a significantly lower overall overhead. Compared to Comparison Protocols 2 and 3, this protocol reduces the number of exponentiation and bilinear pairing operations and also outperforms these two protocols in terms of overall computational overhead.

[0136] The above descriptions are merely embodiments of the present invention, and common knowledge such as specific structures and / or characteristics in the solutions are not described in detail here. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the structure of the present invention, and these should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention. These modifications and improvements will not affect the effectiveness of the implementation of the present invention or the practicality of the patent. The scope of protection claimed in this application should be determined by the content of its claims, and the specific embodiments described in the specification can be used to interpret the content of the claims.

Claims

1. A proxy signature method based on an identity proxy signature protocol, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: (1) System settings: First, input the system security parameters to obtain the system master key. and parameters ; (2) Key extraction: By entering the user's identity, you can get public and private keys , public and private keys , public and private keys ; (3) Proxy key generation: Generate an authorization certificate Send to , After receiving the certificate, the proxy signing key is further calculated. ; (4) Agent's signature: Input parameters ,information , public key and of Output proxy signed encrypted text ; (5) Deciphering the divination slip: enter ,parameter , public key and private key Output Or the symbols for deciphering the divination slip ; (1) System settings, the specific steps are as follows: set up It is a prime number. Additive cyclic group, It is a prime number. Multiplication cyclic group, yes generator, yes a bilinear mapping; PKG selects three secure hash functions , , , ; PKG randomly selects the system master key public key of computing system Finally, PKG released the system parameters. But the master key of the security system ; (2) Key extraction, the specific steps are as follows: PKG based on user identity Calculate the user's private key ,in The user's public key; thus obtaining the relevant user information. Public and private keys: original signer The public and private keys are Agent signing secret The public and private keys are ; receiver The public and private keys are ; (3) Proxy key generation, the specific steps are as follows: Original signer First, generate an authorization certificate. Used to explain and represent the signatory The relationships between them and other restricted content; 1) Original signatory Random selection ,calculate , , Then Send to the agent who signed the secret ; 2) Agent signing secret Receiver of the original signature Sent over Verify whether the following equations are true: ; If the equation is true, then calculate. ,here It is the agent's signature key; (4) Proxy signing, the specific steps are as follows: Agent signing secret Random selection Then calculate , , , , Agent signing secret Will Send to the recipient ; (5) Deciphering the divination slip, the specific steps are as follows: Receiver Received the agent's signed encrypted message Then, calculate Then restore message and calculate Finally, verify whether the following equation holds true: ; If the equation holds true, the agent will sign the encrypted message. and agents signing secrets If the public key is also authenticated, then the recipient Those who believe that the agent signed the secret Regarding the message The agent's signature is legal and accepted. .

Citation Information

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