Communication control method and device of vehicle, electronic equipment and computer readable storage medium

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a vehicle communication control method and device, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining a target file which is used for storing a communication domain name of a network service, and the network service is a service authorized to establish communication connection with a vehicle; in response to the network communication request, verifying the network communication request by using the target file to obtain a first verification result, the first verification result being used for indicating an authorization state of a target network service requested to be accessed by the network communication request; in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization state is an authorized state, accessing the target network service by using the network communication request; or, in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization state is an unauthorized state, prohibiting the access to the target network service by using the network communication request. The technical problem that the communication security of the vehicle cannot be effectively guaranteed in the related technology is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle communication technology, and in particular to a vehicle communication control method, device, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing prevalence of intelligent connected vehicles, the connection between vehicles and the internet is becoming increasingly close. However, this also introduces cybersecurity risks, especially malicious attacks and data breaches targeting in-vehicle systems. Traditional vehicle communication control strategies, such as firewall or blacklist strategies, can mitigate known cyberattacks to some extent. However, facing increasingly complex network environments and constantly evolving attack techniques, traditional communication control strategies are struggling to cope with new types of cyberattacks and cannot effectively guarantee vehicle communication security.

[0003] There is currently no effective solution to the technical problem that traditional communication control strategies cannot effectively guarantee vehicle communication security. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a vehicle communication control method, device, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium, aiming to improve the technical problem that the communication security of vehicles cannot be effectively guaranteed in related technologies.

[0005] According to one aspect of the embodiments of this application, a communication control method for a vehicle is provided. The method includes: acquiring a target file, wherein the target file is used to store the communication domain name of a network service, the network service being a service authorized to establish a communication connection with the vehicle; in response to a network communication request, verifying the network communication request using the target file to obtain a first verification result, wherein the first verification result is used to indicate the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request; in response to the first verification result indicating an authorized status, accessing the target network service using the network communication request; or, in response to the first verification result indicating an unauthorized status, prohibiting access to the target network service using the network communication request.

[0006] In the vehicle communication control method provided in this application embodiment, the target file stores the communication domain names of network services authorized to establish communication connections with the vehicle. Based on this, after responding to a network communication request, the network communication request can be verified based on the target file to obtain a first verification result. If the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is authorized, then the network communication request can be used to access the target network service. If the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is unauthorized, then the network communication request is prohibited from accessing the target network service. That is, by verifying the responded network communication request through the target file, it can be ensured that the vehicle's network communication requests only access authorized network services, effectively blocking network communication requests corresponding to unauthorized network services, thereby improving the protection strength of vehicle secure communication, achieving the purpose of comprehensively resisting unknown network attacks, realizing the technical effect of improving vehicle communication security, and thus solving the technical problem in related technologies that cannot effectively guarantee vehicle communication security.

[0007] Optionally, the network communication request is verified using the target file to obtain a first verification result, including: determining the matching result between the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request and the communication domain name stored in the target file; in response to the matching result indicating that there is a communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determining that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is authorized; or, in response to the matching result indicating that there is no communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determining that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is unauthorized.

[0008] In this embodiment, by accurately matching the target communication domain name in the network communication request with the communication domain name in the target file, a matching result is obtained. Then, based on the matching result, the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is determined. This enables proactive screening and authorization control of vehicle network communication, ensuring that vehicle network communication requests only access authorized network services. This establishes a clear access threshold for vehicle network communication, effectively avoids malicious network attacks, and improves vehicle communication security.

[0009] Optionally, the target file is a file signed with the private key of a digital certificate. Before using the target file to verify the network communication request, the method further includes: performing signature verification on the target file based on the public key of the digital certificate to obtain a second verification result; in response to the second verification result indicating that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, configuring the target file in the vehicle using the vehicle's network configuration interface.

[0010] In this embodiment, the target file is signed with the private key of a digital certificate. After receiving the target file, the signature is verified using the public key of the digital certificate. Once the verification confirms that the target file has not been tampered with, it can be securely configured into the vehicle. This signing mechanism effectively ensures the security of the target file during transmission, preventing attacks or malicious tampering and enhancing the integrity and reliability of the target file.

[0011] Optionally, after configuring the target file, the method further includes: controlling the network configuration interface to be in a locked state, wherein the locked state is used to indicate that devices other than the target device are prohibited from modifying the vehicle's network configuration, and the target device is used to provide the target file.

[0012] In this embodiment, after the target file is configured in the vehicle, the control network configuration interface is locked. This effectively prevents unauthorized devices from modifying the vehicle's network configuration, reduces the risk of the target file being maliciously tampered with, and enhances the vehicle's security capabilities.

[0013] Optionally, the method further includes: in response to receiving an updated target file sent by the target device, updating the target file already configured in the vehicle using a network configuration interface.

[0014] In this embodiment, upon receiving the updated target file from the target device, the target file already configured in the vehicle can be updated promptly via the network configuration interface, enabling the vehicle to verify network communication requests according to the latest target file. This dynamic target file update mechanism effectively prevents new types of network attacks, fixes known vulnerabilities, and enhances the vehicle's adaptability to new network attacks.

