A method and device for securely generating and distributing keys for multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission
By using multi-antenna beamforming technology and a method of generating keys in wireless communication, the problem that traditional secure communication solutions are difficult to protect wireless communication information is solved, and the secure transmission of information in high dynamic scenarios is realized.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411035841.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-31
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-31
AI Technical Summary
Traditional secure communication solutions are difficult to effectively solve the security problems of wireless communications, especially in diversified and time-varying wireless channel environments, which cannot effectively protect communication information.
The key security generation and distribution method of multi-antenna under line-of-sight transmission is adopted. The central user generates the root key based on time-varying distance data and local noise data, and uses multi-antenna beamforming technology to transmit stable signals in the direction of legal users, and eavesdropping Add interference to the direction to ensure the secure transmission of the key.
It improves the physical layer security of wireless communications, enhances the secure transmission capability of data link information in high dynamic scenarios, and is suitable for a variety of actual scenarios, especially for long-distance visual security communication.
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Figure CN118574118B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This document relates to the field of confidential communications, and in particular to a method and device for securely generating and distributing keys for multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission. Background Art
[0002] Nowadays, wireless communication technology has been widely used in various fields such as military and civilian. Its development has eliminated the restriction of traditional wired access that requires cables as the medium, greatly facilitated human life and promoted social development. Security is an important criterion for measuring the quality of wireless communication, which characterizes the ability of wireless communication systems to resist human damage and eavesdropping. Since wireless channels are open channels, anyone can intercept communication information at a location where the electromagnetic signal in space is strong enough, and communication security is greatly threatened.
[0003] Traditional secure communication solutions are mainly based on cryptography, which uses specific mathematical methods to design keys and hide information in ciphertext through algorithms. The legitimate receiving end receives the ciphertext and decrypts it using the key; the illegal eavesdropping end does not have the key and cannot decrypt it. However, the diversity and time-varying nature of the topological structure of wireless communication networks increase the difficulty of wireless communication security management, and traditional secure communication solutions cannot effectively solve the security problems of wireless communication.
[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a method for secure key generation and distribution, as traditional secure communication solutions cannot effectively solve the security problem of wireless communications. Summary of the invention
[0005] This specification provides a multi-antenna key security generation and distribution method under line-of-sight transmission, which is used to solve the problem that traditional secure communication solutions cannot well solve the security problem of wireless communication.
[0006] In a first aspect, the present specification provides a method for secure key generation and distribution of multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission, including: the method is applied to a multi-element communication system, wherein the multi-element communication system includes: a central user Alice, a legitimate user Bob, and an eavesdropping user Eve;
[0007] The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and encodes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0008] Legal user Bob generates random pilot , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null trap in the direction of the central user Alice, where the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice;
[0009] The central user Alice obtains the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob , according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0010] The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. , forming a zero sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob;
[0011] The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and uses the random pilot Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0012] The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0013] If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
[0014] In the second aspect, the present specification provides a method and device for secure key generation and distribution of multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission, including: a root key generation and modulation module, a random pilot generation module, a root key scrambling module, a scrambled root key transmission module, a scrambled root key descrambling module, a root key demodulation and decryption module, and a root key success verification module; wherein:
[0015] The root key generation and modulation module is used for the central user Alice to generate a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between itself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and to code and modulate the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0016] The random pilot generation module is used to generate random pilots for the legitimate user Bob. , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null sink in the direction of the central user Alice;
[0017] The root key scrambling module is used by the central user Alice to obtain the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob. , and according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0018] The scrambled root key transmission module is used for the central user Alice to use the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key to the legitimate user Bob, and to use the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. , forming a zero sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob;
[0019] The scrambling root key descrambling module is used for the legitimate user Bob to obtain the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0020] The root key demodulation and decryption module is used for the legitimate user Bob to perform BPSK demodulation and de-interleaving channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0021] The root key success verification module is used to determine that the root key transmission is successful if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC verification, and the legitimate user Bob sends information to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
[0022] In a third aspect, this specification also provides an electronic device, including: a communication interface, a processor, and a memory;
[0023] The processor calls the program instructions in the memory to perform the following actions:
[0024] The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and encodes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0025] Legal user Bob generates random pilot , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null trap in the direction of the central user Alice, where the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice;
[0026] The central user Alice obtains the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob , according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0027] The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. , forming a zero sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob;
[0028] The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and uses the random pilot Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0029] The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0030] If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
[0031] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:
[0032] The present specification provides a method for secure key generation and distribution of multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission. The method generates a root key by a central user Alice according to time-varying distance data with a legitimate user Bob and local noise data; the legitimate user Bob uses a sum beam to transmit a random pilot in the direction of the central user Alice to generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; a first artificial interference is transmitted in the eavesdropping direction using a difference beam to form a null in the direction of the central user Alice; the central user Alice scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot to obtain a scrambled root key; the central user Alice uses a sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses a difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob descrambles the scrambled root key according to the random pilot; if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful. First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when it is impossible to obtain rich channel information, the method selects local noise and time-varying ranging information as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication; secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble the root key; finally, the multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit a stable useful signal in the direction of the target user to improve the received signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user. This method can realize physical layer security enhancement for wireless communication, greatly improve the data link information security transmission capability in high dynamic scenarios, can effectively protect the transmitted information, and has high versatility and portability. It is suitable for a variety of practical scenarios, especially for long-distance line-of-sight security communication. It provides a feasible and reliable solution with great application value. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0033] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of this specification and constitute a part of this specification. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of this specification are used to explain this specification and do not constitute an improper limitation on this specification. In the drawings:
[0034] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a method for securely generating and distributing keys for multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission provided in an embodiment of this specification;
[0035] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication system model provided in an embodiment of this specification;
[0036] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of a key generation and distribution working principle provided in an embodiment of this specification;
[0037] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of a key security generation and distribution device for multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission provided in an embodiment of this specification;
[0038] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of an electronic device structure provided in an embodiment of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0039] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this specification clearer, the technical solutions of this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the specific embodiments of this application and their corresponding drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this specification, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this document.
