Time service cheating method and device suitable for moving target, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a time service cheating method and device suitable for a moving target, electronic equipment and a storage medium, and belongs to the technical field of electronic countermeasures. On the basis of a synchronous deception signal generation technology, the transmission time delay of the synchronous deception signal is compensated on the code phase of a real navigation satellite signal, and the transmitting power of the deception signal is compensated, so that Doppler frequency shift introduced into the deception signal by relative motion at two ends can be effectively compensated; the deception signal is close to a real signal in signal levels such as power and code phase, and the positioning result of the deception signal is close to that of the real signal, so that hidden cut-in with a dynamic target tracking loop is realized; according to the navigation satellite time domain deception strategy in the dynamic scene, it can be guaranteed that the target positioning result is not affected all the time, only the time service result of the target positioning result is deception, the deception effect is accurate and controllable, time domain deception can be more difficult to detect and defend, the attack efficiency of a navigation satellite deception jamming technology is improved, and the action scene of the navigation satellite deception jamming technology is expanded.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of electronic countermeasures, and more specifically, relates to a timing deception method, device, electronic equipment and storage medium applicable to a moving target. Background Art

[0002] The concealment of navigation satellite deception technology means that conventional deception interference detection methods are difficult to detect the existence of deception signals, whether from the perspective of power or signal layer and information layer. This means that in the initial stage of the deception implementation, not only the information layer such as the telegram is consistent with the real signal, but also the signal layer such as power and code phase, as well as its positioning and timing results are close to the real signal.

[0003] However, since the deception jammer is usually stationary, for dynamic targets, the relative motion of the two ends will introduce Doppler frequency shift in the deception signal, which not only makes it difficult to covertly cut into the target receiver tracking loop, but also may cause deviations in the deception effect. At the same time, for the time domain deception of moving targets, it is also necessary to try to ensure that the target positioning result is always unaffected and only the timing result is deceived.

[0004] Researching covert time deception methods suitable for dynamic targets will make time domain deception more difficult to detect and defend against, improve the attack effectiveness of navigation satellite deception and jamming technology, and expand its application scenarios. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a timing deception method, device, electronic device and storage medium suitable for moving targets, so as to solve the problem that the Doppler frequency shift of the deception signal introduced by the relative motion of the dynamic scene leads to a decrease in the success rate of covert deception interference and the deception effect is prone to deviation; and solves the problem of navigation satellite time domain deception strategy in dynamic scenes.

[0006] To achieve the above object, a first aspect of the present invention provides a timing deception method applicable to a moving target, comprising the following steps:

[0007] obtaining a first position of a target receiver;

[0008] Based on the first position, predicting a second position of the target receiver at a next epoch;

[0009] estimating a code phase of a real navigation satellite signal at a target receiver at that moment according to the second position;

[0010] Calculating a synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay according to the spoofing terminal position and the second position;

[0011] The code phase is compensated for the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal to obtain the pseudo-range observation of the navigation satellite after compensation, and the transmission power of the deception signal is compensated to obtain the synchronous deception signal after compensation; the synchronous deception signal is transmitted to the target receiver to obtain the control right of the tracking loop of the target receiver;

[0012] After obtaining control of the target receiver tracking loop, the pseudorange observation amount is added with the pseudorange change amount caused by the desired timing signal deception degree to obtain the desired timing signal deception code phase;

[0013] The synchronization deception signal is adjusted according to the phase of the desired timing signal deception code to perform timing deception interference on the target receiver.

[0014] Further, compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal includes: compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal according to a free space propagation loss formula, and the free space propagation loss formula is:

[0015] L=-32.5-20lgR-201gf:

[0016] The transmit power compensation formula of the spoof signal is:

[0017] P(t+1-dt s )=-130dBm-L+ΔP;

[0018] Where L is the propagation loss, dB; R is the propagation distance, km; f is the signal frequency, MHz; P(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive signal t+1-dt s The transmit power at the time, dBm; ΔP is the expected power increment of the spoof signal relative to the real signal, dB.

[0019] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay is:

[0020]

[0021] Among them, X0(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive end at t+1-dt s The position at the moment; X u (t+1) is the position of the target receiver at time t+1; dt s is the propagation delay of the deceptive signal; c is the speed of light.

