Anti-quantum collaborative signature method, signature verification method, system, equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention provides an anti-quantum collaborative signature method, a signature verification method, a system, equipment and a medium, and the signature method comprises the steps: decrypting an encryption private key according to a target quantum key to obtain a private key of a current signature participant, determining a commitment value of the current signature participant according to a current random number, a public index and an asymmetric encryption modulus, and verifying the commitment value of the current signature participant according to the commitment value. Determining a current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity label of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus and the cross-domain session key, and sending the current signature value and the message to be signed to the next signature participant, and sending the to-be-signed message to the next signature participant, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the to-be-signed message until the last signature participant generates a target signature value, and sending the target signature value to the signature verification party. The security of the collaborative signature is improved by using a quantum physical mechanism, and quantum computing attacks can be resisted.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of network security, in particular to an anti-quantum collaborative signature method, a signature verification method, a system, a device and a medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the growth of distributed systems and multi-party collaboration needs, traditional single signature gradually cannot meet the needs of complex scenarios, and collaborative signature technology emerges as the times require. Among them, collaborative signature allows multiple signature participants to jointly generate a joint signature through a cryptographic protocol, which can prove the approval of each party to the message and compress communication overhead, and becomes a core technology in the fields of blockchains, multi-party contracts, etc.

[0003] In related technologies, for different application scenarios, collaborative signature schemes based on national cryptographic algorithms, elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), and identity-based encryption (IBE) digital signature technology are often used.

[0004] However, the above-mentioned collaborative signature schemes are all based on traditional mathematical foundations and are difficult to resist quantum computing attacks, and are insufficient in security. SUMMARY

[0005] Therefore, the embodiments of the present application provide an anti-quantum collaborative signature method, a signature verification method, a system, a device and a medium to solve the problem of being difficult to resist quantum computing attacks and insufficient security.

[0006] In a first aspect, the embodiments of the present application provide an anti-quantum collaborative signature method applied to a current signature participant in multiple signature participants, and the method comprises: receiving system parameters, a quantum key pool, an encryption private key and an encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key sent by a key generation center through a target quantum key distribution node in a communication domain to which the current signature participant belongs, and a cross-domain session key sent by the target quantum key distribution node, wherein the system parameters include an asymmetric encryption modulus and a public exponent; determining a target quantum key from the quantum key pool according to the encryption key identifier, and decrypting the encryption private key according to the target quantum key to obtain a private key of the current signature participant; determining a commitment value of the current signature participant according to a current random number, the public exponent and the asymmetric encryption modulus; determining a current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus and the cross-domain session key; sending the current signature value and the message to be signed to a next signature participant of the current signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed, until a last signature participant in the plurality of signature participants generates a target signature value and sends the target signature value to a signature verifier.

[0007] In an optional implementation, the system parameters further include an identity of a first hash function; and the determining the current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus and the cross-domain session key includes: if the current signature participant is a first signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, determining a current hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant and the message to be signed by using the first hash function; determining the current signature value according to the current hash value, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0008] In an optional implementation, the system parameters further include an identity of a first hash function; and the determining the current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus and the cross-domain session key includes: if the current signature participant is a middle signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, determining a current hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the commitment values of other participants before the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, the identities of the other participants and the message to be signed by using the first hash function; determining the current signature value according to a previous signature value of a previous signature participant of the current signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, the current hash value, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0009] In an optional implementation, the method further includes: performing a keyed hash operation on the current signature value according to the target quantum key, to obtain a signature integrity label of the current signature participant; sending the signature integrity label to the next signature participant, so that the next signature participant performs integrity verification on the current signature value according to the signature integrity label, and generates the next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed after the integrity verification is passed.

[0010] In an optional embodiment, the private key of the current signature participant is generated by the key generation center by the following steps: generating the private key of the current signature participant according to the identity of the current signature participant and the asymmetric encryption modulus by using a second hash function.

[0011] In a second aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide an anti-quantum collaborative signature method, applied to a signature verifier, and the method comprises the following steps: receiving a target signature value and a message to be signed sent by a last signature participant in a plurality of signature participants, the target signature value being generated by using the anti-quantum collaborative signature method in any one of the first aspect; obtaining a commitment value, a cross-domain session key and an asymmetric encryption modulus of each signature participant in the plurality of signature participants; reconstructing hash values of the signature participants according to the identity of each signature participant, the commitment value of each signature participant, the cross-domain session key and the message to be signed by using a first hash function; determining a verification signature value according to the hash values of the signature participants, the commitment values of the signature participants, the identities of the signature participants and the asymmetric encryption modulus; performing signature verification according to the verification signature value and the target signature value.

[0012] In an optional embodiment, the step of determining the verification signature value according to the hash values of the signature participants, the commitment values of the signature participants, the identities of the signature participants and the asymmetric encryption modulus comprises the following steps: determining a target hash value according to the identities of the signature participants and the hash values of the signature participants by using a second hash function; determining the verification signature value according to the target hash value, the commitment values of the signature participants and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0013] In a third aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide an anti-quantum cooperative signature system, comprising: a plurality of signature participants, a key generation center, a quantum key distribution node in a communication domain to which each signature participant belongs, and a signature verifier; The current signature participant in the plurality of signature participants is configured to execute the method of any one of the first aspect; The signature verifier is configured to execute the method of any one of the second aspect.

