Power distribution automation terminal safety debugging method based on Bluetooth communication

Abstract

The invention provides a power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication, and the method comprises the steps: extracting a historical operation record and a current task context from an operator identity identifier, calculating a real-time permission range of resource access, and adjusting an initial access boundary according to the real-time permission range; a security gateway module is embedded in a Bluetooth communication channel, a cross-domain data exchange request is intercepted and analyzed, whether the request exceeds the adjusted access boundary is judged, and if yes, transmission is refused; analyzing the cross-domain data exchange request, extracting a source domain identifier and a target domain identifier of a data packet from the cross-domain data exchange request, and encrypting the data packet to obtain encrypted cross-domain transmission data; and obtaining a decryption key distribution record of the encrypted cross-domain transmission data in the security domain of the receiving end, judging whether the key is matched or not, if so, decrypting the data and transmitting the data to the target domain, and otherwise, discarding the data.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information technology, and in particular to a power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication. BACKGROUND

[0002] The security debugging of the power distribution automation terminal is one of the core links of the development of the smart grid, and its importance lies in guaranteeing the stable operation and efficient maintenance of the power system. Especially under the background of the increasing popularity of distributed energy, the communication security and operation reliability of terminal equipment have become key issues that cannot be ignored. Bluetooth communication is widely used in the debugging scene of power distribution automation terminals due to its convenience and low power consumption characteristics. However, this technology has exposed significant security risks in actual deployment. Existing debugging methods mostly rely on single identity authentication mechanisms or simple permission allocation, which are difficult to cope with complex operating environments and diverse attack methods. Especially in key devices such as ring network cabinet telemetry remote control units, there is a lack of dynamic division of resource access boundaries and effective supervision of cross-domain operations, resulting in a high risk of unauthorized operations or data leakage. The limitations of current solutions are that most methods only stay at the surface permission control level and fail to deeply solve the security isolation problem of the terminal internal operating system, and lack real-time audit capabilities for data exchange behavior during debugging. This extensive management approach often seems inadequate when faced with multi-user, multi-task debugging requirements. Therefore, how to realize hierarchical security domain isolation of the terminal system in the Bluetooth communication environment, how to dynamically divide resource access permissions according to the identity of the operator, and how to ensure the security and traceability of data exchange between different security domains, these technical problems will cause key modules such as power distribution switch operation command processing units and current collection circuit parameters to be exposed to potential threats, thereby causing unique technical problems such as system configuration tampering or operation command abuse. Therefore, how to realize hierarchical security domain isolation mechanism in the debugging of power distribution automation terminals based on Bluetooth communication, automatically divide the resource access boundaries of the operator, and realize the security management and control of cross-domain data exchange by means of security gateway and log audit technology, has become a key problem that needs to be solved. SUMMARY

[0003] The present application provides a power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication, mainly including:

[0004] (1) receiving a debugging request through Bluetooth, parsing the operator identity and resource type, and dividing the terminal system based on the authentication result using a hierarchical security domain model, and assigning the instruction processing module and the data collection module to different security domains and determining the initial access boundary;

[0005] (2) Obtain the operator's identity information through Bluetooth communication, extract its historical operation records and current task context, calculate the real-time permission range of resource access using a dynamic permission allocation model, and optimize the initial access boundary according to the calculation results;

[0006] (3) Use the security gateway module integrated in the Bluetooth communication link to intercept and analyze cross-domain data exchange requests, verify whether the request meets the adjusted access boundary, and if it exceeds the boundary, refuse transmission and generate an abnormal operation log;

[0007] (4) In the Bluetooth communication link, parse the cross-domain data exchange request through the security gateway module, extract the source domain identifier and target domain identifier, encrypt the data content, and generate an integrity check value, and assemble the cross-domain transmission data packet;

[0008] (5) In the security domain of the receiving end, verify the decryption key distribution record of the cross-domain transmission data packet, judge the key validity through the key matching mechanism, decrypt the qualified data and transmit it to the target domain, otherwise discard the data and record the alarm log;

[0009] (6) In the target domain, parse the decrypted cross-domain data packet, extract the operation instruction and parameter configuration content, combine the timestamp and identity information to generate detailed trace records and store them in the database to realize operation traceability;

[0010] (7) Extract data exchange and operation records from the trace database, analyze instruction execution frequency and abnormal behavior characteristics, trigger security domain boundary redivision and permission update through threshold determination to deal with potential risks.

[0011] Preferably, the step (1) comprises:

[0012] Receive the identity identifier and resource access request transmitted by the Bluetooth low power protocol, parse to obtain the identity identifier hash value and resource type code, the identity identifier hash value is used to query the authentication key data in the preset identity database;

[0013] Use the authentication key data to perform decryption operation on the resource type code, obtain the resource access permission level code and resource identifier from the decryption result, and match the security domain rule table according to the resource access permission level code to obtain the security domain identification number;

[0014] Divide the instruction processing security domain and data collection security domain according to the security domain identification number, and establish an encrypted transmission tunnel through the security domain communication rule library;

[0015] According to the resource identifier, a set of acquisition instructions is obtained from a resource mapping table, and a basic operation instruction sequence is obtained by instruction decomposition on the set of acquisition instructions. An operation code and a parameter segment are parsed from the basic operation instruction sequence, the operation code and the parameter segment are combined to form an execution instruction unit, and the execution instruction unit is stored in an execution queue cache area. According to the order of the instruction units in the execution queue cache area, the execution instruction unit is transmitted to a data acquisition security domain through an encrypted transmission tunnel, and is written into an acquisition task queue for data acquisition task allocation.

