A trusted device loop insertion method, communication system and electronic device

By using anonymous user tokens and device connection control, and employing hash-based anonymous identification, blinding processing, and biometric authentication, the problem of protecting device user information and ensuring trusted access in multi-device collaborative scenarios is solved, enabling secure access and communication between devices and protecting user identity privacy.

CN123122835APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17NANJING GLORY SOFTWARE TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202610967446.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-06-30
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In multi-device collaboration scenarios, how can we balance the protection of device user information with trusted access, prevent malicious devices from impersonating and entering the loop, and ensure user identity privacy?

Method used

By using anonymous user tokens and device connection control, employing hash value anonymization identification, blinding processing, and multiple biometric authentication methods, the anonymity and security of the device entry process are ensured. Session keys are used to isolate key usage, enabling end-to-end encrypted communication between devices.

Benefits of technology

It enables secure access and communication between devices, protects user identity and privacy, prevents the impact of key leakage, and ensures a high degree of unity between communication security and privacy protection.

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Abstract

This application discloses a trusted device loop entry method, communication system, and electronic device, relating to the field of terminal technology. The method includes: when a first-side device establishes a trust ring based on local anonymized materials, a second-side device obtains a first anonymous user token and sends a loop entry request to a trusted execution device via a device connection control device. The trusted execution device responds to the loop entry request by verifying the first anonymous user token and the authentication signature of the second-side device's authentication device. Upon successful verification, the trusted execution device sends a loop entry authorization response to both the first-side device and the device connection control device. The loop entry authorization response instructs the second-side device to access the trust ring based on the local anonymized materials of the authentication device. This solution achieves secure access for trusted devices while fully protecting user identity privacy.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of terminal technology, and in particular to a trusted device loop entry method, a communication system, and an electronic device. Background Technology

[0002] Users typically own multiple devices such as mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers. As multi-device collaboration scenarios become increasingly popular, these devices need to be added to a unified trust ring to achieve secure communication and resource sharing across devices. At the same time, they also need to establish end-to-end secure channels with cloud-based AI agents and confidential computing services.

[0003] In multi-device collaborative scenarios, a cross-device trust loop needs to be established to achieve secure communication between devices. However, existing solutions for device entry into the loop and communication processes face multiple security requirements, including device connection control, user information, and end-to-end data transmission.

[0004] How to balance the protection of device user information and trusted access in multi-device collaborative scenarios has become an urgent technical problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a trusted device loop entry method, a communication system, and an electronic device, achieving the effect of balancing device user information security and trusted access in multi-device collaborative scenarios.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the embodiments of this application adopt the following technical solutions.

[0007] Firstly, a trusted device loop-entry method is provided, applicable to a system including end-side devices, account authentication devices, anonymous credential issuance devices, device connection control devices, and trusted execution devices, wherein the end-side devices include a first end-side device and a second end-side device. The method includes: When the first end-device establishes a trust ring based on local anonymity materials, the second end-device obtains a first anonymous user token through an account authentication device or an anonymous credential issuance device, and sends an entry request to the trusted execution device through a device connection control device. The local anonymity materials include an anonymous user identifier, and the first anonymous user token includes a first anonymous user identifier tag, which is obtained by the first end-device based on the hash value of the anonymous user identifier. In response to the entry request, the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the second end-device's proof device. The proof device of the second end-device includes the first end-device in the trust ring, and the proof signature of the proof device is generated by the proof device based on its local device private key. After successful verification, the trusted execution device sends an entry authorization response to both the first end-device and the device connection control device. The entry authorization response authorizes the second end-device to join the trust ring of the first end-device based on the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token.

[0008] In this application, the second end-side device (new end-side device) entering the ring requires verification of the anonymous user token by the trusted execution device to confirm the legitimacy of the user's identity. Simultaneously, the verification of the proof signature confirms that the ring entry operation is authorized by the existing trusted devices within the ring. After successful verification, the trusted execution device sends a ring entry authorization response to the first end-side device and the device connection control device. Thus, after receiving the ring entry authorization response from the trusted execution device, the new end-side device can access the trusted ring. Specifically, the second end-side device (new end-side device) uses a first anonymous user token to prove its legitimacy to the trusted execution device. The anonymous user identifier tag contained in this token is a hash value of the anonymous user identifier, not plaintext. Due to the one-way nature of hash functions, no intermediate node or attacker can deduce the anonymous user identifier or the user's true identity from this tag. Furthermore, this token is based on blinding processing, making it impossible to associate the token with a specific user, thereby ensuring that the user's identity is invisible to intermediate nodes throughout the ring entry process, providing excellent privacy protection for the end-side device. When a second-side device initiates a ring entry request, it requires an anonymous user token and a signature issued by a trusted device within the ring. This signature is generated by the proving device based on its local device private key and cannot be forged by a third party. The trusted execution device independently verifies the validity of the signature while verifying the validity of the anonymous user token. Upon successful verification, ring entry is allowed, thus achieving secure access for trusted devices. This solution achieves secure access for trusted devices while fully protecting user identity privacy, preventing malicious devices from impersonating others to enter the ring. Simultaneously, it ensures that the information acquired by each intermediate node in fulfilling its responsibilities is minimized, preventing the restoration of the complete association between user and device identities.

[0009] In one possible implementation of the first aspect, the method further includes: The first end-side device receives the loop entry authorization response, encrypts the local anonymous material based on the device public key of the second end-side device, and stores the encrypted local anonymous material in the anonymous certificate issuing device; The device connection control device receives the loop entry authorization response and issues the first device token to the second end device. The second-side device obtains the encrypted local anonymized material from the anonymous credential issuing device and decrypts the encrypted local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second-side device. The second-side device determines the second anonymous user label based on the anonymous user identifier in the local anonymous material; If the second anonymous user tag matches the first anonymous user tag, the second end device accesses the trust ring based on the first device token sent by the device connection control device.

[0010] In this application, the first end-side device uses the device public key of the second end-side device to encrypt local anonymous materials and stores the encrypted materials in the anonymous credential issuing device. This encrypted material can only be decrypted by the second end-side device holding the corresponding device private key. The anonymous credential issuing device only acts as a ciphertext storage and forwarding node and cannot obtain the plaintext of the key materials throughout the process, ensuring zero-knowledge of the intermediate nodes during key distribution. Even if the stored data of the anonymous credential issuing device is leaked, the attacker only obtains the ciphertext that cannot be decrypted. After receiving the loop entry authorization response, the device connection control device issues a first device token to the second end-side device. This token is independent of the anonymous user token and is used for device-level connection authentication. It is functionally and lifecycle-isolated from the anonymous user token, and the leakage of either token does not affect the security of the other. After the second-side device decrypts and obtains the local anonymized materials, it calculates a second anonymous user tag based on the anonymous user identifier within it. This tag is then compared with the first anonymous user tag. Access to the trust ring is only permitted if the two match. This mechanism ensures that the anonymous user identifier obtained after decryption and the anonymous user token used for ring entry authorization belong to the same anonymous identity, preventing the key envelope from being incorrectly replaced or maliciously tampered with during custody or transmission. Finally, the second-side device accesses the trust ring based on the first device token issued by the device connection control device. This device token, along with the binding relationship within the ring, jointly confirms the legitimate member identity of the device. Thus, the new device completes the entire ring entry process from anonymous identity verification to key material acquisition and device-level credential issuance, ensuring end-to-end security during the ring entry process and achieving end-to-end anonymization protection of the user's identity.

[0011] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the local anonymization material also includes a first root key, and the method further includes: The second end-side device generates a session key based on the first key in the local anonymized material; after the second end-side device connects to the trust ring, it conducts encrypted communication with other end-side devices in the trust ring based on the session key.

[0012] In this application, when the second-side device initiates service communication, it does not directly use the first key to encrypt service data. Instead, it derives an independent session key based on the first key and uses this session key to conduct encrypted communication with the first-side device, achieving request-level key isolation. The session key is only valid within the processing cycle of the current request. After completing request processing, the first-side device and the trusted execution device clear the session key from memory without any form of persistent storage, ensuring strict forward security. This solution, while ensuring secure communication between devices, minimizes the security impact of potential key leakage, controlling the risk of a single key leakage within a single request, achieving a high degree of unity between communication security and privacy protection.

[0013] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the first end-device establishes a trust loop based on local anonymization material, including: The first end-side device generates an anonymous user identifier, a first root key, and a first encryption key locally.

[0014] The first end device obtains a second anonymous user token, which contains a first anonymous user identifier tag.

[0015] The first end-side device sends a registration request to the device connection control device; the registration request carries a second anonymous user token and the device public key of the first end-side device.

[0016] In response to the registration request, the device connection control device obtains the device identifier and trust ring identifier of the first end device, and sends the registration request, device identifier, and trust ring identifier to the trusted execution device.

[0017] After the trusted execution device verifies the second anonymous user token, it establishes a binding relationship between the anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device.

[0018] The device connection control device sends a second device token and a connection identifier of the trust ring to the first end device.

[0019] The first-side device establishes a trust ring based on the connection identifier of the trust ring and the second device token.

[0020] In this application, the first end-side device generates an anonymous user identifier, a first root key, and a first encryption key locally as local anonymization materials. A trusted execution device then establishes a binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier, providing a security foundation for subsequent new end-side devices joining the ring and end-to-end encrypted communication. Simultaneously, the device connection control device independently issues device tokens and connection identifiers, achieving decoupling between device-level authentication and user-level authentication; the leakage of one device token does not affect the security of another device token.

[0021] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the first end device obtains the second anonymous user token, including: The first end-side device generates an anonymous user identifier and uses the hash value of the anonymous user identifier as a first anonymous user label; the first end-side device generates token input information based on the first anonymous user label and performs blinding processing on the token input information to obtain a blinded token; the first end-side device sends the blinded token and the account access token to the account authentication device.

[0022] After the account authentication device verifies the blinding token, it forwards the blinding token to the anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinding token, generates a content verification result, and sends the content verification result to the first terminal device. The first terminal device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token.

[0023] In this application, after verifying the account token through the account authentication device, only transparent forwarding is performed. The anonymous credential issuance device performs content verification (i.e., evaluation) on the blinded token. The first-side device finally unblinds the token to obtain the anonymous user token. Throughout the entire process, neither the account authentication device nor the anonymous credential issuance device can obtain the plaintext of the first anonymous user identifier tag or the final token, thus achieving zero-knowledge issuance of anonymous user credentials and effectively protecting user identity privacy.

[0024] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the blinding process includes a verifiable unintentional pseudo-random function (VOPRF) blinding, the content verification result is the VOPRF content verification result, and the evaluation result includes a discrete logarithm equivalent proof.

[0025] The first-side device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token, including: After the discrete logarithm equivalence proof in the content verification result is passed by the first end-side device, the first end-side device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token.

[0026] In this application, by adopting the VOPRF protocol and introducing discrete logarithmic equivalent proof, the first-side device can verify that the anonymous credential issuing device does indeed use the correct private key to verify the content of the blinded token without deblinding. This prevents malicious servers from returning false content verification results, ensures the authenticity and integrity of the content verification results, and enhances the verifiability of the anonymous credential issuance process.

[0027] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the second anonymous user token in the registration request is encrypted with the first root key, and the first end-side device shares the first root key with the trusted execution device.

[0028] The trusted execution device establishes a binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device, including: The trusted execution device decrypts the second anonymous user token based on the first root key to obtain the first anonymous user identifier tag of the first terminal device; the trusted execution device obtains the binding tag; wherein, the binding tag is the hash value of the binding data obtained by binding the anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, the device identifier and the device public key of the first terminal device; the trusted execution device stores the correspondence between the binding tag and the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier and the device identifier.

[0029] In this application, the binding tag binds four elements—the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, the device identifier, and the device public key—into an unforgeable tag value through cryptographic hashing. Any change to any element will cause the binding tag value to change, ensuring the integrity and immutability of the binding relationship and effectively preventing anonymous materials from being maliciously bound across rings or replayed across devices.

[0030] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, after the trusted execution device establishes the binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device, the method further includes: The first end-side device encrypts the anonymous user identifier based on the first encryption key to obtain the encrypted anonymous user identifier; the first end-side device sends the encrypted anonymous user identifier and the metadata of the trust ring to the anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device stores the encrypted anonymous user identifier and the metadata of the trust ring.

[0031] In this application, the anonymous user identifier is encrypted using a first encryption key and then hosted on an anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device only stores the ciphertext and cannot decrypt it, so that the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier exists only in the local trusted environment of the end device. This realizes the ciphertext storage and transmission of the anonymous user identifier and reduces the risk of leakage of core key materials at intermediate nodes.

[0032] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the second-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through an account authentication device or an anonymous credential issuing device, including: The second-side device obtains the first anonymous user identifier tag through a preset loop entry path; the second-side device generates a token input based on the first anonymous user tag, performs blinding processing on the token input, and obtains a blinded token; the second-side device sends the blinded token and the account access token to the account authentication device.

[0033] After the account authentication device verifies the blinded token of the second-side device, it forwards the blinded token to the anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinded token, generates a content verification result, and sends the content verification result to the second-side device.

[0034] The second-side device performs deblinding processing on the content verification results to obtain the first anonymous user token.

[0035] In this application, the new end-side device obtains its corresponding anonymous user token through the same VOPRF protocol. This anonymous user token and the anonymous user token of the first end-side device are based on the same first anonymous user identifier tag, so that different devices of the same user hold the same anonymous identity identifier, providing an identity basis for subsequent communication and permission management between devices based on shared anonymous identity, while maintaining the zero-knowledge characteristic of the anonymous credential issuance process.

[0036] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, before the trusted execution device verifies the proof signature of the first anonymous user token and the proof device of the second end device in response to the loop entry request, the method further includes: In response to a loop entry operation triggered by a second device via a preset loop entry path, the first device obtains the device public key and the first anonymous user token of the second device. The first device then obtains the biometric identity information generated by the loop entry operation and performs biometric authentication. Upon successful authentication, the first device generates a proof signature using its device private key. The biometric identity information includes at least one of fingerprint information, facial information, or iris information generated by the loop entry operation.

[0037] In this application, biometric authentication ensures that the entry operation is authorized by a trusted device within the ring, preventing devices from being maliciously added to the trust ring without user confirmation. The signature generated by biometric authentication is non-repudiable and can serve as valid evidence of the entry operation, preventing users from subsequently denying authorization.

[0038] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the loop entry request carries a first anonymous user token from the second-side device and device information of the second-side device's authentication device; sending the loop entry request to the trusted execution device via the device connection control device includes: In response to the ring entry request, the device connection control device verifies the authentication signature of the authentication device of the second-side device, the device token of the authentication device, the connection identifier of the trust ring in which the authentication device is located, and the ring state of the trust ring in which the authentication device is located. After successful verification, the device connection control device sends the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the second end-side device to the trusted execution device.

[0039] In this application, before forwarding the loop entry request to the trusted execution device, the device connection control device first verifies the device token, proof signature, connection identifier, and ring state of the authenticating device. This completes the initial filtering at the device level without decrypting the anonymous user token, effectively reducing the processing burden of the trusted execution device and preventing the anonymous user token from being parsed and leaked at the gateway layer.

[0040] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, biometric authentication includes fingerprint authentication, facial recognition authentication, iris authentication, or rapid online identity authentication.

[0041] This application supports multiple biometric authentication methods such as fingerprint, facial recognition, iris authentication, or fast online identity authentication, enabling trusted devices within the ring to choose the most suitable authentication method based on their own hardware configuration. This improves the compatibility of the solution and the user experience, while ensuring the security strength of user intent confirmation.

[0042] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the preset entry method includes any one of the following: QR code entry, near-field discovery device entry, pairing code-based entry, third-party entry, certified trusted device entry, or remote accountless registration entry. The preset entry path is related to the proof method of the proof device. The proof device guarantee method includes any one of the following: trusted device scanning and online fast identity authentication, trusted device near-field confirmation, pairing code and trusted device signature, trusted device and online fast identity authentication secondary confirmation, trusted certificate and user confirmation, or trusted device registration.

[0043] This application provides a variety of differentiated entry paths and corresponding guarantee methods, covering most practical application scenarios such as near-field devices, remote devices, manufacturer-trusted devices, and screenless devices. Different paths employ different levels of security measures, allowing users to choose the appropriate security level based on the device's environment and trust level, achieving a flexible balance between security and convenience.

[0044] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature, including at least one of the following: Verify the validity of the signature; Alternatively, verify whether the first anonymous user's token is still valid; Alternatively, verify that the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token matches the anonymous user identifier tag in the established binding relationship; Alternatively, verify that the device identifier of the second-side device is not bound to other trust rings.

[0045] In this application, the trusted execution device comprehensively verifies the ring entry request from four dimensions: proof signature validity, token validity period, consistency of anonymous user identifier label, and device exclusivity. If any dimension fails verification, the ring entry is rejected, which effectively prevents a variety of security threats such as forged proof signatures, expired token replay, cross-device abuse of anonymous identities, and cross-ring binding of devices.