[0014] In a fourth aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer device, comprising: a processor, a memory, and a bus, the memory stores machine readable instructions executable by the processor, when the computer device is running, the processor and the memory communicate through the bus, and the processor executes the machine readable instructions to execute the method of any one of the first aspect.

[0015] In a fifth aspect, the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer readable storage medium, the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by the processor to execute the method of any one of the first aspect.

[0016] The present application provides an anti-quantum cooperative signature method, a signature verification method, a system, a device, and a medium. The anti-quantum cooperative signature method comprises: decrypting an encrypted private key according to a target quantum key to obtain a private key of a current signature participant, determining a commitment value of the current signature participant according to a current random number, a public exponent, and an asymmetric encryption modulus, determining a current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, an identity of the current signature participant, a message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and a cross-domain session key, sending the current signature value and the message to be signed to a next signature participant, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed, until a last signature participant in the plurality of signature participants generates a target signature value and sends the target signature value to a signature verifier. Thus, the quantum physical mechanism is used to improve the security of cooperative signature, and the quantum computing attack can be resisted. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0017] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present application, and therefore should not be considered as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can also be obtained without creative labor.

[0018] Figure 1 The architecture of the anti-quantum cooperative signature system provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure; Figure 2 Flowchart of the anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 1 ; Figure 3 Flowchart of the anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 2 ; Figure 4 Flowchart of the anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 3 ; Figure 4 Flowchart of the anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 5 ; Figure 6 Flowchart of the anti-quantum cooperative signature verification method provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 7 Schematic diagram of a specific anti-quantum cooperative signature and signature verification method provided by the present application Figure 8 Structural schematic diagram of the anti-quantum cooperative signature device provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 9 Structural schematic diagram of the anti-quantum cooperative signature verification device provided by the embodiment of the present application Figure 10 Structural schematic diagram of the computer device provided by the embodiment of the present application DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described below in connection with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments of the present application. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the accompanying drawings herein can be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed present application, but only represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments of the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0020] First, the professional terms involved in the present application are explained: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD): A technology that uses quantum mechanics principles to securely share keys between two communicating parties. Its core mechanism is based on the no-cloning theorem of quantum states, ensuring that any eavesdropping will inevitably disturb the quantum states, which will be detected by both parties. The security of QKD does not rely on computational complexity assumptions, but is guaranteed by quantum physics laws, making it resistant to quantum computing attacks.

[0021] Identity-Based Encryption (IBE): A public key encryption system that innovatively uses user identity identifiers (such as email addresses, mobile phone numbers, etc.) as public keys. In this system, a trusted authority (Private Key Generation Center) generates a private key for each user identity based on a pre-set system master key. This technology avoids the complexity of certificate management in traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), simplifying the public key distribution and verification process. The encryptor only needs to know the recipient's identity identifier and the system public parameters to complete the encryption operation, without the need to obtain, verify, and manage the recipient's public key as in traditional public key encryption, greatly simplifying the public key management process. It is especially suitable for large-scale user groups and mobile communication scenarios, effectively reducing system complexity and operational costs.

[0022] Collaborative Signature: A technology that allows multiple signing participants to jointly sign a message. In practical applications, when a document or data needs to be approved by multiple departments and members, collaborative signature can enable each party to contribute partial signature information based on an established cryptographic protocol, ultimately generating a joint signature that represents the consensus of all parties. This signature ensures the reliability and integrity of the message source, prevents individual parties from denying participation, reduces communication overhead, and is more efficient than the traditional single signature repeated verification mode. It is a key technology in distributed collaboration scenarios such as e-government approval processes and blockchain transaction verification.

[0023] To address the problem of current collaborative signature schemes being based on traditional mathematical foundations and being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, this application provides a collaborative signature method that integrates quantum key distribution and identity-based encryption. By leveraging quantum physics mechanisms to ensure unconditional security in key distribution, the security of collaborative signature is enhanced, achieving a unified solution for resisting quantum computing attacks and efficient collaborative signature.

[0024] Figure 1 The architecture of the anti-quantum collaborative signature system provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in the following figure: Figure 1As shown, the system comprises a plurality of signature participants 10, a key generation center 20, a quantum key distribution node 30 in a communication domain to which each signature participant 10 belongs, and a signature verifier 40.

[0025] In the system, one communication domain can be configured with one quantum key distribution node 30, and one communication domain includes at least one signature participant, that is, different signature participants can correspond to the same quantum key distribution node 30 or different quantum key distribution nodes 30.

[0026] The key generation center 20 can be a trusted key generation (TKG) center, configured to generate a system master key and generate a corresponding private key for each signature participant 10 based on the identity of the signature participant 10, and distribute the private key to the signature participant 10 through the corresponding quantum key distribution node 30.

