A secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain

Abstract

The present invention discloses a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on a consortium chain. The method is as follows: Step 1: A registration agency generates a challenge set and sends it to a sensor device. The sensor device calculates a response using a PUF and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the consortium chain; Step 2: The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to an edge device; Step 3: The edge device uses the received pseudonym and proof to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result in the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and immutability. The present invention enhances the security of device authentication and is suitable for scenarios such as the industrial Internet of Things that require high security and privacy protection.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of industrial Internet of Things communication security, relates to a device authentication method, and specifically to the field of industrial Internet of Things communication security. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), more and more devices are connected to networks for data exchange and communication. However, existing device authentication methods primarily rely on centralized trust institutions, which presents problems such as single points of failure, fragile centralized trust, and vulnerability to attacks. Especially as network scale expands, traditional authentication methods are unable to meet the needs of device identity authentication in large-scale, distributed environments.

[0003] A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a unique, unreplicable feature based on the hardware characteristics of a device. It provides a unique identity for the device, enhancing security and attack resistance during authentication. However, existing PUF technology still faces challenges in data transmission security and low authentication efficiency in practical applications.

[0004] To improve the efficiency and security of smart device authentication, consortium blockchain technology, as a decentralized distributed ledger, can provide a transparent, secure, and tamper-proof recording mechanism for device authentication. However, relying solely on consortium blockchain technology for device authentication still cannot effectively address issues such as cyberattacks and data leaks. A secure and effective smart device authentication method is urgently needed. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the existing challenges of smart device authentication, such as the vulnerability of centralized trust mechanisms, insufficient data transmission security, and low authentication efficiency, this paper proposes a secure and efficient smart device authentication method based on a consortium blockchain. By combining the decentralized recording capabilities of the consortium blockchain, the uniqueness and non-replicability of PUFs, and the privacy protection of zero-knowledge proofs, this method achieves efficient device identity authentication, enhances data privacy during communication, and improves the security and anti-attack capabilities of the authentication process.

[0006] The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0007] A secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on a consortium chain achieves device identity authentication and secure communication through three stages: initialization, signature generation, and identity verification. The specific steps include:

[0008] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0009] The registration authority generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses the PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the consortium chain.

[0010] Step 2: Signature generation phase:

[0011] The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device;

[0012] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0013] The edge device uses the received pseudonym and certificate to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result in the alliance chain to ensure data transparency and immutability.

[0014] A secure and efficient smart device authentication system based on a consortium chain that implements the above method includes a registration agency, a sensor device, an edge device, and a consortium chain, wherein:

[0015] The registration authority is responsible for generating random number sequences and challenge sets to assist sensor devices in completing identity authentication, assigning unique device identifiers, and mapping them to elliptic curve elements to ensure the uniqueness of device identities and data integrity.

[0016] The sensor device generates a response using a physical unclonable function, matches the challenge set, and securely communicates with the edge device through zero-knowledge proof to protect identity privacy;

[0017] The edge device receives the pseudonym, message, and certificate sent by the sensor device, verifies the device identity and message integrity, and records the verification results on the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and non-tamperability;

[0018] The alliance chain serves as a distributed data storage platform, records and verifies data, prevents data tampering and forgery, and improves system security.

[0019] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0020] 1. Combining PUF, hash algorithm and elliptic curve cryptography, a unique device identifier is generated and mapped to the elliptic curve group element, which enhances the anti-attack capability of device authentication and defends against physical cloning attacks and reverse engineering.

[0021] 2. Use zk-SNARKs to construct non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, enabling devices to efficiently complete identity authentication without leaking sensitive information, improving the privacy and efficiency of authentication, and adapting to the high security requirements in distributed environments.

[0022] 3. Distributed storage and multi-party verification of device authentication information are achieved through the alliance chain, ensuring the transparency and credibility of the authentication process, and providing a decentralized and secure solution for large-scale device management in the Industrial Internet of Things.

[0023] 4. Enhanced the security of device authentication, suitable for scenarios such as the Industrial Internet of Things that require high security and privacy protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] Figure 1 Flowchart of a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain.

[0025] Figure 2 This is a specific flow chart of a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain.

