Ship navigation interference detection method and device and PNT trusted terminal equipment

Abstract

The invention provides an interference detection method and device for ship navigation and PNT trusted terminal equipment, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining global navigation satellite GNSS data, shore-based trusted service information and a data verification type configuration file, the shore-based trusted service information comprises the credibility of ship-borne navigation, and the data verification type configuration file is used for indicating the type of invalid data; determining the number of data in the GNSS data in a continuous preset time period; if the data quantity is smaller than the preset quantity and the invalid data type indicated in the data verification class configuration file is no data, determining that the data in the preset time period is abnormal data; determining the total length of abnormal time occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data; determining an initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data; and determining a target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility. And through multi-level information integration, the interference identification accuracy of the navigation system is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of marine navigation, and in particular, to a method, device, and PNT trusted terminal device for detecting interference in ship navigation. Background Art

[0002] Marine navigation is crucial in modern shipping. It provides ship positioning, heading, speed, and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information, which is the basis for ensuring the safe and efficient navigation of ships. Reliable PNT information can help ships accurately determine their positions, plan routes, avoid collision risks during navigation, improve navigation efficiency, and reduce accidents. In addition, PNT information in navigation is also crucial for maritime traffic management, coping with bad weather, and ship automation operations.

[0003] However, the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has inherent vulnerabilities and is vulnerable to intentional, accidental, or natural radio interference attacks, which makes it impossible for GNSS to always provide reliable PNT information.

[0004] Therefore, how to identify interference in ship navigation is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a method, device, equipment, and storage medium for detecting interference in ship navigation to improve the accuracy of identifying interference in ship navigation.

[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for detecting interference in ship navigation, including:

[0007] Obtain on-board navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification class configuration file. The on-board navigation sensor information includes Global Navigation Satellite (GNSS) data, the shore-based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification class configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data;

[0008] Determine the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period;

[0009] If the number of data is less than a preset number, and the data verification class configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data, determine that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data;

[0010] Determine the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data;

[0011] Determine an initial interference probability based on the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data;

[0012] Determine a target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility;

[0013] Output the target interference probability.

[0014] Optionally, the determining the initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data;

[0015] Divide the total abnormal time length by the total data time length of the GNSS data to obtain the initial interference probability.

[0016] Optionally, the determining the target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility includes:

[0017] Determine the target weight corresponding to the credibility according to a preset credibility and weight mapping relationship;

[0018] Divide the initial interference probability by the target weight to obtain the target interference probability.

[0019] Optionally, before determining the number of GNSS data that exceed a preset decision threshold within a continuous preset time period, the method further includes:

[0020] Convert the time of the measurement data in the on-board navigation sensor information and the time of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard timestamp respectively;

[0021] Convert the coordinates of the measurement data in the on-board navigation sensor information and the coordinates of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard coordinate system respectively.

[0022] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0023] For the measurement data converted to the standard timestamp, determine the measurement data corresponding to each time node by the difference method.

[0024] Optionally, the data verification class configuration file further includes a range interval for each type of measurement data, and the method further includes:

[0025] For each type of measurement data in the on-board navigation sensor information, delete the data outside the corresponding range interval;

[0026] For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, delete the data outside the corresponding range interval.

[0027] Optionally, the data verification class configuration file further includes a protocol format for each type of measurement data, and the method further includes:

[0028] For each type of measurement data in the navigation sensor information carried, delete the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format;

[0029] For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, delete the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format.

[0030] In a second aspect, the present application further provides an interference detection device for ship navigation, including:

[0031] An acquisition module, configured to acquire on-board navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification type configuration file, where the on-board navigation sensor information includes global navigation satellite GNSS data, the shore-based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification type configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data;

[0032] A first determination module, configured to determine the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period;

[0033] A second determination module, configured to determine that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data if the number of data is less than a preset number and the data verification type configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data;

[0034] A third determination module, configured to determine the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data;

[0035] A fourth determination module, configured to determine an initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data;

[0036] A fifth determination module, configured to determine a target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility;

[0037] An output module, configured to output the target interference probability.

[0038] In a third aspect, the present application further provides a PNT trusted terminal device, including: a memory, a processor;

[0039] The memory stores computer execution instructions;

[0040] The processor executes the computer execution instructions stored in the memory, so that the processor executes the method according to any one of the first aspects.

[0041] In a fourth aspect, the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, where computer execution instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer execution instructions are executed by a processor, they are used to implement the method according to any one of the first aspects.

[0042] Fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any one of the first aspect.

