Detection device, in-vehicle device, detection method, and computer program

By using oscillation circuits and detection circuits in the on-board network to judge illegal intrusion, and combining temperature compensation technology, the problem of illegal intrusion in which the existing technology cannot detect illegal terminals imitate ECU communication sequences is solved, and the accuracy and reliability of detection are improved.

CN119096242APending Publication Date: 2024-12-06AUTONETWORKS TECH LTD +2
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202380038742.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2022-05-16
Filing Date
2023-05-01
Publication Date
2024-12-06

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing vehicle-mounted network detection methods cannot effectively detect illegal intrusions by illegal terminals by imitating the MAC address and communication sequence of the ECU, resulting in the inability to accurately identify illegal intrusions.

Method used

By using the oscillation circuit and the detection circuit in the detection device, it is determined whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal received on the communication line is consistent with the frequency of the third oscillation signal in the ECU. If it is different, it is determined to be illegal intrusion and pass through the temperature sensor The temperature control unit compensates the oscillator frequency to improve detection accuracy.

Benefits of technology

More reliable detection of illegal intrusions is achieved, misjudgment is reduced, and high accuracy can be maintained under changes in temperature and aging factors.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The detection device is connected to an ECU mounted in a vehicle via a communication line, and is provided with: an oscillation circuit that outputs a first oscillation signal on the basis of oscillation of a first oscillator; the detection circuit outputs, to a determination unit, a detection value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a reception signal received from the communication line. When the detection value is different from a normal value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU, the determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a detection device, an on-vehicle device, a detection method, and a computer program. This application claims priority based on Japanese application No. 2022-079938 filed on May 16, 2022, and all the contents described in the Japanese application are cited by reference. Background Art

[0002] A technology for preventing illegal intrusion into an in-vehicle network including an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) mounted on a vehicle is known. For example, in Patent Document 1, a terminal connecting a CPU included in the ECU to a port is monitored. And, if the MAC address of the connected terminal is different from the target MAC address of the terminal pre-registered in the MAC address table, the port is disabled to prevent illegal intrusion into the in-vehicle LAN.

[0003] Prior Art Literature

[0004] Patent Literature

[0005] Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2019-125991 Summary of the invention

[0006] The detection device disclosed in the present invention is a detection device connected to an ECU mounted on a vehicle via a communication line, and the detection device comprises: an oscillation circuit that outputs a first oscillation signal based on the oscillation of a first oscillator; and a detection circuit that outputs a detection value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line to a determination unit, and the determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the detection value is different from a normal value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator included in the ECU.

[0007] The detection method disclosed herein is a detection method for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein the detection method includes a step of determining that there is illegal intrusion on the communication line when a detection value is different from a normal value, the detection value being a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on the oscillation of a first oscillator and the frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line, and the normal value being a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

[0008] The computer program disclosed herein is a computer program for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein the computer program causes a computer to execute a step of determining that there is illegal intrusion in the communication line when a detection value is different from a normal value, the detection value being a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on the oscillation of a first oscillator and the frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line, and the normal value being a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0009] Figure 1 It is a diagram showing a configuration example of an in-vehicle system according to an embodiment.

[0010] Figure 2 It is shown Figure 1 A diagram showing a situation where the vehicle system is illegally hacked into.

[0011] Figure 3 It is a diagram showing a configuration example of a vehicle-mounted device according to an embodiment.

[0012] Figure 4 It is a diagram showing a configuration example of a detection device according to an embodiment.

[0013] Figure 5 is a flow chart illustrating a detection method according to an embodiment.

[0014] Figure 6 is a flow chart illustrating a detection method according to an embodiment.

[0015] Figure 7 : is a graph illustrating detection values ​​according to the embodiment.

[0016] Figure 8 is a graph illustrating the temperature characteristics of an oscillator.

[0017] Fig. 9 This is a table illustrating the relationship between normal values ​​and temperatures according to a modified example.

[0018] Fig.10 is a graph illustrating the aging characteristics of an oscillator.

[0019] Fig.11 It is a diagram showing the configuration of an in-vehicle system according to a modified example.

[0020] Fig.12 : is a graph illustrating detection values ​​according to a modified example. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] [Problems to be Solved by the Present Disclosure]

[0022] In recent years, there is a method in which a malicious terminal is used to spy on data transmitted and received between a plurality of ECUs in an in-vehicle network, thereby recording a normal sequence in the malicious terminal, and then the malicious terminal impersonates an ECU and illegally invades the in-vehicle network.

[0023] In this case, the illegal terminal copies the MAC address of the ECU included in the vehicle network, so the illegal intrusion cannot be detected by the conventional monitoring method such as Patent Document 1.

[0024] In view of the above problems, an object of the present disclosure is to provide a detection device, an in-vehicle device, a detection method, and a computer program that can more reliably detect illegal intrusion.

[0025] [Effects of the present disclosure]

[0026] According to the present disclosure, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0027] [Description of Embodiments of the Present Disclosure]

[0028] The embodiments of the present disclosure include the following structures as main points.

[0029] (1) The detection device disclosed in the present invention is a detection device connected to an ECU mounted on a vehicle via a communication line, the detection device comprising: an oscillation circuit that outputs a first oscillation signal based on the oscillation of a first oscillator; and a detection circuit that outputs a detection value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line to a determination unit, the determination unit determining that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the detection value is different from a normal value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator included in the ECU.

[0030] Although an illegal terminal can imitate the communication sequence of the ECU, it cannot imitate the third oscillation signal caused by the second oscillator of the ECU. Therefore, by determining whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal received from the communication line is equivalent to the frequency of the third oscillation signal, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0031] (2) In the detection device according to (1), the determination unit may determine that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the difference between the detection value and the normal value exceeds a predetermined value.

[0032] With this configuration, when the detection value deviates from the normal value due to an error or the like, it is possible to suppress an erroneous determination of illegal intrusion.

[0033] (3) In the detection device of (2), the detection circuit may include: a first circuit, which receives the first oscillation signal and the second oscillation signal and detects the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of the second oscillation signal; and a second circuit, which converts the difference detected in the first circuit into the detection value.

[0034] With this configuration, it is possible to convert the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of the second oscillation signal into a detection value.

[0035] (4) In the detection device of (3), the received signal may be a signal obtained by superimposing the second oscillation signal and the data signal. In this case, the detection circuit may further include an extraction circuit that extracts the second oscillation signal from the received signal and outputs the extracted signal to the first circuit.

[0036] With this configuration, the second oscillation signal can be extracted from the received signal.

[0037] (5) The detection device according to any one of (1) to (4) may further include a storage unit that stores the normal value in advance and the determination unit.

[0038] With this configuration, it is possible to detect illegal intrusion within the detection device.

[0039] (6) The detection device of (5) may further include a changing unit that changes the normal value stored in the storage unit. The changing unit may be capable of selecting a plurality of operation modes including a first mode and a second mode. When the first mode is selected, the changing unit changes the normal value stored in the storage unit to the detection value output from the detection circuit during the period in which the first mode is selected. When the second mode is selected, the changing unit does not change the normal value stored in the storage unit.

