Safe handshake protocol method for vehicle remote control

Abstract

The invention relates to a secure handshake protocol method for vehicle remote control, and the method comprises the steps: receiving response information transmitted by a vehicle after a remote control platform transmits a communication establishment request to the vehicle, and generating a session key based on the communication establishment request and the response information by the remote control platform; the remote control platform encrypts the control instruction based on the session key to obtain an encrypted instruction, calculates a message authentication code of the control instruction by adopting a set algorithm, generates a security instruction packet based on the encrypted instruction and the message authentication code, and sends the security instruction packet to the vehicle; according to the method, the session key which is temporarily negotiated is used in each session, the security of historical or future sessions cannot be influenced even if a certain session key is cracked, the security risk is limited in a single session by the temporary security of the session key, the minimum permission principle is followed, and the integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of each control instruction are ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle control technology, and in particular to a secure handshake protocol method and system for remote vehicle control. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology, remote vehicle control functions (such as remote speed limiting, remote locking, and remote air conditioning activation) are becoming increasingly common, especially in scenarios such as fleet management, car sharing, and advanced driver assistance systems. However, the transmission of remote control commands brings serious security challenges: Command forgery: Attackers may impersonate a legitimate control platform and send malicious commands to vehicles (such as malicious speed limits or sudden braking), leading to serious safety accidents.

[0003] Command tampering: Attackers tamper with the content of legitimate commands during transmission, for example, changing "speed limit to 30km / h" to "speed limit to 120km / h".

[0004] Replay attack: Attackers intercept historical legitimate commands and resend them to harass or attack vehicles.

[0005] Identity spoofing: Illegal vehicles may impersonate others to attempt to access remote control platforms, steal services, or launch attacks.

[0006] Existing technologies often use simple username / password authentication or static API keys, which have low security; once the key is leaked, the system is completely out of control. Although common security protocols such as TLS can provide basic encryption, they cannot meet the needs of vehicle control scenarios for strong authentication of command sources, low latency, high reliability, and fine-grained management of command lifecycles. Summary of the Invention

[0007] This invention addresses the technical problems existing in the prior art by providing a secure handshake protocol method and system for remote vehicle control. By performing two-way authentication and dynamic session key negotiation before command transmission, the integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of each control command are ensured.

[0008] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control is provided, comprising: Step 11: After the remote control platform sends a communication establishment request to the vehicle, it receives the response information sent by the vehicle. The remote control platform generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information. Step 12: The remote control platform encrypts the control command based on the session key to obtain an encrypted command, calculates the message authentication code of the control command using a set algorithm, and generates a security command packet based on the encrypted command and the message authentication code and sends it to the vehicle.

[0009] Based on the above technical solution, the present invention can also be improved as follows.

[0010] Optionally, the communication establishment request sent to the vehicle in step 1 includes: a first random number generated by the remote control platform and the digital certificate of the remote control platform.

[0011] Optionally, the remote control platform also receives a vehicle digital certificate sent by the vehicle and a second random number generated by the vehicle; the response information is obtained by the vehicle digitally signing a combination of the first random number, the second random number, and the instruction ID of the current session using its own stored vehicle private key. After receiving the response information, the remote control platform further includes: verifying the validity of the vehicle digital certificate; and using the public key in the vehicle digital certificate to verify the validity of the digital signature. After the validity verification of the vehicle digital certificate and the digital signature is passed, the remote control platform uses the same key derivation function as the vehicle to generate a session key for this session using a combination of the first random number, the second random number, and the shared key / secret.

[0012] Optionally, the security instruction package is a combination of the encryption instruction, message authentication code, instruction ID, and timestamp.

[0013] Optionally, the remote control platform can verify the vehicle's identity via facial recognition before sending a communication establishment request.

[0014] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control is provided, comprising: Step 1: After receiving the communication establishment request sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle generates response information and sends it back to the remote control platform; the vehicle generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information. Step 2: After receiving the security instruction packet sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle obtains the vehicle's control instruction based on the security instruction packet; the security instruction packet is generated based on the encrypted instruction and message authentication code of the control instruction, the encrypted instruction is obtained by encrypting the control instruction based on the session key, and the message authentication code is calculated by applying a set algorithm to the control instruction.

[0015] Optionally, the communication request includes: a first random number generated by the remote control platform and a digital certificate of the remote control platform; When the vehicle receives the communication establishment request, it verifies the validity of the digital certificate and generates a second random number; it then generates response information based on the first random number and the second random number.

