31 results about "Physical unclonable function" patented technology

The disclosure relates to a method of obtaining a cryptographic key in a chipset (1). An initial configuration message may be generated using a physical unclonable function (hereinafter: PUF) (22) of the chipset (1). Said PUF (22) may generate a predetermined value when using the initial configuration message as input to the PUF (22). The initial configuration message may be transmitted to a client access server (31). An altered configuration message may be received from the client access server (31), wherein the altered configuration message is generated by the client access server (31) based on the initial configuration message. The cryptographic key may be obtained from the PUF (22) using the altered configuration message as input to the PUF (22).

A method for authentication between multiple communication parties is disclosed. Authentication can be carried out by the means of each communication party having a device having a physical unclonable function. To make this possible, the devices have a known quantum correlation that can be used in conjunction with entangled photons to verify the identities of the devices.

A silicon-anchored hardware enforcement system enables low-latency, cryptographically gated execution of artificial intelligence for stem cell therapy and regenerative medicine. A Sovereign Identity Token derived from a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) permanently binds model decryption to a specific hardware instance and restricts execution to a Trusted Execution Environment synchronized to a hardware-protected Safety Epoch. Encrypted AI model weights are decryptable only upon successful hardware validation. Multimodal clinical inputs, including genetic, imaging, and structured patient data, are integrated through a hardware-constrained fusion architecture that operates under enforced biological safety parameters. FPGA-implemented predicate logic evaluates defined biological safety conditions at sub-millisecond latency, and an ASIC-based nullification circuit irreversibly suppresses outputs that violate hardware-defined thresholds within a bounded millisecond response time. A distributed revocation protocol propagates credential invalidation across networked nodes within sub-second latency while preserving reduced-capacity safe mode operation. A permissioned provenance ledger records hardware-attested execution events and supports automated regulatory documentation. The system provides secure clinical deployment, federated research enablement, and verifiable auditability for high-risk therapeutic environments.

Embodiments described herein include a system, apparatus, article of manufacture, method and / or computer program product embodiments, and / or combinations and sub-combinations thereof, for delay-based physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for chiplets to verify system integrity. A die may include a plurality of chiplets including a first chiplet and a second chiplet. The first chiplet may be connected to the second chiplet via an interposer. As part of an authentication process, the first chiplet may request the second chiplet to transmit a signal via one or more wires of the interposer. A first signature based on the characteristics of the transmitted signal may be measured at a first time, which constitutes the first evaluation of the PUF. The first signature may be used as a baseline comparison for subsequent signatures as a means to confirm that the chiplets, interposers, and / or interconnects have not been altered or modified.

A data processing method, including: obtaining a challenge sequence of challenge-response pairs, and generating, by a physical unclonable function, an original response sequence corresponding to the challenge-response pairs; generating a first index parameter according to the challenge sequence, and obtaining feature bit information in the original response sequence according to the first index parameter; converting the challenge sequence to generate a second index parameter, and updating the first index parameter according to the second index parameter and the feature bit information; obtaining new feature bit information in the original response sequence according to the updated first index parameter; and repeatedly generating second index parameters, updating the first index parameter according to the second index parameters and the latest obtained feature bit information, and obtaining multiple pieces of feature bit information, to generate a target response sequence according to the multiple pieces of feature bit information.

A semiconductor device with a physical unclonable function includes: a substrate; a physical unclonable function (PUF) structure; and a logic circuit configured to determine a logical value of the PUF structure and operate the logical value to generate a random number. The PUF structure includes: a first conductive layer over the substrate; an insulating layer on the first conductive layer; a second conductive layer on the insulating layer; and a conductive via penetrating the insulating layer and connecting the second conductive layer and the first conductive layer.

The application discloses a lightweight authentication method for an unmanned system, wherein a ground station part is configured to realize safe registration of a UAV node under a trusted channel, and realize safe authentication and safe communication with the UAV node under a non-trusted channel; and the UAV node part is configured to extract an ID of itself from a physical unclonable function as a private key of the UAV node, and generate a public key, so as to complete binding of the UAV node and the physical unclonable function. The UAV node private key is generated by the integrated physical unclonable function in the UAV node, so that unique binding of the UAV node is realized, the corresponding private key is not taken out of the UAV node, and the possibility of being copied and the possibility of private key leakage are greatly reduced. The preset information can maximally reduce the cost of executing an identity authentication protocol after the UAV takes off. The security strength is simultaneously enhanced by negotiation and preset information, the flexibility of the protocol is increased, and the calculation efficiency is improved.

