Declarable ring signature implementation method, Internet of Vehicles system, device and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to a declarable ring signature implementation method, an Internet of Vehicles system, equipment and a medium, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the initialization generation of system public parameters, carrying out the broadcasting, generating a vehicle public-private key pair through a secret key generation center according to the safety parameters, and transmitting the vehicle public-private key pair to a vehicle; wherein the vehicle private key comprises a pseudo-random function private key; the vehicle generates a ring signature after signing a message by using a double-ring signature algorithm, compresses a signature size to a logarithm level by using an inner product parameter, generates a random number according to a pseudo-random function private key to carry out commitment operation, and combines a generated commitment value c and a ring signature result to obtain a signature result capable of declaring a ring signature scheme; performing signature validity verification on the signature result capable of declaring the ring signature scheme, and outputting a verification result of the ring signature after the verification is passed; the random number is reproduced through the pseudo-random function to generate declaration evidence, and the identity of the signer can be confirmed after declaration verification is passed. Compared with the prior art, the privacy protection flexibility and efficiency of the Internet of Vehicles are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network privacy protection technology, and in particular to a method for implementing a declarable ring signature, a vehicle network system, equipment, and medium. Background Art

[0002] Leveraging V2X communication technology, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) can effectively improve traffic safety and travel efficiency, significantly reducing the incidence of traffic accidents, by sharing data such as vehicle speed, road conditions, and accident warnings in real time. However, during this data exchange process, private data such as a vehicle's real-time location, historical routes, and driving habits can easily become a target for criminals. Leakage of this data not only threatens the privacy of vehicle owners but can also be used for targeted fraud, tracking, and even traffic disruptions. Therefore, while ensuring efficient data sharing, employing advanced privacy protection technologies to encrypt sensitive information such as signatures has become a critical issue that needs to be addressed in IoV security.

[0003] After searching, Chinese invention patent application CN116167097A discloses a ring signature method for authorized sharing of personal privacy data of Internet of Vehicles users. Although this method achieves privacy protection through a layered setting and the SM2 algorithm, it has the following drawbacks:

[0004] 1) During the authorization process, multiple user public keys must be randomly selected for signature, and a hash operation must be performed on the signature public key set to construct a Merkle tree and store it on the blockchain. This increases the frequency of communication interactions and data transmission volume, resulting in high communication overhead and making it difficult to meet the high-frequency communication needs of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0005] 2) Relying on a random set of user public keys to participate in signing, users cannot declare their membership in the ring in advance. This lacks controllability and a clear declaration mechanism for the composition of the signature ring, affecting the traceability and responsibility of the signing subject.

[0006] 3) Lack of dynamic adjustment capabilities and insufficient flexibility in privacy protection. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned existing technologies and provide a method for implementing a declarable ring signature, a vehicle network system, a device and a medium, thereby improving the flexibility and efficiency of privacy protection in the vehicle network.

[0008] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0009] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system is provided, comprising:

[0010] Initialization phase: After initialization, the system public parameters are generated and broadcast. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle. Among them, the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF ;

[0011] Signature phase: The vehicle uses the double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature σ RS , using the inner product parameter to compress the signature size to the logarithmic level, according to the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF Generate a random number for the commitment operation, and use the generated commitment value c and the ring signature result σ RS After the combination, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme is obtained σ=(σ RS ,c);

[0012] Signature verification phase: Verify the validity of the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and output the verification result of the ring signature after verification.

[0013] Identity verification stage: A pseudo-random function is used to reproduce random numbers to generate a declaration evidence. After the declaration verification is passed, the identity of the signer is confirmed.

[0014] Preferably, generating a vehicle public-private key pair (pk, sk) according to security parameters includes:

[0015] 1) Generate the ring signature public key pk RS and the ring signature private key sk RS ;

[0016] 2) Construct a standard signature model Σ=(Σ.Gen, Σ.Sign, Σ.Verify) based on a polynomial time algorithm, where Σ.Gen, Σ.Sign, and Σ.Verify are the standard key generation sub-model, the standard signature sub-model, and the standard verification sub-model, respectively. Input the security parameter λ into the standard key generation sub-model Σ.Gen and output the standard signature public key pk Σ And the standard signature private key sk Σ , used to subsequently associate the ring signature with the statement;

[0017] 3) Input the security parameter λ into the private key generation model PRF.Gen in the pseudo-random function to generate the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the calculation expression is sk PRF ←PRF.Gen(1 λ );

[0018] 4) The ring signature public key pk RS And the standard signature public key pk Σ The vehicle public key pk is obtained by combining RS ,pk Σ), the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature private key sk RS , standard signature private key sk Σ and pseudo-random function private key sk PRF The vehicle private key sk is obtained by combining (pk, sk RS ,sk Σ ,sk PRF ) and obtain the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk).