[0040] With this configuration, it is possible to compensate for the frequency deviation of the oscillator due to aging, thereby more reliably detecting unauthorized intrusion.

[0041] (7) In the detection device of (5) above, the determination unit may determine the normal value based on a temperature detected by a temperature sensor that detects a temperature of at least one of the first oscillator and the second oscillator.

[0042] With this configuration, it is possible to compensate for the frequency deviation of the oscillator caused by temperature change, thereby more reliably detecting unauthorized intrusion.

[0043] (8) The detection device of any one of (1) to (7) may further include a temperature control unit, which instructs the temperature adjustment unit to adjust the temperature of the second oscillator, and the detection circuit outputs a first detection value to the determination unit, wherein the first detection value is the detection value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of the second oscillation signal included in the received signal received during the period when the second oscillator is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature according to the instruction of the temperature control unit. The determination unit may determine that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the difference between the first detection value and a first normal value exceeds a predetermined value, wherein the first normal value is the normal value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of the third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator during the period when the second oscillator is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

[0044] According to this structure, when the first detection value does not follow the temperature adjustment of the temperature adjustment unit, illegal intrusion is detected, and when the first detection value follows the temperature adjustment of the temperature adjustment unit, illegal intrusion is not detected. Thus, even if the frequency of the second oscillator and the frequency of the third oscillator coincide by chance at a certain temperature, illegal intrusion can be detected.

[0045] (9) The vehicle-mounted device of the present disclosure is a vehicle-mounted device connected to the ECU via the communication line, and comprises: a PHY unit that operates at a physical layer and converts the received signal into a digital signal; and a processing unit that receives the digital signal converted by the PHY unit, and the PHY unit comprises: a conversion unit that converts the received signal into the digital signal; and a detection device of any one of (1) to (8).

[0046] (10) The detection method disclosed in the present invention is a detection method for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein the detection method includes a step of determining that there is illegal intrusion in the communication line when a detection value is different from a normal value, the detection value being a value corresponding to the difference between a frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on the oscillation of a first oscillator and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line, and the normal value being a value corresponding to the difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

[0047] Although an illegal terminal can imitate the communication sequence of the ECU, it cannot imitate the third oscillation signal caused by the second oscillator of the ECU. Therefore, by determining whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal received from the communication line is equivalent to the frequency of the third oscillation signal, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0048] (11) The computer program disclosed herein is a computer program for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein the computer program causes a computer to execute a step of determining that there is illegal intrusion in the communication line when a detection value is different from a normal value, wherein the detection value is a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on the oscillation of a first oscillator and the frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a received signal received from the communication line, and the normal value is a value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

[0049] Although an illegal terminal can imitate the communication sequence of the ECU, it cannot imitate the third oscillation signal caused by the second oscillator of the ECU. Therefore, by determining whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal received from the communication line is equivalent to the frequency of the third oscillation signal, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0050] [1. Details of embodiments of the present disclosure]

[0051] Hereinafter, details of the embodiments of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings.

[0052] [1.1 Structure of the vehicle-mounted system 1]

[0053] Figure 1 It is a diagram showing a configuration example of the vehicle-mounted system 1 according to the embodiment.

[0054] The vehicle-mounted system 1 is a system installed in a vehicle 9 such as an automobile. The vehicle-mounted system 1 includes a vehicle-mounted device 10, a plurality of ECUs (Electronic Control Units) 20, and a plurality of communication lines 30 that respectively connect the vehicle-mounted device 10 and the plurality of ECUs 20. The vehicle-mounted device 10 and the plurality of ECUs 20 are respectively connected by the plurality of communication lines 30 to form a vehicle-mounted network.

[0055] The vehicle-mounted device 10 is, for example, a relay device that relays data sent and received between a plurality of ECUs 20. Specifically, the vehicle-mounted device 10 is a relay device that has the functions of an Ethernet switch (Ethernet is a registered trademark) and an L2 switch. It should be noted that the vehicle-mounted device 10 may be an integrated ECU that manages control of a plurality of ECUs 20, or may be the same ECU as the plurality of ECUs 20.

[0056] The number of ECUs 20 included in the vehicle-mounted system 1 is not particularly limited, and may be one. Figure 1 In the example of FIG. 1 , the vehicle-mounted system 1 includes four ECUs 20 . When the four ECUs 20 are distinguished, they are referred to as ECUs 21 , 22 , 23 , and 24 , respectively.

[0057] ECU 20 is, for example, a device that controls various parts of the vehicle 9 (e.g., brakes, doors, batteries, air conditioners, etc.) (operation system ECU). The function of ECU 20 is not particularly limited, and ECU 20 may also be a device that communicates with sensors and monitors the status of various parts of the vehicle 9 (cognitive system ECU). A plurality of ECUs 20 may have different functions or the same functions.

[0058] Multiple (in Figure 1 In the example, four communication lines 30 are respectively extended from the vehicle-mounted device 10. When distinguishing the four communication lines 30, the line extending to the ECU 21 is called the communication line 31, the line extending to the ECU 22 is called the communication line 32, the line extending to the ECU 23 is called the communication line 33, and the line extending to the ECU 24 is called the communication line 34.

[0059] When the in-vehicle network is an Ethernet-based network, the communication line 30 is, for example, a communication line based on 1000BASE-T1 or 1000BASE-RH standards. It should be noted that the communication line 30 may also be based on other standards such as CAN (Controller Area Network).

[0060] [1.2 Issues to be solved by the implementation method]

[0061] Figure 21 is a diagram showing a situation where the vehicle-mounted system 1 is illegally hacked. First, the intruder inserts a hub H1 connected to an illegal terminal D1 in the middle of the communication line 31. The illegal terminal D1 is, for example, a personal computer such as a notebook computer, or a tablet terminal. The hub H1 is, for example, a repeater hub that copies the data flowing in the communication line 31. For example, the intruder cuts the communication line 31 and installs connectors on the cut parts, and connects the hub H1 to the connectors. In addition, sometimes the communication line 31 is unplugged from one of the vehicle-mounted device 10 and ECU21, and the hub H1 is inserted, and a new communication line is connected from the hub H1 to the other of the vehicle-mounted device 10 and ECU21.

[0062] Next, the intruder copies the data flowing in the communication line 31 to the illegal terminal D1 connected to the hub H1. And, based on the data, the illegal terminal D1 analyzes, for example, the MAC (Media Access Control) address of the ECU 21 and the communication sequence between the ECU 21 and the vehicle-mounted device 10. Then, the illegal terminal D1 copies the MAC address and communication sequence of the ECU 21 to impersonate the ECU 21 and sends illegal data to the vehicle-mounted device 10.

[0063] For example, in the case of Patent Document 1, whether the communication partner is normal or illegal is determined based on the MAC address. In the above method, since the illegal intrusion is performed in a state where the MAC address of ECU 21 is copied, the software-based monitoring method of Patent Document 1 cannot detect the illegal intrusion.