Generating, by a computing device, a device secret, the generating comprising: providing, by at least one physical unclonable function (PUF), at least one value; and generating, using a key derivative function (KDF), the device secret, wherein the at least one value provided by the at least one PUF is an input to the KDF; and storing, in memory of the computing device, the generated device secret.

A device is provided. The device includes a physical unclonable function (PUF) cell array. The PUF cell array includes multiple bit cells, and generates a PUF response output, in response to a challenge input, based on a data state of one bit cell in the bit cells. Each of the bit cells stores a bit data and includes a transistor having a control terminal coupled to a word line and a first terminal coupled to a source line, a first memory cell having a first terminal coupled to a first data line and a second terminal coupled to a second terminal of the transistor, and a second memory cell having a first terminal coupled to a second data line, different from the first data line, and a second terminal coupled to the second terminal of the first memory cell at the second terminal of the transistor.

Multiple helper data solutions (a.k.a., helper data blocks), and therefore multiple possible PUF output values, are generated for a given integrated circuit die. These helper data blocks are encrypted and stored in a nonvolatile memory on the integrated circuit die. Each helper data block is encrypted such that each helper data block can only be decrypted by a decryption key that is different from the other encrypted helper data blocks stored on that integrated circuit die. The keys to decrypt the multiple helper data blocks are released one at a time and spread over time. Because the helper data is encrypted, each PUF output value is only discoverable when its associated key is released. Accordingly, counterfeit systems or integrated circuits will need to be re-reverse engineered each time a new key is released.

A micro-electro-mechanical system (MEMS) apparatus includes at least one semiconductor device, a power supply, a transimpedance amplifier, a lock-in amplifier, a signal analyzer, and a processor. The semiconductor device has a MEMS structure, an input electrode, and two anchors. The two anchors of the MEMS structure are respectively fixed and could serve as output electrodes, the input electrode is adjacent to a long side of the MEMS structure, and the MEMS structure includes five sections having different widths. The power supply is electrically connected to the input electrode. The transimpedance amplifier is electrically connected to the output electrode. The lock-in amplifier is electrically connected to the transimpedance amplifier and the input electrode. The signal analyzer is electrically connected to the transimpedance amplifier. The processor is electrically connected to the signal analyzer.

A leakage-based physical unclonable function (L-PUF) device, a L-PUF array and applications thereof are provided. The L-PUF device includes a precharge circuit, two leaky devices and a sense amplifier. The two leaky devices are electrically connected to the precharge circuit respectively. Each leaky device includes a transistor having a control end electrically connected to ground, a first end electrically connected to the precharge circuit and a second end electrically connected to ground. The sense amplifier is electrically connected to the first end of each of the two leaky devices, and may generate a first output signal and a second output signal. The sense amplifier may switch between a first state and a second state based on a voltage difference between the first leaky device and the second leaky device, which is determined by a leakage current of the first leaky device and a leakage current of the second leaky device.

A system and method for storing keys, secrets, and passwords securely in an off-chip keystore are provided. An off-chip keystore stores a plurality of ciphertext keys that include encrypted keys, secrets, and passwords. A programmable logic device, such as a system on a chip, is coupled to the off-chip keystore. The programable logic device enrolls a physical unclonable function (PUF) within the programmable logic device. The PUF generates a keystore encryption key (KEK) that a secure processor, such as a cryptographic engine, uses to encrypt a plaintext key into a ciphertext key, and decrypt the ciphertext key into the plaintext key. The ciphertext key is stored in the off-chip keystore. When the programmable logic device is powered down, the KEK is not stored within the programmable logic device, but is regenerated to decrypt cyphertext keys and encrypt plaintext keys once the programmable logic device is powered up.

The application discloses a kind of pipeline robot bidirectional security authentication method and system, it is related to belong to computer and network security technical field, this method includes: based on physical unclonable function and national secret SM3 / SM4 algorithm generates dynamic authentication credential;Temporary session key is used to encrypt authentication message;Through link state perception mechanism, authentication strategy is adaptively adjusted;And introduce session context cache recovery mechanism to quickly rebuild security channel;The system includes robot end authentication unit and control terminal authentication unit, integrates PUF module, dynamic credential generation and verification module, time synchronization and link monitoring module.The present application aims to solve the problem that prior art is difficult to realize high reliability, low delay, decentralized bidirectional authentication in the environment of no positioning signal, weak communication and dynamic topology, effectively resist cloning, replay and man-in-the-middle attack, while ensuring security, authentication delay is controlled within 800 milliseconds, suitable for resource-constrained closed pipeline environment.