[0043] The present application provides a method, apparatus, and PNT trusted terminal device for interference detection in ship navigation. The method includes: obtaining on-board navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification class configuration file. The on-board navigation sensor information includes GNSS data, the shore-based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification class configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data. Determine the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period. If the number of data is less than the preset number, and the data verification class configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data, then determine the data within the preset time period as abnormal data. Determine the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data. According to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data, determine the initial interference probability. According to the initial interference probability and the credibility, determine the target interference probability. Output the target interference probability. This method improves the anti-interference ability and interference recognition accuracy of the ship navigation system in complex environments through multi-level information integration, calculation, and output of interference probability, thereby improving the reliability of the ship navigation system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] The accompanying drawings herein are incorporated into the specification and form a part of the specification, showing embodiments consistent with the present application, and are used together with the specification to explain the principles of the present application.

[0045] Figure 1 It is a schematic flow chart of the method for interference detection in ship navigation provided by the present application;

[0046] Figure 2 It is a schematic flow chart of the interference detection provided by the present application;

[0047] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the space-time unified method provided by the present application;

[0048] Figure 4 It is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of the interference detection device for ship navigation provided by the present application;

[0049] Figure 5 It is a schematic structural diagram of the PNT trusted terminal device provided by the present application.

[0050] Through the above-mentioned accompanying drawings, specific embodiments of the present application have been shown, and there will be more detailed descriptions hereinafter. These drawings and textual descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of the concept of the present application in any way, but to illustrate the concept of the present application to those skilled in the art by referring to specific embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0051] Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, and examples thereof are shown in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the accompanying drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with the present application. On the contrary, they are merely examples of devices and methods consistent with some aspects of the present application as detailed in the appended claims.

[0052] Shore-based trusted service information: refers to positioning, navigation, or other auxiliary information provided by shore facilities or service systems that has been verified and is reliable.

[0053] Onboard navigation sensor information: refers to data detected by sensors carried by the ship itself, such as GNSS data, water depth data, ship's heading information, ship speed, etc.

[0054] Reliable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information is a key fundamental element of e-navigation. However, the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is vulnerable to intentional, accidental, or natural radio interference and cannot provide reliable PNT information. Since GNSS is not only a key part of marine navigation but also a key national infrastructure, there is usually no backup system.

[0055] In view of this, the present application proposes an onboard integrated PNT trusted terminal. Through an interference detection method for onboard navigation, the probability of navigation being interfered can be determined. Specifically, by combining the role of shore-based trusted service assistance, the interference probability of GNSS data obtained by multi-source navigation sensors on the ship end is calculated, improving the accuracy of the current interference probability calculation for the ship.

[0056] The technical solution of the present application and how the technical solution of the present application solves the above technical problems will be described in detail below with specific embodiments. These several specific embodiments below can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be repeated in some embodiments. The embodiments of the present application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0057] Figure 1 The flowchart of the interference detection method for ship navigation provided by the present application is shown in Figure 1 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0058] S101. Obtain on-board navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification configuration file. The on-board navigation sensor information includes Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data, the shore-based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data.

[0059] Various sensors are installed on the ship, including:

[0060] (1) GNSS-related devices: Capable of obtaining positioning information. The GNSS signal receiving antenna is used to receive and transmit satellite signals to the terminal; the high-sensitivity GNSS receiver is used to receive, process, and demodulate signals; the radio frequency circuit supports signals of the GPS, BDS, Galileo, and GLONASS satellite systems; the antenna transceiver cable is used to connect the GNSS antenna and is responsible for transmitting PNT signals.

[0061] (2) Echo sounder: Used to detect and return water depth information.

[0062] (3) Compass: Measures the ship's heading information.

[0063] (4) Log: Measures eastward and northward speed information and calculates it into range information through the speed calculation device in the log.

[0064] (5) Anemometer and wind vane: Measures and records wind speed and wind direction data.

[0065] (6) Differential positioning (RBN-DGNSS) receiver: Receives differential positioning information and calculates the positioning information through built-in embedded software.

[0066] (7) Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver for ships: Used to receive shore-based trusted service information.

[0067] (8) Vessel Data Exchange System (VDES) receiver for ship-shore communication: Used to receive shore-based trusted service information.

[0068] (9) Navigational Telex (NAVTEX) receiver: Used to receive maritime safety information sent from the shore.

[0069] (10) Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) receiver: Used to receive positioning and navigation assistance data sent from the shore.

[0070] The on-board navigation sensor information includes the content of items 1 - 5 above, while the shore-based trusted service information includes the content of items 6 - 10 above. The shore-based trusted service information also includes the credibility of navigation at the current position of the ship.

[0071] The shore-based trusted service information is sent from the shore-based base station to the ship. The shore-based base station obtains the positioning information of the ship by exchanging data with the communication and navigation equipment on the ship, and then performs data fusion calculation on the credibility. The specific process is as follows:

[0072] The shore-based base station receives the AIS or VDES signals from the ship, and parses the information such as the ship's position, speed, and heading. If the shore-based base station also receives the auxiliary positioning data transmitted from differential GNSS (such as RBN-DGNSS, CORS system), the differential information is used to correct and enhance the accuracy of these data. After integrating and correcting these data, the shore-based base station will calculate the credibility of the ship's position according to multiple factors (such as the quality of the data, time stamp, error correction, etc.). In this application, the credibility refers to an evaluation value of the positioning reliability. The shore-based base station also sends specific navigation data to the ship, such as differential correction information, navigation warnings, and maritime weather information.