[0064] Therefore, in this embodiment, the frequency of the oscillator (e.g., crystal oscillator) included in the ECU 20 is focused on to detect illegal intrusion. In each of the multiple ECUs 20, an oscillator is provided to generate an oscillation signal (clock signal). For example, the ECU 21 includes a second oscillator 71. The frequency of the oscillator has individual differences (allowable deviations), and even oscillators of the same specification have frequency differences of, for example, ±20 to 50 ppm. Therefore, the clock has been synchronized on the receiving side of the signal in a manner that eliminates this frequency difference.

[0065] like Figure 1 As shown, in a normal state (a state without illegal intrusion), the vehicle-mounted device 10 receives an oscillation signal SG3 (an example of a “third oscillation signal” in the present disclosure) generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator 71 included in the ECU 21 .

[0066] On the other hand, Figure 2As shown, in the case where the illegal terminal D1 impersonates the ECU 21 and transmits data to the vehicle-mounted device 10 , the vehicle-mounted device 10 receives the oscillation signal SGx generated based on the oscillation of the third oscillator H2 included in the hub H1 .

[0067] Although the illegal terminal D1 can impersonate the MAC address and communication sequence data of ECU21, it cannot imitate the frequency of the oscillation signal SG3 sent from ECU21 because the frequency of the oscillation signal SGx sent to the vehicle-mounted device 10 depends on the characteristics of the third oscillator H2.

[0068] After in-depth research, the inventor came up with the following invention: using a signal caused by a hardware structure such as an oscillator that cannot be imitated in the illegal terminal D1, it is determined whether the frequency of the oscillation signal received in the vehicle-mounted device 10 is equivalent to the frequency of the oscillation signal SG3 of the ECU 21, thereby more reliably detecting illegal intrusion. The specific structure is described below.

[0069] [1.3 Structure of the vehicle-mounted device 10]

[0070] Figure 3 It is a diagram showing a configuration example of the vehicle-mounted device 10 according to the embodiment.

[0071] The in-vehicle device 10 includes a plurality of PHY units 11 , a processing device 12 , a first oscillator 13 , and a temperature sensor 14 .

[0072] The PHY unit 11 is an area that operates at the physical layer in the OSI (Open System Interconnection) reference model, and is, for example, an integrated circuit such as Ethernet PHY. The PHY unit 11 includes a detection device 40 and a conversion device 50. The detection device 40 and the conversion device 50 may be implemented by different areas in the PHY unit 11, or by sharing at least a portion of the area.

[0073] The detection device 40 is a device for detecting illegal intrusion into the communication line 30. The details of the detection device 40 will be described later. The conversion device 50 is a device for converting an analog signal flowing on the communication line 30 side and a digital signal input and output to the processing device 12. Specifically, the conversion device 50 has a function of converting an analog signal (received signal RS1) received from the communication line 30 into a digital signal DS1 that can be recognized by the processing device 12 and outputting it to the processing device 12, and a function of converting the digital signal DS1 input from the processing device 12 into an analog signal that can be recognized by the ECU 20 and sending it to the communication line 30.

[0074] exist Figure 3In the example, four PHY units 11 are provided corresponding to the number of ECUs 20. It should be noted that the number of PHY units 11 is not particularly limited, and for example, more than five PHY units 11 may be provided. The four PHY units 11 have the same internal structure, and are respectively connected to the four communication lines 31, 32, 33, and 34. It should be noted that the detection device 40 may be provided only in the PHY unit 11 connected to the communication line 31 among the four PHY units 11, and the detection device 40 may be omitted in the other three PHY units 11.

[0075] The processing device 12 is a device that performs various processes based on the digital signal DS1 converted by the PHY unit 11, such as a microcontroller unit (MCU). The processing device 12 can also be a PLD (Programmable Logic Device) such as a CPLD (Complex PLD) or an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array).

[0076] The processing device 12 includes a control unit 61, a storage unit 62, and a reading unit 63. These units 61, 62, and 63 are electrically connected to each other via a bus B1.

[0077] The control unit 61 includes a circuit structure such as a processor. Specifically, the control unit 61 includes one or more CPUs (Central Processing Units). The processor included in the control unit 61 may also be a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit). The control unit 61 reads the computer program stored in the storage unit 62 and performs various operations and controls.

[0078] The storage unit 62 has a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory, and stores various data including a normal value V1 described later. The volatile memory includes, for example, a RAM (Random Access Memory). The nonvolatile memory includes, for example, a flash memory, a HDD (Hard Disk Drive), an SSD (Solid State Drive), or a ROM (Read Only Memory). The storage unit 62 stores, for example, a computer program and various parameters in the nonvolatile memory.

[0079] The reading unit 63 reads information from a computer-readable recording medium 64. The recording medium 64 is, for example, an optical disk such as a CD or a DVD or a USB flash memory. The reading unit 63 is, for example, an optical drive or a USB terminal. The recording medium 64 records a computer program and various parameters, and by causing the reading unit 63 to read the recording medium 64, the computer program and various parameters are stored in the non-volatile memory of the storage unit 62.

[0080] The control unit 61 compares the detection value Vx input from the detection circuit 43 described later with the normal value V1 stored in the storage unit 62. For example, the absolute value (|Vx-V1|) of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 is calculated. And, when the absolute value exceeds the limit value α (|Vx-V1|>α), it is determined that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31. In this case, the control unit 61 functions as the "determination unit" of the present disclosure, and the storage unit 62 functions as the "storage unit" of the present disclosure.

[0081] The first oscillator 13 is an element used as a clock source for each circuit included in the vehicle-mounted device 10. The first oscillator 13 is, for example, a crystal oscillator. It should be noted that the first oscillator 13 may also be a ceramic oscillator. Figure 1 In the example, a first oscillator 13 is provided in the vehicle-mounted device 10, and an oscillation component is supplied from the first oscillator 13 to each unit 11, 12 of the vehicle-mounted device 10. It should be noted that the first oscillator 13 may be provided separately in each unit 11, 12 of the vehicle-mounted device 10.

[0082] The temperature sensor 14 is a sensor for detecting the temperature of the first oscillator 13 . The temperature sensor 14 is, for example, a temperature measuring resistor (RTD) such as a thermistor. It should be noted that the temperature sensor 14 may also be a thermocouple or an infrared radiation thermometer. The temperature sensor 14 outputs a detection signal to the processing device 12 .

[0083] [1.4 Structure of the detection device 40]

[0084] Figure 4 Detection device 40 is a diagram showing a configuration example of a detection device 40 according to an embodiment. Detection device 40 includes a reception circuit 41 , an oscillation circuit 42 , a detection circuit 43 , a logic circuit 44 , and a memory circuit 45 .

[0085] The receiving circuit 41 is a circuit (receiver) that receives the reception signal RS1 from the communication line 31 . The receiving circuit 41 may perform pre-processing such as amplification and noise reduction on the reception signal RS1 . The receiving circuit 41 outputs the reception signal RS1 (or the pre-processed reception signal RS1 ) to the detection circuit 43 .

