Cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC

Abstract

The present invention discloses a cross-domain authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) based on blockchain and certificateless ECC. The method comprises the following steps: a trusted authority generates and publishes global parameters for certificateless elliptic curve cryptography and deploys a blockchain network; all roadside units and vehicles sequentially initiate registration requests to the trusted authority; legitimate roadside units receive pseudonyms and legitimate vehicles receive keys returned by the trusted authority; registered vehicles and the roadside units perform mutual authentication and key negotiation; the vehicle sends a signed authentication request packet to the roadside unit; the roadside unit verifies the freshness of the request and the validity of the signature through a blockchain smart contract, and then returns the data packet to the vehicle via a secure channel for verification; and the vehicle is reauthenticated when its position changes. The present invention adopts a certificateless elliptic curve cryptography system, eliminating the traditional certificate transmission and verification overhead and reducing communication latency.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of secure communication technologies for Internet of Vehicles (IoV), and in particular to an IoV cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC. Background Art

[0002] In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environment, due to the frequent cross-domain movement of vehicles, there is an urgent need to establish an efficient cross-domain identity authentication mechanism. Existing technical solutions generally rely on fixed certificate issuing authorities. , there are single point failure risks and complex certificate management processes, making it difficult to meet the actual needs of dynamic cross-domain scenarios. In addition, during cross-domain communication, the identity mutual recognition mechanism between different trust domains has efficiency bottlenecks, making it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and facing the security threat of privacy information leakage.

[0003] While blockchain technology can enhance data credibility through its decentralized nature and provide a new solution for identity authentication, traditional blockchain solutions are limited by complex key management systems and high computational overhead, making them difficult to directly adapt to the low-latency, high-concurrency nature of the Internet of Vehicles. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a dynamic cross-domain authentication solution that integrates certificateless cryptography with blockchain technology to achieve efficient cross-domain identity authentication while ensuring user privacy. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a highly efficient and secure Internet of Vehicles cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC.

[0005] The technical solution of the present invention to solve the above technical problems is: a cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, comprising the following steps:

[0006] S1, initialization phase: trusted institution Generate and publish certificateless elliptic curve cryptography Deploy the blockchain network with the global parameters of

[0007] S2, registration phase: all roadside units and all vehicles Trusted Institutions Initiate a registration request, a legal roadside unit Received from a trusted institution Return of pseudonymous, legitimate vehicle received by trusted agency The returned key;

[0008] S3, initial authentication phase: registered vehicles and roadside units Mutual authentication and key negotiation are carried out between the vehicle and the roadside unit. Send a signed authentication request packet to the roadside unit Verify the freshness of the request and the validity of the signature through the blockchain smart contract, and then return the data packet to the vehicle for verification through a secure channel to ensure identity and communication security;

[0009] S4, re-authentication stage: Re-authentication is divided into intra-domain re-authentication and cross-domain re-authentication; when the vehicle location changes, the vehicle needs to be re-authenticated to ensure the security and credibility of the network.

[0010] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method of Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, in step S1, the initialization phase refers to Generate system initialization parameters, taking the given security parameters as input, Generate non-singular elliptic curves , 、 are the horizontal and vertical coordinates, 、 All are set coefficients, and Select the base point for generating the elliptic curve and two hash functions 、 and publicly announce all system parameters, Generate your own public and private key pair, where the private key , Representation model The multiplicative group of ; Define smart contracts and set update algorithms and query algorithms .

[0011] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, in step S1, the process of defining the smart contract is as follows:

[0012] S111: Create a makefile containing the configuration parameters for setting up the blockchain, and then Select trusted partners and initiate a blockchain based on the established consensus mechanism. The initialization of the blockchain block includes storing the hash value of the vehicle public key, the pseudo-identity, and the hash value of the session key; define the smart contract : Claim owner address ,create structure, The structure contains fields ,in is the public key hash, For dynamic pseudonyms, is the session key chain;

[0013] S112: Declare a public array ;

[0014] S113: Constructor: Setup Equal to the current caller address ,initialization The length is 0.