[0073] S102. Determine the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period.

[0074] In this step, on the PNT trusted terminal side of the ship, the GNSS data is obtained, and then the abnormal data in the GNSS data needs to be determined, and then the interference probability is determined. If the GNSS signal is interfered, the data cannot be received. Therefore, it is possible to determine whether the data is abnormal by determining the number of data within a continuous time period. This time period is a preset time decision threshold, which can be set to 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute, or 5 minutes, for example.

[0075] Exemplarily, in a conventional GNSS receiving system, based on the GPS system, data is received once per second, so 60 data points can be received within one minute. When it is necessary to judge the interference probability, 60 minutes of GNSS data has been received. The preset time period can be set to one minute, and the preset time period is set as a sliding window, which slides once every 10 seconds, and the number of data in each sliding window is determined. Normally, the amount of data in each sliding window is 60.

[0076] It should be noted that the interference probability can be calculated when the shore-based trusted service information is received. At this time, the credibility is received, and using the just-received credibility for calculation can improve the calculation accuracy. The reception of the shore-based trusted service information is not real-time, and it is received once every 60 minutes, or at other time intervals, which is specifically determined according to the actual situation and is not limited.

[0077] S103. If the number of data is less than the preset number, and the invalid data type indicated in the data verification class configuration file is no data, determine that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data.

[0078] Among them, the preset quantity can be determined according to the data volume within a preset time period, or can be set to a fixed value (such as 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 30, etc.).

[0079] In the above example, the preset time period is set to 1 minute. Under normal circumstances, the data within the preset time period is 60. If the data volume is less than the preset quantity of 30, it is determined that the data within this time period is abnormal data. Labels of abnormal data are added to all the data within this time period. It should be noted that data being 0 or empty both indicate no data.

[0080] When determining abnormal data, it is necessary to combine the instructions in the data verification class configuration file. Only when the invalid data type indicated in the configuration file is no data can the above-mentioned quantity be determined. If the invalid data type indicated in the configuration file is out of range or parity check exception, indicating that it is acceptable that no data is received, then the data quantity is not calculated through the above method.

[0081] S104. Determine the total abnormal time occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data.

[0082] Sum up the time periods corresponding to all the data labeled as abnormal data to obtain the total abnormal time occupied by all abnormal data.

[0083] S105. Determine the initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time and the total data time of the GNSS data.

[0084] In one implementation, divide the total abnormal time by the total data time of the GNSS data to obtain the initial interference probability. Exemplarily, the total data time of the GNSS data is 60 minutes, the total abnormal time is 6 minutes, and the initial interference probability is 10%.

[0085] In one implementation, it is necessary to combine the number of segments of the abnormal time. A fixed influence weight, such as 5%, is set for each segment of abnormal data. Exemplarily, the total data time of the GNSS data is 60 minutes, the total abnormal time is 6 minutes, the initial interference probability is 10%, and the abnormal time is 6 segments, then the initial interference probability is 40%.

[0086] S106. Determine the target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility.

[0087] The credibility represents the evaluation value of the positioning reliability. The lower the evaluation value, the higher the probability of being interfered. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively determine the target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility.

[0088] In one implementation, according to a preset credibility and weight mapping relationship, the target weight corresponding to the credibility is determined. Different ranges of credibility correspond to different weights. Exemplarily, the weight corresponding to a credibility of 95 - 100 is 1, the weight corresponding to a credibility of 90 - 95 is 0.8, the weight corresponding to a credibility of 80 - 90 is 0.5, and the weight corresponding to a credibility of 0 - 80 is 0.1. After the target weight is queried, the initial interference probability is divided by the target weight to obtain the target interference probability.

[0089] Exemplarily, the initial interference probability is 40%, the credibility is 85, the corresponding target weight is 0.5, and the target interference probability is 80%.

[0090] S107. Output the target interference probability.

[0091] This embodiment provides a method for interference detection in ship navigation. The method includes: obtaining on - ship navigation sensor information, shore - based trusted service information, and a data verification class configuration file. The on - ship navigation sensor information includes GNSS data, the shore - based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification class configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data; determining the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period; if the number of data is less than the preset number and the data verification class configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data, determining that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data; determining the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data; determining the initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data; determining the target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility; and outputting the target interference probability. This method improves the anti - interference ability and interference recognition accuracy of the ship navigation system in a complex environment through multi - level information integration, calculation, and output of interference probability, thereby improving the reliability of the ship navigation system.