[0019] Preferably, the vehicle uses a double ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature result σ RS , generate a random number through a pseudo-random function, and perform a commitment operation to generate a commitment value c, and after combining, obtain the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c), including:

[0020] 1) Using the double ring signature algorithm to pass the ring signature private key sk RS Sign the message m and get the ring signature result σ RS ;

[0021] 2) Use pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature result σ RS And the label value 0 is input into the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function to generate the first random number r ∑ ;

[0022] 3) Using the signature scheme of the standard signature model ∑ and the first random number r ∑ , through the standard signature private key sk ∑ For the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) to sign and obtain the standard signature σ ∑ =∑.Sign(sk ∑ ,(pk,σ RS );r ∑ ), the standard signature σ ∑ After combining with the vehicle public key pk, the second key pair (pk, σ Σ );

[0023] 4) Generate the second random number r using the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function Com =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σ RS ,1)) and define the label value as 1, through the second random number r Com For the second key pair (pk,σ ∑ ) performs commitment operation and generates commitment value c=Com((pk,σ ∑ );r Com), Com is the commitment operation;

[0024] 5) The ring signature result σ RS After combining with the corresponding commitment value c, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c).

[0025] Preferably, the signature validity verification is performed on the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and the verification result of the ring signature is output after the verification is passed, specifically:

[0026] Ring public key The ring signature public key in Ring signature σ RS and message m is input to the verification model If the ring signature σ RS =⊥, the signature verification is deemed to have failed, and the verification result of the output ring signature is 0; otherwise, the verification result of the output ring signature is 1.

[0027] Preferably, the pseudo-random function is used to reproduce the random number to generate the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ), specifically including:

[0028] The same input as the ring signature process, including the pseudo-random private key sk PRF , public key pk, ring signature result σ RS And the corresponding label 0 is input into the verification model PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function, and the first random number r is recalculated ∑ for r' ∑ =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σ RS ,0));

[0029] Using the same label 1 as the ring signature process, the second random number r is recalculated using a pseudo-random function Com for r' Com ;

[0030] Use the recalculated second random number r' Com , through the standard signature model ∑ for the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) Sign again to get the re-signed standard signature σ' ∑ ;

[0031] The second random number r' will be recalculated Com and the recalculated standard signature σ' ∑ After combination, we get the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ).

[0032] Preferably, the declarable verification specifically includes:

[0033] According to the ring public key The superscript n corresponds to the number of the vehicle public key, the signer's vehicle public key pk, and the signature result of the ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c) and the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ) performs declarable verification. If both checks are met, the current signature is deemed valid and label 1 is output;

[0034] Among them, two inspections include:

[0035] 1) According to the recalculated standard signature σ' ∑ And the recalculated second random number r' Com The recalculated commitment value c'=Com(σ' ∑ ,r' Com ) matches the commitment value c generated by the initial signing process;

[0036] 2) Use ∑.Verify(pk ∑ ,σ' ∑ ,(pk,σ RS ))Verify the signature, output 0 if the verification fails, and output 1 if the verification passes; where ∑.Verify is the standard verification sub-model in the standard signature model.

[0037] Preferably, when the commitment value c'=Com((pk,σ' ∑ );r' Com ) does not match the commitment value c generated in the initial signing process, the output statement evidence ζ = ⊥.

[0038] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a vehicle networking system is provided. Entities of the vehicle networking system include a trusted institution, a traffic management department, a key generation center, a roadside unit, and a vehicle. The above-mentioned method is used to implement a declarable ring signature, specifically including:

[0039] Initialization phase: After initialization, the system public parameters are generated and broadcast. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle. Among them, the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF ;

[0040] Signature phase: The vehicle uses the double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature result σ RS , according to the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF Generate a random number for the commitment operation, and use the generated commitment value c and the ring signature result σ RSAfter the combination, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme is obtained σ=(σ RS ,c);

[0041] Signature verification phase: Verify the validity of the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and output the verification result of the ring signature after verification.

