Cross-regional vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable function

Abstract

The invention discloses a cross-regional vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, which belongs to the field of Internet of Vehicles information security, and comprises the following steps: initializing a trusted management mechanism system; initializing a regional agent mechanism; the cross-regional vehicle CDV selects a local trusted vehicle LTV; carrying out cross-regional vehicle authentication; the agent ATA creates an interaction identity; the LTV generates a temporary key; the CDV obtains the secret key and verifies the secret key; and the LTV verifies the credibility of the CDV. According to the method, the unique identity label is generated by using the PUF, so that the authentication security is ensured, the calculation and communication overhead is reduced, the robustness and diversity of the authentication information are improved, the potential safety hazard in cross-regional authentication can be effectively reduced, and the method has a wide application prospect in the fields of intelligent transportation, automatic driving and the like.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking information security, and particularly to a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of intelligent transportation services, Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET), as one of its core technologies, is playing an increasingly important role. Vehicular Ad-hoc Network realizes data sharing and information exchange through wireless communication between vehicles, and provides key services such as real-time road condition monitoring, vehicle safety warning, and environmental perception for the intelligent transportation system. Vehicular Ad-hoc Network can not only improve traffic efficiency, but also play a crucial role in enhancing road safety and optimizing traffic flow. However, with the popularization of Vehicular Ad-hoc Network, network security issues have gradually become one of the bottlenecks restricting its wide application, especially the challenges in cross-region authentication and vehicle identity verification.

[0003] Traditional encryption technologies are widely used in the field of network security. However, in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, especially in Vehicular Ad-hoc Network, due to limited resources, weak computing power, and the continuous evolution of possible attack methods, traditional security methods based on computing face many challenges. Therefore, how to ensure network security while reducing computing overhead and resource consumption has become a problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function with good security.

[0005] The technical solution of the present invention to solve the above technical problems is: a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, including the following steps: S1: Initialization of the trusted management agency system; S2: Initialization of the regional agency; S3: The cross-region vehicle CDV selects a locally trusted vehicle LTV; S4: Cross-region vehicle authentication; S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity; S6: The LTV generates a temporary key; S7: The CDV obtains the key and verifies it; S8: The LTV verifies the credibility of the CDV.

[0006] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, the specific process of the step S1 is as follows: S11: The trusted management agency TA generates Pt and S t , P t is TA's public key, and S t is TA's private key; S12: For each proxy agency ATA of TA, generate AS m and AID m , where AS m is the long - term private key of the m - th proxy agency, and AID m is the unique identifier of the m - th proxy agency; S13: TA loads all {AID, AS} pairs of all ATA into the memory, and at the same time, each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of ATA, and AS is the long - term private key of ATA.

[0007] For the above - mentioned cross - region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S2 is as follows: S21: ATA sets P A and S A , where P A is the public key of ATA, and S A is the private key of ATA; S22: ATA assigns CID n and private key CK n to the vehicles registered within the service range, where CID n is the unique identifier of the n - th registered vehicle, and CK n is the private key of the n - th registered vehicle; S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge - response pairs CRP of the physical unclonable function PUF in the local ATA server; S24: ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding time limit for each registered vehicle, and signs the reputation value RE, , where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of PUF, is the concatenation operation, and Hash() is the hash function; S25: ATA pre - loads {CID n , {C, R}, RE n , deadline n} into the memory. C is the challenge stored by the vehicle in the ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the n - th registered vehicle, and deadline n is the time limit of the n - th registered vehicle.

