Authentication methods, devices, communication equipment and storage media

By generating TLS pre-defined certificates in 5G SBA, the problem of lack of standardized certificate management is solved, a trust chain is established, and reliable authentication is achieved in the same security domain and different security domains, thereby improving authentication reliability.

CN117413557BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17BEIJING XIAOMI MOBILE SOFTWARE CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202280001718.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-05-13
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2042-05-13

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the service-based architecture (SBA) of fifth-generation mobile communication technology (5G), the lack of a standardized automated certificate management model and trust chain leads to complex certificate lifecycle management, increases security risks, and affects network deployment and availability.

Method used

The first Certificate Authority (CA) generates a pre-defined certificate based on the TLS (Transmission Security Protocol) protocol, including Type I and Type II certificates, for entity authentication in the same and different security domains, establishing a chain of trust and improving the authentication mechanism.

Benefits of technology

It improves the authentication reliability of wireless communication networks, ensures that entities in the same and different security domains can be reliably authenticated, and improves the authentication mechanism of wireless communication networks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This disclosure provides an authentication method, wherein the method is performed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes: generating a predetermined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS); wherein the predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following: a first type certificate of an entity located in a first security domain of the first root CA; a second type certificate of an entity located in a second security domain of a second CA, wherein the second type certificate is used at least for TLS authentication between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to, but is not limited to, the field of wireless communication technology, and particularly to an authentication method, apparatus, communication device, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Transport Layer Security (TLS) is ubiquitous in Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of 5G mobile communication technology. However, unlike the standardized model using Certificate Management Protocol v2 (CMPv2) in wireless networks, SBA lacks a standardized model and set of procedures for automated certificate management. SBA also lacks a standardized protocol for managing certificate lifecycle events. Therefore, automated certificate management within the SBA architecture warrants further investigation. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This disclosure presents an authentication method, apparatus, communication device, and storage medium.

[0004] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first root certificate authority (CA), the method comprising:

[0005] Generate a pre-defined certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol).

[0006] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0007] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0008] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0009] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0010] Send the pre-defined certificate to the entity.

[0011] In one embodiment, generating a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes:

[0012] In response to the interconnection protocol reached between the first security domain and the second security domain, the second type of certificate is generated.

[0013] In one embodiment, generating a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes:

[0014] Generate a first type of certificate signed with the private key of the first root CA;

[0015] And / or,

[0016] Generate a second type of certificate based on the private key signature of the first root CA.

[0017] In one embodiment, generating a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes:

[0018] Generate the root certificate;

[0019] The root certificate is used to generate the first type of certificate.

[0020] In one embodiment, the entity includes at least one of the following:

[0021] Root CA;

[0022] TLS server CA;

[0023] TLS client CA;

[0024] TLS proxy CA;

[0025] TLS server;

[0026] TLS client;

[0027] TLS proxy.

[0028] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first type entity, the method comprising:

[0029] Obtain a pre-ordered certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol) secure transport protocol;

[0030] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0031] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0032] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0033] In one embodiment, obtaining a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes:

[0034] Obtain the pre-configured reserved certificate;

[0035] or,

[0036] Receive the pre-defined certificate sent by the first CA.

[0037] In one embodiment, the first type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0038] TLS server CA;

[0039] TLS client CA;

[0040] TLS proxy CA.

[0041] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0042] Generate the third type of certificate based on the private key signature of the first type of entity.

[0043] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0044] Send a third type of certificate to a second type of entity, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0045] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS client CA; the second type of entity is a TLS client; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes:

[0046] Send the TLS client certificate to the TLS client.

[0047] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS server CA; the second type of entity is a TLS server; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes:

[0048] Send the TLS server certificate to the TLS server.

[0049] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS proxy CA; the second type of entity is a TLS proxy; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes:

[0050] Send the TLS proxy certificate to the TLS proxy.

[0051] In one embodiment, sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes:

[0052] Send the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate to the second type of entity.

[0053] In one embodiment, the second type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0054] TLS server

[0055] TLS client

[0056] TLS proxy.

[0057] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a second type entity, the method comprising:

[0058] Obtain a third type of certificate, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0059] In one embodiment, obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0060] Obtain the pre-configured third-type certificate;

[0061] or,

[0062] Receive the third type certificate sent by the first type entity.

[0063] In one embodiment, the first type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0064] TLS server CA;

[0065] TLS client CA;

[0066] TLS proxy CA.

[0067] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS client CA; the second type of entity is a TLS client; obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0068] Receive the TLS client certificate sent by the TLS client CA.

[0069] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS server CA; the second type of entity is a TLS server; obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0070] Receive the TLS server certificate sent by the TLS server CA.

[0071] In one embodiment, the first type of entity is a TLS proxy CA; the second type of entity is a TLS proxy; obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0072] Receive the TLS proxy certificate sent by the TLS proxy CA.

[0073] In one embodiment, obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0074] Receive the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate sent by the first type of entity.

[0075] In one embodiment, the second type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0076] TLS server;

[0077] TLS client;

[0078] TLS proxy.

[0079] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a TLS client, the method comprising:

[0080] Upon receiving a TLS server certificate from a TLS server, the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate is determined;

[0081] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0082] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate includes:

[0083] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate based on the TLS server CA certificate.

[0084] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0085] The root certificate generated by the root CA of the security domain is used to verify whether the certificate of the TLS server CA is trustworthy.

[0086] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, the method comprising:

[0087] In response to receiving a second TLS proxy certificate sent by a second TLS proxy in a second security domain, the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate is determined.

[0088] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate includes:

[0089] Verify the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate based on the TLS proxy CA certificate in the second security domain.

[0090] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0091] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS proxy CA certificate based on the root certificate in the second security domain.

[0092] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0093] Verify the trustworthiness of the root certificate in the second security domain based on the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0094] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, the method comprising:

[0095] In response to receiving a TLS client certificate sent by a TLS client in the first security domain, the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate is determined.

[0096] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate includes:

[0097] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate based on the TLS client CA certificate in the first security domain.

[0098] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0099] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS client CA certificate based on the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0100] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication method is provided, wherein the method is performed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, the method comprising:

[0101] In response to receiving a TLS server certificate sent by a TLS server in the first security domain, the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate is determined.

[0102] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate includes:

[0103] The TLS server certificate is verified for trustworthiness based on the public key of the TLS server CA in the first security domain.

[0104] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0105] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server CA certificate based on the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0106] According to an eighth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0107] The generation module is configured to generate pre-defined certificates based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol).

[0108] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0109] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0110] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0111] According to a ninth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0112] The receiving module is configured to receive pre-defined certificates based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol).

[0113] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0114] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0115] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0116] According to a tenth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0117] The receiving module is configured to acquire a third-type certificate, wherein the third-type certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0118] According to an eleventh aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0119] The determination module is configured to: in response to receiving a TLS server certificate from a TLS server, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate;

[0120] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0121] According to a twelfth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0122] The determination module is configured to: in response to receiving a second TLS proxy certificate sent by a second TLS proxy in a second security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the certificate of the second TLS proxy.

