V2X certificate link value configuration method and system based on double-LA system
By generating and encrypting pre-linked values through a dual LA system, combined with a scrambling mechanism, the problem of insufficient privacy protection for OBUs under a single LA authority is solved, thereby improving the security and privacy of the V2X certificate management system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202511677155.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-11-17
- Publication Date
- 2026-01-13
AI Technical Summary
In existing V2X certificate management systems, individual LA authorities can obtain the plaintext link value of PC certificates, which poses a risk of insufficient privacy protection for OBUs and internal security attacks.
A dual-LA system is adopted, in which pre-linked values are generated and encrypted through two LA institutions, and then combined to generate the final linked value. A scrambling mechanism is introduced in the PRA to ensure the privacy and security of the linked value.
It improves the security and privacy protection during the certificate replacement process, prevents internal security attacks, and enhances the privacy protection of the OBU.
Smart Images
Figure CN121334672A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) wireless security technology, and in particular to a V2X certificate link value configuration method and system based on a dual LA architecture. Background Technology
[0002] The statements in this section are merely background information related to the present invention and do not necessarily constitute prior art.
[0003] With the rapid development of the internet, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity, centered on the vehicle, has gradually entered people's lives. Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) technology and C-V2X technology based on mobile cellular communication systems are currently the main V2X communication technologies. Regardless of the communication technology used, V2X needs to address communication security issues, specifically including verifying the identity of the legitimate base station during connection, verifying vehicle identity, ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of communication data, and preventing the leakage of vehicle privacy information. Solving these problems requires V2X to adopt appropriate cryptographic schemes and authentication technologies.
[0004] Public key encryption authentication based on digital certificates is currently commonly used in V2X security mechanisms. In practical applications, to ensure the de-identification and anti-tracking capabilities of terminal devices, the OBU (On-Board Unit) applies for pseudonymous certificates from a Certificate Authority (CA), often applying for multiple pseudonymous certificates with the same validity period at once. The OBU periodically replaces the certificates used for message signing according to the pseudonymous certificate usage policy. When a pseudonymous certificate expires, the existing LTE-V2X certificate management system architecture will effectively revoke the certificates in batches without leaking information about the same group of pseudonymous certificates. Some existing technologies ensure the security of the above process by deploying a License Authority (LA) within the LTE-V2X certificate management system architecture. Specifically, when the OBU applies for a pseudonymous certificate: PRA triggers the retrieval of the link value for the entity that applied for the certificate.
[0005] PRA constructs the corresponding structure to obtain the link value from LA.
[0006] LA returns the link chain identifier and the encrypted link value to PRA.
[0007] The PRA adds the encrypted link value to the PC issuance request and sends it to the PCA.
[0008] PCA decrypts the link value, embeds it into the PC certificate, and issues the certificate.
[0009] When revoking a PC certificate: MA extracts the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior, identifies its corresponding LA, and sends it to the LA.
[0010] MA constructs a response structure request LA using the link value to query the corresponding link seed.
[0011] LA finds the corresponding link seed from the link value lv through the mapping relationship.
[0012] LA returns the link seed and LA's unique identifier laId to MA.
[0013] MA adds the laId and link seed together to the CRL for periodic signing and revocation.
[0014] However, the above process has some drawbacks: 1. A single LA (Local Authority) can access the plaintext link value of a PC certificate and know which link values were requested at the same time, without guaranteeing the privacy protection of the OBU by the LA.
[0015] 2. PCA knows the plaintext certificates, including the plaintext link value. PCA can determine which certificates belong to the same link chain identifier based on the issuance requests at the same time. OBU is at risk of being attacked by internal security attacks. Summary of the Invention
[0016] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, the purpose of this invention is to provide a V2X certificate link value configuration method and system based on a dual LA (Label Authority) architecture. By using dual LA institutions, the security defense and privacy protection during the certificate replacement process can be further improved on the basis of the V2X security mechanism.
