A survey archive security storage and tracing method

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of file management, and discloses a surveying and mapping file safe storage and tracing method, which comprises the following steps: determining a target associated block chain network based on to-be-traced surveying and mapping file data; calling cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials, and establishing a to-be-verified log set; verifying the cross-chain operation logs and the watermark anchoring credentials in the to-be-verified log set based on the to-be-traced surveying and mapping file data, and obtaining a first verification result; extracting quantum watermark information by using a quantum key; verifying the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring credentials, and obtaining a second verification result; calculating a tracing credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and outputting a tracing report based on the tracing credibility parameter and a preset tracing result judgment threshold. Through implementation of the application, the problem that related surveying and mapping file safe storage and tracing technologies cannot meet cross-chain operation atomicity requirements and cannot guarantee the whole life cycle safety of high-security-level surveying and mapping files is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of archival management technology, specifically to a method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of surveying and mapping geographic information, surveying and mapping archives, as a core component of the national spatial data infrastructure, encompass various data types including vector maps, remote sensing imagery, and 3D point clouds. Their security and traceability directly impact the accuracy of decision-making in critical areas such as land planning, resource exploration, and emergency rescue. With the acceleration of digital transformation, traditional paper-based archive management is gradually being replaced by electronic archive management. However, issues such as susceptibility to tampering, inconsistencies in cross-system data transfer, and difficulties in verifying ownership have become prominent, driving the industry's demand for upgraded secure evidence storage and traceability technologies. Currently, blockchain technology, with its immutable distributed ledger, has become a crucial support for the preservation of surveying and mapping archives. By writing archive operation records and ownership information into the blockchain, cross-node data synchronization and tamper traceability are achieved. For example, in government surveying and mapping archive management, consortium blockchains are widely used to record operations such as archive creation, borrowing, and modification, relying on node consensus mechanisms to ensure log integrity. To address the data isolation problem between different blockchain systems, cross-chain interaction technology is gradually being applied to surveying and mapping archive transfer scenarios. Existing cross-chain solutions are mostly based on hash time-locked contracts or distributed private key control to enable the transfer of archival data between different blockchain networks such as government blockchains, enterprise blockchains, and public blockchains.

[0003] However, significant limitations remain in adapting to the characteristics of surveying and mapping archives and ensuring cross-chain security and traceability reliability. From the perspective of cross-chain circulation, surveying and mapping archive data has high dimensionality and strict accuracy requirements, but current cross-chain technology lacks a dedicated verification mechanism for archive data, relying solely on general hash verification to ensure data consistency. This makes cross-chain data distortion prone to occur due to missing archive features. Regarding watermarking technology, traditional digital watermarking is based on classical cryptographic algorithms, facing the risk of being cracked by quantum computing. With the improvement of quantum computing power, the security of classical encryption algorithms such as RSA and ECC is challenged, making watermarks based on these algorithms easily cracked or tampered with. Furthermore, watermarking schemes do not fully consider the processing characteristics of surveying and mapping archives. After archive compression, cropping, and noise interference, watermark robustness is insufficient, often resulting in watermark loss or incorrect extraction, failing to effectively verify ownership. From the perspective of traceability mechanisms, current solutions mostly rely on a single verification dimension, either tracing circulation records solely through blockchain logs or confirming ownership solely through watermark extraction, lacking coordination between the two. When a dispute arises regarding the archives, if the on-chain logs are tampered with by multiple nodes in collusion, or if the watermark is destroyed, individual verification methods are unlikely to provide reliable evidence, resulting in low credibility of the tracing results.

[0004] In summary, existing technologies for secure storage and traceability of surveying and mapping archives fail to meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, exhibit insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness, and lack a highly reliable traceability mechanism linking blockchain and watermarking. Furthermore, the device security modules are not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to guarantee the security of highly confidential surveying and mapping archives throughout their entire lifecycle. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, the present invention provides a method for secure storage and traceability of surveying and mapping archives, in order to solve the problems that related surveying and mapping archives secure storage and traceability technologies cannot meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, have insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness and adaptability, and lack a highly reliable traceability mechanism that links blockchain and watermark. At the same time, the device security module is not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to ensure the security of high-confidential surveying and mapping archives throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0006] This invention provides a method for secure storage and traceability of surveying and mapping archives. The method includes: acquiring surveying and mapping archive data to be traced; determining a target associated blockchain network based on the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced; retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials based on the target associated blockchain network to establish a log set to be verified; verifying the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified based on the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and obtaining a first verification result; extracting quantum watermark information from the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced using quantum key distribution; verifying the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring credentials to obtain a second verification result; calculating a traceability credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result; and outputting a traceability report based on the traceability credibility parameter and a preset traceability result judgment threshold.

[0007] The method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives provided in this embodiment firstly obtains the data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced and determines the target associated blockchain network, providing a precise data source and network support for the traceability of surveying and mapping archives. First, complete data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced is comprehensively collected, covering the core content of the archives, metadata, and associated operation records, ensuring the integrity of the traceability data foundation. Then, combining the archive's generation scenario, storage nodes, and cross-chain interaction history, blockchain networks that have data interactions with the archives are selected as the target associated blockchain networks, clarifying the network scope required for traceability and avoiding deviations in the traceability direction due to ambiguous network positioning. Secondly, a log set to be verified is established by retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials based on the target associated blockchain network, integrating the core verification evidence required for traceability. Operation logs generated during the cross-chain transmission, storage, and modification of the archives are extracted from the distributed nodes of the target associated blockchain network, recording the archive's flow path and operational behavior; simultaneously, watermark anchoring credentials generated during archive preservation are retrieved, which associate the archives with the initial watermark information, ensuring the relevance of watermark traceability. The two types of data are categorized and organized according to time sequence and operation type, forming a clearly structured log set to be verified. Then, the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified are used to obtain the first verification result, initially determining the validity of the archive traceability from the perspective of data consistency. The archive data to be traced is compared with the archive content snapshots and operation parameters in the cross-chain operation logs to verify whether the archives have been tampered with or have abnormal parameters during the cross-chain process; at the same time, the archive data is checked against the archive identifier, watermark generation time, and other information recorded in the watermark anchoring credentials to ensure the authenticity of the correspondence between the credentials and the archives. Through multi-dimensional comparison, the first verification result reflecting data consistency is generated. Subsequently, quantum key distribution is used to extract quantum watermark information from the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, ensuring the security of the watermark extraction process and the integrity of the watermark information. Quantum keys possess the characteristics of being uncopyable and resistant to cracking. Using them as extraction keys can effectively prevent illegal interception or tampering during the extraction process, ensuring the security of the extraction operation. Simultaneously, quantum watermark information is deeply embedded in the archival data. With the help of quantum keys, the watermark embedding location can be precisely located, allowing for the complete extraction of archival traceability information from the watermark. This avoids watermark information loss or damage due to improper extraction methods, providing a reliable data source for subsequent watermark verification. Furthermore, a second verification result is obtained by verifying the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate, further strengthening the reliability of traceability verification from the perspective of watermark correlation. The extracted quantum watermark information is compared with the watermark features and generation rules recorded in the watermark anchoring certificate to verify whether the quantum watermark is the original watermark generated during archival storage, eliminating interference from counterfeit watermarks. At the same time, the consistency of archival identifiers, operation nodes, and other content contained in the watermark information with the anchoring certificate is checked to ensure that the binding relationship between the watermark and the archive has not been broken.The second verification result generated through specialized verification can supplement the verification gap in the watermark dimension of the first verification result. Finally, by calculating the traceability credibility parameter based on the first and second verification results, and combining it with a preset threshold to output a traceability report, a quantitative evaluation and clear presentation of the traceability results are achieved. Based on indicators such as the number of qualified items and the degree of matching of the two types of verification results, a preset algorithm is used to calculate the traceability credibility parameter, transforming the abstract verification result into an intuitive quantitative value; then, this parameter is compared with a preset traceability result judgment threshold to clarify whether the archival traceability result is qualified. Finally, the credibility parameter, verification details, and judgment conclusion are output in the form of a traceability report, making the traceability results clear and easy to understand, providing users with clear archival traceability basis, and meeting the practical needs of surveying and mapping archival traceability. By implementing this invention, the problems of related surveying and mapping archival security storage and traceability technologies failing to meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness adaptation, and lack of a highly reliable traceability mechanism linking blockchain and watermarks are solved. Furthermore, the device security module is not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to guarantee the security of high-confidential surveying and mapping archivals throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0008] In one optional implementation, the process of obtaining the user-inputted search instruction and parsing the search instruction to obtain terrain constraints includes: determining the type of the search instruction input by the user, wherein the search instruction contains at least one core search condition; wherein the core search condition includes at least one of the following: file number, surveying project name, target area name, and surveying time; the search instruction type includes: text-based search instructions and map visualization interaction instructions; if the search instruction type is a text-based search instruction, parsing and extracting terrain keywords from the search instruction to obtain preliminary terrain information; if the search instruction type is a map visualization interaction instruction, parsing the latitude and longitude range of the selected area in the search instruction, and identifying preliminary terrain information based on the latitude and longitude range; determining supplementary terrain information based on the search instruction and a preset surveying project association database; and quantifying and integrating the preliminary terrain information and supplementary terrain information to obtain terrain constraints.

[0009] In one optional implementation, the above-mentioned acquisition of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and the determination of the target associated blockchain network based on the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, include: Obtain the metadata of the above-mentioned survey and mapping archives data to be traced, and extract the archive unique identifier and chain network marker fields from the above metadata; Based on the above chain network tag fields, the corresponding blockchain list is matched in the preset surveying and mapping archive chain network mapping library, and blockchains related to the historical circulation of archives are selected as candidate associated chains. Submit the unique file identifier and applicant qualification certificate to the node management module of the above-mentioned candidate associated chain network to apply for chain network access, and request the candidate associated chain network to return the access verification result; Receive the permission verification results returned by the candidate associated blockchain network, and determine the candidate blockchain network whose permission verification result is passed as the target associated blockchain network.