[0016] Preferably, step (2) comprises:

[0017] According to the operator identity, a historical operation record is read from an identity database, and the historical operation record is marked with a time stamp to generate a time sequence operation record list;

[0018] Based on the task code in the time sequence operation record list, a task description list is matched and obtained in a task rule library, and the task description list generates a task resource mapping table according to a resource access list;

[0019] Through the task stage state in the task resource mapping table, a task progress database is queried, the task progress database generates a context association data table in combination with the task resource mapping table, a resource access probability distribution is calculated to obtain a resource access weight matrix, a real-time authority range of resource access is calculated through the resource access weight matrix, and the initial access boundary is adjusted according to the real-time authority range.

[0020] Preferably, the step (3) comprises:

[0021] According to the Bluetooth communication data packet, a link layer frame header and a data field are extracted, and the source security domain identifier and the target security domain identifier of the cross-domain access request in the data field are obtained;

[0022] According to the resource access type code, a resource access boundary and a permission control parameter are obtained in the access control table for the cross-domain access request;

[0023] The source security domain identifier and the target security domain identifier are used to query an inter-domain routing path in a gateway routing rule library, and the inter-domain routing hop number corresponding to the inter-domain routing path is obtained;

[0024] An actual authority level is generated through the operation command word and the permission control parameter, and if the actual authority level exceeds the resource access boundary, the cross-domain data path is closed.

[0025] Preferably, the step (3) comprises: setting an interception rule in the security gateway module, capturing all cross-domain data exchange requests, parsing the request data packet, extracting the key information of the source domain, target domain and request type, matching the key information of the request with the adjusted access boundary rule, returning a transmission denial response message to the source domain if the request exceeds the access boundary, generating an abnormal operation log, recording the key information of the request and the reason for denial, specifically comprising:

[0026] According to the gateway interception rule, the cross-domain data request packet is captured, the source domain identification code, target domain identification code and request type code are read, and the request feature vector is obtained;

[0027] The access control parameter table is read from the boundary rule library, the target request type limit value is searched in the access control parameter table according to the source domain identification code and the target domain identification code, and the permission comparison vector is obtained;

[0028] The request type code in the request feature vector is compared with the permission comparison vector, the permission matching score is judged through the permission matching threshold, and the access control result code is obtained;

[0029] The message routing module selects the response message type according to the access control result code, constructs the response data packet according to the response message format, and sends the response data packet to the source domain.

[0030] Preferably, the step (4) comprises:

[0031] The session key identification is queried in the key manager through the source domain identification and target domain identification of the data packet, and if the session key identification is queried, the corresponding session key data is obtained from the key storage area;

[0032] The session key data is used to encrypt the to-be-encrypted data stream to obtain an encrypted data block, and an integrity check value is calculated for the encrypted data block;

[0033] The transmission channel configuration parameters are read from the gateway configuration library, the encrypted data block and the integrity check value are packaged according to the transmission channel configuration parameters, and a transmission control field is added at the start position of the packaged data to obtain the encrypted cross-domain transmission data.

[0034] Preferably, the step (5) comprises:

[0035] According to the source domain identification and target domain identification in the cross-domain transmission data packet, the key distribution record is obtained from the key distribution database, and the decryption key index is obtained through the key distribution record;

[0036] The decryption key index is used to read decryption key data from the secure key library, a key verification sequence is generated by the decryption key data, and a verification score is obtained according to the key verification sequence;

[0037] If the verification score meets the verification parameters in the verification rule table, the encrypted data payload is decrypted using the decryption key data, and a decrypted data packet is obtained through the decryption process;

[0038] If the decrypted data packet passes the integrity check, a transmission path is obtained from the routing table according to the target domain identifier, and the decrypted data packet is sent to the target domain through the transmission path. If the verification result is not qualified or the integrity check fails, an abnormal event record is generated.

[0039] Preferably, the step (6) comprises:

[0040] The data length identifier and the format version number are read from the data packet header, and the corresponding parsing rule is obtained in the parsing rule table according to the format version number;

[0041] The instruction operation code is extracted by the instruction segment parser according to the parsing rule, the standard instruction description is obtained from the instruction mapping database, and the instruction operation object and the operation method are obtained;

[0042] The parameter configuration value in the data packet is read by the parameter segment parser, and if the parameter configuration value has a matching item in the parameter definition table, a parameter configuration record is generated;

[0043] The exchange record header is constructed according to the instruction operation object and the operation method, the standard instruction description, the parameter configuration record, the operation time record and the identity feature record are filled in the exchange record, and stored in the traceability database.