[0042] Identity verification stage: A pseudo-random function is used to reproduce random numbers to generate a declaration evidence. After the declaration verification is passed, the identity of the signer is confirmed.

[0043] According to a third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the program, any one of the methods described above is implemented.

[0044] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, any one of the methods described above is implemented.

[0045] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0046] (1) This invention introduces declarable ring signature technology, which allows the signer to reveal his or her identity to meet legal accountability requirements. By designing a dual-ring structure, the inner product parameter is used to reduce the signature size and construct a dynamic anonymous ring, thereby improving the flexibility and efficiency of privacy protection.

[0047] (2) The commitment operation is performed by generating random numbers through a pseudo-random function, which ensures the randomness and uniqueness of each signature. In the declaration phase, the signer can use the same pseudo-random function and initial input parameters to regenerate the same random number as when signing, thereby proving the authenticity and integrity of the signature. The setting of the commitment mechanism effectively prevents the signature from being tampered with or forged, providing strong security protection for the declarable ring signature and higher reliability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] Figure 1 It represents the interaction relationship and data flow of Internet of Vehicles entities (TA, TMD, KGC, RSU, and vehicles).

[0049] Figure 2 To describe the process of key generation, signature generation, verification, declaration and declaration verification.

[0050] Figure 3 To compare the changing trend of signature size of declarable ring signature and other ring signatures with the number of ring members n,

[0051] Figure 4 To demonstrate the runtime consistency of claimable ring signatures and DualRing in the signature generation and verification phases. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0052] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0053] Example

[0054] like Figure 1 As shown, the entities in the Internet of Vehicles in this embodiment include a trusted authority TA, a traffic management department TMD, a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit RSU, and vehicles, as follows:

[0055] Trusted Authority (TA): Responsible for initializing the entire IOV system, including generating public system parameters and configuring encryption algorithms. It also authenticates the identities of other entities, such as KGCs, TMDs, RSUs, and vehicles, ensuring they are authenticated before joining the IOV.

[0056] Traffic Management Department (TMD): Utilizes real-time data for traffic flow analysis and intelligent management, and assists in traffic incident investigations by revealing the identity of the signer through a declarable ring signature mechanism.

[0057] Key Generation Center (KGC): The core of key management in the Internet of Vehicles, responsible for generating and distributing key pairs for each vehicle.

[0058] Roadside Unit (RSU): plays the role of data relay and transmission in the Internet of Vehicles. RSU is usually installed on both sides of the road to communicate with vehicles and verify the validity of signed messages sent by vehicles.

[0059] Vehicle: A mobile node in the Internet of Vehicles, primarily responsible for generating and signing traffic-related data.

[0060] like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment provides a method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system. The declarable ring signature includes a key generation phase (C-DRS.Gen), a signature phase (C-DRS.Sign), a verification phase (C-DRS.Verify), a claim phase (C-DRS.Claim), and a declarable verification phase (C-DRS.VerClaim). Through collaborative work, the security, privacy, and traceability of the signing process are ensured.

[0061] During the key generation phase, the system generates a public-private key pair based on security parameters. The public key is used for signature verification, while the private key is used for signature generation. The signature algorithm then uses the private key and the message, combined with the public keys of other members of the ring, to generate a ring signature. This signature not only protects the signer's privacy but also ensures the randomness and uniqueness of each signature by generating a random number using a pseudorandom function. This randomness is crucial for preventing signature prediction and forgery.

[0062] The verification algorithm verifies the validity of the signature, ensuring that it was indeed generated by a member of the ring without revealing the identity of the specific signer. The claim algorithm allows the signer to reveal their identity when necessary and generate claim evidence. The claimable verification algorithm verifies the authenticity of the claim evidence, ensuring that the signer cannot deny their signing.

[0063] Pseudorandom functions play a key role in claimable ring signatures. They consist of a pair of algorithms, PRF = (PRF.Gen, PRF.Eval), one for generating pseudorandom numbers and the other for verifying their accuracy. During the signing process, the random numbers generated by the pseudorandom function not only ensure the randomness of the signature but also its reproducibility. This means that during the claiming phase, the signer can use the same pseudorandom function and initial input parameters to regenerate the same random number as when signing, thereby proving the authenticity and integrity of the signature. This mechanism effectively prevents signature tampering or forgery, providing strong security for claimable ring signatures.

