Intelligent household equipment communication method driven by physical unclonable function

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of smart home devices, in particular to a smart home device communication method driven by a physical unclonable function, which is used for establishing a secure session between a resource-limited initiating device and a resource-limited receiving device, and comprises the following steps: A, generating a physical unclonable function key; b, anti-quantum key negotiation; c, combining identity authentication and signature; d, establishing a secure session key; and E, safely transmitting the instruction. According to the method, the non-persistent key is generated and established through the physical unclonable function key, so that the problems of physical attack and key stealing are solved; anti-quantum key negotiation and lattice ciphertext de-encapsulation provide anti-quantum security, and the problem of future calculation threats is solved; identity authentication and signature are combined to realize single handshake, delay and power consumption are reduced, and the requirements of low power consumption and high efficiency are met; drift calibration is implemented, so that the stability of the key of the physical unclonable function is guaranteed, and the reliability is improved; and the confidentiality and the integrity of the instruction are ensured by the final secure transmission of the instruction.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of smart home device technology, and in particular to a communication method for smart home devices driven by physically unclonable functions. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid popularization of the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart home devices, their security issues have become increasingly prominent. Traditional secure communication methods mainly rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS / SSL) protocols, which are mostly based on public-key cryptography such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However, the upcoming era of quantum computing poses a fatal threat to these traditional cryptographic systems. Once large-scale quantum computers are put into use, the existing secure communication foundation will become completely ineffective.

[0003] To address quantum security issues, quantum-resistant algorithms such as lattice cryptography have been proposed. However, these algorithms typically involve high computational complexity and large key and ciphertext sizes, making them difficult to implement efficiently in resource-constrained smart home microcontrollers (MCUs). Furthermore, smart home devices are often deployed in home environments, making them highly vulnerable to physical-level attacks such as key theft, chip cloning, and side-channel attacks. Traditional key storage methods rely on vulnerable non-volatile memories (such as eFuse), making it difficult to guarantee absolute key security.

[0004] Designing a secure communication solution that can resist both quantum and physical attacks while meeting the requirements of smart home devices for low power consumption, low latency, and high efficiency is an urgent problem to be solved in this field. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to address the shortcomings of existing technologies by providing a communication method for smart home devices driven by physically non-cloning functions. This method establishes non-persistent keys through the generation of physically non-cloning function keys, solving the problems of physical attacks and key theft. Quantum-resistant key negotiation and ciphertext decapsulation provide quantum-resistant security, addressing future computational threats. Identity authentication and signature merging achieve a single handshake, reducing latency and power consumption, meeting the requirements for low power consumption and high efficiency. Drift calibration ensures the stability of the physically non-cloning function keys, improving reliability. Finally, secure instruction transmission ensures the confidentiality and integrity of instructions.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a smart home device communication method driven by a physically unclonable function, used to establish a secure session between a resource-constrained initiating device and a receiving device. The method includes the following steps: A. Physically Unclonable Function Key Generation: The initiating and receiving devices utilize their internal physically unclonable function modules to generate and export a non-persistently stored lattice cryptographic private key and a physically unclonable function driver private key for authentication in real time during communication. B. Quantum-resistant key negotiation: The initiating device uses a lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol to calculate and generate a lattice public key and lattice ciphertext associated with the one-time session secret using the initiating device's lattice cryptographic private key; C. Identity authentication and signature merging: The initiating device uses the physical non-clonable function of the initiating device to drive the private key to digitally sign the key negotiation message composed of the public key and the ciphertext, forming the authentication message in the low-power secure handshake state machine; D. Secure session key establishment: After receiving the authentication message, the receiving device performs the following operations: D1. Physically non-clonable function-driven asymmetric signature verification, verifying the digital signature in the authentication message; D2. Drift calibration implementation: When the receiving device generates or recovers the lattice cryptographic private key, it implements a real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism. D3. Decrypt the ciphertext using the private key of the receiving device to decrypt the ciphertext, recover the one-time session secret, and derive a shared session key from the one-time session secret; E. Secure command transmission: The initiating device uses a shared session key to perform symmetric encryption and message authentication code processing on the control commands, and then transmits the encrypted commands to the receiving device for execution.