[0092] Figure 2 This is a schematic flow diagram of the interference detection provided by this application. As Figure 2 shown, after the interference detection module is started, it first receives on - ship navigation sensor information - type data, shore - based trusted service information - type data, and data verification - type data, and then performs interference detection using these data (the calculation of interference probability has been introduced in the above embodiment and will not be elaborated here). Finally, it outputs the interference detection result, that is, the probability of being interfered, and returns the operating status of each module and the probability of being interfered to the main control module for various types of data.

[0093] Table 1 Interference Detection Data Interface Table

[0094]

[0095] Based on the above embodiments, the on-board navigation sensor information includes data from multiple sensors, and the shore-based trusted service information measurement data also includes multiple data, and their timestamps may be different. The timestamp of the shore-based trusted service information may be determined based on the time zone where the shore-based station is located. Therefore, it is necessary to unify the time and coordinates of all data in order to perform interference detection.

[0096] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the time and space unification method provided by this application. As Figure 3 shown, for each measurement data in the on-board navigation sensor information and the measurement data of the shore-based trusted service information, check the time information of each type, and convert the time to a preset standard timestamp (such as UTC timestamp) respectively. Specifically, the measurement data or reference data in each subclass has a timestamp (which may be local time or time in other time zones). Standardize these timestamps to the standard UTC timestamp. If the timestamp is not in UTC format, a time zone conversion is required.

[0097] For the convenience of data calculation, it is necessary to convert the data with the same timestamp to fixed time nodes in this time period. For example, in the preset time format, there will be a data point every second, but the received data may have data timestamps that are not whole seconds, or data points are missing, or the timestamp is the previous second, resulting in a coincidence of data timestamps. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the corresponding measurement data for each second through linear interpolation based on the data before and after.

[0098] Repeat the above steps for each data class. Each data class has its unique timestamp and data, ensuring that the data in each subclass is interpolated and adjusted at the time nodes in the preset time format.

[0099] In some cases, such as when the interval time between data timestamps is too long and the data points cannot be interpolated by proportion, these data need to be assigned to the closest time node.

[0100] After time unification, convert the coordinates of the measurement data to a unified standard coordinate system respectively.

[0101] Before performing time and space unification on the data, it is necessary to preprocess the received original data. The following introduces the process of receiving data and data preprocessing.

[0102] For on-board navigation sensor information:

[0103] I. Message extraction

[0104] 1) Extract the message in NMEA-0183 (IEC61162-1 / 2) protocol format and receive it at a rate of 9600 / 19200 / 38400bps.

[0105] 2) Extract the message information from the on-board navigation sensors GNSS receiver, compass, log, echo sounder, and wind speed and direction indicator. The format is NMEA-0183 (IEC61162-1 / 2).

[0106] 3) Receive the messages of GNSS: $--GGA, $--GSV, $--VTG, $--UTC (IEC61162-2)

[0107] Receive the messages of the compass: $--HDT, $--ROT (IEC61162-2).

[0108] Receive the messages of the log: $--VBW (IEC61162-1).

[0109] Sounder: $--DBT (NEMA-0183).

[0110] Wind speed and direction indicator: $--MWV (NEMA-0183).

[0111] II. Message parsing

[0112] 1) Parse the Universal Coordinated Time (UCT) and positioning latitude and longitude information from the GNSS navigation system.

[0113] Receive the $GNGGA message and parse the UCT time: in the format of hhmmss.sss (hours, minutes, seconds, milliseconds), latitude and longitude: latitude in the format of ddmm.mmmm (degrees, minutes), N: latitude hemisphere N (northern hemisphere) or S (southern hemisphere), longitude in the format of dddmm.mmmm (degrees, minutes), E: longitude hemisphere E (east longitude) or W (west longitude), and HDOP horizontal dilution of precision (0.5 - 99.9).

[0114] Receive the $GPGSV message and parse the total number of currently visible satellites, satellite PRN code numbers (range: 01 - 32), and signal-to-noise ratio, unit: dbHz, range: 00 - 99. The signal-to-noise ratio is used to determine the health status of the satellite.

[0115] Receive the $GNVTG message and parse the course over ground, unit: degrees, with true north as the reference benchmark, speed over ground, unit: Knots, range: 000.0 - 999.9, and horizontal movement speed, speed unit: km / h.

[0116] Receive the $GPUTC message and parse the receiver status.

[0117] 2) Parse the heading information from the compass; receive the $HEHDT message and parse the course azimuth angle in the format of nnn.nn, ranging from 0.0° to 359.9°; receive the $HEROT message and parse the turning rate in the format of x.x.

[0118] 3) First parse the eastward and northward speed information from the log, and then receive the range information parsed by the speed calculation device in the log. Receive the $VMVBW message and parse the speed information and the voyage information.