[0027] The quantum key distribution node 30 is deployed in a communication domain, and generates a cross-domain session key through a quantum channel and negotiation with other nodes, to provide quantum secure key support for collaborative signature.

[0028] The signature participant 10 is configured to generate a partial signature in turn according to a predetermined cryptographic protocol, and finally integrate the partial signatures to form a complete signature, that is, each signature participant 10 performs signature layer by layer based on the signature of the previous signature participant 10, and the last signature participant 10 sends the generated target signature to the signature verifier 40 for signature verification.

[0029] It should be noted that the key generation center 20, the quantum key distribution node 30, the signature participant 10, and the signature verifier 40 can be deployed on independent computer devices. The key generation center 20 and the quantum key distribution node 30 are in communication connection, and the plurality of signature participants 10 and the signature verifier 40 are in communication connection, respectively.

[0030] The current signature participant in the plurality of signature participants is configured to execute the anti-quantum collaborative signature method in the following embodiments, and the signature verifier is configured to execute the anti-quantum collaborative signature verification method in the following embodiments.

[0031] It should be noted that the system is divided into a key infrastructure layer and a collaborative signature application layer. The key infrastructure layer includes a master key generation module, a system parameter management software, an identity private key calculation module, a quantum key pool manager, a private key encryption transmission module, and a cross-domain session negotiation module, which are respectively used for system master key, management of system parameters, calculation of identity private key, management of quantum key pool, transmission of encrypted private key, and cross-domain session negotiation.

[0032] The cooperative signature application layer includes an identity management module, a private key secure storage chip, a quantum key injection interface, a signature generation module, a dynamic hash calculation module, and a signature integrity label, which are respectively used for managing an identity, securely storing a private key, injecting a quantum key, generating a signature value, calculating a dynamic hash, and a signature integrity label.

[0033] In the embodiment, the cooperative signature system architecture is constructed, the responsibilities and cooperation relationship of the trusted key generation center, the quantum key distribution node, the signature participant and the signature verifier are defined, the system stability and reliability are improved, the deployment and maintenance are facilitated, the advantages of quantum key distribution and identity-based encryption are fully played, and the overall performance is improved.

[0034] Figure 2 The anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided in the embodiment of the application Figure 1 The execution subject of the embodiment can be a current signature participant in multiple signature participants, and the current signature participant is a non-last signature participant in the multiple signature participants that perform signature.

[0035] As shown in Figure 2 , the method can include: S101, receiving system parameters, a quantum key pool, an encryption private key, and an encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key sent by a key generation center through a target quantum key distribution node in a communication domain to which a current signature participant belongs, and a cross-domain session key sent by the target quantum key distribution node.

[0036] The system parameters include: an asymmetric encryption modulus and a public exponent.

[0037] The key generation center generates an asymmetric encryption (RSA) modulus according to two preset large prime numbers, and the asymmetric encryption modulus is represented as , and satisfies , wherein is the asymmetric encryption modulus, is the large prime number, is the public exponent, is a system master private key, is an Euler function, , is a modulus operation. The system master private key is a master private key pre-generated by the key generation center, and is the highest authority key of the entire cryptographic system.

[0038] The quantum key pool is a quantum key distribution node in a communication domain to which multiple signature participants belong, and is generated by negotiation between the quantum key distribution node and the key generation center through a preset key agreement algorithm and a quantum channel, that is, the quantum key pool is generated by negotiation between the multiple quantum key distribution nodes and the key generation center.

[0039] The encryption private key is generated by the key generation center selecting a target quantum key from the quantum key pool and encrypting the private key of the current signature participant using the target quantum key, and the encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key is the identifier of the target quantum key.

[0040] The private key of the current signature participant is generated by the key generation center using the following steps: The private key of the current signature participant is generated by the key generation center using the following steps:

[0041] The second hash function is represented as , the input domain is , and the output domain is , is an arbitrary length binary string, is a non-zero integer space modulo .

[0042] The private key of the current signature participant is , satisfying , is an element in , where is the identity identifier of the current signature participant, is the order of the current signature participant among the multiple signature participants, i.e., the th signature participant.

[0043] The target quantum key is , representing the th key in the quantum key pool, used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the private key transmission, and the is used to encrypt the private key of the current signature participant to generate the secret private key.

[0044] The cross-domain session key is a quantum session key generated by the quantum key distribution nodes in the communication domain to which the multiple signature participants belong using a preset session key agreement algorithm, i.e., the quantum session key generated by the multiple quantum key distribution nodes is , and the signature participants are prepared for collaborative signature, and the positive integer represents the number of signature participants. The cross-domain session key is generated through a quantum key distribution protocol, satisfying the unconditional physical security.

[0045] The key generation center sends the coefficient parameter, the quantum key pool, the encryption private key, and the encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key to the current signature participant through the target quantum key distribution node, and the current signature participant receives and stores the quantum key pool to its own hardware storage module (such as a private key secure storage chip).