[0044] Preferably, the step (7) comprises:

[0045] According to the timestamp and instruction record in the traceability record database, the instruction execution frequency in a unit time is obtained by using the sliding time window method, and the instruction frequency sequence is obtained;

[0046] The long short-term memory network is trained by the instruction frequency sequence, the operation time sequence feature is obtained, and the behavior feature descriptor is generated;

[0047] The resource authorization list is read from the permission configuration database, and the unauthorized access ratio in a unit time is calculated for the resource access item in the data exchange record;

[0048] If the behavior feature descriptor indicates that the operation frequency exceeds the preset threshold or the unauthorized access ratio exceeds the preset upper limit, the security domain redivision unit generates new boundary values and permission rule sets, and the boundary value takes effect operation is performed by the security domain controller.

[0049] Preferably, the step (7) comprises: reading data exchange and operation trace records in a certain time range from the database, classifying the records according to operation instruction types to obtain the execution times of various types of instructions, setting a standard execution frequency threshold, identifying abnormal frequency operation instructions exceeding the threshold, analyzing operation records of illegal access to unauthorized resources, extracting common features of abnormal behavior operations, and generating an analysis report of operation instruction execution frequency and abnormal behavior features, specifically comprising:

[0050] According to the data exchange time interval, the operation instruction code and the resource access identifier are extracted to obtain the instruction operation sequence;

[0051] The instruction operation sequence is calculated by using a sliding time window to obtain the operation instruction execution times per unit time, and the execution times are compared with the upper limit value of the standard execution frequency in the frequency control parameter table to determine whether the operation instruction is a frequency abnormal instruction;

[0052] The authorized record table in the authorization database is queried through the resource access identifier, and a list of illegal access statistics is generated for the resource access identifier that does not exist in the authorized record table;

[0053] The association operation sequence is extracted from the list of illegal access statistics by using an association rule learner, the association operation sequence is analyzed by time sequence clustering algorithm to obtain an abnormal behavior feature library, and the analysis report content is generated according to the instruction frequency analysis result and the abnormal behavior feature library.

[0054] The technical scheme provided by the embodiment of the application can include the following beneficial effects:

[0055] The application discloses a power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication. In view of the identity authentication, resource access control and data security transmission problems in the Bluetooth debugging environment, the application adopts a hierarchical security domain model and combines a dynamic permission allocation algorithm to realize fine management of system resources. By embedding a security gateway module in the Bluetooth communication channel, cross-domain data exchange requests are intercepted, analyzed and encrypted, thereby effectively preventing unauthorized access. Meanwhile, the application also establishes a complete data exchange and operation trace mechanism, can monitor abnormal behaviors in real time, and automatically triggers security domain boundary redivision and permission update according to a preset threshold. The dynamic adjustment mechanism significantly improves the security and flexibility of the system, and provides an effective solution for sensitive data protection in the Bluetooth debugging environment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0056] Figure 1 A flowchart of the power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication.

[0057] Figure 2A schematic diagram of a power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0058] In order for those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in the specification, the technical solutions in the specification will be clearly and completely described below in combination with the drawings in the specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the specification, not all. Based on the embodiments in the specification, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor should belong to the protection scope of the specification.

[0059] As Figure 1 , the power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication can specifically include:

[0060] S101, receiving a debugging request through Bluetooth communication, parsing the operator identity and the requested resource type, dividing the terminal system based on the authentication result using a hierarchical security domain model, and distributing the instruction processing module and the data acquisition module to different security domains and determining the initial access boundary.

[0061] The power distribution automation terminal has Bluetooth communication function and can receive the debugging request sent by the external device. The debugging request is initiated by the operator through the mobile terminal and contains the identity and the resource type requested to be accessed, such as switch control instruction or current acquisition parameter. After receiving the request, the terminal system first parses the data packet to extract the identity and resource type information.

[0062] S1011, receiving the debugging request transmitted by the Bluetooth low power protocol, parsing the data packet to obtain the identity hash value and the resource type code, and querying the identity database for authentication.

[0063] The debugging request is transmitted through the broadcast packet of the Bluetooth low power protocol, and the data packet contains the device address and the load information. The terminal parses the data packet to extract the hash value of the identity and the resource type code. The identity hash value is generated by using the SHA-256 algorithm and has a length of 256 bits, which is used to query the authentication key in the preset identity database. The authentication key is generated based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm and contains a 256-bit private key and a 512-bit public key. The resource type code is composed of a 16-bit resource identifier and an 8-bit access type, which supports multiple resource access scenarios. The terminal decrypts the resource type code according to the authentication key to obtain the permission level code and the resource identifier, ensuring the reliability of identity authentication.

[0064] S1012, according to the authentication result, matching the security domain rule, dividing the instruction processing security domain and the data acquisition security domain, building the encrypted transmission channel and determining the initial access boundary.

[0065] After successful authentication, the terminal queries the security domain rule table according to the permission level code to obtain the security domain identification number. Based on the identification number, the system allocates the instruction processing module to the instruction processing security domain and the data acquisition module to the data acquisition security domain. The instruction parsing cache and execution queue are set in the instruction processing security domain, and the data cache and acquisition task queue are set in the data acquisition security domain. According to the communication rules between security domains, the terminal generates a 256-bit key and a 128-bit initialization vector using the AES-256-GCM algorithm to establish an encrypted transmission channel. The channel negotiates a session key based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol to ensure data interaction security. According to the resource identifier, the terminal extracts the instruction set from the resource mapping table, decomposes it into operation code and parameter segment, and stores it in the execution queue to form an initial access boundary, limiting the access range of the operator to the resource.

