Security protection method and system for Internet of Vehicles browser, vehicle and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of network security, and discloses a security protection method and system for an Internet of Vehicles browser, a vehicle and a medium, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining an operation and a progress in a running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser; corresponding preset security protection is carried out on the operation and / or the process to ensure the operation security of the Internet of Vehicles browser, and the preset security protection comprises system level call protection and memory level vulnerability protection. According to the method, security protection requirements of system level calling and memory level vulnerabilities are considered, and corresponding security protection is performed on related operations and processes involved in the operation process of the Internet of Vehicles browser, so that the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser can be greatly improved, potential attack surfaces or vulnerabilities are prevented from being utilized, and the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser is improved. Therefore, the vehicle machine system is protected from being attacked by a hostile attacker, and safer vehicle networking interaction experience can be provided for a user.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a security protection method, system, vehicle and medium for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] As an important part of the vehicle's onboard system, the Internet of Vehicles browser is mainly used to realize the interaction between users and the Internet, and can support infotainment services, real-time navigation, intelligent voice assistants, and integration with vehicle / IoT devices. It is usually designed based on embedded systems, which must not only meet the characteristics of limited hardware resources, but also provide a smooth user experience and high security. Internet of Vehicles browsers generally use customized open source engines such as Chromium, WebKit, or Gecko.

[0003] Currently, due to the limited interactive environment, the Internet of Vehicles browser seems to be relatively safe, but in fact there are many attack surfaces that can be exploited. For example, malicious attackers use attack surfaces or vulnerabilities to carry out malicious attacks, which increases the risk of Internet of Vehicles browsers being attacked, further reduces the security of Internet of Vehicles browsers, and makes it difficult to provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, the present invention provides a security protection method, system, vehicle and medium for an Internet of Vehicles browser to solve the problem that existing Internet of Vehicles browsers have potential attack risks, resulting in poor security of the Internet of Vehicles browsers and inability to provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0005] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles, the method comprising:

[0006] Get the operations and processes during the running of the Internet of Vehicles browser;

[0007] The operations and / or processes are respectively preset with corresponding security protections to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protections include system-level call protections and memory-level vulnerability protections.

[0008] The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser of the present invention is based on the security protection requirements of the browser at the system level and the memory level vulnerabilities. By performing corresponding security protection on the relevant operations and processes involved in the Internet of Vehicles browsing operation process, it can effectively avoid the potential attack risks of the Internet of Vehicles browser, further improve the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser, protect the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers, and provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0009] In an optional implementation, the system-level call protection includes security operation protection, and preset security protection is performed on the operation, including:

[0010] Get the current callback function corresponding to the operation;

[0011] Determine whether the current callback function exists in a preset callback whitelist, wherein the preset callback whitelist is configured based on all bound callback functions in the Internet of Vehicles browser and in accordance with preset security requirements;

[0012] If the current callback function exists in the preset callback whitelist, the parameters of the current callback function are verified;

[0013] If the current callback function does not exist in the preset callback whitelist, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0014] The present invention designs a callback function protection mechanism, that is, by obtaining the current callback function corresponding to the operation and performing whitelist verification and parameter verification on it, it is used to determine whether the operation has potential risks, and the legitimacy authentication of the callback function can be achieved, which further reduces the possibility of malicious attackers using the callback function to attack, thereby greatly ensuring the operating security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0015] In an optional implementation, performing parameter verification on the current callback function includes:

[0016] Get the parameters to be verified of the current callback function;

[0017] The parameter to be verified is verified based on a preset verification method, wherein the preset verification method at least includes type verification, value range check and parameter source verification.

[0018] The present invention can ensure that each incoming parameter of the callback function meets the parameter security requirements by performing type verification, value range check and parameter source verification on the parameters to be verified of the current callback function, and further prevent malicious attackers from using the callback function for type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing.