[0046] S102, determining a target quantum key from the quantum key pool according to the encryption key identifier, and decrypting the encrypted private key according to the target quantum key to obtain the private key of the current signature participant.

[0047] The current signature participant queries and determines a target quantum key from a quantum key pool stored by itself according to the encryption key identifier, and decrypts the encrypted private key according to the target quantum key to obtain the private key of the current signature participant.

[0048] S103, determining a commitment value of the current signature participant according to the current random number, the public exponent and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0049] The current random number is a random number randomly selected by the current signature participant , The commitment value of the current signature participant is expressed as:

[0050] wherein, is the public exponent, is the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0051] S104, determining a current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity identifier of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus and the cross-domain session key.

[0052] The current signature participant corresponds to a current hash value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the cross-domain session key, the identity identifier of the current signature participant, and the message to be signed, and determines a current signature value according to the current hash value, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0053] S105, sending the current signature value and the message to be signed to the next signature participant of the current signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed, until the last signature participant in the plurality of signature participants generates a target signature value, and sends the target signature value to the signature verifier.

[0054] The current signature participant sends the current signature value and the message to be signed to the first participant, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed, and repeats the step until the last signature participant generates a target signature value, and the last signature participant sends the target signature value to the signature verifier.

[0055] The next signature participant randomly selects a random number as a next random number, calculates a commitment value of the next signature participant according to the next random number, and uses the first hash function to generate a hash value of the next signature participant as a next hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the next signature participant, the commitment values of the signature participants before the next signature participant, the identity of the next signature participant, the identities of the signature participants before the next signature participant, and the message to be signed, and then determines a next signature value according to the current signature value, the next random number, the next hash value, a private key of the next signature participant, and a non-symmetrical encryption modulus.

[0056] Similarly, for the last signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, the last signature participant randomly selects a random number as a last random number, calculates a commitment value of the last signature participant according to the last random number, and uses the first hash function to generate a hash value of the last signature participant as a target hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the last signature participant, the commitment values of the signature participants before the last signature participant, the identity of the last signature participant, the identities of the signature participants before the last signature participant, and the message to be signed, and then determines a target signature value according to the signature value of the last signature participant of the previous signature participant, the last random number, the target hash value, a private key of the last signature participant, and a non-symmetrical encryption modulus.

[0057] It should be noted that the process of generating the corresponding signature value by the next signature participant and the last signature participant can refer to the implementation process of generating the corresponding signature value by the current signature participant as the intermediate signature participant.

[0058] In this embodiment, by using the identity-based encryption anti-quantum collaborative signature framework, the quantum key generation center provides unconditional secure key distribution, the private key is generated by the identity, the security and reliability of the key are ensured from the source, the quantum computing attack is avoided, the anti-quantum, efficient, and low-overhead multi-party collaborative signature is realized, the private key is encrypted by means of the quantum key, the information leakage and tampering are prevented, the security and efficiency of the collaborative signature in the transmission and cooperation links are greatly improved, in addition, by fusing the identity-based encryption, the key management system is simplified, the identity is used as the public key, the public key distribution and verification cost is reduced, the collaborative signature process based on the quantum key protection is innovatively designed, the interaction mode and the calculation steps of each participant are optimized, the communication overhead and the system synchronization pressure are reduced, the efficient, safe, and flexible collaborative signature effect suitable for various distributed cooperation scenarios is achieved, the authenticity and integrity of the multi-party cooperation message are ensured, and the security demand of the quantum computing era is adapted, and the information security cooperation technology is promoted.

[0059] Figure 3 Flowchart of anti-quantum cooperative signature method provided for embodiments of the present application Figure 2 As shown in Figure 3 In an optional embodiment, the system parameters further include an identification of the first hash function.

[0060] The first hash function is represented as The input domain is The output domain is , is an arbitrary-length binary string, is a positive integer, is a binary string with a length of .

[0061] The step S104 of determining the current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key can include: S201, if the current signature participant is the first signature participant in the multiple signature participants, a first hash function is used to determine a current hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, and the message to be signed.

[0062] The multiple signature participants perform signature in sequence, if the current signature participant is the first signature participant in the multiple signature participants, the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, and the message to be signed are concatenated, and a first hash function is used to perform hash operation on the concatenated result to obtain a current hash value.

[0063] The current hash value is represented as: , wherein is the current hash value, is the cross-domain session key, is the commitment value of the current signature participant, is the identity of the current signature participant, is the message to be signed, represents concatenating the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, and the message to be signed.

[0064] S202, determine the current signature value according to the current hash value, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0065] Perform a modulo operation on the asymmetric encryption modulus, and use the current hash value as the exponent of the private key of the current signing participant, perform an exponentiation operation, and use the product of the exponentiation result, the current random number, and the modulo operation result as the current signature value.

[0066] The current signature value is represented as: ,in, It is the current random number. It is the current hash value. is the private key of the current signer, and N is the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0067] The current signature value can also be represented as .

[0068] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating the quantum-resistant collaborative signature method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 3 ,like Figure 4 As shown, in an optional implementation, the system parameters further include: an identifier of the first hash function.