[0064] Next, the method of this embodiment is introduced in detail.

[0065] S1. Initialization phase: The trusted organization RA runs Setup, initializes and generates system public parameters and then broadcasts them. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle. Among them, the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF .

[0066] In the initialization phase, the setup algorithm inputs the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters required for general ring signatures, such as in It's a group, and satisfy g is The generator of .

[0067] Specifically, the key generation center generates a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk) based on security parameters, where the public key is used for signature verification and the private key is used for signature generation.

[0068] The generation process of the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) is implemented through the key generation algorithm C-DRS.Gen. The specific calculation process is as follows:

[0069] Input: Security parameter λ

[0070] Output: vehicle public key pk = (pk RS ,pk Σ ), vehicle private key sk=(pk,sk RS ,sk Σ ,sk PRF )

[0071] 1) Generate the ring signature public key pk RS and the ring signature private key sk RS :

[0072] Randomly select a private key sk RS ∈Z q , calculate the public key

[0073] 2) Construct a standard signature model ∑=(∑.Gen,∑.Sign,∑.Verify) based on a polynomial time algorithm, where ∑.Gen, ∑.Sign, and ∑.Verify are the standard key generation sub-model, the standard signature sub-model, and the standard verification sub-model, respectively. Input the security parameter λ into the standard key generation sub-model ∑.Gen and output the standard signature public key pk Σ And the standard signature private key sk Σ , used to subsequently associate the ring signature with the statement;

[0074] 3) Input the security parameter λ into the private key generation model PRF.Gen in the pseudo-random function to generate the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the calculation expression is sk PRF ←PRF.Gen(1 λ );

[0075] 4) The ring signature public key pk RS And the standard signature public key pk Σ The vehicle public key pk is obtained by combining RS ,pk Σ ), the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature private key sk RS , standard signature private key sk Σ and the private key sk of the pseudo-random function PRF The vehicle private key sk is obtained by combining (pk, sk RS ,sk Σ ,sk PRF ) and obtain the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk).

[0076] S2, Signature phase: The vehicle runs C-DRS.Sign, uses the double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate the ring signature result σ RS , using the inner product parameter (NISA) to compress the signature size to the logarithmic level, according to the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF Generate a random number for the commitment operation, and use the generated commitment value c and the ring signature result σ RS After the combination, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme is obtained σ=(σ RS ,c).

[0077] During the signing phase, the private key and message are combined with the public keys of other members of the ring to generate a ring signature. This signature not only protects the privacy of the signer but also generates a random number through a pseudo-random function, ensuring the randomness and uniqueness of each signature. This randomness is crucial for preventing signatures from being predicted and forged.

[0078] In a claimable ring signature, a pseudorandom function (PRF) is used to generate random numbers for signing, ensuring the randomness of each signature. Its determinism allows these random numbers to be recalculated during verification, ensuring the authenticity of the claim and the integrity of the signature. The determinism of the PRF allows the same random numbers to be recalculated during verification, thus ensuring the authenticity of the claim and the integrity of the signature.

[0079] The pseudo-random function consists of a pair of algorithms PRF = (PRF.Gen, PRF.Eval). PRF.Gen is a polynomial time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a pseudo-random function key sk. PRF ;PRF.Eval is a polynomial time verification algorithm, input pseudo-random function key sk PRF and a string of characters x∈{0,1} of arbitrary length * , output a string r, where x can represent a string of any content, and the first random number r ∑ In the input, x is defined as label 0 and the second random number r is Com The input of x is defined as label 1.

[0080] This embodiment adopts a ring signature algorithm with a dual-ring DualRing structure.

[0081] In the DualRing ring signature algorithm, the inner product parameter NISA is a knowledge proof, consisting of a pair of algorithms NISA = (NISA.Proof, NISA.Verify). is the proof of generation; Output 0 or 1 indicates that the signature is invalid or valid respectively.

[0082] The DualRing ring signature algorithm consists of three polynomial-time algorithms: DRS = (DRS.Gen, DRS.Sign, DRS.Verify). To shorten the signature to logarithmic size, a proof of knowledge (NISA) algorithm—the inner product parameter—is employed. This algorithm consists of a pair of algorithms: NISA = (NISA.Proof, NISA.Verify).