[0010] In one optional implementation, the above-mentioned method of retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermarked anchor credentials based on the target associated blockchain network to establish a log set to be verified includes: Send a data retrieval request to the cross-chain traceability zone of the aforementioned target-related blockchain network. The data retrieval request carries the unique identifier of the aforementioned survey and mapping archive data to be traced and the retrieval scope, which includes the cross-chain circulation stage and the watermark embedding stage. Receive the cross-chain operation log and watermark anchoring certificate returned by the target associated blockchain network, and determine the validity result and matching result of the blockchain node signature of the watermark anchoring certificate and the log node signature of the node public key of the target associated blockchain network. If the matching result fails, the data retrieval request is resent to the cross-chain traceability area of ​​the aforementioned target-related blockchain network until the matching result is successful. If the matching result is successful, the above cross-chain operation logs are sorted from oldest to newest based on the timestamp; From the sorted cross-chain operation logs, select those containing multi-dimensional feature hash sets and node signature records, and combine them with the imprinted anchor credentials to form a log set to be verified.

[0011] In one optional implementation, the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified are verified based on the aforementioned source-traceable mapping archive data to obtain a first verification result, including: Calculate the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archives data to be traced based on the archive type; The current multi-dimensional feature hash is compared with the multi-dimensional feature hash set recorded in the log set to be verified, and the feature hash matching degree result is calculated. Calculate the consistency of the document time sequence between the watermark embedding timestamp in the above watermark anchored document and the first cross-chain timestamp in the cross-chain operation log; The first verification result is calculated based on the preset first weight coefficient, feature hash matching result, credential time sequence consistency result, and log node signature validity result.

[0012] In one optional implementation, the above-mentioned calculation of the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced based on the archive type includes: If the archive type of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced is a vector archive, calculate the coordinate hash and topological relationship hash of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash; If the archive type of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced is a raster archive, calculate the pixel value hash and resolution level hash of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash.

[0013] In an optional implementation, before extracting the quantum watermark information from the traceable mapping archive data using quantum key distribution, the method further includes: Extract the watermark extraction key hash value and the file confidentiality level from the above watermark anchoring certificate; The quantum key dynamic management module sends a key retrieval request, which carries the hash value of the watermark extraction key, the file confidentiality level, and the applicant's authorization certificate. The quantum key dynamic management module is used to verify whether the above-mentioned applicant's authorization certificate is valid. If it is valid, the quantum key corresponding to the above-mentioned applicant's authorization certificate is matched. The quantum key was transmitted to the traceability terminal using a quantum-secure transmission channel.

[0014] In one optional implementation, the extraction of quantum watermark information from the traceable mapping archive data using quantum key distribution includes: If the archive type of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data is a vector archive, the quantum watermark entangled state is decoupled from the archive topological relationship feature space by using the inverse operation of the quantum controlled NOT gate. Based on the quantum watermark entangled state analysis, the ownership unit ID, creation time and encryption level are obtained, and the quantum watermark information in the traceable survey and mapping archive data is obtained. If the archive type of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data is a raster archive, perform Laplace pyramid inverse decomposition on the archive image of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data, and obtain the quantum watermark information from the quantum states of each level pixel through formula based on the middle 3 embedded levels of the watermark anchor certificate record.

[0015] In one optional implementation, the verification of the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate to obtain a second verification result includes: The Hamming distance between the extracted quantum watermark information and the watermark feature parameters in the above-mentioned watermark anchoring certificate is calculated, and the watermark integrity result is obtained based on the above-mentioned Hamming distance and the Hamming distance preset threshold. The public key of the archive owner is retrieved from the aforementioned target-related blockchain network. Based on the binding relationship between the ownership unit ID and the owner's public key in the quantum watermark information, the result of ownership legitimacy is obtained. The matching result of the encryption level in the quantum watermark information and the confidentiality level of the metadata of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced is obtained; The second verification result is calculated based on the preset second weight coefficient, watermark integrity result, ownership legality result, and level matching result.

[0016] In one optional implementation, the calculation of the traceability credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and the output of the traceability report based on the traceability credibility parameter and a preset traceability result judgment threshold, includes: The initial traceability credibility parameter is calculated based on the preset third weight coefficient, the first verification result, and the second verification result. Determine if there are any abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log; If there are abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log, the above initial credibility parameter is calibrated based on the number of abnormal rollback records, and the calibrated source traceability credibility parameter is determined as the source traceability credibility parameter. The tracing result is determined based on the tracing credibility parameter and the tracing result judgment threshold. If the tracing credibility parameter is greater than or equal to the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be successful; if the tracing credibility parameter is less than the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be unsuccessful. If the tracing result is determined to be successful, a tracing success report is generated. The tracing success report includes details of the first verification result, details of the second verification result, and the calculation process of the credibility parameter. The tracing report is then output.

[0017] In an optional implementation, the calculation of the source tracing credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and the output of the source tracing result based on the source tracing credibility parameter, further includes: If the source tracing result is determined to be source tracing failure, anomaly identification and verification are performed based on the first verification result, the first anomaly threshold, the second verification result, and the second anomaly threshold. If the first verification result is less than the first anomaly threshold, the above-mentioned traceable mapping archive data will be marked as an anomaly in the cross-chain operation log, and a traceability failure report will be generated. If the second verification result is less than the second anomaly threshold, the above-mentioned traceable mapping archive data will be marked as quantum watermark anomaly, and a traceability failure report will be generated. Output the marked survey and mapping archive data to be traced and the traceability failure report. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the specific embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the specific embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] In the field of surveying and mapping geographic information, surveying and mapping archives, as a core component of the national spatial data infrastructure, encompass various data types including vector maps, remote sensing imagery, and 3D point clouds. Their security and traceability directly impact the accuracy of decision-making in critical areas such as land planning, resource exploration, and emergency rescue. With the acceleration of digital transformation, traditional paper-based archive management is gradually being replaced by electronic archive management. However, issues such as susceptibility to tampering, inconsistencies in cross-system data transfer, and difficulties in verifying ownership have become prominent, driving the industry's demand for upgraded secure evidence storage and traceability technologies. Currently, blockchain technology, with its immutable distributed ledger, has become a crucial support for the preservation of surveying and mapping archives. By writing archive operation records and ownership information into the blockchain, cross-node data synchronization and tamper traceability are achieved. For example, in government surveying and mapping archive management, consortium blockchains are widely used to record operations such as archive creation, borrowing, and modification, relying on node consensus mechanisms to ensure log integrity. To address the data isolation problem between different blockchain systems, cross-chain interaction technology is gradually being applied to surveying and mapping archive transfer scenarios. Existing cross-chain solutions are mostly based on hash time-locked contracts or distributed private key control to enable the transfer of archival data between different blockchain networks such as government blockchains, enterprise blockchains, and public blockchains.

[0021] However, significant limitations remain in adapting to the characteristics of surveying and mapping archives and ensuring cross-chain security and traceability reliability. From the perspective of cross-chain circulation, surveying and mapping archive data has high dimensionality and strict accuracy requirements, but current cross-chain technology lacks a dedicated verification mechanism for archive data, relying solely on general hash verification to ensure data consistency. This makes cross-chain data distortion prone to occur due to missing archive features. Regarding watermarking technology, traditional digital watermarking is based on classical cryptographic algorithms, facing the risk of being cracked by quantum computing. With the improvement of quantum computing power, the security of classical encryption algorithms such as RSA and ECC is challenged, making watermarks based on these algorithms easily cracked or tampered with. Furthermore, watermarking schemes do not fully consider the processing characteristics of surveying and mapping archives. After archive compression, cropping, and noise interference, watermark robustness is insufficient, often resulting in watermark loss or incorrect extraction, failing to effectively verify ownership. From the perspective of traceability mechanisms, current solutions mostly rely on a single verification dimension, either tracing circulation records solely through blockchain logs or confirming ownership solely through watermark extraction, lacking coordination between the two. When a dispute arises regarding the archives, if the on-chain logs are tampered with by multiple nodes in collusion, or if the watermark is destroyed, individual verification methods are unlikely to provide reliable evidence, resulting in low credibility of the tracing results.