[0119] 4) Parse the water depth information from the echo sounder. Receive the $--DBT message and report the water depth according to the position of the sensor. The depth value is expressed in feet / meters / fathoms.

[0120] 5) Receive the wind speed and direction information from the anemometer and wind vane. Receive the $--MWV message and parse the wind speed and the wind direction information.

[0121] III. Preprocessing of Raw Data

[0122] 1) Conduct authenticity detection on a single data source to determine whether the sensor information or the output navigation result is within the defined range of the corresponding data type.

[0123] 2) Conduct validity detection on various types of single data to determine whether the sensor information or the output navigation result meets the data requirements in the formal protocol. The validity of the input data should be checked according to the rules of the used protocol (integrity, parity, etc.). Incorrect data should be excluded from subsequent processing.

[0124] 3) Conduct unified rate configuration for multi-source data, supporting multiple rate configurations, such as rate configuration modes of 38400 / 19200 / 9600 bps, etc.

[0125] 4) Time alignment. Assume that the motion model of the target is a uniform motion, and use the extrapolation method for time registration. Based on the current system time, extrapolate the data of all sensors to the same system time. If the measured time of the sensor target is before the system time, use the dynamic information of the sensor target with the nearest timestamp of the measured sensor and extrapolate it to the system time according to the rate and the bow direction.

[0126] Through the above method of preprocessing raw data, for the data of each type of sensor, data that does not meet the protocol rules and is out of range can be excluded. When calculating the interference probability, the time nodes corresponding to the excluded data are considered as having no data. Even if interpolation is performed by the difference method, as long as the data before and after are both without data, no interpolation can be performed for the intermediate data.

[0127] For shore-based trusted service information:

[0128] I. Shore-based information reception

[0129] 1) Receive information from information sources of shore-based trusted service information, namely Automatic Identification System (AIS), VHF Data Exchange System (VDES), and Navigational Telex (NAVTEX) of ships, and extract messages of IEC61162 protocol.

[0130] 2) Obtain shore-based trusted service data from the AIS receiver, receive messages of $--VDM or!—VDM, and parse out the following information: UTC time, longitude and latitude, position accuracy (high or low), RAIM flag (not in use or in use), communication status in the base station report; information provided by the shore-based in the binary broadcast message, longitude and latitude information and differential correction data in the GNSS broadcast binary message; position accuracy (high or low), longitude and latitude information, RAIM flag (in use or not in use) in the aids to navigation report.

[0131] 3) Obtain shore-based trusted service data from the VDES receiver, with the same message type as AIS.

[0132] 4) Obtain high-precision spatio-temporal service maritime safety information from the NAVTEX receiver, and receive the output message of the NAVTEX receiver in NEMA format.

[0133] 5) Obtain differential positioning information from the RBN-DGNSS receiver, output differential data in RTCM 2.x format, and output other data such as positioning data in NEMA and GSOF formats.

[0134] 6) Obtain positioning and navigation assistance data from the CORS receiver, and output navigation assistance observation data in NEMA-0183v2.30 and GSOF formats.

[0135] II. Rationality detection

[0136] Conduct validity detection on the data to check whether the information meets the data requirements in the formal protocol. The validity of the input data should be checked according to the rules of the used protocol (integrity, parity, etc.). Incorrect data should be excluded from further processing.

[0137] By preprocessing the shore-based trusted service information and navigation sensor data, data that does not meet the protocol format requirements can be excluded. The following is an example of the data format.

[0138] GNSS data, compass data, log data, wind direction and speed data, AIS, VDES, NAVTEX, RBN-DGNSS data based on the IEC 61162-1 / 2 standard message format;

[0139] 1) Receive GNSS messages in IEC61162-2 format: $--GGA, $--GSV, $--VTG, $--UTC, and the specific format is as follows:

[0140] Format example:

[0141] $GNGGA,132506.000,2233.87430,N,11407.13740,E,1,13,1.0,103.3,M,2.8,M,*5E;

[0142] $GNGGA,<1>,<2>,<3>,<4>,<5>,<6>,<7>,<8>,<9>,<10>,<11>,<12>,<13>,*CS;

[0143] <1>132506.000: UTC time, in hhmmss.sss (hours, minutes, seconds, milliseconds) format;

[0144] <2>2233.87430: Latitude in ddmm.mmmm (degrees, minutes) format (padding with 0s for insufficient leading digits);

[0145] <3>N: Latitude hemisphere N (northern hemisphere) or S (southern hemisphere);

[0146] <4>11407.13740: Longitude in dddmm.mmmm (degrees, minutes) format (padding with 0s for insufficient leading digits);

[0147] <5>E: Longitude hemisphere E (eastern longitude) or W (western longitude);

[0148] Format example:

[0149] $GPGSV,3,2,09,20,25,074,23,13,293,37,24,32,174,31,29,45,251,37,0*6B;

