A certificate-free signature encryption method for vehicular ad hoc network communication
By employing a double-chain structure and the SM9 cryptographic algorithm in vehicular ad hoc networks, a pseudonym-vehicle public key mapping is generated, solving the key escrow and certificate management problems. This achieves efficient and secure certificateless signature encryption, reduces computational and communication overhead, and enhances the security and privacy of vehicle data.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510170356.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-02-17
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
- Estimated Expiration
- 2045-02-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing vehicle-mounted ad hoc network communication solutions, while ensuring data confidentiality, security, and anonymity, suffer from significant computational and communication overhead, as well as insufficient identity security and anti-attack capabilities. Traditional blockchain solutions are unsuitable for vehicle network scenarios, and key escrow and certificate management issues remain unresolved.
It adopts a dual-chain structure, combining the SM9 cryptographic algorithm and blockchain technology. It generates a mapping between pseudonyms and vehicle public keys through hash operations, which reduces storage pressure and improves security. The vehicle autonomously calculates the complete private key and uses public and consortium blockchains to store traffic data and vehicle identity respectively, realizing certificateless signature encryption.
It reduces the storage pressure on VANETs, improves the security and privacy of vehicle data, reduces computing and communication overhead, enhances resistance to attacks, and improves communication efficiency.
Smart Images

Figure CN120034336B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and relates to blockchain technology in the field of information security, as well as the SM9 cryptographic algorithm and methods for proving data security. Background Technology
[0002] Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks that require no infrastructure. With the rapid development of intelligent autonomous driving and wireless communication, VANETs hold significant practical importance for the development of Intelligent Traffic Systems (ITS). Messages transmitted within VANETs contain user privacy or sensitive information; therefore, ensuring the confidential, intact, secure, and anonymous transmission of data within VANETs is crucial.
[0003] I. Ali et al., in "An efficient hybrid signcryption scheme with conditional privacy-preservation for heterogeneous vehicular communication in VANETs," IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 69, no. 10, pp. 11 266–11 280, Oct. 2020, used an IBC-based signcryption scheme designed for heterogeneous VANETs. This scheme is adaptable to different types of vehicles and communication protocols, emphasizing compatibility in diverse network environments. It also ensures secure transmission of IBC-background vehicles to PKI-background receivers. However, this scheme increases implementation complexity and requires more system resources. Furthermore, the user's private key is not derived from the secret value, allowing the KGC to tamper with and forge the user's public key or use the private key for message signing. Additionally, in high-density vehicular environments, its communication and computational overhead remains high. In the paper "Blockchain-assisted certificateless signcryption for vehicle-to-vehicle communication in VANETs" by Hu Ishuang Shao et al. (Computer Networks, 2023), the user first obtains a partial private key generated by the Key Generation Center (KGC). Then, the user uses the partial private key and a randomly chosen secret value to generate the full private key. This eliminates the key escrow storage problem and avoids the security issue of the KGC using the private key to signify messages. However, there is still room for improvement in terms of signcryption and communication overhead. To reduce communication and computational overhead, Ullah et al. proposed a CLC-based online / offline isomorphic signcryption scheme in "Bilinear Pairing-Based Hybrid Signcryption for Secure Heterogeneous Vehicular Communications" (IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2021). This scheme does not use many bilinear pairs and utilizes ECC to reduce overhead and improve efficiency. However, this solution is not secure enough in terms of protecting vehicle identity, tracking malicious vehicles, and preventing replay attacks. This would prevent VANET from running in a high-security environment and would also increase management costs.
[0004] The above solutions improve the confidentiality and security of message transmission to some extent. However, most of the proposed signature encryption schemes have some problems in terms of storage and security, or some have high computational and communication costs. Blockchain, on the other hand, possesses characteristics that can largely guarantee the security, traceability, and integrity of information transmitted in VANETs. Furthermore, blockchain can be used to establish a decentralized device communication platform, improving the security and interoperability of IoT devices. However, traditional solutions based on public blockchains are not suitable for real-world vehicle network scenarios, thus requiring the deployment of consortium blockchains to enhance vehicle network security. Solutions based on consortium blockchains offer limited access permissions, high efficiency, and sufficient scalability (up to a certain number of network nodes), while ensuring security and privacy protection. Therefore, proposing a secure and efficient certificate-free signature encryption scheme is crucial. The SM9 cryptographic algorithm, an identity-based cryptosystem, can effectively solve certificate management and key escrow problems. Dual blockchains can ensure the secure uploading and retrieval of traffic information data by trusted users in the VANETs environment, while providing strong security guarantees for highly private information such as vehicle public keys, real identities, and pseudonyms. Security proofs demonstrate that this scheme, based on the difficult assumption of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, is secure against attackers simulating ordinary users in terms of EUF-CMA and IND-CCA 2. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The purpose of this invention is to propose a certificateless signature encryption method for vehicular ad hoc network communication. This invention employs a dual-chain structure. To alleviate the storage pressure on the blockchain in VANETs, on the one hand, a public blockchain with lower barriers to entry is used to store traffic data, making it easier for registered users to access the data; on the other hand, a consortium blockchain is used to store the vehicle's real identity, pseudonym, and public key, which both reduces storage pressure and improves the security of vehicle-related data. This invention designs a certificateless signature scheme that integrates blockchain technology and the SM9 cryptographic algorithm for V2V communication. The vehicle's real identity is hashed to generate a pseudonym, and the pseudonym and the vehicle's public key are mapped one-to-one on the consortium blockchain to ensure the anonymity of the vehicle in the VANETs environment, improving the vehicle's security and privacy within the environment. To solve the private key management problem of the KGC, after receiving a partial private key allocated by the KGC, the vehicle autonomously calculates the complete private key. This not only increases the security of the private key but also makes it difficult for malicious vehicles to tamper with or steal it.