[0066] The Bluetooth receives the debugging request and performs identity authentication, which can quickly verify the legitimacy of the operator's identity. The layered security domain model isolates the terminal function modules to different security domains to avoid damage to the entire system caused by the breakthrough of a single module. The determination of the initial access boundary lays the foundation for subsequent permission adjustment, ensuring that the debugging operation is performed within a safe range.

[0067] In actual application scenarios, when technicians use mobile devices to debug power distribution switches, the terminal receives Bluetooth requests, verifies the identity, and allocates switch control instructions to the instruction processing security domain and sensor data to the data acquisition security domain. Through the encrypted channel, the instructions and data are transmitted to achieve secure isolation and access control, avoiding system risks caused by unauthorized access.

[0068] S102, obtain the operator's identity information through Bluetooth communication, extract the historical operation records and current task context, calculate the real-time permission range of resource access using a dynamic permission allocation model, and optimize the initial access boundary according to the calculation results.

[0069] After receiving the debugging request, the power distribution automation terminal needs to dynamically adjust the resource access permission according to the operator's identity to ensure the safety and efficiency of the debugging operation. The terminal parses the identity identifier, obtains the historical operation records and task context, generates real-time permission range using the permission allocation algorithm, and then updates the access boundary.

[0070] As Figure 2 , S1021, parse the operator's identity identifier, extract the historical operation records from the identity database, generate the time sequence operation sequence, and build the task association information.

[0071] The terminal receives an identity label via Bluetooth communication, generates a 256-bit hash value based on an SHA-256 algorithm, and uses the hash value as an index to query an identity database. The identity database stores operation records of an operator, and each record includes a 32-bit timestamp, a 16-bit task code, and operation details. The timestamp is accurate to milliseconds, and the task code is divided into high 8-bit task categories and low 8-bit task identifiers. The terminal extracts historical operation records, sorts the records according to the timestamps, and generates a time sequence operation sequence. The sequence records the types and frequencies of tasks performed by the operator in the past. For example, the operator may be involved in tasks such as switch control, data acquisition, or parameter configuration, each type of task corresponding to different resource access requirements. The terminal matches task description information from a task rule library based on the time sequence operation sequence, and generates an association information table including task types, execution stages, and resource requirements, to provide basic data for subsequent permission calculation.

[0072] S1022, in combination with the current task context and the historical operation sequence, a context association mapping is queried from a task progress database to determine task resource requirements.

[0073] The terminal queries the task rule library by the task code to obtain a task description list, and the list includes information such as task stages, resource types, and access frequencies. The task rule library is organized in a tree structure, with a first-level node representing a task category, such as debugging, maintenance, or monitoring, a second-level node being refined into a specific task, such as voltage acquisition or instruction issuance, and a leaf node storing resource access rules. The terminal accesses the task progress database in combination with the task description list to extract an execution stage identifier of the current task, such as an initialization, execution, or completion stage. Based on the task stage and the historical operation sequence, the terminal generates a context association mapping to record the relationship between task execution progress and resource access. For example, in a task of debugging a power distribution switch, the initialization stage requires access to configuration parameters, the execution stage requires operation of control instructions, and the completion stage requires logging. The context association mapping provides a dynamic basis for permission allocation, ensuring that the permission closely matches the task requirements.

[0074] S1023, based on the context association mapping, a probability inference model is used to calculate resource access weights, to generate real-time permission ranges and update access boundaries.

[0075] The terminal uses the context association mapping to analyze the resource access demand using a Bayesian probability model, and calculates the access probability distribution of each type of resource. For example, assuming that the task involves current collection, the mapping shows that the collection module is accessed frequently, and the terminal calculates its access probability as 0.5, the instruction processing module probability as 0.3, and the log recording probability as 0.2. The terminal generates a resource access weight matrix based on the probability distribution, which records the quantitative relationship between resource types and permission requirements. The weight matrix is further converted into a permission feature vector, and the vector elements represent the access priority of each resource. The terminal inputs the permission feature vector into the dynamic permission allocation model, which calculates the real-time permission range based on a preset rule set and outputs the upper and lower limit values of the permission interval. The permission rule set includes the constraint conditions of the task scenario, such as increasing the permission for high-frequency tasks and limiting access for low-frequency tasks. The terminal uses a segmented mapping function to convert the permission interval into specific access boundary values, such as granting full access to resources with a probability greater than 0.4, granting partial access to resources with a probability between 0.2 and 0.4, and only allowing querying for resources with a probability less than 0.2. The terminal updates the initial access boundary according to the real-time boundary value to ensure that the permission allocation is highly consistent with the task context.