[0017] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solution: The first aspect of this invention provides a method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA system, including a certificate application stage: Construct an LTE-V2X certificate management structure based on a dual LA system, which includes a first LA authority and a second LA authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority sends a request to the dual LA system to obtain the link value; After receiving a request to obtain a link value, the first LA and the second LA agencies generate a pre-link value. The dual LA system calculates the corresponding link seed based on the application; generates a pre-link value and a link chain identifier based on the link seed; and associates the pre-link value with the link seed and the link seed with the link chain identifier, respectively. The first and second LA organizations encrypt their respective pre-linked values separately. The pseudonym certificate registration authority uses a scrambling mechanism to send various certificate requests from multiple different in-vehicle devices along with encrypted pre-linked values to the pseudonym certificate authority. The pseudonymous certificate authority decrypts the pre-linked values encrypted by the first and second certificate authorities, combines the two decrypted pre-linked values to obtain the final linked value, and issues the certificate.
[0018] Furthermore, it also includes a certificate revocation phase: The abnormal behavior management agency retrieves the link value from the pseudonym certificate that exhibited abnormal behavior and identifies the corresponding pseudonym certificate authority. Pseudo-certificate authorities use mapping relationships to find the corresponding link seed from the link value; The dual LA system returns the link seed to the abnormal behavior management agency, which then revokes the certificate.
[0019] Furthermore, each LA authority is uniquely identified by laId, and LA authorities share an SM4 symmetric key with pseudonym certificate authorities for encrypting and decrypting pre-linked values.
[0020] Furthermore, the specific steps for calculating the corresponding link seed based on the application details in the dual LA system are as follows: If the current device is applying for a link value for the first time, the LA agency will randomly generate a random number as the initial link seed, and calculate the link seed based on the iMin sent by the pseudonym certificate registration agency; If this is not the first time the device has requested a link value, the request will include the link chain identifier from the previous request. The LA agency will use the link chain identifier to find the corresponding link seed and calculate the link seed for this request.
[0021] Furthermore, the specific steps taken by the first LA organization to encrypt the link values are as follows: The first LA agency returns the link chain identifier and the pre-linked value encrypted using a symmetric key to the pseudonym certificate registration authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-linked value obtained from the first LA authority.
[0022] Furthermore, the specific steps taken by the second LA agency to encrypt the link values are as follows: The second LA agency returns the link chain identifier and the pre-linked value encrypted using a symmetric key to the pseudonym certificate registration authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-linked value obtained from the second LA authority.
[0023] A second aspect of this invention provides a method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA architecture, including a certificate application stage: The request from the certificate application entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
[0024] Furthermore, it also includes a certificate revocation phase: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.
[0025] A third aspect of this invention provides a V2X certificate link value configuration system based on a dual LA architecture, including a certificate application module configured as follows: The request from the certificate request entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
[0026] Furthermore, it also includes a certificate revocation module, which is configured as follows: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.
[0027] The above one or more technical solutions have the following beneficial effects: This invention discloses a V2X certificate link value configuration method and system based on a dual LA system. Based on the existing LTE-V2X certificate management system architecture, an additional LA institution is added to form a dual LA system. The link value is generated by XORing the pre-link value to generate the corresponding certificate. A scrambling mechanism is added to the PRA to further realize the privacy protection of the OBU within the system and further prevent security attacks from within the system.
[0028] The LTE-V2X certificate management architecture based on a dual-LA system of this invention features a complete and feasible connection and interaction relationship between its components, including dual LAs, MA, PCA, and PRA, enabling efficient and secure implementation of pseudonymous certificate application or revocation processes. Information transmission between its various components complies with relevant standards such as PKI, 3GPP, and CCSA's "Technical Requirements for Security Certificate Management System for LTE-based Vehicle-to-Everything Wireless Communication Technology." Different users and systems typically invoke the PKI authentication system according to relevant specifications, ensuring the system's ease of access and usability through adherence to these specifications.