[0008] For the above - mentioned cross - region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S3 is as follows: S31: Each vehicle locally broadcasts the information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle; S32: The CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies RE. The formula is as follows: ; where T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and the deadline is less than the set time difference , verification continues; otherwise, verification ends. The CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends the message , where T2 is the second timestamp; S33: After receiving the message , the ATA decrypts it and verifies the reputation based on C and CID. The formula is as follows: ; ; ; where PUF( ) is a physically unclonable function used to map challenge-response pairs; is the response obtained by inputting C through the PUF function, is the SG generated by the ATA based on relevant information, is the comparison function; if the verification passes, that is, and are equal, then the passing message is broadcast; if the verification fails, a vehicle is reselected; S34: According to the passing information , the vehicle with the highest reputation value is selected as the trusted vehicle, and the unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

[0009] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physically unclonable functions, the specific process of step S4 is as follows: S41: The CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends the message M1 to the LTV. The formula is as follows: ; ; where, is the identity identifier of the CDV, is the first challenge deposited by the CDV in the ATA of the registration location during registration, is the corresponding response, is the message verification; S42: After the LTV receives the message M1, it compares the timestamps: ; Among them, is the fourth timestamp. If and have a time difference greater than , it does not meet the requirements, and the verification is immediately terminated. If it meets the requirements, the LTV generates the fifth timestamp T5 and generates the message M2. The formula is as follows: ; ; Among them is 's corresponding response, is the first challenge deposited by the LTV in the registration area ATA during registration, is the message verification; S43: The LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA in the area where the CDV is located through a public channel ^ , and the ATA ^ compares the sixth timestamp and the fifth timestamp . If the comparison passes, that is, the time difference is less than , then according to and find the corresponding , and then generate the message verification . The formula is as follows: ; ; ; ; Among them, is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function; S44: If the comparison of the message verification passes, that is and are exactly equal, then retrieve whether the information of the cross-regional vehicle CDV is in the temporary database of the local server.

[0010] The above cross-regional vehicle authentication method based on the physical unclonable function, the step S44 is divided into two cases: The first case: If the information of the cross-regional vehicle CDV is not in the temporary database of the local server, then the message is sent to the TA. The TA finds the original registration location of the vehicle according to in M1, and then sends the encrypted message , where is the long-term private key of the ATA, the CDV registration agency; & After ATA & decrypts the encrypted message , according to , uses the PUF function to generate the corresponding response , and then compares the message authentication and , where = ; if the comparison passes, that is, and are exactly equal, then the message is returned, where is the second set of challenge response pairs of CDV; after TA receives the message , it uses S t to decrypt, and then uses the private key ^ of ATA to encrypt to obtain the message , and then sends the message to ATA ^ ; The second case: If the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA ^ again verifies and compares the messages according to ( and , where is generated in the same way as in the first case; if it does not pass, that is, and are not equal, then ATA ^ marks the suspicious vehicle and reports it to TA; if it passes, it enters the generation stage of the interactive identity.

[0011] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on the physical unclonable function, the specific process of step S5 is as follows: S51: ATA ^ generates the interactive identity IID of CDV and LTV; S52: ATA ^ generates the message , and encrypts it with the private key CK $ of LTV and sends it to LTV: .

[0012] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on the physical unclonable function, the specific process of step S6 is as follows: S61: After LTV receives the message , it uses the private key CK $ to decrypt the message ; S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, temporary key SK, sub-message , sub-message , message authentication and message M4 and send them to CDV. The formulas are as follows: ; ; ; ; ; where is the exclusive OR operation.

[0013] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on the physical unclonable function, the specific process of step S7 is as follows: S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message based on the timestamp, and then generates a key and verifies the integrity of the message according to the following formulas: ; ; ; ; ; ; where is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function, is generated by CDV , is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function, is the interactive identity generated by CDV, is the generated message authentication; S72: If the comparison passes, that is, and are equal, then generate the key : ; S73: CDV generates the eighth timestamp , message and sends them to LTV. The formulas are as follows: ; ; where It is a verification message between CDV and LTV.

[0014] For the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S8 is as follows: S81: When receiving , LTV generates a comparison message , and verifies and : ; ; S82: If the comparison passes, that is, and are equal, then LTV considers CDV to be trustworthy, and CDV subsequently uses the interactive identity IID and the key for communication.