[0022] In summary, the relevant surveying and mapping archive security storage and traceability technologies cannot meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, have insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness and adaptability, and lack a highly reliable traceability mechanism that links blockchain and watermark. At the same time, the device security module is not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to guarantee the security of high-confidential surveying and mapping archives throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0023] The method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives provided in this embodiment firstly obtains the data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced and determines the target associated blockchain network, providing a precise data source and network support for the traceability of surveying and mapping archives. First, complete data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced is comprehensively collected, covering the core content of the archives, metadata, and associated operation records, ensuring the integrity of the traceability data foundation. Then, combining the archive's generation scenario, storage nodes, and cross-chain interaction history, blockchain networks that have data interactions with the archives are selected as the target associated blockchain networks, clarifying the network scope required for traceability and avoiding deviations in the traceability direction due to ambiguous network positioning. Secondly, a log set to be verified is established by retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials based on the target associated blockchain network, integrating the core verification evidence required for traceability. Operation logs generated during the cross-chain transmission, storage, and modification of the archives are extracted from the distributed nodes of the target associated blockchain network, recording the archive's flow path and operational behavior; simultaneously, watermark anchoring credentials generated during archive preservation are retrieved, which associate the archives with the initial watermark information, ensuring the relevance of watermark traceability. The two types of data are categorized and organized according to time sequence and operation type, forming a clearly structured log set to be verified. Then, the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified are used to obtain the first verification result, initially determining the validity of the archive traceability from the perspective of data consistency. The archive data to be traced is compared with the archive content snapshots and operation parameters in the cross-chain operation logs to verify whether the archives have been tampered with or have abnormal parameters during the cross-chain process; at the same time, the archive data is checked against the archive identifier, watermark generation time, and other information recorded in the watermark anchoring credentials to ensure the authenticity of the correspondence between the credentials and the archives. Through multi-dimensional comparison, the first verification result reflecting data consistency is generated. Subsequently, quantum key distribution is used to extract quantum watermark information from the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, ensuring the security of the watermark extraction process and the integrity of the watermark information. Quantum keys possess the characteristics of being uncopyable and resistant to cracking. Using them as extraction keys can effectively prevent illegal interception or tampering during the extraction process, ensuring the security of the extraction operation. Simultaneously, quantum watermark information is deeply embedded in the archival data. With the help of quantum keys, the watermark embedding location can be precisely located, allowing for the complete extraction of archival traceability information from the watermark. This avoids watermark information loss or damage due to improper extraction methods, providing a reliable data source for subsequent watermark verification. Furthermore, a second verification result is obtained by verifying the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate, further strengthening the reliability of traceability verification from the perspective of watermark correlation. The extracted quantum watermark information is compared with the watermark features and generation rules recorded in the watermark anchoring certificate to verify whether the quantum watermark is the original watermark generated during archival storage, eliminating interference from counterfeit watermarks. At the same time, the consistency of archival identifiers, operation nodes, and other content contained in the watermark information with the anchoring certificate is checked to ensure that the binding relationship between the watermark and the archive has not been broken.The second verification result generated through specialized verification can supplement the verification gap in the watermark dimension of the first verification result. Finally, by calculating the traceability credibility parameter based on the first and second verification results, and combining it with a preset threshold to output a traceability report, a quantitative evaluation and clear presentation of the traceability results are achieved. Based on indicators such as the number of qualified items and the degree of matching of the two types of verification results, a preset algorithm is used to calculate the traceability credibility parameter, transforming the abstract verification result into an intuitive quantitative value; then, this parameter is compared with a preset traceability result judgment threshold to clarify whether the archival traceability result is qualified. Finally, the credibility parameter, verification details, and judgment conclusion are output in the form of a traceability report, making the traceability results clear and easy to understand, providing users with clear archival traceability basis, and meeting the practical needs of surveying and mapping archival traceability. By implementing this invention, the problems of related surveying and mapping archival security storage and traceability technologies failing to meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness adaptation, and lack of a highly reliable traceability mechanism linking blockchain and watermarks are solved. Furthermore, the device security module is not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to guarantee the security of high-confidential surveying and mapping archivals throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0024] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions. Furthermore, although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.

[0025] This embodiment provides a method for secure storage and traceability of surveying and mapping archives, applied to an intelligent low-voltage electrical system. The intelligent low-voltage electrical system includes an image sensor module, a communication module, an intelligent chip module, and a low-voltage electrical module. Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a surveying and mapping archive secure storage and traceability method according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the process includes the following steps: Step S101: Obtain the data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced, and determine the target associated blockchain network based on the data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced.

[0026] Specifically, step S101 includes: Step a1: Obtain the metadata of the above-mentioned survey and mapping archive data to be traced, and extract the archive unique identifier and chain network marker fields from the above metadata.

[0027] Furthermore, the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced refers to the surveying and mapping archive data that requires traceability operations, including information such as surveying and mapping results and work records; metadata is data describing the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, covering basic information such as the archive's identifier, generation time, and source; the archive's unique identifier is a code or symbol used to uniquely identify the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and it is unique; the blockchain marker field is a specific field in the metadata used to mark that the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced has been associated with a blockchain network. The process involves obtaining the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and then obtaining its metadata. From the metadata, using preset field extraction rules, the unique identifier of the archive is accurately located and extracted. This identifier can point to this particular archive to be traced among numerous surveying and mapping archives. Simultaneously, according to the metadata's structural specifications, the blockchain marker field is found and extracted.

[0028] Step a2: Based on the above-mentioned chain network marker field, match the corresponding blockchain list in the preset surveying and mapping archive chain network mapping library, and filter out the blockchains related to the historical circulation of archives as candidate associated chains.

[0029] Furthermore, the surveying and mapping archive blockchain mapping library is a pre-established database that stores the correspondence between blockchain marker fields and blockchain networks; the blockchain list is a set of blockchains that may be related to archives, matched from the surveying and mapping archive blockchain mapping library based on the blockchain marker fields; and the candidate associated blockchains are blockchains related to the historical flow of archives, selected from the blockchain list. The blockchain marker fields extracted in step a1 are used as search keywords to search the pre-defined surveying and mapping archive blockchain mapping library. The surveying and mapping archive blockchain mapping library returns the corresponding blockchain list based on the blockchain marker fields. Then, each blockchain in the blockchain list is analyzed, and combined with the historical flow records of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, such as the historical information on the storage, transmission, and operation of the archives, blockchains related to the historical flow of the archives are selected. These selected blockchains constitute the candidate associated blockchains.

[0030] Step a3: Submit the unique identifier of the file and the applicant's qualification certificate to the node management module of the above-mentioned candidate associated chain network to apply for access to the chain network, and request the candidate associated chain network to return the access verification result.

[0031] Furthermore, the node management module is a functional module in the candidate associated chain network used to manage node access permissions; the applicant qualification certificate is a document or information used to prove that the applicant applying to access the chain network has legal qualifications. For the candidate associated chain networks obtained in step a2, an application is submitted to the node management module of each candidate associated chain network. The application content includes the unique identifier of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and the applicant qualification certificate. By submitting this information, the candidate associated chain network is requested to verify the applicant's access permissions and return the permission verification result.

[0032] Step a4: Receive the permission verification results returned by the candidate associated blockchain networks, and determine the candidate blockchain networks with the permission verification results as the target associated blockchain network.

[0033] Furthermore, the permission verification result is the result returned by the candidate associated blockchain network after verifying the applicant's access rights, and is divided into pass and fail; the target associated blockchain network is the candidate associated blockchain network whose permission verification result is pass. The permission verification results returned by the candidate associated blockchain networks are received. The permission verification results of each candidate associated blockchain network are reviewed one by one, and the candidate associated blockchain networks with pass verification results are selected. These selected candidate associated blockchain networks are the target associated blockchain networks.

[0034] Step S102: Based on the aforementioned target-related blockchain network, retrieve cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials to establish a log set to be verified.

[0035] Specifically, step S102 includes: Step b1: Send a data retrieval request to the cross-chain traceability zone of the aforementioned target-related blockchain network. The data retrieval request carries the unique identifier of the aforementioned traceable survey and mapping archive data and the retrieval scope, which includes the cross-chain transfer stage and the watermark embedding stage.

[0036] Furthermore, the target associated blockchain network refers to a set of blockchain networks that, after authorization verification, are determined to have a historical connection with the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced and are accessible; the cross-chain traceability zone refers to a functional area within the target associated blockchain network that specifically stores cross-chain operation records and watermark-related credentials; the data retrieval request refers to a request instruction used to apply to the cross-chain traceability zone for specific data; the unique archive identifier refers to the code or identification information that can uniquely identify the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, ensuring that the retrieved data accurately corresponds to the target archive; and the retrieval scope refers to the time or process interval for limiting data retrieval, including the cross-chain transfer stage and the watermark embedding stage.

[0037] A data retrieval request is constructed, explicitly including the unique identifier of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, ensuring that the cross-chain traceability zone can accurately locate data related to the archive. Simultaneously, the scope of retrieval is clearly defined in the request, explicitly including the cross-chain transfer stage and the watermark embedding stage, avoiding the retrieval of irrelevant data. The constructed data retrieval request is then sent to the cross-chain traceability zone of the target associated blockchain network, awaiting a response from the cross-chain traceability zone and the return of the required data.

[0038] Step b2: Receive the cross-chain operation log and watermark anchoring certificate returned by the target associated blockchain network, and determine the validity and matching results of the blockchain node signature of the watermark anchoring certificate and the log node signature of the node public key of the target associated blockchain network.

[0039] Furthermore, the cross-chain operation log refers to a detailed log recording various operational behaviors during the cross-chain transfer of the traceable surveying and mapping archive data between the target associated blockchain networks; the watermark anchoring certificate refers to the certificate generated when the archive is embedded with a watermark, used to associate the watermark information with the archive, including watermark features, embedded node information, and signature; the blockchain node signature refers to the digital signature performed by the corresponding blockchain node on the certificate when the watermark anchoring certificate is generated, used to verify the authenticity of the certificate; the node public key refers to the public key of each node in the target associated blockchain network, used to verify the validity of the node signature; the log node signature validity result refers to the result of verifying whether the blockchain node signature conforms to the encryption rules and whether it was generated by a legitimate node; the matching result refers to the result of verifying whether the blockchain node signature corresponds to the node public key. The system receives the cross-chain operation log and watermark anchoring certificate returned from the cross-chain traceability zone of the target associated blockchain network. It extracts the blockchain node signature from the watermark anchoring certificate, obtains the node public key corresponding to the target associated blockchain network, uses a preset signature verification algorithm to verify the validity of the blockchain node signature, and generates the log node signature validity result. Simultaneously, the blockchain node signature is matched and verified with the node's public key to determine whether the signature was signed by a legitimate node in the target associated blockchain network, generating a matching result and fully recording both types of results.

[0040] Step b3: If the matching result fails, resend the data retrieval request to the cross-chain traceability zone of the aforementioned target-related blockchain network until the matching result is successful.

[0041] Furthermore, a failed matching result indicates that the verification between the blockchain node signature and the node's public key failed, suggesting that the obtained watermark anchoring certificate may have an abnormal source or be at risk of tampering. If the matching result obtained in step b2 fails, the data retrieval request needs to be reconstructed. In the reconstructed request, the unique identifier of the archive data to be traced remains unchanged. The retrieval scope can be adjusted according to the actual situation, such as refining the time interval of the cross-chain transfer stage or the watermark embedding stage, to ensure that the request information is accurate. The reconstructed data retrieval request is then sent again to the cross-chain traceability area of ​​the target associated blockchain network, and the verification process of step b2 is repeated until the matching result corresponding to the received watermark anchoring certificate is successful, avoiding the impact of abnormal data on subsequent traceability verification.