[0076] The operator debugs the power distribution automation terminal through the mobile device, and the terminal extracts its identity and queries the historical records to display that it has recently completed multiple voltage collection tasks. The task rule library indicates that the voltage collection task needs to access the sensor module and the instruction cache area, and frequently operates to collect parameters during the execution stage. The terminal generates a context mapping based on the task progress, calculates the access probability of the sensor module as 0.6 and the instruction cache area as 0.3, and generates a permission range based on the Bayesian model to grant the sensor module full access and the instruction cache area partial access. The updated access boundary limits the operator's access to other modules, preventing unauthorized operations while ensuring debugging efficiency.

[0077] The dynamic permission allocation mechanism can adjust the access boundary in real time according to the historical behavior of the operator and the current task. Compared with static permission management, the probability model quantifies the resource demand to ensure the accuracy of permission allocation. The dynamic optimization of the permission boundary reduces the risk of unauthorized access, while allowing the operator to efficiently complete the debugging task within a safe range, improving the security and operational flexibility of the system.

[0078] S1024, monitor the permission allocation result through a sliding time window, and update the permission calculation periodically to adapt to task changes.

[0079] The terminal sets a sliding time window of 8 hours, collects the task data of the operator in real time, and updates the permission calculation every hour. The task code, execution frequency, and resource access details are recorded in the window, and the terminal recalculates the access probability and permission range based on the new data. For example, if the operator frequently performs the same task, the terminal can appropriately relax the access permission of related resources; if the task switches frequently, the permission is tightened to reduce the risk. The updated permission range is converted into a new access boundary through a mapping function, which covers the initial boundary to ensure that the permission allocation is always dynamically matched with the task.

[0080] The operator may need to access different resources due to task changes. The terminal dynamically adjusts the permission range through context analysis and probability calculation to avoid excessive or insufficient permissions. The security of boundary adjustment is further ensured by the permission verification of the encrypted transmission channel. The operator can operate efficiently within the authorized range, while the system can quickly respond to abnormal behavior to ensure controllability and safety during the debugging process.

[0081] S103, use the security gateway module integrated in the Bluetooth communication link to intercept and analyze cross-domain data exchange requests, verify whether the request meets the adjusted access boundary, and if it exceeds the boundary, refuse to transmit and generate an abnormal operation log.

[0082] The power distribution automation terminal transmits cross-domain data through Bluetooth communication. To ensure the security of data interaction, the terminal embeds a security gateway module in the communication link, which is responsible for real-time monitoring and verification of cross-domain requests. The gateway module verifies the permissions by analyzing the request content and combining the access boundary rules, blocks illegal access, and records abnormal behavior to ensure controllability during the debugging process.

[0083] S1031, parse the Bluetooth communication data packet, extract the source and target security domain identifiers of the cross-domain request, and obtain the resource access type and operation instruction information.

[0084] The security gateway module is deployed in the link layer of the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol and receives and parses the communication data packet. The data packet contains a 4-byte header control field, of which the 16-bit source security domain identifier and the 16-bit target security domain identifier are used to mark the start and end areas of data interaction. The gateway reads the data domain through the analysis module and extracts the 8-bit resource access type code and the 16-bit operation instruction code. The high 4 bits of the resource access type code represent the resource category, such as sensor data or control instruction, and the low 4 bits represent the operation type, such as query or modification. The operation instruction code supports various debugging operations, such as parameter acquisition reading or switch state change. The terminal generates a request feature set based on the extracted information to provide a basis for subsequent permission verification. For example, in a debugging scenario, the operator requests to read voltage data from the data acquisition security domain, the gateway identifies the source domain as the acquisition module, the target domain as the instruction processing module, and the type code indicates a data query operation.

[0085] S1032, query the access control rule library, generate a permission level based on the resource access type and operation instruction, and judge whether it meets the adjusted access boundary.

[0086] The gateway module accesses the access control rule library according to the resource access type code to obtain the corresponding permission constraint parameter. The rule library is indexed by domain identification pairs and stores the allowed operation types and permission levels, for example, data acquisition domain to instruction processing domain allows query but prohibits modification. The gateway combines the operation instruction code and the constraint parameter to calculate the actual permission level through a preset mapping function. The function input includes the instruction complexity and the resource sensitivity, and the output is a level value of 0 to 15. The terminal compares the actual permission level with the adjusted access boundary, and the boundary defines the upper limit of the permission of each resource. If the level exceeds the boundary, the gateway determines that the request is illegal. For example, the instruction to modify the configuration parameter requires a level of 10, while the boundary limit is 8, so it is determined to be an overreach. The gateway ensures that the request strictly follows the permission allocation through this mechanism to prevent unauthorized operations from affecting the safety of the terminal.

[0087] S1033, check the compliance of the inter-domain routing path, and decide whether to intercept the cross-domain request and record abnormal logs based on the permission determination result.