[0046] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the local anonymization material includes an anonymous user identifier, a first root key, and a first encryption key. The local anonymization material is encrypted based on the device public key of the second-side device, and the encrypted local anonymization material is stored in the anonymity credential issuing device, including: The first end-side device uses the device public key of the second end-side device to encrypt and encapsulate the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key to generate a key envelope ECIES envelope; the first end-side device stores the key envelope in the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0047] In this application, the first end-side device encapsulates local anonymized materials to generate a key envelope, so that the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key can only be transmitted and stored in ciphertext form. The key envelope can only be decapsulated by the second end-side device holding the corresponding device public key. Neither the anonymous credential issuing device nor the device connection control device can decrypt the contents of the envelope, thus realizing zero-knowledge key distribution.

[0048] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the second-side device obtains encrypted local anonymized material from the anonymity credential issuing device and decrypts the encrypted local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second-side device, including: The second-side device obtains the key envelope corresponding to the local anonymous material from the anonymous credential issuing device; the second-side device decrypts the key envelope using its device public key to obtain the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key from the local anonymous material.

[0049] In this application, the second end-side device pulls the key envelope from the anonymous credential issuing device and unseales it in the local trusted environment. During the entire key acquisition process, the anonymous credential issuing device only acts as a ciphertext storage and forwarding node and cannot obtain the key plaintext, thus ensuring the secure transmission of the root key and anonymous user identifier from the first end-side device to the new end-side device.

[0050] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, after the second-side device unseales the key envelope to obtain the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key, the method further includes: The second-side device calculates the hash value of the anonymous user identifier to obtain a first tag. The second-side device compares the first tag with the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token. If they match, the local anonymized material obtained from decryption is confirmed to be correct; if they do not match, the local anonymized material obtained from decryption is destroyed.

[0051] In this application, the second-side device verifies that the anonymous user identifier in the key envelope matches the anonymous user identifier used during loop entry authorization by comparing the hash value of the desealed anonymous user identifier with its own anonymous user identifier tag. This prevents the key envelope from being misissued or replaced, ensuring the correctness and integrity of the desealed key material. If the comparison fails, the key material is destroyed, preventing erroneous or malicious key material from being written into the device's local trusted environment.

[0052] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the first device token is used for device-level authentication between the second-side device and the device connection control device, and the first anonymous user token is used by the second-side device to prove the identity of an anonymous user to the trusted execution device. The first device token and the first anonymous user token are independent of each other.

[0053] In this application, the device token is independently managed by the device connection control device and used for device-level connection authentication, while the anonymous user token is issued by the anonymous credential issuing device and used for request-level user authentication. The two are independent of each other, achieving complete decoupling between device trust and user anonymity. The leakage of either token will not affect the security of the other token, reducing the risk of single point of failure.

[0054] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the first device token of the second end device is issued by the device connection control device based on the device identifier and trust ring identifier of the second end device.

[0055] In this application, the device token is issued in a binding manner with the device identifier and the trust ring identifier, which ensures that the device token can only be used on the corresponding device and in the corresponding trust ring, preventing the device token from being impersonated by other devices or used across rings, and enhancing the anti-counterfeiting and isolation properties of the device token.

[0056] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the second end device performs encrypted communication with the first end device based on a session key, including: The second-side device sends a service request to the device connection control device. The service request carries the first device token and encrypted service data. The encrypted service data is encrypted using a session key. After the device connection control device verifies the first device token, it forwards the encrypted business request to the trusted execution device.

[0057] The trusted execution device uses the first root key to derive a session key, decrypts the encrypted business data based on the session key, and sends the decrypted business data to the corresponding business service agent for business data processing; the business service agent includes the business service agent in the first end device.

[0058] The trusted execution device receives the business response data returned by the business service agent, encrypts the business response data based on the session key, and sends the encrypted business response data to the second end device through the device connection control device.

[0059] In this application, business data is end-to-end encrypted using a session key derived from the first key. The device connection control device only verifies the device token and signature without accessing the plaintext business data. The trusted execution device performs decryption, business processing response encryption, and session cleanup in a hardware-isolated environment, achieving end-to-end confidentiality and integrity protection for business data. Each business request uses an independent session key, so even if a session key is leaked once, it will not affect other requests, achieving forward security for session data.

[0060] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the session key is obtained by a key derivation function based on a hash-based message authentication code, using the first root key, request identifier, connection identifier, and session random number.

[0061] In this application, the session key is derived from the first root key, the request identifier, the connection identifier, and the session random number through a key derivation function based on the hash-based message authentication code, which achieves request-level key isolation and forward security. Even if a session key is leaked, it will not affect other requests, and attackers cannot deduce the first root key from the session key.

[0062] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the method is applied to an enterprise office scenario, where the first end-side device is an employee's personal device and the second end-side device is an employee's office terminal device.

[0063] The second-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuance device, including: The office terminal device performs blinding processing on the account token containing the anonymous user identifier tag to obtain a blinded token, and sends the blinded token to the account authentication device; after the account authentication device verifies the blinded token, it forwards the blinded token to the anonymous credential issuing device; the anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinded token, generates a content verification result, and returns the content verification result to the office terminal device; the office terminal device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the first anonymous user token.

[0064] The second-side device sends an entry request to the trusted execution device via the device connection control device, including: The office terminal device sends an entry request to the trusted execution device through the device connection control device via scanning a code or automatic discovery.

[0065] The method also includes: The employee's personal device obtains the device public key and the first anonymous user token from the office terminal device, performs biometric authentication, and generates a proof signature using the employee's personal device's private key after successful authentication. The trusted execution device verifies the proof signature and the first anonymous user token, and then sends an entry authorization response to the employee's personal device. The employee's personal device uses the office terminal device's device public key to encapsulate the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key, generating a key envelope, which is then entrusted to the anonymous credential issuing device. The office terminal device obtains the key envelope from the anonymous credential issuing device and decapsulates it using its device public key to obtain the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key. The office terminal device then conducts end-to-end encrypted communication with the employee's personal device based on the first key, including encrypted transmission of email data and encrypted transmission of office documents.

[0066] In another possible implementation of the first aspect, the second end device is an Internet of Things (IoT) device without a display screen and without an input device, and the first end device is a home hub device.

[0067] The second-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuance device, including: The home hub device, representing IoT devices, requests a restricted anonymous user token from the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device. The restricted anonymous user token has a shorter validity period than the ordinary anonymous user token, and carries a monitoring device identifier, which is the device identifier of the home hub device.

[0068] The second-side device initiates a loop entry request to the device connection control device, including: The home hub device discovers IoT devices via Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast or a same-segment discovery mechanism. It then initiates a loop entry request on behalf of the IoT device to the device connection control device. This request carries a restricted anonymous user token and a verification signature from the home hub device, which includes a proxy registration flag. After the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and verification signature, it determines the IoT device's initial role as a restricted-access device and records the verification device identifier as the home hub device's device identifier in the binding relationship. While the IoT device is in the restricted-access device phase, it does not have the authority to invite other devices to join the loop, and its service requests must be verified by the home hub device's proxy signature.

[0069] The method also includes: In response to a role upgrade request initiated by the home hub device, the trusted execution device upgrades the IoT device's role from a restricted device to a fully authorized device and issues a device token with full permissions to the IoT device.

[0070] Secondly, this application provides a communication system, which includes an end-side device, an account authentication device, an anonymous credential issuance device, a device connection control device, and a trusted execution device; the end-side device includes a first end-side device and a second end-side device.

[0071] The first end-side device is used to generate and hold local anonymous materials locally, including an anonymous user identifier, a first root key, and a first encryption key; it is also used to establish a trust ring based on the local anonymous materials. The second end device is used to obtain the first anonymous user token from the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuance device, and to initiate an entry request to the device connection control device. A trusted execution device is configured to, in response to an entry request, verify a first anonymous user token and a proof signature of a proof device of a second end-side device, wherein the proof device of the second end-side device includes the first end-side device in the trust ring; and is also configured to send an entry authorization response to the first end-side device and the device connection control device after successful verification. The loop entry authorization response is used to instruct the first end-side device to encrypt local anonymous materials based on the device public key of the second end-side device and store them in the anonymous credential issuing device. The local anonymous materials are used for encrypted communication between the first end-side device and the second end-side device. The loop entry authorization response is also used to instruct the device connection control device to send a first device token to the second end-side device. The first device token is used by the second end-side device to perform the loop entry operation.

[0072] Thirdly, an electronic device is provided, which includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory. The electronic device is an end-side device, an account authentication device, an anonymous credential issuance device, a device connection control device, or a trusted execution device in a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The processor in the electronic device executes the computer program to implement the method steps executed by the corresponding device in any of the first aspects above.

[0073] Fourthly, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, which is deployed in an end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the computer instructions in the computer-readable storage medium are executed by a processor, they implement the method steps executed by any of the corresponding devices in the first aspect.

[0074] Fifthly, a computer program product containing instructions is provided. The computer program product is deployed in an end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The computer program product includes a computer program / instructions. When the computer program / instructions in the computer program product are executed by a processor, they implement the method steps of any of the corresponding devices in the first aspect described above.

[0075] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a chip that is deployed in an end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The chip includes a processor, which is used to call a computer program in memory to execute the method steps executed by any of the corresponding devices in the first aspect.

[0076] It is understood that the beneficial effects achieved by the electronic device described in the third aspect, the computer-readable storage medium described in the fourth aspect, the computer program product described in the fifth aspect, and the chip described in the sixth aspect can be referred to the beneficial effects in the first aspect and any of its possible design embodiments, which will not be repeated here. Attached Figure Description

[0077] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a communication system architecture provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the interaction flow of an anonymous user credential acquisition method provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the interaction flow of a loop establishment method for a front-end device provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the interaction flow of a novel end-side device loop entry method provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the interaction flow of an end-to-end encrypted business communication method provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating an anonymous ID binding, zero knowledge boundary, and token verification pipeline is provided for an embodiment of this application. Figure 7 A complete flowchart illustrating a trusted device loop entry and anonymous communication method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 8 A schematic diagram of an enterprise office scenario provided for an embodiment of this application; Figure 9 A schematic diagram of a smart home scenario provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of an intelligent travel scenario provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 11 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 12 This application provides a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication system according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram of a chip system provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0078] In the description of the embodiments of this application, the terminology used in the following embodiments is for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and is not intended to be a limitation of this application. As used in the specification and appended claims of this application, the singular expressions "a," "the," "the," "the," and "this" are intended to also include expressions such as "one or more," unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that in the following embodiments of this application, "at least one" and "one or more" refer to one or more (including two). The term "and / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist; for example, A and / or B can indicate: A alone, A and B simultaneously, or B alone, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship.

[0079] References to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" in this specification mean that one or more embodiments of this application include a specific feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment. Therefore, the phrases "in one embodiment," "in some embodiments," "in other embodiments," "in still other embodiments," etc., appearing in different parts of this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but rather mean "one or more, but not all, embodiments," unless otherwise specifically emphasized. The terms "comprising," "including," "having," and variations thereof mean "including but not limited to," unless otherwise specifically emphasized. The term "connection" includes direct connections and indirect connections, unless otherwise stated. "First" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated.

[0080] In the embodiments of this application, the terms "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design that is described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design. Specifically, the use of the terms "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0081] The user operations mentioned in the embodiments of this application can also be replaced with other operations. For example, the operation may include one or more of the following: swipe operation, multi-finger swipe operation, single screen operation, multi-tap screen operation, multi-finger single screen operation, multi-finger multi-tap screen operation, long press operation. An operation may also consist of multiple sub-operations, which are not specifically limited in this embodiment of the application.

[0082] It should be noted that the personal information used in the technical solution of this application is limited to information for which individual consent has been obtained, including but not limited to notifying and reminding users to read the relevant user agreement (notification) and sign the agreement (authorization) which includes the authorization of relevant user information before users use the function.

[0083] The technical solutions disclosed in this application involve the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, and disclosure of users' personal information, all of which comply with relevant laws and regulations and do not violate public order and good morals.

[0084] With the rapid development of mobile internet and IoT technologies, users typically own multiple devices, including smartphones, tablets, personal computers, smart wearables, in-vehicle devices, and various IoT terminals. In practical applications, these devices need to be integrated into a unified trust loop to achieve secure communication, data synchronization, and resource sharing across devices. Simultaneously, the rise of cloud-based AI agents and confidential computing services further necessitates that edge devices establish end-to-end secure communication channels with cloud services while protecting user privacy, ensuring that user data is not leaked or tampered with during transmission and processing.

[0085] However, establishing a secure, reliable, and privacy-preserving device communication system in multi-device collaboration scenarios faces numerous technical challenges. On one hand, the system needs to verify the legitimacy of each device attempting to join the trust ring, preventing malicious devices from masquerading as legitimate ones to steal user data or compromise system security. On the other hand, the system needs to conceal the user's true identity during device entry and communication, preventing the correlation and tracking of user behavior across different devices—that is, achieving anonymity protection. Furthermore, the system must perform end-to-end encryption on business communication data between devices, ensuring that data is invisible to intermediate nodes during transmission and preventing man-in-the-middle attacks or data theft by internal nodes. Additionally, the device connection layer also aims to filter illegal requests without accessing plaintext business data, thereby reducing the processing burden on backend security nodes.

[0086] The aforementioned security requirements are interdependent. For example, device authentication requires the system to identify and verify the uniqueness of a device, while user anonymity protection requires the system not to associate device identity with user identity—a natural contradiction. Similarly, end-to-end encryption requires intermediate nodes to be unable to decipher communication content, but the device connection layer needs to identify and block illegal requests without decrypting the content, rendering traditional content analysis-based filtering methods unusable. These contradictions are particularly pronounced in multi-device collaborative scenarios. Existing security solutions typically only address one aspect of these issues; for example, device authentication schemes focus only on device identity verification, encrypted transmission schemes focus only on communication security, and anonymization schemes focus only on privacy protection. A complete solution that can simultaneously address both trusted device access and end-to-end communication security is lacking.

[0087] Therefore, how to ensure the security of trusted devices and user information in multi-device collaborative scenarios has become a technical problem that urgently needs to be solved by those skilled in the art.

[0088] This application provides a trusted device joining a trust ring method. The method includes a second end-device obtaining a first anonymous user token through an account authentication device or an anonymous credential issuing device, and sending a joining request to a trusted execution device via a device connection control device, when a first end-device establishes a trust ring based on local anonymity materials. The local anonymity materials include an anonymous user identifier, and the first anonymous user token includes a first anonymous user identifier tag, which is obtained by the first end-device based on the hash value of the anonymous user identifier. In response to the joining request, the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the second end-device's proof device. The proof device of the second end-device includes the first end-device in the trust ring, and the proof signature of the proof device is generated by the proof device based on the local device's private key. After successful verification, the trusted execution device sends a joining authorization response to the first end-device and the device connection control device. The joining authorization response authorizes the second end-device to join the trust ring of the first end-device based on the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token.

[0089] In this embodiment, the second end-side device (new end-side device) needs to have its anonymous user token verified by the trusted execution device to confirm the legitimacy of the user's identity before joining the ring. Simultaneously, the device verifies the proof signature to confirm that the ring entry operation is authorized by an existing trusted device within the ring. After successful verification, the trusted execution device sends a ring entry authorization response to the first end-side device and the device connection control device. Thus, after receiving the ring entry authorization response from the trusted execution device, the new end-side device can access the trusted ring. Specifically, the second end-side device (new end-side device) uses a first anonymous user token to prove its legitimacy to the trusted execution device. The anonymous user identifier tag contained in this token is a hash value of the anonymous user identifier, not plaintext. Due to the one-way nature of the hash function, no intermediate node or attacker can deduce the anonymous user identifier or the user's real identity from this tag. Furthermore, this token is based on blinding processing, making it impossible to associate the token with a specific user. This ensures that the user's identity is invisible to intermediate nodes throughout the ring entry process, effectively protecting the privacy information of the end-side device. When a second-side device initiates a ring entry request, it requires an anonymous user token and a signature issued by a trusted device within the ring. This signature is generated by the proving device based on its local device private key and cannot be forged by a third party. The trusted execution device independently verifies the validity of the signature while verifying the validity of the anonymous user token. Upon successful verification, ring entry is allowed, thus achieving secure access for trusted devices. This solution achieves secure access for trusted devices while fully protecting user identity privacy, preventing malicious devices from impersonating others to enter the ring. Simultaneously, it ensures that the information acquired by each intermediate node in fulfilling its responsibilities is minimized, preventing the restoration of the complete association between user and device identities.

[0090] The trusted device loop entry method disclosed in this application can be applied to trusted device loop entry and anonymous communication systems. A trusted device loop entry and anonymous communication system includes an end-side device, an account authentication device, an anonymous credential issuance device, a device connection control device, and a trusted execution device.

[0091] Among these, the end-side device can be a terminal device. The account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, and trusted execution device can be device nodes deployed in the cloud.

[0092] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a communication system architecture provided in an embodiment of this application is given. This system is applied to multi-device AI Agent platforms, cloud-side confidential computing services, and cross-device trust ring scenarios to achieve trusted device entry into the ring, end-to-end encrypted and anonymized communication.

[0093] like Figure 1 As shown, the communication system includes end-side devices (e.g., first-side devices and / or new-side devices), user authentication devices (UserAuth), identity service (IDS), device gateway service (Gateway), Honor® confidential computing trusted execution environment (HCC TEE), and business services. The device gateway service can be a gateway device.