[0019] In an optional implementation, the system-level call protection includes sandbox isolation protection, which performs preset security protection on the process, including:

[0020] Assign the corresponding target virtual memory address to the process;

[0021] Check whether the target virtual memory address exceeds the preset boundary range;

[0022] If the target virtual memory address does not exceed the preset boundary range, the relevant instructions of the process are obtained and the legitimacy of the relevant instructions is verified;

[0023] If the target virtual memory address exceeds the preset boundary range, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0024] The present invention designs a sandbox isolation protection mechanism, that is, by allocating an independent virtual memory address space to each process of the Internet of Vehicles browser to prevent the processes from directly accessing each other's data, it can effectively prevent attackers from escaping from the rendering process to the kernel process through the sandbox escape, thereby fundamentally improving the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0025] In an optional implementation, the security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser further includes:

[0026] Isolate processes to limit the scope of system calls of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0027] The present invention can greatly improve the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser by limiting the system call scope of the process to prevent attackers from accessing the core functions of the operating system, help protect the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers, and further provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0028] In an optional implementation, if the preset security protection is memory-level vulnerability protection, the preset security protection is performed on the process, including:

[0029] Get the current memory permissions of the process;

[0030] Determine whether the current memory permissions meet the preset memory permissions;

[0031] If the current execution permission meets the preset memory permission, all objects and their type information of the process are obtained, and type consistency check is performed based on all objects and their type information;

[0032] If the current execution permission does not meet the preset memory permission, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0033] The present invention designs a vulnerability mitigation protection mechanism, namely, performing memory permission protection and object type consistency check at the memory level, which can effectively prevent malicious attackers from exploiting the Internet of Vehicles browser and avoid potential type confusion security issues caused by type mismatch, thereby further reducing the risk of the Internet of Vehicles browser being attacked and providing users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0034] In an optional implementation, before obtaining the current execution permission of the process, the security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser further includes:

[0035] The memory address of the process is randomized to obtain the corresponding random memory address, and the process is run in the random memory address.

[0036] The present invention adopts address space layout randomization, which can increase the difficulty for attackers to leak memory addresses during vulnerability exploitation, thereby improving the security protection capability of vulnerability exploitation and greatly ensuring the operational security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0037] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a security protection system for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles, the system comprising:

[0038] The acquisition module is used to obtain the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser;

[0039] The protection module is used to perform corresponding preset security protection on operations and / or processes respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

[0040] The security protection system for the Internet of Vehicles browser of the present invention takes into account the security protection requirements for system-level calls and memory-level vulnerabilities. By performing corresponding security protection on relevant operations and processes involved in the operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser can be greatly improved, and potential attack surfaces or vulnerabilities can be prevented from being exploited, thereby protecting the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers, and providing users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0041] In a third aspect, the present invention provides a vehicle, comprising a controller, the controller comprising: a memory and a processor, the memory and the processor are communicatively connected to each other, computer instructions are stored in the memory, and the processor executes a security protection method for a vehicle network browser according to the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment thereof by executing the computer instructions.

[0042] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, the computer instructions being used to enable a computer to execute a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles according to the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment thereof. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0043] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific implementation methods of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the specific implementation methods or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some implementation methods of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0044] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of safe operation protection;

[0046] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of sandbox isolation protection;

[0047] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of memory-level vulnerability protection;

[0048] Figure 5 is a structural block diagram of a security protection system for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of a controller of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0050] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0051] An embodiment of the present invention provides an embodiment of a security protection method for an Internet of Vehicles browser. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0052] In this embodiment, a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles is provided. Figure 1 is a flow chart of a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0053] Step S101, obtaining operations and processes during the operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0054] It should be noted that the specific acquisition methods corresponding to the operations and processes involved in the opening process of the Internet of Vehicles browser in this embodiment are not limited here, and can be adaptively obtained according to conventional methods in the field. For example, after the Internet of Vehicles browser is started, the user can click, select pages, scroll pages, etc. through the car display screen or physical buttons, which is only an exemplary description.

[0055] In step S102, corresponding preset security protection is performed on the operation and / or process respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

[0056] In this embodiment, the system-level call protection is mainly designed for the corresponding security protection mechanisms designed for system call permissions, such as identity authentication, limiting system call permissions, etc.; the memory-level vulnerability protection mainly focuses on security protection mechanisms such as memory corruption or leakage to mitigate vulnerability exploitation, such as memory permission restrictions, type confusion mitigation, etc., which are only used as examples and can be adaptively adjusted according to actual needs.