[0026] Figure 3 This is the timing diagram of the initialization phase.

[0027] Figure 4 This is the timing diagram of the signature generation phase.

[0028] Figure 5 This is the timing diagram of the authentication phase. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but is not limited thereto. Any modification or equivalent replacement of the technical solution of the present invention that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0030] The present invention provides a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on a consortium chain. The method implements device identity authentication and secure communication through three stages: initialization stage, signature generation stage, and identity authentication stage. In the initialization stage, the registration authority generates a random sequence and jointly generates a challenge set with the sensor device. The sensor device calculates the response using a physical unclonable function and maps it to an elliptic curve element, which is finally stored in the consortium chain to ensure the transparency and traceability of the data. In the signature generation stage, the sensor device independently generates a signature based on its pseudonym, message, and PUF response, and generates a non-interactive proof through Fiat-Shamir transformation to ensure the integrity and identity authentication of the message. Finally, in the identity authentication stage, the edge device uses the received pseudonym, message, and proof to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message, and records the verification result in the consortium chain to ensure the transparency and non-tamperability of the data.

[0031] like Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0032] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0033] This phase is completed by the registration agency and the sensor device. The registration agency generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the alliance chain. The timing diagram of the initialization phase is as follows: Figure 3 shown.

[0034] Step 11: Challenge set generation:

[0035] The registration authority selects n random numbers to form a random number sequence C=(C1, C2, ..., C n ), and send C as a challenge set to the sensor.

[0036] Step 1 and 2: Calculate sensor response:

[0037] After receiving the challenge set C, the sensor uses PUF to calculate the response r i , get the response set r=(r1,r2,...,r n ).

[0038] Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element:

[0039] The sensor converts the response r generated by each PUF i Use hashing algorithm to map to elliptic curve group element: K i =H(r i ), and use the result K i Calculate the point P on the elliptic curvei =K i G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, and then P i Sent to the registration authority.

[0040] Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store them:

[0041] The registration authority shall i Calculate pseudonym information AID i , get the pseudonym set AID=(AID1, AID2, ..., AID n ), and the information {ID Vi ,AID,P i} is stored in a secure storage area, where is the identity information of each sensor device, AID is the pseudonym set corresponding to the sensor device, P i It's AID i The corresponding elliptic curve point, and then forward the pseudonym set AID to the associated sensor. At the same time, the elliptic curve group element P i Information is stored in the alliance chain to ensure the transparency and verifiability of the data.

[0042] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0043] The sensor stores the received pseudonym set AID and the local challenge set C in a secure storage area.

[0044] Step 2: Signature generation phase:

[0045] This phase is completed independently by the sensor device. The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device. The timing diagram of the signature generation phase is shown in the figure below. Figure 4 shown.

[0046] Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof:

[0047] The sensor generates a challenge value e and calculates a response value y: First, the sensor selects a security modulus N and an unused pseudonym AID i ,calculate and disclose v. Then, the sensor generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN, and concatenate x, v, and the message value M to be verified to generate the challenge value e = H (x||v||M), where H is a cryptographically secure hash function. Afterwards, the sensor calculates the response value

[0048] Step 22: Transmit message and proof:

[0049] The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

[0050] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0051] This phase is completed independently by the edge device. The edge device uses the received pseudonym and certificate to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification results in the alliance chain to ensure data transparency and immutability. The timing diagram of the identity verification phase is shown in the figure below. Figure 5 shown.

[0052] Step 31: Pseudonym Verification:

[0053] The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the consortium chain? If the pseudonym is already in use, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, proceed to step 32.

[0054] Step 32: Verify the zero-knowledge proof:

[0055] The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e Mod N and the challenge value e' = H(x'|v|M'), and then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equality is established, proceed to step 33 and the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0056] Step 3. Record verification results:

[0057] If the authentication is successful, the edge device will i It is added to the used list and recorded in the alliance chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; if the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

[0058] The present invention also provides a secure and efficient smart device authentication system based on a consortium chain for implementing the above method. The system includes a registration agency, a sensor device, an edge device, and a consortium chain, wherein:

[0059] The registration authority is the system's core control node, responsible for generating random number sequences and challenge sets. Its primary responsibility is to collaborate with sensor devices during system initialization to generate basic data for identity authentication. Acting as a root of trust, the registration authority assigns a unique identifier to each sensor device and maps it to an elliptic curve element to ensure device identity uniqueness and data integrity.