[0015] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method of Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, in step S1, the algorithm is updated The specific process is:

[0016] S121: First, perform permission verification. If , returns 0, indicating that the permission verification fails; otherwise, proceeds to step S122;

[0017] S122: Traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , == means judging equality, Indicates the dynamic pseudonym used by the current authority verifier when accessing previously, then update , update the Dynamic pseudonyms for elements , update the Session key hash chain of elements , returns 1 after the update is successful, indicating that the update is successful; if it does not exist , then proceed to step S123;

[0018] S123: Extend the array length, add a C structure size length to the array, and add a new entry. 、 、 , where the new index is used to find the specified position in the array, Indicates that the array No. The PI value of the first position is set to PI, and the same applies to the last two formulas; after successful addition, 1 is returned, indicating that the permission verification is passed.

[0019] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method of Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, in step S1, the query algorithm The specific process is: traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , then returns ; If it does not exist, return an empty flag.

[0020] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method of Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, in step S2, The specific process of vehicle registration is:

[0021] S21: , Received from After receiving the verification message, check the roadside unit identity Has it been registered? If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to ; If not registered, a random number is randomly selected , , then calculate pseudonym and will Return to ;

[0022] S22: , Received from vehicle After receiving the verification message, check the vehicle's identity information Has it been registered? If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to the vehicle. If it has not been registered, a random number will be randomly selected. , , then calculate the vehicle's dynamic pseudonym ; Calculate: , is a point on the elliptic curve, represented by a random number and the base point of the elliptic curve Generated by scalar multiplication; , is another point on the elliptic curve, Is the system master key The modular inverse of , is a hash function, the intermediate quantity By and Splicing hides the true identity of the vehicle, To concatenate symbols, while ensuring the key is associated with the identity; the intermediate ; Randomly select an integer , calculate the vehicle's private key , the vehicle's public key , is a point on the elliptic curve, ; calculate and set an expiration time for the vehicle ,Then, By updating the table entries Upload to blockchain;

[0023] S23: After receiving the information, the vehicle calculates: ; Then the query algorithm gets ;Vehicle Verification , Indicates whether the left side of the equal sign is equal to the right side; if the verification is successful, the vehicle will be stored safely ; otherwise the vehicle will resend the registration request.

[0024] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, the specific process of step S3 is as follows:

[0025] S31: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , ; Vehicle calculated : , generate the first authentication code : , Indicates the exclusive OR operation. 、 and The hash value of 、 and The hash value is XORed, only those with and Only legal vehicles can be generated correctly ; , is an integer used for digital signature; then, the vehicle sends 、 、 and Send to ;

[0026] S32: , is a point on the elliptic curve, is a temporary key for encrypted communication, Receive the authentication request information sent by the vehicle, First verify if the vehicle has been previously certified, if so, The initial authentication request is discarded, otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine After confirming the validity, calculate the encrypted value : , is a hash function, verify Is it true? If the verification is successful, then The vehicle was successfully verified; Randomly pick a random number and timestamp , , calculate the session value and the second authentication code : , , is the PI value of the vehicle, , , ; By updating the algorithm Upload to the blockchain; finally Through a secure channel 、 、 and Send to vehicle;

[0027] S33: The vehicle receives the response and calculates the encrypted value : , session value ;if ,but After the vehicle is authenticated, the vehicle will send the session key Set to .

[0028] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, the specific process of intra-domain re-authentication in step S4 is as follows:

[0029] S411: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , , vehicles will pass through the safety channel and Send to ,in represents the first roadside unit;

[0030] S412: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has been re-authenticated before. If so, Give up authenticating the vehicle; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle, Then check the timestamp effectiveness, Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the third authentication code : , is the encryption function, Send to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ;

[0031] S413: , the vehicle is verified first The validity of , Is the decryption function, using Decrypted random number and ; Vehicle comparison received With the original sent If they are equal, the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fourth authentication code : ; Vehicles pass through the safe channel to send 、 ;

[0032] S414: Verify the message after receiving it The validity of , use Decrypted and random numbers , Compare received With the original sent If they are equal, it means that the re-authentication in the domain is successful.