[0057] The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser of the embodiment of the present invention is based on the security protection requirements of the browser at the system level and the memory level vulnerabilities. By performing corresponding security protection on the relevant operations and processes involved in the Internet of Vehicles browsing operation process, it can effectively avoid the potential attack risks of the Internet of Vehicles browser, further improve the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser, protect the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers, and provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0058] In this embodiment, a security protection method for a vehicle networking browser is provided. When the system-level call protection is a security operation protection, Figure 2 It is a flowchart of safe operation protection, such as Figure 2 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0059] Step S201, obtain the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser. Figure 1 Step S101 of the illustrated embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0060] In step S202, corresponding preset security protection is performed on the operation and / or process respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

[0061] In this embodiment, when the system-level call protection is security operation protection, the operation is preset with security protection in the above step S202, including:

[0062] Step S2021, obtaining the current callback function corresponding to the operation.

[0063] In computer programming, a callback function refers to a function called in a piece of code, which, when executed, calls a function in another piece of code, that is, a function is passed as a parameter to another function and executed when a specific event occurs. Currently, callback functions are widely used in different programming languages ​​and fields, such as event handling, asynchronous programming, graphical user interfaces, etc. The use of callback functions can improve the reusability and modularity of the code and achieve code decoupling. However, the use of callback functions may also bring security risks, such as code injection attacks (that is, attackers modify or tamper with callback functions by injecting malicious code, thereby causing security vulnerabilities), unauthorized access (that is, attackers obtain unauthorized access rights by modifying callback function parameters or bypassing verification logic), data leakage (that is, when the callback function processes sensitive data, the attacker obtains this data) and other security issues.

[0064] It should be noted that the specific method for obtaining the current callback function in this embodiment can be obtained according to conventional methods in the art and is not limited here. For example, the callback function is searched in the front-end development code of the Internet of Vehicles browser; wherein the front-end development code of the Internet of Vehicles browser can be developed based on the programming language JavaScript (used to implement the user interface and interactive logic) accordingly.

[0065] Step S2022 , determining whether the current callback function exists in a preset callback whitelist, wherein the preset callback whitelist is configured based on all bound callback functions in the Internet of Vehicles browser and in combination with preset security requirements.

[0066] In this embodiment, the callback whitelist can be configured in advance, specifically by analyzing all callback functions bound to JavaScript in the Internet of Vehicles browser, and formulating a callback whitelist based on function priority and security requirements. It should be noted that the preset callback whitelist in this embodiment restricts trusted sources, that is, only function calls from trusted sources are allowed to pass verification. Specifically, the callback whitelist configuration can enhance the security of the callback function, thereby improving the overall security of the vehicle system.

[0067] Step S2023: If the current callback function exists in the preset callback whitelist, parameter verification is performed on the current callback function.

[0068] Specifically, the parameter verification of the current callback function in the above step S2023 includes:

[0069] Step A1, obtaining the parameters to be verified of the current callback function.

[0070] In this embodiment, the parameter to be verified actually refers to the incoming parameter (i.e., input parameter) of the current callback function. It should be noted that the callback function involves the interaction between input and output, in which the security of the input data requires special attention, that is, for the parameters passed into the callback function, sufficient input verification is required to ensure the legitimacy and accuracy of the parameters, so as to avoid malicious users from triggering security vulnerabilities and attack behaviors by constructing special inputs.

[0071] Step A2: performing parameter verification on the parameter to be verified based on a preset verification method, wherein the preset verification method at least includes type verification, value range check, and parameter source verification.

[0072] When actually using the callback function, it is necessary to consider the execution permissions of the callback function, that is, to ensure that the callback function can only access necessary resources and data, and cannot unauthorized access to other sensitive information. For example, strict permission control can be performed on the calling context in the callback function to limit the operating scope of the callback function (that is, the preset verification method of this embodiment).

