Decentralized privacy protection data aggregation method suitable for smart power grid

Abstract

The invention discloses a decentralized privacy protection data aggregation method suitable for a smart power grid, and relates to the technical field of smart power grid data security. The method comprises the following steps: setting security parameters, and issuing public parameters through a data center; the intelligent electric meters cooperate with each other to generate a public key and a private key; encrypting power consumption data of the intelligent electric meter, generating a corresponding data report and sending the data report to the gateway; the gateway verifies the validity of the data report and the timestamp, performs data aggregation after the verification is passed, obtains an aggregation report and sends the aggregation report to a data center; and the data center performs data recovery. According to the method, the public and private keys are generated through mutual cooperation of all the intelligent electric meters, it can be guaranteed that data of a single user is not leaked when the data are sent to the data center, the data center can still obtain the sum of power consumption data of other users, and the whole process does not involve a specific trusted entity.

Description

A decentralized, privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of smart grid data security technology, and in particular to a decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids. Background Technology

[0002] In smart grids, a trusted third party (i.e., a central entity for the solution) is often required to generate corresponding public-private key pairs for smart meters installed in users' homes and to select appropriate blind factors for the smart meters. However, this approach carries the risk of a single point of failure; if this third party fails, the entire system can easily collapse. Specifically, an unauthorized adversary can obtain the smart meter's private key and the blind factor used for encryption by intruding into the third-party entity's database. They can then decrypt the ciphertext (i.e., the smart meter's encryption of user electricity consumption data) to obtain the specific electricity consumption data of a single user, thus resulting in insufficient data privacy protection capabilities in existing technical solutions. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this invention is to provide a decentralized, privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids, aiming to solve or improve at least one of the above-mentioned technical problems.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following solution: a decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids, comprising: setting security parameters and publishing public parameters through a data center (DC); and aggregating all smart meters (SMs) i They collaborate to generate a public and private key; at timestamp T, they use the private key to access the smart meter SM. i The electricity consumption data is encrypted, a corresponding data report is generated and sent to the gateway GW; when the gateway GW receives n data reports, it verifies the validity of the data reports and timestamps, and after the verification is successful, it aggregates the data to obtain an aggregate report and sends it to the data center DC; when the data center DC receives the aggregate report, it uses the public parameters and the public key to recover the data.

[0005] Optionally, setting security parameters and publishing public parameters through the data center DC specifically includes: setting security parameters. Randomly select two large prime numbers. and , ,calculate , Define function Random selection , making ,calculate Let the public key of Paillier homomorphic encryption be... The private key is ;in, Represents the least common multiple. Let x represent the greatest common divisor, and let x represent an integer. Indicates less than And with A set of coprime positive integers; a prime number of order is randomly selected. Multiplicative Elliptic Curves And select the multiplicative elliptic curve group A generator And a collision-stable hash function. ;in, Indicates a number less than a prime number. A set of positive integers; Publish system public parameters .

[0006] Optionally, the above refers to all smart meters SM i To enable mutual collaboration and generate public and private keys, specifically including: utilizing each smart meter's SM i Generate the corresponding public and private keys: Enable the smart meter Randomly select parameters and polynomial of degree , making ,in, ; n is the number of electricity meters, x represents an integer; calculate and publish. ; Enable smart meters SM i calculate and announce Any smart meter SM i By verifying the equation Established to extract other smart meters SM j Announced And generate the corresponding private key. and public key Where v = 1, 2, ..., n; the shared private key among the n smart meters is determined as follows: The corresponding public key is .

[0007] Optionally, the step of using the private key to access the smart meter SM at timestamp T... i The electricity consumption data is encrypted, a corresponding data report is generated, and sent to the gateway (GW). Specifically, this includes: instructing the smart meter (SM) to... i Randomly select parameters Calculate ciphertext ,in, Smart meters (SM) iThe collected electricity consumption data; ; Enable smart meters SM i Randomly select parameters ,calculate , ,as well as Generate corresponding data reports. And by smart meters SM i Send to the gateway GW.