[0022] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the code phase is:

[0023] ρ i =||x i (t+1-dt s)-X u (t+1)||+cδt u (t+1)+cδt i (t+1-dt s )

[0024] =R i +c·{δt u (t+1)+δt i (t+1-dt s )};

[0025] Among them, ρ i represents the pseudo-range observation of navigation satellite i, X i (τ) represents the position of navigation satellite i at time τ, ||·|| represents the binary norm, δt u (τ) represents the clock error of the target receiver at time τ, δt i (τ) represents the satellite clock error of navigation satellite i at time τ, R i Represents the geometric distance between navigation satellite i and the target receiver.

[0026] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the pseudorange observation is:

[0027] ρ′ i =ρ i -c·dt s ;

[0028] Among them, ρ′ i represents the pseudorange observation of navigation satellite i after compensation.

[0029] Furthermore, the calculation formula of the expected timing signal decoy code phase is:

[0030] ρ″ i =ρ′ i +Δρ=ρ i -c·dt s +Δρ;

[0031] Where, Δρ=Δt·c;

[0032] Where Δρ is the pseudorange change caused by the desired timing signal deception degree, and Δt is the desired timing signal deception degree.

[0033] Furthermore, the prediction of the second position of the target receiver at the next epoch is based on the motion state of the target receiver through a trajectory prediction algorithm, and the motion state of the target receiver includes position, speed and direction information.

[0034] A second aspect of the present invention provides a timing deception device applicable to a moving target, comprising:

[0035] An information acquisition module, used to acquire a first position of a target receiver;

[0036] a trajectory prediction module, configured to predict a second position of the target receiver at a next epoch based on the first position;

[0037] A synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay calculation module, used to calculate the synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay according to the spoofing terminal position and the second position;

[0038] A code phase calculation module is used to estimate the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal at the target receiver at this moment according to the second position; and is also used to compensate the pseudo-range change caused by the propagation delay of the synchronization deception signal and the expected timing signal deception degree on the code phase, that is, to obtain the expected timing signal deception code phase;

[0039] A spoof signal transmission power compensation module, used to compensate the transmission power of the spoof signal, and obtain a synchronous spoof signal after compensation;

[0040] a target receiver tracking loop control module, used to transmit the synchronization deception signal to the target receiver to obtain control of the target receiver tracking loop; and

[0041] The timing deception interference module is used to adjust the synchronization deception signal according to the expected timing signal deception code phase after obtaining the control of the target receiver tracking loop, so as to perform timing deception interference on the target receiver.

[0042] According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic device for timing deception applicable to moving targets, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, a timing deception method applicable to moving targets as described in any one of the above items is implemented.

[0043] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, in which computer-executable instructions are stored. When the computer-executable instructions are loaded and executed by a processor, a timing deception method applicable to a moving target as described in any one of the above items is implemented.

[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following technical effects:

[0045] A timing deception method suitable for moving targets of the present invention is based on synchronous deception signal generation technology. By compensating for the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal on the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal and compensating for the transmission power of the deception signal, the Doppler frequency shift introduced in the deception signal by the relative movement of the two ends can be effectively compensated, so that the deception signal is close to the real signal in terms of signal levels such as power and code phase, as well as its positioning result, thereby realizing covert entry into the dynamic target tracking loop. The present invention proposes a navigation satellite time domain deception strategy under dynamic scenarios, which can ensure that the target positioning result is always unaffected, and only its timing result is deceived, and the deception effect is accurate and controllable, which can make time domain deception more difficult to detect and defend, improve the attack effectiveness of navigation satellite deception interference technology, and expand its application scenario. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0047] Figure 1 A flowchart of a timing deception method applicable to a moving target provided in Example 1 of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 This is a principle block diagram of a timing deception device applicable to a moving target provided in Example 2 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] In order to make the technical problems, technical solutions and beneficial effects to be solved by the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention.

[0050] The terms used in the embodiments of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit the present invention. The singular forms "a", "said" and "the" used in the embodiments of the present invention and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates other meanings.

[0051] The terms "first" and "second" are used only for descriptive purposes to distinguish objects such as substances from each other, and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. For example, without departing from the scope of the embodiments of the present invention, the first XX may also be referred to as the second XX, and similarly, the second XX may also be referred to as the first XX. Thus, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features.