[0006] This invention discloses a certificate-free signature encryption method for vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) communication, comprising a Key Generation Center (KGC), vehicle users, a public blockchain, a consortium blockchain, and Roadside Units (RSUs). The vehicle users consist of message senders and message receivers. The message sender first encapsulates the session key using the key encapsulation algorithm in the SM9 cryptographic algorithm. Upon receiving the encapsulated information, the message receiver uses a portion of the private key allocated by the KGC and the key decapsulation algorithm of the SM9 cryptographic algorithm to perform relevant calculations to obtain the session key, preparing for subsequent message interaction. During message interaction, the message sender first encrypts the plaintext message using the message encryption algorithm of the SM9 cryptographic algorithm, generating a corresponding message tuple, which is then broadcast on the public blockchain for other vehicles to access. After receiving the broadcast tuple from the sender, the message receiver needs to securely and accurately obtain the sender's plaintext message using the message decryption algorithm of the SM9 cryptographic algorithm. If the message sender encounters a large number of messages requiring processing and decryption, it can execute a batch message decryption algorithm to quickly obtain a large number of plaintext messages, thereby saving time and improving the communication efficiency of VANETs.
[0007] Specifically, the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions.
[0008] The present invention discloses a certificate-free signature encryption method for in-vehicle ad hoc network communication, comprising the following steps:
[0009] (S01): During system initialization and vehicle identity registration, the Key Generation Center (KGC) generates a pair of system public keys Ppub1 and Ppub2 and master private keys s1 and s2, and simultaneously generates two hash functions H1(Z,q) and H2(Z,q); Trusted vehicle user V i You need to submit your vehicle ID to KGC i KGC uses its ID i And generate an identifier hid using the randomly generated private key. i Generate a corresponding anonymous identity PID for it. i KGC utilizes the generated PID i For registered trusted vehicles V i Distribute a pair of vehicle public keys Q 1,i Q 2,i and a pair of partial private keys d 1,i d 2,i KGC will ultimately upload the public key pair of each trusted user's vehicle to the consortium blockchain.
[0010] (S02): Vehicle V i Call the key encapsulation algorithm in the SM9 cryptographic algorithm and apply it to the vehicle V i The session key generated between them, vehicle V iUsing the key derivation function KDF and a self-generated random number r 1,i And obtaining vehicle V from the consortium blockchain j public key Q 1,i The session key K is obtained through the corresponding calculation. 1,i And the ciphertext C of the conversation 1,i Vehicle V j After receiving the session key and ciphertext, the session key is verified and calculated by calling the key desealing algorithm in SM9 cipher, using the partial private key allocated by KGC and the KDF function;
[0011] (S03): Trusted vehicle V i As the message sender, utilize the private key pair distributed by KGC and select a random number. Autonomous and complete private key pair {D 1,i D 2,i Vehicle V i Then, two random numbers are selected, and the message m is encrypted using the SM9 cryptographic algorithm, including the message encryption algorithm, the Enc encryption algorithm, and the Message Authentication Code (MAC) function. i Encryption is performed to obtain ciphertext C. i =C 2,i ||C 3,i ||C 4,i Signature Ω i =(S i ,h 2,i ) and the key element ω 2,i ω 3,i Finally, the message tuple {m i ,Ω i C i ,t i} is sent to the receiving vehicle Vj, where t i It is vehicle V i Broadcast tuple {m i ,Ω i C i ,t i At that moment.
[0012] (S04): Trusted vehicle V j As the message receiver, I receive the message tuple {m′} from the message sender. i ,Ω′ i ,C′ i ,t i After that, vehicle V j First, the message's timeliness is checked. Then, the message decryption algorithm, the Dec symmetric decryption algorithm, and the MAC function in the SM9 cryptographic algorithm are called to verify the message signature. During this process, two key elements ω′ can be obtained. 2,i ,ω′3,i And decrypting the ciphertext yields a secure, reliable, and tamper-proof plaintext message m. i ;
[0013] (S05): Receiving vehicle V j Received from different vehicles V1, V2, ..., V n The message tuples sent are {m′1,Ω′1,C′1,t1},{m′2,Ω′2,C′2,t2},...,{m′ n ,Ω′ n ,C′ n ,t n Vehicle Vj first checks the timeliness of the message, then Vj will add element {ω′}. 2,1 ,ω′ 3,1},{ω′ 2,2 ,ω′ 3,2},......,{ω′ 2,n ,ω′ 3,n The aggregation process is performed separately to obtain elements W1 and W2; then the vehicle V... j The two obtained elements are verified, and the corresponding ciphertext decryption process is then carried out after the verification is successful.