[0040] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this specification are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Specific embodiment 1
[0041] This embodiment provides a method for securely generating and distributing keys using multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission. Figure 1-Figure 3 The method is applied to a multi-element communication system, wherein the multi-element communication system includes: a central user Alice using M antennas, K legitimate users using N antennas, and an eavesdropping user Eve using Z antennas; for a specific communication model, see Figure 2 ;
[0042] This embodiment provides a MIMO eavesdropping channel model with directional interference nulling, the model includes a central user Alice,
[0043] There are several legitimate users, an eavesdropper EVe, and each node is equipped with multiple antennas;
[0044] The central user Alice and the legitimate user have the same elevation angle and azimuth angle; the central user Alice, the legitimate user and the stealing user Eve all meet the far-field condition, and the premise is line-of-sight transmission. In this application scenario, there will be no multipath interference.
[0045] It should be noted that due to the multi-antenna situation, the received digital beam has directional directivity. By using the array direction information known to the legitimate user and the central user, the superimposed interference will form a null-sink, thereby protecting the useful information being transmitted. At the eavesdropping users in other directions, the interference cannot form a null-sink, thereby ensuring the secure transmission of key generation.
[0046] Specifically, the working principle of the method provided in this embodiment is:
[0047] The legitimate user sends useful pilot information superimposed with interference to the central user Alice. Artificial interference independent of the useful pilot information can prevent eavesdroppers in other directions from eavesdropping on useful messages. The beamforming at the legitimate user end can aim the energy at the target receiver Alice, improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the target user, and at the same time achieve the formation of a null in the interference direction, which can offset the interference noise and suppress external interference.
[0048] In the existing multi-antenna eavesdropping channel model where there is no hostile interferer, when the eavesdropper's channel state information is unknown, the legitimate user sender generally adopts the method of sending artificial interference to suppress eavesdropping. Through a certain beamforming design scheme, it can be ensured that the eavesdropping channel is deteriorated without affecting or having little impact on the legitimate channel. It has been proved that sending information signals in the direction of the legitimate channel and sending artificial interference in other directions is the optimal scheme.
[0049] Assume that the target receiver Alice is not affected by any other interference except background noise. Design a beamforming scheme to ensure that Alice's signal-to-interference-noise ratio SINR is achieved with as little power as possible, and use all the remaining power to send artificial interference signals to suppress illegal eavesdropping. In order to ensure that the artificial interference signal has the least impact on the target receiver, the pilot information signal and artificial interference beamforming scheme should ensure that the artificial interference signal is orthogonal to the pilot information at Alice.
[0050] Furthermore, this embodiment provides a technical solution for key generation and distribution between a central user Alice and a legitimate user Bob, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0051] Step 102: The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and codes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0052] Specifically, a specific implementation of step 102 may be:
[0053] S1021, the central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data;
[0054] The preset algorithm used in this embodiment is a 128-bit binary information digest algorithm, where the information digest algorithm refers to an existing cryptographic hash function that generates a 128-bit (16-byte) hash value to ensure that information transmission is complete and consistent;
[0055] S1022, calculating the CRC sequence of the root key, combining the root key with the CRC sequence of the root key, and obtaining an extended key sequence after adding the CRC sequence;
[0056] S1023, channel-encode the extended key sequence and send it to an interleaver, and then perform BPSK modulation to obtain a coded and modulated root key.
[0057] Specific example:
[0058] Step 1.1: Based on the available time-varying distance data between the legitimate users Alice and Bob and the local noise data collected by Alice, Alice uses the information digest algorithm to generate a root key. The generated root key is recorded as:
[0059] ,in .
[0060] Step 1.2, calculate CRC sequence ,in is the length of the CRC sequence. and Merge ,in To increase the length of the key sequence after the CRC sequence.
[0061] Step 1.3, key sequence Channel coding is performed to obtain ,in is the codeword length after channel coding, and the code rate .
[0062] Step 1.4: channel coded sequence The interleaver outputs .
[0063] Step 1.5, use Pair Sequence Modulate and obtain key data ,in ; Refers to the length of the modulated codeword;
[0064] Based on this, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when rich channel information cannot be obtained, local noise and time-varying ranging information are selected as random sources to generate root keys for secure communication, providing the first level of protection for subsequent confidential communications; further, through channel coding, interleaving, Modulation provides a second level of security.
[0065] Step 104: Legal user Bob generates a random pilot , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , due to the directivity of multiple array elements, a null is formed in the direction of the central user Alice, causing unavoidable interference to the eavesdropping direction; the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice;
[0066] It should be noted that step 104 includes the steps of random pilot and first artificial interference, and the specific implementation method may be:
[0067] S104, the random pilot and the first artificial interference generated by the legitimate user Bob are both 1024PSK signals, which are composed of 31-order and 20-order Sequence generation, random pilot and first artificial interference length are , specifically:
[0068] The artificial interference provided in this embodiment includes a first artificial interference and a second artificial interference, wherein the first artificial interference and the second artificial interference are generated by different entities but in the same manner; the first artificial interference is generated by the legitimate user Bob, and the second artificial interference is generated by the central user Alice;
[0069] S1041, for the 31-order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob uses the received 32-bit random noise data as its initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output The first 40N-long sequence is cut from the sequence of length, and 4 times the length is extracted to obtain a 10N-long sequence. .