[0052] Example 1

[0053] The embodiment of the present invention provides a timing deception method applicable to a moving target, and the process is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0054] S1. Get the first position X of the target receiver u (t);

[0055] Specifically, the existing target detection system can be used to detect the first position X of the target receiver in real time. u (t); Existing target detection systems include but are not limited to intelligence, radar, infrared detection equipment, etc.

[0056] S2. Based on the first position, predict the second position X of the target receiver at the next epoch (time t+1). u (t+1);

[0057] Specifically, the existing trajectory prediction algorithm can be used to predict the motion state of the target receiver, and the motion state of the target receiver includes information such as position, speed and direction.

[0058] S3, estimating the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal at the target receiver at that moment according to the second position predicted in S2;

[0059] Specifically, the calculation formula of the code phase is:

[0060] ρ i =||X i (t+1-dt s )-X u (t+1)||+cδt u (t+1)+cδt i (t+1-dt s )

[0061] =R i +c·{δt u (t+1)+δt i (t+1-dt s )};

[0062] Among them, ρ irepresents the pseudo-range observation of navigation satellite i, X i (τ) represents the position of navigation satellite i at time τ, ||·|| represents the binary norm, δt u (τ) represents the clock error of the target receiver at time τ, δt i (τ) represents the satellite clock error of navigation satellite i at time τ, R i Represents the geometric distance between navigation satellite i and the target receiver.

[0063] S4, calculating the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal according to the deception terminal position and the second position predicted by S2;

[0064] Specifically, the calculation formula for the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal is:

[0065]

[0066] Among them, X0(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive end at t+1-dt s The position at the moment; X u (t+1) is the position of the target receiver at time t+1; dt s is the propagation delay of the deceptive signal; c is the speed of light.

[0067] The synchronous deception signal propagation delay may be calculated by using a synchronous deception signal propagation delay calculation module, and the synchronous deception signal propagation delay calculation module includes an existing synchronous deception signal generation model.

[0068] S5. Compensate the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal on the code phase to obtain the pseudo-range observation of the navigation satellite, and compensate the transmission power of the deception signal to obtain the synchronous deception signal; transmit the synchronous deception signal to the target receiver to obtain the control right of the tracking loop of the target receiver;

[0069] Compensating the synchronous deception signal propagation delay on the code phase can align the code phase with the real signal phase arriving at the phase center of the receiving antenna of the target receiver. Specifically, the propagation delay of the deception signal is compensated on the code phase. The calculation formula of the pseudo-range observation of the navigation satellite after compensation is:

[0070] ρ′ i =ρ i -c·dt s ;

[0071] Among them, ρ′ i represents the pseudo-range observation of navigation satellite i after compensation, and c is the speed of light.

[0072] Specifically, compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal includes: compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal according to a free space propagation loss formula, and the free space propagation loss formula is:

[0073] L = -32.5-201g R-201g f;

[0074] The transmit power compensation formula of the spoof signal is:

[0075] P(t+1-dt s )=-130dBm-L+AP;

[0076] Where L is the propagation loss, dB; R is the propagation distance, km; f is the signal frequency, MHz; P(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive signal t+1-dt s The transmit power at the time, dBm; ΔP is the expected power increment of the spoof signal relative to the real signal, dB.

[0077] By compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal, the timing spoofing method of the embodiment of the present invention can be more concealed.

[0078] S6. After obtaining control of the target receiver tracking loop, add the pseudorange observation amount to the pseudorange change amount caused by the desired timing signal deception degree to obtain the desired timing signal deception code phase;

[0079] Specifically, the calculation formula of the expected timing signal decoy code phase is:

[0080] ρ″ i =ρ′ i +Δρ=ρ i -c·dt s +Δρ;

[0081] Where, Δρ=Δt·c;

[0082] Where Δρ is the pseudorange change caused by the desired timing signal deception degree, and Δt is the desired timing signal deception degree.

[0083] S7. Adjust the synchronization deception signal according to the phase of the desired timing signal deception code to perform timing deception interference on the target receiver.