[0014] Furthermore, step (S01) is described as follows:
[0015] (1) System initialization:
[0016] The Key Generation Center (KGC) selects three cyclic groups of order q: two additive cyclic groups (G1,+) and (G2,+). There exists a homomorphism ψ from G2 to G1 such that ψ(P2) = P1, and a bilinear pair e: G1 × G2 → G T G T It is a multiplicative cyclic group; P1 and P2 are the generators of G1 and G2 respectively; the inputs of the cryptographic functions H1(Z,q) and H2(Z,q) are both Z and an integer q, and the outputs are h1∈[1,q-1] and h2∈[1,q-1] respectively, where q is a large prime number and Z represents a bit string;
[0017] (2) System parameter generation:
[0018] KGC randomly selects s1, s2 ∈ Z. q * Calculate element P in G2 pub1 =s1P2,P pub2 =s2P1,P pub1 and P pub2 It is a pair of system public keys; KGC calculates G TIn the middle, elements g1 = e(P1, Ppub1), g2 = e(P2, Ppub2), and then parameters params = {q, P1, P2, Ppub1, Ppub2, g1, g2, H1, H2, G1, G2, G} are defined. T Expose the parameters on VANET and store s1 and s2 secretly;
[0019] (3) Vehicle information generation:
[0020] KGC randomly generates a large byte hid. i Represents the trusted vehicle V i Private key generates identifier, calculates PID i =h 1,i , where h 1,i =H(ID) i ||hid i ,q), PID i For KGC to give vehicle V i Generated anonymous identity; KGC calculates t 1,i =h 1,i +s1,t′ 1,i =h 1,i +s2 if t 1,i ,t′ 1,i If ≠0, then calculate t. 2,i =s1 / t 1,i ,t′ 2,i =s2 / t 2,i Then calculate:
[0021]
[0022] d 1,i d 2,i As vehicle V i Partial private key pair;
[0023]
[0024] Q 1,i Q 2,i As vehicle V i Public key pair; finally, KGC sends a key to the trusted vehicle V. i Send key i ={d 1,i ,d 2,i Q 1,i Q 2,i ,PID i};
[0025] The key encapsulation and decapsulation algorithm based on the SM9 cryptographic algorithm described in step (S02) of this invention includes the following specific contents:
[0026] (1) Session key encapsulation
[0027] V i Generate random number r 1,i ∈Z q * Simultaneously calculate element C in G1 1,i =r 1,i ·Q 1,j Then C 1,i Convert the data type to a bit string; V i Calculate G T elements in and ω 1,i Convert data type to bit string; calculate K 1,i =KDF(C 1,i ||ω 1,i ||ID i ,klen1), if K 1,i If the string is all zero bits, then return (1) to regenerate a random number r. 1,i Perform the calculation; otherwise, V i The output will be (K1,i,C1,i), where K1,i is the encapsulated key, and C1,i is the key between KGC and vehicle V. i The corresponding ciphertext generated during the session; ultimately V i (K) 1,i C 1,i Send to the corresponding vehicle Vj;
[0028] (2) Session key decryption
[0029] Vehicle V j Received (K) 1,i C 1,i After that, verify the ciphertext C. 1,i Check if ∈G1 is true; if not, exit and report to KGC; if true, then vehicle V... j Calculate G T element ω′ 1,i =e(C 1,i ,d 1,j ), and at the same time ω′ 1,i Convert the data type to a bit string; convert the received C... 1,i Convert the data type to a bit string and calculate V. i Encapsulated key K′ 1,i =KDF(C 1,i ||ω′ 1,i ||ID i ,klen1), KDF is the key derivation function, if K′ 1,i All 0 or K 1,i =K′ 1,iIf the condition is not met, an error message will be displayed and the system will exit; otherwise, vehicle V will be detected. i Securely accept session key K 1,i .
[0030] The message encryption algorithm based on the SM9 cryptographic algorithm described in step (S03) of this invention includes the following specific contents:
[0031] (1) Private key generation
[0032] Vehicle V i Select random number V i calculate
[0033]
[0034] D 1,i D 2,i As a vehicle private key pair;
[0035] (2) Message Sign-in
[0036] 1) Vehicle V i Select random number Calculate G1 and G respectively T element C 3,i =r 3,i Q 1,j ,
[0037] 2) Calculate h 2,i =H2(m i ||ω 2,i ,q), L i =(r 2,i -h 2,i )modq; if L i =0, then return (1) to select a random number r again. 2,i Otherwise, calculate K. 2,i =KDF(C 2,i ||ω 3,i ||ID j klen) = K1_len||K2_len, where klen represents the length of the key;
[0038] 3) Calculate S i =L i ·D 1,i Let Ω i =(S i ,h 2,i ), calculate C 4,i =Enc(K1_len,m i Enc is a symmetric encryption algorithm; calculate C 5,i=MAC(K2_len,C 4,i MAC is a message authentication function, the purpose of which is to prevent the input data from being maliciously tampered with;
[0039] 4) Finally, output the ciphertext C i =C 3,i ||C 4,i ||C 5,i ; and {m i ,Ω i C i ,t i Send to other vehicles V j , where t i It is vehicle V i Broadcast tuple {m i ,Ω i C i ,t i At the same time, the broadcast tuple will also be stored on the public blockchain for other trusted vehicles to access.