[0070] S1042, for the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as its initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, and finally outputs From the sequence of length, extract the first 10N long sequence .
[0071] S1043, for a sequence of 10N length and Perform modulo-2 addition to obtain a new sequence of length 10N .
[0072] Among them, the modulo-2 addition process is the exclusive-OR process, and the specific form is: 1+1=0, 0+0=0, 1+0=1, 0+1=1;
[0073] S1044, for 10N long sequence Perform 1024PSK modulation to obtain a symbol sequence of length N;
[0074] S1045: Based on the scenario requirements, use the N-length symbol sequence as a random pilot. , the first artificial interference .
[0075] Furthermore, a specific implementation of step 104 may be:
[0076] T1041. Determine the beamforming coefficients of the transmitted signal and artificial interference according to the array element arrangement , ,It is worth noting that due to the directivity of the multi-element array, ,the artificial interference beam will be nulled at the legitimate user Alice’s end, ,which will not cause interference to the legitimate user, but only cause ,unbreakable interference to the eavesdropping ends in other directions;
[0077] T1042, according to the beamforming coefficient , , adjust the signal transmission direction so that the random pilot Send to the legitimate user Alice, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction; making the first artificial interference A null sink is generated on the legitimate user Alice side, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0078] Based on this, through the beamforming technology, the artificial interference generated by the legitimate user Bob does not interfere with the central user Alice, so that the random pilot generated by the legitimate user Bob is smoothly transmitted to the central user Alice, providing directional protection measures for the central user Alice to transmit the key, and also improving the signal transmission quality; at the same time, the eavesdropping user cannot completely descramble the random pilot generated by the legitimate user Bob, and is also affected by the artificial interference generated by the legitimate user Bob, so it cannot obtain a real and effective signal;
[0079] Step 106: The central user Alice obtains the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob. , and according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0080] Based on this, directional encryption protection measures are added to key communication based on the random pilot shared between the central user Alice and the legitimate user Bob;
[0081] Step 108: The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, generating interference in the eavesdropping direction; and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. , forming a null sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0082] Among them, the central user Alice generates the second artificial interference The first artificial interference is generated by the legitimate user Bob The way it is produced is the same.
[0083] It should be noted that the sum beam and difference beam used by the central user Alice also need to determine the beamforming coefficients, and determine the sum beam direction and difference beam direction according to the beamforming coefficients;
[0084] Specific example:
[0085] Because of the first artificial interference from Bob A null is formed in the direction of Alice, so Alice is not affected by interference and can obtain the random pilot sent by Bob. Use this Key data generated for Alice Scramble to get the key . Send Key When the sum beam is used to transmit in the direction of Bob, interference is generated in the eavesdropping direction; a second artificial interference is transmitted When the difference beam is used to form a null in the direction of Bob, it will cause unavoidable interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0086] Based on this, the beamforming technology is used again to enable the legitimate user Bob to successfully receive the scrambled key sent by the central user Alice. At the same time, due to the direction angle problem, the eavesdropping user cannot obtain a clear scrambled root key and can only obtain local information. At the same time, due to the influence of Alice's artificial interference, the local key information obtained by the eavesdropping user is submerged in the artificial interference information, thereby ensuring the security of key communication;
[0087] Step 110: The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and uses the random pilot Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0088] Specific example:
[0089] Due to the second artificial interference from Alice A null is formed in the direction of Bob, so Bob is not affected by the interference and can obtain the key sent by Alice. , and based on the random pilot Key data Descramble and obtain the estimated sequence of key data .
[0090] Step 112: The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0091] Step 114: If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform her that the root key transmission is successful.
[0092] Furthermore, after step 114, the method further includes: step S116 in which the root key verification fails, which may be specifically performed in the following manner:
[0093] S1161. If the root key estimation sequence does not satisfy the CRC check, the legitimate user Bob sends a request to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission fails.
[0094] S1162. The central user Alice generates a root key again, and transmits the root key to the legitimate user Bob after coding modulation and random pilot scrambling. The legitimate user Bob descrambles and demodulates the scrambled root key according to the random pilot until the root key is successfully transmitted.
[0095] Specific example:
[0096] The legitimate user Bob determines the validity of the root key: if the estimated sequence of the key data If the CRC check is satisfied, the root key transmission is determined to be successful, and Bob sends a message to Alice to inform her that the root key transmission is successful; otherwise, Bob sends a request to Alice to inform her that the root key transmission has failed, and steps 1 to 4 are repeated until the key is successfully obtained.
[0097] It should be noted that due to the first artificial interference , Second artificial interference For Eve, the eavesdropping user, the useful signal is drowned in the artificial interference and the root key cannot be obtained.
[0098] Furthermore, this embodiment also provides a technical solution for central user Alice to generate and distribute keys to multiple legitimate users Bob-i;
[0099] First of all, it should be noted that the number of the legal user Bob is at least one; if the number of the legal user Bob is K, where K is an integer greater than 1;
[0100] Because the time-varying distance data between the central user Alice and each legitimate user Bob-i is different, the root key generated for each legitimate user Bob-i is also different;
[0101] Because the directions between the central user Alice and each legitimate user Bob-i are different, each legitimate user Bob-i transmits a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. The beam directions used are different. Similarly, each legitimate user Bob-i transmits the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. The difference beam pointing method used is also different;
[0102] The eavesdropping direction corresponding to the legitimate user Bob-i refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob-i and the central user Alice.