[0123] According to a thirteenth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0124] The determination module is configured to: in response to receiving a TLS client certificate sent by a TLS client in the first security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate.

[0125] According to a fourteenth aspect of the present disclosure, an authentication apparatus is provided, wherein the apparatus includes:

[0126] The determination module is configured to: in response to receiving a TLS server certificate sent by a TLS server in a first security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate.

[0127] According to a fifteenth aspect of the present disclosure, a communication device is provided, the communication device comprising:

[0128] processor;

[0129] Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions;

[0130] The processor is configured to implement the method described in any embodiment of this disclosure when running the executable instructions.

[0131] According to a sixteenth aspect of the present disclosure, a computer storage medium is provided, the computer storage medium storing a computer executable program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the methods described in any embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0132] In this embodiment, a predetermined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) is generated. The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following: a first-type certificate for an entity within a first security domain where a first Certificate Authority (CA) resides; and a second-type certificate for an entity within a second security domain where a second CA resides. The second-type certificate is used at least for TLS authentication between entities in the first and second security domains. Thus, since the first CA can generate the first-type certificate and / or the second-type certificate, entities within the same security domain can authenticate each other based on the first-type certificate, and / or entities in different security domains can authenticate each other based on the second-type certificate. Compared to situations without intra-domain entity authentication and / or inter-domain entity authentication, this improves the authentication mechanism of the wireless communication network and enhances the authentication reliability of the wireless communication network. Attached Figure Description

[0133] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of a wireless communication system according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0134] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0135] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an SBA architecture according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0136] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a trust chain according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0137] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a trust chain according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0138] Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0139] Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0140] Figure 8 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0141] Figure 9 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0142] Figure 10 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0143] Figure 11 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0144] Figure 12 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0145] Figure 13 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0146] Figure 14 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0147] Figure 15 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0148] Figure 16 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0149] Figure 17 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0150] Figure 18This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0151] Figure 19 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0152] Figure 20 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0153] Figure 21 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0154] Figure 22 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0155] Figure 23 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0156] Figure 24 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0157] Figure 25 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0158] Figure 26 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0159] Figure 27 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0160] Figure 28 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0161] Figure 29 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0162] Figure 30 This is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0163] Figure 31 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0164] Figure 32 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0165] Figure 33 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0166] Figure 34 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0167] Figure 35 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0168] Figure 36 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0169] Figure 37 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an authentication device according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0170] Figure 38 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0171] Figure 39 This is a block diagram illustrating a base station according to an exemplary embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0172] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numerals in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with those of this disclosure. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of embodiments of this disclosure.

[0173] The terminology used in this disclosure is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the embodiments of this disclosure. The singular forms “a” and “the” as used in this disclosure are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used herein refers to and includes any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0174] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc., may be used to describe various information in embodiments of this disclosure, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, first information may also be referred to as second information without departing from the scope of embodiments of this disclosure, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "when," "when," or "in response to a determination."

[0175] For the sake of brevity and ease of understanding, the terms “greater than” or “less than” are used in this document to characterize size relationships. However, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the term “greater than” also includes the meaning of “greater than or equal to”, and “less than” also includes the meaning of “less than or equal to”.

[0176] Please refer to Figure 1 This illustration shows a schematic diagram of the structure of a wireless communication system provided in an embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the wireless communication system is a communication system based on mobile communication technology. The wireless communication system may include: several user equipment 110 and several base stations 120.

[0177] User equipment 110 can be a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to a user. User equipment 110 can communicate with one or more core networks via a Radio Access Network (RAN). User equipment 110 can be an Internet of Things (IoT) user equipment, such as sensor devices, mobile phones, and computers with IoT user equipment capabilities. For example, it can be a fixed, portable, pocket-sized, handheld, computer-embedded, or vehicle-mounted device. Examples include a station (STA), subscriber unit, subscriber station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, access point, remote terminal, access terminal, user terminal, user agent, user device, or user equipment. Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a device from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a vehicle-mounted device, such as a vehicle computer with wireless communication capabilities, or a wireless user equipment connected to an external vehicle computer. Alternatively, user equipment 110 can also be a roadside device, such as a street light, traffic light, or other roadside device with wireless communication capabilities.

[0178] Base station 120 can be a network-side device in a wireless communication system. This wireless communication system can be a fourth-generation mobile communication (4G) system, also known as a Long Term Evolution (LTE) system; or it can be a 5G system, also known as a New Radio (NR) system; or it can be the next generation after 5G. In this case, the access network in the 5G system can be called NG-RAN (New Generation-Radio Access Network).

[0179] The base station 120 can be an evolved NB (eNB) used in a 4G system. Alternatively, the base station 120 can also be a gNB (gNB) using a centralized-distributed architecture in a 5G system. When the base station 120 adopts a centralized-distributed architecture, it typically includes a central unit (CU) and at least two distributed units (DUs). The central unit is equipped with a protocol stack of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer, the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, and the Media Access Control (MAC) layer; the distributed units are equipped with a physical (PHY) layer protocol stack. This disclosure does not limit the specific implementation of the base station 120.

[0180] Base station 120 and user equipment 110 can establish a wireless connection via a wireless air interface. In different implementations, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fourth-generation mobile communication network technology (4G) standard; or, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fifth-generation mobile communication network technology (5G) standard, such as a new air interface; or, the wireless air interface can also be a wireless air interface based on a next-generation mobile communication network technology standard based on 5G.

[0181] In some embodiments, user equipment 110 can also establish E2E (End to End) connections. Examples include V2V (vehicle to vehicle), V2I (vehicle to Infrastructure), and V2P (vehicle to pedestrian) communication scenarios in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication.

[0182] Here, the user equipment mentioned above can be considered as the terminal equipment in the following embodiments.

[0183] In some embodiments, the wireless communication system described above may further include a network management device 130.

[0184] Several base stations 120 are connected to network management device 130. Network management device 130 can be a core network device in a wireless communication system, such as a Mobility Management Entity (MME) in an Evolved Packet Core (EPC). Alternatively, it can be other core network devices, such as a Serving Gateway (SGW), a Public Data Network Gateway (PGW), a Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), or a Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The implementation of network management device 130 is not limited in this embodiment.

[0185] To facilitate understanding by those skilled in the art, this disclosure provides multiple embodiments to clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this disclosure. Of course, those skilled in the art will understand that the multiple embodiments provided in this disclosure can be executed individually, or in combination with the methods of other embodiments in this disclosure, or individually or in combination with some methods in other related technologies; this disclosure does not limit these aspects.

[0186] To better understand the technical solutions described in any embodiment of this disclosure, the application scenarios in the related technologies are first explained:

[0187] TLS certificates are ubiquitous in 5G SBA. Certificate-based Internet Protocol (IP) protocols will be used to protect Scaleable Bandwidth Interconnect (SBI) interfaces, such as N4 or N9. However, unlike the standardized model using CMPv2 in wireless networks, SBA lacks a standardized model and set of procedures for automating certificate management.

[0188] The SBA also lacks a standardized protocol for managing certificate lifecycle events, such as bootstrapping, requesting, issuing, registering, revoking, and renewing.