[0007] Preferably, the merging of the authentication and key negotiation steps is achieved by embedding the digital signature driven by the physical non-clonable function of the initiating device as an indivisible field into the extended data portion of the ciphertext, thereby strictly limiting the number of communication round trips of the secure handshake protocol to one.

[0008] Preferably, the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism includes the following steps: Real-time environmental monitoring: Before receiving the authentication message, the receiving device collects the temperature and voltage parameters around the receiving device in real time. Based on the lookup table correction, the receiving device searches for the corresponding correction code in the pre-stored physical non-cloning function response calibration lookup table according to the temperature and voltage parameters, and applies the correction code to the original physical non-cloning function response to generate a stable and accurate lattice cryptographic private key.

[0009] Preferably, the triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism include: The ambient temperature of the equipment changes by more than ΔT degrees Celsius, where ΔT is between 1°C and 5°C. Or the power supply voltage of the equipment fluctuates by more than ΔV volts, where ΔV is between 0.05V and 0.2V; Or, the device has been powered on more than N times since its last successful certification, where N is between 1 and 10 times.

[0010] Preferably, the physically unclonable function module integrates a side-channel attack detection mechanism; The side-channel attack detection mechanism includes: during the export of the private key driven by the lattice cryptography or the physical non-cloning function, the power consumption curve of the device where the physical non-cloning function module is located is monitored in real time. When the monitored curve change rate or instantaneous peak exceeds the preset security threshold, the security circuit breaker mechanism is immediately triggered to destroy the currently exported key.

[0011] Preferably, when determining the communication target, the initiating device dynamically applies a layered trust domain security policy, and determines whether to use a physically unclonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol or a traditional TLS / SSL protocol by checking the target device's media access control address or the IP address range where the target device is located.

[0012] Preferably, the layered trust domain security policy includes a dynamic local security level adjustment mechanism, the execution conditions of which are: Local threat detection: When the initiating or receiving device determines that there is a high-risk threat in the local area network through side-channel attack detection mechanism or network abnormal traffic analysis, it switches the local area network communication protocol from the physically unclonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol to a pre-configured lightweight authentication protocol based solely on a shared symmetric key. Switching conditions: Protocol downgrading is only allowed when the battery level of the initiating or receiving device is below a preset threshold and the device requires a millisecond-level fast response.

[0013] Preferably, the derivation process of a one-time session secret includes: Using a cryptographic hash function as the key derivation function, a one-time session secret is taken as input, and a subkey for symmetric encryption and a subkey for message authentication code are generated.

[0014] Preferably, the message authentication code processing adopts a hash-based message authentication code algorithm and uses the message authentication code subkey for calculation, and the symmetric encryption adopts the authentication encryption mode.

[0015] Preferably, if signature verification or ciphertext decapsulation fails during secure session key establishment, the receiving device immediately performs the following operations: Clear the current session state and all temporary keys; send an unencrypted security alert message to the initiating device; and record this authentication failure event in the receiving device's immutable security log.

[0016] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: Generating non-persistent keys through physically non-clonable function keys solves the problems of physical attacks and key theft; quantum-resistant key negotiation and ciphertext decapsulation provide quantum-resistant security, addressing future computational threats; identity authentication and signature merging achieve a single handshake, reducing latency and power consumption, meeting the requirements of low power consumption and high efficiency; drift calibration ensures the stability of the physically non-clonable function keys, improving reliability; and secure instruction transmission ensures the confidentiality and integrity of instructions. Attached Figure Description

[0017] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a smart home device communication method driven by a physically unclonable function according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0018] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0019] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention discloses a smart home device communication method driven by a physically unclonable function, used to establish a secure session between a resource-constrained initiating device and a receiving device. The method includes the following steps: A. Physically Unclonable Function Key Generation: The initiating and receiving devices utilize their internal physically unclonable function modules to generate and export a non-persistently stored lattice cryptographic private key and a physically unclonable function driver private key for authentication in real time during communication, thereby establishing a hardware root of trust based on physically unclonable functions. The generated lattice cryptographic private key and physically unclonable function driver private key are restricted to non-persistent storage, fundamentally eliminating the risk of key storage theft, thus establishing a hardware root of trust based on physically unclonable functions, greatly enhancing the device's ability to resist physical cloning and key leakage attacks.