[0040] The message decryption algorithm based on the SM9 cryptographic algorithm described in step (S04) of this invention includes the following specific contents:
[0041] (1) Check transmission delay
[0042] Vehicle V j Receive message tuple {m′ i ,Ω′ i ,C′ i ,t i Vehicle based on arrival time t j and the previous moment t i To check the transmission delay; first, vehicle V j Determine t j -t i > Check if Δt is true. If true, directly reject the message tuple; otherwise, message receiver V... j Perform the following steps, where Δt is the specified maximum transmission delay;
[0043] (2) Message decryption
[0044] 1) Vehicle V j Verify h′ 2,i ∈Z q * S′ i Check if ∈G1 is true. If not, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed from C′. i Take C′ from 2,i Verify C′ 2,i If ∈G1 is true, report to KGC; otherwise:
[0045] Calculate G T ω′ 3,i =e(C′) 2,i D 2,i ), u i =e(S′) i Q 2,i );
[0046] 2) Calculate K′ 2,i =KDF(C′) 2,i ||ω′ 3,i ||ID j ,klen)=K′1_len||K′2_len,ω′ 2,i =u i ·t i ;
[0047] 3) Calculate h′ 2,i =H2(m′) i ||ω′ 2,i ,q), test h 2,i =h′ 2,i If the condition is not met, an error is reported and the error is sent to KGC; otherwise, m′ is calculated. i =Dec(K′1_len,C′) 3,i Dec is a symmetric decryption algorithm;
[0048] 4) Calculate f i =MAC(K′2_len,C′) 3,i ), from C′ i Take C′ from 3,i Determine f i =C′ 4,i Check if the condition is met. If not, exit reporting to KGC; otherwise, output message m′. i .
[0049] The message decryption algorithm based on the SM9 cryptographic algorithm described in step (S05) of this invention includes the following specific contents:
[0050] (1) Check transmission delay
[0051] When receiving vehicle V j Received from different vehicles V1, V2, ..., V n The message tuples sent are {m′1,Ω′1,C′1,t1},{m′2,Ω′2,C′2,t2},...,{m′ n ,Ω′ n ,C′ n ,t nThe vehicle first checks the timeliness of the message; if the maximum transmission delay is exceeded, the message is rejected; otherwise, the receiver begins to recover the message. Vehicle V j Accept each message array {m′ i ,Ω′ i ,C′ i ,t i};
[0052] (2) Batch message decryption
[0053] 1) In the tuple received by vehicle Vj for verification, {Ω1,......Ω n arrays of} The elements in S′1,......S′ n Check if ∈G1 is true. If not, the verification fails; otherwise, check C′ of each received tuple. i Take C′ from 2,i Verify C′ 2,i If ∈G1 is true, report to KGC; otherwise:
[0054] Calculate G T ω′ 3,i =e(C 2,i D 2,i ),
[0055] 2) Verification Check if the condition is met. If not, message recovery fails; otherwise:
[0056] 3) Calculate K′ for each message tuple. 2,i =KDF(C′) 2,i ||ω′ 3,i ||ID j ,klen)=K′1_len||K′2_len;
[0057] 4) Calculate m′ respectively i =Dec(K′1_len,C′) 3,i ), recover the plaintext message, Dec is the symmetric decryption algorithm;
[0058] 5) Calculate f respectively i =MAC(K′2_len,C′) 3,i ), from the C′ contained in each tuple i Take C′ from 4,i Determine f i =C′ 4,i Check if the condition is met; if not, exit reporting to KGC, otherwise output message {m′1,......,m′ n} Attached Figure Description
[0059] Figure 1 This is a system model diagram of the information security sharing scheme without certificate signature encryption according to the present invention.
[0060] Figure 2 The flowchart of the information security sharing scheme without certificate signature encryption of the present invention is as follows.
[0061] Figure 3 This is an information interaction diagram of the certificate-free signature encryption information security sharing scheme of the present invention.
[0062] Figure 4 The diagram shows the computational overhead of the certificate-free signature encryption information security sharing scheme of this invention.
[0063] Figure 5 This is a comparison chart showing the computational overhead of decrypting the information security sharing scheme without certificate signature encryption of the present invention.
[0064] Figure 6 This is a comparison chart showing the computational overhead of batch decryption for the certificate-free signature-encrypted information security sharing scheme of this invention. Detailed Implementation
[0065] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0066] 1. The model structure layout of the present invention.
[0067] like Figure 1 The specific parameters for the overall structure of this invention are defined as follows:
[0068] Vehicles: Each intelligent vehicle is equipped with a wireless-enabled OBU. The OBU obtains vehicle dynamic information from the RSU or other vehicles and shares traffic-related messages via DSRC technology or the PC5 interface between V2V and V2I communication. To avoid privacy breaches, each vehicle communicates using an anonymous identity issued by the KGC. Furthermore, each OBU is synchronized with the system time of all entities in the VANETs.