[0084] A covert timing deception method applicable to a moving target according to an embodiment of the present invention is based on synchronous deception signal generation technology. When the position information of the target terminal (i.e., the target receiver) is acquired in real time, a trajectory prediction algorithm is used to estimate the motion trajectory of the target receiver in the next epoch, and the navigation satellite signal code phase at the predicted position is estimated. At the same time, the synchronous deception signal propagation delay is calculated according to the distance between the predicted position and the deception terminal, and the synchronous deception signal propagation delay is compensated to the deception signal phase. On this basis, the pseudo-range change caused by the desired timing signal deception degree is additionally superimposed, so as to achieve a covert and quantitative deception of the timing result without affecting the target positioning. The timing deception method according to the embodiment of the present invention is applicable to the deception interference of 1PPS and timestamp of dynamic navigation satellite timing terminals.

[0085] A timing spoofing method suitable for moving targets in an embodiment of the present invention can effectively compensate for the Doppler frequency shift introduced in the spoofing signal by the relative movement of the two ends by compensating for the propagation delay of the synchronous spoofing signal on the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal and compensating for the transmission power of the spoofing signal, so that the spoofing signal is close to the real signal in terms of signal levels such as power and code phase, as well as its positioning result, thereby achieving covert entry into the dynamic target tracking loop; an embodiment of the present invention proposes a navigation satellite time domain deception strategy in a dynamic scenario, which can ensure that the target positioning result is always unaffected and only its timing result is deceived, and the deception effect is accurate and controllable, which can make time domain deception more difficult to detect and defend, improve the attack effectiveness of navigation satellite deception interference technology, and expand its application scenario.

[0086] Example 2

[0087] The embodiment of the present invention provides a timing deception device suitable for moving targets, such as Figure 2 As shown, including:

[0088] An information acquisition module, used to acquire a first position of a target receiver;

[0089] A trajectory prediction module, configured to predict a second position of the target receiver at a next epoch based on the first position of the target receiver;

[0090] A synchronous deception signal propagation delay calculation module, used to calculate the synchronous deception signal propagation delay according to the deception terminal position and the second position;

[0091] A code phase calculation module is used to estimate the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal at the target receiver at that moment according to the second position; and is also used to compensate the pseudo-range variation caused by the propagation delay of the synchronization deception signal and the desired timing signal deception degree on the code phase, that is, to obtain the desired timing signal deception code phase;

[0092] A spoof signal transmission power compensation module is used to compensate the transmission power of the spoof signal according to a free space propagation loss formula, and obtain a synchronous spoof signal after compensation;

[0093] a target receiver tracking loop control module, used to transmit a synchronous deception signal to the target receiver to obtain control of the target receiver tracking loop; and

[0094] The timing deception jammer is used to, after acquiring control of the target receiver's tracking loop, adjust the synchronization deception signal according to the expected timing signal deception code phase to perform timing deception jammer on the target receiver.

[0095] The above modules are connected in sequence. The implementation principle and technical effects of the device provided in the embodiment of the present invention are the same as those of the above method embodiment. For the sake of brief description, the parts not mentioned in the device embodiment can be referred to the corresponding contents in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0096] Example 3

[0097] An embodiment of the present invention provides a timing deception electronic device applicable to moving targets, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can be run on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, a timing deception method applicable to moving targets as described in Example 1 is implemented.

[0098] Specifically, the electronic device may be a mobile phone, a computer or a tablet computer, etc., including a memory and a processor. The electronic device may also include: an input / output (I / O) interface, and a communication component.

[0099] The processor is used to execute all or part of the steps in the timing deception method applicable to a moving target as in Example 1. The memory is used to store various types of data, which may include, for example, instructions of any application or method in the electronic device, as well as data related to the application. The processor may be an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a digital signal processor (DSP), a programmable logic device (PLD), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a controller, a microcontroller, a microprocessor or other electronic components.

[0100] Example 4

[0101] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which computer-executable instructions are stored. When the computer-executable instructions are loaded and executed by a processor, a timing deception method applicable to a moving target as described in Example 1 is implemented.

[0102] The computer-readable storage medium of the embodiment of the present invention includes: flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory, for example, SD (Secure Digital Memory Card), random access memory (RAM), static random access memory (SRAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), magnetic memory, disk, optical disk, server, APP (Application, abbreviation of application software) application store, etc., various media that can store program verification codes.