[0020] B. Quantum-resistant key negotiation: The initiating device employs a lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol. Using its lattice cryptographic private key, it calculates and generates a lattice public key, as well as lattice ciphertext associated with the one-time session secret. By adopting this lightweight lattice cryptography protocol, this step endows the communication process with quantum-resistant security, effectively resisting the risk of future quantum computers breaking the key negotiation mechanism. Simultaneously, the protocol's lightweight nature ensures its adaptability to the computational efficiency requirements of resource-constrained initiating and receiving devices.

[0021] C. Identity authentication and signature merging: The initiating device uses its physical non-cloning function to drive its private key to digitally sign the key negotiation message consisting of the public key and the ciphertext, forming the authentication message in the low-power secure handshake state machine, thereby merging the identity authentication and key negotiation steps. By merging the identity authentication and key negotiation steps, the number of round trips in the secure communication handshake can be minimized, thereby significantly reducing the latency and power consumption during the communication process, and meeting the efficiency requirements of resource-constrained devices for low-power secure handshakes.

[0022] D. Secure session key establishment: After receiving the authentication message, the receiving device performs the following operations: D1. Physically unclonable function-driven asymmetric signature verification verifies the digital signature in the authentication message to achieve decentralized hardware identity authentication of the initiating device; it can confirm the authenticity of the initiating device's hardware identity without relying on a third-party central institution, thus enhancing the decentralized security features of the system.

[0023] D2. Drift calibration implementation: When generating or recovering lattice cryptographic private keys, the receiving device implements a real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism to ensure the stability and accuracy of the lattice cryptographic private key generation by the receiving device; it overcomes the sensitivity of physical non-cloning functions to environmental changes (such as temperature and voltage) and significantly improves the reliability of the key generation process.

[0024] D3. Grammar decryption: The grammar cipher text is decrypted using the receiving device's grammar cipher private key to recover the one-time session secret, and a shared session key is derived from the one-time session secret. By recovering the shared session key through grammar decryption, quantum-resistant key negotiation is completed while ensuring the confidentiality of subsequent communications.

[0025] E. Secure command transmission: The initiating device uses a shared session key to perform symmetric encryption and message authentication code processing on the control commands, and then transmits the encrypted commands to the receiving device for execution. This ensures the confidentiality of the control commands and prevents their content from being stolen; at the same time, the message authentication code processing guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the command content during transmission, thereby ensuring the secure and reliable execution of smart home device control commands.

[0026] The working principle is as follows: First, a hardware security foundation is established through the generation of physically non-clonable function keys. Specifically, the initiating and receiving devices utilize their internal physically non-clonable function modules to generate and export a non-persistently stored ciphertext private key and a physically non-clonable function driver private key for authentication in real time during communication. This ensures that the generated private keys are not persistently stored, thereby enhancing the key's resistance to physical theft.

[0027] Secondly, quantum resistance is achieved through quantum-resistant key negotiation. Specifically, the initiating device employs a lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol. Using the initiating device's lattice cryptographic private key, it calculates and generates a lattice public key, as well as lattice ciphertext associated with the one-time session secret. By adopting a lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol, quantum resistance to the communication process is achieved while ensuring computational efficiency, meeting the needs of resource-constrained devices.

[0028] Next, low latency and high efficiency are achieved by merging authentication and signature. Specifically, the initiating device uses its own physically non-clonable function to drive its private key to digitally sign the key negotiation message consisting of the public key and the ciphertext, forming the authentication message in the low-power secure handshake state machine. This merges the authentication and key negotiation steps, significantly reducing latency and power consumption during communication.

[0029] Multiple security safeguards are implemented during the establishment of the secure session key: First, asymmetric signature verification driven by a physically non-cloning function verifies the digital signature in the authentication message, achieving reliable hardware identity authentication. Simultaneously, drift calibration is implemented—that is, the receiving device performs a real-time physically non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism when generating or retrieving the lattice cryptographic private key—improving the stability and accuracy of lattice cryptographic private key generation. Subsequently, through lattice ciphertext decapsulation, the lattice ciphertext is decrypted using the receiving device's lattice cryptographic private key to recover the one-time session secret. A shared session key is then derived from this one-time session secret, ultimately completing the establishment of the quantum-resistant secure key.