[0189] 1. The lack of standardization leads to many customized or proprietary methods and different choices of certificate management protocols, resulting in inconsistent models.

[0190] 2. Once service slicing and non-public networks (NPNs) are introduced into a service provider network, the architecture may become further complicated by the manual management or lack of standardized procedures for lifecycle management of TLS certificates belonging to entities under different laws.

[0191] All of the above may increase security risks and affect the deployment and availability of operators' 5G SBA networks.

[0192] To fill the gap in SBA's automated certificate management, the first step should be to examine the chain of trust within the SBA architecture. Only after the chain of trust is confirmed can the standardized protocols used to manage the lifecycle be analyzed.

[0193] Unlike the standardized model using CMPv2 in wireless networks, SBA lacks a standardized model and chain of trust for automated certificate management. Therefore, research on automated certificate management within the SBA architecture faces several issues requiring further investigation.

[0194] In some embodiments, at least one of the following needs to be implemented:

[0195] 1. Establish a trust chain in the certificate authority hierarchy within the SBA architecture.

[0196] 2. Issue appropriate certificates for different 5G network functions (NFs).

[0197] 3. Ensure that 5G NF can verify certificates issued in the same security domain and different security domains.

[0198] like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes:

[0199] Step 21: Generate a pre-defined certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol) secure transport protocol;

[0200] The reserved certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0201] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0202] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0203] It should be noted that the entities in the SBA involved in this disclosure can be of various types, such as entities in fifth-generation mobile communication (5G) networks or other evolved entities. In some embodiments of this disclosure, an entity can be deployed as a standalone communication node or deployed uniformly within existing network elements. In short, an entity can be understood as a logical node that can be flexibly deployed in a network, and no limitation is made here. Please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 3 This illustrates a trust chain within a Certificate Authority hierarchy in an SBA. It includes two security domains: Security Domain A (corresponding to the first security domain in step 21) and Security Domain B (corresponding to the second security domain in step 21). This SBA includes at least one of the following entities:

[0204] Root CA A (Root CA A );

[0205] Root CA B (Root CA B );

[0206] TLS server CA A (TLS server CA A );

[0207] TLS Proxy CA A (TLS Proxy CA A );

[0208] TLS Client CA A (TLS client CA A );

[0209] TLS server CA B (TLS server CA B );

[0210] TLS Proxy CA B (TLS Proxy CA B );

[0211] TLS Client CA B (TLS client CA B );

[0212] TLS Proxy A2 A2 );

[0213] TLS Proxy A1 A1);

[0214] TLS Proxy B2 B2 );

[0215] TLS Proxy B1 B1 );

[0216] TLS Server A A );

[0217] TLS Client A A );

[0218] TLS Server B B );

[0219] TLS Client B B ).

[0220] In this diagram, solid arrows represent certificate issuance (Issues a certificate); dashed arrows represent TLS connection establishment (Establishes a TLS connection). It should be noted that the English-Chinese translations in the accompanying diagrams can be found in this section; they will not be repeated in the diagrams themselves. For example, Figure 3 , Figure 4 and Figure 5 Explanation.

[0221] In this embodiment, security domain A can also correspond to the second security domain, and security domain B can also correspond to the first security domain; no limitation is made here. It should be noted that when the first security domain is security domain A, the first root certificate authority (CA) is the TLS server CA. A When the first security domain is security domain B, and the first root certificate authority (CA) is the TLS server CA... B In this embodiment of the disclosure, the number of security domains may also be greater than two, for example, three, and is not limited here.

[0222] Root Certificate Authority (CA): The CA is the anchor of trust in the trust chain within a security domain. There can only be one root CA in each security domain. The root CA generates a root certificate, which is a self-signed certificate. All certificates in the security domain are directly or indirectly signed by this root certificate. When operators (where different operators may correspond to different security domains, for example, operator A may correspond to security domain A) reach an interconnection agreement, the root CA generates a cross certificate. Here, the second type of certificate in step 21 can be a cross certificate to ensure mutual authentication between two Transport Layer Security (TLS) terminal entities in two different security domains. The generated cross certificate can be configured locally in each security domain (the root CA can send this cross certificate to different entities) and stored together with the root certificate in the TLS terminal entity. For example, the first root CA could be the root CA in security domain A. A It should be noted that the first type of certificate generated can itself be the root certificate.

[0223] TLS Client CA: A CA that distributes TLS client certificates to TLS clients within a specific operator's security domain.

[0224] TLS Server CA: A CA that distributes TLS server certificates to TLS servers within a specific operator's security domain.

[0225] TLS Proxy CA: A CA that distributes TLS proxy certificates to TLS proxies within a specific operator's security domain.

[0226] TLS Server: A TLS endpoint entity that acts as a producer of 5G Network Functions (NFs). The TLS server possesses a TLS server certificate issued by a TLS Server CA. Here, the NF can be an Access Control and Mobility Management Function (AMF) or a Session Management Function (SMF), etc.

[0227] TLS Client: A TLS terminal entity that acts as a consumer of a 5G Network Function (NF). The TLS client possesses a TLS client certificate issued by a TLS Client CA. Here, the NF can be an Access Control and Mobility Management Function (AMF) or a Session Management Function (SMF), etc.

[0228] TLS Proxy: A network function that acts as a proxy in a Service Based Architecture (SBA) (e.g., Service Communication Proxy (SCP) and Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP)). This TLS proxy can act as an intermediary between TLS clients and TLS servers, or assist TLS end entities in establishing TLS connections between security domains. TLS entities can verify the identity of the TLS proxy by verifying its TLS proxy certificate.

[0229] It should be noted that, considering that some TLS end entities can act as both NF producers and NF consumers, they may need TLS client certificates and TLS server certificates.

[0230] For TLS connections within a security domain, please refer to the trust chain section. Figure 4 Since the TLS server, TLS client, and TLS proxy all trust the same root CA, they can authenticate each other by verifying entity certificates. Here, TLS entity certificates include the TLS server certificate, TLS client certificate, and TLS proxy certificate.

[0231] For TLS connections between security domains, please refer to the trust chain section. Figure 5 TLS connections between security domains are primarily established between TLS proxies in different security domains. Figure 5 This illustrates a cross-domain trust chain. For example... Figure 5 As shown, TLS proxyA trusts TLSproxy CA. A TLS Proxy CA A Trust Root CA A Root CA A Trust Root CA B Considering the Root CA B If TLS proxyA is a trust anchor in security domain B, then TLS proxyA trusts the TLS entity within security domain B. Conversely, if TLS proxyB is a trust anchor in security domain C, then TLS proxyA trusts the TLS entity within security domain B. B TLS proxy CA B Trust Root CA B Root CA B Trust Root CA A Considering the Root CA A It is the trust anchor in security domain A, and TLS proxyB trusts the TLS entities within security domain A.

[0232] In one embodiment, a predetermined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) is generated; wherein the predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following: a first type certificate of an entity located in a first security domain where a first root CA resides; a second type certificate of an entity located in a second security domain where a second CA resides, the second type certificate being used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain. The predetermined certificate is then sent to the entity.