[0015] Optionally, after prohibiting access to the target network service via network communication requests, the method further includes: sending the network communication request to a target storage address of the vehicle, wherein the target storage address is used to store network communication requests corresponding to network services in an unauthorized state.

[0016] In this embodiment of the application, for network communication requests that have not passed authorization verification, not only is it prohibited to use the network communication request to access the target network service, but the network communication request is also redirected to the target storage address inside the vehicle, thereby preventing the network communication request that has not passed authorization verification from flowing to the external network environment.

[0017] Optionally, the method further includes: in response to the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address being greater than or equal to a preset number, generating a network communication request set based on the network communication requests stored in the target storage address; encrypting the network communication request set to obtain an encrypted network communication request set; and sending the encrypted network communication request set to the target device.

[0018] In this embodiment of the application, when the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address is greater than or equal to a preset number, the set of network communication requests constituted by the network communication requests stored in the target storage address can be encrypted and then transmitted to the target device. This allows the target device to centrally analyze network communication requests that have not passed authorization verification, identify abnormal communication patterns, and promptly detect potential security threats or system failures, providing strong support for remote diagnosis and safety management of vehicles.

[0019] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a communication control device for a vehicle is provided. The device includes: an acquisition unit, configured to acquire a target file, wherein the target file stores the communication domain name of a network service, the network service being a service authorized to establish a communication connection with the vehicle; a verification unit, configured to verify the network communication request using the target file in response to a network communication request, obtaining a first verification result, wherein the first verification result indicates the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request; and a control unit, configured to access the target network service using the network communication request in response to the first verification result indicating an authorized status; or, in response to the first verification result indicating an unauthorized status, prohibit access to the target network service using the network communication request.

[0020] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, an electronic device is also provided, including a processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; wherein the processor is configured to execute instructions to implement the method described above.

[0021] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program is configured to perform the above-described method when run by a processor.

[0022] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method.

[0023] It should be noted that the general descriptions above and the detailed descriptions below are merely illustrative and explanatory for this application and do not constitute a limitation thereof. Attached Figure Description

[0024] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a vehicle communication control method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the communication mechanism in a vehicle communication control system provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0026] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a vehicle communication control device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0027] Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0028] To make the technical problems, technical solutions, and beneficial effects solved by this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0029] In vehicle cybersecurity, firewall control strategies are typically employed. These strategies involve deploying firewalls within the vehicle's infotainment system or telematics box (T-Box) to block known cyberattacks. However, this defense mechanism is only effective against known threats and struggles to address emerging cyberattacks.

[0030] In related technologies, security chips or hardware virtualization are also used to divide security domains and restrict network access by non-secure modules to enhance vehicle communication security. While this approach provides high vehicle communication security, its high hardware cost and low flexibility limit its application in low-cost models, and the long hardware update cycle makes it difficult to quickly adapt to new service requirements or security threats.

[0031] However, this application provides a vehicle communication control method that verifies network communication requests received by the vehicle by storing a target file containing the communication domain names of network services authorized to establish communication connections with the vehicle, and obtains a first verification result. If the first verification result indicates that the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request exists in the target file, it is determined that the target network service requested by the network communication request is in an authorized state. In this case, the network communication request is controlled to access the target network service normally. If the first verification result indicates that the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request does not exist in the target file, it is determined that the target network service requested by the network communication request is in an unauthorized state. In this case, the network communication request is prohibited from accessing the target network service normally, that is, the network communication request is intercepted, and the network communication request is stored in the vehicle's target storage address. The target storage address is used to store all intercepted network communication requests for subsequent analysis.

[0032] The vehicle communication control method provided in this application achieves the following technical effects: by verifying network communication requests through the target file, only network communication requests are allowed to access network services authorized to establish communication connections with the vehicle, while network communication requests corresponding to unknown network services that are not authorized to establish communication connections with the vehicle are blocked. This "zero-trust" security protection mechanism can effectively block network communication requests corresponding to unauthorized network services, thereby improving the protection strength of vehicle secure communication, achieving the goal of comprehensively resisting unknown network attacks, and realizing the technical effect of improving vehicle communication security. This solves the technical problem in related technologies that cannot effectively guarantee vehicle communication security.

[0033] This application provides a vehicle communication control method, please refer to... Figure 1 This includes the following steps:

[0034] S110: Obtain the target file.

[0035] S120: In response to a network communication request, the network communication request is verified using the target file to obtain a first verification result.

[0036] S130: In response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is authorized, request access to the target network service using network communication is permitted; or, in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is unauthorized, request access to the target network service using network communication is prohibited.

[0037] In this embodiment, the target file is used to store the communication domain names of network services. These network services are those authorized to establish communication connections with the vehicle; that is, the network services corresponding to the communication domain names stored in the target file are certified, secure, and compliant with the vehicle's communication requirements. Examples include software upgrade services, remote diagnostic services, vehicle networking services, and other third-party services. No specific restrictions are imposed here. This target file can also be referred to as a whitelist file.