[0030] Finally, through secure instruction transmission, the initiating device uses a shared session key to perform symmetric encryption and message authentication code processing on the control instructions, and then transmits the encrypted instructions to the receiving device for execution, thereby ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the instruction content.

[0031] The generation and use of the non-persistently stored lattice-cipher private key and the physically non-cloning function-driven private key follow these limitations: Once a secure session is established, the lattice-cipher private key and the physically non-cloning function-driven private key are cleared from the device's volatile memory; the device retains only the shared session key. The generated private key is destroyed immediately after use, fundamentally eliminating the risk of the private key being stored long-term in device memory and thus vulnerable to physical attacks or reverse engineering, greatly enhancing the system's security against physical attacks.

[0032] The lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol employs a variant of the Kyber algorithm. This variant adjusts the parameter set of the lattice cryptography algorithm to ensure that the computational complexity of key negotiation does not exceed the execution cycles of N low-power microcontroller multiplication operations, thus meeting the resource-constrained requirements of both the initiating and receiving devices. Specifically, the value of N (i.e., the number of multiplication operations) is limited to between 1,000,000 and 20,000,000. By adjusting the parameter set of the lattice cryptography algorithm and limiting its computational complexity, a lightweight application of the lattice cryptography algorithm is achieved, meeting the resource-constrained requirements of both the initiating and receiving devices. This solves the technical challenge of efficiently and practically applying lattice cryptography in low-power IoT devices while maintaining quantum resistance.

[0033] The parameter set adjustment for the lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol includes the following steps: The memory consumption target setting sets a maximum memory consumption threshold M kilobytes (KB) based on the on-chip memory capacity of the initiating or receiving device, to ensure that the memory required by the lattice cryptography algorithm during operation does not exceed the maximum memory consumption threshold M kilobytes (KB); this sets a clear storage limit for the application of the lattice cryptography algorithm on resource-constrained devices.

[0034] The parameter set was configured to adjust parameters such as the multinomial dimension and modulus of the lattice cryptography algorithm, so that the actual memory consumption of the lattice cryptography algorithm during key negotiation meets the maximum memory consumption threshold of M kilobytes (KB); memory optimization of the lattice cryptography algorithm was achieved through parameter adjustment.

[0035] Memory efficiency is guaranteed, ensuring that the lattice cryptography algorithm can be executed efficiently in the on-chip memory of resource-constrained smart devices. Storage efficiency is guaranteed for the lattice cryptography algorithm, solving the storage efficiency problem in low-memory IoT devices.

[0036] Specifically, in certain low-power smart locks, M can be limited to 8KB.

[0037] In high-end smart gateway devices, M can be limited to 32KB.

[0038] In this embodiment, the authentication and key negotiation steps are combined by embedding the digital signature driven by the initiating device's physically unclonable function as an indivisible field into the extended data portion of the ciphertext, thus strictly limiting the number of round trips for the secure handshake protocol to one. By embedding the digital signature into the extended data portion of the ciphertext, the number of round trips for the secure handshake protocol is strictly limited to one. This mechanism significantly reduces the number of communications, thereby reducing latency and power consumption during communication and meeting the efficiency requirements of low-power secure handshakes.

[0039] Specifically, when constructing the authentication message, the initiating device also includes the following steps to prevent replay attacks: By embedding a timestamp or serial number, the initiating device uses a current timestamp or a strictly incrementing serial number as an integral part of the signature input data before generating a physically unclonable function-driven digital signature. This timestamp or serial number embedding limits the signature input data, ensuring that each generated digital signature is unique.

[0040] Before performing asymmetric signature verification driven by a physically unclonable function, the receiving device performs a freshness check on the timestamp or sequence number embedded in the authentication message. Specifically, it checks whether the timestamp is within the allowed time window or whether the sequence number is greater than the sequence number of the last successfully received message. This freshness check by the receiving device ensures that the authentication message is valid only once, thereby effectively enhancing the anti-replay attack capability of the single handshake protocol.

[0041] The real-time physical non-clonable function drift calibration mechanism in this embodiment includes the following steps: Real-time environmental monitoring involves collecting temperature and voltage parameters around the receiving device in real time before receiving the authentication message. This real-time environmental monitoring ensures that the calibration mechanism can obtain real-time environmental status information at the time of key generation.