[0083] (pk,sk)←DRS.Gen(1 λ ): Input security parameter λ, calculate pk=g sk Get the public-private key pair (pk, sk).

[0084] Enter a set of ring public keys The signer's private key sk j and message m.

[0085] Choose a random number r∈Z q , and a set of random numbers c i ∈Z q , where i≠j.

[0086] Calculation: Commitment 1. 2. Where H represents a hash function, 3. 4.z=rc j ·sk j .

[0087] Then calculate P=R·(g z ) -1 Call Where pp represents the system common parameters; Finally, a signature σ=(z, R, π) about the message m is output.

[0088] Enter the public key set Signature σ and message m, Output 0 or 1 indicates that the signature is invalid or valid respectively.

[0089] The Com function is a commitment operation, specifically referring to the Pedersen commitment: Pedersen commitment is a cryptographic commitment scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem, proposed by Torben Pryds Pedersen in 1992. The first step is the parameter setting stage, where a prime order cyclic group is selected. Generators g and h (must satisfy log g h is unknown to ensure security). Next is the commitment generation phase: for message m, a random blinding factor r is selected and the commitment value C = g is calculated.m h r modp. Finally, the opening and verification phase: revealing m and r, and verifying whether C is equal to g m h r Pedersen promises have the following core properties:

[0090] Perfect hiding: Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the commitment value C does not reveal any information about m.

[0091] Computational binding: The attacker cannot find another set of m', r' such that g m h r =g m' h r' , unless the discrete logarithm problem can be solved.

[0092] Additive homomorphism: If but Supports arithmetic operations under ciphertext.

[0093] The above features enable it to be applied in multiple privacy protection fields. For example, in blockchain privacy protection, privacy coins such as Monero and Zcash are used to hide transaction amounts.

[40] ; Verify data consistency without exposing input values ​​in secure multi-party computation; Protect the privacy of participants in electronic voting and auctions while ensuring that commitments cannot be tampered with.

[0094] Pedersen vector commitment is an extension of Pedersen commitment to multi-valued scenarios, supporting vector a=(a1,K,a n ) Generate a commitment value C. Let g=(g1,K,g n ), the Pedersen vector commitment is expressed as:

[0095]

[0096] Its most important feature is that it can verify the value of a single position without opening the entire vector, making it suitable for large-scale data sets. At the same time, it preserves additive homomorphism and supports element-by-element operations between vectors. It is suitable for combination with polynomial commitments to improve the efficiency of complex proofs.

[0097] The signing process is specifically implemented as follows:

[0098] Input: Ring public key The signer's private key sk and the message m.

[0099] Output: If verification passes:

[0100]

[0101] Then output signature σ, otherwise output (⊥,⊥).

[0102] 1) Using the dual-ring DualRing signature algorithm to pass the ring signature private key sk RS Sign the message m and get the ring signature result σ RS ;

[0103] 2) Use pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature result σ RS And the label value 0 is input into the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function to generate the first random number r ∑ ; Among them, for the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval, the input pseudo-random function key sk PRF and a string of characters x∈{0,1} of arbitrary length * , output a string r;

[0104] 3) Using the signature scheme of the standard signature model ∑ and the first random number r ∑ , through the standard signature private key sk ∑ For the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) to sign and obtain the standard signature σ ∑ =∑.Sign(sk ∑ ,(pk,σ RS );r ∑ ), the standard signature σ ∑ After combining with the vehicle public key pk, the second key pair (pk, σ ∑ );

[0105] 4) Generate the second random number r using the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function Com =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σ RS ,1)) and define the label value as 1, through the second random number r Com For the second key pair (pk,σ ∑ ) performs commitment operation and generates commitment value c=Com((pk,σ ∑ );r Com ), Com is the commitment operation;

[0106] 5) The ring signature result σ RS After combining with the corresponding commitment value c, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c).

[0107] S3, signature verification phase: The roadside unit RSU runs C-DRS.Verify to verify the validity of the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme. After the verification is passed, the verification result of the ring signature is output.

[0108] Input: Public key set of all members in the ring Signature σ=(σ RS , c) and message m.

[0109] Output: If the ring signature is invalid σ RS =⊥, then output 0, indicating that the verification failed, otherwise output the verification result of the ring signature

[0110] The specific implementation process is:

[0111] Ring public key The ring signature public key in Ring signature σ RS and the message m is input into the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in , if the ring signature σ RS =⊥, the signature verification is deemed to have failed, and the verification result of the output ring signature is 0; otherwise, the verification result of the output ring signature is 1.