[0073] In this embodiment, parameter verification is implemented for each callback function, that is, by performing type verification, value range check and source legitimacy confirmation on the incoming parameters, to ensure that each parameter meets the verification requirements, which can effectively prevent malicious attackers from using the callback function for type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing.

[0074] It should be noted that type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing are two common types of browser vulnerabilities. For details, please refer to the adaptive understanding of vulnerability-related knowledge.

[0075] In the embodiment of the present invention, by performing type verification, value range check and parameter source verification on the parameters to be verified of the current callback function, it can ensure that each incoming parameter of the callback function meets the parameter security requirements, and further prevent malicious attackers from using the callback function for type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing.

[0076] Step S2024: if the current callback function does not exist in the preset callback whitelist, then return to the step of obtaining the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0077] A callback function protection mechanism is designed in the embodiment of the present invention, that is, by obtaining the current callback function corresponding to the operation and performing whitelist verification and parameter verification on it, it is used to determine whether the operation has potential risks, thereby realizing the legitimacy authentication of the callback function, further reducing the possibility of malicious attackers using the callback function to attack, thereby greatly ensuring the operating security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0078] In this embodiment, a security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles is provided. When the system-level protection is called as sandbox isolation protection, Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the sandbox isolation protection process, such as Figure 3 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0079] Step S301, obtain the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser. Figure 1 Step S101 of the illustrated embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0080] In step S302, respectively, preset security protections are performed on the operations and / or processes to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protections include system-level call protections and memory-level vulnerability protections.

[0081] In this embodiment, the system-level call protection includes sandbox isolation protection. It should be noted that the sandbox technology is to build a "sandbox" in the computer system, restricting the operation of the application or system process within this "sandbox" so that it cannot access or modify the core resources of the system, thereby achieving the effect of isolation; this technology effectively prevents mutual interference and potential threats between applications by limiting the access rights of applications to system resources. Specifically, the preset security protection for the process in the above step S302 includes:

[0082] Step S3021, allocate a corresponding target virtual memory address to the process.

[0083] In this embodiment, the linear memory model of WebAssembly can be used to achieve independent allocation of the target virtual memory address. It should be noted that WebAssembly is a virtual instruction set architecture, whose overall architecture includes the core ISA (Industry Standard Architecture) definition, binary encoding, definition and execution of program semantics, and application programming interfaces for different embedded environments (such as the Web); its initial goal is to compile programs written in languages ​​such as C / C++ and run them better on the Web platform while ensuring security and running speed close to that of native applications.

[0084] It should be explained that the linear memory model in this embodiment is constructed through WebAssembly, which is used to allocate independent virtual memory address space, thereby preventing each process from directly accessing each other's data, and ensuring the independent allocation of memory for each process.

[0085] Step S3022, checking whether the target virtual memory address exceeds a preset boundary range.

[0086] In this embodiment, the specific value of the preset boundary range is adaptively adjusted according to actual needs and is not limited here. Specifically, strengthening the boundary check of the target virtual memory address can ensure that the attacker's access does not exceed the linear memory range.

[0087] Step S3023, if the target virtual memory address does not exceed the preset boundary range, then obtain the relevant instructions of the process and verify the legitimacy of the relevant instructions.

[0088] In this embodiment, the specific content and acquisition method of process-related instructions can be adaptively determined according to actual needs. Specifically, during the WebAssembly loading phase, the legality of the instructions is verified, and undeclared function calls or illegal jumps are prohibited. Specifically, through static analysis and runtime verification, it can ensure that each instruction is executed within the design range, further preventing attackers from using illegal instructions to exploit the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0089] Step S3024: If the target virtual memory address exceeds the preset boundary range, return to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0090] Step S3025, isolating the process to limit the scope of system calls of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0091] In this embodiment, isolating processes includes process isolation and permission isolation, which specifically uses the kernel isolation feature of the operating system, such as Linux's Seccomp or Windows's AppContainer, to limit the system call range of the process, thereby preventing attackers from accessing the core functions of the operating system. In this way, even if an attacker discovers a serious vulnerability in the rendering process and obtains the highest permission of the rendering process, he cannot make further exploits.