[0042] Based on the lookup table correction, the receiving device searches for the corresponding correction code in the pre-stored physical non-cloning function response calibration lookup table according to temperature and voltage parameters, and applies the correction code to the original physical non-cloning function response to generate a stable and accurate lattice cryptographic private key, which enables the physical non-cloning function response to be corrected according to environmental changes.

[0043] Ultimately, stable and accurate lattice cryptographic private keys were generated, thus overcoming the inherent environmental sensitivity of physically unclonable functions and significantly improving the reliability of lattice cryptographic private key generation for physically unclonable functions.

[0044] The triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism in this embodiment include: the ambient temperature of the device changes by more than ΔT degrees Celsius, where ΔT is between 1°C and 5°C; Or the power supply voltage of the equipment fluctuates by more than ΔV volts, where ΔV is between 0.05V and 0.2V; Or, the device has been powered on more than N times since its last successful certification, where N is between 1 and 10 times.

[0045] By setting explicit threshold ranges for ambient temperature changes, power supply voltage fluctuations, and power-on cycles as triggering conditions, quantitative control of key environmental factors that may cause physical non-cloning functions (PNFs) to fail is achieved. This ensures that the real-time PNF drift calibration mechanism can be activated at necessary and critical moments, thereby improving the reliability of lattice cryptography private key generation and the adaptive stability of the system.

[0046] For example, in an embodiment of a low-power smart door lock, the triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism can be specifically limited to: the ambient temperature of the device changes by more than 2°C; or the power supply voltage of the device fluctuates by more than 0.1V; or the device has been powered on more than 5 times since the last successful certification.

[0047] In an embodiment of a high-end smart gateway device, the triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism may be specifically limited to: the ambient temperature of the device changes by more than 5°C; or the power supply voltage of the device fluctuates by more than 0.05V; or the device has been powered on more than once since the last successful authentication.

[0048] Specifically, the triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism also include a physical non-cloning function performance adaptive adjustment mechanism: The thresholds for ΔT and ΔV are dynamically adjusted. Instead of being fixed values, they are variables that are dynamically adjusted in real time based on historical calibration data. This allows the trigger thresholds of the calibration mechanism to adapt to the actual aging and performance changes of physically non-clonable function modules.

[0049] To predict drift trends, the receiving device monitors the rate of change of ambient temperature and power supply voltage in real time. If the rate of change indicates that the Hamming distance of the physical non-cloning function response will exceed the 1% bit error rate threshold within a short period of time, a calibration mechanism is immediately triggered to prevent key generation failure in advance.

[0050] It enables intelligent and predictive management of the calibration mechanism, preventing key generation failures in advance and transforming the calibration strategy from a passive response to proactive predictive maintenance, which greatly improves the reliability of grid cryptography private key generation and the long-term stability of the system.

[0051] The physically unclonable function module in this embodiment integrates a side-channel attack detection mechanism; The side-channel attack detection mechanism includes: during the export of the private key driven by the lattice cryptography or the physical non-cloning function, real-time monitoring of the power consumption curve of the device where the physical non-cloning function module is located, ensuring that abnormal physical leakage signals can be captured at the moment when the key is most vulnerable during export.

[0052] When the monitored rate of change of the curve or the instantaneous peak value exceeds the preset security threshold, the security circuit breaker mechanism is immediately triggered, thereby destroying the currently exported key. The response is achieved by triggering the security circuit breaker mechanism, which destroys the currently exported key.

[0053] It enables real-time detection and immediate defense against side-channel attacks, preventing attackers from obtaining keys through power consumption analysis, thereby significantly enhancing the hardware security of the lattice cryptographic private key and the private key export process driven by physically unclonable functions.

[0054] Specifically, the side-channel attack detection mechanism is a collaborative monitoring mechanism, which includes: Multi-dimensional feature monitoring, in addition to real-time monitoring of power consumption curves during the private key export process driven by lattice cryptography or physical non-cloning functions, also simultaneously monitors the real-time electromagnetic radiation (EMR) characteristics or clock delay jitter characteristics of the device; ensuring that attack detection can cover multiple side-channel information.