[0233] In one embodiment, generating a certificate in the SBA may include:

[0234] 1. Generate Type 1 certificates for TLS servers, TLS clients, or TLS proxies within a security domain (e.g., within the first security domain):

[0235] The root CA generates a first-type certificate, signed with the private key of the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA. The TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA generates a corresponding third-type certificate, signed with the private key of the intermediate-level CA. This third-type certificate contains the public key and can be used to establish a TLS tunnel between TLS entities. Here, the intermediate-level CA can be any of the following: TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA.

[0236] 2. Generate certificates for TLS proxies across security domains (e.g., between the first and second security domains):

[0237] Root CA A Generate by Root CA A TLS proxy CA signed with private key A Certificate (corresponding to the first type of certificate). TLS proxy CA A Generate a certificate for TLS proxyA (corresponding to a third-class certificate), which uses a TLS proxy CA. A The private key is used for signing. The TLS proxyA certificate contains the public key and can be used to establish a TLS tunnel between TLS entities.

[0238] Root CA A Generate by Root CA A Root CA signed with private key B Cross-certificate (corresponding to the second type of certificate). Root CA B Generate by Root CA B Root CA signed with private key A Cross-certificate. Root CA Aand Root CA B The trust relationship between them allows inter-domain TLS proxies in different security domains to verify each other.

[0239] In one embodiment, the certificate can be verified in the SBA.

[0240] Validating certificates in an SBA architecture:

[0241] 1. Verify TLS certificates between TLS entities within the security domain:

[0242] Assuming the TLS client and TLS server are in the same security domain (e.g., the first security domain) and a self-signed certificate of the root CA (i.e., the root certificate) is pre-configured, when the TLS client receives the TLS server's certificate as part of the TLS handshake, the TLS client performs the following procedure:

[0243] Step a1: The TLS client checks to ensure the TLS server certificate has not expired. Since the TLS server certificate is signed by the TLS server CA, the TLS client attempts to obtain the TLS server CA certificate. Once the TLS server CA certificate is obtained, the TLS client uses the public key in the TLS server CA certificate to verify that the TLS server certificate is correctly signed.

[0244] Step a2: The TLS client attempts to verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server CA certificate. Given that the TLS server CA certificate is signed by the root CA, the TLS client uses the public key from the provided self-signed root certificate to verify the signature of the TLS server CA certificate.

[0245] Step a3: The TLS client has a pre-installed self-signed root certificate that is implicitly trusted by the TLS client, thus ensuring that the public key in the root certificate is trustworthy. At this point, the TLS client successfully verifies the identity of the TLS server, establishes a trust chain to the TLS server, and completes the TLS handshake within the security domain.

[0246] Similarly, in the case of two-way authentication, the TLS server can verify the TLS client certificate, verify the identity of the TLS client, and complete the TLS handshake within the security domain.

[0247] 2. Verify the TLS certificates between TLS proxies in the security domains:

[0248] Suppose TLS proxyA and TLS proxyB are in different security domains and have pre-installed self-signed certificates of their root CAs (e.g., TLS proxyA has pre-installed a root CA). A The self-signed certificate, TLS proxyB pre-configures the root CA. B(Self-signed certificate). When TLS proxyA receives the certificate of TLS proxyB as part of an SSL or TLS handshake, TLS proxyA performs the following procedure.

[0249] Step b1: TLS proxyA checks to ensure that TLS proxyB's certificate has not expired. This is because TLS proxyB's certificate is issued by the TLS proxy CA. B It is signed, therefore TLS proxyA will attempt to obtain the TLS proxy CA. B Certificate. Once you obtain the TLS proxy CA... B Certificate, TLS proxyA uses TLS proxy CA B The public key in the certificate is used to verify whether the TLS proxy B certificate is correctly signed.

[0250] Step b2: TLS proxyA attempts to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering TLS proxy CAs... B The certificate is issued by the root CA. B If signed, TLS proxy A will attempt to obtain the root CA. B Certificate. Obtain the root CA. B After obtaining the certificate, TLS proxyA uses the root CA. B The public key in the certificate is used to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate correctly signed?

[0251] Step b3: TLS proxyA attempts to verify the Root CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering the root CA. B The certificate is issued by the Root CA. A For the signed TLS proxyA, the public key from the pre-signed root certificate is used to verify the root CA. B The signature on the certificate.

[0252] Step b4: TLS proxyA has a pre-installed self-signed root certificate implicitly trusted by TLS proxyA, thus ensuring the root CA. A The public key in the root certificate is trusted. At this point, TLS proxyA successfully verifies the identity of TLS proxyB, establishes a trust chain to TLS proxyB, and completes the SSL or TLS handshake between security domains.

[0253] It should be noted that the Root CA A Issuing a Root CA BThe certificate provided is called a cross certificate (corresponding to the second type of certificate in this disclosure). A TLS entity may request a cross certificate as needed or provide one in advance (stored together with the self-signed root certificate).

[0254] In this embodiment, a predetermined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) is generated. The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following: a first-type certificate of an entity within a first security domain where a first Certificate Authority (CA) resides; and a second-type certificate of an entity within a second security domain where a second CA resides. This certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first and second security domains. Since the first CA can generate both the first-type and / or second-type certificates, entities within the same security domain can authenticate each other based on the first-type certificate, and / or entities in different security domains can authenticate each other based on the second-type certificate. Compared to situations without intra-domain entity authentication and / or inter-domain entity authentication, this improves the authentication mechanism of the wireless communication network and enhances its reliability.

[0255] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0256] like Figure 6 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes:

[0257] Step 61: Send a pre-ordered certificate to the entity, wherein the pre-ordered certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0258] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0259] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0260] In one embodiment, a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) is generated; the pre-defined certificate is sent to the entity, wherein the pre-defined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0261] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0262] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0263] In this way, once an entity receives the pre-ordered certificate, it can use the pre-ordered certificate for the entity's authentication.

[0264] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0265] like Figure 7 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes:

[0266] Step 71: In response to the interconnection protocol reached between the first security domain and the second security domain, generate a second type of certificate;

[0267] The second type of certificate is the certificate of the entity located in the second security domain where the second root CA is located. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0268] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0269] like Figure 8 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes:

[0270] Step 81: Generate a first type of certificate signed with the private key of the first root CA; and / or, generate a second type of certificate signed with the private key of the first root CA;

[0271] The first type of certificate is the certificate of the entity located in the first security domain of the first root CA; the second type of certificate is the certificate of the entity located in the second security domain of the second root CA. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0272] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0273] like Figure 9 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes:

[0274] Step 91: Generate a root certificate; wherein the root certificate is used to generate a first type of certificate, wherein the first type of certificate is the certificate of the entity in the first security domain where the first root CA is located.

[0275] The first type of certificate can be a certificate of a TLS server CA, a TLS client CA, or a TLS proxy CA.

[0276] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0277] like Figure 10 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, and the method includes:

[0278] Step 101: Obtain a pre-ordered certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol) secure transport protocol;

[0279] The reserved certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0280] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0281] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0282] In one embodiment, obtaining a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes:

[0283] Obtain the pre-configured reserved certificate;

[0284] or,

[0285] Receive the pre-defined certificate sent by the first CA.