[0092] It should be noted that Seccomp is a kernel feature in the Linux operating system that can filter system calls issued by containers at a granular level. Specifically, a simple Seccomp profile will contain a list of system calls and the corresponding operations whenever a system call is made. When this feature is enabled, the attack surface will be reduced to allowed system calls, and dangerous system calls will be prohibited; among them, dangerous system calls may lead to kernel vulnerabilities, privilege escalation, and container crashes. In addition, AppContainer is a security feature in the Windows operating system, which is mainly used to provide isolation and security of applications. Specifically, AppContainer is commonly used in UWP (Universal Windows Platform) applications (also known as Metro, Store, Modern applications), which is a sandbox environment to limit the access rights of applications, thereby preventing malware and unauthorized access.

[0093] A sandbox isolation protection mechanism is designed in the embodiment of the present invention, that is, by allocating an independent virtual memory address space to each process of the Internet of Vehicles browser to prevent each process from directly accessing each other's data, it can effectively prevent attackers from escaping from the rendering process to the kernel process through the sandbox, thereby fundamentally improving the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser; and by limiting the system call range of the process to prevent attackers from accessing the core functions of the operating system, it can greatly improve the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser, help protect the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers, and further provide users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0094] In this embodiment, a security protection method for a vehicle networking browser is provided. When the preset security protection is memory-level vulnerability protection, Figure 4 This is a flowchart of memory-level vulnerability protection, such as Figure 4 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0095] Step S401, obtain the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser. Figure 1 Step S101 of the illustrated embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0096] In step S402, corresponding preset security protection is performed on the operation and / or process respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

[0097] Specifically, the preset security protection for the process in the above step S402 includes:

[0098] Step S4021, randomize the memory address of the process to obtain a corresponding random memory address, and run the process in the random memory address.

[0099] In this embodiment, the address space layout randomization technology is introduced. Each time the Internet of Vehicles browser is started, the memory addresses of the JavaScript engine, WebAssembly, and loaded shared libraries are randomized. Even if an attacker triggers a vulnerability, the various addresses in the memory must be leaked first, otherwise there is no way to exploit the vulnerability, which can increase the difficulty for the attacker to leak the memory address during the vulnerability exploitation process. Specifically, by increasing the difficulty for the attacker to leak the memory address during the vulnerability exploitation process, the security protection capability of the vulnerability exploitation is further improved, which greatly ensures the operation security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0100] Step S4022, obtaining the current memory permissions of the process.

[0101] In this embodiment, the specific content of the current memory permission is not limited here and is adaptively determined according to actual needs, such as readable permission, writable permission, read-write permission, etc.

[0102] Step S4023, determining whether the current memory permission complies with the preset memory permission.

[0103] In this embodiment, the specific content of the preset memory permission is adaptively adjusted according to actual needs and is not limited here.

[0104] It should be noted that the relevant content of the above step S4023 of this embodiment is essentially an execution protection strategy, that is, the Internet of Vehicles browser adopts the Write XOR Execute strategy to ensure that the memory segment can only be used for writing or executing, and cannot have both permissions at the same time, which can effectively prevent attackers from injecting and running malicious code.

[0105] It should be explained that Write XOR Execute (W^X) is a memory protection technology that is mainly used to prevent buffer overflow attacks and improve system security. Specifically, the principle of W^X is to prohibit memory pages from having both write (Write) and execute (Execute) permissions at the same time, that is, a memory page can only be written or executed, but not both permissions at the same time; this design can effectively prevent certain types of attacks, because attackers cannot write and execute malicious code at the same memory location at the same time, thereby reducing the risk of buffer overflow.

[0106] Step S4024, if the current execution permission meets the preset memory permission, all objects of the process and their type information are obtained, and a type consistency check is performed based on all objects and their type information.

[0107] It should be noted that the relevant content of the above step S4024 of this embodiment is essentially a type confusion mitigation technology. Specifically, the Internet of Vehicles browser uses Hidden Classes to dynamically assign type information to objects and performs consistency checks on object types during JIT compilation (Just-In-Time Compilation). For example, if an operation requires a specific type, runtime check logic will be inserted during compilation to ensure that the type is correct and further avoid type confusion.