[0088] The gateway module queries the routing rule library based on the source security domain identification and the target security domain identification, uses an adjacency matrix to represent the inter-domain connection relationship, and supports up to 32 security domains. The matrix elements are 1 for direct connection and 0 for no connection. The gateway uses the shortest path algorithm to calculate the routing hop count, for example, from the acquisition domain to the instruction domain, it needs to pass through the buffer domain, and the hop count is 2. The terminal reads the hop count limit from the configuration table and sets it to 3, and if the actual hop count exceeds it, it is determined that the routing is illegal. The gateway generates a determination state based on the results of the permission level and the routing hop count, and if either of them is not compliant, it activates the interception mechanism and closes the cross-domain data channel. After interception, the gateway writes logs to the abnormal event library, including a 64-bit timestamp, a 32-bit domain identification pair, an 8-bit resource type code, a 16-bit instruction code, and an 8-bit interception reason code, which distinguishes between permission over-limit and routing abnormality. The log supports millisecond-level precision, which is convenient for subsequent tracing. For example, a request is intercepted due to permission level over-limit, the log records the time as April 10, 2025, 09:15:32, and the reason code indicates overreach access.

[0089] When debugging the power distribution automation terminal, the operator requests cross-domain access to sensor data through a mobile device, and the gateway module identifies that the request is from the data acquisition domain to the instruction processing domain, and the type code is data reading. The permission check shows that the request level meets the boundary, the routing hop count is 1, and it meets the compliance requirements, so the gateway releases the request. If the request attempts to modify the parameter, the permission level exceeds the boundary, the gateway immediately intercepts and records the exception, ensuring system safety.

[0090] The security gateway module improves the security of cross-domain data interaction through fine-grained permission verification and routing verification. Compared with traditional static verification, dynamic boundary matching can adapt to task changes, the interception mechanism effectively blocks illegal requests, and log records provide clear abnormal trace basis for operation and maintenance personnel, ensuring reliable execution of debugging operations.

[0091] S1034, construct a response message and feedback to the source domain, update the communication log to support performance monitoring.

[0092] The gateway module generates a response message according to the determination result, the message contains a 4-byte header and an 8-byte state description, and the header type field indicates permission or rejection. The rejection message is attached with a reason code, such as 0x01 for permission exceeding. The gateway selects the format from the response template library, constructs the data packet and sends it to the source domain through the message routing module. The routing module uses an acknowledgement mechanism to ensure reliable message transmission, records the sending time and the number of retransmissions. The communication log stores the transmission delay and state, the delay range is usually 100 to 200 milliseconds, which supports gateway performance analysis. For example, a certain rejection message is retransmitted once due to network congestion, and the log shows that the total delay is 180 milliseconds.

[0093] In an industrial scenario, an operator requests to modify the switch state across domains, the gateway detects that the permission is exceeded, generates a rejection message and sends it to the mobile device, and records the abnormal log at the same time. The log shows that the request time is April 12, 2025, 14:20, and the interception reason is that the permission level exceeds 0x0200. The fast response and detailed record of the gateway effectively prevent potential risks, and support subsequent security audit and optimization.

[0094] S104, parse the cross-domain data exchange request through the security gateway module in the Bluetooth communication link, extract the source domain identifier and the target domain identifier, encrypt the data content and generate an integrity check value, and assemble the cross-domain transmission data packet.

[0095] The power distribution automation terminal processes cross-domain data interaction through the security gateway module to ensure the transmission security of data between different security domains. The gateway module parses the request data packet, extracts the key identifier, encrypts the data and attaches the check information, generates a data packet that meets the transmission rules, prevents data leakage or tampering, and improves the security of the debugging process.

[0096] S1041, parse the cross-domain data request packet, extract the source domain identifier and the target domain identifier from the header, and obtain the data payload to generate the encrypted data stream.

[0097] The security gateway module receives a cross-domain data request packet in Bluetooth communication, parses a 16-byte header control field thereof, wherein a source domain identifier and a target domain identifier each occupy 4 bytes, and a fixed coding format is adopted, for example, data acquisition domain coding is 0x00010002, and instruction processing domain coding is 0x00020002. The gateway reads the data payload through the parsing unit, extracts the variable-length data content, and generates a to-be-encrypted data stream. The data payload supports a maximum of 64KB transmission, and usually contains debugging instructions or acquisition parameters, for example, 2KB parameter configuration of a voltage acquisition task. The parsing process ensures complete extraction of the data stream, and records the interaction relationship between the source domain and the target domain, thereby providing a basis for subsequent encryption and verification. In a debugging scenario, an operator requests transmission of sensor data, the gateway identifies that the source domain is an acquisition module and the target domain is an instruction module, and the data stream contains acquisition parameters and a timestamp.

[0098] S1042, query the key manager to obtain a session key, generate an encryption initial vector based on the key, and perform encryption processing on the data stream.

[0099] The gateway module queries the key manager using the source domain identifier and the target domain identifier, obtains a 32-bit session key identifier, and the identifier is composed of a 16-bit inter-domain relationship code and a 16-bit timestamp, for example, the key identifier of the acquisition domain and the instruction domain is 0x56780002. The key manager adopts a hierarchical structure, each security domain is configured with a 256-bit master key, and a temporary session key is used for inter-domain communication. The gateway extracts the session key from the key storage area, generates a 128-bit encryption initial vector based on the identifier through the SHA-256 algorithm, and ensures the uniqueness of each encryption. The encryption process adopts the AES-256-GCM algorithm, inputs a 256-bit key and an initial vector, and converts the to-be-encrypted data stream into an encrypted data block. The encryption algorithm combines grouping encryption and authentication to generate ciphertext and output a 16-byte authentication tag. For example, 1KB acquisition data generates 1024 bytes of ciphertext and authentication tags after encryption, thereby guaranteeing the confidentiality and integrity of the data.