[0103] Similarly, because the central user Alice and each legitimate user Bob-i are in different directions, the central user Alice uses different beam directions to transmit the scrambling root key to each legitimate user Bob-i, and transmits the second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. The difference beam pointing used is also different;
[0104] The specific implementation method can be:
[0105] S1181. Within a specified radiation period, the central user Alice generates the root key corresponding to each legitimate user Bob-i using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and each legitimate user Bob-i and the collected local noise data; wherein, ;
[0106] S1182, the central user Alice obtains the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob-i , and according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain the scrambled root key corresponding to the legitimate user Bob-i;
[0107] S1183, the central user Alice adjusts the sum beam to transmit the corresponding scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob-i, generating interference in the eavesdropping direction; and adjusts the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference , forming a null sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob-i, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0108] S1184, legal user Bob-i uses random pilot Descramble and demodulate the corresponding scrambled root key until the root key is successfully transmitted.
[0109] Based on this, within the specified radiation period, the central user Alice realizes secure communication with each legitimate user Bob-i in turn.
[0110] To summarize, in this embodiment, the central user Alice generates a root key based on the time-varying distance data and local noise data with the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot in the direction of the central user Alice to generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; the difference beam is used to transmit a first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the central user Alice; the central user Alice scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot to obtain a scrambled root key; the central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob descrambles the scrambled root key based on the random pilot; if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful. First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when it is impossible to obtain rich channel information, the method selects local noise and time-varying ranging information as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication; secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble the root key; finally, the multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit a stable useful signal in the direction of the target user to improve the received signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user. This method can realize physical layer security enhancement for wireless communication, greatly improve the data link information security transmission capability in high dynamic scenarios, can effectively protect the transmitted information, and has high versatility and portability. It is suitable for a variety of practical scenarios, especially for long-distance line-of-sight security communication. It provides a feasible and reliable solution with great application value. Specific embodiment 2
[0111] This embodiment provides a key generation and distribution method for wireless physical layer secure communication based on a MIMO system under long-distance line-of-sight communication;
[0112] The working principle of the method provided in this embodiment is:
[0113] First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when rich channel information cannot be obtained, local noise and time-varying ranging information are selected as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication;
[0114] Secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it out, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble and obtain the root key.
[0115] Finally, multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit stable useful signals in the direction of the target user to improve the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user.
[0116] It should be further explained that the communication system model used by the method of the present invention is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, it includes: the central node Alice using M antennas, K ordinary nodes Bob-1, Bob-2, ..., Bob-K using N antennas, and the eavesdropping user Eve using Z antennas, where Alice needs to generate a key and distribute the key securely to Bob.
[0117] The method provided in this embodiment specifically comprises the following steps:
[0118] Step 1: The legitimate user Alice generates a root key. Specifically:
[0119] Step 1.1: Based on the available time-varying distance data between the legitimate users Alice and Bob and the local noise data collected by Alice, Alice uses the MD5 message digest algorithm to generate a root key. The generated root key is recorded as: ,in .
[0120] Step 1.2, calculate CRC sequence ,in is the length of the CRC sequence. and Merge ,in To increase the length of the key sequence after the CRC sequence.
[0121] Step 1.3, key sequence Channel coding is performed to obtain ,in is the codeword length after channel coding, and the code rate .
[0122] Step 1.4: channel coded sequence The interleaver outputs .
[0123] Step 1.5, use Pair Sequence Modulate and obtain key data ,in .
[0124] Step 2: The legitimate user Bob generates a random pilot and the first artificial interference , transmit random pilot When the sum beam is transmitted in the direction of Alice, interference is generated in the eavesdropping direction; the first artificial interference is transmitted When the signal is transmitted, the difference beam is used to form a null in the direction of Alice, which causes unbreakable interference in the direction of eavesdropping.
[0125] The specific steps include:
[0126] Step 2.1: The random pilot and artificial interference generated by the legitimate user Bob are both 1024PSK signals, generated by 31-order and 20-order m-sequences. The lengths of the random pilot and artificial interference are both N. Specifically:
[0127] Step 2.1.1, for the 31-order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 32-bit random noise data as its initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output The first 40N-long sequence is cut from the sequence of length, and 4 times the length is extracted to obtain a 10N-long sequence. .
[0128] Step 2.1.2, for the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as its initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, and finally outputs From the sequence of length, extract the first 10N long sequence .
[0129] Step 2.1.3, for a sequence of length 10N and Do a modular addition to get a new sequence of length 10N .
[0130] Step 2.1.4, for 10N long sequences Perform 1024PSK modulation to obtain a symbol sequence of length N as a random pilot , the first artificial interference .
[0131] Step 2.2: Design the beamforming coefficients for transmitting useful signals and artificial interference according to the array element arrangement. and , according to this coefficient, the random pilot Send to the legitimate user Alice, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction; making the first artificial interference A null sink is generated on the legitimate user Alice side, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0132] Step 3: The legitimate user Alice generates a second artificial interference , which is generated in the same way as the first artificial interference described in step 2.1 same.
[0133] Because of the first artificial interference from Bob A null is formed in the direction of Alice, so Alice is not affected by interference and can obtain the random pilot sent by Bob. Use this Key data generated for Alice Scramble to get the key . Send Key When the sum beam is used to transmit in the direction of Bob, interference is generated in the eavesdropping direction; a second artificial interference is transmitted When the signal is transmitted, the difference beam is used to form a null in the direction of Bob, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0134] Step 4: Due to the second artificial interference from Alice A null is formed in the direction of Bob, so Bob is not affected by the interference and can obtain the key sent by Alice. , and based on the random pilot Key data Descramble and obtain the estimated sequence of key data .