[0033] In the above-mentioned cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, the specific process of cross-domain re-authentication in step S4 is as follows:

[0034] S421: , the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fifth authentication code : , , is a derived hash value, the vehicle sends 、 and Send to the second roadside unit ;

[0035] S422: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has sent a cross-domain re-authentication request before. If so, The vehicle authentication will be abandoned; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine The effectiveness, if effective, calculate , call the query algorithm to get ;Then, Compare , if equal, Calculate encrypted value , Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , calculate the new session key : , Calculate the sixth authentication code : and sends it to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ; Calculate the derived hash value : , and call the update algorithm to update the session key chain;

[0036] S423: After the vehicle receives the message, it first verifies The validity of the encrypted value is then calculated and the new session key : , , the final session key Updated successfully.

[0037] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0038] 1. This invention replaces traditional centralized , eliminating the risk of single point failure and enhancing the reliability and robustness of the system. The distributed nature of the blockchain ensures that authentication data cannot be tampered with and improves cross-domain mutual trust capabilities.

[0039] 2. The present invention uses certificateless elliptic curve cryptography The system eliminates the transmission and verification overhead of traditional certificates and reduces communication delays; vehicles and Directly participate in authentication through locally generated public and private key pairs, simplifying the key management process.

[0040] 3. The present invention designs a dual re-authentication mechanism within and across domains, combines blockchain smart contracts to quickly recover session keys, and supports vehicles in Low-latency secure switching during high-speed movement between coverage domains ensures communication continuity.

[0041] 4. The present invention utilizes Its high efficiency reduces the computational complexity of encryption and decryption, while enabling fast query and update through lightweight smart contracts, which can adapt to the high concurrency and low latency requirements of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0042] 5. The present invention hides the real identity of the vehicle through dynamic pseudonyms and hash chain mechanisms, which can prevent cross-domain tracking. The blockchain only stores hash values ​​rather than original data, which can avoid privacy leakage.

[0043] 6. The present invention is based on a dynamic timestamp and random number challenge-response mechanism, which can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks. The blockchain distributed verification mechanism further reduces the risk of identity forgery. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] Figure 1 This is a system framework diagram of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 2 Flowchart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0047] like Figure 1 As shown, the system framework includes: terminal entity layer, blockchain network layer and trusted institution , the terminal entity layer includes vehicles , roadside unit ; Among them, the vehicle is responsible for carrying the on-board unit , generate dynamic pseudonyms, public-private key pairs and execute authentication protocols. Responsible for verifying vehicle identity and negotiating session keys And key recovery during cross-domain switching. The smart contracts of the blockchain network layer are divided into three categories: blockchain distributed storage public key hash , dynamic pseudonym of the vehicle and session keychain , ensuring that data cannot be tampered with. During the system initialization phase, the main functions include generating global parameters (elliptic curves, hash functions) and deploying the blockchain network; When registering as a physical entity, you need to verify the vehicle / After the identity is obtained, its key material is generated and written into the blockchain; Update invalid keys or revoke illegal nodes through smart contracts.

[0048] like Figure 2 As shown, a cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC includes the following steps:

[0049] S1, initialization phase: trusted institution Generate and publish certificateless elliptic curve cryptography Deploy the blockchain network with the global parameters of

[0050] The initialization phase is Generate system initialization parameters, taking the given security parameters as input, Generate non-singular elliptic curves , 、 are the horizontal and vertical coordinates, 、 All are set coefficients, and Select the base point for generating the elliptic curve and two hash functions 、 and publicly announce all system parameters, Generate your own public and private key pair, where the private key , Representation model The multiplicative group of ; Define smart contracts and set update algorithms and query algorithms .

[0051] The process of defining a smart contract is:

[0052] S111: Create a makefile containing the configuration parameters for setting up the blockchain, and then Select trusted partners and initiate a blockchain based on the established consensus mechanism. The initialization of the blockchain block includes storing the hash value of the vehicle public key, the pseudo-identity, and the hash value of the session key; define the smart contract : Claim owner address ,create structure, The structure contains fields ,in is the public key hash, For dynamic pseudonyms, is the session key chain;

[0053] S112: Declare a public array ;

[0054] S113: Constructor: Setup Equal to the current caller address ,initialization The length is 0.