[0150] $GPGSV,<1>,<2>,<3>,<4>,<5>,<6>,<7>,<8>~<11>,<12>~<15>,<16>~<19>,*CS;

[0151] <3>09: Total number of currently visible satellites;

[0152] <4>02: Satellite PRN code number, range: 01 - 32;

[0153] <7> 15: Signal-to-noise ratio, unit: dbHz, range: 00 - 99;

[0154] Format example:

[0155] $GNVTG,244.71,T,M,0.00,N,0.00,K,A*27;

[0156] $GNVTG,<1>,<2>,<3>,<4>,<5>,<6>,<7>,<8>,*CS;

[0157] <1> 244.71: Course over ground, unit: degrees, referenced to true north, two-dimensional direction indication, equivalent to a two-dimensional compass;

[0158] <2> T: True north reference system;

[0159] <3>: Magnetic declination;

[0160] <4> M: Magnetic north reference system;

[0161] <5> 0.00: Speed over ground, unit: Knots, range: 000.0 - 999.9;

[0162] <6> N: Speed unit: knot;

[0163] <7> 0.00: Horizontal movement speed;

[0164] <8> K: Speed unit: kilometers per hour, km / h.

[0165] 2) Receive messages from a compass in IEC61162 - 2 format: $--HDT, $--ROT;

[0166] Format example:

[0167] $HEHDT,nnn.nn,T*hh;

[0168] nnn.nn represents the course azimuth angle, between 0.0° and 359.9°, separated by commas before and after.

[0169] $--ROT,xx,A*hh <cr> <lf>;

[0170] xx: Turning speed, degrees / minute.

[0171] 3) Receive the message of the log in IEC61162-1 format: $--VBW

[0172] $--VBW,x.x,x.x,A,x.x,x.x,A,x.x,A,x.x,A*hh <cr> <lf>;

[0173] $--VBW,<1>,<2>,<3>,<4>,<5>,<6>,<7>,<8>,<9>,<10>*hh <cr> <lf>;

[0174] <1>: Longitudinal water speed, unit: knot;

[0175] <2>: Transverse water speed, unit: knot;

[0176] <3>: Status: water speed, A = data valid, V = data invalid;

[0177] <4>: Longitudinal speed over the ground, unit: knot;

[0178] <5>: Transverse speed over the ground, unit: knot;

[0179] <6>: Status: speed over the ground, A = data valid, V = data invalid.

[0180] 4) Receive the echo sounder message in NEMA-0183 format: $--DBT

[0181] $--DBT,DATA_FEET,f,DATA_METRES,M,DATA_FATHOMS,F*hh <cr> <lf>。

[0182] Water depth information, with depth values expressed in feet, meters, and fathoms.

[0183] 5) Receive anemometer and wind vane message in NEMA-0183 format: $--MWV.

[0184] Format example:

[0185] $--MWV,123,R,5.8,N,A * - Wind speed (m / s).

[0186] 6) Refer to ITU-R M.1371-4 Recommendation to receive AIS messages: $--VDM or!—VDM. The message information to be extracted is Message 4, Message 8, Message 17, and Message 21.

[0187] Format example:

[0188] !ABVDM,1,1,3,A,169DvlgP1R8KPtvFBfOCt3?h0@RT,0*03;

[0189] AB: AIS data of SAAB.

[0190] VDM: Information of the ship received by this station.

[0191] 1: Total number of message segments required to transmit this message.

[0192] 1: This message segment is the nth segment of the entire message.

[0193] 3: Sequence identifier of the message segment.

[0194] A: This message segment is received through Channel A.

[0195] 169DvlgP1R8KPtvFBfOCt3?h0@RT: Parsed data part, which is the information to be extracted and is encrypted information that needs to be decoded.

[0196] 0*03: 0 represents the number of padded bits, and 03 is the CRC check result of the data section.

[0197] 7) VDES is the same as AIS.

[0198] 8) Receive NAVTEX receiver messages in NEMA format. Receive message information in 7-bit ASCII format, without a handshake protocol, and requires a transmission rate of 4800. (The output format of this receiver refers to the NT-1002 marine navigation warning receiver).

[0199] 9) Receive the data of the RBN-DGNSS receiver in the RTCM 2.x format: Input and output data through the SPS356 general serial port. The differential data outputs differential information in the RTCM 2.x format, and other data such as positioning data in the NE MA and GSOF formats. The data transmission rate is 1 pps. (The output format of this receiver refers to the Trimble SPS356 DGNSS beacon receiver).

[0200] 10) Receive the positioning and navigation auxiliary observation data of the CORS receiver in the NEMA-0183 v2.30 and GSOF formats: (The output format of the receiver refers to the Aloi Beidou static three-generation full-band reference station BeiDou satellite CORS station receiver). Receive from the CORS receiver by using data transmission methods such as WiFi, Bluetooth, data radio, 4G full-net communication, and wired network. (The data transmission method of the receiver output refers to the SC200Ⅱ intelligent CORS terminal).