[0094] UserAuth, IDS, Gateway, and HCC TEE are located at different trust boundaries and do not trust each other. The breach of any one of these service nodes will not result in the complete disclosure of the user's identity or business data in plaintext.

[0095] The following sections describe the responsibilities of each node at each stage of the communication system (trusted device access and anonymous communication system).

[0096] UserAuth: During the anonymous user credential acquisition phase, it receives the native account access token (AT) and blinding token sent by the client device and verifies the validity of the AT. After successful verification, UserAuth transparently forwards the blinding token to the IDS. UserAuth only performs account authentication and transparent forwarding functions; it does not parse, record, or store the content of the blinding token, nor does it participate in the subsequent verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function (VOPRF) evaluation (i.e., content verification), anonymous token deblinding, or business data processing performed by the IDS.

[0097] IDS: During the anonymous user credential acquisition phase, it receives the blinded token forwarded by UserAuth, performs VOPRF evaluation on the blinded token, generates an evaluation result, and returns the evaluation result to the end device. The evaluation result is accompanied by a discrete logarithm equality proof (DLEQ) for the end device to verify the correctness of the evaluation.

[0098] Furthermore, during the ring establishment and binding phase of the first-side device, as well as the service request and end-to-end encryption phase, the IDS is also used to host the ciphertext data submitted by the end-side device. This ciphertext data includes the first ciphertext E_K3(anon_id) generated by the end-side device using the first encryption key K3 to encrypt the anonymous user identifier anon_id, and the key envelope ECIES(new_device_pk, K1‖K3‖anon_id) encapsulated by the trusted device within the ring using the new end-side device's device public key. When hosting the ciphertext data, the IDS only stores the ciphertext itself, does not attempt to decrypt it, and does not hold any key materials required for decryption. The IDS is unaware of the real user identity, the plaintext anon_id, the anon_id_tag, K1, or K3.

[0099] Gateway: During the ring establishment and binding phase of the first-side device and the service request and end-to-end encryption phase, it is used to establish network connections for the end-side device, manage the mapping relationship between the connection identifier connect_id, the device identifier device_id and the trust ring identifier ring_id, and issue device tokens device_token for device-level authentication.

[0100] Specifically, when a device registers for the first time, Gateway registers the device's public key, assigns a connect_id, and issues a device_token with a preset validity period (e.g., 90 days or 120 days) after HCCTEE completes anonymous user token verification. The device_token is managed independently by Gateway and is used for device establishment and connection maintenance. Gateway does not assume responsibility for user authentication, does not decrypt business payloads, and does not hold any user-level anonymous credentials or key materials.

[0101] HCC TEE is deployed in a hardware-isolated trusted execution device. HCC TEE is used during the ring establishment and binding phases on the front-end device, as well as the service request and end-to-end encryption phases. It verifies the validity of the anonymous user token (anonymous_user_token) submitted by the front-end device, performs trusted device guarantee verification, establishes the binding relationship between the anonymous user identifier tag (anon_id_tag) and the device identifier (device_id) and trust ring identifier (ring_id), and performs end-to-end service encryption processing. HCC TEE also returns an authorization success response to the front-end device and the Gateway after successful anonymous user token verification, and returns a short-term IDS escrow authorization to the front-end device.

[0102] Specifically, during the ring establishment phase at the headend device, the HCC TEE negotiates and derives the first key K1 with the headend device via the P-256 ECDH protocol, stores K1 in a sealed manner, and establishes a correspondence between anon_id_tag, K1, and the ring state. The HCC TEE does not receive, write, or decrypt data protected by K3 (such as E_K3(anon_id)). Throughout the entire service processing, the HCC TEE does not access the plaintext of anon_id or K3. During the service request phase, the HCC TEE verifies the binding relationship between anonymous_user_token and anon_id_tag ​​and derives a session key K_session for decrypting the ciphertext of the service request.

[0103] The HCC TEE verifies the validity of the anonymous user token by at least the following: verifying the validity of the proof signature; verifying the validity and expiration date of the new endpoint's anonymous_user_token; verifying that the new endpoint's device identifier is not bound to other trust rings (device exclusivity verification); and verifying that the anon_id_tag ​​in the new endpoint's anonymous_user_token matches the anon_id_tag ​​in the established binding relationship. After all verifications pass, the trusted execution device returns an entry authorization to the trusted devices within the ring and an authorization confirmation to the device connection control device.

[0104] During the business execution phase, HCC TEE and / or Gateway also perform auditing and strategy management.

[0105] For example, HCC TEE and Gateway each generate audit logs. The audit logs generated by HCC TEE include device registration events, loop entry ruling events, anonymous user token verification results, and binding relationship change records; the audit logs generated by Gateway include device connection events, token issuance events, and abnormal events (including signature failures, replay attacks, and crosstalk detection). The audit logs are stored in an immutable manner, and the checksums of the audit logs are periodically written to the blockchain or a trusted timestamp service.

[0106] The Gateway counts the number of consecutive failures in device signature verification. When the number of consecutive failures reaches the first threshold, the device is marked as pending verification. When the number of failures reaches the second threshold, the connection request of the device is permanently rejected. The HCC TEE sets an observation period for newly connected devices and restricts the device's access permissions during the observation period. When the number of times the device triggers suspicious behavior reaches the third threshold, the device is automatically expelled.

[0107] Optionally, Gateway executes corresponding security policies when it detects the following abnormal situations: when the device signature verification fails consecutively to the first threshold (e.g., 3 or 5 times), the device is marked as pending verification; when the consecutive failures reach the second threshold (e.g., 10 or 15 times), the connection request of the device is permanently rejected and an anomaly is reported to the trusted execution device; when the mapping relationship between connect_id and device_id is detected to be inconsistent with the local storage, it is determined to be a crosstalk attack and the connection is immediately disconnected; when nonce reuse is detected, the request is directly rejected and the replay attack event is recorded.

[0108] Optionally, when the trusted execution device detects that the anonymous_user_token verification of the new end device fails or that the binding relationship conflicts, it returns an error code to the device connection control device, which rejects the request and increments the device's failure count by 1.

[0109] Optionally, the trusted execution device sets an observation period for new endpoint devices joining the ring, during which access permissions for the new endpoint devices are restricted. When the number of suspicious behaviors triggered by the new endpoint devices during the observation period reaches a threshold, the trusted execution device automatically expels the new endpoint devices. Suspicious behaviors include exceeding the threshold number of requests per unit time, requesting sensitive data, or a sudden change in connection location.

[0110] In some other possible implementations, HCC TEE can also verify device exclusivity, that is, ensure that a device identifier (device_id) can only belong to one trust ring at a time, preventing the security risk of identity cross-propagation caused by a device joining multiple trust rings at the same time.

[0111] HCC TEE maintains a global device registry, recording the device_id of devices already connected to the ring and their associated ring_id. When a new device requests to join the ring, HCC TEE queries this registry: if the device_id does not exist, the connection is allowed and a record is added; if the device_id already exists and the ring_id matches the current ring, it is considered a duplicate connection; if the device_id already exists and the ring_id is different, the connection is rejected and an alarm is triggered. When a device deregisters from its original trusted ring, HCC TEE deletes the corresponding record from the registry, allowing the device to rejoin other rings.

[0112] This prevents malicious users from adding the same device to multiple trust rings to transfer sensitive information or expand the attack surface between different rings. For example, if a compromised IoT device belongs to both a home trust ring and an office trust ring, an attacker could use that device to steal data from the office ring.

[0113] In some other possible implementations, HCC TEE can also perform trust propagation decay, that is, the trust level of the end device decreases step by step as the guarantee link extends, preventing the end device with a low trust level from guaranteeing the end device with a high trust level.

[0114] Specifically, trusted devices within the ring have different trust levels, including Controlled (controlled level, restricted permissions) and Duplex (two-way trusted level, full permissions). New edge devices initially join the ring at the Controlled level and enter an observation period. After the observation period, if no abnormal behavior occurs, they can be upgraded to Duplex by the HCC TEE decision. New edge devices do not directly acquire the Duplex level simply because they are guaranteed by a Duplex device. Controlled level edge devices do not have the authority to guarantee the entry of other edge devices into the ring. Guarantee requests initiated by Controlled level edge devices will be rejected by the HCC TEE. In this embodiment, identity guarantee means identity verification, the guaranteeing device is also the verification device, and the guarantee signature is also the verification signature.

[0115] If Duplex device A guarantees the entry of device B into the ring, device B is initially controlled. Even if device B is subsequently upgraded to a Duplex, the trust level of device C guaranteed by device B will also initially be controlled. Trust decays to the lowest level with each guarantee link and does not accumulate as the guarantee chain extends.

[0116] This prevents attackers from first compromising a low-privilege controlled device and then using that device to vouch for a malicious device joining the ring, thus achieving a "leap" in privilege escalation. Through the trust decay mechanism, any new device joining the ring, regardless of who vouches for it, must undergo independent observation and adjudication by the HCC TEE before gaining full privileges.

[0117] In some other possible implementations, HCC TEE can also verify session-level expiration. Each business session has an independent and finite lifecycle; the associated keys and states become invalid immediately after the session ends, ensuring that even if keys are leaked, it will not affect historical or other sessions.

[0118] Specifically, each business request uses an independent session key K_session, which is only valid within the current request-response cycle. After HCC TEE processes the business request and returns the encrypted response, it immediately clears K_session from memory; the end device also clears its locally cached K_session upon receiving the response. If the request-response cycle is not completed within the preset time (e.g., timeout), HCC TEE proactively clears K_session and invalidates session_nonce.

[0119] Each request carries a unique and time-sensitive request_id. The device connection control device and HCC TEE cache used request_ids, and reject duplicate requests with the same request_id received within a preset time window. Anonymous user tokens carry an expires_at field; HCC TEE rejects requests if the current time has exceeded the expiration date during verification.

[0120] This prevents security risks associated with long-term validity of session keys, while the expiration mechanism limits the time window for token replay attacks.

[0121] Business Service (AI Agent): During the business request and end-to-end encryption phases, the business agent receives the decrypted plaintext data forwarded by the HCC TEE, executes the corresponding business logic (such as AI model inference, data query, etc.), generates a response plaintext, and returns the response plaintext to the HCC TEE. The business agent does not participate in key management, device authentication, or anonymous credential verification; it only processes plaintext data within the security boundaries of the HCC TEE.

[0122] The endpoint devices include the first endpoint device (i.e., the first endpoint device) and the second endpoint device. Each endpoint device is equipped with a local Trusted Execution Equipment (TEE) or Secure Element (SE) for performing VOPRF blinding and deblinding, generating local key materials (including anon_id, K1, and K3), performing trusted device proof signing, generating and hosting ciphertext, and retrieving and unsealing key envelopes from the IDS. The endpoint devices access the system through the Gateway, and each endpoint device holds a device token issued by the Gateway for device-level authentication.

[0123] For new edge devices, during the loop entry phase, the new edge device can generate a loop entry request carrying the device's public key through a trusted device and send the request to the Gateway. After verifying the validity of the trusted device, the Gateway forwards the loop entry request to the HCC TEE. The HCC TEE responds to the loop entry request by performing device verification. During the service request and end-to-end encryption phase, the new edge device generates `request_id` and `session_nonce`. Using the first key K1, it derives the session key K_session = HKDF(K1, request_id, connect_id, session_nonce) through a hash-based message authentication code-based keyderivation function (HKDF). The salt value of HKDF is the concatenation of `connect_id` and `request_id`, and the information field is `session_nonce`. The new edge device uses the session key K_session to encrypt the service payload (using AES-256-GCM mode) to generate encrypted service data.

[0124] The new edge device obtains the key envelope from the IDS and decrypts it in its local trusted environment (TEE or SE) based on its own device public key, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3. The new edge device calculates the hash value of the decrypted anon_id and compares it with its own anon_id_tag. If the comparison matches, the device confirms successful ring entry and holds the device_token for subsequent device-level authentication.

[0125] In the following embodiments, each stage of trusted device access and anonymous communication is described in detail, taking into account the various nodes in the trusted device access and anonymous communication system.

[0126] See Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the interaction flow of an anonymous user credential acquisition method provided in an embodiment of this application. The method is applied to a system that includes at least a client-side device, an account authentication device (UserAuth), and an anonymous credential issuance device (IDS), and is used to implement credential issuance for user anonymization.

[0127] After a user logs in with their native account, the first-side device generates an anonymous user identifier (anon_id) in a local trusted environment and calculates its hash value using a cryptographic hash function (such as SHA-256), resulting in the anonymous user identifier tag (anon_id_tag ​​= H(anon_id)). Additionally, the first-side device constructs a token input (token_input = {anon_id_tag, request_id, expires_at, nonce}).

[0128] The front-end device performs VOPRF blinding processing on the token input to obtain a blinded token (blinded_element). The front-end device then sends the blinded token and the native account access token (AT) together to the account authentication device UserAuth.

[0129] Upon receiving the blinded token and AT, UserAuth verifies the validity of the AT. This includes verifying the validity of the AT's signature and whether the AT is within its validity period. If verification is successful, UserAuth transparently forwards the blinded token only to the Anonymous Credential Issuing Device (IDS). UserAuth does not parse, record, or store the contents of the blinded token, nor does it participate in subsequent VOPRF evaluations or the anonymity token deblinding process. If AT verification fails, UserAuth directly returns an authentication failure response to the client-side device without forwarding the blinded token.

[0130] After receiving the blinding token, the IDS performs a VOPRF evaluation on the token using its VOPRF private key, generating an evaluation result, `evaluated_element`. This evaluation result includes a Discrete Logarithmic Equivalence (DLEQ) proof. The DLEQ proof demonstrates that the IDS evaluated the blinding token using the correct private key, and that this private key corresponds to the public key publicly committed to by the IDS. The IDS then returns the evaluation result and the DLEQ proof to the front-end device.

[0131] After receiving the evaluation result and DLEQ proof, the first-side device verifies the correctness of the DLEQ proof. If the DLEQ proof verification fails, the first-side device discards the evaluation result and terminates the process; if the DLEQ proof verification succeeds, the first-side device performs a deblinding operation on the evaluation result to obtain an anonymous user token (anonymous_user_token). The anonymous user token contains anon_id_tag, request_id, validity period information, and the signature of the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0132] In some other feasible implementations, the IDS periodically rotates its VOPRF key pair, with a rotation period not exceeding 90 days. During key rotation, the IDS uses the new private key to evaluate subsequently received blinded tokens and updates its publicly committed public key. During a preset transition period after key rotation (e.g., 24 hours), the IDS simultaneously accepts DLEQ proof verification corresponding to the old and new public keys to ensure that edge devices can still obtain anonymous user tokens normally during the rotation period.

[0133] In some other feasible implementations, the client-side device caches the anonymous_user_token locally after obtaining it. When the anonymous_user_token is about to expire (e.g., less than 24 hours remaining), the client-side device automatically repeats the process described in this embodiment to refresh the anonymous_user_token, without requiring the user to re-enter their account and password. During the refresh process, the client-side device constructs a token input using the same anon_id_tag, thereby obtaining a new anonymous_user_token corresponding to the same anonymous user identity. The client-side device can automatically refresh the anonymous user token when it is about to expire, without requiring the user to re-enter their account and password, improving the user experience. Simultaneously, by limiting the token's lifespan through validity period management, it reduces the security risks associated with token leakage.

[0134] In some other feasible implementations, the front-end device establishes a secure channel with UserAuth using a secure transport layer protocol (such as TLS 1.3) when sending the blinding token and AT, preventing the blinding token and AT from being eavesdropped on or tampered with during network transmission. UserAuth and IDS also establish a secure channel using a secure transport layer protocol.

[0135] In some other feasible implementations, after UserAuth verifies the AT, when forwarding the blinded token to the IDS, no metadata (such as source IP address, device fingerprint, user ID) that could identify the end-user device or user is attached. UserAuth only forwards the blinded token as opaque binary data, ensuring that the IDS cannot associate the blinded token with a specific user or device.

[0136] In some other feasible implementations, when constructing the token input, the endpoint device also adds a device type field `device_type` to the token input. `device_type` identifies the type of endpoint device (including mobile phones, tablets, personal computers, and IoT devices). The anonymous user token carries the `device_type`, which is then used by the trusted execution device to implement differentiated access control policies based on the device type during the business request phase.

[0137] In this embodiment, UserAuth only verifies the validity of the native account access token and does not parse the content of the blinded token; IDS only performs VOPRF evaluation and does not access account information. The separation of responsibilities and information isolation between the two ensures that the breach of either service will not lead to the leakage of the association between the user's identity and anonymous credentials. Furthermore, IDS only processes the blinded token input and cannot associate the blinded token with a specific user or device, achieving zero-knowledge propagation of credentials and effectively protecting user privacy. Even if the IDS is controlled by an attacker, the attacker cannot extract any information related to the user's identity from the blinded token. In addition, through discrete logarithmic equivalent proofs, the edge device can cryptographically verify that the IDS has indeed used the correct private key to evaluate the blinded token, preventing malicious servers from returning false evaluation results and ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the evaluation results.