[0112] S4, identity proof stage: The signer reproduces the random number through a pseudo-random function to generate a statement evidence; verifies the matching of the commitment value and the standard signature to confirm the signer's identity.

[0113] (1) Declaration of Evidence

[0114] Input: Ring public key The signature result of the vehicle private key sk and the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c).

[0115] Output: If c≠Com(σ' Σ ,r' Com ), then the commitment is invalid and the output is ζ=⊥, otherwise the output is a valid statement ζ=(r' Com ,σ' Σ ).

[0116] The specific implementation is as follows:

[0117] 1) The same input as the ring signature process, including the pseudo-random private key sk PRF , public key pk, ring signature result σ RS And the corresponding label 0 is input into the verification model PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function, and the first random number r is recalculated Σ for r' ∑ =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σRS ,0));

[0118] 2) Using the same label 1 as the ring signature process, recalculate the second random number r using a pseudo-random function Com for r' Com ;

[0119] 3) Use the recalculated second random number r' Com , through the standard signature model ∑ for the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) Sign again to get the re-signed standard signature σ' ∑ ;

[0120] 4) The recalculated second random number r' Com and the recalculated standard signature σ' ∑ After combination, we get the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ).

[0121] (2) Declarable verification

[0122] Input: Ring public key The signer's public key pk, signature σ=(σ RS ,c) and the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ).

[0123] Output: If both checks pass, the signature is considered valid and output is 1.

[0124] According to the ring public key The superscript n corresponds to the vehicle public key number, the signer's vehicle public key pk, and the ring signature output σ=(σ RS ,c) and the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ) performs declarable verification. If both checks are met, the current signature is deemed valid and label 1 is output;

[0125] Among them, two inspections include:

[0126] 1) According to the recalculated standard signature σ' ∑ And the recalculated second random number r' Com The recalculated commitment value c'=Com(σ' ∑ ,r' Com ) matches the commitment value c generated by the initial signing process;

[0127] 2) Use ∑.Verify(pk ∑ ,σ' ∑ ,(pk,σ RS))Verify the signature, output 0 if the verification fails, and output 1 if the verification passes; where ∑.Verify is the standard verification submodel in the standard signature model, 0 / 1←∑.Verify(pk,σ,m).

[0128] This embodiment further provides a vehicle networking system. The entities of the vehicle networking system include a trusted organization, a traffic management department, a key generation center, a roadside unit, and a vehicle. The above method is used to implement a declarable ring signature, specifically including:

[0129] Initialization phase: The trusted institution initializes and generates the system public parameters and broadcasts them to all vehicles and roadside units. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle; the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random private key sk PRF , used to generate random numbers for use in the signing phase;

[0130] Signature phase: The vehicle uses a double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message to generate a ring signature σ RS , a pseudo-random function is used to generate a random number for the commitment operation, generating a commitment value c, and the ring signature output σ=(σ RS ,c) to each entity of the Internet of Vehicles system, and the vehicle outputs σ=(σ RS ,c) Generate declaration evidence and output it to the traffic management department after verification;

[0131] Signature verification phase: The roadside unit verifies the validity of the ring signature output σ and outputs the verification result of the ring signature after passing the verification;

[0132] Identity verification stage: The traffic management department reproduces random numbers through a pseudo-random private key generation model, verifies the matching of the commitment value and the standard signature, and confirms the identity of the signer.

[0133] Figure 3This reflects the comparison of the changes in signature size among these schemes as the number of ring members increases. When n=64, the signature of the C-DRS scheme of the present invention is about 65% smaller than that of the scheme in document 1 (Duan Junke, Zheng Shihui, Wang Wei, et al. ConciseRingCT Protocol Based on Linkable Threshold Ring Signature[J]. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing), about 75% smaller than that of the scheme in document 2 (Yanxue Jia, Shifeng Sun, Yuncong Zhang, et al. PBT: A New Privacy-Preserving Payment Protocol for Blockchain Transactions[J]. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing), and about 15% smaller than that of the scheme in document 3 (Yuen Tsz Hon, Sun Shi-Feng, Liu Joseph K, et al. RingCT 3.0 for Blockchain Confidential Transaction: Shorter Size and Stronger Security[J]. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). When n=1024, the signature of the C-DRS scheme is about 96% smaller than that of the scheme in Reference 1, about 79% smaller than that of the scheme in Reference 2, and about 11% smaller than that of the scheme in Reference 3. By comparing the running time of the signature and verification algorithms in DualRing and C-DRS, as shown in Figure 4 As shown in the figure, the results show that as the number of ring members increases, the computational overhead of C-DRS is almost consistent with that of DualRing. Experimental results show that while the computational overhead is basically the same as DualRing, the communication overhead of the declarable ring signature method (C-DRS) of the present invention is far less than that of other existing ring signature schemes.