[0086] The oscillation circuit 42 is a circuit that generates the first oscillation signal SG1 based on the oscillation of the first oscillator 13. The frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 depends on the frequency of the first oscillator 13. The oscillation circuit 42 outputs the first oscillation signal SG1 to the detection circuit 43.

[0087] The detection circuit 43 generates a detection value Vx corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 included in the reception signal RS1 , and outputs the detection value Vx to at least one of the logic circuit 44 and the processing device 12 .

[0088] More specifically, the detection circuit 43 includes an extraction circuit 431 , a first circuit 432 , and a second circuit 433 .

[0089] Here, the reception signal RS1 is a signal obtained by superimposing the second oscillation signal SG2 (clock) and the data signal DS2 on one differential signal. Thus, both the second oscillation signal SG2 and the data signal DS2 can be transmitted through one communication line 30 .

[0090] The extraction circuit 431 is a circuit that extracts the second oscillation signal SG2 from the reception signal RS1 and outputs the second oscillation signal SG2 to the first circuit 432. The extraction circuit 431 is, for example, a CDR (Clock Data Recovery) circuit.

[0091] The first circuit 432 receives the first oscillation signal SG1 from the oscillation circuit 42 and receives the second oscillation signal SG2 from the extraction circuit 431. The first circuit 432 is a circuit that detects the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2. The first circuit 432 is, for example, a PFD (Phase Frequency Detector) circuit. The difference detected by the first circuit 432 is output to the second circuit 433 as a pulse wave, for example.

[0092] The second circuit 433 is a circuit that converts the difference detected in the first circuit 432 into a detection value Vx. The second circuit 433 includes a CP (Charge Pump) circuit 434, a filter circuit 435, and an AD (Analog to digital) conversion circuit 436. The difference detected in the first circuit 432 is input to the CP circuit 434.

[0093] The CP circuit 434 is a circuit that outputs a current signal (pulse current) corresponding to the difference (pulse wave) detected in the first circuit 432 , and includes, for example, a capacitor and a diode. The current signal output from the CP circuit 434 is input to the filter circuit 435 .

[0094] The filter circuit 435 is a circuit that converts the current signal output from the CP circuit 434 into a voltage value. The filter circuit 435 is, for example, a lag-lead filter, and converts the pulse current into a smoothed voltage value. The voltage value output from the filter circuit 435 is input to the AD conversion circuit 436.

[0095] The AD conversion circuit 436 is a circuit that converts the voltage value (analog value) outputted from the filter circuit 435 into a digital value. The AD conversion circuit 436 outputs the converted digital value to at least one of the logic circuit 44 and the processing device 12 as a detection value Vx.

[0096] It should be noted that, for example, when the processing device 12 is provided with an AD conversion circuit, the detection circuit 43 may output the voltage value (analog value) converted in the filter circuit 435 as the detection value Vx to the processing device 12. In this case, the detection value Vx is converted into a digital value in the AD conversion circuit of the processing device 12.

[0097] The logic circuit 44 includes a circuit structure (Circuitry) such as a processor, etc. Specifically, the control unit 61 includes a plurality of logic gates, and performs various calculations and controls based on the parameters stored in the memory circuit 45 and the detection value Vx input from the detection circuit 43 .

[0098] The memory circuit 45 is a circuit for storing various parameters. The memory circuit 45 is, for example, a PROM (Programmable ROM). The memory circuit 45 stores a normal value V1 and a limit value α, which will be described later.

[0099] The logic circuit 44 compares the detection value Vx input from the detection circuit 43 with the normal value V1 stored in the memory circuit 45. For example, the absolute value (|Vx-V1|) of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 is calculated. And, when the absolute value exceeds the limit value α (|Vx-V1|>α), it is determined that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31. In this case, the logic circuit 44 functions as the "determination unit" of the present disclosure, and the memory circuit 45 functions as the "storage unit" of the present disclosure.

[0100] [1.5 Detection method]

[0101] Next, the detection method of illegal intrusion in the vehicle-mounted system 1 is described. In the vehicle-mounted system 1, the control unit 61 of the processing device 12 can detect illegal intrusion, and the logic circuit 44 of the detection device 40 can detect illegal intrusion. Hereinafter, the former detection method is described as a "first detection example" and the latter detection method is described as a "second detection example".

[0102] [1.5.1 First detection example: the control unit 61 detects illegal intrusion]

[0103] Figure 5 as well as Figure 6 is a flow chart illustrating a detection method according to an embodiment. Figure 5 as well as Figure 6 Controls executed by the vehicle-mounted device 10 are respectively shown.

[0104] Figure 7 3 is a graph illustrating the detection value Vx according to the embodiment.

[0105] In the in-vehicle system 1, storage of the normal value V1 is performed first, and then detection of illegal intrusion is performed. Figure 5 is a flowchart showing the steps for storing a normal value V1, Figure 6 is a flow chart showing steps for performing detection of an unauthorized intrusion. Figure 7 It shows execution Figure 5 as well as Figure 6 The vertical axis represents the detection value Vx and the horizontal axis represents the time.

[0106] The normal value V1 is stored, for example, before the vehicle 9 is shipped, in a manufacturing plant of the vehicle 9. Figure 7 Before the vehicle 9 is shipped (ie, in the manufacturing plant), the possibility of illegal intrusion into the vehicle-mounted system 1 is low, so it is possible to register the normal value V1 in the storage unit 62 as if there is no illegal intrusion.

[0107] Reference Figure 5 First, the first circuit 432 detects the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 generated based on the oscillation of the first oscillator 13 and the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator 71 included in the ECU 21 (step S11). Specifically, the vehicle-mounted device 10 and the ECU 21 are operated, and a test signal formed by superimposing the third oscillation signal SG3 and the data signal is sent from the ECU 21 to the vehicle-mounted device 10 via the communication line 31. The vehicle-mounted device 10 receives the test signal as a reception signal RS1.

[0108] After the reception signal RS1 is preprocessed in the reception circuit 41, it is input to the CDR circuit 431. In the CDR circuit 431, the third oscillation signal SG3 is extracted from the reception signal RS1, and the third oscillation signal SG3 is input to the first circuit 432 (PFD circuit). In addition, the first oscillation signal SG1 generated in the oscillation circuit 42 based on the oscillation of the first oscillator 13 is also input to the first circuit 432. The first circuit 432 compares the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 with the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3, and outputs the frequency difference as a pulse wave to the second circuit 433. As described above, step S11 ends.

[0109] Next, the second circuit 433 converts the frequency difference into a detection value Vx (from step S12 to step S14). Specifically, the CP circuit 434 converts the frequency difference into a current value (step S12), the filter circuit 435 converts the current value into a voltage value (step S13), and the AD conversion circuit 436 converts the voltage value into a digital value (step S14).

[0110] Finally, the storage unit 62 of the processing device 12 stores the detection value Vx as the normal value V1 (step S15). Specifically, the AD conversion circuit 436 outputs the digital value as the detection value Vx to the processing device 12. The control unit 61 of the processing device 12 stores the input detection value Vx as the normal value V1 in the storage unit 62. As described above, step S15 ends.