[0138] See Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the interaction process for a loop establishment method for a front-end device provided in an embodiment of this application. This method is applied to a system comprising at least a front-end device, a Trusted Execution Device (HCC TEE), a Device Connection Control Device (Gateway), and an Anonymous Credential Issuance Device (IDS), and is used to establish the root key and binding relationship of a trust loop.

[0139] The first-end equipment is passing through Figure 2 After obtaining the anonymous user token (anonymous_user_token) using the method provided in the embodiment, the following ring establishment process is executed.

[0140] The first-side device generates an anonymous user identifier (anon_id) in a local trusted environment (TEE or SE) and calculates its hash value to obtain the anonymous user identifier tag (anon_id_tag ​​= H(anon_id)). The first-side device also generates a first root key K1 and a first encryption key K3, as well as a device signature key pair. For example, the first root key K1 can be a 256-bit AES key used to derive the service session key; the first encryption key K3 can be a 256-bit AES key used to encrypt anon_id. The device signature key pair is an ECDSA key pair based on the elliptic curve secp256r1.

[0141] The first-end device and HCC TEE derive the first key K1 using the P-256 elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Specifically, the first-end device generates a first temporary key pair, and HCC TEE generates a second temporary key pair; HCC TEE and the first-end device exchange their respective temporary public keys; the first-end device uses its temporary private key and HCC TEE's temporary public key to calculate a shared secret, and HCC TEE uses its temporary private key and the first-end device's temporary public key to calculate the same shared secret; based on the shared secret, using anon_id_tag ​​as the salt and a preset string as the info field, HCC TEE and the first-end device derive the first key K1 using the HKDF algorithm. HCC TEE stores the first key K1 locally in a sealed manner, using a storage key bound internally to HCC TEE for encryption, ensuring that K1 can only be decrypted and used within HCC TEE.

[0142] The first-side device sends a registration request to the device connection control device. The registration request carries the anonymous_user_token, the first-side device's device public key, and the bootstrap ciphertext. The bootstrap ciphertext contains anon_id_tag, which is encrypted and protected using a pre-negotiated temporary key between the first-side device and the HCC TEE.

[0143] After receiving the registration request, the Gateway registers the device public key of the first-side device, sets the mapping relationship between the device identifier device_id and the trust ring identifier ring_id of the first-side device to a pending confirmation state, and forwards the registration request to HCCTEE.

[0144] After receiving the registration request, the HCC TEE verifies the validity of the anonymous_user_token. This verification includes checking the validity of the anonymous_user_token's signature, whether the current time is within the token's validity period, and whether the anon_id_tag ​​in the anonymous_user_token matches the anon_id_tag ​​decrypted from the bootstrap ciphertext. Upon successful verification, the HCC TEE calculates the binding tag anon_binding_tag = H(anon_id_tag, ring_id, device_id, device_sign_pk).

[0145] Here, device_sign_pk is the device signature public key of the head-end device. HCC TEE establishes and stores the binding relationship between anon_id_tag, ring_id and device_id, and associates this binding relationship with the sealed storage K1.

[0146] HCC TEE returns a loop establishment success response to Gateway.

[0147] After receiving the ring connection success response, the Gateway assigns a connection identifier (connect_id) to the first-end device and issues a device token (device_token) with a validity period of a preset duration (e.g., 60 days, 90 days, 120 days, etc.). The Gateway then sends the connect_id and device_token to the first-end device.

[0148] The HCC TEE returns IDS managed authorization to the headend device. Upon receiving the IDS managed authorization, the headend device encrypts the anonymous user identifier anon_id using the first encryption key K3, generating the first ciphertext E_K3(anon_id), and then manages the first ciphertext and the trust ring metadata pubkey_ring metadata to the IDS. The first ciphertext can only be decrypted on the device holding K3; neither the HCC TEE nor the IDS holds the plaintext K3.

[0149] In some other feasible implementations, after generating a device signature key pair, the first-side device reports the device signature public key `device_sign_pk` to the HCC TEE via the Gateway. The HCC TEE then stores `device_sign_pk` in association with the binding relationship. In subsequent business requests, the HCC TEE verifies the authenticity of the requesting device by checking the consistency between the device signature and `device_sign_pk`.

[0150] In some other feasible implementations, HCC TEE, when verifying anonymous_user_token, also checks whether the request_id in anonymous_user_token matches the request_id of the current registration request to prevent replay attacks.

[0151] In some other feasible implementations, when the Gateway issues a device_token, it writes the device identifier and trust ring identifier of the first-end device into the device_token, thus binding the device_token to a specific device and a specific trust ring. When the Gateway subsequently receives a service request from the first-end device, it verifies that the device identifier in the device_token matches the device identifier in the request, and verifies that the trust ring identifier in the device_token matches the locally stored ring_id, preventing the device_token from being used by other devices or across rings.

[0152] In this embodiment, the first-end device and the HCC TEE derive the first key K1 via the P-256 ECDH protocol, which is unknown to any intermediate node. K1 is stored sealed within the HCC TEE and cannot be retrieved even if the storage medium is compromised. During the ring establishment phase, the HCC TEE securely binds the anonymous user identifier tag, trust ring identifier, device identifier, and device signature public key using binding tags to prevent anonymous materials from being used across the ring by malicious devices. Furthermore, the anonymous user identifier is encrypted using K3 and hosted on the IDS. The IDS only stores the ciphertext and cannot decrypt it. The first-end device only retains the anonymous user identifier tag locally, achieving encrypted storage and transmission of the anonymous user identifier and reducing the risk of leakage of the anonymous user identifier.

[0153] Furthermore, during the ring establishment phase described in this embodiment, Gateway independently issues and manages device tokens for each device in the trust ring. These device tokens are independent of anonymous user tokens. Device tokens are used for device-level connection authentication, while anonymous user tokens are used for request-level user authentication. Their responsibilities are separated, and the leakage of one token does not affect the security of the other.

[0154] See Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the interaction process for a new end-side device joining a ring according to an embodiment of this application. The method is applied to a system including a new end-side device, a trusted device within the ring, a Gateway device for device connection control, a Trusted Execution Device (HCC TEE), and an Anonymous Credential Issuance Device (IDS), to enable the new end-side device to securely join an existing trusted ring.

[0155] New end-side equipment can be used Figure 2The embodiment describes a method for obtaining an anonymous user token (anonymous_user_token). After obtaining the anonymous user token, the following loop entry procedure is performed. At this point, the new end device has not yet obtained the anonymous user identifier (anon_id), the first root key K1, or the first encryption key K3.

[0156] The new end-device initiates an entry request to the trusted device within the ring via near-field communication (including QR code scanning, Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast, or discovery within the same network segment). The entry request carries the new end-device's device identifier (device_id), device public key (device_pub_key), and anonymous_user_token. The trusted device within the ring is an end-device already in the ring (as described above). Figure 3 The example illustrates the first-end device or other Duplex-level devices already in the loop.

[0157] Upon receiving a ring entry request, a trusted device within the ring (such as the initial device) performs ring entry confirmation through user interaction. For example, the trusted device within the ring can display a ring entry confirmation interface to obtain confirmation actions from the user. After receiving the confirmation action, the trusted device within the ring triggers biometric authentication (including fingerprint authentication, facial recognition authentication, or quick online identity authentication). Upon successful authentication, the trusted device within the ring generates a proof signature using its device signing private key. In this embodiment, the proof signature is a signature of the new device's device identifier, device public key, anonymous user token, and the current trust ring identifier.

[0158] The trusted device within the ring sends the proof signature, the anonymous_user_token of the new endpoint, and the device public key of the new endpoint to the Gateway. After verifying the validity of the device_token of the trusted device within the ring, the Gateway forwards the proof signature, the anonymous_user_token of the new endpoint, and the device public key of the new endpoint to the HCC TEE.

[0159] HCC TEE performs at least one of the following verification operations: (1) Verify the validity of the proof signature, confirm that the proof signature is signed by the private key of the trusted device in the ring and that the signature content is consistent with the device identifier, device public key, anonymous_user_token and current ring_id of the new end device; (2) Verify the validity of the anonymous_user_token of the new terminal device, including signature verification, validity period verification and anon_id_tag ​​format verification; (3) Verify that the device identifier of the new end device is not bound to other trust rings, i.e., device exclusivity verification; (4) Verify that the anon_id_tag ​​in the anonymous_user_token of the new end device is consistent with the anon_id_tag ​​in the established trust ring binding relationship.

[0160] After all verifications are successful, the HCC TEE returns an entry authorization to the trusted device within the ring and an authorization confirmation to the Gateway.

[0161] After receiving the entry authorization, the trusted device within the ring encapsulates the anonymous user identifier anon_id, the first root key K1, and the first encryption key K3 using the device public key of the new endpoint, generating a key envelope ECIES(new_device_pk, K1‖K3‖anon_id), and entrusts the key envelope to the IDS. The Gateway assigns a connect_id to the new endpoint and issues a device_token, which is then sent to the new endpoint.

[0162] The new edge device reads the key envelope from the IDS and decrypts it using its device public key in the local trusted environment, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3. The new edge device calculates the hash value of the decrypted anon_id and compares it with its own anon_id_tag. If the comparison matches, the device confirms successful ring insertion.

[0163] In some other feasible implementations, after confirming successful ring entry, the new end-device sends a ring entry confirmation message to the HCC TEE. This message carries the authentication credentials generated by the new end-device using K1. After verifying the authenticity of these credentials, the HCC TEE adds the new end-device's device identifier to the binding relationship and updates the trust ring's member list.

[0164] In some other feasible implementations, HCC TEE sets an observation period for new edge devices, restricting their access permissions during this period. The duration of the observation period is specified by the trusted device within the ring during the guarantee process, or automatically determined by HCC TEE based on the new edge device's entry method (e.g., QR code entry, automatic discovery, pairing code entry, cloud entry, or registration without an account). When the number of suspicious behaviors triggered by the new edge device during the observation period reaches a threshold, HCC TEE automatically removes the new edge device. For example, suspicious behaviors include exceeding a first threshold in the number of requests per unit time, requesting sensitive data, or a sudden change in connection location.

[0165] In some other feasible implementations, after successful biometric authentication, the trusted device within the ring can also generate a timestamp and a random number (nonce), incorporating both into the proof signature. The HCC TEE verifies the freshness of the timestamp (e.g., deviation not exceeding 30 seconds) and the uniqueness of the random number (nonce) to prevent replay attacks on the proof signature.

[0166] In some other feasible implementations, when a new edge device initiates an entry request via QR code scanning, it generates a QR code. This QR code encodes the new edge device's device identifier, public key, hash value of the anonymous_user_token, and validity period. The device then signs the QR code content using its private key. Trusted devices within the ring scan the QR code, verify the signature validity, and execute subsequent guarantee procedures upon successful verification.

[0167] In some other feasible implementations, HCC TEE can also perform device exclusivity verification on new end-side devices; see details for further information. Figure 1 The method for performing device exclusivity verification using HCC TEE in the embodiments will not be described in detail here.

[0168] In some other feasible implementations, when a new end-device reads the key envelope from the IDS, a long polling method is used. That is, the new end-device sends a read request to the IDS, and if the key envelope is not yet ready, the IDS maintains the connection and waits until the key envelope becomes available or a timeout occurs. The default timeout for long polling is 5 minutes, after which the new end-device re-initiates the read request.

[0169] In this embodiment, the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key are distributed via an ECIES ciphertext envelope, which can only be decrypted by the private key of the new end device. The anonymous credential issuing device only holds the ciphertext and cannot decrypt it; the device connection control device does not handle the key material at all, achieving zero-knowledge key distribution. Biometric authentication ensures that the ring entry operation is explicitly authorized by the holder of the trusted device within the ring, preventing the device from being maliciously added to the trust ring without user confirmation. The signature generated by biometric authentication is non-repudiable. In addition, the trusted execution device verifies that the device identifier of the new end device is not bound to other trust rings, preventing a device from joining multiple trust rings simultaneously and eliminating the security risk of cross-propagation of identity. The newly added device is initially in a restricted observation period; even if the device is maliciously controlled, the attacker can only perform limited operations and cannot access sensitive services. After the observation period expires and no abnormal behavior occurs, it is automatically upgraded to a fully trusted device. It supports multiple ring entry triggering methods such as QR code scanning, automatic discovery, and pairing codes, adapting to different device types and usage scenarios, balancing security and convenience.

[0170] See Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the interaction flow of an end-to-end encrypted service communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. The method is applied to a system comprising at least an end-side device, a device connection control device (Gateway), a trusted execution device (HCC TEE), and a service AI Agent, to implement end-to-end encrypted service requests and responses.

[0171] After completing the loop entry and holding the device token (device_token), the first root key (K1), and the anonymous user identifier (anon_id), the end-side device (either the first end-side device or the new end-side device) executes the following business communication process.

[0172] The endpoint device generates a request identifier (request_id) and a session nonce (session_nonce). For example, the request_id can be a 16-byte random number used to uniquely identify the current business request; the session_nonce can be a 16-byte cryptographically secure random number used to provide randomness for session key derivation.

[0173] The endpoint device uses the first key K1, with the concatenation of the connection identifier connect_id and the request identifier request_id as the salt value, and the session random number session_nonce as the information field info, to derive the session key K_session through the HKDF algorithm. Wherein, K_session = HKDF(K1,connect_id‖request_id,session_nonce).

[0174] The edge device uses the session key K_session to encrypt the business data payload in AES-256-GCM mode, generating encrypted business data and authentication tags.

[0175] The endpoint device sends a service request to the Gateway. The service request carries a device token, device signature, timestamp, nonce, connect_id, request_id, session_nonce, encrypted service data, and authentication tag. The device signature is generated by the endpoint device using its device signing private key to sign at least a portion of the service request (including device_token, request_id, timestamp, and nonce).

[0176] After receiving a business request, the Gateway verifies the validity of the information carried in the request.

[0177] In one specific implementation, the Gateway performs at least one of the following verification operations: (1) Verify the validity of device_token, including verifying whether the signature of device_token is valid and whether the current time is within the validity period of device_token.

[0178] (2) Verify the validity of the device signature and confirm that the device signature is signed by the private key of the end device and that the signature content is consistent with the request parameters.

[0179] (3) Verify that the deviation between the timestamp and the current time does not exceed a preset threshold (e.g., 30 seconds).

[0180] (4) Verify that the random number nonce has not been used to prevent replay attacks.

[0181] (5) Verify whether the connect_id matches the device identifier carried in the device_token to prevent cross-connection attacks.

[0182] If any of the above verifications fails, the Gateway directly rejects the service request and does not forward it to HCCTEE. If all verifications pass, the Gateway forwards the service request to the trusted execution device.

[0183] After receiving a business request, the HCC TEE verifies the validity of the anonymous_user_token or its derived credentials carried in the business request, confirms that the anon_id_tag ​​in the anonymous_user_token is consistent with the established binding relationship, and confirms that the anonymous_user_token has not expired and the signature is valid.

[0184] After successful verification, the HCC TEE uses the locally sealed first key K1, with the concatenation of connect_id and request_id from the business request as the salt value and session_nonce as the information field, to re-derive the session key K_session using the same HKDF algorithm. Since the derived parameters are exactly the same as those of the end device, the derived K_session is consistent with the K_session used by the end device for encryption.

[0185] HCC TEE uses the session key K_session to decrypt the encrypted business data and verify the authentication tag. Successful decryption yields the plaintext business data.

[0186] HCC TEE sends the business message in plaintext to the business service AI Agent. The business service executes the corresponding business logic (such as AI model inference, data query, and calculation tasks) based on the business message, generates a response message in plaintext, and returns the response message in plaintext to HCC TEE.

[0187] The HCC TEE uses the session key K_session to encrypt the plaintext response, generating encrypted response data. The HCC TEE then returns the encrypted response data to the endpoint device via the Gateway. The Gateway does not decrypt the response data during forwarding.

[0188] After receiving the encrypted response data, the end device uses the locally cached session key K_session to decrypt the encrypted response data and obtain the plaintext response.

[0189] After processing a business request, the HCC TEE clears the K_session and the plaintext of the business request from volatile memory. The client-side device also clears the locally cached K_session after processing the response. Each business request uses a unique request_id and session_nonce to ensure that each derived K_session is distinct.

[0190] In some other feasible implementations, when HCC TEE sends the business plaintext to the business service, it appends a request_id to the plaintext, so that the business service returns the request_id along with the plaintext response. HCC TEE then writes the request_id into the response header when encrypting the response, and the end device matches the response with the previously initiated request based on the request_id in the response.

[0191] In some other feasible implementations, the Gateway executes appropriate security policies when it detects the following anomalies: When a device signature verification fails consecutively for a certain number of times (e.g., 3 or 5 times), the Gateway marks the device as pending verification and sends an alarm to the operation and maintenance system. When a device signature verification fails consecutively for a larger number of times (e.g., 10 or 15 times), the Gateway permanently rejects the device's connection request and reports the abnormal device information to the trusted execution device.

[0192] When the mapping relationship between connect_id and device_id is found to be inconsistent with the local storage, it is determined to be a cross-connection attack. The connection corresponding to the connect_id is immediately disconnected and the relevant device is required to re-establish the connection.

[0193] When nonce reuse is detected, the request is rejected directly and the replay attack event is recorded.