[0029] Advantages of additional aspects of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention. Attached Figure Description
[0030] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0031] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the LTE-V2X certificate management architecture based on a dual LA system in Embodiment 1 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0032] It should be noted that the following detailed descriptions are exemplary and intended to provide further illustration of the invention. Unless otherwise specified, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention pertains.
[0033] It should be noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of exemplary embodiments according to the invention. As used herein, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular form is also intended to include the plural form. Furthermore, it should be understood that when the terms "comprising" and / or "including" are used in this specification, they indicate the presence of features, steps, operations, devices, components, and / or combinations thereof. The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0034] Terminology Explanation: V2X: Vehicle to Everything.
[0035] LA: Linkage Authority.
[0036] PCA: Pseudonym Certificate Authority.
[0037] PRA: Pseudonym Certificate Registration Authority.
[0038] Ls: Linkage Seed.
[0039] lv: Linkage Value.
[0040] OBU: On Board Unit, vehicle-mounted equipment.
[0041] MA: Misbehavior Authority.
[0042] Lci: Link chain identifier, used to identify a link chain.
[0043] CRL: Certificate Revocation List.
[0044] PC: Pseudonym Certificate.
[0045] PKI: Public Key Infrastructure.
[0046] Plv: Prelinking value.
[0047] Example 1: Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA system, including a certificate application stage and a certificate revocation stage: Step 1: Certificate application stage.
[0048] Step 1.1: Construct an LTE-V2X certificate management structure based on a dual LA architecture, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this includes root certificate authorities, intermediate certificate authorities, registered certificate authorities, application certificate authorities, pseudonymous certificate authorities, anomaly management authorities, CRL services, dual LA systems, pseudonymous certificate registration authorities, application certificate registration authorities, certification authorities, and V2X devices.Figure 1 The dashed lines represent optional methods in actual deployment, while the implementation represents indispensable methods. C1-C11 represent the interaction processes at the two ends of the corresponding solid lines.
[0049] Root Certificate Authority (CA): This is the highest-level CA in a PKI system within a connected vehicle security architecture. The root CA first needs to issue its own self-signed certificate, also known as the root certificate. The root certificate is the endpoint of the entire certificate chain within a PKI system, serving as the trust anchor. The root CA can issue sub-CA certificates to lower-level CAs as needed, such as certificates from registered certificate authorities, pseudonymous certificate authorities, and application certificate authorities.
[0050] Intermediate Certificate Authorities (ICAs) are located between root certificate authorities and CAs that issue registration certificates and various authorized certificates. They extend the hierarchy of the PKI system, enabling multi-level deployment and management of CAs. The types of certificates issued by an ICA depend on the permissions of the ICA certificate or are determined by the certificate management policy of a PKI system.
[0051] Enrollment Certificate Authority (ECA): Responsible for issuing registration certificates to connected vehicle devices such as OBUs, RSUs, and VSPs. To join a connected vehicle application, OBUs, RSUs, and VSPs can be certified by an enrollment authority and obtain a registration certificate. They then use this certificate to apply to an application authorization authority (pseudonym certificate authority, application certificate authority, etc.) for the V2X communication certificate actually used to generate V2X security messages.
[0052] Application Certificate Authority (ACA): Also known as Application Authorization CA, it is responsible for issuing Identity Certificates to OBUs and Application Certificates to connected vehicle devices such as RSUs and VSPs.
[0053] The Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) is responsible for issuing pseudonym certificates to the OBU. The OBU uses these pseudonym certificates to digitally sign the Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) it broadcasts. To prevent the leakage of vehicle travel routes, the PCA should issue multiple pseudonym certificates with the same validity period to the OBU; the OBU periodically replaces the certificates used for message signing according to the pseudonym certificate usage policy.
[0054] Misbehavior Authority (MA): Based on the abnormal behavior detection reports reported by V2X devices, it determines which pseudonym certificates, application certificates, and identity certificates need to be revoked, and issues the corresponding certificate revocation list.