[0055] The multi-factor judgment logic for side-channel attacks adopts a multi-factor security model. The security circuit breaker mechanism is triggered only when at least one of the abnormal power consumption curve and the real-time electromagnetic radiation characteristic or clock delay jitter characteristic exceeds the preset threshold of the real-time electromagnetic radiation characteristic or clock delay jitter characteristic, thereby effectively distinguishing between malicious attacks and normal circuit noise.

[0056] It effectively distinguishes between malicious attacks and normal circuit noise, avoids false triggering caused by circuit noise, and significantly enhances the defense capability and detection robustness against complex coordinated side-channel attacks.

[0057] In this embodiment, when determining the communication target, the initiating device dynamically applies a hierarchical trust domain security policy. It determines whether to use a physically non-clonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol (for local area network communication) or a traditional TLS / SSL protocol (for external wide area network communication) by checking the target device's Media Access Control (MAC) address or the IP address range where the target device is located.

[0058] It can automatically select the protocol with the best match between security level and computational efficiency based on the trust domain (local or external) of the communication target, ensuring that local area network communication can obtain high security protection based on physical non-cloning functions and lattice cryptography, while external wide area network communication can maintain the interoperability of traditional protocols, realizing the self-adaptation of security policy and efficiency optimization.

[0059] The hierarchical trust domain security policy in this embodiment includes a dynamic local security level adjustment mechanism. The execution conditions for the dynamic local security level adjustment mechanism are as follows: Local threat detection involves the initiating or receiving device using side-channel attack detection mechanisms or network anomaly traffic analysis to determine if a high-risk threat exists within the local area network. In this case, the local area network communication protocol is switched from a physically non-clonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol to a pre-configured lightweight authentication protocol based solely on a shared symmetric key. This ensures the system can identify security risks to the local network when under attack.

[0060] The switching condition is such that protocol degradation is only allowed when the battery level of either the initiating or receiving device is below a preset threshold and the device requires a millisecond-level rapid response. This tightly links threat response with device resource status (such as battery level) and application requirements (such as rapid response).

[0061] When local threat detection and switching conditions are met, the device switches the local area network communication protocol from a physically non-cloning function-lattice cryptography protocol to a pre-configured lightweight authentication protocol based solely on a shared symmetric key. This enables dynamic adaptive adjustment of the security protocol. In extreme scenarios where high-risk threats are coupled with extremely limited resources (such as power), it can sacrifice some security for low power consumption and millisecond-level fast response, greatly improving the task reliability and continuous operation capability of smart home devices.

[0062] Specifically, the dynamic local security level adjustment mechanism includes the following steps: Threat index calculation involves the initiating or receiving device weighting side-channel attack indicators and abnormal network traffic indicators to generate a quantified real-time threat index R. This threat index calculation enables the quantitative assessment of threats, transforming abstract security risks into quantifiable indicators and providing a basis for refined decision-making.

[0063] Intermediate threat response: When the real-time threat index R exceeds the preset intermediate threshold Rmid, and the device's battery level is below the preset threshold while the device requires millisecond-level rapid response, the device switches the local area network communication protocol from the physically non-cloning function-lattice cryptography protocol to a pre-configured lightweight authentication protocol based solely on a shared symmetric key. Through intermediate threat response, the protocol achieves adaptive degradation. Under specific conditions where threats exist and resources are limited, dynamic adaptive degradation of the security protocol is realized, ensuring the device's task continuity and response speed in extreme scenarios.

[0064] Advanced Threat Response: When the real-time threat index R exceeds the preset advanced threshold Rhigh (Rhigh>Rmid), the device ignores battery level and response conditions, immediately triggers hardware isolation mode, disconnects all network communication, and only accepts local control commands based on the hardware physical interface. Advanced Threat Response achieves the highest level of proactive defense, enabling forced isolation of the highest-level persistent threats, providing an uncompromising proactive defense and security lock-in capability.

[0065] The derivation process of the one-time session secret in this embodiment includes: using a cryptographic hash function as the key derivation function, taking the one-time session secret as input, and generating a subkey for symmetric encryption and a subkey for message authentication codes. Expanding and separating the negotiated one-time session secret into two functionally independent subkeys achieves key separation, avoiding the security risks caused by using the same key for both symmetric encryption and message authentication code processing simultaneously, and improving the practicality and security of the secure session key.