Systems and method are provided for determining a reliability of a physically unclonable function (PUF) cell of a device. A first signal is provided to a first branch of a PUF cell and a second signal is provided to a second branch of the PUF cell, the first and second signals being provided in synchronization. A base PUF cell value is determined based on an output of the PUF cell produced by the first signal and the second signal. A third signal is provided to the first branch and a fourth signal is provided to the second branch, the third signal and fourth signal being provided out of synchronization. A stressed PUF cell value is determined based on an output of the PUF cell produced by the third signal and the fourth signal. The PUF cell is determined to be unusable based on a difference between the PUF cell value and the stressed PUF cell value.

Semiconductor device comprising: a physically non-clonable functional field (PUF) with PUF cells that output first bits; a non-volatile memory configured to store marker bits indicating whether the first bits are valid, first mask bits generated by masking second bits depending on a parity of the second bits, and second mask bits generated by masking auxiliary bits associated with the second bits, wherein the second bits are valid bits derived from the first bits; an extraction unit configured to extract the second bits from the first bits using the marker bits; a de-masking unit configured to de-mask the second bits using the first mask bits while receiving the second bits to provide third bits;a bit decoding unit configured to compress the third bits to provide fourth bits while receiving the third bits; and a block decoding unit configured to generate a security key by decoding the fourth bits and the second mask bits, wherein the extraction unit, the unmasking unit, the bit decoding unit, and the block decoding unit are connected in series and operate simultaneously.

The application relates to a distributed Internet of Things device authentication method based on lightweight messages. By introducing a lightweight message mechanism, key information in the authentication process is encapsulated and transmitted in a simple and efficient manner, greatly reducing data transmission volume, reducing communication overhead, making the transmission of authentication messages in the network more rapid, and effectively shortening the data transmission time in the authentication process. At the same time, the unique physical characteristics of the physical unclonable function are used for authentication, avoiding complex asymmetric encryption operations, reducing the computing resource consumption of terminal devices and authentication service devices, and improving the authentication efficiency. In the large-scale Internet of Things device authentication scenario, the application greatly improves the authentication efficiency, reduces the system load and resource consumption, enhances the real-time performance and scalability of the Internet of Things system, and ensures that large-scale terminal devices can quickly and stably access the network.

A hardware-anchored cryptographic provenance system for securing raw medical data precisely at the analog-to-digital conversion edge. The system integrates a physical unclonable function directly into medical diagnostic equipment, such as MRI scanners or ECG monitors. At the exact millisecond of biological data capture, an analog-to-digital provenance anchor generates a cryptographic seal that binds the raw data to the device's unforgeable hardware identity, creating a Diagnostic Genesis Package. This inbound data sealing prevents the injection of maliciously generated synthetic deepfakes or altered imagery into downstream artificial intelligence networks. A zero-trust ingestion gateway at the receiving server mathematically verifies the sensor seal, physically dropping any data lacking legitimate hardware provenance. The system supports multimodal cross-sensor synchronization and tamper-responsive zeroization, ensuring that downstream AI shadow execution and global federated training models ingest only pristine, mathematically verified patient data.

The application provides a physical unclonable function generating device and system, wherein the device comprises: a first multi-feedback ring oscillator for oscillating based on an external excitation signal; a first asynchronous counter for collecting a first average oscillation frequency of the first multi-feedback ring oscillator; a second multi-feedback ring oscillator for oscillating based on the external excitation signal; a second asynchronous counter for collecting a second average oscillation frequency of the second multi-feedback ring oscillator; and a comparator for generating a response of the physical unclonable function based on the first average oscillation frequency and the second average oscillation frequency. The device utilizes the multi-feedback structure of the first multi-feedback ring oscillator and the second multi-feedback ring oscillator to introduce strong nonlinearity in the circuit, thereby increasing the nonlinearity component in the PUF design, improving the resistance to machine learning, and enhancing the randomness of the PUF.

Embodiments herein describe relaxation oscillator circuits for physical unclonable function (PUF) circuits and / or for providing clocks to multiple dies. The relaxation oscillator circuit generates a clock having a frequency that is based in part on random process variations of the passive components of the relaxation oscillator circuit. The relaxation oscillator circuit may be distributed amongst multiple dies of an integrated circuit device, to incorporate additional sources of randomness / entropy, enhance security, to provide clocks to the multiple dies. The relaxation oscillator circuits include differential and single-ended relaxation oscillator circuits. Resistive and / or capacitive components may be configurable, which may be useful for testing purposes, altering PUF codes, and / or generating time-multiplexed clocks.