[0135] Step 5: The legitimate user Bob determines the validity of the root key: If the estimated sequence of the key data If the CRC check is satisfied, the root key transmission is determined to be successful, and Bob sends a message to Alice to inform her that the root key transmission is successful; otherwise, Bob sends a request to Alice to inform her that the root key transmission has failed, and steps 1 to 4 are repeated until the key is successfully obtained.
[0136] Step 6, due to the second artificial interference and the first artificial interference For Eve, the useful signal is drowned in the artificial interference and the root key cannot be obtained.
[0137] In order to verify the effectiveness of the method of this embodiment, this embodiment also provides a simulation experiment, and the specific simulation process makes the following assumptions:
[0138] (1) Alice, Bob and Eve all meet the far-field condition. The distance between Alice and Bob is L = 100 km.
[0139] (2) Eve is equidistant from Alice and Bob;
[0140] (3) The elevation angle and azimuth angle of the transmitting and receiving ends are the same;
[0141] (4) Alice and Bob are facing each other, that is, the pitch angle and azimuth Both ;
[0142] (5) Two adjacent array elements on the X-axis transmit interfering array elements, that is, one row and two columns.
[0143] Experiment 1: Eavesdropping on the pitch angle of user Eve , azimuth is not limited; artificial interference is Department;
[0144] Artificial interference forms a null in the target direction of both Bob and Alice. When the pitch angle of the eavesdropping end Eve is consistent with that of the legitimate user, under the same signal-to-noise ratio, the success rate of the legitimate user Bob to obtain the key will be much higher than that of the eavesdropping end Eve, and the success rate increases with the increase of the signal-to-noise ratio. Taking Eve's pitch angle = 0° and azimuth angle = 4° as an example, even if the signal-to-noise ratio reaches 10dB, the key extraction success rate is still less than 50%. When the signal-to-noise ratio SNR = -14dB, the probability of successful key extraction on Bob's end reaches: 99.99%.
[0145] Experiment 2: Azimuth of Eve's direction , consistent with the legitimate users, the pitch angle changes;
[0146] Artificial interference in Department;
[0147] Artificial interference forms a null in the target direction of both Bob and Alice. Even if the azimuth of the eavesdropping end is consistent with that of the legitimate user, under the same signal-to-noise ratio, the success rate of Bob's key acquisition will be much higher than that of Eve's eavesdropping end. When Eve's azimuth and elevation angles are both 0°, the success rate of the legitimate user's key acquisition is still about 5dB higher than that of the eavesdropping end. The success rate of Bob's key acquisition increases with the increase of the signal-to-noise ratio. When the signal-to-noise ratio reaches -14dB, the probability of Bob's key extraction success has reached: 99.99%.
[0148] To summarize, in this embodiment, the central user Alice generates a root key based on the time-varying distance data and local noise data with the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot in the direction of the central user Alice to generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; the difference beam is used to transmit a first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the central user Alice; the central user Alice scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot to obtain a scrambled root key; the central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob descrambles the scrambled root key based on the random pilot; if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful. First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when it is impossible to obtain rich channel information, the method selects local noise and time-varying ranging information as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication; secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble the root key; finally, the multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit a stable useful signal in the direction of the target user to improve the received signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user. This method can realize physical layer security enhancement for wireless communication, greatly improve the data link information security transmission capability in high dynamic scenarios, can effectively protect the transmitted information, and has high versatility and portability. It is suitable for a variety of practical scenarios, especially for long-distance line-of-sight security communication. It provides a feasible and reliable solution with great application value. Specific embodiment three
[0149] This embodiment provides a method and device for securely generating and distributing keys using multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission. Figure 4 , including: a root key generation and modulation module 401, a random pilot generation module 402, a root key scrambling module 403, a scrambled root key transmission module 404, a scrambled root key descrambling module 405, a root key demodulation and decryption module 406, and a root key success verification module 407; wherein:
[0150] The root key generation and modulation module 401 is used for the central user Alice to generate a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between itself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and to code and modulate the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0151] The random pilot generation module 402 is used for the legitimate user Bob to generate random pilots. , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null sink in the direction of the central user Alice, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0152] The root key scrambling module 403 is used for the central user Alice to obtain the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob. , and according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0153] The scrambled root key transmission module 404 is used for the central user Alice to use the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key to the legitimate user Bob, generating interference in the eavesdropping direction; and to use the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0154] The scrambling root key descrambling module 405 is used for the legitimate user Bob to obtain the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0155] The root key demodulation and decryption module 406 is used for the legitimate user Bob to perform BPSK demodulation and de-interleaving channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0156] The root key success verification module 407 is used to determine that the root key transmission is successful if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC verification, and the legitimate user Bob sends information to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
[0157] Optionally, the random pilot generation module 402 is specifically configured to:
[0158] For the 31-order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob uses the received 32-bit random noise data as the initial value, feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, extracts the first 40N-long sequence from the final output 231-1-length sequence, performs 4-fold extraction, and obtains a 10N-long sequence ;
[0159] For the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as the initial value, feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, and intercepts the first 10N-length sequence from the final output 220-1 length sequence ;
[0160] For a sequence of length 10N and Perform modulo-2 addition to obtain a new sequence of length 10N ;
[0161] For 10N long sequences Perform 1024PSK modulation to obtain a symbol sequence of length N;
[0162] According to the scenario requirements, the N-length symbol sequence is used as a random pilot , the first artificial interference .
[0163] Optionally, the central user Alice generates a second artificial interference The first artificial interference is generated by the legitimate user Bob The way it is produced is the same.
