466 results about "Trusted Platform Module" patented technology

A method for providing a secure firmware update. A first authentication credential is securely stored on a platform in an encrypted form using a key generated by a secure token, such as a trusted platform module (TPM). Typically, the authentication credential will identify a manufacture and the operation will be performed during manufacture of the platform. A configuration of the platform is “imprinted” such that an identical configuration is required to access the key used to decrypt the first authentication credential by sealing the key against the platform configuration. During a subsequent firmware update process, a firmware update image containing a second authentication credential is received at the platform. If the platform configuration is the same as when the key was sealed, the key can be unsealed and used for decrypting the first authentication credential. A public key in the first authentication credential can then be used to authenticate the firmware update image via the second authentication credential.

A system, method, and program product is provided that executes a start sequence of an information handling system that includes a hardware based TPM. Multiple PCRs are stored in the TPM and are initialized to a predetermined state when the start sequence commences. During execution of the start sequence, software modules, including a hypervisor, are loaded the system's memory. PCR values resulting from the loading of the software modules are calculated. The resulting PCR values are compared with expected PCR values. If the PCR values match the expected PCR values, then a virtual environment is created under the hypervisor. The virtual environment includes a VM and a virtual trust platform module (vTPM) that is used by the virtual machine to satisfy the virtual machines TPM requests.

A method and system to emulate a trusted platform module to execute trusted operations. A virtual machine monitor is executed to support a virtual machine session. An operating system is loaded into the virtual machine session. The trusted platform module is emulated to hold a key associated with the virtual session and to execute trusted operations.

A “Firmware-Based TPM” or “fTPM” ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM® architecture's TrustZone™ extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a “firmware-based TPM” without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices.

A method, system, and article of manufacture to share trusted hardware across multiple operational environments. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is loaded to support a plurality of virtual machines in a computer system, the VMM including a VMM multiplexer. A first and a second virtual machine (VM) are loaded. A trusted hardware device is shared between the first VM and the second VM using the VMM multiplexer. In one embodiment, the trusted hardware device includes a trusted platform module (TPM).

A method and architecture for secure transmission of data within optical-switched networks. In one embodiment, the optical switched network comprises a photonic burst-switched (PBS) network. Under various schemes, security keys including encryption and decryption keys are generated by edge nodes and the decryption keys are distributed to other edge nodes in a PBS network. In one embodiment, the security keys are dynamically generated by a trusted platform module (TPM). A source edge node uses its encryption key to encrypt selected data bursts to be sent to a destination edge node via a virtual lightpath coupling the source and destination edge nodes. Security data are embedded in a control burst header indicates to the destination node whether corresponding data bursts sent via the virtual lightpath are encrypted. The security data also includes the decryption key and may also identify an encryption/decryption algorithm to be used. In some embodiments, public key infrastructure facilities are used in conjunction with employment of private and public keys and digital certificates.

A virtual PCR (VPCR) construct is provided that can be cryptographically tagged as optionally resettable or as enduring for the life of a client (process, virtual machine, and the like) and that can be loaded into a resettable hardware PCR to make use of the functionality of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The VPCRs may cryptographically reflect their characteristics (resettable or not) in their stored values. Also, since the PCRs are virtualized, they are (effectively) unlimited in number and may be given general names (UUIDs) that are less likely to collide. The VPCRs can be loaded into a physical PCR as needed, but in a way that stops one piece of software from impersonating another piece of software. The VPCRs thus enable all software using the TPM to be given access to TPM functionality (sealing, quoting, etc.) without security concerns.

Biometric data, which may be suitably transformed are obtained from a biometric input device contained within a stand-alone computer or a mobile device, which may contain an ASIC chip connected to or incorporated within the stand-alone computer or mobile device and which includes the capability for capturing one or more biometric samples and for biometric feature extraction, matching and encryption. For extra security, the biometric matching is used in conjunction with a PIN to authenticate the user to the stand-alone computer or mobile device. The biometric template and other sensitive data residing on the mobile device are encrypted using hardware elements of the mobile device (or the ASIC) together with the PIN hash and/or the Password hash. An obfuscated version of the Password, stored on the ASIC or the mobile device is de-obfuscated and released to the mobile device authentication mechanism, including a Trusted Platform Module if present, in response to a successfully decrypted template and matching biometric sample and PIN. A de-obfuscated password is used to authenticate the user to the mobile device and the same or a different de-obfuscated password may be used to authenticate the user to a remote computer using the SSL/TLS or a process based upon a symmetric encryption algorithm. The locally generated password may be used to encrypt data at rest on the mobile device or ASIC and the remote authentication password may be used to encrypt data in transit to and from a remote computer. This creates a trusted relationship between the stand-alone computer or mobile device and the remote computer. The system also eliminates the need for the user to remember and enter complex passwords on the mobile device or for secure transmission of data. A similar method may be used, with the signature/sign biometric modality to determine whether the holder of an IC chip card is, in fact the card owner.

The subject mater herein relates to processing of sensitive data and, more particularly, to a partitioned scheme for trusted platform module support. Various embodiments provide systems, methods, and software that instantiate one or more emulated trusted platform modules in respective sequestered processor cores. In some embodiments, a trusted platform module in instantiated in a processor core, sequestered for the trusted platform module, for each operating system or virtual machine operating on a computing device. The operating system may then communicate with the appropriate trusted platform module over a secure communication channel, such as an interpartition bridge.