[0111] Reference Figure 6 as well as Figure 7 The detection of illegal intrusion is performed when the power of the vehicle-mounted device 10 is turned on, for example. It should be noted that the detection of illegal intrusion can be performed periodically, for example, while the power of the vehicle-mounted device 10 is turned on, or can be performed based on the operation of the passenger of the vehicle 9. Figure 7 In the example, the process is executed at time X2 and time X3 after the vehicle 9 is shipped from the factory.

[0112] First, the first circuit 432 detects a difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 included in the reception signal RS1 received from the communication line 31 (step S21 ).

[0113] Specifically, the vehicle-mounted device 10 receives the reception signal RS1 from the communication line 31. Here, the reception signal RS1 is unclear at the time of step S21. Figure 1 The signal sent from ECU 21 is as shown in Figure 2 As shown, the signal is sent from the illegal hub H1.

[0114] After the reception signal RS1 is preprocessed in the reception circuit 41, it is input to the CDR circuit 431. In the CDR circuit 431, the second oscillation signal SG2 is extracted from the reception signal RS1, and the second oscillation signal SG2 is input to the first circuit 432. In addition, the first oscillation signal SG1 is also input to the first circuit 432. The first circuit 432 compares the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 with the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2, and outputs the frequency difference as a pulse wave to the second circuit 433. As described above, step S21 ends.

[0115] Next, the second circuit 433 converts the frequency difference into a detection value Vx (from step S22 to step S24). Specifically, the CP circuit 434 converts the frequency difference into a current value (step S22), the filter circuit 435 converts the current value into a voltage value (step S23), and the AD conversion circuit 436 converts the voltage value into a digital value (step S24).

[0116] Next, the control unit 61 of the processing device 12 monitors whether the detection value Vx is within a predetermined range (step S25). Here, if the second oscillation signal SG2 included in the received signal RS1 is a signal based on the second oscillator 71 included in the ECU 20, the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 is substantially equal to the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 within a range of, for example, ±2ppm. On the other hand, if the second oscillation signal SG2 is a signal based on the third oscillator H2 included in the hub H1, the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 is different from the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 in most cases except for the case of accidental coincidence.

[0117] In step S25, the difference between the detection value Vx (i.e., the value corresponding to the difference between the first oscillation signal SG1 and the second oscillation signal SG2) and the normal value V1 (i.e., the value corresponding to the difference between the first oscillation signal SG1 and the third oscillation signal SG3) is monitored. If the difference exceeds a predetermined value, it can be considered that the second oscillation signal SG2 is not a signal caused by the second oscillator 71, and thus illegal intrusion is determined.

[0118] Specifically, the AD conversion circuit 436 outputs the digital value as the detection value Vx to the processing device 12. The control unit 61 of the processing device 12 compares the input detection value Vx with the normal value V1 stored in the storage unit 62. For example, the control unit 61 calculates the absolute value (|Vx-V1|) of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1.

[0119] When the difference between the detected value Vx and the normal value V1 exceeds a predetermined value (limit value α) (No in step S25), the control unit 61 determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31 (step S26: intrusion determination). For example, when the absolute value of the difference between the detected value Vx and the normal value V1 exceeds the limit value α (|Vx-V1|>α), the control unit 61 performs an intrusion determination.

[0120] Here, the limit value α is appropriately set according to the detection accuracy of illegal intrusion required in the vehicle-mounted device 10. The smaller the limit value α is set, the easier it is to detect illegal intrusion. On the other hand, due to the influence of temperature and the like described later, even if there is no illegal intrusion, the detection value Vx is likely to differ from the normal value V1 by more than the limit value α, and the possibility of erroneous judgment increases. In addition, the larger the limit value α is set, the smaller the possibility of erroneous judgment is, and on the other hand, it is easy to miss illegal intrusion. The limit value α is set to a value of 2 ppm or less, for example.

[0121] When the intrusion determination is made, the control unit 61 eliminates the reception signal RS1 received by the vehicle-mounted device 10 (step S27). In addition, the control unit 61 may also cause a display unit (e.g., a display) not shown in the figure to perform a display notifying that an illegal intrusion has occurred. For example, the control unit 61 may cause the display unit to display a text such as "illegal intrusion detected".

[0122] On the other hand, when the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 is within a predetermined value (limit value α) (Yes in step S25), the control unit 61 does not perform intrusion determination and receives the digital signal DS1 (step S28). For example, when the absolute value of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 is less than the limit value α (|Vx-V1|≤α), the control unit 61 does not perform intrusion determination.

[0123] In step S28, the control unit 61 receives the digital signal DS1 converted from the received signal RS1 by the conversion device 50 in the PHY unit 11. The control unit 61 executes various controls such as communication with the ECU 21 based on the digital signal DS1. As described above, the detection of illegal intrusion ends.

[0124] exist Figure 7 In the example, at time X2, the detection value Vx is value V1 (Vx=V1). The detection value Vx is a value that is within the limit value α from the normal value V1, so no illegal intrusion is detected at time X2. On the other hand, at time X3, the detection value Vx is value V2 (Vx=V2). The detection value Vx is a value that is more than the limit value α from the normal value V1, so illegal intrusion is detected at time X3.

[0125] In the first detection example, the control unit 61 functions as the "determination unit" of the present disclosure, and the storage unit 62 functions as the "storage unit" of the present disclosure. In the illegal terminal D1 and the hub H1, although the communication sequence of the ECU21 can be imitated, the third oscillation signal SG3 caused by the second oscillator 71 of the ECU21 cannot be imitated. Therefore, by determining whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 received in the vehicle-mounted device 10 is equivalent to the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 of the ECU21, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0126] Furthermore, by providing the detection device 40 inside the PHY unit 11 , the circuit configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 10 as a whole can be made more compact.

[0127] [1.5.2 Second detection example: Logic circuit 44 detects illegal intrusion]

[0128] In the second detection example, description of the steps of executing the same processing as in the first detection example is appropriately omitted. In the second detection example, the normal value V1 is first stored, and then the detection of illegal intrusion is performed.

[0129] Reference Figure 5 . From step S11 to step S14, the same processing as the first detection example described above is performed in the detection device 40. Then, the memory circuit 45 stores the detection value Vx as the normal value V1 (step S15). Specifically, the AD conversion circuit 436 outputs the digital value as the detection value Vx to the logic circuit 44. The logic circuit 44 stores the input detection value Vx as the normal value V1 in the memory circuit 45. As described above, step S15 ends.

[0130] Reference Figure 6 From step S21 to step S24, the same processing as the above-mentioned first detection example is performed in the detection device 40. Then, the logic circuit 44 monitors whether the detection value Vx is within a predetermined range (step S25).

[0131] Specifically, the AD conversion circuit 436 outputs a digital value as a detection value Vx to the logic circuit 44. The logic circuit 44 compares the input detection value Vx with the normal value V1 stored in the memory circuit 45. For example, the logic circuit 44 calculates the absolute value (|Vx-V1|) of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1.

[0132] When the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 exceeds a predetermined value (limit value α) (No in step S25), the logic circuit 44 determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31 (step S26: intrusion determination). For example, when the absolute value of the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 exceeds the limit value α (|Vx-V1|>α), the logic circuit 44 performs an intrusion determination.