[0042] Step b4: If the matching result is successful, sort the above cross-chain operation logs from oldest to newest based on the timestamp.

[0043] Furthermore, a timestamp refers to the time information recorded when a cross-chain operation log is generated, representing the time when the operation occurred. It possesses uniqueness and temporal sequence. Cross-chain operation log sorting refers to the process of organizing and arranging the cross-chain operation logs according to the order in which they were generated. After the matching result in step b2 passes the characterization, the corresponding timestamp is extracted from each received cross-chain operation log. Based on the time information recorded by the timestamp, a preset sorting algorithm, such as bubble sort or quick sort, is used to arrange all cross-chain operation logs in order from oldest to most recent time. During the sorting process, it is necessary to ensure that the timestamp information of each log is complete and has not been tampered with. If an abnormal timestamp is found in a log, the authenticity of the log must be re-verified, and if necessary, the cross-chain operation logs of that stage must be retrieved again to ensure that the sorted logs can completely reflect the timeline of the cross-chain transfer of the archives.

[0044] Step b5: Select cross-chain operation logs containing multi-dimensional feature hash sets and node signature records from the sorted cross-chain operation logs, and combine them with the imprinted anchor credentials to form a log set to be verified.

[0045] Furthermore, the multi-dimensional feature hash set refers to the set of hash values ​​obtained by hashing the multi-dimensional features of the archive recorded in the cross-chain operation log, used to verify the integrity of the archive content; the node signature record refers to the digital signature of the operating node on the log recorded in the cross-chain operation log, used to verify the legitimacy of the log source; the log set to be verified refers to the systematic data set formed by integrating and filtering the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials, used for subsequent verification. From the cross-chain operation logs sorted in step b4, logs containing multi-dimensional feature hash sets and node signature records are filtered according to preset filtering rules. During the filtering process, the field content of each log needs to be checked one by one to ensure that the retained logs have both types of key information, and logs missing any information are removed. The filtered cross-chain operation logs are integrated with the watermark anchoring credentials matched in step b2, and the watermark anchoring credentials are mapped to the corresponding cross-chain circulation stage or watermark embedding stage logs according to the logic of "time sequence plus credential association", forming a log set to be verified with a clear structure and complete information.

[0046] Step S103: Based on the above-mentioned source-traceable survey and mapping archive data, verify the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the above-mentioned log set to be verified, and obtain the first verification result.

[0047] Specifically, S103 includes: Step c1: Calculate the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced based on the archive type of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced.

[0048] Further, step c1 above includes: Step d1: If the archive type of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced is a vector archive, calculate the coordinate hash and topological relationship hash of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archive data to be traced to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash.

[0049] Furthermore, vector archives refer to surveying archives that represent geospatial information using geometric elements such as points, lines, and surfaces, as well as associated attribute data. Their core feature is reflected in the topological relationships between spatial coordinates and elements. Coordinate hashing refers to the hash value obtained by hashing the spatial coordinate data of geometric elements in vector archives, which is used to characterize the uniqueness of coordinate data. Topological relationship hashing refers to the hash value obtained by hashing the topological relationship data between geometric elements in vector archives, which is used to characterize the uniqueness of topological relationships.

[0050] For vector archives, the spatial coordinate data of all geometric elements is first extracted. This data includes key information such as vertex coordinates and node coordinates. The coordinate data is preprocessed to remove redundant coordinate points and correct coordinate offset errors, ensuring the accuracy and standardization of the coordinate data. Then, a pre-defined hash algorithm is used to calculate the coordinate hash. Next, the topological relationship data between geometric elements is extracted. A topological analysis algorithm is used to identify adjacency, containment, and intersection relationships between elements. These relationships are converted into standardized topological relationship description text or data structures, which are then hashed to generate topological relationship hashes. Finally, the coordinate hashes and topological relationship hashes are integrated to form the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the vector archive.

[0051] Step d2: If the archive type of the above-mentioned source-traceable surveying and mapping archive data is a raster archive, calculate the pixel value hash and resolution level hash of the above-mentioned source-traceable surveying and mapping archive data to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash.

[0052] Furthermore, raster archives refer to surveying and mapping archives that store geospatial information in the form of pixel matrices, such as remote sensing imagery and digital elevation models. Their core characteristics are reflected in pixel value distribution and resolution levels. Pixel value hashes are hash values ​​obtained by hashing the pixel value data in the pixel matrix of a raster archive, used to characterize the uniqueness of pixel value distribution. Resolution level hashes are hash values ​​obtained by hashing the resolution information and corresponding resolution level division data of a raster archive, used to characterize the uniqueness of resolution attributes. For raster archives, all pixel value data in their pixel matrix are first extracted. This data reflects information such as color, grayscale, or elevation of the raster archive. The pixel value data is preprocessed, including removing noisy pixels and unifying the pixel value quantization range to ensure the consistency of pixel value data. Then, a preset hash algorithm is used to calculate the pixel value hashes from the preprocessed pixel value data. Subsequently, the resolution information of the raster archive is extracted, such as the actual geographical distance represented by each pixel. Based on preset resolution level division rules, the resolution level to which the archive belongs is determined. The resolution information and resolution level data are integrated into standardized resolution description data, which is then hashed to generate a resolution level hash. The pixel value hash and the resolution level hash are then combined to form the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the raster archive.

[0053] Step c2: Compare the current multi-dimensional feature hash with the multi-dimensional feature hash set recorded in the log set to be verified, and calculate the feature hash matching degree result.

[0054] Furthermore, the multi-dimensional feature hash set refers to the set of multi-dimensional feature hashes recorded in the cross-chain operation logs of the log set to be verified, representing the archival data to be traced at various stages of the historical cross-chain process, reflecting the characteristic changes in the historical state of the archives; the feature hash matching degree result refers to the quantitative result of the matching degree between the current multi-dimensional feature hash and each historical hash value in the multi-dimensional feature hash set, used to determine whether the archive content has been tampered with. The multi-dimensional feature hash set of the cross-chain operation log records is extracted from the log set to be verified, and the current multi-dimensional feature hash is compared with each historical feature hash in the hash set one by one. During the comparison, a preset similarity calculation method is used to quantify the similarity between the current hash and each historical hash. Based on the matching of all historical hashes, the feature hash matching degree result is calculated comprehensively according to preset rules. If the matching degree reaches the preset standard, it indicates that the archive content is highly consistent with the historical state; otherwise, content tampering may have occurred.

[0055] Step c3: Calculate the consistency of the document timing between the watermark embedded timestamp in the above watermark anchored document and the first cross-chain timestamp in the cross-chain operation log.

[0056] Furthermore, the watermark embedding timestamp refers to the specific time information recorded in the watermark anchoring certificate regarding the embedding of the watermark in the traceable surveying and mapping archive data, which has the characteristic of being tamper-proof; the first cross-chain timestamp refers to the specific time information recorded in the cross-chain operation log regarding the first cross-chain transfer of the traceable surveying and mapping archive data between the target associated blockchain networks; the certificate timing consistency result refers to the result of verifying whether the order of the watermark embedding time and the first cross-chain time is logically consistent, and is used to judge the timing rationality of watermark anchoring and cross-chain operation.

[0057] Extract the watermark embedding timestamp from the watermark anchored certificate, and filter out the first cross-chain timestamp corresponding to the first cross-chain operation from the cross-chain operation log. Convert the two timestamps to a unified time format and compare their time order. Logically, watermark embedding should be completed before the first cross-chain operation of the file to ensure that all files transferred across the chain carry a valid watermark. Generate a certificate time sequence consistency result based on the time comparison result: if the watermark embedding timestamp is earlier than or equal to the first cross-chain timestamp, the time sequence is consistent; if the watermark embedding timestamp is later than the first cross-chain timestamp, the time sequence is inconsistent and should be marked as an anomaly.

[0058] Step c4: Calculate the first verification result based on the preset first weight coefficient, feature hash matching result, credential time sequence consistency result, and log node signature validity result.

[0059] Furthermore, the first weight coefficient refers to a pre-defined set of coefficients used to allocate the importance of the feature hash matching degree result, the voucher time sequence consistency result, and the log node signature validity result in the first verification result. This set includes the feature hash matching degree weight, the time sequence consistency weight, and the signature validity weight. The first verification result refers to the result quantified by combining the three types of sub-results and their corresponding weights, reflecting the consistency between the log set to be verified and the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and is used to initially determine the basic validity of the archive traceability. The pre-defined first weight coefficient is obtained, clarifying the weight values ​​corresponding to the feature hash matching degree result, the voucher time sequence consistency result, and the log node signature validity result. The sum of the weight values ​​must meet pre-defined constraints to ensure the calculation logic is reasonable. The three types of sub-results are quantified, for example, converting qualitative results such as "matching," "consistent," and "valid" into pre-defined quantified values, and directly using the percentage result of the feature hash matching degree as the quantified value. Following the calculation logic of "first verification result = feature hash matching degree result × feature hash matching degree weight + voucher time sequence consistency result × time sequence consistency weight + log node signature validity result × signature validity weight," each quantified value and its corresponding weight are substituted to calculate the final first verification result. After the calculation is completed, the result needs to be checked for range to ensure that it conforms to the preset quantization range. If it exceeds the range, the quantization value or weight coefficient of the sub-result should be rechecked, corrected, and recalculated.

[0060] Step S104: Use quantum key distribution to extract quantum watermark information from the above-mentioned traceable mapping archive data.

[0061] Specifically, prior to step S104, the above method further includes: Step e1: Extract the watermark extraction key hash value and the file confidentiality level from the above watermark anchoring certificate.