[0060] The sensor device is a key node for data collection and processing. It utilizes a physically unclonable function to generate unique responses that match a predetermined set of challenges. During the signature generation phase, the sensor device generates a pseudonym and computes a non-interactive proof to ensure message integrity and device identity authentication. During this process, the sensor device securely communicates with the edge device using zero-knowledge proof technology to protect the privacy of its identity.

[0061] During the authentication process, the edge device receives the pseudonym, message, and non-interactive proof sent by the sensor device and performs authentication using data from the consortium chain. By comparing the pseudonym and zero-knowledge proof, the edge device confirms the identity of the sensor device and the integrity of the message, and records the verification results on the consortium chain, ensuring data transparency and immutability.

[0062] In this approach, the consortium chain serves as a distributed, tamper-proof data storage platform, recording all pseudonyms, elliptic curve elements, and verification results. This not only provides public verification capabilities but also enhances the overall security of the system by preventing data tampering and forgery during transmission.

[0063] Example:

[0064] To better illustrate the implementation process of the present invention, the following numerical example is given using the identity authentication of a smart sensor device in an industrial IoT environment. The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0065] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0066] Step 11: Challenge set generation:

[0067] Assume that the registration authority generates a random challenge value:

[0068] C1=1101010110100011101011001011110 0101010110010101100101110111001

[0070] And send the challenge value to the sensor device.

[0071] Step 1 and 2: Calculate sensor response:

[0072] After receiving the challenge value, the sensor device calculates C1 using the physical unclonable function and generates the corresponding response value r1:

[0073] r1=PUF(C1)=0111000010011011010011111100111000101111110110111010101100011

[0074] Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element:

[0075] Each response value r1 is hashed and mapped to an elliptic curve group element. Assuming the elliptic curve generator is G, the hash operation H converts the response value r1 into an element K1:

[0076] K1=H(r1)=d11e56df51afb31b483d831289c348ebe0d2897b7ba91f6a8b73a111a5248dca

[0077] Generate a point P1=K1·G on the elliptic curve for K1. Assuming G is a point (2,3) on the elliptic curve, we can calculate:

[0078] P1=(18917398067340506345137914529686948747050858794009997185804415506896096232130 0,283760971010107595177068717945304231205762881910149957787066232603441443481950)

[0079] Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store them:

[0080] The registration authority generates the pseudonym AID1 based on the received P1 value:

[0081] AID1=ed7d983744c4a089fbedd5f82172b389d2fed973db1a28c9daa8025679dbd8ec

[0082] And the information {ID V1 ,AID1,P1} is stored in a secure storage area, and then the pseudonym AID1 is forwarded to the associated sensor. At the same time, the elliptic curve group element P1 information is stored in the consortium chain to ensure the transparency and verifiability of the data.

[0083] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0084] The sensor stores the received pseudonym AID1 list and the local challenge sequence C in a secure storage area.

[0085] Step 2: Signature generation phase

[0086] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0087] The sensor stores the received pseudonym AID1 and the local challenge value C in a secure storage area.

[0088] Step 2: Signature generation phase

[0089] Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof:

[0090] The sensor selects a safety module N:

[0091] N=315741075059843576597772542680841234606 11250916589237335909561901749767750915

[0093] calculate And expose v:

[0094] v=17686794539748756519311499251672453297 113953217513008017795466288332165131661

[0096] The sensor then generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN:

[0097] ρ=142267607305850178786698899847933740494 23355585462175182468397031929317015435

[0099] x=ρ 2 modN=227648400843376487219431537176464820181 95936207597438869132503250776913771600

[0101] Then concatenate x, v, and the message value M to be verified to generate the challenge value e=H(x||v||M):

[0102] M=749282801977853085

[0103] e=H(x||v||M)=9616cbebce2520a6c2a5d0763dda1560e7ef7621a079be1a6443d408cfcfd0ba

[0104] Where H is a cryptographically secure hash function. The sensor then calculates the response value y = ρ × AID1 e modN:

[0105] y=ρ×AID1 e modN=20747925581165124016469101175890185046753373088608554758111458588471681221980

[0106] Step 22: Transmit message and proof:

[0107] The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

[0108] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0109] Step 31: Pseudonym Verification:

[0110] The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the consortium chain? If the pseudonym is already in use, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, proceed to step 32.