[0008] Optionally, the step of verifying the validity of the data reports and timestamps after the gateway GW receives n data reports, and then aggregating the data after successful verification to obtain an aggregated report and sending it to the data center DC, specifically includes: after the gateway GW receives n data reports, calculating... Verify the equation If true, perform the following aggregation operation: calculate the aggregated ciphertext. Generate aggregate report And send it to the data center (DC).

[0009] Optionally, the step of performing data recovery using the public parameters and the public key after the data center DC receives the aggregated report specifically includes: using the Paillier homomorphic encrypted private key. calculate ;in, For all smart meters The sum of collected user electricity consumption data.

[0010] According to specific embodiments provided by the present invention, the following technical effects are disclosed: The present invention discloses a decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids. The method includes setting security parameters and publishing public parameters through a data center; smart meters cooperating to generate public and private keys; encrypting the electricity consumption data of the smart meters, generating corresponding data reports and sending them to a gateway; the gateway verifying the validity of the data reports and timestamps, and after successful verification, aggregating the data to obtain an aggregation report and sending it to the data center; and the data center performing data recovery. The present invention, through the mutual cooperation among all smart meters to generate public and private keys, ensures that the data of individual users is not leaked when sending this data to the data center, while the data center can still obtain the sum of the electricity consumption data of other users, and the entire process does not involve any specific trusted entity. Attached Figure Description

[0011] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0012] Figure 1 is a flowchart illustrating the privacy-preserving data aggregation method of the present invention; Figure 2 is a data transmission diagram in this embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0013] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0014] The purpose of this invention is to provide a decentralized, privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids, aiming to solve or improve at least one of the above-mentioned technical problems.

[0015] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0016] As shown in Figures 1 and 2, this invention provides a decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids, including: Step 100: Setting security parameters and publishing public parameters through a data center (DC). Specifically: 1) Randomly selecting two large prime numbers. ,calculate , ;in Represents the least common multiple. Define a function. ,in It is an integer. (Random selection) Make ,calculate ;in Denotes the greatest common divisor. Indicates less than And with The set of coprime positive integers. Let the public key for Paillier homomorphic encryption be... The private key is .

[0017] 2) Randomly select prime numbers of order Multiplicative Elliptic Curves And select the multiplicative elliptic curve group A generator And a collision-stable hash function. ;in, Indicates a number less than a prime number. The set of positive integers.

[0018] 3) Publish system public parameters .

[0019] Step 200: Install all smart meters SM i They collaborate to generate public and private keys. This includes: 1) Smart meters. Generate public and private keys: smart meters Random selection and polynomial of degree , making ,in n represents the number of electricity meters, and x represents an integer.

[0020] Smart meters Randomly select parameters and polynomial of degree , making ,in, ; n is the number of electricity meters, x represents an integer; calculate and publish. ; Enable smart meters SM i calculate and announce Any smart meter SM i By verifying the equation Established to extract other smart meters SM j Announced And generate the corresponding private key. and public key Where v = 1, 2, ..., n; the shared private key among the n smart meters is determined as follows: The corresponding public key is .

[0021] Step 300: At timestamp T, use the private key to access the smart meter SM. i The electricity consumption data is encrypted, a corresponding data report is generated, and sent to the gateway (GW). Specifically: 1) Smart meters Random selection Calculate ciphertext ,in It is a smart meter Collected user electricity consumption data, .

[0022] 2) Smart meters Random selection ,calculate , ,as well as .

[0023] 3) Smart meters Will Send to the gateway GW.

[0024] Where g is a randomly selected term belonging to One of the elements; Indicates less than And with A set of coprime positive integers is used to construct the public key for Paillier homomorphic encryption; This is a random blinding factor; Digital signatures are used to verify the legality and integrity of data reports. The temporary public key in the signature is used to generate the signature, and consists of a generator h and a random integer k. i Obtained through exponential operations; This is the value calculated by the hash function.

[0025] Step 400: After the gateway (GW) receives n data reports, it verifies the validity of the data reports and timestamps. Upon successful verification, it aggregates the data to obtain an aggregated report and sends it to the data center (DC). The gateway (GW) receives... Data Report Then, perform the following steps: 1) Verify the validity of the data report and timestamp: calculate Verify the equation Check if the condition is met. If it is met, perform the following data aggregation operation.