[0286] In one embodiment, the first type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0287] TLS server CA;

[0288] TLS client CA;

[0289] TLS proxy CA.

[0290] In one embodiment, the root CA generates a first-type certificate signed with its private key as a TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA. This first-type certificate is the certificate of an entity within the first security domain where the first root CA resides. The root CA sends the first-type certificate to the first-type entity. The first-type entity receives the first-type certificate based on the TLS secure transport protocol. The TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA generates a corresponding third-type certificate signed with the private key of an intermediate-layer CA as a TLS server, TLS client, or TLS proxy. This third-type certificate contains a public key and can be used to establish a TLS tunnel between TLS entities. Here, the intermediate-layer CA can be any one of the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA.

[0291] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0292] like Figure 11 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, and the method includes:

[0293] Step 111: Send a third type of certificate to the second type of entity, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0294] In one embodiment, the second type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0295] TLS server;

[0296] TLS client;

[0297] TLS proxy.

[0298] In one embodiment, the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA generates a corresponding third-type certificate for the TLS server, TLS client, or TLS proxy, signed with the private key of an intermediate CA. This third-type certificate contains a public key and can be used to establish a TLS tunnel between TLS entities. Here, the intermediate CA can be any one of the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA.

[0299] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0300] like Figure 12 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, and the method includes:

[0301] Step 121: Generate a third-type certificate based on the private key signature of the first-type entity.

[0302] In one embodiment, a third-type certificate is generated based on the private key signature of the first-type entity. The third-type certificate, containing a public key, is sent to the second-type entity for establishing a TLS tunnel between the different entities.

[0303] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0304] like Figure 13 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, which is a TLS client CA; and a second type entity is a TLS client; the method includes:

[0305] Step 131: Send the TLS client certificate to the TLS client.

[0306] In one embodiment, a TLS client certificate is generated based on the private key signature of the TLS client CA. The TLS client certificate, containing a public key, is sent to the TLS client for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0307] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0308] like Figure 14 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, which is a TLS server (CA); and a second type entity is a TLS server; the method includes:

[0309] Step 141: Send the TLS server certificate to the TLS server.

[0310] In one embodiment, a TLS server certificate signed with the private key of the TLS server CA is generated. The TLS server certificate, containing the public key, is sent to the TLS server for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0311] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0312] like Figure 15 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, which is a TLS proxy CA; and a second type entity is a TLS proxy; the method includes:

[0313] Step 151: Send the TLS proxy certificate to the TLS proxy.

[0314] In one embodiment, a TLS proxy certificate signed with the private key of the TLS proxy CA is generated. The TLS proxy certificate, containing a public key, is sent to the TLS proxy for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0315] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0316] like Figure 16 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first type entity, and the method includes:

[0317] Step 161: Send the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate to the second type of entity.

[0318] In one embodiment, a TLS client certificate and a TLS server certificate, signed with the private key of a first type of entity, are generated. The TLS client certificate and the TLS server certificate, containing a public key, are then sent to a second type of entity for establishing a TLS tunnel between the different entities.

[0319] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0320] like Figure 17 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is performed by a second type of entity, and the method includes:

[0321] Step 171: Obtain a third type of certificate, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key and is used to establish a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0322] In one embodiment, a third type of certificate sent by a first type of entity is obtained, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0323] In one embodiment, obtaining the third type of certificate includes:

[0324] Obtain the pre-configured third-type certificate;

[0325] or,

[0326] Receive the third type certificate sent by the first type entity.

[0327] In one embodiment, the second type of entity includes at least one of the following:

[0328] TLS server;

[0329] TLS client;

[0330] TLS proxy.

[0331] In one embodiment, the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA generates a corresponding third-type certificate for the TLS server, TLS client, or TLS proxy, signed with the private key of an intermediate-layer CA. This third-type certificate contains a public key and is used to establish a TLS tunnel between different entities. The second type of entity receives the third-type certificate sent by the first type of entity. The third-type certificate for the TLS server, TLS client, or TLS proxy, containing a public key, can be used to establish a TLS tunnel between TLS entities. Here, the intermediate-layer CA can be any one of the TLS server CA, TLS client CA, or TLS proxy CA.

[0332] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0333] like Figure 18 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a second type entity, the first type entity being a TLS client CA; the second type entity being a TLS client; the method includes:

[0334] Step 181: Receive the TLS client certificate sent by the TLS client CA.

[0335] In one embodiment, the TLS client CA generates a TLS client certificate signed with its private key. The TLS client CA sends the TLS client certificate to the TLS client, wherein the TLS client certificate contains a public key used to establish a TLS tunnel between different entities. The TLS client receives the TLS client certificate sent by the TLS client CA.

[0336] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0337] like Figure 19 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a second type entity, the first type entity being a TLS server (CA); the second type entity being a TLS server; the method includes:

[0338] Step 191: Receive the TLS server certificate sent by the TLS server CA.

[0339] In one embodiment, the TLS server CA generates a TLS server certificate signed with its private key. The TLS server CA sends the TLS server certificate to the TLS server, wherein the TLS server certificate contains a public key used to establish a TLS tunnel between different entities. The TLS server receives the TLS server certificate sent by the TLS server CA.

[0340] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0341] like Figure 20 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a second type entity, the first type entity being a TLS proxy CA; the second type entity being a TLS proxy; the method includes:

[0342] Step 201: Receive the TLS proxy certificate sent by the TLS proxy CA.

[0343] In one embodiment, the TLS proxy CA generates a TLS proxy certificate signed with its private key. The TLS proxy sends the TLS proxy certificate to the TLS proxy, wherein the TLS proxy certificate contains a public key used to establish a TLS tunnel between different entities. The TLS proxy receives the TLS proxy certificate sent by the TLS proxy CA.

[0344] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0345] like Figure 21 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is performed by a second type of entity, and the method includes:

[0346] Step 211: Receive the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate sent by the first type of entity.

[0347] In one embodiment, a first type entity generates TLS client and TLS server certificates signed with its private key. The first type entity sends the TLS client and TLS server certificates to a second type entity, wherein the TLS client and TLS server certificates contain a public key used to establish a TLS tunnel between the different entities. The second type entity receives the TLS client and TLS server certificates sent by the first type entity.

[0348] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0349] like Figure 22 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, which is executed by a TLS client and includes:

[0350] Step 221: In response to receiving the TLS server certificate from the TLS server, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate;

[0351] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0352] In one embodiment, it is assumed that the TLS client and TLS server are in the same security domain (e.g., the first security domain) and a self-signed certificate of the root CA (i.e., the root certificate) is pre-configured. When the TLS client receives the TLS server's certificate as part of the TLS handshake, the TLS client performs the following procedure:

[0353] Step a1: The TLS client checks to ensure the TLS server certificate has not expired. Since the TLS server certificate is signed by the TLS server CA, the TLS client attempts to obtain the TLS server CA certificate. Once the TLS server CA certificate is obtained, the TLS client uses the TLS server CA certificate's public key to verify that the TLS server certificate is correctly signed.