[0055] Update algorithm The specific process is:

[0056] S121: First, perform permission verification. If , returns 0, indicating that the permission verification fails; otherwise, proceeds to step S122;

[0057] S122: Traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , == means judging equality, Indicates the dynamic pseudonym used by the current authority verifier when accessing previously, then update , update the Dynamic pseudonyms for elements , update the Session key hash chain of elements , returns 1 after the update is successful, indicating that the update is successful; if it does not exist , then proceed to step S123;

[0058] S123: Extend the array length and add a The length of the structure size, add new entries, 、 、 , where the new index is used to find the specified position in the array, Indicates that the array No. The PI value of the first position is set to PI, and the same applies to the last two formulas; after successful addition, 1 is returned, indicating that the permission verification is passed.

[0059] Query Algorithm The specific process is: traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , then returns ; If it does not exist, return an empty flag.

[0060] S2, registration phase: all roadside units and all vehicles Trusted Institutions Initiate a registration request, a legal roadside unit Received from a trusted institution Return of pseudonymous, legitimate vehicle received by trusted agency The returned key.

[0061] The specific process of vehicle registration is:

[0062] S21: , Received from After receiving the verification message, check the roadside unit identity Has it been registered? If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to ; If not registered, a random number is randomly selected , , then calculate pseudonym and will Return to ;

[0063] S22: , Received from vehicle After receiving the verification message, check the vehicle's identity information Has it been registered? If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to the vehicle. If it has not been registered, a random number will be randomly selected. , , then calculate the vehicle's dynamic pseudonym ; Calculate: , is a point on the elliptic curve, represented by a random number and the base point of the elliptic curve Generated by scalar multiplication; , is another point on the elliptic curve, Is the system master key The modular inverse of , is a hash function, the intermediate quantity By and Splicing hides the true identity of the vehicle, To concatenate symbols, while ensuring the key is associated with the identity; the intermediate ; Randomly select an integer , calculate the vehicle's private key , the vehicle's public key , is a point on the elliptic curve, ; calculate and set an expiration time for the vehicle ,Then, By updating the table entries Upload to blockchain;

[0064] S23: After receiving the information, the vehicle calculates: ; Then the query algorithm gets ;Vehicle Verification , Indicates whether the left side of the equal sign is equal to the right side; if the verification is successful, the vehicle will be stored safely ; otherwise the vehicle will resend the registration request.

[0065] S3, initial authentication phase: registered vehicles and roadside units Mutual authentication and key negotiation are carried out between the vehicle and the roadside unit. Send a signed authentication request packet to the roadside unit Verify the freshness of the request and the validity of the signature through the blockchain smart contract, and then return the data packet to the vehicle for verification through a secure channel to ensure identity and communication security.

[0066] The specific process of step S3 is:

[0067] S31: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , ; Vehicle calculated : , generate the first authentication code : , Indicates the exclusive OR operation. 、 and The hash value of 、 and The hash value is XORed, only those with and Only legal vehicles can be generated correctly ; , is an integer used for digital signature; then, the vehicle sends 、 、 and Send to ;

[0068] S32: , is a point on the elliptic curve, is a temporary key for encrypted communication, Receive the authentication request information sent by the vehicle, First verify if the vehicle has been previously certified, if so, The initial authentication request is discarded, otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine After confirming the validity, calculate the encrypted value : , is a hash function, verify Is it true? If the verification is successful, then The vehicle was successfully verified; Randomly pick a random number and timestamp , , calculate the session value and the second authentication code : , , is the PI value of the vehicle, , , ; By updating the algorithm Upload to the blockchain; finally Through a secure channel 、 、 and Send to vehicle;

[0069] S33: The vehicle receives the response and calculates the encrypted value : , session value ;if ,but After the vehicle is authenticated, the vehicle will send the session key Set to .

[0070] S4, re-authentication phase: Re-authentication is divided into intra-domain re-authentication and cross-domain re-authentication. When the vehicle's location changes, such as when it moves from one domain to another, the vehicle needs to be re-authenticated to ensure the security and credibility of the network.