[0026] 2) Calculate aggregated ciphertext .

[0027] 4) The gateway (GW) will aggregate reports. Send to the data center (DC).

[0028] Step 500: After the data center DC receives the aggregation report, it performs data recovery using the public parameters and the public key. When the data center DC receives the aggregation report from the gateway GW... Then, perform the following steps: using the private key obtained through Paillier homomorphic encryption. calculate ; That is, all smart meters The sum of collected user electricity consumption data.

[0029] As can be seen, the data transmission in this embodiment does not involve a specific central hub; the public and private keys of the smart meters are generated collaboratively among all smart meters. Even for encrypted data... Decryption was performed, but it was still impossible to obtain the electricity consumption data of a single user. ,because and Only smart meters I know it myself. It can achieve privacy protection for user data.

[0030] This specification uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the core ideas of the present invention. At the same time, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A decentralized, privacy-preserving data aggregation method suitable for smart grids, characterized in that, include: Configure security parameters and publish them as public parameters through the data center (DC); All smart meters SM i They collaborate to generate public and private keys; At timestamp T, the private key is used to access the smart meter SM. i The electricity consumption data is encrypted, a corresponding data report is generated and sent to the gateway GW; when the gateway GW receives n data reports, it verifies the validity of the data reports and timestamps, and after the verification is successful, it aggregates the data to obtain an aggregate report and sends it to the data center DC; when the data center DC receives the aggregate report, it uses the public parameters and the public key to recover the data.

2. The decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method for smart grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The setting of security parameters and the publication of public parameters through the data center DC specifically includes: setting security parameters. Randomly select two large prime numbers. and ， ,calculate ， Define function Random selection , making ,calculate Let the public key of Paillier homomorphic encryption be... The private key is ;in, Represents the least common multiple. Let x represent the greatest common divisor, and let x represent an integer. Indicates less than And with A set of coprime positive integers; a prime number of order is randomly selected. Multiplicative Elliptic Curves And select the multiplicative elliptic curve group A generator And a collision-stable hash function. ;in, Indicates a number less than a prime number. A set of positive integers; Publish system public parameters 。 3. The decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method for smart grids according to claim 2, characterized in that, The above refers to all smart meters SM i To enable mutual collaboration and generate public and private keys, specifically including: utilizing each smart meter's SM i Generate the corresponding public and private keys: Enable the smart meter Randomly select parameters and polynomial of degree , making ,in, ; n is the number of electricity meters, x represents an integer; calculate and publish. ; Enable smart meters SM i calculate and announce Any smart meter SM i By verifying the equation Established to extract other smart meters SM j Announced And generate the corresponding private key. and public key Where v = 1, 2, ..., n; the shared private key among the n smart meters is determined as follows: The corresponding public key is 。 4. The decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method for smart grids according to claim 3, characterized in that, The private key is used at timestamp T to access the smart meter SM i The electricity consumption data is encrypted, a corresponding data report is generated, and sent to the gateway (GW). Specifically, this includes: instructing the smart meter (SM) to... i Randomly select parameters Calculate ciphertext ,in, Smart meters (SM) i The collected electricity consumption data; ; Enable smart meters SM i Randomly select parameters ,calculate 、 ,as well as Generate corresponding data reports. And by smart meters SM i Send to the gateway GW.

5. The decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method for smart grids according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the gateway GW receives n data reports, it verifies the validity of the data reports and timestamps, and after successful verification, it aggregates the data to obtain an aggregated report and sends it to the data center DC. Specifically, this includes: after the gateway GW receives n data reports, it calculates... Verify the equation If true, perform the following aggregation operation: calculate the aggregated ciphertext. Generate aggregate report And send it to the data center (DC).

6. The decentralized privacy-preserving data aggregation method for smart grids according to claim 5, characterized in that, When the data center (DC) receives the aggregated report, it performs data recovery using the public parameters and the public key, specifically including: using the Paillier homomorphic encrypted private key. calculate ;in, For all smart meters The sum of collected user electricity consumption data.

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