[0038] Optionally, the target device can pre-determine the network service that establishes a communication connection with the vehicle, and then generate a target file based on the determined communication domain name of the network service. This target device can be a vehicle manufacturer's server. After generating the target file, it can be encrypted, and the encrypted target file can be transmitted to the vehicle's infotainment system.

[0039] For example, after generating the target file, the private key of the digital certificate can be used to encrypt and sign the target file to ensure its integrity and reliability during transmission. After the signed target file is transmitted to the vehicle's infotainment system, the system can use the public key of the digital certificate to verify the signature. If the signature verification result indicates that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, it can then be used to verify network communication requests. The public key used for signature verification corresponds to the private key used for signing.

[0040] Optionally, to ensure the timeliness and validity of the target file, it can be dynamically updated based on changes in network services within the network environment. For example, if a new network service emerges that needs to establish a communication connection with the vehicle, and this new network service is a certified network service, the communication domain name of the new network service can be added to the target file to obtain an updated target file. If the network service corresponding to the original communication domain name in the target file is abnormal, the abnormal communication domain name can be deleted from the target file to obtain an updated target file. This updated target file can then be used to verify network communication requests.

[0041] For example, the target device can monitor the network environment in real time and update the target file according to the status of various network services in the network environment. The updated target file is then sent to the vehicle's infotainment system, which in turn updates the stored target file based on the updated target file.

[0042] Optionally, after obtaining the target file, if the vehicle's in-vehicle infotainment system responds to a network communication request, it can use the target file to verify the network communication request and obtain a first verification result. This first verification result indicates the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request. If the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is authorized, then the target network service is determined to be an authenticated and secure network service. In this case, the network communication request can be used to access the target network service; that is, the network communication request is allowed and executed, a secure communication connection is established with the target network service, and data exchange or service usage is performed.

[0043] Optionally, if the target network service requested by the network communication request is in an unauthorized state, it is determined that the target network service is not authenticated. In this case, to ensure vehicle communication security, sending the network communication request to the target network service is prohibited; for example, the network communication request can be intercepted.

[0044] Optionally, after intercepting the network communication request, to prevent the request from flowing into the external network environment, the request can be redirected to the vehicle's target storage address. That is, if the network communication request verification fails, the request is sent to the vehicle's target storage address.

[0045] Optionally, by storing failed network communication requests inside the vehicle instead of allowing them to flow into the external network environment, unnecessary consumption of network resources can be avoided, and the impact of malicious traffic on the external network environment can be reduced. Furthermore, analyzing the network communication requests stored in the target storage address can optimize the vehicle's security protection strategy and enhance its intelligent defense capabilities.

[0046] In steps S110 to S130 of this application, each network communication request is verified through the target file. This ensures that the vehicle's network communication requests only access authorized network services and effectively blocks network communication requests corresponding to unauthorized network services. This "zero-trust" security protection mechanism can effectively block network communication requests corresponding to unauthorized network services, thereby improving the protection strength of vehicle secure communication and achieving the goal of comprehensively resisting unknown network attacks. This achieves the technical effect of improving the communication security of the vehicle and solves the technical problem in related technologies that cannot effectively guarantee the communication security of the vehicle.

[0047] The method described in this embodiment will now be further explained.

[0048] As an optional implementation, step S120 verifies the network communication request using the target file to obtain a first verification result, including: determining the matching result between the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request and the communication domain name stored in the target file; in response to the matching result indicating that there is a communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determining that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is authorized; or, in response to the matching result indicating that there is no communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determining that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is unauthorized.

[0049] In this embodiment, when verifying a network communication request using a target file, the verification can be performed by determining whether the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request is in the target file.

[0050] Optionally, the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request is matched with the communication domain name stored in the target file to obtain a matching result, wherein the matching result can indicate whether there is a communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name.

[0051] Optionally, if the matching result indicates that the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request exists in the target file, then the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is determined to be authorized, that is, the network communication request is an authorized communication request. In this case, normal access to the target network service by the network communication request can be controlled. Conversely, if the matching result indicates that the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request does not exist in the target file, then the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is determined to be unauthorized, that is, the network communication request is an unauthorized communication request. In this case, access to the target network service by the network communication request is prohibited, and the network communication request can be redirected to the target storage address of the vehicle.

[0052] In the above steps, by accurately matching the target communication domain name in the network communication request with the communication domain name in the target file, a matching result is obtained. Then, based on the matching result, the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request is determined. This enables proactive screening and authorization control of vehicle network communication, ensuring that vehicle network communication requests only access authorized network services. This establishes a clear access threshold for vehicle network communication, effectively avoids malicious network attacks, and improves vehicle communication security.

[0053] As an optional implementation, the target file is a file signed with the private key of a digital certificate. Before using the target file to verify the network communication request, the method further includes: performing signature verification on the target file based on the public key of the digital certificate to obtain a second verification result; in response to the second verification result indicating that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, configuring the target file in the vehicle using the vehicle's network configuration interface.

[0054] In this embodiment, since the target file is used to determine whether a network communication request can normally access the target network service, the security and integrity of the target file are crucial. To ensure the reliability of the target file and prevent malicious tampering during transmission, the target file can be encrypted during transmission using a digitally signed private key.