[0069] Step S104 above, determining the current signature value based on the commitment value of the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key, may include: S301. If the current signing participant is an intermediate signing participant among multiple signing participants, the first hash function is used to determine the current hash value based on the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the commitment values ​​of other participants before the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the identity identifiers of other participants, and the message to be signed.

[0070] Each signing participant can broadcast its own commitment value through the channel, so that subsequent participants can receive the commitment values ​​broadcast by the previous signing participants.

[0071] The intermediate signature participant is any participant among the multiple signature participants, excluding the first and last signature participants.

[0072] If the current signing participant is an intermediate signing participant, the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the commitment values ​​of other participants before the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the identity identifiers of other participants, and the message to be signed are concatenated, and the first hash function is used to perform a hash operation on the concatenation result to obtain the current hash value.

[0073] The current signatory is the [number]th [signature participant]. If there are multiple participants, the current hash value is represented as: using the QKD session key. generating a dynamic hash parameter , wherein, is a cross-domain session key, is a commitment value of a current signing participant, is an identity of the current signing participant, is a message to be signed, is a commitment value of a first signing participant, is an identity of the first signing participant, indicates splicing the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the commitment values of other participants before the current signing participant, the identity of the current signing participant, the identities of the other participants, and the message to be signed.

[0074] S302, determining a current signature value according to a last signature value of a last signing participant of the current signing participant in a plurality of signing participants, a current hash value, a private key of the current signing participant, a current random number, and an asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0075] wherein the last signature value of the last signing participant is a signature value of the last signing participant, and can be expressed as .

[0076] performing a modulus operation on the asymmetric encryption modulus, performing an exponential operation with the current hash value as an exponent of the private key of the current signing participant, and taking a product of the last signature value, the result of the exponential operation, the current random number, and a result of the modulus operation as the current signature value.

[0077] the current signature value is expressed as , wherein, is the current random number, is the current hash value, is the private key of the current signing participant, and N is the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0078] In this embodiment, the first signing participant selects a random number to calculate a signature value and passes it on, and the subsequent participants receive it in turn, generate a random number, generate a dynamic hash value using a quantum session key, calculate a signature value and pass it on, ensuring the randomness and unpredictability of the signature process, and in the collaborative signature process, the hash parameter is dynamically generated using a quantum key, the intermediate information in the signature is encrypted and protected, the interaction process of each signing participant is optimized, and the communication overhead and synchronization difficulty are reduced.

[0079] Figure 5 Flowchart of the anti-quantum collaborative signature method provided by the embodiment of the application Figure 4 , as shown in an optional implementation, the method can further include: Figure 5 ​S401, performing a keyed hash operation on the current signature value according to the target quantum key to obtain a signature integrity label of the current signature participant.

[0080] The keyed hash function is used to perform a hash operation on the current signature value according to the target quantum key to obtain a signature integrity label of the current signature participant, which is expressed as: , wherein, is the signature integrity label of the current signature participant, denotes the keyed hash function, is the target quantum key, is the current signature value.

[0081] In some embodiments, the keyed hash operation can be a calculation of a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC), that is, the signature integrity label is a hash message authentication code.

[0082] S402, sending the signature integrity label to the next signature participant, so that the next signature participant performs integrity verification on the current signature value according to the signature integrity label, and generates the next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed after the integrity verification is passed.

[0083] The signature integrity label is sent to the first participant, and the next signature participant uses the keyed hash function to perform a hash operation on the received current signature value to obtain a target label. If the target label and the signature integrity label are consistent, it means that the received current signature value has not been tampered with, and the integrity verification is passed. If the target label and the signature integrity label are inconsistent, it means that the received current signature value has been tampered with, and the integrity verification is not passed.

[0084] That is, the current signature participant sends to the next signature participant, so that the next signature participant performs signature after the integrity verification is passed.

[0085] In summary, the scheme fuses quantum key distribution and identity-based encryption technology, uses the unconditional security of quantum key distribution to ensure the key generation and distribution process, uses identity information as a public key to simplify the key management system, improves the security of collaborative signature, resists quantum computing attacks, simplifies the key management process, reduces system complexity and operation cost, and designs a mechanism for dynamically generating hash parameters based on quantum keys and using quantum keys to encrypt and protect the intermediate information in the signature and perform integrity verification, reduces the risk of information leakage and tampering, improves the flexibility and adaptability of the signature process, and optimizes communication overhead and system synchronization difficulty.

[0086] Figure 6A flowchart of an anti-quantum cooperative signature verification method provided by the embodiment is shown in the figure. The execution subject of the embodiment can be a signature verification party.

[0087] As shown in the figure, the method can include the following steps. Figure 6 S501, receiving a target signature value sent by a last signature participant in a plurality of signature participants and a message to be signed.

[0088] The target signature value is generated by using the anti-quantum cooperative signature method.

[0089] After the last signature participant generates the target signature value, the last signature participant sends the target signature value and the message to be signed to the signature verification party. The target signature value can be expressed as .