[0055] Linkage Authority (LA): Implements link value supply functionality, including individual link values and group link values. It receives link value requests from PRAs, verifies the validity of the requests, and generates link values; it also receives link seed queries from MAs, verifies the validity of the requests, and returns the required link seeds to the MA. Before certificate revocation, link values do not reveal information that multiple pseudonymous certificates belong to the same certificate application entity. Link values support efficient revocation, simplify the revocation process, optimize revocation performance, and provide trusted anti-tracking capabilities for OBUs. To ensure the unlinkability of link values, the trustworthiness of the LA can be guaranteed based on a mechanism of joint management by multiple authorities.
[0056] Application Registration Authority (ARA): Receives identity certificate applications from OBUs and application certificate applications from connected vehicle devices such as RSUs and VSPs; generates identity / application certificate generation requests and sends them to the Application Certificate CA; obtains identity / application certificates from the Application Certificate Authority and sends them to connected vehicle devices such as OBUs, RSUs, and VSPs.
[0057] The Pseudonym Registration Authority (PRA) receives pseudonym certificate applications from OBUs, expands the pseudonym certificate seed key provided by OBUs, obtains the corresponding certificate link value from the LA, generates a pseudonym certificate generation request based on the expanded key and link value, and sends it to the Pseudonym Certificate CA; it obtains the OBU's pseudonym certificate from the Pseudonym Certificate Authority and sends it to the OBU.
[0058] Authentication and Authorization Authority (AAA): Responsible for the authentication and authorization of V2X devices. AAA can issue security credentials to V2X devices, enabling them to apply for digital certificates from certificate authorities, or to provide authorized security credentials or authorization services to V2X devices upon authorization requests from certificate authorities.
[0059] V2X equipment: On-board unit (OBU), roadside unit (RSU), and service provider (VSP) are collectively referred to as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) equipment.
[0060] In one specific implementation, the dual LA system includes two identical LA mechanisms, referred to as the first LA mechanism and the second LA mechanism, respectively.
[0061] Currently, in a single LA (Local Area Authority) scenario, the PCA (Primary Application Authority) uses the link value obtained from the LA as the unique ID of the pseudonym certificate when issuing it. In this case, if an attacker understands the LA's internal calculation mechanism, they can reverse-engineer the link value rules for a specific vehicle application. This allows attackers to capture and listen to communication data during V2X communication. By matching the unique ID of the pseudonym certificate with the link value in the obtained V2X security messages, they can reverse-engineer the vehicle's electronic driving trajectory over a period of time, thus achieving an attack.
[0062] Based on the above, this embodiment designs a dual LA system, including two LA authorities. With two LA authorities, even if the internal mechanisms of one or both LA authorities are simultaneously accessed, when the PCA issues a pseudonym certificate, it performs mathematical operations on the two link values obtained from the two LA authorities. This ensures that the link value used to sign the pseudonym certificate is no longer associated with the LA, effectively preventing the aforementioned attacks. Each LA authority is uniquely identified by laId, which represents the unique identifier of the LA authority and is used to distinguish different LA authorities in the dual LA system. The LA authorities and the pseudonym certificate authority share an SM4 symmetric key, preSm4, used for encrypting and decrypting the pre-link value.
[0063] In this embodiment, unless otherwise specified as a first LA mechanism or a second LA mechanism, it means that both mechanisms are applicable.
[0064] Step 1.2: The pseudonym certificate registration authority sends a request to the dual LA system to obtain the link value.
[0065] Step 1.3: After receiving the request to obtain the link value, the first LA agency and the second LA agency generate the pre-link value Plv.
[0066] Step 1.3.1: The dual LA system calculates the corresponding link seed based on the application.
[0067] Step 1.3.2: Generate the pre-linking value Plv and the linking identifier lci based on the linking seed.
[0068] In one specific implementation, the PRA triggers the acquisition of a link value lv for the certificate requesting entity. For each series w, the LA authority generates an initial link seed. In each time period i, the LA authority generates a batch of pre-link values plvlaId,,w,i,j using the SM4 algorithm. Within each i-th period, 20 certificates are generated, and the sequence number of the link value corresponding to these 20 certificates is indicated by j, where j ranges from 0 to 19. The j value is different for each link value, and plvlaId represents the laId of the pre-link value.