[0133] When the intrusion determination is made, the logic circuit 44 cancels the reception signal RS1 received by the vehicle-mounted device 10 (step S27). In addition, the logic circuit 44 may output a predetermined first detection signal to the processing device 12 when the intrusion determination is made. In this case, the control unit 61 of the processing device 12 that receives the first detection signal may cancel the reception signal RS1.

[0134] On the other hand, when the difference between the detection value Vx and the normal value V1 is within a predetermined value (limit value α) (Yes in step S25), the logic circuit 44 does not make an intrusion determination. In this case, the logic circuit 44 outputs a second detection signal different from the first detection signal to the processing device 12. And, the control unit 61 of the processing device 12 that receives the second detection signal receives the digital signal DS1 (step S28). For example, the first detection signal is one of a high-level signal and a low-level signal, and the second detection signal is the other of a high-level signal and a low-level signal. In the above manner, the detection of illegal intrusion ends.

[0135] In the second detection example, the logic circuit 44 functions as the "determination unit" of the present disclosure, and the memory circuit 45 functions as the "storage unit" of the present disclosure. In such a configuration, it is also possible to more reliably detect illegal intrusion by determining whether the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 is equivalent to the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 of the ECU 21.

[0136] [2. Modifications]

[0137] Hereinafter, a modification of the embodiment will be described. In the modification, the same reference numerals are given to the same configuration as that of the above-described embodiment, and description thereof will be omitted.

[0138] [2.1 Correction of normal value corresponding to temperature characteristics]

[0139] Figure 8 is a graph illustrating the temperature characteristics of an oscillator. Figure 8 The horizontal axis represents the temperature in Celsius. Figure 8 The vertical axis represents the frequency deviation (Δf / f) of the oscillator at each temperature with respect to the frequency of the oscillator at 25 degrees Celsius.

[0140] like Figure 8 As shown in FIG. 1 , it is known that the frequency of oscillation of an oscillator such as a crystal oscillator changes according to temperature. For example, when the temperature is higher than 25 degrees Celsius, the frequency of the oscillator gradually slows down, and after passing the minimum value, there is a tendency to gradually increase. In addition, there is a tendency that when the temperature is lower than 25 degrees Celsius, the frequency of the oscillator gradually increases, and after passing the maximum value, it gradually decreases.

[0141] Therefore, when the storage of the normal value V1 (from step S11 to step S15) is performed in an environment of 25 degrees Celsius, for example, when the detection of illegal intrusion (from step S21 to step S25) is performed in an environment of 40 degrees Celsius (for example, in summer), the frequencies of the first oscillator 13 included in the vehicle-mounted device 10 and the second oscillator 71 included in the ECU 21 become slower than the respective frequencies when the normal value V1 is stored. The degree of frequency slowdown is different between the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71.

[0142] Therefore, when detecting illegal intrusion at a temperature different from the temperature when the normal value V1 is stored, the limit value α is set to a smaller value (for example, 0.5 ppm). Although it is the second oscillation signal SG2 based on the oscillation of the second oscillator 71 (that is, although there is no illegal intrusion), since the detection value Vx differs from the normal value V1 by more than the limit value α, it is possible to make an intrusion judgment (step S26).

[0143] In order to prevent such erroneous judgment, the limit value α may be set larger. However, when the limit value α is set larger, the possibility that the detection value Vx corresponding to the second oscillation signal SG2 based on the oscillation of the third oscillator H2 of the illegal hub H1 accidentally falls within the range of the limit value α relative to the normal value V1 increases, thereby increasing the possibility of missing the illegal intrusion.

[0144] Therefore, in this modification, the normal value V1 is determined based on the temperature detected by the temperature sensor that detects the temperature of at least one of the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71. Thus, the frequency deviation of the oscillator caused by the temperature change is compensated.

[0145] Specifically, the temperature sensor 14 ( Figure 3 ) to detect the temperature of the first oscillator 13. The vehicle-mounted system 1 is a system mounted on the vehicle 9, so it can be considered that the temperature of the second oscillator 71 is about the same as the detection temperature of the temperature sensor 14. Therefore, in this modification, the temperature of the entire vehicle-mounted system 1 including the first oscillator 13 is detected by the temperature sensor 14. It should be noted that different temperature sensors may be provided in the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71, respectively, or a temperature sensor may be provided in the second oscillator 71.

[0146] Fig. 9 This is a table illustrating the relationship between normal values ​​and temperatures according to a modified example. Fig. 9 The table is stored in the storage unit 62 in the first detection example, and is stored in the memory circuit 45 in the second detection example. Fig. 9 In the table, the first column indicates the temperature range, and the second column indicates the normal value corresponding to the temperature range. Fig. 9 The table is obtained, for example, by performing tests under various temperature conditions in the vehicle-mounted system 1 before shipment.

[0147] For example, when the temperature Tx detected by the temperature sensor 14 is lower than the first temperature T1, the determination unit (the control unit 61 in the first detection example and the logic circuit 44 in the second detection example) determines the normal value to be "V11". Furthermore, when the temperature Tx detected by the temperature sensor 14 exceeds the first temperature T1 and is lower than the second temperature T2, the determination unit determines the normal value to be "V12" which is different from V11. Furthermore, when the temperature Tx detected by the temperature sensor 14 exceeds the second temperature T2 and is lower than the third temperature T3, the determination unit determines the normal value to be "V13" which is different from V11 and V12.

[0148] In this way, the determination unit determines the normal value based on the table stored in the storage unit and the detected temperature Tx. As a result, the frequency deviation of the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71 caused by the temperature change can be compensated, so that, for example, it is possible to suppress the situation where an erroneous determination is made even though the limit value α is set to a smaller value. As a result, it is possible to suppress erroneous determinations, and it is possible to set the limit value α with a low possibility of missing an illegal intrusion, so that an illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0149] [2.2 Correction of normal values ​​corresponding to aging characteristics]

[0150] Fig.10 This is a graph illustrating the aging characteristics (time-dependent characteristics) of an oscillator. Fig.10 The horizontal axis of the logarithm represents the number of days that have passed. Fig.10 The vertical axis represents the frequency deviation (Δf / f) of the oscillator at each time point with respect to the frequency of the oscillator on the first day.

[0151] like Fig.10 As shown in FIG. 1 , it is known that the frequency of vibration of an oscillator such as a crystal oscillator changes with aging. Fig.10 In FIG. 1 , an example is shown in which the frequency of an oscillator gradually decreases (oscillation gradually slows down) due to impurities adhering to the oscillator due to aging. However, depending on the characteristics of the oscillator, for example, due to gas being released from the oscillator due to aging, the frequency of the oscillator gradually increases, and after reaching a maximum value after a certain number of days, the frequency gradually decreases.