[0055] Optionally, after the target file is generated, it is signed by the target device using the private key of the digital certificate. This signing process creates a set of encrypted data as proof of the authenticity and integrity of the target file. The signing ensures that the target file can only be generated by a legitimate entity possessing the private key, preventing the possibility of file forgery.

[0056] Optionally, after receiving the target file, the vehicle's infotainment system first uses a set of public keys corresponding to the signing private key to verify the signature of the target file, obtaining a second verification result. This verification process confirms that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, ensuring the reliability of the file's content and origin.

[0057] Optionally, if the second verification result indicates that the signature verification of the target file is successful, that is, the signature of the target file matches the public key successfully, then it is determined that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, that is, the content and source of the target file are trustworthy.

[0058] Optionally, after verifying the signature of the target file, it can be configured in the vehicle via the vehicle's network configuration interface. This configuration process ensures that the target file can be correctly read and applied by the vehicle's infotainment system for real-time verification and control of network communication requests.

[0059] In the above steps, digital signatures and public key verification can effectively detect and prevent malicious tampering of the target file during transmission, ensuring the integrity and reliability of the target file content.

[0060] As an optional implementation, after configuring the target file, the method further includes: controlling the network configuration interface to be in a locked state, wherein the locked state is used to indicate that devices other than the target device are prohibited from modifying the vehicle's network configuration, and the target device is used to provide the target file.

[0061] In this embodiment, the configuration and management of the target file is crucial to ensuring network communication security. However, simply configuring the target file is insufficient to guarantee the security of the vehicle system, as any unverified modifications could expose the system to new security threats. Therefore, after configuring the target file in the vehicle, the vehicle's network configuration interface can be locked.

[0062] Optionally, the network configuration interface allows changes to the vehicle's network settings, including but not limited to proxy server configuration, Domain Name System (DNS) settings, and firewall rules. These settings directly affect how the vehicle interacts with external networks. If the network configuration interface is not properly protected, attackers may use various methods (such as malware, physical access, social engineering, etc.) to tamper with network settings, thereby bypassing security policies and achieving unauthorized communication or data theft. Therefore, after the target file is configured, the vehicle's infotainment system will automatically lock the network configuration interface. The locked state means that no device other than the target device can directly modify the vehicle's network configuration. This target device is typically a specific device or system authorized by the automaker, possessing a unique identifier and undergoing digital certificate or other forms of security authentication to ensure its legitimacy.

[0063] Optionally, the target device has permission to modify or update network configurations, typically for emergency security responses, system maintenance, or dynamic whitelist updates. These operations are only permitted after a rigorous authentication and authorization process. Each time the target device unlocks the network configuration interface for modification or update, its operation is recorded in detail, including the device identifier, operation time, and the content of the operation. These records are used for subsequent security audits and event tracking.

[0064] In the above steps, after configuring the target file in the vehicle, the vehicle's network configuration interface is locked, which effectively prevents unauthorized devices from modifying the vehicle's network settings and maintains the security and stability of the vehicle's infotainment system.

[0065] As an optional implementation, the method further includes: in response to receiving an updated target file sent by the target device, updating the target file already configured in the vehicle using a network configuration interface.

[0066] In this embodiment, to ensure the real-time nature and accuracy of the target file, the target file can be updated periodically according to changes in the status of network services in the network environment.

[0067] Optionally, the target device refers to a specific device or system officially authorized by the automaker for updating or maintaining the vehicle's network configuration, such as the automaker's server. The target device typically possesses high security and reliability to ensure that no additional security risks are introduced during operation, and the target device has the authority to modify the vehicle's network configuration.

[0068] Optionally, if the target device receives a new network service in the network environment that needs to establish a communication connection with the vehicle, it can authenticate the new network service. That is, it can determine whether the new network service meets the requirements for secure communication with the vehicle. If the authentication is successful, the communication domain name of the new network service can be added to the target file, resulting in an updated target file. If the target device receives a change in the status of the network service corresponding to a communication domain name already stored in the target file—that is, if the network service no longer meets the requirements for secure communication with the vehicle—then the communication domain name of that network service can be deleted from the target file, resulting in an updated target file. In other words, the target device can add or delete communication domain names in the target file based on the status of network services in the network environment to obtain an updated target file, ensuring the validity and reliability of the target file.

[0069] Optionally, after receiving the updated target file, the target device can encrypt and sign the updated target file and send it to the vehicle's infotainment system. After receiving the updated target file sent by the target device, the infotainment system can first verify the identity information of the target device to ensure that the target device is an authorized device to modify the vehicle's network configuration.

[0070] Optionally, if the target device passes the verification, the updated target file can be further verified by signature to ensure that the updated target file has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0071] Optionally, after both the target device's authentication and the updated target file's signature verification are successful, the vehicle's infotainment system will compare the version information of the old and new target files. If the updated target file version is higher than the version information of the target file currently configured in the vehicle, the target file already configured in the vehicle will be updated using the network configuration interface, thereby achieving dynamic updating of the target file.