[0164] Optionally, the random pilot generation module 402 is specifically configured to:
[0165] Determine the beamforming coefficients of the transmitted signal and artificial interference according to the array element arrangement , ;
[0166] According to the beamforming coefficients , , adjust the signal transmission direction so that the random pilot Send to the legitimate user Alice, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction; making the first artificial interference A null sink is generated on the legitimate user Alice side, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0167] Optionally, the root key generation and modulation module 401 is specifically used for:
[0168] The central user Alice generates the root key using the information digest algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data;
[0169] Calculating a CRC sequence of the root key, combining the root key with the CRC sequence of the root key to obtain an extended key sequence after adding the CRC sequence;
[0170] The extended key sequence is channel-coded and then sent to an interleaver, and then modulated by BPSK to obtain a coded and modulated root key.
[0171] Optionally, the device further comprises: the root key verification failure module, wherein the root key verification failure module is used to:
[0172] If the root key estimation sequence does not satisfy the CRC check, the legitimate user Bob sends a request to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission has failed;
[0173] The central user Alice generates a root key again, and transmits the root key to the legitimate user Bob after coding modulation and random pilot scrambling. The legitimate user Bob descrambles and demodulates the scrambled root key according to the random pilot until the root key is successfully transmitted.
[0174] Optionally, the number of the legal user Bob is at least one;
[0175] If the number of legal users Bob is K, K>1, the time-varying distance data between the central user Alice and each legal user Bob-i is different, and the root key generated for each legal user Bob-i is also different; where, ;
[0176] The directions between the central user Alice and each legitimate user Bob-i are different. Each legitimate user Bob-i transmits a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. The sum beams used are different in direction, and each legitimate user Bob-i transmits the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction The difference beam pointing method used is also different;
[0177] The eavesdropping direction corresponding to the legitimate user Bob-i refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob-i and the central user Alice.
[0178] Optionally, the central user Alice and the legitimate user have the same elevation angle and azimuth angle; the central user Alice, the legitimate user Bob and the stealing user Eve all meet the far field condition.
[0179] To summarize, in this embodiment, the central user Alice generates a root key based on the time-varying distance data and local noise data with the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot in the direction of the central user Alice to generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; the difference beam is used to transmit a first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the central user Alice; the central user Alice scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot to obtain a scrambled root key; the central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob descrambles the scrambled root key based on the random pilot; if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful. First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when it is impossible to obtain rich channel information, the method selects local noise and time-varying ranging information as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication; secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble the root key; finally, the multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit a stable useful signal in the direction of the target user to improve the received signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user. This method can realize physical layer security enhancement for wireless communication, greatly improve the data link information security transmission capability in high dynamic scenarios, can effectively protect the transmitted information, and has high versatility and portability. It is suitable for a variety of practical scenarios, especially for long-distance line-of-sight security communication. It provides a feasible and reliable solution with great application value. Specific embodiment 4
[0180] This manual also provides an electronic device, see Figure 5 , the electronic device can implement the details of the method described in the above embodiment and achieve the same effect. Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device 500 includes: a processor 501, a transceiver 502, a memory 503, a user interface 504 and a bus interface, wherein:
[0181] In the embodiment of this specification, the electronic device 500 further includes: a computer program stored in the memory 503 and executable by the processor 501, and the computer program is executed by the processor 501 to implement the following steps:
[0182] The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and encodes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key;
[0183] Legal user Bob generates random pilot , the first artificial interference and uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. , generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null sink in the direction of the central user Alice, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0184] The central user Alice obtains the random pilot sent by the legitimate user Bob , and according to the random pilot , scramble the coded modulated root key to obtain a scrambled root key;
[0185] The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, generating interference in the eavesdropping direction; and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction. , forming a null sink in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction;
[0186] The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambling root key sent by the central user Alice, and uses the random pilot Descrambling the scrambled root key to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence;
[0187] The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence;
[0188] If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
[0189] exist Figure 5 In the embodiment, the bus framework may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, specifically one or more processors represented by processor 501 and various circuits of memory represented by memory 503 are linked together. The bus framework may also link together various other circuits such as peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and are therefore not further described in this document. The bus interface provides an interface. The transceiver 502 may be a plurality of components, namely, a transmitter and a receiver, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium. For different user devices, the user interface 504 may also be an interface capable of externally and internally connecting required devices, and the connected devices include but are not limited to a keypad, a display, a speaker, a microphone, a joystick, and the like.
[0190] The processor 501 manages the bus architecture and the usual processing, and the memory 503 can store data used by the processor 501 when performing operations. Optionally, when the computer program is executed by the processor 501, the following steps can also be implemented:
[0191] Optionally, the legitimate user Bob generates a random pilot , the first artificial interference ,include:
[0192] For the 31-order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob uses the received 32-bit random noise data as the initial value, feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, extracts the first 40N-long sequence from the final output 231-1-length sequence, performs 4-fold extraction, and obtains a 10N-long sequence ;
[0193] For the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as the initial value, feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, and intercepts the first 10N-length sequence from the final output 220-1 length sequence ;
[0194] For a sequence of length 10N and Perform modulo-2 addition to obtain a new sequence of length 10N ;
[0195] For 10N long sequences Perform 1024PSK modulation to obtain a symbol sequence of length N;
[0196] According to the scenario requirements, the N-length symbol sequence is used as a random pilot , the first artificial interference .
[0197] Optionally, the central user Alice generates a second artificial interference The first artificial interference is generated by the legitimate user Bob The way it is produced is the same.