[0354] Step a2: The TLS client attempts to verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server CA certificate. Given that the TLS server CA certificate is signed by the root CA, the TLS client uses the public key of the provided self-signed root certificate to verify the signature of the TLS server CA certificate.

[0355] Step a3: The TLS client locally pre-installs a self-signed root certificate that is implicitly trusted by the TLS client, thereby ensuring that the public key in the root certificate is trustworthy. At this point, the TLS client successfully verifies the identity of the TLS server, establishes a trust chain to the TLS server, and completes the TLS handshake within the security domain. It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in this disclosure can be executed alone or in conjunction with some methods in this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0356] like Figure 23 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, which is executed by a TLS client and includes:

[0357] Step 231: Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate based on the TLS server CA certificate;

[0358] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0359] In one embodiment, it is assumed that the TLS client and TLS server are in the same security domain (e.g., the first security domain) and a self-signed certificate of the root CA (i.e., the root certificate) is pre-configured. When the TLS client receives the TLS server's certificate as part of the TLS handshake, the TLS client performs the following process: The TLS client checks to ensure that the TLS server certificate has not expired. Given that the TLS server certificate is signed by the TLS server CA, the TLS client attempts to obtain the TLS server CA certificate. Once the TLS server CA certificate is obtained, the TLS client uses the TLS server CA certificate's public key to verify that the TLS server certificate is correctly signed.

[0360] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0361] like Figure 24 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, which is executed by a TLS client and includes:

[0362] Step 241: Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server CA certificate based on the root certificate of the security domain.

[0363] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0364] In one embodiment, it is assumed that the TLS client and TLS server are in the same security domain (e.g., the first security domain) and a self-signed certificate of the root CA (i.e., the root certificate) is pre-configured. When the TLS client receives the TLS server's certificate as part of the TLS handshake, the TLS client performs the following procedure: The TLS client attempts to verify whether the TLS server CA certificate is trustworthy. Given that the TLS server CA certificate is signed by the root CA, the TLS client uses the public key from the pre-configured self-signed root certificate to verify the signature of the TLS server CA certificate.

[0365] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0366] like Figure 25 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0367] Step 251: In response to receiving the second TLS proxy certificate sent by the second TLS proxy in the second security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate.

[0368] In one embodiment, assuming TLS proxyA and TLS proxyB are in different security domains and have pre-signed self-signed certificates of their root CAs (e.g., TLS proxyA has pre-signed a root CA certificate), A The self-signed certificate, TLS proxyB pre-configures the root CA. B (Self-signed certificate). When TLS proxyA receives the certificate of TLS proxyB as part of an SSL or TLS handshake, TLS proxyA performs the following procedure:

[0369] Step b1: TLS proxyA checks to ensure that TLS proxyB's certificate has not expired. This is because TLS proxyB's certificate is issued by the TLS proxy CA. B It is signed, therefore TLS proxyA will attempt to obtain the TLS proxy CA. B Certificate. Once you obtain the TLS proxy CA... B Certificate, TLS proxyA uses TLS proxy CA B The certificate's public key is used to verify whether the TLS proxy B certificate is correctly signed.

[0370] Step b2: TLS proxyA attempts to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering TLS proxy CAs... B The certificate is issued by the root CA. B If signed, TLS proxy A will attempt to obtain the root CA. B Certificate. Obtain the root CA. B After obtaining the certificate, TLS proxyA uses the root CA. B The public key of the certificate is used to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate correctly signed?

[0371] Step b3: TLS proxyA attempts to verify the Root CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering the root CA. B The certificate is issued by the Root CA. A For the signed TLS proxyA, the public key of a pre-installed self-signed root certificate is used to verify the root CA. B The signature on the certificate.

[0372] Step b4: TLS proxyA has a pre-installed self-signed root certificate implicitly trusted by TLS proxyA, thus ensuring the root CA. A The public key in the root certificate is trusted. At this point, TLS proxyA successfully verifies the identity of TLS proxyB, establishes a trust chain to TLS proxyB, and completes the SSL or TLS handshake between security domains. It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in this disclosure can be executed alone or in conjunction with some methods in this disclosure or related technologies.

[0373] like Figure 26 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0374] Step 261: Verify the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate based on the TLS proxy CA certificate in the second security domain.

[0375] In one embodiment, assuming TLS proxyA and TLS proxyB are in different security domains and have pre-signed self-signed certificates of their root CAs (e.g., TLS proxyA has pre-signed a root CA certificate), A The self-signed certificate, TLS proxyB pre-configures the root CA. B(Self-signed certificate). When TLS proxyA receives TLS proxyB's certificate as part of an SSL or TLS handshake, TLS proxyA performs the following process: TLS proxyA checks to ensure that TLS proxyB's certificate has not expired. This is because TLS proxyB's certificate is issued by the TLS proxy CA. B It is signed, therefore TLS proxyA will attempt to obtain the TLS proxy CA. B Certificate. Once you obtain the TLS proxy CA... B Certificate, TLS proxyA uses TLS proxy CA B The certificate's public key is used to verify whether the TLS proxy B certificate is correctly signed.

[0376] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0377] like Figure 27 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0378] Step 271: Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS proxy CA certificate based on the root certificate in the second security domain.

[0379] In one embodiment, assuming TLS proxyA and TLS proxyB are in different security domains and have pre-signed self-signed certificates of their root CAs (e.g., TLS proxyA has pre-signed a root CA certificate), A The self-signed certificate, TLS proxyB pre-configures the root CA. B (Self-signed certificate). When TLS proxyA receives the TLS proxyB certificate as part of an SSL or TLS handshake, TLS proxyA performs the following procedure:

[0380] TLS proxyA attempts to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering TLS proxy CAs... B The certificate is issued by the root CA. B If signed, TLS proxy A will attempt to obtain the root CA. B Certificate. Obtain the root CA. B After obtaining the certificate, TLS proxyA uses the root CA. B The public key in the certificate is used to verify the TLS proxy CA. B Is the certificate correctly signed?

[0381] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0382] like Figure 28 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0383] Step 281: Verify whether the root certificate in the second security domain is trustworthy based on the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0384] In one embodiment, assuming TLS proxyA and TLS proxyB are in different security domains and have pre-signed self-signed certificates of their root CAs (e.g., TLS proxyA has pre-signed a root CA certificate), A The self-signed certificate, TLS proxyB pre-configures the root CA. B (Self-signed certificate). When TLS proxyA receives the certificate of TLS proxyB as part of an SSL or TLS handshake, TLS proxyA performs the following procedure: TLS proxyA attempts to verify the Root CA. B Is the certificate trustworthy? Considering RootCA... B The certificate is issued by the Root CA. A For the signed TLS proxyA, the public key from the pre-signed root certificate is used to verify the RootCA. B The signature on the certificate.

[0385] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0386] like Figure 29 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0387] Step 291: In response to receiving a TLS client certificate sent by a TLS client in the first security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate.

[0388] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate includes:

[0389] The TLS client certificate is verified for trustworthiness based on the public key of the TLS client CA certificate in the first security domain.