[0071] The specific process of intra-domain reauthentication is as follows:

[0072] S411: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , , vehicles will pass through the safety channel and Send to ,in represents the first roadside unit;

[0073] S412: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has been re-authenticated before. If so, Give up authenticating the vehicle; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle, Then check the timestamp effectiveness, Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the third authentication code : , is the encryption function, Send to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ;

[0074] S413: , the vehicle is verified first The validity of , Is the decryption function, using Decrypted random number and ; Vehicle comparison received With the original sent If they are equal, the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fourth authentication code : ; Vehicles pass through the safe channel to send 、 ;

[0075] S414: Verify the message after receiving it The validity of , use Decrypted and random numbers , Compare received With the original sent If they are equal, it means that the re-authentication in the domain is successful.

[0076] The specific process of cross-domain re-authentication is as follows:

[0077] S421: , the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fifth authentication code : , , is a derived hash value, the vehicle sends 、 and Send to the second roadside unit ;

[0078] S422: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has sent a cross-domain re-authentication request before. If so, The vehicle authentication will be abandoned; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine The effectiveness, if effective, calculate , call the query algorithm to get ;Then, Compare , if equal, Calculate encrypted value , Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , calculate the new session key : , Calculate the sixth authentication code : and sends it to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ; Calculate the derived hash value : , and call the update algorithm to update the session key chain;

[0079] S423: After the vehicle receives the message, it first verifies The validity of the encrypted value is then calculated and the new session key : , , the final session key Updated successfully.

Claims

1. A cross-domain authentication method for Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain and certificateless ECC, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1, initialization phase: trusted institution Generate and publish certificateless elliptic curve cryptography Deploy the blockchain network with the global parameters of In step S1, the initialization phase refers to Generate system initialization parameters, taking the given security parameters as input, Generate non-singular elliptic curves , 、 are the horizontal and vertical coordinates, 、 All are set coefficients, and Select the base point for generating the elliptic curve and two hash functions 、 and publicly announce all system parameters, Generate your own public and private key pair, where the private key , Representation model The multiplicative group of ; Define smart contracts and set update algorithms and query algorithms ; S2, registration phase: all roadside units and all vehicles Trusted Institutions Initiate a registration request, a legal roadside unit Received from a trusted institution Return of pseudonymous, legitimate vehicle received by trusted agency The returned key; S3, initial authentication phase: registered vehicles and roadside units Mutual authentication and key negotiation are carried out between the vehicle and the roadside unit. Send a signed authentication request packet to the roadside unit Verify the freshness of the request and the validity of the signature through the blockchain smart contract, and then return the data packet to the vehicle for verification through a secure channel to ensure identity and communication security; S4, re-authentication phase: Re-authentication is divided into intra-domain re-authentication and cross-domain re-authentication. When the vehicle's location changes, the vehicle needs to be re-authenticated to ensure the security and credibility of the network. The specific process of cross-domain re-authentication in step S4 is as follows: S421: , the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fifth authentication code : , , is a derived hash value, the vehicle sends 、 and Send to the second roadside unit ; S422: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has sent a cross-domain re-authentication request before. If so, Authentication of vehicles will be waived; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine The effectiveness, if effective, calculate , call the query algorithm to get ;Then, Compare , if equal, Calculate encrypted value , Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , calculate the new session key : , Calculate the sixth authentication code : and sends it to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ; Calculate the derived hash value : , and call the update algorithm to update the session key chain; S423: After the vehicle receives the message, it first verifies The validity of the encrypted value is then calculated and the new session key : , , the final session key Updated successfully.

2. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S1, the process of defining a smart contract is as follows: S111: Create a makefile containing the configuration parameters for setting up the blockchain, and then Select trusted partners and initiate a blockchain based on the established consensus mechanism. The initialization of the blockchain block includes storing the hash value of the vehicle public key, the pseudo-identity, and the hash value of the session key; define the smart contract : Claim owner address ,create structure, The structure contains fields ,in is the public key hash, For dynamic pseudonyms, is the session key chain; S112: Declare a public array ; S113: Constructor: Setup Equal to the current caller address ,initialization The length is 0.

3. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 2 is characterized in that: In step S1, the update algorithm The specific process is: S121: First, perform permission verification. If , returns 0, indicating that the permission verification fails; otherwise, proceeds to step S122; S122: Traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , == means judging equality, Indicates the dynamic pseudonym used by the current authority verifier when accessing previously, then update , update the Dynamic pseudonyms for elements , update the Session key chain of elements , returns 1 after the update is successful, indicating that the update is successful; if it does not exist , then proceed to step S123; S123: Extend the array length, add a C structure size length to the array, and add a new entry. 、 、 , where the new index is used to find the specified position in the array, Indicates that the array No. The PI value of the first position is set to PI, and the same applies to the last two formulas; after successful addition, 1 is returned, indicating that the permission verification is passed.

4. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 3 is characterized in that: In step S1, the query algorithm The specific process is: traversal For each element in Elements , if there is The public key hash of the element , then returns ; If it does not exist, return an empty flag.

5. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In the step S2, The specific process of vehicle registration is: S21: , Received from After receiving the verification message, check the roadside unit identity Has it been registered? If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to ; If not registered, a random number is randomly selected , , then calculate pseudonym and will Return to ; S22: , Received from vehicle After receiving the verification message, check the vehicle's identity information Whether it has been registered. If it has been registered, the registration application will be rejected and an error message will be returned to the vehicle; If not registered, a random number is selected , , then calculate the vehicle's dynamic pseudonym ; Calculate: , is a point on the elliptic curve, represented by a random number and the base point of the elliptic curve Generated by scalar multiplication; , is another point on the elliptic curve, Is the system master key The modular inverse of , is a hash function, the intermediate quantity By and Splicing hides the true identity of the vehicle, To concatenate symbols, while ensuring the key is associated with the identity; the intermediate ; Randomly select an integer , calculate the vehicle's private key , the vehicle's public key , is a point on the elliptic curve, ; calculate and set an expiration time for the vehicle ,Then, By updating the table entries Upload to blockchain; S23: After receiving the information, the vehicle calculates: ; Then query the algorithm to get ;Vehicle Verification , Indicates whether the left side of the equal sign is equal to the right side; If the verification is successful, the vehicle will be stored safely ; otherwise the vehicle will resend the registration request.

6. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S3 is: S31: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , ; Vehicle calculated : , generate the first authentication code : , Indicates the exclusive OR operation. 、 and The hash value of 、 and The hash value is XORed, only those with and Only legal vehicles can be generated correctly ; , is an integer used for digital signature; then, the vehicle sends 、 、 and Send to ; S32: , is a point on the elliptic curve, is a temporary key for encrypted communication, Receive the authentication request information sent by the vehicle, First verify if the vehicle has been previously certified, if so, The initial authentication request is discarded, otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle; then examine After confirming the validity, calculate the encrypted value : , is a hash function, verify Is it true? If the verification is successful, then The vehicle was successfully verified; Randomly pick a random number and timestamp , , calculate the session value and the second authentication code : , , is the PI value of the vehicle, , , ; By updating the algorithm Upload to the blockchain; finally Through a secure channel 、 、 and Send to vehicle; S33: The vehicle receives the response and calculates the encrypted value : , session value ;if ,but After the vehicle is authenticated, the vehicle will send the session key Set to .

7. The vehicle network cross-domain authentication method based on blockchain and certificateless ECC according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The specific process of intra-domain re-authentication in step S4 is as follows: S411: , vehicle selection random number and timestamp , , vehicles will pass through the safety channel and Send to ,in represents the first roadside unit; S412: , After receiving the message, first verify whether the vehicle has been re-authenticated before. If so, waive vehicle authentication; otherwise, Continue to authenticate the vehicle, Then check the timestamp effectiveness, Randomly select a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the third authentication code : , is the encryption function, Send to the vehicle via a secure channel 、 ; S413: , the vehicle is verified first The validity of , Is the decryption function, using Decrypted random number and ; Vehicle comparison received With the original sent If they are equal, the vehicle randomly selects a random number and timestamp , , then calculate the fourth authentication code : ; Vehicles pass through the safety channel send 、 ; S414: Verify the message after receiving it The validity of , use Decrypted and random numbers , Compare received With the original sent If they are equal, it means that the re-authentication in the domain is successful.

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