[0198] Optionally, the use of the sum beam transmits a random pilot signal toward the center user Alice. , generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction , forming a null in the direction of the central user Alice, causing unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction, including:
[0199] Determine the beamforming coefficients of the transmitted signal and artificial interference according to the array element arrangement , ;
[0200] According to the beamforming coefficients , , adjust the signal transmission direction so that the random pilot Send to the legitimate user Alice, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction; making the first artificial interference A null sink is generated on the legitimate user Alice side, causing interference in the eavesdropping direction.
[0201] Optionally, the central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between the central user Alice and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and codes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key, including:
[0202] The central user Alice generates the root key using the information digest algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data;
[0203] Calculating a CRC sequence of the root key, combining the root key with the CRC sequence of the root key to obtain an extended key sequence after adding the CRC sequence;
[0204] The extended key sequence is channel-coded and then sent to an interleaver, and then modulated by BPSK to obtain a coded and modulated root key.
[0205] Optionally, after the legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and deinterleaving channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence, the method further includes:
[0206] If the root key estimation sequence does not satisfy the CRC check, the legitimate user Bob sends a request to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission has failed;
[0207] The central user Alice generates a root key again, and transmits the root key to the legitimate user Bob after coding modulation and random pilot scrambling. The legitimate user Bob descrambles and demodulates the scrambled root key according to the random pilot until the root key is successfully transmitted.
[0208] Optionally, the number of the legal user Bob is at least one;
[0209] If the number of legal users Bob is K, K is an integer greater than 1, the time-varying distance data between the central user Alice and each legal user Bob-i is different, and the root key generated for each legal user Bob-i is also different; where i=1, 2, ..., K;
[0210] The directions between the central user Alice and each legitimate user Bob-i are different. Each legitimate user Bob-i transmits a random pilot signal toward the central user Alice. The sum beams used are different in direction, and each legitimate user Bob-i transmits the first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction The difference beam pointing method used is also different;
[0211] The eavesdropping direction corresponding to the legitimate user Bob-i refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob-i and the central user Alice.
[0212] Optionally, the central user Alice and the legitimate user have the same elevation angle and azimuth angle; the central user Alice, the legitimate user and the stealing user Eve all meet the far-field condition.
[0213] To summarize, in this embodiment, the central user Alice generates a root key based on the time-varying distance data and local noise data with the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob uses the sum beam to transmit a random pilot in the direction of the central user Alice to generate interference in the eavesdropping direction; the difference beam is used to transmit a first artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the central user Alice; the central user Alice scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot to obtain a scrambled root key; the central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit a second artificial interference in the eavesdropping direction to form a null in the direction of the legitimate user Bob; the legitimate user Bob descrambles the scrambled root key based on the random pilot; if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, it is determined that the root key transmission is successful. First, when generating keys, in the scenario of long-distance line-of-sight communication, when it is impossible to obtain rich channel information, the method selects local noise and time-varying ranging information as random sources to generate root keys for encrypted communication; secondly, when distributing keys, the central node uses the pilot signal received from the common node to scramble the root key before sending it, and the common node then uses the pilot signal to descramble the root key; finally, the multi-antenna beamforming technology is used to transmit a stable useful signal in the direction of the target user to improve the received signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate user. At the same time, interference is added in the eavesdropping direction other than the target user direction to reduce the received signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping user. This method can realize physical layer security enhancement for wireless communication, greatly improve the data link information security transmission capability in high dynamic scenarios, can effectively protect the transmitted information, and has high versatility and portability. It is suitable for a variety of practical scenarios, especially for long-distance line-of-sight security communication. It provides a feasible and reliable solution with great application value.
[0214] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of this specification and is not intended to limit this specification. For those skilled in the art, this specification may have various changes and modifications. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of this specification shall be included in the protection scope of this specification.
Claims
1. A method for secure key generation and distribution of multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission, characterized in that: The method is applied to a multi-element communication system, wherein the multi-element communication system comprises: a central user Alice, a legitimate user Bob and an eavesdropping user Eve; The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and encodes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key; The legitimate user Bob generates a random pilot γ and the first artificial interference z B And use the sum beam to transmit the random pilot γ towards the central user Alice, and use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference z towards the eavesdropping direction B , where the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice; The central user Alice obtains the random pilot γ sent by the legitimate user Bob, and scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain the scrambled root key; The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference z in the eavesdropping direction. A ; The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambled root key sent by the central user Alice, and descrambles the scrambled root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence; The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence; If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, the root key transmission is determined to be successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful; Among them, the legal user Bob generates a random pilot γ, a first artificial interference z B ,include: For the 31st order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 32-bit random noise data as the initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output 2 31 -1 length sequence, extract the first 40N length sequence, perform 4-fold extraction, and obtain a 10N length sequence x1; For the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as the initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output 2 20 -1 length sequence, extract the first 10N length sequence x2; Perform modulo-2 addition on the 10N-length sequences x1 and x2 to obtain a new 10N-length sequence x; Perform 1024PSK modulation on the 10N-length sequence x to obtain an N-length symbol sequence; According to the scenario requirements, the N-length symbol sequence is used as a random pilot or the first artificial interference; The central user Alice generates the second artificial interference z A The first artificial interference z is generated by the legitimate user Bob B The way it is produced is the same.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The random pilot γ is transmitted toward the central user Alice using the sum beam, and the first artificial interference z is transmitted toward the eavesdropping direction using the difference beam. B ,include: According to the arrangement of array elements, the beamforming coefficients w1 and w2 of the transmitted signal and artificial interference are determined; According to the beamforming coefficients w1 and w2, the signal transmission direction is adjusted so that the random pilot γ is sent to the legitimate user Alice, so that the first artificial interference z B It generates a zero trap on the legitimate user Alice's side and causes unbreakable interference in the eavesdropping direction.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; And encoding and modulating the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the encoded and modulated root key, including: The central user Alice generates the root key using the information digest algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; Calculating a CRC sequence of the root key, combining the root key with the CRC sequence of the root key to obtain an extended key sequence after adding the CRC sequence; The extended key sequence is channel-coded and then sent to an interleaver, and then modulated by BPSK to obtain a coded and modulated root key.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that After the legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and deinterleaving channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence, the method further includes: If the root key estimation sequence does not satisfy the CRC check, the legitimate user Bob sends a request to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission has failed; The central user Alice generates a root key again, and transmits the root key to the legitimate user Bob after coding modulation and random pilot scrambling. The legitimate user Bob descrambles and demodulates the scrambled root key according to the random pilot until the root key is successfully transmitted.