[0152] Therefore, when, for example, the storage of the above-mentioned normal value V1 (from steps S11 to S15) is performed in an environment where a small number of days have passed (for example, 10 days), when the detection of illegal intrusion is performed (from steps S21 to S25) after, for example, 1000 days, since the frequencies of the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71 are different from their respective frequencies when the normal value V1 is stored, even though there is no illegal intrusion, it is possible that the detection value Vx differs from the normal value V1 by more than the limit value α and an intrusion judgment is made (step S26).

[0153] Therefore, in this modification, the normal value V1 stored in the vehicle-mounted device 10 can be updated by the operation of the manager in order to take into account the aging characteristics of the first oscillator 13 and the second oscillator 71. This compensates for the frequency deviation of the oscillator caused by aging.

[0154] For example, the owner of the vehicle 9 takes the vehicle 9 to a business operator (e.g., a dealer) that regularly performs vehicle inspections for the purpose of inspecting the vehicle 9. The business operator is, for example, an administrator who has been granted management authority over the vehicle system 1 by the manufacturer of the vehicle system 1, and holds a key for overwriting the normal value V1. The key may be, for example, a key inserted into the vehicle device 10 in a hardware manner or a key input into the vehicle device 10 in a software manner.

[0155] For example, the logic circuit 44 or the control unit 61 functions as a determination unit and also functions as a change unit that changes the normal value V1 stored in the storage unit (memory circuit 45 or storage unit 62). The change unit can select a plurality of operation modes including the first mode and the second mode.

[0156] Normally, the second mode is selected as the operation mode of the change unit. When the second mode is selected, the change unit cannot change the normal value V1 stored in the storage unit. Only when the administrator inputs a key to the vehicle-mounted device 10, the change unit can select the first mode.

[0157] When the first mode is selected, when the administrator instructs the changing unit to update the normal value V1 through an input unit (eg, a keyboard) not shown in the figure, the changing unit executes Figure 5 The normal value V1 is stored in the storage unit. The changing unit changes the normal value V1 stored in the storage unit to the detection value Vx output from the detection circuit 43 during the period in which the first mode is selected.

[0158] For example, in the first year inspection of a vehicle 9 ( Fig.10 At time X11), the manager updates the normal value V1 to a new value. Fig.10X12) and the fifth year inspection ( Fig.10 At the time X13), the manager also updates the normal value. Thus, the frequency deviation of the oscillator caused by aging can be compensated, so as in the case of temperature compensation, it is possible to suppress erroneous judgments and set a limit value α with a low possibility of missing illegal intrusion. As a result, illegal intrusion can be detected more reliably.

[0159] [2.3 Intentionally changing the temperature of the oscillator]

[0160] In the above embodiment, the illegal intrusion is detected by utilizing the hardware difference between the second oscillator 71 included in the ECU 21 and the third oscillator H2 included in the illegal hub H1. However, if the frequency of the second oscillator 71 coincides with the frequency of the third oscillator H2 by chance, the illegal intrusion may not be detected.

[0161] Therefore, in this modification, the temperature of the second oscillator 71 is intentionally changed, and unauthorized intrusion is detected when the detected value Vx after the temperature change differs from the temperature-compensated normal value V4 by more than the threshold value α.

[0162] Fig.11 2 is a diagram showing a configuration of a vehicle-mounted system 1a according to a modified example. In the vehicle-mounted system 1a, the ECU 21 includes a temperature adjustment unit 72 for adjusting the temperature of the second oscillator 71 and a temperature sensor 73 for detecting the temperature of the second oscillator 71. Figure 1 Furthermore, in this modification, the control unit 61 also functions as a temperature control unit that instructs the temperature adjustment unit 72 .

[0163] The temperature adjustment unit 72 is, for example, a heating unit such as a resistance heater that can only perform heating. It should be noted that the temperature adjustment unit 72 may also be capable of performing both heating and cooling. In this case, the temperature adjustment unit 72 is, for example, a Peltier element.

[0164] Fig.12 : is a coordinate diagram of the detection value Vx of the modified example. In this modified example, the normal value is temperature compensated. For example, the normal value at 25 degrees Celsius is determined as "V1", the normal value at the first predetermined temperature T4 higher than 25 degrees Celsius is determined as "V4", and the normal value at the second predetermined temperature T5 higher than the first predetermined temperature T4 is determined as "V5".

[0165] For example, consider a case where the detection environment is 25 degrees Celsius. First, in a state where the temperature control unit (control unit 61) does not instruct the temperature adjustment unit 72 (i.e., the second oscillator 71 is at 25 degrees Celsius), the vehicle-mounted device 10 performs detection of illegal intrusion. In this case, if, for example, the same value as the normal value V1 is detected as the detection value Vx, illegal intrusion is not detected.

[0166] At 25 degrees Celsius, when no illegal intrusion is detected, the frequency of the second oscillator 71 and the frequency of the third oscillator H2 may coincide by chance. Therefore, next, the temperature control unit instructs the temperature adjustment unit 72 to adjust the temperature of the second oscillator 71 to the first predetermined temperature T4. And at the time X4 when the temperature of the second oscillator 71 reaches the first predetermined temperature T4, the vehicle-mounted device 10 performs illegal intrusion detection again.

[0167] Specifically, the detection circuit 43 outputs a first detection value Vx1 to the determination unit, and the first detection value Vx1 is a detection value Vx corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 included in the received signal RS1 received during the period when the second oscillator 71 is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature T4 according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

[0168] Furthermore, the determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31 when the difference between the first detection value Vx1 and the first normal value V4 exceeds a predetermined value (limit value α), and the first normal value V4 is a normal value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator 71 during the period when the second oscillator 71 is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature T4 according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

[0169] For example, in the case of an illegal intrusion, although the temperature of the second oscillator 71 is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature T4 by the temperature adjustment unit 72, the temperature of the third oscillator H2 of the illegal hub H1 is not changed, so the first detection value Vx1 is "V1". On the other hand, in the case of no illegal intrusion, the first detection value Vx1 becomes "V4" along with the temperature adjustment of the second oscillator 71. Therefore, in this modified example, in the case where the first detection value Vx1 does not follow the temperature adjustment by the temperature adjustment unit 72, the illegal intrusion is detected, and in the case where it follows the temperature adjustment by the temperature adjustment unit 72, the illegal intrusion is not detected. As a result, even if the frequency of the second oscillator 71 and the frequency of the third oscillator H2 coincide by chance, the illegal intrusion can be detected.

[0170] Furthermore, at time X5 after the temperature of the second oscillator 71 is further changed to the second predetermined temperature T5 higher than the first predetermined temperature T4 by the temperature adjustment unit 72, the vehicle-mounted device 10 can perform the illegal intrusion detection again. By changing the temperature multiple times and performing the illegal intrusion detection each time, the detection accuracy can be further improved.

[0171] Specifically, the detection circuit 43 outputs a second detection value Vx2 to the determination unit, and the second detection value Vx2 is a detection value Vx corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the second oscillation signal SG2 included in the received signal RS1 received during the period when the second oscillator 71 is adjusted to the second predetermined temperature T5 according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

[0172] Furthermore, the determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line 31 when the difference between the second detection value Vx2 and the second normal value V5 exceeds a predetermined value (limit value α), and the second normal value V5 is a normal value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal SG1 and the frequency of the third oscillation signal SG3 generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator 71 during the period when the second oscillator 71 is adjusted to the second predetermined temperature T5 according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

[0173] It should be noted that the first predetermined temperature T4 may be a temperature lower than 25 degrees Celsius, and the second predetermined temperature T5 may be a temperature lower than the first predetermined temperature T4.