[0062] Furthermore, the watermark anchoring certificate refers to the certificate stored in the target-related blockchain network that is associated with the watermark embedding operation of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced. It contains key information required for watermark extraction and blockchain node signatures. The watermark extraction key hash value refers to the hash value obtained by hashing the quantum key used to extract the quantum watermark. It is used to locate the corresponding quantum key in the key management module to avoid leakage caused by the key being directly stored in the certificate. The archive confidentiality level refers to the level of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced according to its sensitivity. Different levels correspond to different quantum key access permissions and transmission security standards. The watermark anchoring certificate is extracted from the log set to be verified. Through the preset certificate parsing rules, the field recording the watermark extraction key hash value in the certificate is located. This field is usually stored in encryption and needs to be decrypted using the public key of the blockchain node associated with the certificate to obtain the original watermark extraction key hash value. At the same time, the field recording the archive confidentiality level in the certificate is parsed. This field generally exists in a standardized encoding form. It is converted into a clear confidentiality level description through an encoding lookup table to ensure that the corresponding permission requirements can be accurately matched when the key is called later.

[0063] Step e2: Send a key retrieval request to the quantum key dynamic management module. The key retrieval request carries the hash value of the watermark extraction key, the file confidentiality level, and the applicant's authorization certificate.

[0064] Furthermore, the quantum key dynamic management module refers to a management system specifically designed for generating, storing, distributing, and reclaiming quantum keys, and possesses key access control and dynamic matching functions; the key retrieval request refers to a request instruction used to apply to the quantum key dynamic management module to obtain a specific quantum key, and must carry sufficient information to verify the legitimacy of the retrieval; the applicant authorization certificate refers to a file or data proving that the applicant has the authority to retrieve the corresponding quantum key, including information such as the applicant's identity identifier, authorization validity period, and range of keys that can be retrieved.

[0065] A key retrieval request is constructed, explicitly including the hash value of the watermark extraction key extracted in step e1 and the file confidentiality level. The watermark extraction key hash value is used to accurately locate the quantum key to be retrieved, and the file confidentiality level is used to verify whether the applicant has the retrieval authority for the corresponding level of key. Simultaneously, the applicant's authorization certificate is attached to the request in a preset format. This certificate must be pre-certified by an authoritative institution to ensure its authenticity and validity. The completed key retrieval request is then sent to the quantum key dynamic management module, awaiting the module's verification and response.

[0066] Step e3: Use the quantum key dynamic management module to verify whether the above-mentioned applicant's authorization certificate is valid. If it is valid, match the quantum key corresponding to the above-mentioned applicant's authorization certificate.

[0067] Furthermore, the legality of the applicant's authorization certificate refers to the authenticity, validity, and matching of the applicant's authorization certificate with the current key access requirement, which needs to be confirmed through multiple verification rules. The quantum key refers to a key generated based on quantum mechanics principles, possessing non-copyability and anti-interception properties, used to extract quantum watermarks from the traceable mapping archive data, ensuring the security of the watermark extraction process. After receiving the key access request, the quantum key dynamic management module first verifies the legality of the applicant's authorization certificate: verifying whether the digital signature in the certificate is issued by an authoritative institution, confirming through a signature verification algorithm that the certificate has not been tampered with; checking the authorization validity period to ensure the current time is within the authorization range; comparing the range of accessible keys recorded in the certificate with the archive's confidentiality level to confirm that the applicant has the authority to access quantum keys of that level. If all verification items pass, the authorization certificate is deemed legal. Then, using the hash value of the watermark extraction key in the request as an index, a matching query is performed in the quantum key repository to locate the quantum key corresponding to that hash value. This key is usually bound to a specific traceable archive and can only be used to extract the quantum watermark from that archive.

[0068] Step e4: Use a quantum-secure transmission channel to transmit the aforementioned quantum key to the traceability operation terminal.

[0069] Furthermore, a quantum-secure transmission channel refers to a transmission channel built based on quantum key distribution technology, possessing the characteristic that the key cannot be intercepted or copied during transmission, ensuring the absolute security of the quantum key during transmission. A traceability operation terminal refers to a terminal device that performs quantum watermark extraction operations on the data of the traceable surveying and mapping archives. It must have a secure module for receiving and storing quantum keys and be authorized for authentication. After matching a quantum key, the quantum key dynamic management module first initiates the establishment process of the quantum-secure transmission channel, sending a channel establishment request to the traceability operation terminal. After the terminal responds, both parties negotiate and generate a temporary session key through the quantum key distribution protocol, which is used to encrypt the quantum key transmitted subsequently. The matched quantum key is encrypted using the temporary session key to prevent the key from being stolen during transmission. Through the established quantum-secure transmission channel, the encrypted quantum key is sent to the traceability operation terminal. After receiving it, the terminal decrypts it using the locally stored session key to obtain the original quantum key, which is then stored in the terminal's secure encryption module, ensuring the security of key storage on the terminal side.

[0070] Specifically, step S104 includes: Step f1: If the archive type of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data is a vector archive, the quantum watermark entangled state is decoupled from the archive topological relationship feature space by using the inverse operation of the quantum controlled NOT gate. Based on the quantum watermark entangled state analysis, the ownership unit ID, creation time and encryption level are obtained, and the quantum watermark information in the traceable survey and mapping archive data is obtained.

[0071] Furthermore, vector archives refer to surveying and mapping archives that represent geospatial information using geometric elements such as points, lines, and surfaces, as well as associated attribute data. Their quantum watermarks are embedded in the topological relationship feature space. The quantum controlled NOT gate inverse operation refers to the operation used to de-entangle the quantum watermark with the topological relationship feature space of the vector archive; through this operation, an independent quantum watermark entangled state can be separated. The topological relationship feature space refers to the feature-dimensional space formed by the topological relationships between geometric elements in the vector archive, which is the embedding carrier of the quantum watermark. The quantum watermark entangled state refers to the quantum correlation state formed between the quantum watermark and the topological relationship feature space, which needs to be decoupled through a specific inverse operation. The ownership unit ID refers to the unique code identifying the surveying and mapping unit to which the quantum watermark belongs. The creation time refers to the specific time information of the quantum watermark embedding in the archive. The encryption level refers to the level classification of the sensitivity of the archive data, determining the access and usage permissions of the archive. Loading the quantum key activates the execution permission of the quantum controlled NOT gate inverse operation. Using the topological relationship feature space of the vector file as the operation object, the inverse operation of the quantum controlled NOT gate is initiated to gradually de-entangle the quantum watermark with the topological relationship feature space, separating them into independent quantum watermark entangled states. Quantum state measurement is performed on the entangled quantum watermark state, and the measurement result is converted into classical binary data. Using preset parsing rules, the ownership unit ID, creation time, and encryption level are extracted from the binary data. This information is then integrated to obtain the quantum watermark information of the vector file. After extraction, the integrity of the information must be verified; if any is missing, the decoupling and parsing process is repeated.

[0072] Step f2: If the archive type of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data is a raster archive, perform Laplace pyramid inverse decomposition on the archive image of the above-mentioned traceable survey and mapping archive data, and obtain the quantum watermark information from the quantum states of each level pixel through formula based on the middle 3 embedded layers of the watermark anchor certificate record.

[0073] Furthermore, a raster archive refers to a surveying archive that stores geospatial information in the form of a pixel matrix, with its quantum watermark embedded in pixel quantum states at different levels; the Laplace pyramid inverse decomposition refers to the operation of inversely decomposing the raster archive image according to resolution levels, through which the original pixel quantum states of each level can be restored, providing a basis for watermark extraction; the archive image refers to the visualized image data of the raster archive, containing pixel information at different resolution levels; the three middle embedding levels refer to the three resolution levels in the middle position after the Laplace pyramid decomposition of the raster archive, which are the preset embedding carriers of the quantum watermark, and the specific levels are determined by the watermark anchoring certificate; the pixel quantum state refers to the quantum state corresponding to the pixel data of the raster archive, and the quantum watermark is embedded in the form of modulated pixel quantum states; the watermark anchoring certificate refers to the certificate that records the embedding position of the quantum watermark, used to locate the watermark extraction range. Based on the watermark anchoring certificate, the three middle embedding levels after the Laplace pyramid decomposition of the raster archive are determined, and the level range of watermark extraction is clarified. The archival image undergoes inverse Laplacian pyramid decomposition, progressively restoring it from low-resolution to high-resolution levels to obtain the original pixel quantum states of the three intermediate embedded layers. A quantum key is loaded, and the pixel quantum states at each level are calculated using a preset formula to separate and reconstruct the quantum state information of the quantum watermark. The reconstructed quantum state information is then subjected to quantum state measurement and classical data conversion to obtain information such as the ownership unit ID, creation time, and encryption level, which are then integrated to form the quantum watermark information of the raster archive. After extraction, the consistency between the information and the watermark anchoring certificate must be verified to ensure that the watermark information has not been tampered with.

[0074] Step S105: Verify the above quantum watermark information and the above watermark anchoring certificate to obtain the second verification result.

[0075] Specifically, step S105 includes: Step g1: Calculate the Hamming distance between the extracted quantum watermark information and the watermark feature parameters in the above-mentioned watermark anchoring certificate, and obtain the watermark integrity result based on the above-mentioned Hamming distance and the preset threshold of Hamming distance.