[0016] Optionally, the vehicle uses its stored vehicle private key to digitally sign the combination of the first random number, the second random number, and the instruction ID of the current session to generate the response information; The vehicle sends the response information, vehicle digital certificate, and second random number back to the remote control platform.

[0017] Optionally, in step 22, after the vehicle receives the safety instruction packet, it verifies the freshness of the timestamp and the validity of the message authentication code. If the verification is successful, it uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the control instruction.

[0018] Optionally, after the vehicle receives and executes the control command or when the session exceeds a preset validity period, the remote control platform and the vehicle destroy the session key in memory.

[0019] This invention provides a secure handshake protocol method and system for remote vehicle control, with the following advantages: Strong two-way authentication: Two-way identity verification between the platform and the vehicle is achieved through digital certificates, and facial recognition is added to fundamentally prevent identity spoofing. Forward security: Each session uses a temporarily negotiated session key; even if a session key is cracked, it will not affect the security of past or future sessions. Replay attack resistance: Combining random numbers, timestamps, and command IDs effectively resists replay attacks. Integrity guarantee: The integrity of the challenge-response process and control commands is ensured through digital signatures and message authentication codes. Least privilege and lifecycle management: The temporary nature of the session key limits security risks to a single session, adhering to the principle of least privilege. Attached Figure Description

[0020] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating an embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention; Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating another embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention; Figure 3 This invention provides a structural block diagram of a secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control. Detailed Implementation

[0021] The principles and features of the present invention are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The examples given are only for explaining the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0022] Figure 1 A flowchart of an embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention is shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the secure handshake protocol method includes: Step 11: After the remote control platform sends a communication establishment request to the vehicle, it receives the response information sent by the vehicle. The remote control platform generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information.

[0023] Step 12: The remote control platform encrypts the control command based on the session key to obtain the encrypted command, calculates the message authentication code of the control command using a set algorithm, and generates a security command packet based on the encrypted command and the message authentication code and sends it to the vehicle.

[0024] In specific implementation, the present invention provides a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, which is executed between the remote control platform and the vehicle's onboard T-Box.

[0025] The present invention provides a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control. Each session uses a temporarily negotiated session key. Even if a session key is cracked, it will not affect the security of historical or future sessions. The temporary nature of the session key limits security risks to a single session, follows the principle of least privilege, and ensures the integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of each control command.

[0026] Example 1 Embodiment 1 provided by the present invention is an embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention. The secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention includes three stages: stage one is two-way authentication and session key negotiation, stage two is secure command transmission, and stage three is session termination.

[0027] Phase One includes: the remote control platform initiates a challenge after connecting to the vehicle. The vehicle's T-Box receives the challenge and verifies and responds. The remote control platform receives the response and verifies and generates a session key. Phase Two includes: the remote control platform encrypts and signs the command, and the vehicle's T-Box verifies and executes the command after receiving the secure command packet.

[0028] Combination Figure 1 It can be seen that embodiments of this secure handshake protocol method include: Step 11: After the remote control platform sends a communication establishment request to the vehicle, it receives the response information sent by the vehicle and generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information.

[0029] In one possible embodiment, the communication establishment request sent to the vehicle in step 11 includes: a first random number generated by the remote control platform and a digital certificate of the remote control platform.

[0030] In practice, when a remote control platform needs to initiate control of a vehicle, it first establishes a communication connection with the target vehicle's T-Box. It generates an initial random number and sends it, along with its own digital certificate, to the vehicle's T-Box as a challenge. In practice, this control can be a request for dangerous intervention.

[0031] In one possible embodiment, when the vehicle receives a communication establishment request, it verifies the validity of the digital certificate and generates a second random number; the vehicle then generates response information based on the first and second random numbers.

[0032] In one possible implementation, the vehicle uses its stored vehicle private key to digitally sign a combination of a first random number, a second random number, and the instruction ID of the current session to generate a response message.

[0033] The vehicle will send the response information, vehicle digital certificate, and a second random number back to the remote control platform.

[0034] In one possible embodiment, after receiving the response information, the remote control platform further includes: verifying the validity of the vehicle digital certificate; using the public key in the vehicle digital certificate to verify the validity of the digital signature; thereby confirming the authenticity of the vehicle's identity and the integrity of the response data. This achieves two-way authentication between the vehicle and the remote control platform.