[0069] Trusted Authority (TA): The Key Generation Center (KGC) possesses powerful computing capabilities and storage space within VANETs, making it resistant to malicious attacks and completely trustworthy. It is responsible for system initialization and generating a series of public parameters to assist roadside units and users in completing registration.
[0070] Roadside Units (RSUs): Roadside unit nodes facilitate communication and interaction between vehicles and infrastructure. They communicate bidirectionally with vehicles using wireless communication technologies such as in-vehicle communication, Wi-Fi, and cellular networks. Specifically, RSUs collect data from roadside vehicle sensors, traffic lights, cameras, and other devices, transmitting this data to the cloud or other central locations for use by traffic management and intelligent transportation systems. Simultaneously, their location beside the road increases the coverage of vehicle communication, improving its reliability and continuity to facilitate user authentication, task data processing, and consensus. They possess powerful computing and storage capabilities, and as management nodes in the blockchain, they can view vehicle messages in real time and record them on the blockchain.
[0071] Users: Users include message senders (MS) and message receivers (MR), as defined below:
[0072] (1) Message Sender (MS): They are usually ordinary vehicle users who provide road and other information. When an MS encounters a traffic accident or other road traffic event, the vehicle user obtains the message tuple corresponding to the message through a message signature algorithm and broadcasts it on the public blockchain for other MRs to obtain in a timely manner, thereby achieving the goal of quickly understanding relevant road information and ultimately increasing traffic efficiency in the VANETs environment.
[0073] (2) Message Recipients (MR): They are usually vehicle users who need to obtain road information in a timely manner. Without knowing the current road information, MRs can obtain road information securely, accurately and completely by quickly obtaining message tuples published by MS on the public blockchain and using message decryption algorithms.
[0074] Public blockchains have low barriers to entry, allowing the system to read data and send transaction confirmations by default. They incentivize and promote competitive ledger recording through tokens, protecting user rights from the influence of application developers. As a decentralized distributed ledger technology, it stores data in blocks and uses cryptographic methods to ensure data security and immutability. This invention utilizes these characteristics to encrypt and store user privacy information on the blockchain to ensure the validity and integrity of user identities, while also storing transaction information on the blockchain to ensure the fairness of transactions. This solution uses a public blockchain to store road and traffic information, allowing registered, trusted users to promptly obtain the traffic information they need from the public blockchain stored on the OBU.
[0075] Consortium Blockchain: In a consortium blockchain, each institution owns one or more nodes. Data can only be read, written, and transmitted between different institutions within the system, and the permissions of participating nodes are completely equal. This scheme utilizes the consortium blockchain to store the real and anonymous identities of each registered vehicle pair, as well as the vehicle's public key. Only individuals with the authorization of a trusted institution can access their private information. Based on the one-to-one mapping between anonymous identities and vehicle public keys, the consortium blockchain provides a vehicle public key lookup service for registered vehicles.
[0076] SM9 Cryptographic Algorithm: The SM9 cryptographic algorithm, a national standard for public-key cryptography, is an Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) algorithm released by the State Cryptography Administration of China in 2010 as part of the national cryptographic standards. A key feature of the SM9 algorithm is the direct generation of public keys based on user identity information (such as username or email address), eliminating the need for complex certificate management and public key distribution processes, thus simplifying the management of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The SM9 algorithm comprises four main parts: signature verification algorithm, key encapsulation and decapsulation algorithm, encryption and decryption algorithm, and key exchange algorithm. With its unique identity-based key management mechanism, high-efficiency algorithm performance, wide range of applications, and strict security assumptions, the SM9 algorithm has become an important public-key cryptographic algorithm. It not only simplifies the key management process but also provides efficient security guarantees, making it suitable for various modern application needs.
[0077] 2. The certificate-free signature-encrypted information security sharing scheme of the present invention
[0078] The certificateless signature encryption scheme for VANET communication proposed in this invention, which integrates dual blockchains and the SM9 cryptographic algorithm, is as follows: Figure 2 As shown.
[0079] (1) Setup: During the system initialization phase, after inputting the security parameter k, KGC generates the system master private key and publishes the system security parameters, where k is a positive integer.
[0080] (2) RegAIDPSK: KGC uses the real identity ID of a trusted user to generate a corresponding pseudonym, part of the private key and public key. And the above data is stored securely in the consortium blockchain.
[0081] (3) Session key encapsulation for vehicles: Vehicle users generate a separate call key using their own vehicle public key and real identity ID, encrypt it, and then send the encapsulated ciphertext to the corresponding vehicle user.
[0082] (4) Session key unblocking for vehicles: Vehicle users receive encrypted messages from other users and verify and unblock them.
[0083] (5) SPKGen: Trusted vehicles use the private keys, public keys and system security parameters distributed by KGC to generate complete private keys autonomously.
[0084] (6) Sighcrypt: The message sender uses its complete private key, public key, pseudonym, etc. as the algorithm to complete the plaintext signing process and obtain the ciphertext. The pseudonym and public key can be quickly obtained from the consortium blockchain.
[0085] (7) Unsighcrypt: The message receiver uses the received message tuple, vehicle public key, pseudonym and real identity to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the plaintext message.
[0086] The data exchange process in a certificateless signature encryption scheme is as follows: Figure 3 As shown.