[0076] Furthermore, the watermark feature parameters refer to the set of parameters recorded in the watermark anchoring certificate that characterize the core features of the quantum watermark, such as watermark quantum state features and embedding position encoding, which serve as the benchmark for verifying watermark integrity. The Hamming distance is an indicator used to measure the degree of difference between the quantum watermark information and the watermark feature parameters, obtained by counting the number of different data points at corresponding positions. The Hamming distance preset threshold is a pre-set critical value used to determine whether the Hamming distance is within an acceptable range; if the distance is less than the threshold, the watermark is considered intact. The watermark integrity result refers to the comparison result based on the Hamming distance and the preset threshold, used to determine whether the extracted quantum watermark information is complete and has not been tampered with. Watermark feature parameters are extracted from the watermark anchoring certificate, and the watermark feature parameters and the quantum watermark information extracted in step S104 are converted into a unified binary data sequence. The Hamming distance calculation algorithm is used to compare the two data sequences bit by bit, counting the number of different bits at corresponding positions to obtain the Hamming distance. The calculated Hamming distance is compared with a preset threshold for Hamming distance: if the Hamming distance is less than or equal to the preset threshold, it indicates that the extracted quantum watermark information is similar to the watermark feature parameters in the anchored certificate, and the watermark is determined to be complete, generating a "complete" watermark integrity result; if the Hamming distance is greater than the preset threshold, it indicates that the watermark may have been tampered with or is missing, and the watermark is determined to be incomplete, generating an "incomplete" watermark integrity result.

[0077] Step g2: Retrieve the public key of the archive owner from the aforementioned target-related blockchain network. Based on the binding relationship between the ownership unit ID in the quantum watermark information and the public key of the owner, obtain the result of ownership legitimacy.

[0078] Furthermore, the target-related blockchain network refers to a set of blockchain networks that, after authorization verification, have a historical connection with the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced and are accessible, storing public key information related to archive ownership; the archive owner's public key refers to the public key of the legitimate owner of the archive stored in the target-related blockchain network, used to verify the legitimacy of the owner's ID; the owner's ID refers to the unique code recorded in the quantum watermark information that identifies the surveying and mapping unit to which the watermark belongs; the binding relationship refers to the pre-established correspondence between the archive owner's public key and the owner's ID, stored in the ownership management module of the target-related blockchain network, ensuring a one-to-one correspondence between the public key and the ID; the ownership legitimacy result refers to the verification result based on the binding relationship between the owner's ID and the owner's public key, used to determine whether the owner of the quantum watermark is legitimate. A public key retrieval request is sent to the ownership management module of the target-related blockchain network, carrying the unique identifier of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced. The module locates and returns the corresponding archive owner's public key based on the identifier. The ownership unit ID is extracted from the quantum watermark information. The "owner's public key - ownership unit ID" binding relationship table stored in the target-related blockchain network is then queried to find the public key corresponding to that ownership unit ID. The found public key is compared with the retrieved public key of the archive's ownership unit: if they match perfectly, it indicates that the ownership unit ID in the quantum watermark information matches the legitimate ownership unit recorded on the blockchain, generating a "legitimate" ownership legitimacy result; if they do not match, it indicates that the ownership unit ID may be forged, generating an "illegitimate" ownership legitimacy result.

[0079] Step g3: Based on the encryption level in the quantum watermark information and the confidentiality level of the metadata of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced, the level matching result is obtained.

[0080] Furthermore, the encryption level refers to the level classification recorded in the quantum watermark information that identifies the sensitivity of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, determining the access and usage rights of the archives; metadata refers to the basic information describing the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, including the archive's confidentiality level, creation time, source, etc.; the confidentiality level refers to the level recorded in the metadata, classified according to the sensitivity of the archive, corresponding to the encryption level in the quantum watermark, used to control the dissemination and scope of use of the archives; the level matching result refers to the comparison result based on the encryption level and the confidentiality level, used to determine whether the encryption level in the quantum watermark is consistent with the confidentiality level of the archive's metadata. The encryption level is extracted from the quantum watermark information, and the encryption level exists in a standardized coding form, which is converted into a clear level description through a coding lookup table. At the same time, the confidentiality level is extracted from the metadata of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and similarly converted into a corresponding level description. The encryption level description and the confidentiality level description are precisely compared: if they are completely identical, it indicates that the encryption level of the quantum watermark record is consistent with the confidentiality level of the archive metadata, generating a "matching" level matching result; if they are different, it indicates that the level information may have been tampered with or entered incorrectly, generating a "mismatching" level matching result.

[0081] Step g4: Based on the preset second weight coefficient, watermark integrity result, ownership legality result, and level matching result, the second verification result is calculated.

[0082] Furthermore, the second weight coefficient refers to the preset set of coefficients used to allocate the importance of the watermark integrity result, ownership legitimacy result, and grade matching result in the second verification result. It includes watermark integrity weight, ownership legitimacy weight, and grade matching weight, and the sum of the weight values ​​satisfies the preset constraints. The second verification result refers to the result obtained by quantifying the consistency between the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchor certificate and the archive metadata by combining the three types of sub-results and their corresponding weights. It is an important basis for determining the validity of archive traceability.

[0083] During operation, the preset second weight coefficient is first obtained to clarify the weight values ​​corresponding to the watermark integrity result, ownership legality result, and level matching result. The three types of sub-results are then quantified: qualitative results such as "complete," "legal," and "matching" are converted into preset positive vector values, while qualitative results such as "incomplete," "illegal," and "mismatching" are converted into preset negative vector values. Following the calculation logic of "Second verification result = Watermark integrity result × Watermark integrity weight + Ownership legality result × Ownership legality weight + Level matching result × Level matching weight," each quantified value and its corresponding weight are substituted to calculate the final second verification result. After calculation, the result is checked for range to ensure it conforms to the preset quantization interval. If it exceeds the interval, the sub-result quantified values ​​or weight coefficients are rechecked, corrected, and recalculated to ensure the accuracy and reasonableness of the result.

[0084] Step S106: Calculate the traceability credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and output the traceability report based on the traceability credibility parameter and the preset traceability result judgment threshold.

[0085] Specifically, step S106 includes: Step h1: Calculate the initial traceability credibility parameter based on the preset third weight coefficient, the first verification result, and the second verification result.

[0086] Furthermore, the third weight coefficient refers to a pre-defined set of coefficients used to allocate the importance of the first and second verification results in the initial traceability credibility parameter. It includes the weights of the first and second verification results, and the sum of the weight values ​​satisfies pre-defined constraints to ensure the rationality of the calculation logic. The initial traceability credibility parameter refers to the credibility parameter calculated based solely on the two types of verification results and their corresponding weights, without considering anomalies in cross-chain operation logs. It serves as the basis for subsequent parameter calibration. First, obtain the pre-defined third weight coefficient to clarify the weight values ​​corresponding to the first and second verification results. Confirm that both the first and second verification results have been quantized, such as positive results corresponding to positive vectorized values ​​and negative results corresponding to negative vectorized values. If quantization has not been completed, convert the qualitative results into standardized quantized values ​​according to pre-defined rules. Following the calculation logic of "initial traceability credibility parameter = first verification result × first verification result weight + second verification result × second verification result weight," substitute the quantized values ​​of the two types of verification results and their corresponding weights to calculate the initial traceability credibility parameter. After the calculation is completed, the parameters are checked for range to ensure that they are within the preset quantization range. If they are outside the range, the quantization value or weight coefficient is rechecked, corrected, and recalculated to ensure the accuracy of the initial parameters.

[0087] Step h2: Determine if there are any abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log.

[0088] Furthermore, cross-chain operation logs refer to detailed logs recording various operational behaviors during the cross-chain transfer of data from traceable survey archives between target-related blockchain networks, including information such as operation time, operation node, and operation type. Abnormal rollback records refer to rollback operation records in the cross-chain operation logs that do not conform to normal business processes. Normal rollbacks are usually triggered by reasonable reasons such as data transmission errors, while abnormal rollbacks may be related to data tampering or illegal operations and require careful identification. The sorted cross-chain operation logs are extracted from the log set to be verified, and the operation type of each log is checked one by one in chronological order to filter out records with the operation type "rollback". Anomaly determination is performed on the filtered rollback records: check whether the preceding operations corresponding to the rollback record are complete; if the preceding operations are missing, it is marked as abnormal; check whether the initiating node of the rollback operation is a legitimate node in the target-related blockchain network; if the initiating node is not in the list of legitimate nodes, it is marked as abnormal; verify the remarks information of the rollback operation; if the remarks information is ambiguous or contradicts normal business logic, it is marked as abnormal. All rollback records marked as abnormal are counted. If at least one abnormal rollback record exists, it is determined that there is an abnormal rollback record in the cross-chain operation log; if no abnormal rollback record is found, it is determined that there is no abnormal rollback record.

[0089] Step h3: If there are abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log, the above initial credibility parameter is calibrated based on the number of abnormal rollback records, and the calibrated source traceability credibility parameter is determined as the source traceability credibility parameter.

[0090] Furthermore, the number of abnormal rollback records refers to the total number of rollback operations judged as abnormal in the cross-chain operation log. The higher the number, the higher the possibility of abnormal risks in the cross-chain data transfer process. Calibration refers to the process of adjusting the initial traceability credibility parameter based on the number of abnormal rollback records. Calibration reduces the interference of abnormal operations on the credibility parameter, making the final parameter more reflective of the authenticity and effectiveness of the archive traceability. The traceability credibility parameter refers to the final credibility parameter obtained after calibration, which comprehensively reflects the consistency between the archive data and historical records, the compliance of quantum watermarking, and the standardization of cross-chain operations. If abnormal rollback records are determined to exist in the cross-chain operation log, the number of abnormal rollback records is first counted, and then a calibration coefficient is determined according to the preset calibration rules. The calibration coefficient is usually a positive number less than 1. The more abnormal rollbacks, the smaller the calibration coefficient. The initial parameter is calibrated according to the calculation logic of "traceability credibility parameter = initial traceability credibility parameter × calibration coefficient" to obtain the calibrated traceability credibility parameter. If the number of abnormal rollback records is zero, no calibration is required, and the initial traceability confidence parameter is directly determined as the final traceability confidence parameter. After calibration, the parameter is checked again to see if it is within the preset quantization range. If it exceeds the range, the calibration coefficient is adjusted appropriately to ensure that the final parameter meets the requirements.

[0091] Step h4: Determine the tracing result based on the tracing credibility parameter and the tracing result judgment threshold. If the tracing credibility parameter is greater than or equal to the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be successful; if the tracing credibility parameter is less than the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be unsuccessful.