[0134] This paper introduces declarable ring signature technology, allowing signers to reveal their identities to meet legal accountability requirements. By designing a dual-ring DualRing structure, using inner product parameters to reduce signature size and construct a dynamic anonymous ring, the flexibility and efficiency of privacy protection are improved.

[0135] The electronic device of the present invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in a read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into a random access memory (RAM). In the RAM, various programs and data required for device operation can also be stored. The CPU, ROM, and RAM are connected to each other via a bus. An input / output (I / O) interface is also connected to the bus.

[0136] Many components in a device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units, such as a keyboard and mouse; output units, such as various types of displays and speakers; storage units, such as magnetic disks and optical disks; and communication units, such as network cards, modems, and wireless communication transceivers. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices via computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0137] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as methods S1 to S4. For example, in some embodiments, methods S1 to S4 can be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program can be loaded and / or installed on the device via a ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of methods S1 to S4 described above can be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU can be configured to execute methods S1 to S4 by any other appropriate means (for example, by means of firmware).

[0138] The functions described above herein may be performed, at least in part, by one or more hardware logic components. For example, and without limitation, exemplary types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chips (SOCs), load programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and the like.

[0139] The program code for implementing the method of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. Such program code can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device so that when the program code is executed by the processor or controller, the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram are implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, as a stand-alone software package, partially on the machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0140] In the context of the present invention, machine-readable medium can be a tangible medium that can contain or store a program for use with an instruction execution system, device or equipment or used in combination with an instruction execution system, device or equipment. Machine-readable medium can be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. Machine-readable medium can include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared or semiconductor systems, devices or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media can include electrical connections based on one or more lines, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memories (RAM), read-only memories (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memories (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0141] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various equivalent modifications or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention, and such modifications or substitutions are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention shall be subject to the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system, characterized in that: include: Initialization phase: After initialization, the system public parameters are generated and broadcast. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle. Among them, the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF ; Signature phase: The vehicle uses the double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature σ RS , using the inner product parameter to compress the signature size to the logarithmic level, according to the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF Generate a random number for the commitment operation, and use the generated commitment value c and the ring signature result σ RS After the combination, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme is obtained σ=(σ RS ,c); Signature verification phase: Verify the validity of the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and output the verification result of the ring signature after verification. Identity verification stage: A pseudo-random function is used to reproduce random numbers to generate a declaration evidence. After the declaration verification is passed, the identity of the signer is confirmed.

2. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The generation of a vehicle public-private key pair (pk, sk) based on security parameters includes: 1) Generate the ring signature public key pk RS and the ring signature private key sk RS ; 2) Construct a standard signature model ∑=(∑.Gen,∑.Sign,∑.Verify) based on a polynomial time algorithm, where ∑.Gen, ∑.Sign, and ∑.Verify are the standard key generation sub-model, the standard signature sub-model, and the standard verification sub-model, respectively. Input the security parameter λ into the standard key generation sub-model ∑.Gen and output the standard signature public key pk Σ And the standard signature private key sk Σ , used to subsequently associate the ring signature with the statement; 3) Input the security parameter λ into the private key generation model PRF.Gen in the pseudo-random function to generate the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the calculation expression is sk PRF ←PRF.Gen(1 λ ); 4) The ring signature public key pk RS And the standard signature public key pk Σ The vehicle public key pk is obtained by combining RS ,pk Σ ), the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature private key sk RS , standard signature private key sk Σ and pseudo-random function private key sk PRF The vehicle private key sk is obtained by combining (pk, sk RS ,sk Σ ,sk PRF ) and obtain the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk).

3. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 2, characterized in that: The vehicle uses the double ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature result σ RS , generate a random number through a pseudo-random function, and perform a commitment operation to generate a commitment value c, and after combining, obtain the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c), including: 1) Using the double ring signature algorithm to pass the ring signature private key sk RS Sign the message m and get the ring signature result σ RS ; 2) Use pseudo-random function private key sk PRF , the vehicle public key pk, the ring signature result σ RS And the label value 0 is input into the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function to generate the first random number r ∑ ; 3) Using the signature scheme of the standard signature model ∑ and the first random number r ∑ , through the standard signature private key sk ∑ For the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) to sign and obtain the standard signature σ ∑ =∑.Sign(sk ∑ ,(pk,σ RS );r ∑ ), the standard signature σ ∑ After combining with the vehicle public key pk, the second key pair (pk, σ Σ ); 4) Generate the second random number r using the polynomial time verification algorithm PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function Com =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σ RS ,1)) and define the label value as 1, through the second random number r Com For the second key pair (pk,σ ∑ ) performs commitment operation and generates commitment value c=Com((pk,σ ∑ );r Com ), Com is the commitment operation; 5) The ring signature result σ RS After combining with the corresponding commitment value c, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c).

4. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The signature validity verification is performed on the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and the verification result of the ring signature is output after the verification is passed, specifically: Ring public key The ring signature public key in Ring signature σ RS and message m is input to the verification model If the ring signature σ RS =⊥, the signature verification is deemed to have failed, and the verification result of the output ring signature is 0; otherwise, the verification result of the output ring signature is 1.

5. The method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 1, wherein: The pseudo-random function is used to reproduce the random number and generate the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ), specifically including: The same input as the ring signature process, including the pseudo-random private key sk PRF , public key pk, ring signature result σ RS And the corresponding label 0 is input into the verification model PRF.Eval in the pseudorandom function, and the first random number r is recalculated ∑ for r' ∑ =PRF.Eval(sk PRF ,(pk,σ RS ,0)); Using the same label 1 as the ring signature process, the second random number r is recalculated using a pseudo-random function Com for r' Com ; Use the recalculated second random number r' Com , through the standard signature model ∑ for the first key pair (pk,σ RS ) Sign again to get the re-signed standard signature σ' ∑ ; The second random number r' will be recalculated Com and the recalculated standard signature σ' ∑ After combination, we get the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ).

6. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The declarable verification specifically includes: According to the ring public key The superscript n corresponds to the number of the vehicle public key, the signer's vehicle public key pk, and the signature result of the ring signature scheme σ=(σ RS ,c) and the statement evidence ζ=(r' Com ,σ' ∑ ) performs declarable verification. If both checks are met, the current signature is deemed valid and label 1 is output; Among them, two inspections include: 1) According to the recalculated standard signature σ' Σ And the recalculated second random number r' Com The recalculated commitment value c'=Com(σ' Σ ,r' Com ) matches the commitment value c generated by the initial signing process; 2) Use Σ.Verify(pk Σ ,σ' Σ ,(pk,σ RS ))Verify the signature, output 0 if the verification fails, and output 1 if the verification passes; where Σ.Verify is the standard verification sub-model in the standard signature model.

7. A method for implementing a declarable ring signature for an Internet of Vehicles system according to claim 6, characterized in that: When the commitment value c'=Com((pk,σ' Σ );r' Com ) does not match the commitment value c generated in the initial signing process, the output statement evidence ζ = ⊥.

8. A vehicle networking system, characterized in that: The entities of the Internet of Vehicles system include a trusted institution, a traffic management department, a key generation center, a roadside unit, and a vehicle, and the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is used to implement a declarable ring signature, specifically including: Initialization phase: After initialization, the system public parameters are generated and broadcast. The key generation center generates the vehicle public and private key pair (pk, sk) based on the security parameters and sends it to the vehicle. Among them, the vehicle private key sk contains the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF ; Signature phase: The vehicle uses the double-ring signature algorithm to sign the message and generate a ring signature result σ RS , according to the pseudo-random function private key sk PRF Generate a random number for the commitment operation, and use the generated commitment value c and the ring signature result σ RS After the combination, the signature result of the declarable ring signature scheme is obtained σ=(σ RS ,c); Signature verification phase: Verify the validity of the signature result σ of the declarable ring signature scheme, and output the verification result of the ring signature after verification. Identity verification stage: A pseudo-random function is used to reproduce random numbers to generate a declaration evidence. After the declaration verification is passed, the identity of the signer is confirmed.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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