[0108] It should be explained that Hidden Classes are Java hidden classes, which are special classes that cannot be directly accessed or used by applications. Specifically, hidden classes are mainly used for dynamically generated classes, usually used in frameworks or libraries; their introduction aims to enhance Java's support for dynamic language features, improve performance and security, and reduce potential security risks.

[0109] Step S4025: If the current execution permission does not meet the preset memory permission, return to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0110] A vulnerability mitigation protection mechanism is designed in the embodiment of the present invention, that is, memory permission protection and object type consistency check are performed at the memory level, which can effectively prevent malicious attackers from exploiting the Internet of Vehicles browser and avoid potential type confusion security issues caused by type mismatch, thereby further reducing the risk of the Internet of Vehicles browser being attacked and providing users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0111] The above-mentioned security protection technical solution for the Internet of Vehicles browser proposed in the embodiment of the present invention aims to improve the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser through a variety of security mitigation mechanisms, prevent potential attack surfaces from being exploited, and thus protect the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers. The specific process of this solution includes: First, for the attack surface of the callback function in the Internet of Vehicles browser, the trusted sources are restricted through the whitelist mechanism, the legality of the input parameters is strictly verified, and a multi-layer permission authentication mechanism is introduced to ensure the safe calling of sensitive functions. Secondly, for WebAssembly-related vulnerabilities, process isolation and sandbox technology are adopted, combined with the linear memory model and instruction sandboxing strategy to prevent malicious code from escaping the sandbox through type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing. Finally, through address space layout randomization, execution protection strategy and type confusion mitigation technology, the difficulty of vulnerability exploitation by malicious exploiters is further improved, and the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser is comprehensively enhanced.

[0112] In summary, the security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to the embodiment of the present invention has the following significant advantages:

[0113] 1. Strengthened the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0114] (1) The callback function protection mechanism can effectively prevent vulnerabilities such as type confusion and out-of-bounds reading and writing caused by insufficient input parameter verification, greatly reducing the possibility of malicious attackers exploiting callback functions.

[0115] (2) WebAssembly sandbox isolation technology ensures independent memory allocation. Combined with process isolation and instruction sandboxing strategies, it can effectively prevent attackers from escaping from the rendering process to the kernel process through the sandbox, fundamentally improving the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0116] 2. Strengthened the protection capability against the exploitation of Internet of Vehicles browser vulnerabilities.

[0117] (1) The address space layout randomization and execution protection strategy are adopted to further increase the difficulty for attackers to leak memory addresses during vulnerability exploitation, which can effectively prevent malicious attackers from exploiting the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0118] (2) Type confusion mitigation technology can avoid potential type confusion security issues caused by type mismatches by dynamically allocating object type information and performing runtime type checking, thereby further reducing the risk of attacks on the Internet of Vehicles browser and providing users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0119] In this embodiment, a security protection system for a vehicle networking browser is also provided, which is used to implement the above-mentioned embodiments and preferred implementation modes, and will not be repeated here. As the term "module" is used below, it can implement a combination of software and / or hardware with a predetermined function. Although the system described in the following embodiments is preferably implemented in software, the implementation of hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and conceivable.

[0120] The present invention provides a security protection system for vehicle networking browsers, such as Figure 5 As shown, the system includes:

[0121] The acquisition module 501 is used to acquire the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0122] The protection module 502 is used to perform corresponding preset security protection on operations and / or processes respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

[0123] In some optional embodiments, the protection module 502 includes: a first operation protection submodule, a second operation protection submodule, a third operation protection submodule and a fourth operation protection submodule; wherein the first operation protection submodule is used to obtain the current callback function corresponding to the operation; the second operation protection submodule is used to determine whether the current callback function exists in a preset callback whitelist, wherein the preset callback whitelist is based on all bound callback functions in the Internet of Vehicles browser and is configured in accordance with preset security requirements; the third operation protection submodule is used to perform parameter verification on the current callback function if the current callback function exists in the preset callback whitelist; the fourth operation protection submodule is used to return to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser if the current callback function does not exist in the preset callback whitelist.