[0087] Vehicle V i V j First, the user provides their real identity ID to KGC, and then KGC uses a key generation algorithm to obtain V. i V j Each with its own pseudonym, a portion of its private key, and the vehicle's public key Q. 1,i Q 2,i Q 1,j Q 1,j Then KGC stores all of the above information on the consortium blockchain. When vehicle V i A message needs to be sent to the target vehicle V. j At that time, the first step is to obtain the target vehicle V from the consortium blockchain. j The vehicle's public key, combined with its own private key, is used to encrypt the message using the SM9 message encryption algorithm, generating the corresponding message tuple {m i ,Ω i C i ,t i Where Ω represents the message signature, and C... i This is a encrypted message. Vehicle V i This information is stored on the consortium blockchain to facilitate access to the message by other vehicles. When the target vehicle V... j Received message tuple {m′ i ,Ω′ i ,C′ i ,t i Afterwards, the signature and ciphertext are verified and decrypted using the user's private key. Upon successful verification, the message m will be received. i .
[0088] 3. Guarantee of the correctness of this invention
[0089] To verify the correctness of the decryption and encryption algorithms, it is necessary to first verify h. 2,i =h′ 2,i Whether they are equal can be determined by examining the expressions for both ω′. 2,i =ω 2,i Verify whether they are equal; if it is proven, ω′ 2,i and ω 2,i The consistency of (S′) proves the correctness of the algorithm. i ,h′ 2,i )=(S i ,h 2,i Under the premise that: we have:
[0090]
[0091] By L i =(r 2,i -h 2,i From the expression mod q, we can see that L i +h 2,i =r 2,i Therefore, the above formula has:
[0092]
[0093] Further proof demonstrates that the key (K′1_len, K′2_len) used in decryption is the same as the key (K1_len, K2_len) generated in encryption. In C′ i =C i Given this premise, we only need to verify ω′ 3,i =ω 3,i In short, we have:
[0094]
[0095] During batch message decryption, first let The specific steps for batch verification are as follows:
[0096] Because L i +h 2,i =r 2,i ,so,
[0097] Next, let The batch verification steps are as follows:
[0098]
[0099] Therefore, we can obtain the correct key (K1_len, K2_len) and correctly generate the plaintext m. i In the case of ciphertext C i =C 3,i ||C 4,i ||C 5,i Decryption becomes very natural, meaning that the decryption algorithm and the encryption algorithm are consistent with each other.
[0100] 4. Security Guarantee of the Invention
[0101] (1) Privacy Protection
[0102] Before joining VANET, all vehicles need to submit their real ID to KGC. KGC generates a pseudonym PID for the vehicle based on its ID. This way, no third party other than KGC can obtain the vehicle's real ID, thus ensuring the vehicle's privacy.
[0103] (2) Decentralization
[0104] Unlike the centralized database storage method used in traditional intelligent transportation systems, this project adopts a distributed storage scheme with dual blockchains, which eliminates the dependence on trusted third-party entity databases, avoids the potential risk of centralized malicious attacks on traditional centralized data storage, and saves costs in terms of maintenance.
[0105] (3) Non-repudiation
[0106] All information sent by the vehicle will be recorded on the public blockchain. KGC can use the records to find the real $ID$ of the vehicle that sent the information under a pseudonym.
[0107] (4) Defend against spoofing attacks
[0108] The sender's private key is known only to the sender, and their anonymous identity is unknown to any third party except the KGC. Therefore, during the signing phase, attackers cannot impersonate trusted nodes in VANET, thus protecting against forgery attacks.
[0109] (5) Resistance to key attacks
[0110] To address the key management issue, KGC generates only a portion of the vehicle's private key, ensuring that only the vehicle knows its own private key. Simultaneously, the vehicle's public key is indirectly generated from the system's master private key, preventing attackers from obtaining the system's master private key. Therefore, this scheme is resistant to key attacks.
[0111] 5. Communication overhead analysis of this invention
[0112] In the message tuple {m} transmitted by the vehicle i ,Ωi C i ,t i In}, C i =C 2,i ||C 3,i ||C 4,i Ω i =(S i ,h 2,i ), S i C 2,i ∈G1, C 3,i With message m i, Same length Where |G1| = 64 bypes, |m i, | = 20 bytes, |t i | = 4 bytes, resulting in the final communication overhead:
[0113]
[0114] The present invention and existing technical solutions: Shao et al. in "Computer Networks" 2023, 23 "Blockchain-assisted certificateless signcryption for vehicle-to-vehicle communication in VANETs"; Ali et al. in "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology" 2021, 70(6) "Bilinear pairing-based hybrid signcryption for secure heterogeneousvehicular communications"; Hu et al. in "Vehicular Communications》2020, 26 "Secure message classification services through identity-based signcryption with equality test towards the Internet of vehicles"; Kar et al. in "IEEE Transactionson Vehicular Technology" 2024, 73(6) "SL-PPCP: Secure and low-cost privacy-preserving communication protocol for vehicular ad-hoc networks"; Kumar et al. in, "Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies》2020,31(6)“A securedata transmission protocol for cloud-assisted edge-internet of The communication overhead comparison of “yhingsenvironment” Hou et al. in Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies 2021, 32(8) “Heterogeneous signcryption scheme supporting equalitytest from PKI to CLC toward IoT” is shown in Table 1.