[0090] S502, obtaining a commitment value of each signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, a cross-domain session key, and a non-symmetric encryption modulus.

[0091] The commitment value obtaining request is sent to the plurality of signature participants respectively to obtain the commitment value of each signature participant, the session key obtaining request is sent to the quantum distribution node of the communication domain to which any signature participant (such as the last signature participant) belongs to obtain the cross-domain session key, and the non-symmetric encryption modulus obtaining request is sent to the key generation center to obtain the non-symmetric encryption modulus.

[0092] S503, using a first hash function to reconstruct the hash value of each signature participant according to the identity of each signature participant, the commitment value of each signature participant, the cross-domain session key, and the message to be signed.

[0093] For the first signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, the identity of the first signature participant, the commitment value of the first signature participant, the cross-domain session key, and the message to be signed are spliced, and the first hash function is used to perform hash operation on the spliced result to reconstruct the hash value of the first signature participant.

[0094] For the non-first signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, the identity of the non-first signature participant, the identity of the signature participant before the non-first signature participant, the commitment value of the non-first signature participant, the commitment value of the signature participant before the non-first signature participant, the cross-domain session key, and the message to be signed are spliced, and the first hash function is used to perform hash operation on the spliced result to reconstruct the hash value of the non-first signature participant.

[0095] The hash value of the first signature participant is expressed as: The hash value of the non-first signature participant is expressed as: . ​​

[0096] S504, determine the verification signature value according to the hash value of each signature participant, the commitment value of each signature participant, the identity of each signature participant and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0097] Determine the target hash value according to the identity of each signature participant and the hash value of each signature participant by using the second hash function; determine the verification signature value according to the target hash value, the commitment value of each signature participant and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0098] The hash value of each signature participant is used as the exponent of the identity of each signature participant for exponential operation, and the second hash function is used to hash the exponential operation result of each signature participant to obtain the target hash value. The target hash values of all participants are added to obtain the first addition result, and the target hash value is represented as The first addition result is represented as: .

[0099] The commitment values of each signature participant are added to obtain the second addition result, and the second addition result is represented as: .

[0100] The product of the first addition result, the second addition result and the modulus operation result of the asymmetric solution is used as the verification signature value, and the verification signature value is represented as: , is the modulus operation result.

[0101] S505, perform signature verification according to the verification signature value and the target signature value.

[0102] If the verification signature value and the target signature value are consistent, the signature verification is passed (the signature is valid), and if the verification signature value and the target signature value are inconsistent, the signature verification is not passed (the signature is invalid).

[0103] In this embodiment, the signature verifier receives the final signature, obtains the necessary information through the quantum channel, recalculates the hash value and verifies whether the equation is established layer by layer to determine the validity of the signature. In the signature verification stage, a rigorous layer-by-layer verification mechanism is designed to ensure that the signature result is reliable and effective.

[0104] Taking a quantum key distribution node, signature participants including signature participant 1, signature participant 2, …, signature participant n as an example, Figure 7 is a specific anti-quantum cooperative signature and signature verification method provided by the present application, as shown in Figure 7 the key generation stage includes the following steps: Step 1, the key generation center generates system parameters.

[0105] Step 2, the key generation center sends system parameters to each signing participant through the quantum key distribution node.

[0106] Step 3, the quantum key distribution node negotiates with the key generation center to generate a quantum key pool through a quantum channel, and injects each signing participant through the quantum key distribution node.

[0107] Step 4, the key generation center calculates the private key of each signing participant and transmits it to each signing participant using quantum encryption.

[0108] Step 5, the quantum key distribution node negotiates to generate a cross-domain session key and sends it to each signing participant.

[0109] The collaborative signature phase includes the following steps: Step 1, signing participant 1 calculates a commitment value.

[0110] Step 2, signing participant 1 broadcasts the commitment value.

[0111] Step 3, signing participant 1 calculates a signature value and a signature integrity label based on the commitment value.

[0112] Step 4, signing participant 1 sends the signature value and the signature integrity label to signing participant 2.

[0113] Each signing participant calculates its own signature value and sends it to the next signing participant layer by layer.

[0114] Step 5, signing participant n sends the target signature value to the signature verifier.

[0115] The signature verification phase includes the following steps: Step 1, obtain the cross-domain session key from the quantum key distribution node.

[0116] Step 2, calculate the verification signature value.

[0117] Step 3, signature verification, determine whether the verification hash value and the target signature value are consistent.

[0118] If consistent, the signature verification is passed, the signature is valid, if not consistent, the signature verification is not passed, the signature is invalid.

[0119] In this embodiment, the quantum key distribution provides an unconditional secure key distribution mechanism, which is combined with the identity-based encryption simple identity public key system and embedded in the collaborative signature architecture, solving many technical problems such as quantum computing threat, complex key management, large communication overhead, and high system synchronization requirement faced by existing collaborative signature technology, and realizing efficient, flexible, and secure multi-party collaborative signature effect under the premise of resisting quantum computing attacks.

[0120] Figure 8A structure diagram of an anti-quantum cooperative signature device provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown in the figure. The device can be integrated in a current signature participant.