[0124] In some optional embodiments, the third operation protection submodule includes: a first protection unit and a second protection unit; wherein the first protection unit is used to obtain the parameters to be verified of the current callback function; the second protection unit is used to perform parameter verification on the parameters to be verified based on a preset verification method, wherein the preset verification method includes at least type verification, numerical range check and parameter source verification.

[0125] In some optional embodiments, the protection module 502 also includes: a first isolation protection submodule, a second isolation protection submodule, a third isolation protection submodule, a fourth isolation protection submodule and a fifth isolation protection submodule; wherein the first isolation protection submodule is used to assign a corresponding target virtual memory address to the process; the second isolation protection submodule is used to check whether the target virtual memory address exceeds a preset boundary range; the third isolation protection submodule is used to obtain relevant instructions of the process and verify the legitimacy of the relevant instructions if the target virtual memory address does not exceed the preset boundary range; the fourth isolation protection submodule is used to return to the step of obtaining operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser if the target virtual memory address exceeds the preset boundary range; the fifth isolation protection submodule is used to isolate the process to limit the system call range of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

[0126] In some optional embodiments, the protection module 502 also includes: a first vulnerability protection sub-module, a second vulnerability protection sub-module, a third vulnerability protection sub-module, a fourth vulnerability protection sub-module and a fifth vulnerability protection sub-module; wherein the first vulnerability protection sub-module is used to randomize the memory address of the process, obtain the corresponding random memory address, and run the process in the random memory address; the second vulnerability protection sub-module is used to obtain the current memory permission of the process; the third vulnerability protection sub-module is used to determine whether the current memory permission meets the preset memory permission; the fourth vulnerability protection sub-module is used to obtain all objects and their type information of the process if the current execution permission meets the preset memory permission, and perform a type consistency check based on all objects and their type information; the fifth vulnerability protection sub-module is used to return to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser if the current execution permission does not meet the preset memory permission.

[0127] The further functional description of each of the above modules is the same as that of the above corresponding embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0128] The security protection system for the Internet of Vehicles browser in this embodiment is presented in the form of functional units, where the units refer to ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) circuits, processors and memories that execute one or more software or fixed programs, and / or other devices that can provide the above functions.

[0129] The security protection system for the Internet of Vehicles browser of the embodiment of the present invention can take into account the security protection requirements of system-level calls and memory-level vulnerabilities, and greatly improves the security of the Internet of Vehicles browser by performing corresponding security protection on the relevant operations and processes involved in the operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser. It effectively prevents potential attack surfaces or vulnerabilities from being exploited, thereby protecting the vehicle system from attacks by malicious attackers and providing users with a safer Internet of Vehicles interactive experience.

[0130] The present invention also provides a vehicle, which includes a controller. Figure 6 , Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the controller provided in an optional embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 6As shown, the controller includes: one or more processors 10, a memory 20, and interfaces for connecting various components, including high-speed interfaces and low-speed interfaces. Each component utilizes different buses to communicate with each other, and can be installed on a common mainboard or installed in other ways as needed. The processor can process the instructions executed in the master controller, including instructions stored in or on the memory to display the graphical information of the GUI on an external input / output device (such as, a display device coupled to the interface). In some optional embodiments, if necessary, multiple processors and / or multiple buses can be used together with multiple memories and multiple memories. Similarly, multiple master controllers can be connected, and each master controller provides some necessary operations (for example, as a server array, a group of blade servers, or a multi-processor system). Figure 6 A processor 10 is taken as an example.

[0131] The processor 10 may be a central processing unit, a network processor or a combination thereof. The processor 10 may further include a hardware chip. The hardware chip may be a dedicated integrated circuit, a programmable logic device or a combination thereof. The programmable logic device may be a complex programmable logic device, a field programmable gate array, a general purpose array logic or any combination thereof.

[0132] The memory 20 stores instructions executable by at least one processor 10, so that at least one processor 10 executes the method shown in the above embodiment.