[0066] This embodiment employs a hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm for message authentication code processing, using a message authentication code subkey for computation. Symmetric encryption utilizes an authenticated encryption mode (such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305). This provides industry-standard message integrity protection and authentication capabilities. By using an authenticated encryption mode with symmetric encryption, data integrity is verified while encrypting the data, ensuring confidentiality and tamper resistance during transmission.

[0067] By employing a hash-based message authentication code algorithm and authentication encryption mode, the secure transmission of instructions is ensured to have industry-recognized high security, guaranteeing the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of control instructions, thereby improving the reliability of the entire communication system.

[0068] Specifically, the derivation process of the one-time session secret employs a key stretching mechanism based on hardware entropy enhancement, which includes the following steps: Hardware entropy acquisition involves the receiving or initiating device extracting a device-unique response value from the physically unclonable function module (after calibration) before deriving the subkey, which serves as the unique entropy value. This unique entropy value is obtained through hardware entropy acquisition, introducing hardware uniqueness into the key derivation process.

[0069] The key derivation function is constructed by taking a one-time session secret, a unique entropy value (as a salt), and a preset number of iterations Y as the main input parameters, where the value of Y is limited to between 1000 and 10000. The input parameters are limited by constructing the key derivation function, the hardware unique entropy is used as the salt, and the strength of the key stretching is limited.

[0070] The key stretching operation involves the key derivation function performing at least Y iterative operations based on a cryptographic hash function to expand the one-time session secret and unique entropy value into a symmetric cryptographic subkey and a message authentication code subkey with high security strength. High-strength key derivation is achieved through the key stretching operation.

[0071] It implements key stretching based on hardware-specific entropy, which significantly increases the computational difficulty against brute-force and pre-computation attacks, provides additional security margins, and enhances the unpredictability of subkeys with hardware-specific entropy.

[0072] If signature verification or ciphertext decapsulation fails during the establishment of the secure session key in this embodiment, the receiving device immediately performs the following operations: Clear the current session state and all temporary keys; send an unencrypted security alert message to the initiating device; and record this authentication failure event in the receiving device's immutable security log.

[0073] Upon authentication or decryption failure, sensitive temporary information remaining in memory is immediately cleared, preventing further key leakage risks. A security alert message is sent to notify the initiator to respond. Furthermore, recording the event in an immutable security log provides a reliable chain of evidence for subsequent troubleshooting and security incident tracing. These measures collectively enhance the security and auditability of protocol establishment failures.

[0074] Specifically, after the receiving device performs the clear and record operations, the method includes the following steps to restrict malicious attempts: Failed attempt count: The receiving device counts in real time the number of failed attempts (CF) initiated by the initiating device that lead to signature verification or ciphertext decapsulation failure within a preset time window (TW). By counting failed attempts, quantitative monitoring of attack behavior is achieved, enabling continuous monitoring of potential brute-force or enumeration attacks.

[0075] Attack threshold determination: The receiving device compares the number of failures CF with the preset maximum failure threshold Cmax. Network lockout penalty: If the number of failures (CF) exceeds the maximum failure threshold (Cmax), the receiving device immediately triggers the network lockout penalty mechanism. The network lockout penalty mechanism includes: Temporarily isolate and block connection requests from the initiating device (identified by the MAC address and / or IP address of the initiating device) for a duration equal to the preset penalty duration TP. The high-security challenge mark records the initiating device's identity (MAC address and / or IP address) in a local blacklist and marks it as requiring a higher-security challenge-response process for the next authentication after the penalty time period (TP) ends.

[0076] If the number of failures (CF) exceeds the maximum failure threshold (Cmax), the receiving device immediately triggers a network locking penalty mechanism. This achieves proactive defense and punishment against malicious attempts, preventing persistent and repetitive attack attempts, significantly increasing the attacker's attempt cost, and thus improving the system's resistance to brute-force and enumeration attacks.