[0035] After the vehicle's digital certificate and digital signature have been verified as valid, the remote control platform uses the same key derivation function as the vehicle to generate a symmetric session key for this session using a combination of a first random number, a second random number, and a shared key / secret.

[0036] The shared key / secret is a shared key / secret that has been negotiated between the vehicle and the remote control platform.

[0037] Step 12: The remote control platform encrypts the control command based on the session key to obtain the encrypted command, calculates the message authentication code of the control command using a set algorithm, and generates a security command packet based on the encrypted command and the message authentication code and sends it to the vehicle.

[0038] In one possible implementation, the security instruction packet is a combination of encrypted instructions, message authentication codes, instruction IDs, and timestamps.

[0039] In practice, the remote control platform uses the session key generated in step 11 to encrypt specific control commands (such as "LIMIT_SPEED:60") and calculates the message authentication code of the command. The platform combines the encrypted command, message authentication code, command ID, and timestamp into a secure command package and sends it to the vehicle.

[0040] In one possible implementation, after receiving a safety instruction packet, the vehicle verifies the freshness of the timestamp and the validity of the message authentication code. If the verification is successful, the control instruction is obtained by decrypting the packet using the session key.

[0041] In practice, checking the freshness of the timestamp is to prevent replay attacks; using the same session key and algorithm to verify the message authentication code is to ensure that the instruction has not been tampered with during transmission; after receiving the control instruction, the plaintext instruction is sent to the vehicle execution unit through the vehicle's internal security bus (such as CAN FD); the vehicle execution unit executes the instruction and returns the execution result.

[0042] In one possible implementation, after the vehicle receives and executes the control command or when the session exceeds a preset validity period (e.g., 30 seconds), the remote control platform and the vehicle destroy the session key in memory to ensure the temporary and one-time use characteristics of the key.

[0043] In one possible implementation, the remote control platform verifies the vehicle's identity via facial recognition before sending a communication request. When remote control of the vehicle is required while it is in motion, the facial recognition system prevents identity spoofing and ensures the security of remotely controlled vehicles.

[0044] The present invention provides a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, which focuses on closely integrating a general security concept (two-way authentication, key negotiation) with the specific high-security scenario of remote vehicle control, and makes several targeted innovations: Strongly linked to vehicle identity: Using a vehicle digital certificate as the identity foundation, it is associated with unique identifiers such as the VIN code, and facial recognition is also added for multiple guarantees.

[0045] Automotive-grade hardware dependency: It emphasizes that private key storage and computation must be completed in the HSM (Hardware Security Module), which is a necessary design to meet automotive functional safety requirements.

[0046] Instruction-level security: It not only protects the channel, but also focuses on the lifecycle security of individual instructions (from generation and transmission to execution and destruction).

[0047] Session binding: The proposed "one-time password" session mechanism greatly enhances the overall security of the system.

[0048] Example 2 Embodiment 2 of the present invention is an embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention. The secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention includes three stages: stage one is two-way authentication and session key negotiation, stage two is secure command transmission, and stage three is session termination.

[0049] Phase One includes: the remote control platform initiates a challenge after connecting to the vehicle. The vehicle's T-Box receives the challenge and verifies and responds. The remote control platform receives the response and verifies and generates a session key. Phase Two includes: the remote control platform encrypts and signs the command, and the vehicle's T-Box verifies and executes the command after receiving the secure command packet.

[0050] like Figure 2 The diagram shown is a flowchart of another embodiment of a secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by this invention. Figure 2 It can be seen that embodiments of this secure handshake protocol method include: Step 21: After receiving the communication establishment request sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle generates response information and sends it back to the remote control platform; the vehicle generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information.

[0051] Step 22: After receiving the security instruction packet sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle obtains the vehicle's control instruction based on the security instruction packet. The security instruction packet is generated based on the encrypted instruction and message authentication code of the control instruction. The encrypted instruction is obtained by encrypting the control instruction based on the session key, and the message authentication code is calculated by using a set algorithm on the control instruction.

[0052] It is understood that the secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention corresponds to the secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided in Embodiment 1. The relevant technical features of the secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control can be referred to the relevant technical features of the secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, and will not be repeated here.

[0053] Example 3 Embodiment 3 provided by this invention is an embodiment of a secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control provided by this invention. Figure 3 This invention provides a structural diagram of a secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control, in conjunction with... Figure 3 It is known that embodiments of the secure handshake protocol system include: vehicles and remote control platforms.