A self-timed readout driver for a leakage-based physical unclonable function (L-PUF) device, a L-PUF array using the same, and applications thereof are provided. The self-timed readout driver includes a precharge transistor, an inverter and a leaky device. The precharge transistor has a control end, a first end and a second end. The inverter is electrically connected to the second end of the precharge transistor. The leaky device having a control end electrically connected to ground, a first end electrically connected to the second end of the precharge transistor, and a second end electrically connected to ground. The control end of the precharge transistor is configured to receive an input signal. The inverter is configured to generate a sense enable (SE) signal. The input signal and the SE signal may be used as two input signals for the L-PUF device.

An electronic device may include a printed circuit board having a physically unclonable function (PUF) source. The PUF source includes a plurality of fuses that provide PUF data based on a measurement of electrical parameters resulting from a first signal being transmitted through the plurality of fuses. The electronic device also has processing circuitry in communication with the PUF source that can detect a triggering event at the electronic device and determine an event type based on the detected triggering event. The processing circuitry can select at least one fuse of the plurality of fuses based on the determined event type and change an electrical property of the selected at least one fuse such that the PUF data from the PUF source is modified.

The application relates to the technical field of data security, and particularly discloses a security protection system for mobile phone mainboard data encryption. The system comprises a physically unclonable function module, a security key derivation module, a dynamic key management module, a hardware binding verification module and an encryption engine module. The physically unclonable function module is adopted to generate a device original entropy source, and a root key is derived based on the entropy source, so that the risk of storing the key in a general flash memory in a static form is eliminated. The root key is generated based on inherent and unclonable physical randomness in a chip manufacturing process, and exists only in a volatile memory, so that an attacker cannot obtain the key by physically detecting the flash memory or analyzing a firmware image, and essential safety of key storage is realized.

The application discloses a kind of robot security recovery systems and methods based on physical unclonable function (PUF).System integration in robot master chip, including PUF key generation unit (generate unique key based on chip physical characteristics), security trigger unit (activate PUF in response to forced interruption event) and key verification unit (compare external key and PUF key).When robot encounters security attack, hardware exception or user instruction causes forced interruption, the system automatically enters unusable state;Only when external input key is consistent with PUF dynamically generated key, recovery operation is allowed. The application realizes key non-replicable, strict authentication of recovery operation, effectively prevents unauthorized recovery and secondary attack, and improves robot security.

The application discloses a PUF-based convolutional neural network model intellectual property protection method, which comprises the following steps: implementing a physical unclonable function on a field programmable logic gate array to provide a unique fingerprint bound with the specific field programmable logic gate array. A true data set and a false data set are used to train a convolutional neural network model to obtain a true model and a false model, and two parameter matrices of the same layer of the true model and the false model are mixed by executing a confusion algorithm to utilize the physical unclonable function response. After the confusion is completed, a recovery convolution layer dependent on the physical unclonable function response is added to the model, so that the correct result can be calculated only when the convolutional neural network model runs on the specific field programmable logic gate array. Thus, the physical unclonable function is used for IP protection of the convolutional neural network model, and the IP protection work is advanced from after the model is stolen to before the model is stolen.

Methods provide device authentication for an intrusion detection system implementing building automation and control network (BACnet) Master-Slave / Token-Passing (MS / TP). An authentication protocol provides countermeasures to vulnerabilities in the BACnet MS / TP physical layer by utilizing an extended message format to cloak device identifiers (IDs). Adversaries are prevented from using known device IDs to gain access to the network. An authenticating device hashes a device identifier of a device to be authenticated combined with a random number. The authenticating device receives a hash of the random number plus the device identifier from the device. The authenticating device compares the hashes and authenticates the device if the hashes match. To transmit the hash, the BACnet MS / TP frame format includes an extended header cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field having bytes reallocated from the data field of the frame format. Another countermeasure utilizes a physical unclonable function (PUF) of the device in the extended header CRC.

A secure sensor responsive to a physical or environmental phenomenon may include two electrical components connected to a voltage source and may include an analog comparator connected to the two components. The output of the comparator represents one bit of a key. An A / D converter may be connected to an opposing side of one of the components where the A / D converter output is related by a coefficient of the component's characteristic to a physical phenomenon. The components may have the same nominal value. The components and the A / D converter may be encased in a package configured to inhibit inspection and discovery.