[0069] If the current device is applying for a link value for the first time, the LA agency will randomly generate a 128-bit random number as the initial link seed ls(0), and calculate the link seed ls(iMin) based on the iMin sent by the pseudonym certificate registration authority.
[0070] If the current device is not requesting a link value for the first time, it will carry the link chain identifier from the previous request. The LA agency will find the corresponding link seed ls(i) through the link chain identifier and use ls(i) as ls(iMin-1) to calculate the current link seed ls(iMin).
[0071] Here, series w refers to the certificate issuance series. For each certificate application, the V2X certificate system issues a series of certificates every 7 days. Each certificate request constitutes a issuance series, i.e., w. Each cycle is numbered i, starting from 0. When the LA system generates a link value, the time when the current V2X device applies for the certificate in the system is denoted as iMin.
[0072] Step 1.3.3: Associate the pre-link value with the link seed, and the link seed with the link chain identifier.
[0073] Associating the pre-link value with the link seed is for the revocation process, while associating the link seed with the link chain identifier is for the PRA to use when requesting a link value for the device next time.
[0074] Step 1.4: The first LA mechanism and the second LA mechanism check their respective pre-linkage values. plvlaId,,w,i,j Encrypt separately.
[0075] Step 1.4.1: The first LA agency... plvlaId,,w,i,j Encryption is performed to obtain the encrypted pre-linked value. eplvlaId,,w,i,j .
[0076] Step 1.4.1.1: The first LA agency combines the link chain identifier lci and the pre-link value encrypted using the symmetric key preSm4. eplvlaId,,w,i,j and corresponding laId,,w,i,j Send it to the pseudonym certificate registration authority, PRA. Among them, laId,,w,i,j A sequence composed of LaId.
[0077] Step 1.4.1.2: The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-link value obtained from the first LA authority.
[0078] Specifically, the PRA will obtain the LCI and encrypted pre-linked value from the first LA agency. eplvlaId,,w,i,j These are denoted as lci1 and Plv1, respectively, and then PRA persists lci1 and Plv1. In this embodiment, persistence is achieved through database storage.
[0079] Step 1.4.2: The second LA mechanism... plvlaId,,w,i,j Encryption is performed to obtain the encrypted pre-linked value. eplvlaId,,w,i,j .
[0080] Step 1.4.2.1: The second LA agency will link the chain identifier lci and the data encrypted using the symmetric key preSm4. eplvlaId,,w,i,j and corresponding laId,,w,i,j Send to pseudonym certificate registration authority PRA .
[0081] Step 1.4.2.2: The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-link value obtained from the second LA authority.
[0082] Specifically, the PRA will obtain the LCI and encrypted pre-linked value from the second LA agency. eplvlaId,,w,i,j These are denoted as lci2 and Plv2 respectively, and then PRA persists lci2 and Plv2.
[0083] PRA then received a collection from two LA agencies. {eplvlaId,,w,i,j, laId, w, i, j}w,i,j .
[0084] Step 1.5: The pseudonym certificate registration authority sends various certificate requests from multiple different vehicle devices along with encrypted pre-linked values to the pseudonym certificate registration authority through a shuffling mechanism.
[0085] In one specific implementation, when a pseudonym certificate is applied for, there is a binding relationship between the vehicle and the certificate application, which is stored in the PRA (Personal Register). To avoid the PCA (Public Authority of Vehicles) being aware of this binding relationship, this embodiment separates the logic of the PRA accepting the vehicle's certificate application from the logic of the PRA requesting the PCA, processing them separately. After receiving the vehicle's pseudonym certificate application, the PRA does not directly request the PCA, but first stores the application log; then, when the stored log reaches a certain number, it sends a batch of pseudonym certificate applications to the PCA simultaneously. This disrupts the relationship between the pseudonym certificate applications and the vehicles, making it impossible for the PCA to know which vehicle the received pseudonym certificate application actually comes from.