[0133] The memory 20 may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system, an application required by at least one function; the data storage area may store data created according to the use of the controller, etc. In addition, the memory 20 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-transient memory, such as at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other non-transient solid-state storage device. In some optional embodiments, the memory 20 may optionally include a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor 10, and these remote memories may be connected to the controller via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0134] The memory 20 may include a volatile memory, such as a random access memory; the memory may also include a non-volatile memory, such as a flash memory, a hard disk or a solid state drive; the memory 20 may also include a combination of the above types of memory.

[0135] The controller also includes a communication interface 30 for the main control chip to communicate with other devices or a communication network.

[0136] A computer-readable storage medium is also provided in an embodiment of the present invention. The method according to the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, firmware, or can be implemented as a computer code that can be recorded in a storage medium, or can be implemented as a computer code that is originally stored in a remote storage medium or a non-temporary machine-readable storage medium and will be stored in a local storage medium and downloaded through a network, so that the method described herein can be stored in such software processing on a storage medium using a general-purpose computer, a dedicated processor, or programmable or dedicated hardware. Among them, the storage medium can be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only storage memory, a random access memory, a flash memory, a hard disk or a solid-state hard disk, etc.; further, the storage medium can also include a combination of the above types of memories. It can be understood that a computer, a processor, a microprocessor main control chip or programmable hardware includes a storage component that can store or receive software or computer code. When the software or computer code is accessed and executed by a computer, a processor or hardware, the method shown in the above embodiment is implemented.

[0137] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art may make various modifications and variations without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, and such modifications and variations are all within the scope defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: The method comprises: Get the operations and processes during the running of the Internet of Vehicles browser; The operations and / or processes are respectively subjected to corresponding preset security protections to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protections include system-level call protections and memory-level vulnerability protections.

2. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The system-level call protection includes security operation protection, and preset security protection is performed on the operation, including: Get the current callback function corresponding to the operation; Determine whether the current callback function exists in a preset callback whitelist, wherein the preset callback whitelist is configured based on all bound callback functions in the Internet of Vehicles browser and in accordance with preset security requirements; If the current callback function exists in the preset callback whitelist, then parameter verification is performed on the current callback function; If the current callback function does not exist in the preset callback whitelist, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

3. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The verifying parameters of the current callback function includes: Obtain the parameters to be verified of the current callback function; The parameter to be verified is verified based on a preset verification method, wherein the preset verification method at least includes type verification, value range check and parameter source verification.

4. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The system-level call protection includes sandbox isolation protection, which performs preset security protection on the process, including: Allocating a corresponding target virtual memory address to the process; Checking whether the target virtual memory address exceeds a preset boundary range; If the target virtual memory address does not exceed the preset boundary range, then obtaining the relevant instructions of the process and performing a validity verification on the relevant instructions; If the target virtual memory address exceeds the preset boundary range, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes within the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

5. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The method further comprises: The process is isolated to limit the scope of system calls of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

6. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 1 is characterized in that: If the preset security protection is memory level vulnerability protection, the preset security protection is performed on the process, including: Get the current memory permissions of the process; Determine whether the current memory permission meets the preset memory permission; If the current execution permission meets the preset memory permission, all objects of the process and their type information are obtained, and type consistency check is performed based on all objects and their type information; If the current execution permission does not meet the preset memory permission, the process returns to the step of obtaining the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser.

7. The security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to claim 6 is characterized in that: Before obtaining the current execution permission of the process, the method further includes: A memory address randomization process is performed on the process to obtain a corresponding random memory address, and the process is run in the random memory address.

8. A security protection system for Internet of Vehicles browsers, characterized in that: The system comprises: The acquisition module is used to obtain the operations and processes in the running process of the Internet of Vehicles browser; The protection module is used to perform corresponding preset security protection on the operation and / or the process respectively to ensure the safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles browser, wherein the preset security protection includes system-level call protection and memory-level vulnerability protection.

9. A vehicle, characterized in that: The vehicle includes a controller, which includes: a memory and a processor, the memory and the processor are communicatively connected to each other, the memory stores computer instructions, and the processor executes the security protection method for the Internet of Vehicles browser according to any one of claims 1 to 7 by executing the computer instructions.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable a computer to execute the security protection method for a browser of an Internet of Vehicles according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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