[0072] Optionally, after the target file is completely updated, the vehicle's network configuration interface will be locked again until it receives another update request for the target file from the target device; otherwise, other devices will not be able to modify the target file.

[0073] Optionally, after configuring the updated target file in the vehicle, the updated target file can be used as a reference to verify the network communication requests responded to by the vehicle.

[0074] In the above steps, the dynamic updating capability of the target file allows automakers to quickly respond to newly discovered security threats, add or delete communication domain names in the target file in a timely manner, effectively resist new types of network attacks in the network environment, and improve the vehicle's security protection capabilities.

[0075] As an optional implementation, after prohibiting access to the target network service via network communication requests, the method further includes: sending the network communication request to a target storage address of the vehicle, wherein the target storage address is used to store network communication requests corresponding to network services in an unauthorized state.

[0076] In this embodiment, network communication requests that fail to pass verification can be stored in the vehicle's target storage address to prevent such network communication requests from flowing into the external network environment.

[0077] Optionally, the target storage address can be a memory area or hard disk space within the vehicle, used to store network communication requests attempting to access unauthorized network services. The main purpose of storing such network communication requests through the target storage address is to ensure that these requests are securely stored, not leaked to external networks, and do not interfere with the vehicle's normal communication and services. Optionally, the stored request information may include, but is not limited to, the request's timestamp, source process information, target domain name, and request type, which can be used for subsequent security analysis of these network communication requests.

[0078] Optionally, the network communication requests stored in the target storage address can be used for in-depth analysis of potential attack behaviors, identification of system vulnerabilities, and tracking of malicious activity. By analyzing these network communication requests, insights into attack sources, attack methods, and attack frequencies can be gained, thereby enabling the development of targeted protection strategies to enhance the vehicle's overall defense capabilities.

[0079] Optionally, network communication requests stored in the target storage address can also serve as the basis for triggering a security response. For example, if a large number of network communication requests targeting the same unauthorized network service are detected within a short period of time, this may indicate a specific attack pattern. In this case, an emergency response plan can be activated according to preset security protection strategies, and the vehicle owner and security team can be notified to promptly block the threat and reduce potential damage.

[0080] The steps described above, which redirect unauthorized network communication requests and store them at a target storage address, represent an intelligent security strategy that combines defense and observation. This not only instantly blocks potential non-compliant access but also provides security teams with rich data resources for continuous optimization of protective measures, thereby building a more robust cybersecurity barrier for vehicles.

[0081] As an optional implementation, the method further includes: in response to the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address being greater than or equal to a preset number, generating a network communication request set based on the network communication requests stored in the target storage address; encrypting the network communication request set to obtain an encrypted network communication request set; and sending the encrypted network communication request set to the target device.

[0082] In this embodiment, the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address is limited. If the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address is greater than or equal to a preset threshold (e.g., 1000 network communication requests), the network communication requests stored in the target storage address can be organized to generate a network communication request set. Then, the network communication request set is encrypted and transmitted to the target device, which decodes and analyzes the network communication request set to identify potential attack behaviors and execute defense strategies, so that the vehicle can better avoid unknown risks.

[0083] In the above steps, if the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address is greater than or equal to a preset number, the set of network communication requests stored in the target storage address can be encrypted and then transmitted to the target device. This allows the target device to centrally analyze network communication requests that have not passed authorization verification, identify abnormal communication patterns, and promptly detect potential security threats or system failures, providing strong support for remote vehicle diagnostics and safety management.

[0084] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be illustrated below with reference to preferred embodiments.

[0085] In this embodiment of the invention, the vehicle manufacturer's server pre-configures a compliance whitelist file, which contains the communication domain names of all authorized and trusted internet resources. The vehicle manufacturer's server can encrypt this whitelist file and send it to the vehicle's infotainment system. Upon receiving the whitelist file, the infotainment system can verify it. If the verification is successful, the whitelist file is stored. When the infotainment system initiates a network communication request, the vehicle's internal global proxy server checks whether the destination domain name of the network communication request is listed in the whitelist file. If the requested destination domain name is on the whitelist, the network communication request is allowed to access the network service corresponding to that domain name. If the requested destination domain name is not on the whitelist, the network communication request is blocked.

[0086] Optionally, network communication requests originating from the vehicle's infotainment system can be verified through a built-in global proxy server instead of being sent directly to the outside. The global proxy server performs the verification process based on a whitelist to ensure that only network communication requests with destination domains on the whitelist are allowed. For domain requests that fail whitelist verification, the proxy server redirects these network communication requests to an invalid local address, preventing them from leaving the vehicle's infotainment system. This ensures that all network communication requests adhere to the "zero trust" security principle, preventing unauthorized domain requests from reaching the destination domain and thus preventing potential data leaks or access to malicious websites. In other words, in this embodiment of the invention, by defaulting to all external communications as potentially dangerous and requiring verification through a whitelist, communication between the vehicle and malicious or unauthorized internet resources is effectively prevented, playing a crucial role in ensuring the data security of intelligent connected vehicles and preventing network attacks.