[0015] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: The present invention uses physical unclonable functions (PUF) to generate unique identity identifiers, ensuring authentication security while reducing computational and communication overheads; by combining a regional authentication mechanism, the risk of forged identities is avoided. The present invention improves the robustness and diversity of authentication information, can effectively reduce security hazards in cross-region authentication, and has broad application prospects in fields such as intelligent transportation and autonomous driving. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0016] Figure 1 is the overall flowchart of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 2 is the flowchart of step S8 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0018] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the drawings and embodiments.

[0019] As Figure 1 shown, a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions includes the following steps: S1: The trusted management agency system is initialized.

[0020] The specific process of step S1 is as follows: S11: The trusted management agency TA generates P t and S t , P t is the public key of TA, and S t is the private key of TA; S12: TA generates AS m and AID m for each proxy agency ATA of TA, and AS mis the long - term private key of the m - th proxy agency, AID m is the unique identifier of the m - th proxy agency; S13: TA loads all {AID, AS} pairs of all ATAs into the memory, and at the same time each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of the ATA and AS is the long - term private key of the ATA.

[0021] S2: Initialization of the regional proxy agency.

[0022] The specific process of step S2 is as follows: S21: The ATA sets P A and S A , P A is the public key of the ATA, S A is the private key of the ATA; S22: The ATA assigns CID n and the private key CK n , where CID n is the unique identifier of the n - th registered vehicle, CK n is the private key of the n - th registered vehicle; S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge - response pairs CRP of the physical unclonable function PUF in the local ATA server; S24: The ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding time limit for each registered vehicle, and signs the reputation value RE, , where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of the PUF, || is the concatenation operation, and Hash() is the hash function; S25: The ATA pre - loads {CID n , {C, R}, RE n , deadline n} into the memory, C is the challenge stored by the vehicle in the ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the n - th registered vehicle, and deadline n is the time limit of the n - th registered vehicle.

[0023] S3: The cross - region vehicle CDV selects a local trusted vehicle LTV.

[0024] The specific process of step S3 is as follows: S31: Each vehicle locally broadcasts the information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle; S32: The CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies the RE. The formula is as follows: ; where T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and the deadline is less than the set time difference , verification continues; otherwise, verification ends. The CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends a message , where T2 is the second timestamp; S33: After receiving the message , the ATA decrypts it and verifies the reputation based on C and CID. The formula is as follows: ; ; ; where PUF( ) is a physically unclonable function used to map challenge-response pairs; is the response obtained by inputting C through the PUF function, is the SG generated by the ATA based on relevant information, is a comparison function; if the verification passes, i.e., and are equal, a pass message is broadcast; if the verification fails, a vehicle is reselected; S34: Based on the passing information , the vehicle with the highest reputation value is selected as the trusted vehicle, and the unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

[0025] S4: Cross-region vehicle authentication.

[0026] The specific process of step S4 is as follows: S41: The CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends the message M1 to the LTV. The formula is as follows: ; ; where, is the identity identifier of the CDV, is the first challenge deposited by the CDV in the ATA of the registration location during registration, is the corresponding response, is the message verification; S42: After receiving the message M1, the LTV compares the timestamps: ; where, is the fourth timestamp. If and have a time difference greater than then it does not meet the requirements and the verification is immediately terminated. If it meets the requirements, LTV generates the fifth timestamp T5 and generates the message M2. The formula is as follows: ; ; where is 's corresponding response, is the first challenge deposited by LTV in the registration location ATA during registration, is the message verification; S43: LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA in the area where CDV is located through a public channel ^ , ATA ^ compares the sixth timestamp and the fifth timestamp . If the comparison passes, that is, the time difference is less than , then according to and find the corresponding , and then generate the message verification . The formula is as follows: ; ; ; ; where is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function; S44: If the comparison of the message verification passes, that is, and are exactly equal, then retrieve whether the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is in the temporary database of the local server.