[0201] Figure 4 FIG. is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an interference detection device for ship navigation provided by the present application, as Figure 4 shown. The interference detection device 40 for ship navigation includes:

[0202] An acquisition module 401, configured to acquire on-board navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification class configuration file. The on-board navigation sensor information includes global navigation satellite GNSS data, the shore-based trusted service information includes credibility, and the data verification class configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data.

[0203] A first determination module 402, configured to determine the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period.

[0204] A second determination module 403, configured to determine that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data if the number of data is less than a preset number and the data verification class configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data.

[0205] A third determination module 404, configured to determine the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data.

[0206] A fourth determination module 405, configured to determine an initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data.

[0207] A fifth determination module 406, configured to determine a target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility.

[0208] An output module 407, configured to output the target interference probability.

[0209] Optionally, the fourth determination module 405 is specifically configured to:

[0210] Divide the total abnormal time by the total data time of the GNSS data to obtain the initial interference probability.

[0211] Optionally, the fifth determination module 406 is specifically configured to:

[0212] Determine the target weight corresponding to the credibility according to a preset credibility and weight mapping relationship;

[0213] Divide the initial interference probability by the target weight to obtain the target interference probability.

[0214] Optionally, the apparatus further includes a spatio-temporal unification module 408, which is specifically configured to:

[0215] Convert the time of the measurement data in the on-ship navigation sensor information and the time of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard timestamp respectively;

[0216] Convert the coordinates of the measurement data in the on-ship navigation sensor information and the coordinates of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard coordinate system respectively.

[0217] Optionally, the spatio-temporal unification module 408 is further configured to:

[0218] For the measurement data converted to the standard timestamp, determine the measurement data corresponding to each time node by the difference method.

[0219] Optionally, the apparatus further includes a preprocessing module 409, which is used for:

[0220] For each type of measurement data in the on-ship navigation sensor information, delete the data outside the corresponding range interval;

[0221] For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, delete the data outside the corresponding range interval.

[0222] Optionally, the preprocessing module 409 is further configured to:

[0223] For each type of measurement data in the on-ship navigation sensor information, delete the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format;

[0224] For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, delete the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format.

[0225] The interference detection device for ship navigation provided in this embodiment can execute the method provided in the above method embodiment, and its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, which will not be elaborated here in this embodiment.

[0226] Figure 5 The structural schematic diagram of the PNT trusted terminal device provided for this application. As Figure 5 shown, the device 50 provided in this embodiment includes: at least one processor 501 and a memory 502. Optionally, the device 50 further includes a communication component 503. Among them, the processor 501, the memory 502, and the communication component 503 are connected through a bus 504.

[0227] In the specific implementation process, at least one processor 501 executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory 502, so that at least one processor 501 executes the above method.

[0228] For the specific implementation process of the processor 501, reference can be made to the above method embodiment, and its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, which will not be elaborated here in this embodiment.

[0229] The PNT trusted terminal device further includes a display, which is used to visually display and output trusted-related information. The PNT trusted terminal device also stores an electronic chart, which is used to visually display the route, provide the operation of querying the chart information at any point on the chart, and provide a friendly user interaction display interface.

[0230] For the memory 502, the storage space size requirement for the general navigation ship data in the terminal is between 200GB and 2TB. Therefore, this design solution also requires the storage space size in the terminal to be between 200GB and 2TB. And it is required that this storage space stores ship status, navigation records, configuration and setting information, and the parsed shore-based trusted service reception information, etc. Among these contents, the storage space allocation requirement for the status information occupies the largest space, followed by the navigation records. The occupied space of the configuration and setting information is smaller than that of the ship status information. Therefore, 40% of the storage space is allocated to the ship status, 30% to the navigation records, 20% to the shore-based trusted service reception information, and 10% to the configuration and setting information. When a certain type of information is full, the oldest stored information is deleted to access new information of the same type. Among them, the ship status and navigation records need to save the latitude and longitude, UTC time, total number of visible satellites, satellite PRN code number, satellite signal-to-noise ratio, course over ground, speed over ground, horizontal movement speed, heading azimuth, turning rate, speed, voyage, water depth, wind speed, wind direction and other data after parsing the sensor telegrams. The configuration and setting information needs to configure the storage format information and select the data transmission rate among 38400 / 19200 / 9600bps.

[0231] In the above embodiments, it should be understood that the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU for short), or may also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP for short), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC for short), etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc. The steps of the method disclosed in combination with the invention can be directly implemented by the execution of the hardware processor, or can be implemented by the combination of the hardware and software modules in the processor.

[0232] The memory may include a high-speed memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), and may also include non-volatile memory (Non-volatile Memory, NVM), such as at least one disk memory.