[0087] Optionally, to further enhance network communication security and prevent the proxy configuration from being modified to bypass the aforementioned protection measures, the configuration entry point of the global proxy server is locked, disallowing unauthorized devices from modifying this entry point. In this way, even if the vehicle's infotainment system suffers some degree of intrusion, attackers cannot easily tamper with the proxy settings.

[0088] Alternatively, considering that the whitelist needs to be updated regularly based on the addition or removal of services and changes in the security posture, the whitelist can be updated remotely through a secure channel by the vehicle manufacturer's server without frequent firmware upgrades. This maintains the flexibility of the vehicle communication system and strengthens its long-term security protection capabilities.

[0089] Optionally, the whitelist is not static. Automakers' servers can remotely update the whitelist file via a secure channel, adding new network service domains or removing existing ones to adapt to constantly changing service and security environments. This dynamic update mechanism maintains the highest security standards consistent with the zero-trust principle without altering the physical configuration of the vehicle's infotainment system.

[0090] In this embodiment of the invention, a combination of predefined whitelists, deployment of mandatory global proxies, implementation of security locking, and dynamic update mechanisms achieves comprehensive control over vehicle network communication. This ensures that only verified and authorized communication can proceed, while all other network communication requests are intercepted or redirected, embodying a zero-trust protection strategy of "never trusting, always verifying." This not only effectively defends against known and unknown network attacks but also significantly reduces the risk of data leakage and loss of system control due to network penetration.

[0091] Figure 2This is a schematic diagram of the communication mechanism in a vehicle communication control system provided in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 2 As shown, the vehicle's communication control system includes: a vehicle manufacturer server 201, a vehicle infotainment system 202, a global proxy detection module 203, an engineering mode interface 204, a target network service 205, a local loopback address 206, and an attack target 207.

[0092] The vehicle manufacturer's server 201 is used to generate and update whitelists, and then encrypt and sign the whitelists before sending them to the vehicle's infotainment system. The vehicle manufacturer's server also receives security logs uploaded from vehicles for subsequent analysis and policy optimization.

[0093] The vehicle system 202 is used to receive the whitelist from the vehicle manufacturer's server 201, verify the signature of the whitelist, and store the whitelist after the signature verification is successful.

[0094] The global proxy detection module 203 is located inside the vehicle infotainment system 202. It is used to intercept all network communication requests and allow or redirect them based on a whitelist. This global proxy detection module, through tight integration with the vehicle infotainment system's network protocol stack, ensures that all communication activities are monitored and controlled.

[0095] Engineering module interface 204 is the vehicle's software configuration interface, used for system maintenance and debugging. In this embodiment of the invention, this interface is securely locked, allowing only authorized devices to modify the configuration under specific conditions, preventing malicious tampering of the proxy rules.

[0096] Target network service 205 is the destination of a legitimate communication request, including OTA upgrade servers, remote diagnostic platforms, vehicle networking services, etc.

[0097] The local loopback address 206 is used to store unauthorized or malicious network communication requests. In other words, all intercepted network communication requests will be redirected to this address, thereby preventing the leakage of sensitive information and the execution of malicious behaviors.

[0098] Target 207 is used to indicate external threat sources, including hackers, malware, etc.

[0099] Optionally, the vehicle manufacturer's server 201 dynamically generates and encrypts a signed whitelist file based on the latest system requirements and security policies, ensuring the legality of its content and the reliability of its source. Subsequently, the vehicle manufacturer's server executes step S210 through a secure channel, sending the signed whitelist to the vehicle's infotainment system 202. To maintain the timeliness of the whitelist, the server also periodically (e.g., every 24 hours) executes step S220, sending an updated signed whitelist to the vehicle's infotainment system 202.

[0100] Optionally, after receiving the aforementioned whitelist file, the vehicle infotainment system 202 performs an integrity verification on the received whitelist file. The verification process includes verifying the digital signature of the whitelist to ensure it has not been tampered with. Once the whitelist passes verification, the vehicle infotainment system securely stores it and updates its internal whitelist database. Furthermore, to prevent unauthorized modification of the whitelist, the vehicle infotainment system executes step S230: sending a lock command to the engineering mode interface 204 to close the entry point for modifying network configuration, thereby increasing security.

[0101] Optionally, the vehicle system 202 is also used to perform step S240, sending a network service request to the global agent detection module 203.

[0102] Optionally, after receiving the network communication request sent by the vehicle system 202 and the network communication request sent by the attack target 207 through step S250, the global proxy detection module 203 uses an efficient algorithm (such as a Trie tree) to verify the request based on the stored whitelist file to determine whether the target domain name of the request is in the whitelist. If the target domain name is in the whitelist, step S260 is executed to allow the network communication request, that is, the network communication request is allowed to be sent normally. Conversely, if the verification result indicates that the communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request is not in the whitelist, step S270 is executed to intercept the network communication request and redirect the network communication request to store the intercepted network communication request in the vehicle's local loopback address 206. That is, for network communication requests corresponding to domain names not in the whitelist, they are redirected to the local loopback address (e.g., an invalid local address) to ensure that sensitive data is not leaked, and attack attempts are recorded for subsequent security analysis.