[0103] The above embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the present invention. It should be pointed out that, for a person of ordinary skill in the art, several modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention patent shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: obtaining a first position of a target receiver; Based on the first position, predicting a second position of the target receiver at a next epoch; estimating a code phase of a real navigation satellite signal at a target receiver at that moment according to the second position; Calculating a synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay according to the spoofing terminal position and the second position; The code phase is compensated for the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal to obtain the pseudo-range observation of the navigation satellite after compensation, and the transmission power of the deception signal is compensated to obtain the synchronous deception signal after compensation; the synchronous deception signal is transmitted to the target receiver to obtain the control right of the tracking loop of the target receiver; After obtaining control of the target receiver tracking loop, the pseudorange observation amount is added with the pseudorange change amount caused by the desired timing signal deception degree to obtain the desired timing signal deception code phase; The synchronization deception signal is adjusted according to the phase of the desired timing signal deception code to perform timing deception interference on the target receiver.

2. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal includes: compensating the transmission power of the spoofing signal according to a free space propagation loss formula, and the free space propagation loss formula is: L = -32.5-20lgR-20lgf; The transmit power compensation formula of the spoof signal is: P(t+1-dt s )=-130dBm-L+ΔP; Where L is the propagation loss, dB; R is the propagation distance, km; f is the signal frequency, MHz; P(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive signal t+1-dt s The transmit power at the time, dBm; ΔP is the expected power increment of the spoof signal relative to the real signal, dB.

3. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The calculation formula of the synchronous deception signal propagation delay is: Among them, X0(t+1-dt s ) is the deceptive end at t+1-dt s The position at the moment; X u (t+1) is the position of the target receiver at time t+1; dt s is the propagation delay of the deceptive signal; c is the speed of light.

4. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The calculation formula of the code phase is: Among them, ρ i represents the pseudo-range observation of navigation satellite i, X i (τ) represents the position of navigation satellite i at time τ, ||·|| represents the binary norm, δt u (τ) represents the clock error of the target receiver at time τ, δt i (τ) represents the satellite clock error of navigation satellite i at time τ, R i Represents the geometric distance between navigation satellite i and the target receiver.

5. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: The calculation formula of the pseudorange observation is: ρ′ i =ρ i -c·dt s ; Among them, ρ′ i represents the pseudorange observation of navigation satellite i after compensation.

6. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The calculation formula of the expected timing signal decoy code phase is: ρ″ i =ρ′ i +△ρ=ρ i -c·dt s +△ρ; Where, Δρ=Δt·c; Where Δρ is the pseudorange change caused by the desired timing signal deception degree, and Δt is the desired timing signal deception degree.

7. A timing deception method applicable to a moving target as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The prediction of the second position of the target receiver at the next epoch is based on the motion state of the target receiver and is predicted by a trajectory prediction algorithm. The motion state of the target receiver includes position, speed and direction information.

8. A timing deception device suitable for moving targets, characterized in that: include: An information acquisition module, used to acquire a first position of a target receiver; a trajectory prediction module, configured to predict a second position of the target receiver at a next epoch based on the first position; A synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay calculation module, used to calculate the synchronous spoofing signal propagation delay according to the spoofing terminal position and the second position; a code phase calculation module, configured to estimate the code phase of the real navigation satellite signal at the target receiver at that moment according to the second position; It is also used to compensate the pseudo-range variation caused by the propagation delay of the synchronous deception signal and the desired timing signal deception degree on the code phase, that is, to obtain the desired timing signal deception code phase; A spoof signal transmission power compensation module, used to compensate the transmission power of the spoof signal, and obtain a synchronous spoof signal after compensation; A target receiver tracking loop control module, used to transmit the synchronization deception signal to the target receiver to obtain control of the target receiver tracking loop; as well as, The timing deception interference module is used to adjust the synchronization deception signal according to the expected timing signal deception code phase after obtaining the control of the target receiver tracking loop, so as to perform timing deception interference on the target receiver.

9. An electronic device for timing deception applicable to moving targets, characterized in that: It includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be run on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements a timing deception method applicable to a moving target as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and when the computer-executable instructions are loaded and executed by the processor, a timing deception method applicable to a moving target as described in any one of claims 1-7 is implemented.

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