[0194] In some other feasible implementations, HCC TEE, when verifying the anonymous_user_token, also checks whether the request_id in the anonymous_user_token matches the request_id in the current business request. If they do not match, HCC TEE rejects the business request to prevent the request_id of the business request from being tampered with.

[0195] In some other feasible implementations, the endpoint device generates a new session_nonce each time a service request is initiated. The session_nonce is not repeated between two consecutive service requests.

[0196] In this embodiment, each business request uses an independent session key, which is derived from K1 by combining request_id, connect_id, and session_nonce. Even if a session key is leaked, an attacker cannot decrypt the business data of other requests, nor can they deduce K1, achieving strict forward security. The session key for each request is destroyed immediately after the request-response cycle ends and is not persistently stored in the system. The device connection control device can complete device authentication and anti-replay checks by verifying device tokens, device signatures, timestamps, and random numbers without decrypting business data, effectively filtering illegal requests. The gateway layer does not need to access the business plaintext, avoiding the risk of business data leakage at the gateway layer, while significantly reducing the processing burden on the trusted execution device. Business data is transmitted encrypted throughout the entire process from the end device to the trusted execution device. The device connection control device cannot snoop on or tamper with the business content, and the business service only receives plaintext within the trusted execution device, ensuring the complete confidentiality of data during transmission and processing. Furthermore, the derivation of session keys incorporates device connection, request, and random dimensions, constructing a multi-dimensional isolated key derivation system. This ensures that session keys remain completely independent even between consecutive requests on the same device and within the same connection. The device connection control device executes appropriate response strategies for anomalies such as signature failures, crosstalk attacks, and replay attacks, effectively mitigating common network attacks and reducing security operation and maintenance costs.

[0197] Table 1 provides Figure 5 The table below provides a multi-path trusted device loop entry method table for the new end-side device's loop entry phase. Table 1 offers six differentiated loop entry implementation methods for new end-side devices based on different device types, communication distances, and security level requirements. It is understood that new end-side devices can also enter the loop through other methods; this embodiment does not limit the loop entry method or the corresponding guarantee method.

[0198] Table 1

[0199] As shown in Table 1 above, the multi-path trusted device loop entry methods include QR code loop entry (Path A), automatic discovery loop entry (Path B), pairing code loop entry (Path C), cloud / third-party loop entry (Path D), trusted certificate loop entry (Path E), and remote accountless registration loop entry (Path F). Each loop entry path differs in typical device types, anonymous user token acquisition methods, guarantee methods, key distribution methods, and initial role configurations to adapt to different application scenarios.

[0200] The method in this embodiment is as described above. Figure 3 This is performed based on the ring establishment process of the first-side device given in the embodiment. That is, the trust ring has been established by the first-side device, which has generated the anonymous user identifier anon_id, the first root key K1 and the first encryption key K3, established a binding relationship with the trusted execution device HCC TEE, and entrusted the first ciphertext E_K3 (anon_id) to the anonymous credential issuance device IDS.

[0201] The following describes each pathway to entry into the circulatory system.

[0202] Path A QR code entry: Suitable for near-field communication devices such as mobile phones or personal computers with display screens and cameras.

[0203] Upon initial startup and selection of "Join an existing trust ring," a new edge device (such as a tablet) displays a QR code on its screen. The QR code's encoded data structure includes a version number, the new edge device's device identifier, device public key, device type, the hash value of an anonymous user token obtained by the new edge device via the VOPRF protocol, an expiration timestamp, and a random number. The new edge device signs the entire QR code encoding using its device signing private key, and encodes the signature within the QR code.

[0204] A trusted device within the ring (such as a mobile phone) scans the QR code, parses it, and verifies the signature validity of the QR code content. Upon successful verification, the trusted device displays an entry confirmation interface to the user. After receiving confirmation from the user, the trusted device triggers biometric authentication. Once authentication is successful, it generates a proof signature using its device signature private key. The proof signature is a signature of the new device's device identifier, device public key, current trust ring identifier, and current timestamp.

[0205] The trusted device within the ring sends the proof signature, the anonymous user token of the new endpoint, and the device public key of the new endpoint to the device connection control device. After verifying the validity of the device token of the trusted device within the ring, the device connection control device forwards the above information to the trusted execution device. After verifying the proof signature and the anonymous user token of the new endpoint, the trusted execution device returns an entry authorization to the trusted device within the ring.

[0206] After receiving the ring entry authorization, the trusted device within the ring uses the new device's public key to perform ECIES encapsulation on the anonymous user identifier anon_id, the first root key K1, and the first encryption key K3 to generate a key envelope, which is then entrusted to the IDS. The device connection control device issues a device token to the new device. The new device retrieves and decapsulates the key envelope from the IDS, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3, thus confirming successful ring entry.

[0207] Optionally, the QR code can have an expiration period, for example, 2 minutes. After the timeout, the new terminal device refreshes the QR code and updates the expiration timestamp and random number. Trusted devices within the ring verify whether the current time is within the QR code's validity period when scanning; if it has expired, they prompt the user to refresh the QR code.

[0208] Optionally, the QR code's encoded data also includes a list of encryption algorithms supported by the new terminal device. The trusted device within the ring selects an encryption algorithm supported by both parties based on the encryption algorithm list for subsequent key envelope encapsulation.

[0209] Path B automatic discovery of incoming devices: Suitable for devices on the same network segment or within Bluetooth Low Energy coverage area.

[0210] After a new end-side device (a personal computer or Bluetooth Low Energy device on the same network segment) is powered on, it sends a ring entry discovery request via multicast Domain Name System service or Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast. The discovery request carries the device identifier, device public key, and anonymous user token obtained by the new end-side device through the VOPRF protocol.

[0211] Upon receiving a discovery request, a trusted device within the ring (such as a mobile phone) displays a "New device discovered" prompt to the user. After user confirmation, the trusted device performs a near-field verification operation (such as clicking the confirmation button) and triggers biometric authentication. Upon successful authentication, the trusted device generates a proof signature, which is a signature of the new device's device identifier, device public key, current trust ring identifier, and current timestamp.

[0212] The subsequent verification of signature, key envelope generation and custody, device token issuance, key envelope acquisition and desealing processes are the same as those in Path A, and will not be repeated here.

[0213] Optionally, after receiving a discovery request, the trusted device within the ring can also establish a local secure channel with the new end-side device via Bluetooth Low Energy or Wi-Fi P2P, and exchange temporary keys on the local secure channel for encryption protection of subsequent communications.

[0214] Optionally, automatic loop discovery is only allowed to be triggered when the trusted device within the loop and the new end-side device are on the same local area network (same subnet) or within Bluetooth Low Energy communication range (usually within 10 meters), in order to prevent remote attackers from initiating automatic loop discovery requests over the Internet.

[0215] Path C Pairing Code Loop: Suitable for scenarios where the pairing code can be transmitted remotely but manually.

[0216] When a trusted device (such as a mobile phone) within the ring triggers the "Add Remote Device" operation, it generates and displays a pairing code. For example, the pairing code can be a 6-digit number or alphanumeric combination with a preset validity period (e.g., 10 minutes). The pairing code is bound to the current trust ring identifier and the current timestamp.

[0217] After the user enters the pairing code, the new end-side device (such as a remote PC) sends the pairing code, its device identifier, device public key, and an anonymous user token obtained automatically via the VOPRF protocol to the device connection control device. The device connection control device forwards the pairing code and the aforementioned information to the HCC TEE. The HCC TEE verifies the validity of the pairing code. It checks that the pairing code matches the current trust ring identifier, is within its validity period, and has not been used before. Upon successful verification, the HCC TEE marks the pairing code as used.

[0218] After HCC TEE verifies the validity of the anonymous user token on the new end device, it sends a guarantee confirmation request to the trusted device within the ring via the device connection control device. Upon receiving the guarantee confirmation request, the trusted device within the ring displays a confirmation interface to the user. After the user confirms, it generates a proof signature and returns it to HCC TEE. After HCC TEE verifies the proof signature, it returns ring entry authorization to the trusted device within the ring.

[0219] The subsequent key envelope generation and custody, device token issuance, key envelope acquisition and desealing processes are the same as those in Path A, and will not be described in detail here.

[0220] In some alternative implementations, pairing codes are for one-time use only, and each pairing code becomes invalid after being used once. If a user enters an incorrect pairing code consecutively for a threshold (e.g., 3 times, 5 times), trusted devices within the ring lock the pairing code input function for a duration (e.g., 5 minutes, 10 minutes). The entropy value of the pairing code is not less than a bit threshold (e.g., 10 bits, 20 bits), and its validity period is a preset duration (e.g., 5 minutes, 10 minutes) to balance security and user experience.

[0221] Path D Cloud / Third-Party Inbound: Suitable for devices such as remote PCs or cloud devices that cannot communicate with trusted devices within the ring via near-field communication.

[0222] The new end-side device (such as a remote PC or cloud server) initiates a loop entry request to the device connection control device via the Internet. The loop entry request carries the device identifier, device public key, and anonymous user token obtained by the new end-side device through the VOPRF protocol.

[0223] The device connection control device forwards the ring entry request to the HCC TEE. After the HCC TEE verifies the validity of the anonymous user token of the new end device, it sends a biometric authentication secondary confirmation request to the trusted device within the ring through the device connection control device. Upon receiving the secondary confirmation request, the trusted device within the ring can display a prompt to the user asking whether to allow the remote device to join the trusted ring. After receiving the user's confirmation, it performs biometric authentication.

[0224] In one specific implementation, after successful authentication, the trusted device within the ring generates a certificate signature and returns it to the HCC TEE. After the HCC TEE verifies the certificate signature, it sets the new device's ring entry role to "Controlled Observation Period"; sets the observation period duration, for example, 48 hours or 72 hours; sets the maximum number of suspicious behaviors, for example, 3 or 5 times; and defines suspicious behaviors. For example, suspicious behaviors may include: the number of requests per unit time exceeding a frequency threshold, such as 80 times / minute or 100 times / minute; requesting sensitive data (e.g., identity information of other devices within the ring); a sudden change in the country or region of the IP address of the connection location, etc.

[0225] The HCC TEE returns an entry authorization to the trusted device within the ring. Upon receiving the entry authorization, the trusted device generates a key envelope using the new endpoint's public key and entrusts it to the IDS. The device connection control device issues a restricted device token to the new endpoint (e.g., with a shortened validity period of 5 or 7 days and limited access permissions). The new endpoint retrieves and decrypts the key envelope from the IDS, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3. The entry into the ring is complete, and the new endpoint's role is under Controlled observation.

[0226] During the observation period, HCC TEE performs behavioral analysis on every service request from the new endpoint device. When a suspicious behavior is detected, HCC TEE increments the suspicious behavior count of the new endpoint device and pushes an alarm notification to trusted devices within the ring. When the suspicious behavior count reaches 3 times, HCC TEE performs automatic expulsion.

[0227] For example, HCC TEE's automatic eviction process may include revoking the device token of the new end-side device; deleting the binding between the anonymous user identifier tag of the new end-side device and the trust ring identifier; notifying IDS to delete the key envelope hosted by the new end-side device; sending an automatic eviction notification to trusted devices within the ring, explaining the reason for the eviction; and adding the device identifier of the new end-side device to a blacklist for a observation period, during which it cannot apply to rejoin the ring for a preset period of time (e.g., 30 days, 60 days).

[0228] If the new device does not trigger any suspicious behavior during the observation period, HCC TEE will automatically upgrade the new device's role from Controlled Observation Period to Duplex (Two-way Trusted) and issue a complete device token to the new device.

[0229] Optionally, the observation period duration and the maximum number of suspicious behaviors are specified by trusted devices within the ring during the guarantee process, or uniformly set by the system administrator through policy configuration.

[0230] Optionally, all service requests made by the new end device during the Controlled observation period must be verified by the proxy signature of the trusted device within the ring, or by the HCC TEE verifying that the IP address of the request source of the new end device and the IP address of the trusted device within the ring belong to the same trusted subnet.

[0231] Path E Trusted Certificate Loop Ingress: Applicable to trusted devices holding vendor certificates.

[0232] New edge devices come pre-installed with a device authentication certificate (manufacturer-trusted certificate). The certificate is issued by the manufacturer's certificate authority and contains the device identifier and public key of the new edge device, as well as the private key signature of the manufacturer's certificate authority.

[0233] When a new device joins the ring, it does not need to obtain an anonymous user token via the VOPRF protocol. Instead, it submits its device authentication certificate to the HCC TEE. The HCC TEE verifies the certificate chain of the device authentication certificate. For example, this includes verifying that the certificate was issued by the vendor's certificate authority, that the certificate is valid, and that the certificate has not been revoked. After successful verification, the HCC TEE generates or downgrades a restricted anonymous user token based on the device information in the certificate.

[0234] The new edge device also completes the guarantee through user confirmation from trusted devices within the ring. The trusted device within the ring displays a confirmation interface to the user, who then performs biometric authentication. Once the authentication is successful, a certificate signature is generated.

[0235] After the HCC TEE verification device certification certificate and proof signature are both approved, the new end-side device's loop entry role will be set to "Controlled Fixed". That is, after the new end-side device enters the loop, its role will be fixed at the Controlled level and cannot be upgraded to Duplex.

[0236] The subsequent key envelope distribution process is the same as in Path A. The new end device obtains anon_id, K1, and K3, but its role is fixed as Controlled, and its permissions are restricted by the Controlled-level access control policy.

[0237] Optionally, the ring entry method supported by the device authentication certificate is optional key distribution. HCC TEE can decide whether to allow the new end device to obtain the complete K1 / K3 / anon_id, or only obtain a limited version (such as obtaining only K1 but with restricted permissions) based on the security level of the device authentication certificate.

[0238] Optionally, Path E can be used in conjunction with other paths. For example, even if the new end device has a device certification certificate, the user can still choose to join the loop by scanning a code or pairing code. In this case, the device certification certificate can serve as an auxiliary authentication factor to enhance the credibility of the guarantee.

[0239] Path F Remote Accountless Registration to Ring: Ring is suitable for Linux servers, IoT devices, or screenless devices that cannot independently complete user login and VOPRF credential acquisition.

[0240] New edge devices (such as smart bulbs, sensors, and Linux servers) have no display screen or input device, cannot perform user login operations, and cannot obtain anonymous user tokens through the VOPRF protocol on their own.

[0241] Once a trusted device within the ring (such as a mobile phone) discovers a new end-device via Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast or a same-network segment discovery mechanism, the user confirms "Register new end-device on behalf of the user" on their mobile phone. The trusted device within the ring then requests a restricted anonymous user token from UserAuth and IDS on behalf of the new end-device.

[0242] For example, the validity period of a restricted anonymous user token is shorter than that of a normal anonymous user token. For instance, a normal anonymous user token has a validity period of 60 / 90 / 120 days, while a restricted anonymous user token may have a validity period of 2 / 7 / 14 days. The restricted anonymous user token carries a specific field (such as the `scope=controlled` field) that identifies the token as being used only for Controlled-level devices. Furthermore, the restricted anonymous user token is bound to the device identifier of a trusted device within the ring; that is, the restricted anonymous user token carries a bound device identifier, which is set to the device identifier of a trusted device within the ring.

[0243] When generating restricted anonymous user tokens, IDS uses a dedicated restricted token key for signing and signs the bound device identification field and specific fields together to prevent tampering.

[0244] After obtaining a restricted anonymous user token, the trusted device within the ring performs a proxy registration guarantee. The trusted device generates a proof signature containing the flag indicating remote, accountless proxy registration into the ring (is_proxy_registration=true). The trusted device then sends the proof signature, the restricted anonymous user token, and the new endpoint's public key to the device connection control device.

[0245] The device connection control device forwards the above information to the HCC TEE. After detecting the is_proxy_registration flag, the HCC TEE does not require the new end-side device to provide independent anonymous user token verification; the bound device identifier in the verified restricted anonymous user token is consistent with the device identifier of the trusted device in the ring; the binding relationship records that the end-side device is a Controlled level device (is_controlled=true) and the bound device identifier is the device identifier of the trusted device in the ring (guardian_device_id=device_id of the trusted device in the ring); the entry role is set to "Controlled observation period".

[0246] The HCC TEE returns an entry authorization to the trusted device within the ring. Upon receiving the entry authorization, the trusted device generates a key envelope using the new device's public key and entrusts it to the IDS. The device connection control device issues a restricted device token to the new device. The new device retrieves and decapsulates the key envelope from the IDS, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3. The entry into the ring is complete, but the device's role remains under Controlled observation.

[0247] During the Controlled observation period, the new endpoint device's permissions are restricted. The new endpoint device cannot access sensitive services (including user contacts, location information, and payment interfaces), cannot actively invite other devices to join the ring, and cannot read the identity information of other devices within the ring. Once the user trusts the new endpoint device, a role upgrade process is initiated through a trusted device within the ring. The role upgrade process includes the trusted device within the ring re-performing FIDO2 authentication to confirm user authorization; the new endpoint device generating a new device key pair locally and calculating the hash value of its public key as the credential for the upgrade request, proving it has not been tampered with. The trusted device within the ring sends an upgrade request to the HCC TEE, carrying the new endpoint device's device identifier and the hash value of its public key. After the HCC TEE verifies the upgrade request, it updates the new endpoint device's role from Controlled to Duplex (two-way trusted). The HCC TEE instructs the device connection control device to issue a complete, unrestricted device token to the new endpoint device. The new endpoint device uses its new device private key to renegotiate or update its session key with the HCC TEE.