[0092] Furthermore, the traceability result judgment threshold refers to a pre-set critical value used to distinguish whether the traceability result is qualified or not. This threshold is determined based on historical traceability data, business needs, and security standards. Different thresholds can be set for archives with different confidentiality levels. Traceability passing means that the traceability credibility parameter reaches or exceeds the judgment threshold, indicating that the authenticity, completeness, and compliance of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced have been verified, and the traceability result is qualified. Traceability failing means that the traceability credibility parameter is below the judgment threshold, indicating that the archive data may have been tampered with, missing, or non-compliant, and the traceability result is unqualified. The pre-set traceability result judgment threshold is obtained to ensure that the threshold matches the confidentiality level and business scenario of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced. The traceability credibility parameter obtained in step h3 is compared with the judgment threshold: if the traceability credibility parameter is greater than or equal to the judgment threshold, it indicates that the verification results of the archival data in dimensions such as cross-chain circulation and quantum watermarking have met the qualified standards, and the traceability result is judged as traceability passed; if the traceability credibility parameter is less than the judgment threshold, it indicates that there is a problem in at least one verification dimension, and the authenticity or compliance of the archival data is questionable, and the traceability result is judged as traceability failed. The specific comparison results of the parameters and thresholds during the judgment process are recorded to provide a basis for the subsequent generation of traceability reports.

[0093] Step h5: If the tracing result is determined to be successful, a tracing success report is generated. The tracing success report includes details of the first verification result, details of the second verification result, and the calculation process of the credibility parameter. The tracing report is then output.

[0094] Furthermore, the traceability report refers to the formal report generated when the traceability result is determined to be successful, recording key information of the entire traceability process. It must include detailed verification details and calculation processes to ensure that the traceability results are traceable and auditable. The first verification result details refer to the detailed information recorded in the process of generating the first verification result, including the basis for calculating the feature hash matching degree, the logic for determining the consistency of the credential time sequence, and the method for verifying the validity of the log node signature. The second verification result details refer to the detailed information recorded in the process of generating the second verification result, including the process of calculating the Hamming distance for watermark integrity, the basis for comparing the public key for ownership legitimacy, and the logic for verifying the level matching. The credibility parameter calculation process refers to the complete process of recording the initial traceability credibility parameter calculation, anomaly rollback calibration, and final parameter determination, including information such as the weight coefficients used, quantization rules, and calibration coefficients. A traceability report should be constructed according to the preset report template. The report should sequentially present the details of the first verification result, the details of the second verification result, and the calculation process of the credibility parameters. The details of the first verification result should explain the calculation or judgment steps for feature hash matching degree, voucher time sequence consistency, and log node signature validity, and include key comparison data. The details of the second verification result should record the verification process for watermark integrity, ownership legality, and level matching in detail, and mark the core verification nodes. The credibility parameter calculation process should clearly list the formulas and substitution values ​​for the initial parameter calculation, the basis for determining the number of abnormal rollback records and calibration coefficients, and the calculation steps for the final parameters. The report content should be rigorous in language and clear in logic, avoiding vague expressions. After completing the report construction, the report should be formatted according to the preset output format and sent to the applicant's designated terminal device through a secure transmission channel.

[0095] In some alternative embodiments, the method further includes: Step i1: If the source tracing result is determined to be source tracing failure, perform anomaly identification and verification based on the first verification result, the first anomaly threshold, the second verification result, and the second anomaly threshold.

[0096] Furthermore, "failed tracing" refers to a tracing credibility parameter falling below a preset tracing result judgment threshold, indicating that the tracing data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced has problems in terms of authenticity, completeness, or compliance, and fails the tracing verification. The first verification result refers to the result obtained based on the consistency verification between the tracing data of the surveying and mapping archives and the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified, reflecting the degree of matching between the archive data and historical cross-chain records. The first anomaly threshold is a pre-set critical value used to determine whether the first verification result is within an abnormal range; below this threshold indicates anomalies in the cross-chain operation log related verification. The second verification result refers to the result obtained based on the consistency verification between the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring credentials and archive metadata, reflecting the authenticity and compliance of the quantum watermark. The second anomaly threshold is a pre-set critical value used to determine whether the second verification result is within an abnormal range; below this threshold indicates anomalies in the quantum watermark related verification. Anomaly identification verification refers to the verification process of locating the specific reason for the tracing failure by comparing the first verification result with the first anomaly threshold and the second verification result with the second anomaly threshold respectively. Obtain preset first and second anomaly thresholds, ensuring that both thresholds align with the quantification dimensions of the first and second verification results, respectively. Compare the first verification result with the first anomaly threshold to determine if it falls below it; simultaneously, compare the second verification result with the second anomaly threshold to determine if it falls below it. Through these two comparison operations, the anomaly dimensions that led to the failure of source tracing are initially identified, providing a basis for subsequent anomaly labeling and report generation, ensuring that the anomaly identification process is logically rigorous and comprehensive in its dimensions.

[0097] Step i2: If the first verification result is less than the first anomaly threshold, mark the above-mentioned source-tracing mapping archive data as cross-chain operation log anomaly and generate a source-tracing failure report.

[0098] Furthermore, "first verification result less than first anomaly threshold" means that the quantified value of the first verification result is lower than the first anomaly threshold, indicating that the consistency between the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced and the cross-chain operation log and watermark anchoring certificate has not reached the minimum standard, and there is anomaly in the cross-chain operation log related verification. "Cross-chain operation log anomaly" refers to a type of anomaly identification result, used to mark the traceability failure of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced due to insufficient matching degree with the cross-chain operation log and watermark anchoring certificate. The anomaly may involve cross-chain record tampering, missing certificates, etc. "Traceability failure report" refers to a report generated when the traceability result is determined to be failure, which records the traceability process, anomaly identification result, and reasons for failure. It is necessary to clearly mark the anomaly type and key verification data to facilitate subsequent problem investigation. If the first verification result is determined to be less than the first anomaly threshold, a "cross-chain operation log anomaly" mark should be added to the metadata of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced. The mark should include the basis for the anomaly determination. Next, generate a traceability failure report according to the preset report template. The report should present a detailed calculation of the first verification result, clearly mark the key verification items that caused the anomaly, and explain the basis for determining the first anomaly threshold to ensure that the report content is traceable and the cause of the anomaly is clearly identifiable.

[0099] Step i3: If the second verification result is less than the second anomaly threshold, mark the above-mentioned traceable mapping archive data as quantum watermark anomaly and generate a traceability failure report.

[0100] Furthermore, a second verification result less than the second anomaly threshold means that the quantized value of the second verification result is lower than the second anomaly threshold, indicating that the consistency between the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate and archive metadata has not reached the minimum standard, and there is an anomaly in the quantum watermark-related verification. A quantum watermark anomaly refers to a type of anomaly identification result used to mark the traceability failure of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced due to non-compliance of the quantum watermark information. The reasons for the anomaly may involve quantum watermark tampering, mismatched ownership information, or inconsistencies between encryption and confidentiality levels. A traceability failure report is a report that records the reasons for the traceability failure, the anomaly type, and key verification data. Reports in quantum watermark anomaly scenarios should highlight the relevant details of quantum watermark verification. If the second verification result is determined to be less than the second anomaly threshold, a "quantum watermark anomaly" mark should first be added to the metadata of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, specifying the core basis for the anomaly determination. Subsequently, a traceability failure report should be generated, detailing the calculation process of the second verification result, clearly indicating the specific dimension corresponding to the anomaly, and explaining the setting logic of the second anomaly threshold to ensure that the report provides accurate guidance for subsequent quantum watermark anomaly investigation.

[0101] Step i4: Output the marked data of the above-mentioned surveying and mapping archives to be traced and the report of failure to trace the source.

[0102] Furthermore, the tagged traceable surveying and mapping archive data refers to the data with cross-chain operation log anomaly or quantum watermark anomaly markers. The marker information is stored in the metadata for easy identification of anomaly types and judgment criteria. The traceability failure report is a formal report recording the reasons for the failure, the anomaly identification process, and key verification data. It must use a standardized format to ensure information completeness and logical clarity. Output refers to the operation of transmitting the tagged archive data and the traceability failure report to a designated recipient according to a preset method, ensuring the security and data integrity of the transmission process. First, the tagged traceable surveying and mapping archive data undergoes integrity verification to confirm that the anomaly marker information in the metadata is not missing, the format is correct, and the core archive data is not damaged due to the marking operation. Next, the traceability failure report undergoes format standardization processing to ensure that the report cannot be illegally tampered with. Finally, through a preset secure transmission channel, the tagged traceable surveying and mapping archive data and the traceability failure report are simultaneously output to the applicant's designated terminal device or archive management system. After transmission, a successful output notification must be sent to the applicant, and a copy of the report and the archive anomaly marker information are stored in the traceability record module of the target associated blockchain network.