[0115] Table 1: Comparison of Communication Overhead for Each Scheme
[0116]
[0117]
[0118] 6. Computational Overhead Analysis of the Invention
[0119] The computational overhead of the signature / decryption process in this invention is relatively low when equipped with an 8th generation Intel Core i5 processor and NVIDIA... The test was performed on a computer with a GeForce GTX 1050Ti and 16GB of DDR4 memory. The main bilinear pairs defined on the elliptic curve set currently used are Weil pairs, Tate pairs, Ate pairs, and Rate pairs. This program chose the Rate pair, which offers better security and higher computational efficiency. The final runtime for the cryptographic operations required in the scheme was obtained. m1 T represents the time required to compute a scalar multiplication in G1. ex This represents the time required to compute a power operation in G1. T represents the time required to map a point to group G1. m2 T′ represents the time required to compute a scalar multiplication in G2. ex Represents the calculation of G T The time required for an exponentiation operation, T pb The time required to compute a bilinear pair, and the execution time of the above ciphers, will be recorded in Table 2. Tables 3 and 4 show a comparison of the computational overhead of the signature-decryption process and the decryption of batch messages between this scheme and the existing schemes mentioned above.
[0120] Table 2 shows the running time of various password operations.
[0121]
[0122] Table 3 compares the message signature decryption overhead of each scheme with that of the present invention.
[0123]
[0124] Table 4 compares the bulk message decryption overhead of each scheme with that of the present invention.
[0125]
[0126] Figure 4 This diagram compares the computational overhead of the present invention with that of other schemes in performing message signature encryption. For one message signature encryption operation, the present invention only requires two scalar multiplications and two G1 operations. T One exponentiation operation is 2T m1 +2T′ ex=1.34ms, which is an average reduction of 82.96% in signature calculation overhead compared to the other six schemes.
[0127] Figure 5 A comparison chart of the computational overhead of this invention and other schemes in performing message signature encryption shows that, for each message decryption, this invention requires two bilinear pairing operations and two G operations. T One exponentiation operation is 2T pb +2T′ ex =8.22ms, which is an average reduction of 13.08% in decryption computation overhead compared to the other six schemes.
[0128] Figure 6 A comparison chart of the computational overhead of this invention and other schemes in performing batch message signing and decryption shows that, when performing fifty message decryption operations, this invention requires fifty-one bilinear pairing operations and two G operations. T One exponentiation operation, i.e., 51T pb +2T′ ex =181.27ms, which reduces the decryption computation cost by an average of 45.96% compared to the other six schemes. This demonstrates that the present invention has a more significant advantage in the VANET environment with large amounts of data.
Claims
1. A certificate-free signature encryption method for vehicular ad hoc network communication, characterized in that: Follow these steps: (S01): The Key Generation Center (KGC) generates a pair of system public keys during system initialization and vehicle identification registration. , and the master private key , Two hash functions are generated simultaneously. , Trusted vehicle user V i You need to submit your vehicle ID to KGC i KGC uses its ID i And generate an identifier hid using the randomly generated private key. i Generate a corresponding anonymous identity PID for it. i KGC utilizes the generated PID i For registered trusted vehicles V i Distribute a pair of vehicle public keys Q 1,i Q 2,i and a pair of partial private keys d 1,i d 2,i KGC will ultimately upload the public key pair of each trusted user's vehicle to the consortium blockchain. (S02): For vehicle V i With vehicle V j The session key generated between them is encapsulated, and the vehicle V i Using the key-derived function KDF and a self-generated random number r 1,i And vehicle V obtained from the consortium blockchain j public key Q 1,j The session key K is obtained through the corresponding calculation. 1,i and the corresponding ciphertext C 1,i Vehicle V j After receiving the session key and ciphertext, the session key is verified and calculated by calling the key decryption algorithm of SM9 cryptography, using the partial private key allocated by KGC and the KDF function; (S03): Trusted vehicle V i As the message sender, utilize the private key pair distributed by KGC and select a random number. Generate complete private key pairs independently Vehicle V i Then, two random numbers are selected, and the message is encrypted using the SM9 cryptographic algorithm, the Enc encryption algorithm, and the Message Authentication Code (MAC) function. Perform a signature process to obtain the ciphertext. ,sign and key elements , ,in, , r 3,i `Enc` is a random number, and `Enc` is a symmetric encryption algorithm. MAC stands for Message Authentication Function, and klen represents the length of the key. Corresponding encryption / decryption algorithm key length, Corresponding message authentication function key length; D 1,i D 2,i For vehicle private key pairs , ; Finally, the message tuple Send to receiving vehicle V j , where t i It is vehicle V i Broadcast tuple The moment; (S04): Trusted vehicle V j As a message receiver, you receive the message tuple from the message sender. Afterwards, vehicle V j First, the message's timeliness is checked. Then, the SM9 cryptographic algorithm's message decryption algorithm, the Dec symmetric decryption algorithm, and the message authentication code (MAC) function are called to verify the message signature. During this process, two key elements can be obtained. , And decrypting the ciphertext; among which , It is a random number. , from Extract from, For vehicle V j One of the private keys; Where e(.) is the bilinear pairing operation, For vehicle V i One of the public keys; Ultimately, we obtain secure, reliable, and tamper-proof plaintext messages. ; (S05): Receiving vehicle V j Received from different vehicles Each sent its own message tuple Vehicle V j First, check the timeliness of the message, then V j elements Elements were obtained by performing aggregation processes separately. and ,in , ; then the vehicle The two obtained elements are verified, and the corresponding ciphertext decryption process is then carried out after the verification is successful.