[0111] Step 32: Verify the zero-knowledge proof:

[0112] The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e modN and challenge value e'=H(x'|v|M'):

[0113] x'=y 2 ×v -e modN=22764840084337648721943153717646482018195936207597438869132503250776913771600

[0114] e'=H(x'|v|M')=9616cbebce2520a6c2a5d0763dda1560e7ef7621a079be1a6443d408cfcfd0ba

[0115] Then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equality is established, proceed to step 33 and the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0116] Step 3. Record verification results:

[0117] If the verification is successful, the edge device adds AID1 to the used list and records it in the alliance chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; if the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

Claims

1. A secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain, characterized by The method comprises the following steps: Step 1: Initialization phase: The registration authority generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses the PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the consortium chain. Step 2: Signature generation phase The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device; Step 3: Identity verification phase: The edge device uses the received pseudonym and certificate to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result in the alliance chain to ensure data transparency and immutability.

2. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of step one are as follows: Step 11: Challenge set generation: The registration authority selects n random numbers to form a random number sequence C=(C1, C2, ..., C n ), and send C as a challenge set to the sensor; Step 1 and 2: Calculate sensor response: After receiving the challenge set C, the sensor uses PUF to calculate the response r i , get the response set r=(r1,r2,...,r n ); Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element: The sensor converts the response r generated by each PUF i Use hashing algorithm to map to elliptic curve group element: K i =H(r i ), and use the result K i Calculate the point P on the elliptic curve i =K i G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, and then P i sent to the registration authority; Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store them: The registration authority shall i Calculate pseudonym information AID i , get the pseudonym set AID=(AID1, AID2, ..., AID n ), and the information Stored in a secure storage area, where is the identity information of each sensor device, AID is the pseudonym set corresponding to the sensor device, P i It's AID i The corresponding point on the elliptic curve, and then forward the pseudonym set AID to the associated sensor, and at the same time, the elliptic curve group element P i Information is stored in the alliance chain to ensure data transparency and verifiability; Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value: The sensor stores the received pseudonym set AID and the local challenge set C in a secure storage area.

3. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of step 2 are as follows: Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof: The sensor generates a challenge value e and calculates a response value y; Step 22: Transmit message and proof: The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

4. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 3 is characterized in that The specific steps of step 21 are as follows: First, the sensor selects a security modulus N and an unused pseudonym AID i ,calculate and disclose v; then, the sensor generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN, and concatenate x, v, and the message value M to be verified to generate a challenge value e = H(x||v‖M), where H is a cryptographically secure hash function; then, the sensor calculates the response value 5. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of step three are as follows: Step 31: Pseudonym Verification: The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the alliance chain? If the pseudonym has been used, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, continue to step 32; Step 32: Verify the zero-knowledge proof: The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e modN and challenge value e'=H(x'|v|M'), then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equality is established, proceed to step 33 and the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails; Step 3. Record verification results: If the authentication is successful, the edge device will i Add to the used list and record in the alliance chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; If the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

6. A secure and efficient authentication system for smart devices based on a consortium chain that implements the method described in any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The system includes a registration agency, sensor devices, edge devices, and a consortium chain, wherein: The registration authority is responsible for generating random number sequences and challenge sets to assist sensor devices in completing identity authentication, assigning unique device identifiers, and mapping them to elliptic curve elements to ensure the uniqueness of device identities and data integrity. The sensor device generates a response using a physical unclonable function, matches the challenge set, and securely communicates with the edge device through zero-knowledge proof to protect identity privacy; The edge device receives the pseudonym, message, and certificate sent by the sensor device, verifies the device identity and message integrity, and records the verification results on the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and non-tamperability; The alliance chain serves as a distributed data storage platform, records and verifies data, prevents data tampering and forgery, and improves system security.

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