[0248] Optionally, each service request sent by the new end-side device during the Controlled observation period must be accompanied by a proxy signature from the trusted device within the ring. Before executing service processing, the HCC TEE verifies the validity of the proxy signature, and only processes the service request after the proxy signature verification is successful.

[0249] Optionally, during the role upgrade process, after upgrading the new end-side device to the Duplex role, the HCC TEE also sends a notification to the IDS to update the restricted anonymous user token to a fully-authorized anonymous user token.

[0250] In this embodiment, six ring entry paths cover most practical application scenarios, including near-field devices (scanning, automatic discovery), remote devices (pairing code, cloud-based ring entry), vendor-trusted devices (certificate-based ring entry), and screenless devices (registration-based ring entry), meeting the ring entry requirements of different device types and usage environments. Different paths employ differentiated security measures. Near-field scanning combined with biometric authentication provides high-strength security; automatic discovery limits access to the same network segment or Bluetooth Low Energy distance, striking a balance between convenience and security; pairing codes provide moderate security in remote scenarios without near-field communication; cloud-based ring entry provides high security through biometric authentication secondary confirmation and an observation period; certificate-based ring entry provides basic security through hardware certificate endorsement; and registration-based ring entry provides limited but upgradable security through restricted tokens and trusted device binding.

[0251] All inbound paths employ a unified ECIES key envelope distribution mechanism. Trusted devices within the ring encapsulate K1 / K3 / anon_id using the new end-device's public key, which is then hosted by the IDS. The new end-device retrieves the key from the IDS and decapsulates it in its local TEE / SE. Different inbound paths only affect user authentication and authorization methods, without impacting the secure key distribution channel. This ensures end-to-end security of key distribution while maintaining system architecture consistency and maintainability.

[0252] See Figure 6 And a table of responsibilities for each component in the trusted device access and anonymous communication system (Table 2 below). Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating an anonymous ID binding, zero-knowledge boundary, and token verification pipeline provided in this application embodiment. Based on the foregoing embodiments, this embodiment further details the generation and binding of anonymous user identifier tags, the information visibility boundaries of each component in the complete process, the complete pipeline for anonymous token verification and binding tag verification during the business request phase, and the derivation and lifecycle management of session keys.

[0253] Table 2

[0254] like Figure 6 As shown in Table 2, the anonymous ID binding and token verification pipeline involves the end-side device, the account authentication device UserAuth, the anonymous credential issuance device IDS, the device connection control device Gateway, and the trusted execution device HCC TEE. Each component has strict boundaries in terms of information visibility and security responsibilities, and no single component can obtain complete information sufficient to reconstruct the user's identity or business content.

[0255] The endpoint devices (including the first endpoint device) generate an anonymous user identifier (anon_id) in the local trusted environment. The endpoint devices calculate the hash value of the anonymous user identifier to obtain the anonymous user identifier label. The endpoint devices also generate a first encryption key and use the first encryption key to encrypt the anonymous user identifier, generating a first ciphertext. The endpoint devices host the first ciphertext to the Anonymous Credential Issuing Device (IDS), along with metadata about the trust ring.

[0256] During this process, the information visibility boundaries of each component are as follows: The anonymous credential issuing device receives and stores the metadata of the first ciphertext and the trust ring, but it does not hold the plaintext of the first encryption key required to decrypt the first ciphertext, and therefore cannot know the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier. The trusted execution device (HCC TEE) does not receive, write to, or decrypt the first ciphertext. The device connection control device does not participate in this process at all. Therefore, the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier exists only in the local trusted environment of the end device. Neither the anonymous credential issuing device nor the trusted execution device can obtain the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier. The trusted execution device can index and verify the anonymous user identifier through subsequently received anonymous user identifier tags without needing to access the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier.

[0257] During the loop establishment phase at the first-side device, the first-side device sends a registration request to the device connection control device. This registration request carries an anonymous user token obtained by the first-side device via the VOPRF protocol, the first-side device's device public key, and a bootstrap ciphertext. The anonymous user token contains an anonymous user identifier tag. The bootstrap ciphertext, containing the anonymous user identifier tag, is encrypted using a pre-negotiated temporary key between the first-side device and the trusted execution device.

[0258] During this phase and all subsequent phases, the account authentication device is only responsible for verifying the validity of the native account access token and transparently forwarding the blinded token to the anonymous credential issuance device. The account authentication device does not deblind the blinded token and does not access the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, or the plaintext business data. During this phase, the anonymous credential issuance device only performs a VOPRF evaluation on the blinded token and returns the evaluation result, as well as the encrypted data submitted by the hosting side. It does not access the real user identity, the plaintext anonymous user identifier, the first root key, the first encryption key, or the session key.

[0259] Upon receiving a registration request, the device connection control device registers the device public key of the first-side device, sets the mapping between the device identifier and the trust ring identifier of the first-side device to a pending confirmation state, and forwards the registration request to the trusted execution device. During this process, the device connection control device can only see the device token, device signature, connection identifier, and the mapping relationship between the device identifier and the trust ring identifier; it cannot see the real user identity, the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier, the plaintext semantics of the anonymous user token, the first root key, the first encryption key, or the session key.

[0260] Upon receiving a registration request, the trusted execution device verifies the validity of the anonymous user token. If verification is successful, the trusted execution device decrypts the anonymous user identifier tag from the bootstrap ciphertext. The trusted execution device then calculates the binding tag based on the anonymous user identifier tag (anon_id_tag), the trust ring identifier (ring_id), the device identifier (device_id), and the device signing public key (device_sign_pk).

[0261] In this embodiment, the binding tag can be represented as: anon_binding_tag=H(anon_id_tag,ring_id,device_id,device_sign_pk); The binding tag uses a cryptographic hash operation to bind four elements—anon_id_tag, ring_id, device_id, and device_sign_pk—to a single, unforgeable tag value. Changing any one of these four elements will result in a change to the value of the binding tag.

[0262] The trusted execution device stores the mapping between binding tags and anonymous user identifier tags, trust ring identifiers, and device identifiers, and associates the binding tags with the first sealed key. After sealing the first key, the trusted execution device maintains the mapping between anonymous user identifier tags, the sealed first key, and the trust ring state. The trusted execution device does not store the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier, nor does it store the plaintext of the first encryption key. The trusted execution device only uses the anonymous user identifier tag to index and verify user identity. The anonymous user identifier tag is a hash value of the anonymous user identifier, and the anonymous user identifier cannot be derived from the anonymous user identifier tag. Therefore, even if the trusted execution device is compromised, the attacker can only obtain the anonymous user identifier tag and not the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier; the plaintext of the anonymous user identifier always remains in the local trusted environment of the edge device.

[0263] The trusted execution device returns a loop establishment success response to the device connection control device. The device connection control device assigns a connection identifier to the first-side device and issues a device token. At this point, the loop establishment of the first-side device is complete, and the first-side device entrusts the ECIES key envelope to the IDS.

[0264] After the new endpoint device obtains its anonymous user token through the account authentication device and the anonymous credential issuance device, the trusted device within the ring performs the guarantee. The trusted device within the ring performs biometric authentication, generates a proof signature, and sends the proof signature, the new endpoint device's anonymous user token, and the new endpoint device's device public key to the device connection control device.

[0265] After verifying the validity of the device token of the trusted device within the ring, the device connection control device forwards the aforementioned information to the trusted execution device. During this process, the device connection control device only verifies the validity of the device token and device signature, and verifies whether the mapping between the connection identifier and the device identifier is consistent; it does not decrypt business data or parse the plaintext semantics of anonymous user tokens.

[0266] After the trusted execution device verifies the signature and the anonymous user token of the new endpoint device, it uses the same binding tag calculation formula as the first endpoint device to establish a binding relationship between the device identifier of the new endpoint device and the anonymous user identifier tag and the trust ring identifier, and associates this binding relationship with the first root key stored in a sealed container. The new endpoint device obtains the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key by retrieving and unsealing the key envelope from the anonymous credential issuing device, thus completing the ring entry.

[0267] During the service request phase, the endpoint device sends a service request to the device connection control device. The service request carries a device token, device signature, timestamp, random number, connection identifier, request identifier, session random number, encrypted service data, and the endpoint device's anonymous user token. The anonymous user token contains an anonymous user identifier tag and a request identifier.

[0268] After successful verification by the device connection control device, the service request is forwarded to the trusted execution device. The trusted execution device obtains the anonymous user token from the service request and verifies its validity.

[0269] After the anonymous user token is verified, the trusted execution device decodes the anonymous user identifier tag from the token. Based on the locally stored binding relationships, the trusted execution device queries the corresponding binding tag and trust ring identifier using the anonymous user identifier tag as an index. If the anonymous user identifier tag does not exist in the local binding relationships, the trusted execution device rejects the service request.

[0270] The trusted execution device obtains the connection identifier and device identifier from the business request, combines them with the anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the locally stored device signature public key, and recalculates the binding tag: anon_binding_tag=H(anon_id_tag,ring_id,device_id,device_sign_pk); The trusted execution device performs a constant-time comparison between the recalculated binding tag and the locally stored binding tag. Constant-time comparison means that the execution time of the comparison operation does not depend on the value of the compared data, thus preventing side-channel attacks. Even if the differences in the data are located in different positions in the two comparisons, the number of CPU cycles consumed by the comparison operation is the same.

[0271] If the comparison results are inconsistent, the trusted execution device rejects the service request; if the comparison results are consistent, the trusted execution device confirms the legitimate device and legitimate user bound to the service request and continues to perform subsequent processing.

[0272] An anonymous user token only proves that the holder has obtained a credential issued by the anonymous credential issuing device, but the credential itself does not contain binding information to a specific device or a specific trust ring. A legitimate user may log in on device A and obtain an anonymous user token, but this user may use the same anonymous user token to initiate a business request on device B. In this case, the anonymous user token itself is valid (correct signature, not expired), but the anonymous user token has no binding relationship with device B. Therefore, the trusted execution device can identify that the anonymous user token used in the request does not match the current device through binding tag verification, thereby rejecting the request and preventing credential abuse across devices. Similarly, if an attacker replays the intercepted anonymous user token in another trust ring, the binding tag verification will also fail because the trust ring identifier is different. If an attacker replays the intercepted anonymous user token on the same device but the request content is tampered with, the tampered request will also fail the binding tag verification because of the device signature public key verification binding.

[0273] During the verification process, the trusted execution device can see the verification materials of the anonymous user token, the anonymous user identification tag, the first key in the sealed state, the derived session key, and the decrypted business plaintext, but cannot see the private key of the end device, the anonymous user identification plaintext, the first encryption key plaintext, or any data protected by the first encryption key.

[0274] After the binding tag verification is successful, the trusted execution device derives the session key K_session based on the first root key K1, the connection identifier connect_id, the request identifier request_id, and the session random number session_nonce. K_session=HKDF(K1,connect_id‖request_id,session_nonce); The trusted execution device uses the session key to decrypt the encrypted business data and obtain the business plaintext.

[0275] The trusted execution device sends the business message in plaintext to the business service AI Agent for processing. After receiving the response in plaintext, it encrypts the response using the session key and returns it to the end device.

[0276] The visible and invisible information of each component in the system can be obtained as shown in Table 2 above.

[0277] In this embodiment, the account authentication device only sees the native account access token and the obfuscated token; the IDS only sees the obfuscated token and the encrypted text; the device connection control device only sees the device token and the mapping relationship; and the HCC TEE only sees the anonymous user identifier tag and the sealed K1. If any component is compromised, the user's identity or business content cannot be recovered independently, achieving defense in depth. Specifically, if the account authentication device is compromised, only the native account access token can be obtained, and the anonymous identity cannot be associated; if the IDS is compromised, only the obfuscated token and the encrypted text can be obtained, and decryption is impossible; if the device connection control device is compromised, only device-level information can be obtained, and the user's identity or business plaintext cannot be known; if the HCC TEE is compromised, the business plaintext can be obtained, but the anonymous user identifier and K3 are still protected. After the anonymous user token is verified, the binding tag still needs to be verified to ensure that the anonymous user token is not only valid itself, but also bound to the currently requested device and trust ring. The binding tag verification specifically protects against three attack scenarios: attackers replaying intercepted anonymous user tokens on other devices (device identifier mismatch), attackers replaying intercepted anonymous user tokens in other trust rings (trust ring identifier mismatch), and attackers replaying the request content on the same device after tampering with it (device signature public key verification fails). This comprehensively prevents the cross-device, cross-ring, and tampering / abuse of credentials. The binding tag binds four elements—anonymous user identifier, trust ring identifier, device identifier, and device signature public key—using cryptographic hash operations. Changing any of these elements will cause the binding tag value to change, ensuring the integrity and immutability of the binding relationship.

[0278] The comparison of bound tags employs a constant-time comparison algorithm. The execution time of the comparison operation does not depend on the value of the compared data, effectively resisting timing side-channel attacks and preventing attackers from guessing the bound tag value by measuring the comparison time difference. Each business request uses an independent session key, which is only used to decrypt the current request and encrypt the corresponding response. After processing, it is immediately cleared from memory and not written to non-volatile storage media, nor is it output to the trusted execution device in any form. Even if a session key is leaked, it only affects that single request and does not affect other requests, achieving request-level key isolation and strict forward security.

[0279] Furthermore, the device connection control device can complete device authentication and anti-replay checks by verifying device tokens, device signatures, timestamps, and random numbers without decrypting business data. This effectively filters illegal requests, significantly reduces the processing burden on trusted execution devices, and avoids the risk of business data being exposed at the gateway layer.

[0280] See Figure 7 , Figure 7This embodiment provides a complete flowchart of a trusted device loop entry and anonymous communication method according to an embodiment of this application. From the perspective of the overall system, this embodiment provides a complete interactive diagram of the entire process from anonymous user credential acquisition, loop establishment by the first-end device, loop entry by the new-end device, to end-to-end encrypted service communication.

[0281] like Figure 7 As shown, this method involves the interaction between end-side devices (including the first end-side device and the new end-side device), the account authentication device UserAuth, the anonymous credential issuance device IDS, the device connection control device Gateway, and the trusted execution device HCC TEE. The method includes: S701, the first-side device constructs a token input and obtains a blind token.

[0282] The first-side device performs VOPRF blinding processing on the token input containing the anonymous user identifier tag to obtain a blinded token.

[0283] S702, the first-side device sends the blind token and the native account access token to the account authentication device.

[0284] S703, the account authentication device verifies the validity of the native account access token.

[0285] After successful verification, the account authentication device will execute: S704, the account authentication device will transparently forward the blind token to the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0286] S705, the anonymous credential issuance device performs VOPRF evaluation on the blinded token and generates evaluation results.

[0287] S706, the anonymous credential issuance device returns the evaluation results to the head-end device.

[0288] S707, after the verification and evaluation results of the first-side equipment, a deblinding operation is performed to obtain the anonymous user token.

[0289] S708, the front-end device generates local anonymized material.

[0290] After obtaining the anonymous user token, the first-side device generates an anonymous user identifier anon_id, a first root key K1, and a first encryption key K3 in the local trusted environment. The first-side device calculates the hash value of the anonymous user identifier to obtain the anonymous user identifier tag.

[0291] The steps in S701-S708 above can be referenced. Figure 2 The implementation methods described in the embodiments will not be elaborated here.

[0292] S709, the first-side device initiates a registration request to the device connection control device.

[0293] The registration request includes an anonymous user token, the device public key of the client-side device, and a boot ciphertext.

[0294] S710, the device connection control device registers the device public key of the first-end device and sets the mapping relationship between the device identifier device_id and the trust ring identifier ring_id of the first-end device to a pending confirmation state.

[0295] S711, the device connection control device forwards the registration request to the trusted execution device.

[0296] S712, the trusted execution device verifies the validity of anonymous user tokens and establishes a binding relationship.

[0297] Upon receiving a registration request, the trusted execution device verifies the validity of the anonymous user token and decrypts the bootstrap ciphertext to obtain the anon_id_tag. The trusted execution device calculates the binding tag, establishes and stores the binding relationship between anon_id_tag, ring_id, and device_id, and associates this binding relationship with the sealed storage K1.

[0298] S713, the trusted execution device returns a loop establishment success response to the device connection control device.

[0299] S714, the device connection control device issues device tokens and assigns connection identifiers.

[0300] After receiving the loop establishment success response, the device connection control device assigns a connection identifier to the first-end device and issues a device token, then sends the connection identifier and device token to the first-end device.

[0301] S715, the trusted execution device returns a loop establishment success response and a short-term IDS managed authorization response to the head-end device.

[0302] S716, the front-end device entrusts the anonymous user identifier ciphertext to the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0303] The first-end device uses the first encryption key K3 to encrypt the anonymous user identifier anon_id, generating the first ciphertext E_K3(anon_id), and then entrusts the first ciphertext and the metadata of the trust ring (collectively referred to as the anonymous user identifier ciphertext) to the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0304] The steps in S709-S716 above can be referenced. Figure 3 The implementation methods described in the embodiments will not be elaborated here.

[0305] S717, new end-side devices obtain anonymous user tokens.