[0174] [2.4 Others]

[0175] The detection device 40 of the embodiment is provided inside the PHY unit 11. However, the detection device 40 may be provided outside the PHY unit 11. Furthermore, a part of the detection device 40 may be provided inside the PHY unit 11, and another part may be provided outside the PHY unit 11. In this case, for example, the "another part" of the detection device 40 may include the processing device 12. That is, the detection device 40 may also include a control unit 61 and a storage unit 62.

[0176] [3. Supplementary Note]

[0177] It should be noted that, with respect to the above-mentioned embodiments and various modifications, at least a part of them can be arbitrarily combined with each other. Moreover, the embodiments and modifications disclosed this time should be considered that all points are examples, not restrictive contents. The scope of the present disclosure is indicated by the claims, and is intended to include all changes within the meaning and scope equivalent to the claims.

[0178] Description of Reference Numerals

[0179] 1. Vehicle system

[0180] 1a In-vehicle system

[0181] 10 Vehicle-mounted device

[0182] 11 PHY

[0183] 12 Processing device

[0184] 13. First Oscillator

[0185] 14 Temperature Sensor

[0186] 20 ECU

[0187] 21 ECU

[0188] 22 ECU

[0189] 23 ECU

[0190] 24 ECU

[0191] 30 Communication lines

[0192] 31 Communication line

[0193] 32 Communication lines

[0194] 33 Communication line

[0195] 34 Communication lines

[0196] 40 Detection device

[0197] 41 Receiving Circuit

[0198] 42 Oscillator Circuit

[0199] 43 Detection circuit

[0200] 44 Logic Circuit

[0201] 45 Memory Circuit

[0202] 431 Extraction Circuit (CDR Circuit)

[0203] 432 First Circuit (PFD Circuit)

[0204] 433 Second Circuit

[0205] 434 CP Circuit

[0206] 435 filter circuit

[0207] 436 AD conversion circuit

[0208] 50 Conversion device

[0209] 61 Control Department

[0210] 62 Storage

[0211] 63 Reading unit

[0212] 64 Recording Media

[0213] 71 Second Oscillator

[0214] 72 Temperature adjustment unit

[0215] 73 Temperature sensor

[0216] 9 Vehicles

[0217] D1 Illegal terminal

[0218] H1 Hub (Repeater Hub)

[0219] H2 Oscillator (Third Oscillator)

[0220] B1 Bus

[0221] RS1 receiving signal

[0222] SG1 first oscillation signal

[0223] SG2 Second oscillation signal

[0224] SG3 oscillation signal (third oscillation signal)

[0225] SGx oscillation signal

[0226] DS1 digital signal

[0227] DS2 data signal

[0228] Vx detection value

[0229] Vx1 detection value (first detection value)

[0230] Vx2 detection value (second detection value)

[0231] V1 Normal value

[0232] V4 Normal value (first normal value)

[0233] V5 Normal value (second normal value)

[0234] α threshold value

[0235] X1 Moment

[0236] X2 Moment

[0237] X3 Moment

[0238] X4 Moment

[0239] X5 Moments

[0240] X11 Moments

[0241] X12 Moment

[0242] X13 Moment

[0243] T1 First temperature

[0244] T2 Second temperature

[0245] T3 Third temperature

[0246] T4 First preset temperature

[0247] T5 Second preset temperature

[0248] Tx detection temperature

Claims

1. A detection device connected to an ECU mounted on a vehicle via a communication line, the detection device comprising: an oscillation circuit that outputs a first oscillation signal based on oscillation of the first oscillator; and a detection circuit that outputs a detection value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a reception signal received from the communication line to a determination unit, The determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the detection value is different from a normal value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

2. The detection device according to claim 1, wherein: The determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the difference between the detection value and the normal value exceeds a predetermined value.

3. The detection device according to claim 2, wherein: The detection circuit comprises: A first circuit is input with the first oscillation signal and the second oscillation signal, and detects a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of the second oscillation signal; as well as The second circuit converts the difference detected in the first circuit into the detection value.

4. The detection device according to claim 3, wherein: The received signal is a signal obtained by overlapping the second oscillation signal and the data signal. The detection circuit further includes an extraction circuit that extracts the second oscillation signal from the received signal and outputs the second oscillation signal to the first circuit.

5. The detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein: The detection device further includes a storage unit that stores the normal value in advance, and the determination unit.

6. The detection device according to claim 5, wherein: The detection device further includes a changing unit that changes the normal value stored in the storage unit. The changing unit is capable of selecting a plurality of operation modes including a first mode and a second mode, When the first mode is selected, the changing unit changes the normal value stored in the storage unit to the detection value output from the detection circuit during the period in which the first mode is selected. When the second mode is selected, the changing unit does not change the normal value stored in the storage unit.

7. The detection device according to claim 5, wherein: The determination unit determines the normal value based on a detected temperature of a temperature sensor that detects a temperature of at least one of the first oscillator and the second oscillator.

8. The detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein: The detection device further includes a temperature control unit that instructs a temperature adjustment unit that adjusts the temperature of the second oscillator. the detection circuit outputting a first detection value to the determination unit, the first detection value being the detection value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of the second oscillation signal included in the received signal received during a period in which the second oscillator is adjusted to a first predetermined temperature according to an instruction of the temperature control unit, The determination unit determines that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the difference between the first detection value and a first normal value exceeds a predetermined value, and the first normal value is the normal value corresponding to the difference between the frequency of the first oscillation signal and the frequency of the third oscillation signal generated based on the oscillation of the second oscillator during the period when the second oscillator is adjusted to the first predetermined temperature according to the instruction of the temperature control unit.

9. An on-vehicle device connected to the ECU via the communication line, the on-vehicle device comprising: A PHY unit operates at a physical layer to convert the received signal into a digital signal; and a processing device to which the digital signal converted by the PHY unit is input, The PHY section includes: a conversion device, converting the received signal into the digital signal; and The detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

10. A detection method for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein: The detection method includes the step of determining that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the detection value is different from the normal value, The detection value is a value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on oscillation of a first oscillator and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a reception signal received from the communication line, The normal value is a value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

11. A computer program for detecting illegal intrusion in a communication line connecting an ECU mounted on a vehicle and a detection device, wherein: The computer program causes the computer to execute the step of determining that there is an illegal intrusion on the communication line when the detected value is different from the normal value, The detection value is a value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of a first oscillation signal output by an oscillation circuit included in the detection device based on oscillation of a first oscillator and a frequency of a second oscillation signal included in a reception signal received from the communication line, The normal value is a value corresponding to a difference between a frequency of the first oscillation signal and a frequency of a third oscillation signal generated based on oscillation of a second oscillator included in the ECU.

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