[0100] In an actual debugging scenario, an operator transmits a switch control instruction through a mobile device, the gateway extracts 2KB instruction data after parsing the request, queries the session key for encryption, and generates an encrypted data block and an authentication tag. The encryption process ensures that the instruction is not intercepted or tampered with during cross-domain transmission, the authentication tag provides a verification basis for the target domain, and prevents fake data from interfering with terminal operation.

[0101] The encryption mechanism combines dynamic keys and initial vectors to significantly improve data transmission security. Compared with static key management, the hierarchical key system supports rapid updating, reduces the risk of key leakage, and the authentication tag ensures that the data has not been tampered with, thereby providing reliable protection for debugging tasks.

[0102] S1043, construct an encrypted transmission packet header and calculate an integrity check value, assemble a cross-domain data packet according to the transmission channel configuration.

[0103] The gateway module constructs a 32-byte transmission packet header for the encrypted data block, including source domain identification, target domain identification, 8-byte session key identification, and 4-byte sequence number. The sequence number is used to prevent replay attacks. The gateway uses the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to calculate a 32-byte integrity check value for the data block, inputs the session key and ciphertext, and appends it to the end of the data block, ensuring that the data is not modified during transmission. The gateway reads the transmission channel parameters from the configuration library, selects real-time transmission or reliable transmission mode, for example, debug instructions use reliable transmission, mode field is set to 0x02, priority is 0x4000. The assembly process integrates the packet header, ciphertext, and check value, adds a 4-byte transmission control field, and the high 8 bits represent the mode, and the low 8 bits represent the response flag, generating a complete cross-domain data packet. For example, after assembling 2KB of ciphertext, the total length is about 2112 bytes, including the packet header and check information.

[0104] In the debugging of power distribution automation terminals, the gateway module processes cross-domain data transmission, generates encrypted data packets and adds check values, and after assembly, sends them to the target domain through the Bluetooth channel. After receiving, the target domain verifies the check value and key, decrypts the original data, and ensures that the instructions or parameters are accurately executed.

[0105] The hierarchical design and encryption protection of cross-domain data packets effectively deal with security threats in complex network environments. The transmission control field supports flexible mode configuration to meet the needs of different debugging tasks, and the integrity check provides double protection for data interaction, significantly reducing the risk in the debugging process.

[0106] S105, verify the decryption key distribution record of the cross-domain transmission data packet in the security domain of the receiving end, judge the validity of the key through the key matching mechanism, decrypt the qualified data and transmit it to the target domain, otherwise discard the data and record the alarm log.

[0107] After receiving the cross-domain transmission data packet, the power distribution automation terminal needs to ensure that the data is decrypted safely and transmitted correctly to the target domain. The terminal verifies the decryption key through the key distribution record, ensures that the data has not been tampered with by combining the integrity check, and transmits the qualified data according to the routing rules, triggers an alarm for abnormal data, ensuring the reliability and security of the debugging process.

[0108] S1051, extract the source domain identification and target domain identification from the cross-domain data packet, obtain the decryption key index from the key distribution database, and read the key data.

[0109] The receiving end analyzes the cross-domain transmission data packet, extracts 4-byte source domain identifier and 4-byte target domain identifier from the 16-byte header, for example, the data collection domain is 0x00010003, and the instruction processing domain is 0x00020003. The terminal queries the key distribution database by using the identifier, the database adopts a tree index structure, and stores a 256-bit key index value for each pair of domains. The key index points to a decryption key in a secure key library, the key is a 256-bit AES key, and a 32-bit timestamp is associated to limit the validity period. The extraction process records a query log to ensure that the key acquisition is traceable. For example, when debugging a voltage collection task, the terminal identifies that the data packet is transmitted from the collection domain to the instruction domain, queries to obtain a key index 0x789A0001, reads corresponding key data, and provides a basis for subsequent verification and decryption.

[0110] S1052, generate a key verification sequence and calculate a matching score, determine whether the key is qualified based on a verification rule to decide a decryption operation.

[0111] The terminal extracts the encrypted payload and a 32-byte digital signature from the data packet, calculates a 256-bit digital fingerprint for the decryption key by using an SHA-256 algorithm, performs an exclusive or operation on the fingerprint and the signature, generates a 32-bit matching identifier, and the identifier value 0 indicates a complete match. The terminal generates a verification sequence based on the key data, which includes three dimensions of key validity period, use frequency and encryption strength. The verification rule library defines a scoring standard: the validity period accounts for 40%, 40 points are obtained if it is not overdue; the use frequency accounts for 30%, 30 points are obtained if it is not over the limit; the strength accounts for 30%, 30 points are obtained if it meets the standard, and the total score is 100 points. The terminal calculates the score, for example, a certain key obtains 40 points within the validity period, 25 points for 5 uses, and 28 points for the strength, and the total score is 93 points. The rule table stipulates that the score higher than 85 is qualified, 60 to 85 is a warning, and lower than 60 is unqualified. The qualified key enters the decryption process, otherwise the terminal discards the data packet and records an exception. This multi-dimensional verification ensures the security of the key and prevents risks caused by expired or stolen keys.