2. The certificate-free signature encryption method for vehicular ad hoc network communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The aforementioned step (S01) is performed according to the following steps: (1) System initialization: The Key Generation Center (KGC) selects three cyclic groups of order q, two of which are additive cyclic groups. , A multiplicative cyclic group G T There exists a homomorphism from G2 to G1. , making And it has bilinear pairs ; , Generators of G1 and G2 respectively; cryptographic functions and The inputs are both Z and an integer q, and the outputs are respectively and , where q is a large prime number and Z represents a bit string; (2) System parameter generation: KGC randomly selects Where s1 and s2 are the system master private keys, calculated elements in , , and It is a pair of system public keys; KGC computation Middle elements , Then the parameters Expose it on VANET, and store s1 and s2 secretly; (3) Vehicle information generation: KGC randomly generates a byte. Represents the trusted vehicle V i Private key generates identifier, calculates ,in , For KGC to give vehicle V i Generated anonymous identity; KGC calculation , like Then calculate , Then calculate: (1) , As vehicle V i Partial private key pair; (2) As vehicle V i Public key pair; finally, KGC sends a key to the trusted vehicle V. i send ; The key encapsulation and decapsulation algorithm in step (S02) includes the following steps: (1) Session key encapsulation V i Generate random numbers Simultaneously calculate the elements in G1 Then Convert the data type to a bit string; V i Calculate G T elements in and will Convert data type to bit string; calculate where klen1 is the key. The length, if If the string is all zero bits, then return a newly generated random number. Perform the calculation; otherwise, V i Output ,in The encapsulated key, For KGC and vehicle V i The corresponding ciphertext generated during the session; ultimately V i Will Send to the corresponding vehicle V j ; (2) Session key decryption Vehicle V j receive Then, verify the ciphertext. If the condition is not met, exit and report to KGC; if the condition is met, then vehicle V... j Calculate G T elements in ,in It is vehicle V j A private key; and at the same time Convert the data type to a bit string; convert the received data... Convert the data type to a bit string and calculate V. i Encapsulated key KDF is a key-derived function, if For all-zero bit strings or If the condition is not met, an error message will be displayed and the system will exit; otherwise, vehicle V will be detected. j Securely receive session key ; The message encryption algorithm described in step (S03) includes the following steps: (1) Private key generation Vehicle V i Select random number V i calculate (3) As a vehicle private key pair; (2) Message signing 1) Vehicle V i Select random number ; calculate separately and element C 2,i , , ; 2) Calculation , If L i =0, then return 1) Select a random number again Otherwise calculate ; 3) Calculate S respectively i C 3,i C 4,i ; 4) Finally, output the ciphertext. ; and will Send to other vehicles V j , where t i It is vehicle V i Broadcast tuple At that moment; simultaneously, the broadcast tuple is stored on the public blockchain for other trusted vehicles to access; The message decryption algorithm described in step (S04) includes the following steps: (1) Check transmission delay Vehicle V j Receive message tuple The vehicle is based on its arrival time t j and transmission time t i To check the transmission delay; first, vehicle V j judge If the condition is met, the message tuple should be rejected immediately; otherwise, the message receiver V should not accept it. j Perform the following steps, where To specify the maximum transmission delay; (2) Message decryption 1) Vehicle V j verify , If the condition is not met, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed from... Take out ,verify If the condition is not met, report it to KGC; otherwise: calculate middle , ; ; 2) Calculation , ; 3) Calculation ,test If the condition is not met, an error is reported and the error is sent to KGC; otherwise, the calculation is performed. Dec is a symmetric decryption algorithm; 4) Calculation ,from Take out ,judge Check if the condition is met; if not, exit reporting to KGC; otherwise, output a message. ; The ciphertext decryption process described in step (S05) includes the following steps: (1) Check transmission delay When receiving vehicle V j Received from different vehicles Each sent its own message tuple Vehicle V j First, the message's timeliness is checked; if it exceeds the specified maximum transmission delay, the message is rejected; otherwise, the receiver begins to recover the message. (Vehicle V) j Receive each message array ; (2) Batch message decryption 1) Vehicle V j Verify the received tuples array elements and Check if the condition is met. If not, the verification fails; otherwise, check each received tuple. Take out ,verify If the condition is not met, report it to KGC; otherwise: Calculate G T middle , ; 2) Verification Check if the condition is met. If not, message recovery fails; otherwise: 3) Calculate each message tuple separately. ; 4) Calculate separately To restore the plaintext message, use Dec as the symmetric decryption algorithm. 5) Calculate separately From the contents of each tuple Take out ,judge Check if the condition is met; if not, exit reporting to KGC; otherwise, output a message. .