[0121] As shown in Figure 8 , the device can include: The receiving module 601 is configured to receive system parameters, a quantum key pool, an encryption private key, and an encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key, which are sent by a key generation center through a target quantum key distribution node in a communication domain to which the current signature participant belongs, and a cross-domain session key sent by the target quantum key distribution node, wherein the system parameters include an asymmetric encryption modulus and a public exponent. The quantum key application module 602 is configured to determine a target quantum key from the quantum key pool according to the encryption key identifier, and decrypt the encryption private key to obtain a private key of the current signature participant according to the target quantum key. The signature generation module 603 is further configured to determine a commitment value of the current signature participant according to the current random number, the public exponent, and the asymmetric encryption modulus. The signature generation module 603 is further configured to determine a current signature value according to the commitment value of the current signature participant, an identity of the current signature participant, a message to be signed, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key. The sending module 604 is configured to send the current signature value and the message to be signed to a next signature participant of the current signature participant in a plurality of signature participants, so that the next signature participant generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed, until a last signature participant in the plurality of signature participants generates a target signature value, and sends the target signature value to a signature verifier.

[0122] In an optional embodiment, the system parameters further include an identity of a first hash function; and the signature generation module 603 is specifically configured to: If the current signature participant is a first signature participant in the plurality of signature participants, determine a current hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signature participant, the identity of the current signature participant, and the message to be signed, by using the first hash function; determine the current signature value according to the current hash value, the private key of the current signature participant, the current random number, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0123] In an optional embodiment, the system parameters further include an identity of a first hash function; and the signature generation module 603 is specifically configured to: If the current signing participant is an intermediate signing participant in the multiple signing participants, a first hash function is used to determine a current hash value according to the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the commitment values of other participants before the current signing participant, the identity of the current signing participant, the identities of the other participants, and the message to be signed; According to the last signature value of the last signing participant in the multiple signing participants, the current hash value, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, and the asymmetric encryption modulus, a current signature value is determined.

[0124] In an optional implementation, the apparatus further includes: The integrity protection module 605 is configured to perform a keyed hash operation on the current signature value according to the target quantum key, to obtain a signature integrity label of the current signing participant; The integrity protection module 605 is further configured to send the signature integrity label to the next signing participant, so that the next signing participant performs integrity verification on the current signature value according to the signature integrity label, and generates a next signature value according to the current signature value and the message to be signed after the integrity verification is passed.

[0125] In an optional implementation, the apparatus further includes: The private key calculation module 606 is configured to generate the private key of the current signing participant by using a second hash function according to the identity of the current signing participant and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0126] The description of the processing procedure of each module in the apparatus and the interaction procedure between the modules can refer to the related description in the above method embodiments, and will not be described in detail here.

[0127] Figure 9 A structure diagram of an anti-quantum collaborative signature verification apparatus provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure. The apparatus can be integrated in a signature verification party.

[0128] As shown in the figure, the apparatus can include: Figure 9 A receiving module 701 configured to receive a target signature value and a message to be signed sent by a last signing participant in multiple signing participants, the target signature value being generated by using the above anti-quantum collaborative signature method; An information acquisition module 702 configured to acquire commitment values, cross-domain session keys, and asymmetric encryption moduli of the signing participants in the multiple signing participants; A dynamic hash reconstruction module 703 configured to determine hash values of the signing participants by using a first hash function according to the identities of the signing participants, the commitment values of the signing participants, the cross-domain session key, and the message to be signed; ​The signature verification module 704 is configured to determine a verification signature value according to the hash value of each signature participant, the commitment value of each signature participant, the identity of each signature participant, and the asymmetric encryption modulus. The signature verification module 704 is further configured to perform signature verification according to the verification signature value and the target signature value.

[0129] In an optional implementation, the signature verification module 704 is specifically configured to: determine a target hash value according to the identity of each signature participant and the hash value of each signature participant by using a second hash function; determine the verification signature value according to the target hash value, the commitment value of each signature participant, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

[0130] The description of the processing procedure of each module in the apparatus and the interaction procedure between the modules can refer to the related description in the above method embodiments, and will not be described in detail here.

[0131] Figure 10 A structural schematic diagram of a computer device provided in the embodiments of the present application is shown in FIG. 1. Figure 10 As shown in FIG. 1, the device can include a processor, a memory, and a bus. The memory stores machine readable instructions executable by the processor. When the electronic device is running, the processor communicates with the memory through the bus. The processor executes the machine readable instructions to perform the anti-quantum cooperative signature method or the anti-quantum cooperative signature verification method.

[0132] The embodiments of the present application further provide a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program. The computer program is run by a processor to execute the above method.

[0133] In the embodiments of the present application, the computer program run by the processor can also execute other machine readable instructions to perform other methods described in the embodiments. For specific method steps and principles, refer to the description of the embodiments, which will not be described in detail here.