[0027] The said step S44 is divided into two cases: The first case: If the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is not in the temporary database of the local server, then send the message to TA. TA finds the original registration location of the vehicle according to in M1, and then sends the encrypted message , where is the long-term private key of the ATA, the registration location agency of CDV & ; After ATA & decrypts the encrypted message , according to , use the PUF function to generate the corresponding response , and then compare for message verification and , where = ; if the comparison passes, that is and are exactly equal, then return the message , where is the second set of challenge response pairs of the CDV; after TA receives the message , use S t to decrypt, and then use the private key ^ of ATA to encrypt to obtain the message , and then send the message to ATA ^ ; The second case: If the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA ^ according to ( ), verify and compare the message and , where is generated in the same way as in the first case; if it fails, that is and are not equal, then ATA ^ marks the suspicious vehicle and reports it to TA; if it passes, enter the generation stage of the interactive identity.

[0028] S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity.

[0029] The specific process of the said step S5 is as follows: S51: ATA ^ generates the interactive identity IID of the CDV and LTV; S52: ATA ^ generates the message , and encrypts it with the private key CK $ of LTV and sends it to LTV: .

[0030] S6: LTV generates a temporary key.

[0031] The specific process of the said step S6 is as follows: S61: After LTV receives the message , use the private key CK $ to decrypt the message ; S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, the temporary key SK, the sub-message , sub-message , message verification and message M4 are sent to CDV, the formula is as follows: ; ; ; ; ; where is the exclusive OR operation.

[0032] S7: CDV obtains the key and verifies it.

[0033] The specific process of step S7 is as follows: S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message according to the timestamp, and then generates the key and verifies the integrity of the message according to the following formula: ; ; ; ; ; ; where is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function, is generated by CDV , is the response obtained by inputting through the PUF function, is the interactive identity generated by CDV, is the generated message verification; S72: If the comparison passes, that is and are equal, then generate the key : ; S73: CDV generates the eighth timestamp , message and sends it to LTV, the formula is as follows: ; ; where is the verification message between CDV and LTV.

[0034] S8: LTV verifies the credibility of CDV.

[0035] As Figure 2 shown, the specific process of step S8 is as follows: S81: When receiving , LTV generates a comparison message , and verifies and : ; ; S82: If the comparison passes, that is, and are equal, then LTV considers CDV to be credible, and CDV subsequently uses the interactive identity IID and the key to communicate.

Claims

1. A cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: Trusted management system initialization; S2: Initialization of regional agencies; S3: Cross-regional vehicle CDV selects local trusted vehicle LTV; S4: Cross-regional vehicle certification; S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity; S6: LTV generates a temporary key; S7: CDV obtains the key and verifies it; S8: LTV verifies the credibility of CDV.

2. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S1 is: S11: The trusted authority TA generates P t and S t , P t is the public key of TA, S t It is the private key of TA; S12: Each TA agent ATA generates AS m and AID m , A.S. m is the long-term private key of the mth agency, AID m is the unique identifier of the mth agency; S13: TA loads the {AID, AS} pairs of all ATAs into the memory, and each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of the ATA and AS is the long-term private key of the ATA.

3. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S2 is: S21: ATA Settings P A and S A , P A is the public key of ATA, S A ATA's private key; S22: ATA assigns CID to vehicles registered within the service area n and private key CK n , where CID n Unique identifier for the nth registered vehicle, CK n The private key for the nth registered vehicle; S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge-response pairs CRP of the physical unclonable function PUF in the local ATA server; S24: ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding time limit for each registered vehicle , and sign the reputation value RE, , where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of PUF, It is a concatenation operation, and Hash() is a hash function; S25: ATA sends {CID n , {C, R}, RE n , deadline n } pre-loaded into memory, C is the challenge of vehicle storage in ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the nth registered vehicle, deadline n is the time limit for the nth registered vehicle.

4. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S3 is: S31: Each local vehicle broadcasts information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle; S32: CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies RE. The formula is as follows: ； Among them, T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and deadline is less than the set time difference , then continue verification, otherwise end verification; CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends a message , where T2 is the second timestamp; S33: ATA receives the message After decryption, the reputation is verified based on C and CID. The formula is as follows: ； ； ； Among them, PUF () is a physical unclonable function, which is used to map challenge-response pairs; is the response obtained by inputting C through the PUF function, It is the SG generated by ATA based on relevant information. is the comparison function; if it passes the verification, then and If they are equal, the broadcast message , if the verification fails, reselect the vehicle; S34: According to the information , select the vehicle with the highest reputation value as the trusted vehicle, and the unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

5. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S4 is as follows: S41: CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends message M1 to LTV. The formula is as follows: ； ； in, is the CDV's identifier, The first challenge for CDV is to deposit it into the ATA of the place of registration when registering. yes The corresponding response, For message verification; S42: After LTV receives message M1, it compares the timestamps: ； in, is the fourth timestamp, if and The time difference is greater than If the requirement is not met, the verification ends immediately. If the requirement is met, LTV generates the fifth timestamp T5 and generates message M2. The formula is as follows: ； ； in yes The corresponding response, The first challenge is to deposit LTV into the ATA at the time of registration. For message verification; S43: LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA in the area where CDV is located through a public channel ^ ,ATA ^ Compare the sixth timestamp and the fifth timestamp , if the comparison passes, that is, the time difference is less than , then according to and Find the corresponding , then generate the message verification , the formula is as follows: ； ； ； ； in, Input through the PUF function The response received; S44: If the comparison message verification is successful, and If they are completely equal, the information of the cross-regional vehicle CDV is retrieved in a temporary database that is not in the local server.

6. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The step S44 is divided into two cases: Case 1: If the cross-region vehicle CDV information is not in the temporary database of the local server, the message Send it to TA, TA will calculate the value according to M1 Find the original registration of the vehicle and send an encrypted message ,in ATA, the registered agency of CDV & ATA's long-term private key & Encrypted Message After decryption, according to , use the PUF function to generate the corresponding response , and then compare the message verification and ,in = If the comparison passes, and If they are completely equal, the message is returned ,in This is the second challenge response pair of CDV; TA receives the message After that, use S t Decrypt and then use ATA ^ Private key Encrypt the message , and then the message Send to ATA ^ ; The second case: If the cross-region vehicle CDV information is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA ^ according to( ), verify the comparison message again and ,in The generation method is the same as case 1; if it does not pass, and If they are not equal, then ATA ^ Mark suspicious vehicles and report them to TA; If passed, it will enter the stage of generating interactive identity.

7. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S5 is as follows: S51: ATA ^ Generate interactive identity IID of CDV and LTV; S52: ATA ^ Generate Message , and use LTV's private key CK $ After encryption, send to LTV: 。 8. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S6 is as follows: S61: LTV receives message Then, use the private key CK $ Decrypting the message ; S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, temporary key SK, and sub-message , Sub-message , Message Verification And message M4 is sent to CDV, the formula is as follows: ； ； ； ； ； in It is an XOR operation.

9. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 8 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S7 is as follows: S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message based on the timestamp, then generates a key and verifies the integrity of the message based on the following formula: ； ； ； ； ； ； in Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, Generated by CDV , Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, is the interactive identity generated by CDV, Verify the generated message; S72: If the comparison passes, and If they are equal, a key is generated. : ； S73: CDV generates the eighth timestamp ,information Sent to LTV, the formula is as follows: ； ； in It is the verification message between CDV and LTV.

10. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 9, characterized in that: The specific process of step S8 is as follows: S81: When receiving , LTV generation comparison message , and verify and : ； ； S82: If the comparison is successful, and If they are equal, LTV considers CDV to be trustworthy, and CDV will use the interactive identity IID and key in the future. To communicate.

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