[0390] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0391] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS client CA certificate using the public key of the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0392] It should be noted that the relevant explanations for step 291 can be found in the explanations for steps 251 to 281. The verification process is similar and will not be repeated here.

[0393] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0394] like Figure 30 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication method, wherein the method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes:

[0395] Step 301: In response to receiving a TLS server certificate sent by a TLS server in the first security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate.

[0396] In one embodiment, determining the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate includes:

[0397] The TLS server certificate is verified for trustworthiness based on the public key of the TLS server CA certificate in the first security domain.

[0398] In one embodiment, the method further includes:

[0399] Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS server CA certificate using the public key of the root certificate in the first security domain.

[0400] It should be noted that the relevant explanations for step 301 can be found in the explanations for steps 251 to 281. The verification process is similar and will not be repeated here.

[0401] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0402] like Figure 31 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0403] Generation module 311 is configured to generate a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol TLS;

[0404] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0405] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0406] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0407] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0408] like Figure 32 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0409] The receiving module 321 is configured to receive a pre-defined certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol Secure) protocol;

[0410] The predetermined certificate includes at least one of the following:

[0411] The first type of certificate of the entity within the first security domain of the first CA;

[0412] The second type of certificate is a second type of certificate for an entity located in the second security domain, and the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain.

[0413] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0414] like Figure 33 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0415] The receiving module 331 is configured to obtain a third type of certificate, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

[0416] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0417] like Figure 34 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0418] The determination module 341 is configured to: determine the validity of the TLS server certificate in response to receiving the TLS server certificate from the TLS server;

[0419] The TLS server and the TLS client are in the same security domain.

[0420] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0421] like Figure 35 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0422] The determination module 351 is configured to: determine the trustworthiness of the certificate of the second TLS proxy in response to receiving a second TLS proxy certificate sent by the second TLS proxy in the second security domain.

[0423] It should be noted that those skilled in the art will understand that the methods provided in the embodiments of this disclosure can be executed alone or together with some methods in the embodiments of this disclosure or some methods in related technologies.

[0424] like Figure 36 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0425] The determination module 361 is configured to: determine the trustworthiness of the TLS client certificate in response to receiving a TLS client certificate sent by a TLS client in the first security domain.

[0426] like Figure 37 As shown, this embodiment provides an authentication device, wherein the device includes:

[0427] The determination module 371 is configured to: determine the trustworthiness of the TLS server certificate in response to receiving a TLS server certificate sent by a TLS server in the first security domain.

[0428] This disclosure provides a communication device, which includes:

[0429] processor;

[0430] Memory used to store processor-executable instructions;

[0431] The processor is configured to implement, when running executable instructions, the methods applicable to any embodiment of this disclosure.

[0432] The processor may include various types of storage media, which are non-transitory computer storage media that can continue to store information after the communication device loses power.

[0433] The processor can connect to the memory via a bus or other means to read executable programs stored in the memory.

[0434] This disclosure also provides a computer storage medium storing a computer executable program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method of any embodiment of this disclosure.

[0435] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiments, the specific manner in which each module performs its operation has been described in detail in the embodiments related to the method, and will not be elaborated upon here.

[0436] like Figure 38 As shown, one embodiment of this disclosure provides a terminal structure.

[0437] Reference Figure 38 The terminal 800 shown in this embodiment is a mobile phone, computer, digital broadcasting terminal, messaging device, game console, tablet device, medical device, fitness device, personal digital assistant, etc.

[0438] Reference Figure 38 Terminal 800 may include one or more of the following components: processing component 802, memory 804, power supply component 806, multimedia component 808, audio component 810, input / output (I / O) interface 812, sensor component 814, and communication component 816.

[0439] Processing component 802 typically controls the overall operation of terminal 800, such as operations associated with display, telephone calls, data communication, camera operation, and recording. Processing component 802 may include one or more processors 820 to execute instructions to complete all or part of the steps of the methods described above. Furthermore, processing component 802 may include one or more modules to facilitate interaction between processing component 802 and other components. For example, processing component 802 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between multimedia component 808 and processing component 802.

[0440] Memory 804 is configured to store various types of data to support operation on terminal 800. Examples of this data include instructions for any application or method operating on terminal 800, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, videos, etc. Memory 804 can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic storage, flash memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk.

[0441] Power supply component 806 provides power to various components of terminal 800. Power supply component 806 may include a power management system, one or more power supplies, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power to terminal 800.

[0442] Multimedia component 808 includes a screen that provides an output interface between terminal 800 and the user. In some embodiments, the screen may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) and a touch panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touchscreen to receive input signals from the user. The touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensors may sense not only the boundaries of touch or swipe actions but also the duration and pressure associated with the touch or swipe operation. In some embodiments, multimedia component 808 includes a front-facing camera and / or a rear-facing camera. When terminal 800 is in an operating mode, such as a shooting mode or video mode, the front-facing camera and / or rear-facing camera may receive external multimedia data. Each front-facing camera and rear-facing camera may be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capabilities.

[0443] Audio component 810 is configured to output and / or input audio signals. For example, audio component 810 includes a microphone (MIC) configured to receive external audio signals when terminal 800 is in an operating mode, such as call mode, recording mode, and voice recognition mode. The received audio signals may be further stored in memory 804 or transmitted via communication component 816. In some embodiments, audio component 810 also includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.

[0444] I / O interface 812 provides an interface between processing component 802 and peripheral interface modules, such as keyboards, click wheels, buttons, etc. These buttons may include, but are not limited to, home buttons, volume buttons, power buttons, and lock buttons.

[0445] Sensor assembly 814 includes one or more sensors for providing state assessments of various aspects of terminal 800. For example, sensor assembly 814 can detect the on / off state of terminal 800, the relative positioning of components such as the display and keypad of terminal 800, changes in the position of terminal 800 or a component of terminal 800, the presence or absence of user contact with terminal 800, the orientation or acceleration / deceleration of terminal 800, and temperature changes of terminal 800. Sensor assembly 814 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects without any physical contact. Sensor assembly 814 may also include a light sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications. In some embodiments, sensor assembly 814 may also include an accelerometer, a gyroscope, a magnetometer, a pressure sensor, or a temperature sensor.

[0446] Communication component 816 is configured to facilitate wired or wireless communication between terminal 800 and other devices. Terminal 800 can access wireless networks based on communication standards, such as Wi-Fi, 2G, or 3G, or combinations thereof. In one exemplary embodiment, communication component 816 receives broadcast signals or broadcast-related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel. In one exemplary embodiment, communication component 816 also includes a near-field communication (NFC) module to facilitate short-range communication. For example, the NFC module may be implemented based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, Infrared Data Association (IrDA) technology, ultra-wideband (UWB) technology, Bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.

[0447] In an exemplary embodiment, terminal 800 may be implemented by one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components to perform the methods described above.

[0448] In an exemplary embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions is also provided, such as a memory 804 including instructions, which can be executed by a processor 820 of a terminal 800 to perform the above-described method. For example, the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be a ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage device, etc.