[0103] The method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives provided in this embodiment firstly obtains the data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced and determines the target associated blockchain network, providing a precise data source and network support for the traceability of surveying and mapping archives. First, complete data of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced is comprehensively collected, covering the core content of the archives, metadata, and associated operation records, ensuring the integrity of the traceability data foundation. Then, combining the archive's generation scenario, storage nodes, and cross-chain interaction history, blockchain networks that have data interactions with the archives are selected as the target associated blockchain networks, clarifying the network scope required for traceability and avoiding deviations in the traceability direction due to ambiguous network positioning. Secondly, a log set to be verified is established by retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials based on the target associated blockchain network, integrating the core verification evidence required for traceability. Operation logs generated during the cross-chain transmission, storage, and modification of the archives are extracted from the distributed nodes of the target associated blockchain network, recording the archive's flow path and operational behavior; simultaneously, watermark anchoring credentials generated during archive preservation are retrieved, which associate the archives with the initial watermark information, ensuring the relevance of watermark traceability. The two types of data are categorized and organized according to time sequence and operation type, forming a clearly structured log set to be verified. Then, the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified are used to obtain the first verification result, initially determining the validity of the archive traceability from the perspective of data consistency. The archive data to be traced is compared with the archive content snapshots and operation parameters in the cross-chain operation logs to verify whether the archives have been tampered with or have abnormal parameters during the cross-chain process; at the same time, the archive data is checked against the archive identifier, watermark generation time, and other information recorded in the watermark anchoring credentials to ensure the authenticity of the correspondence between the credentials and the archives. Through multi-dimensional comparison, the first verification result reflecting data consistency is generated. Subsequently, quantum key distribution is used to extract quantum watermark information from the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, ensuring the security of the watermark extraction process and the integrity of the watermark information. Quantum keys possess the characteristics of being uncopyable and resistant to cracking. Using them as extraction keys can effectively prevent illegal interception or tampering during the extraction process, ensuring the security of the extraction operation. Simultaneously, quantum watermark information is deeply embedded in the archival data. With the help of quantum keys, the watermark embedding location can be precisely located, allowing for the complete extraction of archival traceability information from the watermark. This avoids watermark information loss or damage due to improper extraction methods, providing a reliable data source for subsequent watermark verification. Furthermore, a second verification result is obtained by verifying the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate, further strengthening the reliability of traceability verification from the perspective of watermark correlation. The extracted quantum watermark information is compared with the watermark features and generation rules recorded in the watermark anchoring certificate to verify whether the quantum watermark is the original watermark generated during archival storage, eliminating interference from counterfeit watermarks. At the same time, the consistency of archival identifiers, operation nodes, and other content contained in the watermark information with the anchoring certificate is checked to ensure that the binding relationship between the watermark and the archive has not been broken.The second verification result generated through specialized verification can supplement the verification gap in the watermark dimension of the first verification result. Finally, by calculating the traceability credibility parameter based on the first and second verification results, and combining it with a preset threshold to output a traceability report, a quantitative evaluation and clear presentation of the traceability results are achieved. Based on indicators such as the number of qualified items and the degree of matching of the two types of verification results, a preset algorithm is used to calculate the traceability credibility parameter, transforming the abstract verification result into an intuitive quantitative value; then, this parameter is compared with a preset traceability result judgment threshold to clarify whether the archival traceability result is qualified. Finally, the credibility parameter, verification details, and judgment conclusion are output in the form of a traceability report, making the traceability results clear and easy to understand, providing users with clear archival traceability basis, and meeting the practical needs of surveying and mapping archival traceability. By implementing this invention, the problems of related surveying and mapping archival security storage and traceability technologies failing to meet the atomicity requirements of cross-chain operations, insufficient quantum resistance, poor watermark robustness adaptation, and lack of a highly reliable traceability mechanism linking blockchain and watermarks are solved. Furthermore, the device security module is not optimized for quantum keys and cross-chain data, making it difficult to guarantee the security of high-confidential surveying and mapping archivals throughout their entire lifecycle.

[0104] Although embodiments of the invention have been described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, and such modifications and variations all fall within the scope defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for secure preservation and traceability of surveying and mapping archives, characterized in that, The method includes: Acquire the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and determine the target associated blockchain network based on the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced; Based on the target associated blockchain network, retrieve cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchor credentials to establish a log set to be verified. Based on the source-traceable survey and mapping archive data, the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified are verified to obtain the first verification result. Quantum watermark information was extracted from the traceable survey and mapping archive data using quantum key distribution. The quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate are verified to obtain a second verification result; Based on the first verification result and the second verification result, the traceability credibility parameter is calculated, and based on the traceability credibility parameter and the preset traceability result judgment threshold, the traceability report is output. The steps of acquiring the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, and determining the target associated blockchain network based on the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, include: Obtain the metadata of the survey and mapping archive data to be traced, and extract the archive unique identifier and chain network marker fields from the metadata; Based on the chain network tag field, the corresponding blockchain list is matched in the preset surveying and mapping archive chain network mapping library, and blockchains related to the historical circulation of archives are selected as candidate associated chains. Submit the unique file identifier and applicant qualification certificate to the node management module of the candidate associated chain network to apply for chain network access, and request the candidate associated chain network to return the access verification result; Receive the permission verification results returned by the candidate associated blockchain network, and determine the candidate associated blockchain network whose permission verification result is passed as the target associated blockchain network.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of retrieving cross-chain operation logs and watermarked anchor credentials based on the target associated blockchain network to establish a log set to be verified includes: Send a data retrieval request to the cross-chain traceability zone of the target associated blockchain network. The data retrieval request carries the unique archive identifier and retrieval range of the survey and mapping archive data to be traced. The retrieval range includes the cross-chain circulation stage and the watermark embedding stage. Receive cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials returned by the target associated blockchain network, and determine the validity result and matching result of the blockchain node signature of the watermark anchoring credentials and the log node signature of the node public key of the target associated blockchain network. If the matching result fails, a data retrieval request is sent again to the cross-chain traceability area of ​​the target associated blockchain network until the matching result is successful. If the matching result is successful, the cross-chain operation logs are sorted from oldest to newest based on the timestamp; The cross-chain operation logs containing multi-dimensional feature hash sets and node signature records are filtered out from the sorted cross-chain operation logs, and combined with watermarked anchor credentials to form a log set to be verified.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The first verification result is obtained by verifying the cross-chain operation logs and watermark anchoring credentials in the log set to be verified based on the source-traceable surveying and mapping archive data, including: Calculate the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced based on the archive type of the surveying and mapping archives to be traced; The current multi-dimensional feature hash is compared with the multi-dimensional feature hash set recorded in the log set to be verified, and the feature hash matching degree result is calculated. Calculate the consistency of the document time sequence between the watermark embedding timestamp in the watermark anchored document and the first cross-chain timestamp in the cross-chain operation log; The first verification result is calculated based on the preset first weight coefficient, the feature hash matching result, the credential time sequence consistency result, and the log node signature validity result.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The calculation of the current multi-dimensional feature hash of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, based on the archive type of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced, includes: If the archive type of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced is a vector archive, calculate the coordinate hash and topological relationship hash of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash; If the archive type of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced is a raster archive, calculate the pixel value hash and resolution level hash of the surveying and mapping archive data to be traced to obtain the current multi-dimensional feature hash.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Before using quantum key extraction to extract quantum watermark information from the traceable mapping archive data, the method further includes: Extract the watermark extraction key hash value and the file confidentiality level from the watermark anchoring certificate; The quantum key dynamic management module sends a key retrieval request, which carries the hash value of the watermark extraction key, the file confidentiality level, and the applicant's authorization certificate. The quantum key dynamic management module is used to verify whether the applicant's authorization certificate is valid. If it is valid, the quantum key corresponding to the applicant's authorization certificate is matched. The quantum key is transmitted to the traceability operation terminal using a quantum-secure transmission channel.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The extraction of quantum watermark information from the traceable mapping archive data using quantum key distribution includes: If the archive type of the survey and mapping archive data to be traced is a vector archive, the quantum watermark entangled state is decoupled from the archive topological relationship feature space by using the inverse operation of the quantum controlled NOT gate. Based on the analysis of the quantum watermark entangled state, the ownership unit ID, creation time and encryption level are obtained, and the quantum watermark information in the survey and mapping archive data to be traced is obtained. If the archive type of the surveying and mapping data to be traced is a raster archive, the Laplace pyramid inverse decomposition is performed on the archive image of the surveying and mapping data to be traced, and the quantum watermark information is obtained from the quantum states of each level pixel through a formula based on the middle 3 embedded levels of the watermark anchored certificate record.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The verification of the quantum watermark information and the watermark anchoring certificate to obtain a second verification result includes: The Hamming distance between the extracted quantum watermark information and the watermark feature parameters in the watermark anchoring certificate is calculated, and the watermark integrity result is obtained based on the Hamming distance and a preset threshold for the Hamming distance. The public key of the archive owner is retrieved from the target associated blockchain network. Based on the binding relationship between the ownership unit ID and the owner's public key in the quantum watermark information, the result of ownership legitimacy is obtained. The matching result of the encryption level in the quantum watermark information and the confidentiality level of the metadata of the survey and mapping archives to be traced is obtained; The second verification result is calculated based on the preset second weight coefficient, watermark integrity result, ownership legality result, and level matching result.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The process of calculating a source tracing credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and outputting a source tracing report based on the source tracing credibility parameter and a preset source tracing result judgment threshold, includes: The initial traceability credibility parameter is calculated based on the preset third weight coefficient, the first verification result, and the second verification result; Determine if there are any abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log; If there are abnormal rollback records in the cross-chain operation log, the initial traceability credibility parameter is calibrated based on the number of abnormal rollback records, and the calibrated traceability credibility parameter is determined as the traceability credibility parameter. The tracing result is determined based on the tracing credibility parameter and the tracing result judgment threshold. If the tracing credibility parameter is greater than or equal to the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be successful; if the tracing credibility parameter is less than the tracing result judgment threshold, the tracing result is determined to be unsuccessful. If the tracing result is determined to be successful, a tracing success report is generated. The tracing success report includes details of the first verification result, details of the second verification result, and the calculation process of the credibility parameter. The tracing report is then output.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The step of calculating the source tracing credibility parameter based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and outputting the source tracing result based on the source tracing credibility parameter, further includes: If the source tracing result is determined to be source tracing failure, anomaly identification and verification are performed based on the first verification result, the first anomaly threshold, the second verification result, and the second anomaly threshold. If the first verification result is less than the first abnormal threshold, the data of the mapping archive to be traced will be marked as an abnormal cross-chain operation log and a traceability failure report will be generated. If the second verification result is less than the second anomaly threshold, the data to be traced will be marked as quantum watermark anomaly, and a traceability failure report will be generated. Output the marked mapping archive data to be traced and the traceability failure report.

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