[0054] After the remote control platform sends a communication establishment request to the vehicle, it receives the response information sent by the vehicle and generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information.

[0055] The remote control platform encrypts control commands based on the session key to obtain encrypted commands, calculates the message authentication code of the control commands using a set algorithm, and generates a security command packet based on the encrypted commands and the message authentication code and sends it to the vehicle.

[0056] It is understood that the secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control provided by the present invention corresponds to the secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control provided in the foregoing embodiments. The relevant technical features of the secure handshake protocol system for remote vehicle control can be referred to the relevant technical features of the secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, and will not be repeated here.

[0057] This invention provides a secure handshake protocol method and system for remote vehicle control, which offers the following advantages: Strong two-way authentication: Digital certificates enable two-way identity verification between the platform and the vehicle, while facial recognition fundamentally prevents identity spoofing. Forward security: Each session uses a temporarily negotiated session key; even if a session key is cracked, it will not affect the security of past or future sessions. Replay attack resistance: Combining random numbers, timestamps, and command IDs effectively resists replay attacks. Integrity guarantee: Digital signatures and message authentication codes ensure the integrity of the challenge-response process and control commands. Least privilege and lifecycle management: The temporary nature of the session key limits security risks to a single session, adhering to the principle of least privilege.

[0058] It should be noted that the descriptions of each embodiment in the above embodiments have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0059] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0060] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0061] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0062] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0063] Although preferred embodiments of the invention have been described, those skilled in the art, upon learning the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to these embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including both the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications falling within the scope of the invention.

[0064] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Therefore, if these modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this invention and their equivalents, this invention also intends to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, characterized in that, The secure handshake protocol method includes: Step 11: After the remote control platform sends a communication establishment request to the vehicle, it receives the response information sent by the vehicle. The remote control platform generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information. Step 12: The remote control platform encrypts the control command based on the session key to obtain an encrypted command, calculates the message authentication code of the control command using a set algorithm, and generates a security command packet based on the encrypted command and the message authentication code and sends it to the vehicle.

2. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication establishment request sent by the remote control platform to the vehicle includes: a first random number generated by the remote control platform and the digital certificate of the remote control platform.

3. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The remote control platform also receives the vehicle's digital certificate and a second random number generated by the vehicle; the response information is obtained by the vehicle digitally signing a combination of the first random number, the second random number, and the instruction ID of the current session using its own stored vehicle private key. After receiving the response information, the remote control platform further includes: verifying the validity of the vehicle digital certificate; and using the public key in the vehicle digital certificate to verify the validity of the digital signature. After the validity verification of the vehicle digital certificate and the digital signature is passed, the remote control platform uses the same key derivation function as the vehicle to generate a session key for this session using a combination of the first random number, the second random number, and the shared key / secret.

4. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security instruction package is a combination of the encryption instruction, message authentication code, instruction ID, and timestamp.

5. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the remote control platform sends a communication request to the vehicle, it verifies the vehicle's identity through facial recognition.

6. A secure handshake protocol method for remote vehicle control, characterized in that, The secure handshake protocol method includes: Step 21: After receiving the communication establishment request sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle generates response information and sends it back to the remote control platform; the vehicle generates a session key based on the communication establishment request and response information. Step 22: After receiving the security instruction packet sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle obtains the vehicle's control instruction based on the security instruction packet; the security instruction packet is generated based on the encrypted instruction and message authentication code of the control instruction, the encrypted instruction is obtained by encrypting the control instruction based on the session key, and the message authentication code is calculated by using a set algorithm on the control instruction.

7. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 6, characterized in that, After receiving the communication establishment request sent by the remote control platform, the vehicle generates response information including: When the vehicle receives the communication establishment request, it verifies the digital certificate of the remote control platform; after verifying the validity of the digital certificate, it generates a second random number; and generates response information based on the first random number and the second random number generated by the remote control platform.

8. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The vehicle uses its stored vehicle private key to digitally sign a combination of a first random number, a second random number, and the instruction ID of the current session to generate the response information; The vehicle sends the response information, vehicle digital certificate, and second random number back to the remote control platform.

9. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 6, characterized in that, In step 22, after the vehicle receives the safety instruction packet, it verifies the freshness of the timestamp and the validity of the message authentication code. After successful verification, it uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the control instruction.

10. The secure handshake protocol method according to claim 9, characterized in that, After the vehicle receives and executes the control command, or when the session expires, the vehicle destroys the session key in memory.

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