[0449] like Figure 39 As shown, one embodiment of this disclosure illustrates the structure of a base station. For example, base station 900 can be provided as a network-side device. (Refer to...) Figure 39The base station 900 includes a processing component 922, which further includes one or more processors, and memory resources represented by a memory 932 for storing instructions, such as application programs, that can be executed by the processing component 922. The application programs stored in the memory 932 may include one or more modules, each corresponding to a set of instructions. Furthermore, the processing component 922 is configured to execute instructions to perform any of the methods described above applied to the base station.

[0450] Base station 900 may also include a power supply component 926 configured to perform power management of base station 900, a wired or wireless network interface 950 configured to connect base station 900 to a network, and an input / output (I / O) interface 958. Base station 900 can operate on an operating system stored in memory 932, such as Windows Server™, Mac OS X™, Unix™, Linux™, FreeBSD™, or similar.

[0451] Other embodiments of the invention will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. This disclosure is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the invention that follow the general principles of the invention and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein. The specification and examples are to be considered exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of the invention are indicated by the following claims.

[0452] It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the precise structure described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of the invention is limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. An authentication method, wherein, The method is performed by the first root certificate authority (CA), and the method includes: Generate a pre-defined certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol). The predetermined certificate includes: The second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first CA to the second CA within the second security domain. This second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first and second security domains.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The pre-defined certificate also includes: a first-class certificate of an entity located in the first security domain of the first root CA.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The method further includes: Send the pre-defined certificate to the entity.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The generation of a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes: In response to the interconnection protocol reached between the first security domain and the second security domain, the second type of certificate is generated.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein, The generation of a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes: Generate a first type of certificate signed with the private key of the first root CA; And / or, Generate a second type of certificate based on the private key signature of the first root CA.

6. The method according to claim 2, wherein, The generation of a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes: Generate the root certificate; The root certificate is used to generate the first type of certificate.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The entity includes at least one of the following: Root CA; TLS server CA; TLS client CA; TLS proxy CA; TLS server; TLS client; TLS proxy.

8. An authentication method, wherein, The method is executed by a first type of entity, and the method includes: Obtain a pre-ordered certificate based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol) secure transport protocol; The predetermined certificate includes: The second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first CA to the second CA within the second security domain. This second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first and second security domains.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein, The pre-defined certificate includes: a first-class certificate of an entity located in the first security domain of the first root CA.

10. The method according to claim 8 or 9, wherein, The process of obtaining a pre-defined certificate based on the Transport Security Protocol (TLS) includes: Obtain the pre-configured reserved certificate; or, Receive the pre-defined certificate sent by the first CA.

11. The method according to claim 8, wherein, The first type of entity includes at least one of the following: TLS server CA; TLS client CA; TLS proxy CA.

12. The method according to claim 8 or 9, wherein, The method further includes: Generate a third type of certificate based on the private key signature of the first type of entity.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein, The method further includes: Send a third type of certificate to a second type of entity, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein, The first type of entity is a TLS client CA; the second type of entity is a TLS client; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes: Send the TLS client certificate to the TLS client.

15. The method according to claim 13, wherein, The first type of entity is a TLS server CA; the second type of entity is a TLS server; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes: Send the TLS server certificate to the TLS server.

16. The method according to claim 13, wherein, The first type of entity is a TLS proxy CA; the second type of entity is a TLS proxy; sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes: Send the TLS proxy certificate to the TLS proxy.

17. The method according to claim 13, wherein, Sending the third type of certificate to the second type of entity includes: Send the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate to the second type of entity.

18. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 17, wherein, The second type of entity includes at least one of the following: TLS server; TLS client; TLS proxy.

19. An authentication method, wherein, The method is executed by a second type of entity, and the method includes: Obtain a third type of certificate, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities; the second type of entity is a TLS proxy, the TLS proxy is configured with a predetermined certificate generated by the first root CA, the predetermined certificate includes: a second type of certificate of an entity within the second security domain where the second root CA is located, the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain; the second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first root CA for the second root CA.

20. The method according to claim 19, wherein, The acquisition of the third type of certificate includes: Obtain the pre-configured third-type certificate; or, Receive the third type certificate sent by the first type entity.

21. The method according to claim 20, wherein, The first type of entity includes at least one of the following: TLS server CA; TLS client CA; TLS proxy CA.

22. The method according to claim 20, wherein, The first type of entity is a TLS proxy CA; obtaining the third type of certificate includes: Receive the TLS proxy certificate sent by the TLS proxy CA.

23. The method of claim 20, wherein, The acquisition of the third type of certificate includes: Receive the TLS client certificate and TLS server certificate sent by the first type of entity.

24. An authentication method, wherein, The method is executed by a first TLS proxy in a first security domain, and the method includes: Obtain a pre-defined certificate generated by the first root CA, the pre-defined certificate including: a second type certificate of an entity within the second security domain where the second root CA is located, the second type certificate being used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain, the second type certificate being a cross certificate issued by the first root CA for the second root CA; In response to receiving a second TLS proxy certificate sent by a second TLS proxy in a second security domain, the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate is determined; the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate is indirectly determined based on the second type of certificate.

25. The method according to claim 24, wherein, Determining the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate includes: Verify the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate based on the TLS proxy CA certificate in the second security domain.

26. The method of claim 25, wherein, The method further includes: Verify the trustworthiness of the TLS proxy CA certificate based on the root certificate in the second security domain.

27. The method according to claim 26, wherein, The method further includes: Verify the trustworthiness of the second type of certificate in the second security domain based on the root certificate in the first security domain.

28. An authentication device, wherein, Applied to the first CA, the device includes: The receiving module is configured to receive pre-defined certificates based on the TLS (Transport Security Protocol). The predetermined certificate includes: The second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first CA to the second CA within the second security domain. This second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first and second security domains.

29. An authentication device, wherein, Applied to a second type of entity, the device includes: The receiving module is configured to acquire a third type of certificate, wherein the third type of certificate contains a public key for establishing a TLS tunnel between different entities; the second type of entity is a TLS proxy, the TLS proxy is configured with a predetermined certificate generated by the first root CA, the predetermined certificate includes: a second type of certificate of an entity within the second security domain where the second root CA is located, the second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain; the second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first root CA for the second root CA.

30. An authentication device, wherein, The apparatus for use as a first TLS proxy in a first security domain includes: The receiving module is configured to obtain a predetermined certificate generated by a first root CA. The predetermined certificate includes a second type of certificate of an entity within a second security domain where a second root CA is located. The second type of certificate is used at least for TLS verification between entities in the first security domain and the second security domain. The second type of certificate is a cross certificate issued by the first root CA for the second root CA. The determination module is configured to: in response to receiving a second TLS proxy certificate sent by a second TLS proxy in a second security domain, determine the trustworthiness of the certificate of the second TLS proxy; the trustworthiness of the second TLS proxy certificate is indirectly determined based on the second type of certificate.

31. A communication device, wherein, include: Memory; A processor, connected to the memory, is configured to execute computer-executable instructions stored in the memory and to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, 8 to 18, 19 to 23, 24 to 27.

32. A computer storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, enable the implementation of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, 8 to 18, 19 to 23, and 24 to 27.