A method, apparatus, and computer program product are disclosed in a data processing system for establishing virtual endorsement credentials. The data processing system includes a hardware trusted platform module (TPM). Logical partitions are generated in the system. A different virtual TPM is generated for each one of the logical partitions. For each one of the logical partitions, the virtual TPM that was generated for the logical partition then dynamically generates a virtual endorsement credential for use by the logical partition that includes the virtual TPM. The virtual endorsement credential is generated within the data processing system without the data processing system or its devices accessing a trusted third party that is external to the data processing system.

A method, apparatus, and computer program product are described for implementing a trusted computing environment within a data processing system. The data processing system includes a primary hardware trusted platform module (TPM) and a secondary hardware backup TPM. The data processing system also includes multiple logical partitions. The primary hardware TPM is used to provide trusted computing services to the logical partitions. A determination is made as to whether the primary hardware TPM is malfunctioning. If a determination is made that the primary hardware TPM is malfunctioning, the secondary hardware TPM is designated as a new primary hardware TPM and is utilized instead of the primary TPM to provide trusted computing services to the logical partitions.

A method, computer program, and system for paging platform configuration registers in and out of a trusted platform module. In a trusted computing platform, an unlimited number of platform configuration registers can be obtained through paging. The trust platform module encrypts and decrypts platform configuration registers for storage outside the trusted platform module.

A method and system for enforcing trusted computing (TC) policies in a security module architecture for a hypervisor. Upon receiving a request from a subject for access to an object, TC-related attribute values are obtained for the subject and the object based on a virtualized trusted platform module (vTPM). Access control decisions are the made based at least on the TC-related attribute values and TC-related policies.

An apparatus and method is provided for a direct anonymous attestation scheme from short-group signatures. The method may include the creation of a group public/private key pair for a trusted membership group defined by an issuer; and assigning a cryptographic pair that is combined with a unique private member value to form a private membership key. A trusted member device generates the unique private member value during a join procedure of a trusted membership group. In one embodiment, the private member value of the private membership key is unknown to the issuer. A member may sign a message with the private membership key to form a short-group digital signature that is verified using a public key of the trusted membership group to maintain anonymity of trusted member devices. A size of the private membership key may be reduced to enable storage within a trusted platform module. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

The invention provides a method and system for improving the system booting process via a trusted platform module, wherein he booting process for starting the internal kernel of the operation system are divided into a plurality of interdependent layers, the integrity of the upper layer is verified by the lower layer by using the trusted platform module as the trust root, the system operation control right is transmitted layer upon layer till to the operation system kernel to form an integral trusted chain, and if the integrity verification fails, a correspondent restore scheme will be provided, the boot log is recorded into the file system before entering the operation system. The invention takes into account of the situations such as integrity verification, verification failure restore, and the interaction of the starting log and the operation system so as to form an integral booting system, the initial circumstance is considered as safe and trusted, and the operation system can also proves the safety of its starting circumstances to other platforms by using the log file of the booting process.

Described is a technology by which computer data secrets sealed by a trusted platform module (TPM) or like device may be securely migrated from a physical source computing machine to a physically different destination machine. For example, migration of TPM secrets allows migration of a virtual machine from one physical machine to another. A destination machine receives a set of data sealed at a source machine. The set of data includes a migration key and a secret sealed by the migration key. The destination machine performs attestation with a key server to attest that the destination machine is entitled to access the sealed secret, via credentials, known good configuration and/or other policy compliance. The key server unseals the migration key, and provides a returned key (e.g., the migration key or a session key) to the destination machine for unsealing the secrets.

The invention discloses a dynamic trusted measurement method and a safe embedded system. The method comprises the following steps that: S1. a hardware layer redesigns a trusted BIOS (Basic Input Output System) by a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) chip and traditional hardware, a trust chain is transferred to an application program from the TPM security chip, trusted BISO, a trusted OS (Operating System) kernel and an embedded software stack to realize the trusted starting of a dynamic trusted measurement module (DTM); S2. an application layer measurement request module generates measurement request information according to a suspicious event from safety equipment and a local security strategy requirement, the measurement request information is formatted, and the measurement request is sent to the DTM of a kernel layer to activate the DTM; and S3. the DTM carries out trusted measurement to a system progress or module and responds. According to the dynamic trusted measurement method, the complex real-time attack can be effectively detected and defended, the attack on an internal physical layer can be actively detected and defended, and a safe embedded system platform can be realized.

The invention relates to an Internet of Things smart home security gateway system. The system comprises a user side, a security gateway and a terminal node. The user side and the terminal node each comprise a data encrypting/decrypting module used for encrypting/decrypting a sent control order and received data through a preset encrypting program on a remote client side or the terminal node; the security gateway comprises a safety communication module, a user access control and node identity authentication module, a credible platform module and a log audit and alarm module; the safety communication module achieves data safety filtering, reconstructing and forwarding and guarantees safety of the bi-direction transmission; the credible platform module is used for achieving system safety authentication, user behavior credibility analysis, data sealing storage and free decoupling and can be independently maintained and upgraded; the log audit and alarm module is used for recording user access and node authentication behaviors, carrying out safety audit on the operation of viewing logs and giving a timely alarm for an abnormal phenomenon found in the gateway system safety monitoring process. By means of the Internet of Things smart home security gateway system, the safety performance of a smart home system and the running efficiency of a gateway can be improved, and a safety guarantee is provided for Internet of Things smart home.