[0306] The new client-side device repeats the steps of S701-S708 to obtain the anonymous user token of the new client-side device through the account authentication device and the anonymous credential issuance device.

[0307] S718, the new end-side device initiates an entry request.

[0308] The new end device initiates an entry request to the trusted device within the ring via near-field communication. The entry request carries the device identifier, device public key, and anonymous user token of the new end device.

[0309] S719, In-ring Trusted Device Execution Certificate.

[0310] The trusted device within the ring can be either the initial device or another Duplex-level device already connected to the ring. In this embodiment, the trusted device within the ring is taken as the initial device. After receiving the ring entry request, the trusted device within the ring performs biometric authentication. Upon successful authentication, it uses its device signing private key to generate a proof signature.

[0311] S720: The trusted device within the ring sends the proof signature, the anonymous user token of the new endpoint, and the device public key of the new endpoint to the device connection control device.

[0312] S721, Device connection control device verification and forwarding.

[0313] After verifying the validity of the device token of the trusted device within the ring, the device connection control device forwards the proof signature, the anonymous user token of the new end device, and the device public key of the new end device to the trusted execution device.

[0314] S722, Trusted Execution Device Verification Loop Inbound Request.

[0315] The trusted execution device verifies the validity of the signature, the validity of the anonymous user token of the new endpoint device, and the device exclusivity of the new endpoint device.

[0316] After successful verification, the trusted execution device executes: S723, the trusted execution device returns a successful entry response to the trusted device within the ring and an authorization confirmation to the device connection control device.

[0317] S724, the trusted execution device returns a short-lived IDS managed authorization response to the trusted device within the ring.

[0318] For example, a short-term IDS hosting license can be valid for 5 minutes.

[0319] S725, trusted devices within the ring generate and host key envelopes.

[0320] After receiving the incoming pass response and short-term IDS escrow authorization, the trusted device within the ring uses the device public key of the new end device to encapsulate the anonymous user identifier anon_id, the first root key K1, and the first encryption key K3 using ECIES to generate a key envelope, and then escrows the key envelope to the anonymous credential issuing device.

[0321] S726, Device connection control device issues device tokens.

[0322] The device connection control device assigns a connection identifier to the new end-side device and issues a device token, then sends the device token to the new end-side device.

[0323] S727, the new end-side device acquires and unseales the key envelope.

[0324] The new endpoint device obtains a key envelope from the anonymous credential issuing device and decrypts the key envelope using its device private key in a local trusted environment, obtaining anon_id, K1, and K3. The new endpoint device calculates the hash value of the decrypted anon_id and compares it with its own anon_id_tag. If the comparison matches, the device confirms successful ring insertion.

[0325] The steps for S717-S727 above can be referenced. Figure 4 The implementation methods described in the embodiments will not be elaborated here.

[0326] S728, the new end-side device initiates a service request.

[0327] The new end-side device uses K1 to derive a session key K_session, uses K_session to encrypt service data, and sends service requests to the device connection control device.

[0328] S729, after verifying the validity of the device token and device signature of the new end device, the device connection control device forwards the service request to the trusted execution device.

[0329] S730, a trusted execution device, executes service responses.

[0330] Specifically, this includes: the trusted execution device verifying the validity of the anonymous user token carried in the business request, and using the session key to decrypt the encrypted business data to obtain the business plaintext. The trusted execution device then sends the business plaintext to the business service AI Agent and receives the response plaintext returned by the business service based on the business plaintext.

[0331] S731, the trusted execution device uses a session key to encrypt the plaintext response and returns the encrypted response data to the new end device via the device connection control device.

[0332] S732, new end-side device decrypts to obtain the response plaintext.

[0333] The new end device uses the session key to decrypt the encrypted response data and obtain the plaintext response.

[0334] S733 allows new end-side devices to share a session key with the first end-side device for encrypted communication.

[0335] The steps for S728-S733 above can be referenced. Figure 5 The implementation methods described in the embodiments will not be elaborated here.

[0336] In this embodiment, the anonymous user credential acquisition phase establishes the user's anonymous identity; the first-end device ring-building phase establishes the trust ring root key and binding relationship; the new-end device ring entry phase achieves secure transmission of key materials through a guarantee mechanism and key envelope distribution; and the business communication phase implements request-level forward-secure end-to-end encryption. Throughout the complete process, the account authentication device only verifies the AT and forwards it transparently, the anonymous credential issuance device only processes the blinded token and escrowed ciphertext, and the device connection control device only processes device-level authentication and request forwarding. None of these three can obtain the anonymous user identifier plaintext, root key plaintext, or business plaintext. Each service node has a clear division of labor and separation of responsibilities; if any node is compromised, the complete user identity or business content cannot be obtained. If the account authentication device is compromised, only the AT can be obtained; if the anonymous credential issuance device is compromised, only the blinded token and ciphertext can be obtained; if the device connection control device is compromised, only the device token can be obtained; and if the trusted execution device is compromised, the business plaintext can be obtained, but anon_id and K3 remain protected. This multi-party collaborative security mechanism further enhances the non-destructive nature of trusted device access and the anonymous communication system, as well as data security.

[0337] The trusted device loop entry method provided in this application can be widely applied to various scenarios requiring secure collaboration and privacy protection among multiple devices. The following description uses several typical application scenarios to illustrate the trusted device loop entry method provided in this application. These scenarios are merely examples of some applications of the technical solution in this application and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application.

[0338] Scenario 1: Corporate office scenario, combined with Figure 8 The provided diagram illustrates a typical corporate office environment.

[0339] In a zero-trust office environment, employees typically need to use various terminal devices such as mobile phones, laptops, desktops, and tablets to access internal enterprise resources (corporate intranet) and cloud applications (cloud office platform). Traditional office security solutions usually rely on VPNs and password authentication, which pose security risks such as account leakage, device impersonation, and internal data leakage.

[0340] Using the trusted device ring entry method provided in this application, each office device in an enterprise first obtains an anonymous_user_token through an anonymous user credential acquisition method before connecting to the enterprise intranet or cloud office platform. Then, it is secured by a trusted device already in the ring (such as an employee's mobile phone) and enters the ring via QR code scanning or automatic discovery. The trusted devices in the enterprise trust ring share key materials. After joining the enterprise trust ring, business communications between office devices (such as email services, document services, and business systems) are end-to-end encrypted. If any device is physically lost or maliciously controlled, attackers cannot use it to secure the entry of other malicious devices into the ring because they cannot pass the device's biometric authentication.

[0341] Regarding anonymous auditing, because the anonymous_user_token is decoupled from the real user identity in the solution, auditors cannot infer the user identity from the device identifier in the audit logs. Simultaneously, the tag binding mechanism binds the device identifier to the trust ring, ensuring that audit logs can trace device behavior but cannot be associated with specific users. End-to-end encryption ensures that business data (such as email content and office documents) is invisible to intermediate nodes during transmission, preventing internal personnel or external attackers from stealing sensitive information.

[0342] In remote work scenarios, when employees need to temporarily use hotel computers while traveling for business, they can enter the loop via a pairing code or via cloud-based loop entry with secondary confirmation via mobile phone. After entering the loop, the device is initially in a controlled observation period with limited permissions. After the observation period ends and there is no abnormal behavior, it is upgraded to a fully trusted device, effectively preventing security risks introduced by public devices.

[0343] Scenario 2: Internet of Things (IoT) / Smart Home Trust Loop Scenario, combined with Figure 9 A schematic diagram of a smart home scenario is provided.

[0344] In smart home scenarios, households typically have a variety of IoT devices, such as smart light bulbs, smart door locks, temperature and humidity sensors, smart cameras, central control screens, door and window sensors, and smart speakers. These devices are diverse in type. Some devices (such as door locks and central control screens) have displays and input capabilities, but many devices (such as smart light bulbs and temperature and humidity sensors) lack displays and input devices, making it impossible to independently complete user login and credential acquisition.

[0345] Using the trusted device loop entry method provided in this application, a family trust loop is established with the user's mobile phone as the first-end device. For smart home devices with displays and input capabilities (such as central control screens and smart speakers), they are added to the family trust loop via QR code scanning or automatic discovery. For IoT devices without displays or input capabilities (such as smart light bulbs, temperature and humidity sensors, and door and window sensors), they are added to the loop via remote, accountless registration. After the device is added to the loop, its initial role is a controlled observation period, with only basic control permissions (such as turning lights on and off and reporting temperature), and it cannot access sensitive user information (such as family members' schedules and contacts).

[0346] When a user purchases a new smart camera and needs it to have higher permissions (such as video storage and motion detection), the user can initiate a role upgrade process through a mobile application. After performing biometric authentication, the camera's role will be upgraded from Controlled to Duplex, and the camera will then gain full access permissions.

[0347] In multi-user family scenarios, each family member's mobile phone establishes its own trust ring, or a unified family trust ring is established through the family administrator's mobile phone. When a family member's device enters the ring, it must be guaranteed by the administrator's device to achieve secure sharing of family devices and hierarchical management of permissions.

[0348] Scenario 3: Cross-device collaboration between in-vehicle systems, mobile phones, wearable devices, and personal computers, combined with... Figure 10 The diagram provided illustrates a smart mobility scenario.

[0349] In smart mobility scenarios, users typically own multiple devices such as mobile phones, in-vehicle infotainment systems, smartwatches / bands, and laptops. These devices need to work together seamlessly during the journey, such as transferring navigation information from the mobile phone to the in-vehicle infotainment system, synchronizing health data from the smartwatch to the mobile phone, and synchronizing the mobile phone's calendar to the personal computer.

[0350] Using the trusted device loop entry method provided in this application, when a user purchases a new car, the vehicle's infotainment system acts as a new end-side device, joining the user's existing mobile phone trust ring via a QR code scanning method. The user's mobile phone scans the QR code displayed on the infotainment system screen; after confirmation, the infotainment system obtains K1 / K3 / anon_id, and the loop entry is successful. Subsequently, when the user uses mobile phone navigation in the car, the navigation destination information is transmitted end-to-end in encrypted form to the infotainment system, which automatically initiates route planning; the user's schedule information is synchronized from the mobile phone to the infotainment system, which automatically reminds the user before departure.

[0351] When a user enters the vehicle wearing a smartwatch, the watch is automatically detected by the vehicle's infotainment system. The system then sends a confirmation request to the user's phone, and the watch joins the loop after the user confirms. Within this trust loop, trusted devices share key materials. After joining the loop, the watch's health data (heart rate, fatigue level) is transmitted end-to-end in encrypted form to the vehicle's infotainment system, which intelligently adjusts driving alert strategies based on the driver's fatigue level. If the watch itself lacks the ability to obtain VOPRF credentials, it can be registered through a proxy by the user's phone, which can then obtain a restricted token for the watch to join the loop. After joining the loop, the watch will only have limited permissions, such as reporting health data.

[0352] When users work remotely with their laptops, the laptops can be connected to the ring via cloud-based ring connection after secondary confirmation via the phone's FIDO2. Initially, the laptops are under a controlled observation period for a preset duration, such as 72 hours, after which they are upgraded to a duplex. Once connected, the laptop can perform end-to-end encrypted file transfers and message communications with the phone and vehicle's infotainment system.

[0353] In the aforementioned cross-device collaboration process, the anonymous user token mechanism ensures that communication between devices cannot be linked to the user's real identity by a third party, and the binding tag mechanism ensures that if any device is lost, the user can remove the device from the trust ring via their mobile phone. After removal, the device token of the device is revoked, and the K1 / K3 / anon_id held by it is destroyed locally on the device. The device can no longer access any resources within the ring, thus achieving secure control of cross-device identity synchronization.

[0354] In this embodiment, the three major scenarios of zero-trust office for enterprises, smart home IoT, and cross-device collaboration between vehicles and machines cover the main application areas of multi-device collaboration. The device types, communication distances, and security level requirements are different in each scenario. This solution can adapt to all the above scenarios through differentiated entry paths (scanning, automatic discovery, proxy registration, cloud entry, etc.) and role management (Controlled / Duplex). The scenario applicability of this method is more flexible.

[0355] The end-side device in this application embodiment can be an electronic device. Exemplarily, the electronic device can be a portable computer (such as a mobile phone), tablet computer, laptop computer, personal computer (PC), wearable electronic device (such as a smartwatch), augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) device, in-vehicle computer, etc. The following embodiments do not impose special limitations on the specific form of the electronic device.

[0356] Figure 11 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in this embodiment is provided. Figure 11The electronic device 100 shown may include a processor 110, an external memory interface 120, an internal memory 121, a universal serial bus (USB) interface 130, a charging management module 140, a power management module 141, a battery 142, an antenna 1, an antenna 2, a mobile communication module 150, a wireless communication module 160, an audio module 170, a sensor module 180, a camera 193, a display screen 194, etc.

[0357] It is understood that the structures illustrated in the embodiments of the present invention do not constitute a specific limitation on the electronic device 100. In other embodiments of this application, the electronic device 100 may include more or fewer components than illustrated, or combine some components, or split some components, or have different component arrangements. The illustrated components may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of software and hardware.

[0358] Processor 110 may include one or more processing units, such as: application processor (AP), modem processor, graphics processing unit (GPU), image signal processor (ISP), controller, memory, video codec, digital signal processor (DSP), baseband processor, and / or neural network processing unit (NPU), etc. Different processing units may be independent devices or integrated into one or more processors.

[0359] The controller can be the nerve center and command center of the electronic device 100. The controller can generate operation control signals according to the instruction opcode and timing signals to complete the control of fetching and executing instructions.

[0360] The processor 110 may also include a memory for storing instructions and data. In some embodiments, the memory in the processor 110 is a cache memory. This memory can store instructions or data that the processor 110 has just used or that are used repeatedly. If the processor 110 needs to use the instruction or data again, it can retrieve it directly from the memory. This avoids repeated accesses, reduces the waiting time of the processor 110, and thus improves the efficiency of the system.

[0361] In some embodiments, the processor 110 may include one or more interfaces. Interfaces may include an inter-integrated circuit (I2C) interface, an inter-integrated circuit sound (I2S) interface, a pulse code modulation (PCM) interface, a universal asynchronous receiver / transmitter (UART) interface, a mobile industry processor interface (MIPI), a general-purpose input / output (GPIO) interface, a subscriber identity module (SIM) interface, and / or a universal serial bus (USB) interface, etc.

[0362] It is understood that the interface connection relationships between the modules illustrated in the embodiments of the present invention are merely illustrative and do not constitute a structural limitation on the electronic device 100. In other embodiments of this application, the electronic device 100 may also employ different interface connection methods or combinations of multiple interface connection methods as described in the above embodiments.

[0363] The charging management module 140 receives charging input from a charger, which can be either a wireless or wired charger. The power management module 141 connects to the battery 142, the charging management module 140, and the processor 110. The power management module 141 receives input from the battery 142 and / or the charging management module 140 to power the processor 110, internal memory 121, external memory, display 194, camera 193, and wireless communication module 160, etc.

[0364] The wireless communication function of electronic device 100 can be realized through antenna 1, antenna 2, mobile communication module 150, wireless communication module 160, modem processor and baseband processor, etc.

[0365] Antenna 1 and antenna 2 are used to transmit and receive electromagnetic wave signals. Each antenna in electronic device 100 can be used to cover one or more communication frequency bands. Different antennas can also be multiplexed to improve antenna utilization. For example, antenna 1 can be multiplexed as a diversity antenna for a wireless local area network. In some other embodiments, the antennas can be used in conjunction with tuning switches.

[0366] The mobile communication module 150 can provide solutions for wireless communication, including 2G / 3G / 4G / 5G, applied to the electronic device 100. The mobile communication module 150 may include at least one filter, switch, power amplifier, low noise amplifier (LNA), etc. The mobile communication module 150 can receive electromagnetic waves via antenna 1, and perform filtering, amplification, and other processing on the received electromagnetic waves before transmitting them to a modem processor for demodulation. The mobile communication module 150 can also amplify the signal modulated by the modem processor and convert it into electromagnetic waves for radiation via antenna 1. In some embodiments, at least some functional modules of the mobile communication module 150 may be housed in the processor 110. In some embodiments, at least some functional modules of the mobile communication module 150 and at least some modules of the processor 110 may be housed in the same device.

[0367] The modem processor may include a modulator and a demodulator. The modulator modulates the low-frequency baseband signal to be transmitted into a mid-to-high frequency signal. The demodulator demodulates the received electromagnetic wave signal into a low-frequency baseband signal. The demodulator then transmits the demodulated low-frequency baseband signal to the baseband processor for processing. After processing by the baseband processor, the low-frequency baseband signal is transmitted to the application processor. The application processor outputs a sound signal through an audio device or displays an image or video through the display screen 194. In some embodiments, the modem processor may be a separate device. In other embodiments, the modem processor may be independent of the processor 110 and may be housed in the same device as the mobile communication module 150 or other functional modules.

[0368] The wireless communication module 160 can provide solutions for wireless communication applications on the electronic device 100, including wireless local area networks (WLAN) (such as wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks), Bluetooth (BT), global navigation satellite system (GNSS), frequency modulation (FM), near field communication (NFC), and infrared (IR). The wireless communication module 160 can be one or more devices integrating at least one communication processing module. The wireless communication module 160 receives electromagnetic waves via antenna 2, performs frequency modulation and filtering of the electromagnetic wave signals, and sends the processed signal to processor 110. The wireless communication module 160 can also receive signals to be transmitted from processor 110, perform frequency modulation and amplification, and convert them into electromagnetic waves for radiation via antenna 2.