[0233] The bus may be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For the sake of convenience in representation, the buses in the drawings of this application are not limited to only one bus or one type of bus.

[0234] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which implements the above method when executed by a processor.

[0235] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which computer-executable instructions are stored, and when the processor executes the computer-executable instructions, the above method is implemented.

[0236] The above-readable storage medium can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic memory, flash memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk. The readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible by a general-purpose or special-purpose computer.

[0237] An exemplary readable storage medium is coupled to a processor, enabling the processor to read information from and write information to the readable storage medium. Of course, the readable storage medium can also be a component of the processor. The processor and the readable storage medium can be located in an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Of course, the processor and the readable storage medium can also exist as discrete components in a device.

[0238] The division of units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Additionally, the couplings or direct couplings or communication connections shown or discussed among each other can be indirect couplings or communication connections through some interfaces, devices or units, and can be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0239] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place or distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0240] Furthermore, in each embodiment of the present invention, the functional units can be integrated in a processing unit, or each unit can exist physically alone, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit.

[0241] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or a part of this technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks or optical discs.

[0242] Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of implementing the above method embodiments can be completed by hardware related to program instructions. The foregoing program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it performs the steps of the above method embodiments; and the foregoing storage medium includes: various media such as ROM, RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disc that can store program codes.

[0243] Finally, it should be noted that those skilled in the art will readily conceive of other implementations of the present invention after considering the specification and practicing the invention disclosed herein. The present invention is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the present invention, which follow the general principles of the present invention and include known common knowledge or conventional technical means in the technical field not disclosed in the present invention. It is not limited to the exact structures described above and shown in the drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of the present invention is only limited by the appended claims.< / lf> < / cr> < / lf> < / cr> < / lf> < / cr> < / lf> < / cr>

Claims

1. A method for detecting interference in ship navigation, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtaining onboard navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification configuration file, where the onboard navigation sensor information includes Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data, the shore-based trusted service information includes the credibility of the onboard navigation, and the data verification configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data; Determining the number of data in the GNSS data within a continuous preset time period; If the number of data is less than a preset number and the data verification configuration file indicates that the type of invalid data is no data, determining that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data; Determining the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data; Determining an initial interference probability based on the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data; Determining a target interference probability based on the initial interference probability and the credibility; Outputting the target interference probability.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of determining an initial interference probability based on the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data; Dividing the total abnormal time length by the total data time length of the GNSS data to obtain the initial interference probability.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The step of determining a target interference probability based on the initial interference probability and the credibility includes: Determining a target weight corresponding to the credibility according to a preset credibility and weight mapping relationship; Dividing the initial interference probability by the target weight to obtain the target interference probability.

4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, Before determining the number of GNSS data that exceeds a preset decision threshold within a continuous preset time period, the method further includes: Converting the time of the measurement data in the onboard navigation sensor information and the time of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard timestamp respectively; Converting the coordinates of the measurement data in the onboard navigation sensor information and the coordinates of the measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information to a preset standard coordinate system respectively.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: For the measurement data converted to the standard timestamp, determining the measurement data corresponding to each time node by the difference method.

6. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The data verification configuration file further includes a range interval for each type of measurement data, and the method further includes: For each type of measurement data in the onboard navigation sensor information, deleting the data outside the corresponding range interval; For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, deleting the data outside the corresponding range interval.

7. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The data verification configuration file further includes a protocol format for each type of measurement data, and the method further includes: For each type of measurement data in the onboard navigation sensor information, deleting the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format; For each type of measurement data in the shore-based trusted service information, deleting the data that does not conform to the corresponding protocol format.

8. An interference detection device for ship navigation, characterized in that, It includes: An acquisition module, configured to acquire onboard navigation sensor information, shore-based trusted service information, and a data verification configuration file, where the onboard navigation sensor information includes Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data, the shore-based trusted service information includes the credibility of the onboard navigation, and the data verification configuration file is used to indicate the types of invalid data; A first determination module, configured to determine the number of data in the GNSS data within consecutive preset time periods; A second determination module, configured to determine that the data within the preset time period is abnormal data if the number of data is less than a preset number and the invalid data type indicated in the data verification class profile is no data; A third determination module, configured to determine the total abnormal time length occupied by all abnormal data in the GNSS data; A fourth determination module, configured to determine an initial interference probability according to the total abnormal time length and the total data time length of the GNSS data; A fifth determination module, configured to determine a target interference probability according to the initial interference probability and the credibility; An output module, configured to output the target interference probability.

9. A PNT trusted terminal device, characterized in that, Comprising: A memory and a processor; The memory stores computer execution instructions; The processor executes the computer execution instructions stored in the memory, so that the processor executes the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, Computer execution instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer execution instructions are executed by a processor, they are used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1-7.

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