[0103] The vehicle's communication control system provides a complete communication mechanism, from whitelist definition and loading to agent detection and configuration locking, emphasizing a three-pronged defense mechanism of "definition-interception-locking." By using the vehicle manufacturer's server as the policy center, the vehicle's infotainment system as the executor, and the global agent as the key defense line, a closed-loop, software-driven network security system is formed. This aims to achieve "zero-trust" protection for the vehicle's infotainment network, effectively intercepting unknown threats, while simultaneously reducing costs and meeting security standards through software. Furthermore, the dynamic update function indicates that the vehicle manufacturer's server can promptly update the whitelist upon discovering new security threats or adding service domains without recalling vehicles or requiring on-site configuration changes, thereby improving system response speed and maintenance efficiency.

[0104] The key mechanisms in the communication control of the aforementioned vehicles will be further described below.

[0105] Optionally, the whitelist must adhere to domain name admission rules. For example, the whitelist may be limited to the automaker's own domain name and the domain names of its approved service providers, the latter requiring digital signature verification to ensure their legitimacy. A wide range of domain name rules are supported, including wildcards and exact matches, to accommodate different levels and types of communication needs.

[0106] Optionally, to ensure the integrity of the whitelist file and prevent tampering, the whitelist file can be signed with the private key of a digital certificate and verified on the vehicle's infotainment system using the public key of the digital certificate to confirm the integrity and reliability of the whitelist file.

[0107] Optionally, updates to the whitelist must adhere to strict version control, with each update's version number incrementing to prevent malicious rollbacks of older versions. The update frequency is configurable, for example, once every 24 hours, to quickly adapt to emerging threats and business changes.

[0108] Optionally, for global proxy configuration, in order to achieve precise proxy logic, requests to domains within the whitelist are allowed to pass directly. For domains not on the whitelist, requests will be forcibly redirected to the local loopback address.

[0109] Optionally, to ensure that the global proxy can handle a wide range of network communication protocols, including Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP), while allowing for flexible port configuration to accommodate different service requirements.

[0110] Optionally, an efficient data structure, such as a Trie tree, can be used for domain name matching to ensure that the global agent responds quickly under automotive-grade real-time requirements, with a response latency of no more than 5 milliseconds and an overall memory usage of less than 50MB, making it suitable for resource-constrained in-vehicle environments.

[0111] Optionally, locking can be implemented at multiple system levels, including the kernel and system levels, to prevent malware or unauthorized users from tampering with agent configurations through system interfaces. For example, disabling firewall rule tables (iptables) and the kernel network filtering framework (netfilter), removing ADB debugging privileges, and hiding the engineering mode entry point.

[0112] Optionally, for the dynamic update mechanism of the whitelist, an encrypted protocol can be used to transmit the whitelist update package, while two-way certificate authentication is used to ensure the security of data during transmission and the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity. On the vehicle's side, the integrity of the whitelist update package is ensured by calculating the hash value of the update file and comparing it with the signature.

[0113] Optionally, an automatic rollback mechanism is designed to maintain the system in the latest successful version state in case of update failure. If three consecutive updates fail, a security alert is triggered, indicating that the automaker may have a serious problem.

[0114] Optionally, for intercepted network communication requests, detailed interception information can be recorded, including timestamps, request domain names, source process identifiers (PIDs), and storage location information, for subsequent analysis and forensics. Effective log management is implemented, with a local storage limit of 1000 entries. Logs exceeding this limit are encrypted and compressed, and uploaded to the vehicle manufacturer's security platform according to a traffic threshold policy. In emergency situations, such as high-frequency attacks, logs will be uploaded in real time for immediate response.

[0115] According to an embodiment of this application, a vehicle communication control device is also provided. It should be noted that this vehicle communication control device can be used to execute the vehicle communication control method described in the foregoing embodiments.

[0116] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a vehicle communication control device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 As shown, the vehicle's communication control device 30 includes: an acquisition unit 310, used to acquire a target file, wherein the target file is used to store the communication domain name of a network service, and the network service is a service authorized to establish a communication connection with the vehicle; a verification unit 320, used to verify the network communication request using the target file in response to a network communication request, and obtain a first verification result, wherein the first verification result is used to indicate the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request; and a control unit 330, used to access the target network service using the network communication request in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is authorized; or, in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is unauthorized, to prohibit access to the target network service using the network communication request.

[0117] Optionally, the verification unit 320 is further configured to: determine the matching result between the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request and the communication domain name stored in the target file; in response to the matching result indicating that there is a communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determine that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is authorized; or, in response to the matching result indicating that there is no communication domain name in the target file that matches the target communication domain name, determine that the first verification result indicates that the authorization status of the target network service is unauthorized.

[0118] Optionally, the target file is a file signed with the private key of a digital certificate. Before verifying the network communication request using the target file, the device 30 is further configured to: perform signature verification on the target file based on the public key of the digital certificate to obtain a second verification result; and, in response to the second verification result indicating that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, configure the target file in the vehicle using the vehicle's network configuration interface.