5. The method according to claim 1 or 4, characterized in that: The number of the legal user Bob is at least one; If the number of legal users Bob is K, K is an integer greater than 1, the time-varying distance data between the central user Alice and each legal user Bob-i is different, and the root key generated for each legal user Bob-i is also different; where, i=1,2,……,K; The directions between the central user Alice and the legitimate users Bob-i are different. The sum beams used by the legitimate users Bob-i to transmit random pilots γ to the central user Alice are different. Each legitimate user Bob-i transmits the first artificial interference z in the eavesdropping direction. B The difference beam pointing method used is also different; The eavesdropping direction corresponding to the legitimate user Bob-i refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob-i and the central user Alice.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The central user Alice and the legitimate user have the same elevation angle and azimuth angle; the central user Alice, the legitimate user and the stealing user Eve all meet the far-field condition and the line-of-sight condition, and each wireless signal propagates in a straight line between the legitimate user and the central user.
7. A method and device for secure key generation and distribution of multiple antennas under line-of-sight transmission, used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: include: Root key generation and modulation module, random pilot generation module, root key scrambling module, scrambled root key transmission module, scrambled root key descrambling module, root key demodulation and decryption module, root key success verification module; wherein: The root key generation and modulation module is used for the central user Alice to generate a root key using a preset algorithm according to the time-varying distance data between itself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and to code and modulate the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key; The random pilot generation module is used for the legitimate user Bob to generate random pilot γ and artificial interference z B And use the sum beam to transmit the random pilot γ towards the central user Alice, and use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference z towards the eavesdropping direction B , where the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice; The root key scrambling module is used for the central user Alice to obtain the random pilot γ sent by the legitimate user Bob, and scramble the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain the scrambled root key; The scrambled root key transmission module is used for the central user Alice to use the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key to the legitimate user Bob, and to use the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference z in the eavesdropping direction. A ; The scrambled root key descrambling module is used for the legitimate user Bob to obtain the scrambled root key sent by the central user Alice, and descramble the scrambled root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain the descrambled key estimation sequence; The root key demodulation and decryption module is used for the legitimate user Bob to perform BPSK demodulation and de-interleaving channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence; The root key success verification module is used to determine that the root key transmission is successful if the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC verification, and the legitimate user Bob sends information to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful.
8. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: Communications interfaces, processors, and memory; The processor calls the program instructions in the memory to perform the following actions: The central user Alice generates a root key using a preset algorithm based on the time-varying distance data between herself and the legitimate user Bob and the collected local noise data; and encodes and modulates the root key according to the CRC sequence to obtain the coded and modulated root key; The legitimate user Bob generates random pilot γ and artificial interference z B And use the sum beam to transmit the random pilot γ towards the central user Alice, and use the difference beam to transmit the first artificial interference z towards the eavesdropping direction B , where the eavesdropping direction refers to the direction other than the connection direction between the legitimate user Bob and the central user Alice; The central user Alice obtains the random pilot γ sent by the legitimate user Bob, and scrambles the coded modulated root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain the scrambled root key; The central user Alice uses the sum beam to transmit the scrambled root key in the direction of the legitimate user Bob, and uses the difference beam to transmit the second artificial interference z in the eavesdropping direction. A ; The legitimate user Bob obtains the scrambled root key sent by the central user Alice, and descrambles the scrambled root key according to the random pilot γ to obtain a descrambled key estimation sequence; The legitimate user Bob performs BPSK demodulation and channel decryption on the key estimation sequence to obtain a root key estimation sequence; If the root key estimation sequence satisfies the CRC check, the root key transmission is determined to be successful, and the legitimate user Bob sends a message to the central user Alice to inform that the root key transmission is successful; Among them, the legal user Bob generates a random pilot γ, a first artificial interference z B ,include: For the 31st order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 32-bit random noise data as the initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output 2 31 -1 length sequence, extract the first 40N length sequence, perform 4-fold extraction, and obtain a 10N length sequence x1; For the 20th order m-sequence generator, the legitimate user Bob takes the received 20-bit random noise data as the initial value, and feeds it back to the register after multiple linear shifts, from the final output 2 20 -1 length sequence, extract the first 10N length sequence x2; Perform modulo-2 addition on the 10N-length sequences x1 and x2 to obtain a new 10N-length sequence x; Perform 1024PSK modulation on the 10N-length sequence x to obtain an N-length symbol sequence; According to the scenario requirements, the N-length symbol sequence is used as a random pilot or the first artificial interference; The central user Alice generates the second artificial interference z A The first artificial interference z is generated by the legitimate user Bob B The way it is produced is the same.