[0077] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation and application scope based on the ideas of the present invention. The content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A communication method for smart home devices driven by physically unclonable functions, used to establish a secure session between a resource-constrained initiating device and a receiving device, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: A. Physically Unclonable Function Key Generation: The initiating and receiving devices utilize their internal physically unclonable function modules to generate and export a non-persistently stored lattice cryptographic private key and a physically unclonable function driver private key for authentication in real time during communication. B. Quantum-resistant key negotiation: The initiating device uses a lightweight lattice cryptography key negotiation protocol to calculate and generate a lattice public key and lattice ciphertext associated with the one-time session secret using the initiating device's lattice cryptographic private key; C. Identity authentication and signature merging: The initiating device uses the physical non-clonable function of the initiating device to drive the private key to digitally sign the key negotiation message composed of the public key and the ciphertext, forming the authentication message in the low-power secure handshake state machine; D. Secure session key establishment: After receiving the authentication message, the receiving device performs the following operations: D1. Physically unclonable function-driven asymmetric signature verification, verifying the digital signature in the authentication message; D2. Drift calibration implementation: When the receiving device generates or recovers the lattice cryptographic private key, it implements a real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism. D3. Decrypt the ciphertext using the private key of the receiving device to decrypt the ciphertext, recover the one-time session secret, and derive a shared session key from the one-time session secret; E. Secure command transmission: The initiating device uses a shared session key to perform symmetric encryption and message authentication code processing on the control commands, and then transmits the encrypted commands to the receiving device for execution.

2. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that, The merging of the authentication and key negotiation steps is achieved by embedding the digital signature driven by the physical non-clonable function of the initiating device as an indivisible field into the extended data portion of the ciphertext, thereby strictly limiting the number of round trips for the secure handshake protocol to one.

3. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that, The real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism includes the following steps: Real-time environmental monitoring: Before receiving the authentication message, the receiving device collects the temperature and voltage parameters around the receiving device in real time. Based on the lookup table correction, the receiving device searches for the corresponding correction code in the pre-stored physical non-cloning function response calibration lookup table according to the temperature and voltage parameters, and applies the correction code to the original physical non-cloning function response to generate a stable and accurate lattice cryptographic private key.

4. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 3, characterized in that, The triggering conditions for the real-time physical non-cloning function drift calibration mechanism include: the ambient temperature of the device changes by more than ΔT degrees Celsius, where ΔT is between 1°C and 5°C; Or the power supply voltage of the equipment fluctuates by more than ΔV volts, where ΔV is between 0.05V and 0.2V; Or, the device has been powered on more than N times since its last successful certification, where N is between 1 and 10 times.

5. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that, The physically unclonable function module integrates a side-channel attack detection mechanism; Side-channel attack detection mechanisms include: During the export of the private key driven by the lattice cryptography or the physical non-cloning function, the power consumption curve of the device where the physical non-cloning function module is located is monitored in real time. When the monitored curve change rate or instantaneous peak exceeds the preset security threshold, the security circuit breaker mechanism is immediately triggered to destroy the currently exported key.

6. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 5, characterized in that, When determining the communication target, the initiating device dynamically applies a hierarchical trust domain security policy, and decides whether to use a physically unclonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol or a traditional TLS / SSL protocol by checking the target device's media access control address or the IP address range where the target device is located.

7. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 6, characterized in that, The layered trust domain security policy includes a dynamic local security level adjustment mechanism. The conditions for executing this mechanism are as follows: Local threat detection: When the initiating or receiving device determines that there is a high-risk threat in the local area network through side-channel attack detection mechanism or network abnormal traffic analysis, it switches the local area network communication protocol from the physically unclonable function-lattice cryptographic protocol to a pre-configured lightweight authentication protocol based solely on a shared symmetric key. Switching conditions: Protocol downgrading is only allowed when the battery level of the initiating or receiving device is below a preset threshold and the device requires a millisecond-level fast response.

8. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that, The derivation process of a one-time session secret includes: Using a cryptographic hash function as the key derivation function, a one-time session secret is taken as input, and a subkey for symmetric encryption and a subkey for message authentication code are generated.

9. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 8, characterized in that, The message authentication code processing adopts a hash-based message authentication code algorithm and uses the message authentication code subkey for calculation. The symmetric encryption adopts the authentication encryption mode.

10. A communication method for smart home devices driven by a physically unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that, If signature verification or ciphertext decapsulation fails during secure session key establishment, the receiving device immediately performs the following operations: Clear the current session state and all temporary keys; send an unencrypted security alert message to the initiating device; and record this authentication failure event in the receiving device's immutable security log.

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