[0119] Optionally, after configuring the target file, the device 30 is further configured to: control the network configuration interface to be in a locked state, wherein the locked state is used to indicate that devices other than the target device are prohibited from modifying the vehicle's network configuration, and the target device is used to provide the target file.

[0120] Optionally, the device 30 is also used to: in response to receiving an updated target file sent by the target device, update the target file already configured in the vehicle using a network configuration interface.

[0121] Optionally, after prohibiting access to the target network service via network communication request, the device 30 is further configured to: send the network communication request to the target storage address of the vehicle, wherein the target storage address is used to store the network communication request corresponding to the network service in the unauthorized state.

[0122] Optionally, the device 30 is further configured to: generate a set of network communication requests based on the network communication requests stored in the target storage address in response to the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address being greater than or equal to a preset number; encrypt the set of network communication requests to obtain an encrypted set of network communication requests; and send the encrypted set of network communication requests to the target device.

[0123] In the vehicle's communication control device, the network communication requests are verified through the target file. This ensures that the vehicle's network communication requests only access authorized network services, effectively blocking network communication requests corresponding to unauthorized network services. This enhances the protection strength of the vehicle's secure communication, achieving the goal of comprehensively resisting unknown network attacks and improving the technical effect of enhancing the vehicle's communication security. This solves the technical problem in related technologies that cannot effectively guarantee the communication security of vehicles.

[0124] This application also provides an electronic device 40, please refer to... Figure 4 It includes a memory 410 and a processor 420, wherein the memory 410 is used to store computer programs; and the processor 420 is used to execute the programs stored in the memory 410 to implement the vehicle communication control method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0125] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the vehicle communication control method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0126] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0127] In the above embodiments of this application, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0128] In this application, "multiple" refers to two or more.

[0129] In this application, unless otherwise expressly defined, the terms should be interpreted broadly. For example, they may refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they may refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they may refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; and they may refer to the internal connection of two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this application based on the specific circumstances.

[0130] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc., in this application (if present) are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence.

[0131] In this application, the term "and / or" is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, in this application, the character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0132] Unless otherwise specified, all steps in this application may be performed sequentially or randomly. For example, if the method includes steps A and B, it means that the method may include steps A and B performed sequentially, or it may include steps B and A performed sequentially. For example, if the method may also include step C, it means that step C may be added to the method in any order. For example, the method may include steps A, B, and C, or it may include steps A, C, and B, or it may include steps C, A, and B, etc.

[0133] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit this application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A communication control method for a vehicle, characterized in that, include: Obtain the target file, wherein the target file is used to store the communication domain name of the network service, and the network service is a service authorized to establish a communication connection with the vehicle; In response to a network communication request, the network communication request is verified using the target file to obtain a first verification result, wherein the first verification result is used to indicate the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request; In response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is authorized, the system uses the network communication request to access the target network service; or... In response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is unauthorized, access to the target network service is prohibited using the network communication request.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The network communication request is verified using the target file to obtain a first verification result, including: Determine the matching result between the target communication domain name of the target network service requested by the network communication request and the communication domain name stored in the target file; In response to the matching result indicating that a communication domain name matching the target communication domain name exists in the target file, the authorization status of the target network service indicated by the first verification result is determined to be the authorized status; or, In response to the matching result indicating that there is no communication domain name matching the target communication domain name in the target file, the authorization status of the target network service indicated by the first verification result is determined to be the unauthorized status.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The target file is a file signed with the private key of a digital certificate. Before using the target file to verify the network communication request, the method further includes: Based on the public key of the digital certificate, the target file is signed and verified to obtain a second verification result; In response to the second verification result indicating that the target file has not been tampered with during transmission, the target file is configured in the vehicle using the vehicle's network configuration interface.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, After configuring the target file, the method further includes: The network configuration interface is controlled to be in a locked state, wherein the locked state is used to indicate that devices other than the target device are prohibited from modifying the network configuration of the vehicle, and the target device is used to provide the target file.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to receiving the updated target file sent by the target device, the target file already configured in the vehicle is updated using the network configuration interface.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After prohibiting access to the target network service via the network communication request, the method further includes: The network communication request is sent to the target storage address of the vehicle, wherein the target storage address is used to store the network communication request corresponding to the network service in the unauthorized state.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to the fact that the number of network communication requests stored in the target storage address is greater than or equal to a preset number, a network communication request set is generated based on the network communication requests stored in the target storage address; The network communication request set is encrypted to obtain the encrypted network communication request set; The encrypted set of network communication requests is sent to the target device.

8. A communication control device for a vehicle, characterized in that, include: An acquisition unit is used to acquire a target file, wherein the target file is used to store the communication domain name of a network service, and the network service is a service authorized to establish a communication connection with the vehicle; A verification unit is configured to, in response to a network communication request, verify the network communication request using the target file to obtain a first verification result, wherein the first verification result is used to indicate the authorization status of the target network service requested by the network communication request; The control unit is configured to, in response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is authorized, use the network communication request to access the target network service; or... In response to the first verification result indicating that the authorization status is unauthorized, access to the target network service is prohibited using the network communication request.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, Including processor and memory, among which Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor for executing a program stored in memory to implement the method described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any one of claims 1-7.

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