[0086] Before sending individual certificate requests from multiple different OBUs to the PCA, the PRA shuffles them together. This prevents the PCA from determining that certificate requests received at the same time originate from the same vehicle. The PCA is only responsible for issuing the certificate requests requested by the PRA. The PCA knows the plaintext certificates, including the link values, but due to the PRA's shuffling, it does not know which certificates belong to the same sequence.
[0087] For each certificate request in this request sequence cre,i,j The RA creates a request "packet" to send to the PCA, which contains the cycle number i and the certificate request form. cre,i,j The first LA agency's encrypted pre-linked value eplv LA1，w1，i，j and its corresponding laId = LA1, and the pre-linked value encrypted by the second LA organization. eplv LA2，w2，i，j And its corresponding laId = LA2. cre,i, j This represents the specific certificate request for the j-th request in period i.
[0088] Step 1.6: The pseudonymous certificate authority decrypts the pre-linked values encrypted by the first LA authority and the second LA authority, combines the two decrypted pre-linked values to obtain the final linked value, and issues a certificate.
[0089] In one specific implementation, for each certificate request sequence from the OBU, the PRA associates the request sequence with a series w1 from the first LA and a series w2 from the second LA, where w1 and w2 are the associations of Plv1 and Plv2, respectively, i.e., the associations of the received encrypted Plvs. The PRA adds the encrypted Plv1 and Plv2 to the PC issuance request and sends it to the PCA. The PCA decrypts the linking value, XORs Plv1 and Plv2 to generate the final LV, embeds it into the PC certificate, and issues the certificate. After receiving the "packet" from the PRA, the PCA uses preSm4 to decrypt the two pre-linking values, calculates the final linking value, and stores the pre-linking value and the linking value.
[0090] In this embodiment, the first LA agency and the second LA agency know which pre-linked values were applied for at the same time, but do not know the final linked values, thereby ensuring privacy and improving security.
[0091] This embodiment employs a dual LA mechanism, ensuring that no single entity within the entire issuance system can know the individual link value relationship with the terminal entity: 1. The LA knows which PLVs are associated, but it does not know the final generated link value.
[0092] 2. The PRA only sees the pre-linked values encrypted by the LA agency. The PRA knows which EPLVs belong to specific terminal devices, but it does not know how they are decrypted.
[0093] 3. PCA knows the plaintext certificates, including the link value, but due to the scrambling mechanism of PRA, it does not know which certificates belong to the same terminal device.
[0094] Step 2: Certificate Revocation Stage.
[0095] Step 2.1: The abnormal behavior management agency retrieves the link value lv from the pseudonym certificate that exhibited abnormal behavior and identifies the corresponding pseudonym certificate authority.
[0096] Specifically, the MA retrieves the link value lv from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior and sends it to the PCA. The PCA then returns the two pre-link values plv corresponding to lv and the laId corresponding to each plv to the MA.
[0097] Step 2.2: The pseudonym certificate authority finds the corresponding link seed from the link value through the mapping relationship.
[0098] Step 2.2.1: MA constructs a response structure request PCA through lv to query the corresponding ls.
[0099] Step 2.2.2: PCA uses the link value lv as a parameter to query the LA agency through the mapping relationship to find the corresponding link seeds ls1(i) and ls2(i).
[0100] Step 2.3: The dual LA system returns the link seed to the abnormal behavior management agency, which then revokes the certificate.
[0101] Step 2.3.1: LA returns the link seed ls1(i), laId1, ls2(i), and laId2 to MA.
[0102] Step 2.3.2: MA adds ls1(i), laId1, ls2(i), and laId2 together to the CRL periodic signature release and then revoks them.
[0103] Example 2: Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA system, including a certificate application stage and a certificate revocation stage: Certificate application stage: The request from the certificate application entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
[0104] Certificate revocation phase: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.
[0105] Example 3: Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides a V2X certificate link value configuration system based on a dual LA system, including a certificate application module and a certificate revocation module.
[0106] The certificate application module is configured as follows: The request from the certificate request entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
[0107] The certificate revocation module is configured as follows: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.