[0369] In some embodiments, antenna 1 of electronic device 100 is coupled to mobile communication module 150, and antenna 2 is coupled to wireless communication module 160, enabling electronic device 100 to communicate with networks and other devices via wireless communication technology. The wireless communication technology may include Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), Time Division Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), Long Term Evolution (LTE), BT, GNSS, WLAN, NFC, FM, and / or IR technologies, etc. The GNSS may include the Global Positioning System (GPS), the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), and / or satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS).

[0370] Electronic device 100 implements display functions through a GPU, a display screen 194, and an application processor. The GPU is a microprocessor for image processing, connected to the display screen 194 and the application processor. The GPU is used to perform mathematical and geometric calculations and for graphics rendering. Processor 110 may include one or more GPUs, which execute program instructions to generate or modify display information.

[0371] Electronic device 100 can perform shooting functions through ISP, camera 193, video codec, GPU, display 194 and application processor.

[0372] The external storage interface 120 can be used to connect an external memory card, such as a Micro SD card, to expand the storage capacity of the electronic device 100. The external memory card communicates with the processor 110 through the external storage interface 120 to perform data storage functions. For example, music, video, and other files can be saved on the external memory card.

[0373] Internal memory 121 can be used to store computer executable program code, which includes instructions. Processor 110 executes various functional applications and data processing of electronic device 100 by running the instructions stored in internal memory 121.

[0374] Electronic device 100 can implement audio functions such as music playback and recording through audio module 170, speaker, receiver, microphone, headphone jack, and application processor.

[0375] The sensor module 180 may include pressure sensors, gyroscope sensors, barometric pressure sensors, magnetic sensors, accelerometers, distance sensors, proximity sensors, fingerprint sensors, temperature sensors, touch sensors, ambient light sensors, bone conduction sensors, etc.

[0376] Figure 12 A schematic diagram of the communication system involved in the above embodiments is shown. Figure 12 The communication system 1200 shown includes a first end-side device 1201, an account authentication device 1202, an anonymous credential issuance device 1203, a device connection control device 1204, a trusted execution device 1205, and a second end-side device 1206.

[0377] The first end-side device 1201 and the second end-side device 1206 can be as follows: Figure 11 The electronic device shown.

[0378] This application also provides a chip system (e.g., a system on a chip (SoC)). Figure 13As shown, the chip system includes at least one processor 1301 and at least one interface circuit 1302. The processor 1301 and the interface circuit 1302 are interconnected via lines. For example, the interface circuit 1302 can be used to receive signals from other devices (e.g., the memory of an electronic device). As another example, the interface circuit 1302 can be used to send signals to other devices (e.g., the processor 1301 or the camera of an electronic device). Exemplarily, the interface circuit 1302 can read instructions stored in the memory and send those instructions to the processor 1301. When the instructions are executed by the processor 1301, the electronic device can perform the steps in the above embodiments. Of course, the chip system may also include other discrete components, and this application embodiment does not specifically limit this.

[0379] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium including computer instructions that, when executed on the electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform various functions or steps performed by the electronic device 100 in the above method embodiment.

[0380] This application also provides a computer program product that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the various functions or steps performed by the electronic device 100 in the above method embodiments. For example, the computer may be the aforementioned electronic device 100.

[0381] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, only the division of the above functional modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0382] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another device, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0383] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. A component shown as a unit can be one or more physical units; that is, it can be located in one place or distributed in multiple different locations. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0384] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0385] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, essentially or in other words, the parts that contribute to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solutions, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a device (which may be a microcontroller, chip, etc.) or processor to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0386] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A trusted device loop insertion method, characterized in that, The method is applied to a system including endpoint devices, account authentication devices, anonymous credential issuance devices, device connection control devices, and trusted execution devices, wherein the endpoint devices include a first endpoint device and a second endpoint device; the method includes: When the first end-side device establishes a trust ring based on local anonymized material, the second end-side device obtains a first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuance device, and sends an entry request to the trusted execution device through the device connection control device; wherein, the local anonymized material includes an anonymous user identifier; the first anonymous user token includes a first anonymous user identifier tag; the first anonymous user identifier tag is obtained by the first end-side device based on the hash value of the anonymous user identifier; In response to the ring entry request, the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the proof device of the second end-side device; the proof device of the second end-side device includes the first end-side device in the trust ring, and the proof signature of the proof device is generated by the proof device based on the local device private key. After successful verification, the trusted execution device sends a loop entry authorization response to the first end-side device and the device connection control device; the loop entry authorization response indicates that the second end-side device is authorized to join the trust ring where the first end-side device is located based on the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: The first end-side device receives the ring entry authorization response, encrypts the local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second end-side device, and stores the encrypted local anonymized material in the anonymized credential issuing device; The device connection control device receives the loop entry authorization response and issues a first device token to the second end device. The second end device obtains the encrypted local anonymous material from the anonymous credential issuing device, and decrypts the encrypted local anonymous material based on the device public key of the second end device; The second end-side device determines a second anonymous user tag based on the anonymous user identifier in the local anonymous material; If the second anonymous user tag matches the first anonymous user tag, the second end device accesses the trust ring based on the first device token sent by the device connection control device.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The local anonymized material also includes a first root key, and the method further includes: The second end-side device generates a session key based on the first key in the local anonymization material; After the second end-side device connects to the trust ring, it performs encrypted communication with other end-side devices in the trust ring based on the session key.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The first end-side device establishes a trust loop based on local anonymized materials, including: The first end-side device generates the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key locally; The first end-side device obtains a second anonymous user token, which contains the first anonymous user identifier tag. The first end-side device sends a registration request to the device connection control device; the registration request carries the second anonymous user token and the device public key of the first end-side device. In response to the registration request, the device connection control device obtains the device identifier and trust ring identifier of the first end-side device, and sends the registration request, the device identifier, and the trust ring identifier to the trusted execution device; After the trusted execution device verifies the second anonymous user token, it establishes a binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device. The device connection control device sends a second device token and the connection identifier of the trust ring to the first end-side device; The first end-side device establishes the trust ring based on the connection identifier of the trust ring and the second device token.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The first end-side device obtains the second anonymous user token, including: The first end-side device generates the anonymous user identifier and uses the hash value of the anonymous user identifier as the first anonymous user tag; The first end-side device generates token input information based on the first anonymous user tag, and performs blinding processing on the token input information to obtain a blinded token; The first end-side device sends the blinding token and the account access token to the account authentication device; After the account authentication device verifies the blinding token, it forwards the blinding token to the anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinded token and generates a content verification result. The anonymous credential issuing device sends the content verification result to the first terminal device; The first end-side device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The blinding process includes verifiable unintentional pseudo-random function (VOPRF) blinding, and the content verification result is the VOPRF content verification result, which includes discrete logarithm equivalent proof. The first edge device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token, including: After the first edge device verifies that the discrete logarithm equivalence proof in the content verification result is passed, the first edge device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the second anonymous user token.

7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The second anonymous user token in the registration request is encrypted by the first root key, and the first end-side device and the trusted execution device share the first root key; The trusted execution device establishes a binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device, including: The trusted execution device decrypts the second anonymous user token based on the first root key to obtain the first anonymous user identifier tag of the first terminal device; The trusted execution device acquires a binding tag; the binding tag includes the hash value of the binding data obtained by binding the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, the device identifier, and the device public key of the first end-side device; The trusted execution device stores the correspondence between the binding tag and the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, After the trusted execution device establishes the binding relationship between the first anonymous user identifier tag, the trust ring identifier, and the device identifier of the first end-side device, the method further includes: The first end-side device encrypts the anonymous user identifier based on the first encryption key to obtain the encrypted anonymous user identifier; The first end-side device sends the encrypted anonymous user identifier and the metadata of the trust ring to the anonymous credential issuing device; The anonymous credential issuing device stores the encrypted anonymous user identifier and the metadata of the trust ring.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1-8, characterized in that, The second end-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device, including: The second end-side device obtains the first anonymous user identifier tag through a preset loop entry path; The second end-side device generates a token input based on the first anonymous user tag, and performs blinding processing on the token input to obtain a blinded token; The second end device sends the blinding token and the account access token to the account authentication device; After the account authentication device verifies the blind token of the second terminal device, it forwards the blind token to the anonymous credential issuing device. The anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinded token and generates a content verification result. The anonymous credential issuing device sends the content verification result to the second end-side device; The second end-side device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the first anonymous user token.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, Before the trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the proof device of the second end device in response to the loop entry request, the method further includes: The first end-side device responds to the loop entry operation triggered by the second end-side device through a preset loop entry path, and obtains the device public key of the second end-side device and the first anonymous user token; The first end-side device acquires the biometric identity information generated by the loop entry operation and performs biometric authentication. After successful authentication, the device private key of the first end-side device is used to generate the proof signature. The biometric identity information includes at least one of the fingerprint information, facial information, or iris information generated by the loop entry operation.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The ring entry request carries the first anonymous user token of the second end device and the device information of the second end device's authentication device; The step of sending an entry request to the trusted execution device via the device connection control device includes: In response to the ring entry request, the device connection control device verifies the proof signature of the second end device's proof device, the device token of the proof device, the connection identifier of the trust ring in which the proof device is located, and the ring state of the trust ring in which the proof device is located. After successful verification, the device connection control device forwards the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the proof device of the second end-side device to the trusted execution device.

12. The method according to claim 10 or 11, characterized in that, The preset entry method includes any one of the following: QR code entry, near-field discovery device entry, pairing code-based entry, third-party entry, authentication trusted device entry, or remote accountless registration entry. The preset entry path is related to the proof method of the proof device. The proof method of the proof device includes any one of the following: trusted device scanning and online fast identity authentication, trusted device near-field confirmation, pairing code and trusted device signature, trusted device and online fast identity authentication secondary confirmation, trusted certificate and user confirmation, or trusted device registration.

13. The method according to any one of claims 1-12, characterized in that, The trusted execution device verifies the first anonymous user token and the proof signature, including at least one of the following: Verify the validity of the proof signature; Alternatively, verify whether the first anonymous user token is within its validity period; Alternatively, verify that the anonymous user identifier tag in the first anonymous user token is consistent with the anonymous user identifier tag in the established binding relationship; Alternatively, verify that the device identifier of the second end device is not bound to other trust rings.

14. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The local anonymized material includes the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key; encrypting the local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second end device and storing the encrypted local anonymized material in the anonymized credential issuing device includes: The first end-side device uses the device public key of the second end-side device to encrypt and encapsulate the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key to generate a key envelope ECIES envelope. The first end-side device stores the key envelope into the anonymous credential issuance device.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The second end-side device obtains the encrypted local anonymized material from the anonymity credential issuing device, and decrypts the encrypted local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second end-side device, including: The second end device obtains the key envelope corresponding to the local anonymized material from the anonymized credential issuing device; The second end-side device decrypts the key envelope using its device public key to obtain the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key from the local anonymized material.

16. The method according to any one of claims 1-15, characterized in that, The first device token is used for device-level authentication between the second end device and the device connection control device, and the first anonymous user token is used by the second end device to prove the identity of an anonymous user to the trusted execution device; the first device token and the first anonymous user token are independent of each other.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that, The first device token of the second end device is issued by the device connection control device based on the device identifier and trust ring identifier of the second end device.

18. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The second end-side device performs encrypted communication with the first end-side device based on the session key, including: The second end-side device sends a service request to the device connection control device, the service request carrying the first device token and encrypted service data; the encrypted service data is encrypted using the session key; After the device connection control device verifies the first device token, it forwards the encrypted service request to the trusted execution device. The trusted execution device uses the first root key to derive the session key, decrypts the encrypted business data based on the session key, and sends the decrypted business data to the corresponding business service agent for business data processing; the business service agent includes the business service agent in the first terminal device. The trusted execution device receives the service response data returned by the service service agent, encrypts the service response data based on the session key, and sends the encrypted service response data to the second end device through the device connection control device.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that, The session key is obtained by a key derivation function based on a hash-based message authentication code, using the first root key, request identifier, connection identifier, and session random number.

20. The method according to any one of claims 1-19, characterized in that, The method is applied to enterprise office scenarios, where the first end-side device is an employee's personal device and the second end-side device is an employee's office terminal device. The second end-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device, including: The office terminal device performs blinding processing on the account token containing the anonymous user identifier tag to obtain a blinded token, and sends the blinded token to the account authentication device; after the account authentication device verifies the blinded token, it forwards the blinded token to the anonymous credential issuing device; the anonymous credential issuing device performs content verification on the blinded token, generates a content verification result, and returns the content verification result to the office terminal device; the office terminal device performs deblinding processing on the content verification result to obtain the first anonymous user token; The second end-side device sends a loop entry request to the trusted execution device through the device connection control device, including: The office terminal device sends an entry request to the trusted execution device via a QR code scanning method or an automatic discovery method through the device connection control device. The method further includes: The employee's personal device obtains the device public key of the office terminal device and the first anonymous user token, performs biometric authentication, and generates a proof signature using the device private key of the employee's personal device after successful authentication. After the trusted execution device verifies that the proof signature and the first anonymous user token are valid, it sends an entry authorization response to the employee's personal device. The employee's personal device uses the device public key of the office terminal device to encapsulate the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key to generate a key envelope, and then entrusts the key envelope to the anonymous credential issuing device; The office terminal device obtains the key envelope from the anonymous credential issuing device, and decrypts the key envelope using the device public key of the office terminal device to obtain the anonymous user identifier, the first root key, and the first encryption key. The office terminal device performs end-to-end encrypted communication with the employee's personal device based on the first root key. The end-to-end encrypted communication includes encrypted transmission of email data and encrypted transmission of office documents.

21. The method according to any one of claims 1-19, characterized in that, The second end-side device is an Internet of Things (IoT) device without a display screen and no input device, while the first end-side device is a home hub device; The second end-side device obtains the first anonymous user token through the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device, including: The home hub device, on behalf of the IoT device, requests a restricted anonymous user token from the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device. The restricted anonymous user token has a shorter validity period than the ordinary anonymous user token, and the restricted anonymous user token carries a monitoring device identifier, which is the device identifier of the home hub device. The second end-side device initiates a loop entry request to the device connection control device, including: The home hub device discovers the IoT device via Bluetooth Low Energy Broadcast or a same-segment discovery mechanism, and sends a ring entry request to the device connection control device on behalf of the IoT device. The ring entry request carries the restricted anonymous user token and the proof signature of the home hub device, and the proof signature contains a registration flag. After the trusted execution device verifies that the first anonymous user token and the proof signature are passed, it determines that the initial role of the IoT device is a restricted access device, and records the device identifier of the proof device as the device identifier of the home hub device in the binding relationship; The IoT device is in the restricted access device stage, the IoT device does not have the authority to invite other devices to join the loop, and the IoT device's service requests need to be verified by the proxy signature of the home hub device; The method further includes: In response to a role upgrade request initiated by the home hub device, the trusted execution device upgrades the IoT device's role from a restricted-access device to a fully-access device and issues a device token with full permissions to the IoT device.

22. A communication system, characterized in that, The system includes end-side devices, account authentication devices, anonymous credential issuance devices, device connection control devices, and trusted execution devices; the end-side devices include a first end-side device and a second end-side device. The first end-side device is configured to generate and hold local anonymized material locally, the local anonymized material including an anonymous user identifier, a first root key, and a first encryption key; it is also configured to establish a trust ring based on the local anonymized material. The second end-side device is used to obtain a first anonymous user token from the account authentication device or the anonymous credential issuing device, and to initiate an entry request to the control device connected through the device. The trusted execution device is configured to, in response to the ring entry request, verify the first anonymous user token and the proof signature of the proof device of the second end-side device; the proof device of the second end-side device includes the first end-side device in the trust ring; and is further configured to send a ring entry authorization response to the first end-side device and the device connection control device after the verification is successful. The ring entry authorization response is used to instruct the first end-side device to encrypt the local anonymized material based on the device public key of the second end-side device and store it in the anonymized credential issuing device. The local anonymized material is used for encrypted communication between the first end-side device and the second end-side device. The ring entry authorization response is also used to instruct the device connection control device to send a first device token to the second end-side device. The first device token is used by the second end-side device to perform a ring entry operation.

23. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, characterized in that, The electronic device is an end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device in a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The processor in the electronic device executes the computer program to implement the method steps executed by the corresponding device in any one of claims 1-21.

24. A chip, comprising a processor, characterized in that, The chip is deployed in the end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of a trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The processor in the chip executes the computer program to implement the method steps executed by the corresponding device in any one of claims 1-21.

25. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium is deployed in the end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of the trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system, and the computer program in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by a processor to implement the method steps executed by the corresponding device in any one of claims 1-21.

26. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program product is deployed in the end-side device, account authentication device, anonymous credential issuance device, device connection control device, or trusted execution device of the trusted device loop-in and anonymous communication system. The computer program in the computer program product is executed by a processor to implement the method steps executed by the corresponding device in any one of claims 1-21.