[0134] In the embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can be implemented by other means. The apparatus embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, other division manners can be adopted. For example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units shown or discussed can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some communication interfaces, devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0135] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, i.e. may be located in one place, or may be distributed on multiple network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme.

[0136] In addition, the functional units in the embodiments provided in the present application can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit.

[0137] If the functions are realized in the form of software function units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the present application can be embodied in the form of software products, and the computer software products are stored in a storage medium, including a plurality of instructions for making a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disk or optical disk, and various media that can store program codes.

[0138] It should be noted that: similar reference numbers and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent drawings, in addition, the terms "first", "second", "third" and the like are only used to distinguish description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0139] Finally, it should be noted that: the above-described embodiments are only specific embodiments of the present application, used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, and not to limit them, the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto, although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that any skilled person familiar with the technical field can modify or easily think of changes to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments within the technical scope disclosed by the present application, or make equivalent replacement to part of the technical features; and these modifications, changes or replacements do not make the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application. All should be covered in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A quantum-resistant cooperative signature method, characterized in that, The method, applied to the current signer among multiple signer participants, includes: The system parameters, quantum key pool, encryption private key, and encryption key identifier corresponding to the encryption private key sent by the key generation center through the target quantum key distribution node in the communication domain to which the current signing participant belongs, as well as the cross-domain session key sent by the target quantum key distribution node, wherein the system parameters include: asymmetric encryption modulus and public exponent; Based on the encryption key identifier, a target quantum key is determined from the quantum key pool, and based on the target quantum key, the encryption private key is decrypted to obtain the private key of the current signing participant; The commitment value of the current signing participant is determined based on the current random number, the public index, and the asymmetric encryption modulus. The current signature value is determined based on the commitment value of the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key; The current signature value and the message to be signed are sent to the next signature participant of the current signature participant among the plurality of signature participants, so that the next signature participant generates the next signature value based on the current signature value and the message to be signed, until the last signature participant among the plurality of signature participants generates the target signature value and sends the target signature value to the signature verification party.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system parameters also include: the identifier of the first hash function; the determination of the current signature value based on the commitment value of the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key includes: If the current signing participant is the first signing participant among the plurality of signing participants, then the first hash function is used to determine the current hash value based on the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, and the message to be signed; The current signature value is determined based on the current hash value, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The system parameters also include: the identifier of the first hash function; the determination of the current signature value based on the commitment value of the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the message to be signed, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, the asymmetric encryption modulus, and the cross-domain session key includes: If the current signing participant is an intermediate signing participant among the multiple signing participants, then the first hash function is used to determine the current hash value based on the cross-domain session key, the commitment value of the current signing participant, the commitment values ​​of other participants preceding the current signing participant, the identity identifier of the current signing participant, the identity identifiers of the other participants, and the message to be signed. The current signature value is determined based on the previous signature value of the previous signer among the multiple signing participants, the current hash value, the private key of the current signing participant, the current random number, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: Based on the target quantum key, perform a keyed hash operation on the current signature value to obtain the signature integrity tag of the current signing participant; The signature integrity tag is sent to the next signing participant so that the next signing participant can verify the integrity of the current signature value based on the signature integrity tag. After the integrity verification is successful, the next signature value is generated based on the current signature value and the message to be signed.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The private key of the current signing participant is generated by the key generation center using the following steps: A second hash function is used to generate the private key of the current signing participant based on the identity identifier of the current signing participant and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

6. A quantum-resistant cooperative signature verification method, characterized in that, Applied to a signature verification party, the method includes: The system receives a target signature value and a message to be signed from the last of a plurality of signing participants, wherein the target signature value is generated using the quantum-resistant collaborative signature method described in any one of claims 1-5. Obtain the commitment value, cross-domain session key, and asymmetric encryption modulus of each of the multiple signing participants; Using a first hash function, the hash values ​​of each signing participant are reconstructed based on their identity identifiers, commitment values, cross-domain session keys, and the message to be signed. The verification signature value is determined based on the hash value of each signing participant, the commitment value of each signing participant, the identity identifier of each signing participant, and the asymmetric encryption modulus. Signature verification is performed based on the verification signature value and the target signature value.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of determining the verification signature value based on the hash value of each signing participant, the commitment value of each signing participant, the identity identifier of each signing participant, and the asymmetric encryption modulus includes: A second hash function is used to determine the target hash value based on the identity identifiers of each signing participant and the hash values ​​of each signing participant. The verification signature value is determined based on the target hash value, the commitment values ​​of each signing participant, and the asymmetric encryption modulus.

8. A quantum-resistant cooperative signature system, characterized in that, include: Multiple signing participants, a key generation center, quantum key distribution nodes within the communication domains of each signing participant, and a signature verifier; The current signing participant among the plurality of signing participants is used to perform the method described in any one of claims 1-5; The signature verification party is used to perform the method described in claim 6 or 7.

9. A computer device, characterized in that, include: The device includes a processor, a memory, and a bus, wherein the memory stores machine-readable instructions executable by the processor, and when the electronic device is in operation, the processor communicates with the memory via the bus, and the processor executes the machine-readable instructions to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, performs the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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