[0108] The steps and methods involved in Examples 2, 3 and 4 above correspond to those in Example 1. For specific implementation details, please refer to the relevant description section of Example 1.
[0109] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed in this application can be implemented in electronic hardware or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0110] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, it can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. A computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the flow or function according to the embodiments of this application is generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in or transmitted through a computer-readable storage medium. The computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired or wireless means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data processing device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium, an optical medium, or a semiconductor medium, etc.
[0111] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA system, characterized in that, Including the certificate application stage: Construct an LTE-V2X certificate management structure based on a dual LA system, which includes a first LA authority and a second LA authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority sends a request to the dual LA system to obtain the link value; After receiving a request to obtain a link value, the first LA and the second LA agencies generate a pre-link value. The dual LA system calculates the corresponding link seed based on the application; generates a pre-link value and a link chain identifier based on the link seed; and associates the pre-link value with the link seed and the link seed with the link chain identifier, respectively. The first and second LA organizations encrypt their respective pre-linked values separately. The pseudonym certificate registration authority uses a scrambling mechanism to send various certificate requests from multiple different in-vehicle devices along with encrypted pre-linked values to the pseudonym certificate authority. The pseudonymous certificate authority decrypts the pre-linked values encrypted by the first and second certificate authorities, combines the two decrypted pre-linked values to obtain the final linked value, and issues the certificate.
2. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes the certificate revocation phase: The abnormal behavior management agency retrieves the link value from the pseudonym certificate that exhibited abnormal behavior and identifies the corresponding pseudonym certificate authority. Pseudo-certificate authorities use mapping relationships to find the corresponding link seed from the link value; The dual LA system returns the link seed to the abnormal behavior management agency, which then revokes the certificate.
3. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Each LA authority is uniquely identified by laId. LA authorities share an SM4 symmetric key with pseudonym certificate authorities for encrypting and decrypting pre-linked values.
4. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps for the dual LA system to calculate the corresponding link seed based on the application are as follows: If the current device is applying for a link value for the first time, the LA agency will randomly generate a random number as the initial link seed, and calculate the link seed based on the iMin sent by the pseudonym certificate registration agency; If this is not the first time the device has requested a link value, the request will include the link chain identifier from the previous request. The LA agency will use the link chain identifier to find the corresponding link seed and calculate the link seed for this request.
5. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps by which the first LA organization encrypts the link values are as follows: The first LA agency returns the link chain identifier and the pre-linked value encrypted using a symmetric key to the pseudonym certificate registration authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-linked value obtained from the first LA authority.
6. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps by which the second LA organization encrypts the link values are as follows: The second LA agency returns the link chain identifier and the pre-linked value encrypted using a symmetric key to the pseudonym certificate registration authority; The pseudonym certificate registration authority persists the link chain identifier and encrypted pre-linked value obtained from the second LA authority.
7. A method for configuring V2X certificate link values based on a dual LA system, characterized in that, Including the certificate application stage: The request from the certificate application entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
8. The V2X certificate link value configuration method based on a dual LA system as described in claim 7, characterized in that, It also includes the certificate revocation phase: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.
9. A V2X certificate link value configuration system based on a dual LA architecture, characterized in that, The certificate application module is configured as follows: The request from the certificate application entity to obtain the link value triggers the link value configuration, thus obtaining the initial link seed. After copying the initial link seed, pre-link values are generated based on the two initial link seeds, and the pre-link values are encrypted to obtain two encrypted pre-link values. The two encrypted pre-link values are decrypted separately and then combined to obtain the final link value. The certificate is then issued based on the final link value.
10. The V2X certificate link value configuration system based on a dual LA architecture as described in claim 9, characterized in that, It also includes a certificate revocation module, which is configured as follows: Extract the link value from the pseudonym certificate exhibiting abnormal behavior; The corresponding link seed is found by using the link value through the mapping relationship; Return the link seed along with the certificate and revoke the certificate based on the link seed content.