[0112] When debugging a power distribution automation terminal, the receiving end processes the cross-domain sensor data packet, verifies the key score of 90 points, and confirms that it is qualified to prepare for decryption. If the key score is 50 points due to overage, the terminal immediately discards the data and generates an alarm to prevent illegal data from interfering with the system operation.

[0113] The key verification mechanism improves the judgment accuracy by quantifying the score, and is more suitable for complex scenarios than single matching. The multi-dimensional rule balances safety and usability, the exception record provides a basis for subsequent audit, and ensures that the debugging task is efficiently executed within a safe framework.

[0114] S1053, decrypt the data packet and perform integrity check, and send the qualified data to the target domain through a transmission path selected by a routing table.

[0115] The terminal uses the qualified key and the AES-256-GCM algorithm to decrypt the data payload, to generate plaintext data and a 16-byte authentication tag. The integrity check uses the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm, inputs the key and the plaintext, generates a 32-byte checksum, compares with the tag, and outputs an 8-bit result code, 0x00 indicates pass, 0x01 indicates length exception, and 0x02 indicates check failure. The data packet that passes the check enters the routing stage, and the terminal queries the routing table according to the target domain identifier, and the table stores the inter-domain path. The path encoding supports up to 3-hop transfer, for example, the collection domain to the instruction domain through the buffer domain, encoded as 0x000100030002. The terminal sends the data packet according to the path, and uses the confirmation mechanism to ensure reliable transmission. If decryption or check fails, the terminal discards the data, generates a 128-byte exception record, including a microsecond-level timestamp, domain identifier, result code and 16-bit exception type code, for example, 0x0402 indicates check error.

[0116] In actual scenarios, the terminal receives the cross-domain control instruction data packet, and after the key verification passes, the decryption is successful, the check confirms the data integrity, and the data packet is transmitted to the instruction domain along the routing path. If the data packet is discarded due to check failure, the terminal records the exception time as April 14, 2025, 10:45:12, 789 microseconds, the type code indicates integrity problem, and sends an alarm to the monitoring system.

[0117] Decryption combined with check ensures data credibility, and routing mechanism optimizes transmission efficiency. The fine-grained design of exception record supports rapid positioning of problems, alarm notification improves system response capability, and ensures that the debugging operation is safe and reliable in multi-domain interaction.

[0118] S106, in the target domain, the decrypted cross-domain data packet is parsed, the operation instruction and parameter configuration content are extracted, the detailed trace record is generated combined with the timestamp and the identity information, and stored in the database to realize operation traceable.

[0119] After receiving and decrypting the cross-domain data packet, the power distribution automation terminal needs to extract the instruction and parameter information from the target domain, record the operation details to support the audit and trace of debugging behavior. The terminal parses the data packet in segments, generates structured records, combines high-precision timestamps and identity features, ensures that the operation process is traceable, and enhances system security and management efficiency.

[0120] S1061, the length and version information are obtained by parsing the data packet header, and the instruction operation code and standard description are extracted based on the parsing rule.

[0121] The terminal parses the data packet after decryption, reads the 4-byte data length identifier and the 2-byte format version number from the 8-byte header, supports a maximum of 4GB data in length, and the version number is, for example, 0x0103, indicating the latest instruction specification. The terminal queries the parsing rule library according to the version number to obtain the corresponding segmentation rule, extracts the 8-bit operation code through the instruction parsing module, for example, 0x15 indicates the switch control instruction. The operation code is matched with the standard description in the instruction mapping database, the database organizes the instruction categories in a tree structure, and the mapping result includes a 16-bit operation object identifier, such as 0x0402, indicating a voltage acquisition module, and an 8-bit operation method code, such as 0x03, indicating a state update. The parsing process ensures that the instruction content is clear, for example, in a debugging task, the terminal identifies the instruction as modifying the acquisition frequency, and the object is the sensor module, providing an accurate basis for subsequent recording.

[0122] In the debugging scene, the operator sends a parameter adjustment instruction, and the terminal extracts the operation code and object after parsing the data packet, and confirms that the instruction is to update the current acquisition interval. Record the details of the instruction and the operation time to ensure that subsequent abnormal configuration or misoperation can be traced back.

[0123] Instruction parsing improves compatibility through standardized mapping, and the rule library supports dynamic updating to adapt to new instruction types. Detailed instruction descriptions provide a basis for operation auditing, reducing parsing errors caused by format differences, and ensuring accurate execution of debugging tasks.

[0124] S1062, extract parameter configuration values and verify legality, and generate parameter records to support operation detail tracing.

[0125] The terminal uses a parameter parsing module to read the variable-length parameter segment in the data packet, such as the sampling rate and precision value of the acquisition task. The parameter value is matched with the attribute in the parameter definition table, which stores the parameter range and type, such as a sampling rate range of 10 to 1000 milliseconds and a precision of 16-bit integer. The matched parameter generates a configuration record, which includes the parameter name, value, and constraint condition, such as a sampling rate of 50 milliseconds. Illegal parameters, such as values outside the range, are discarded and abnormal logs are recorded. Legal records provide context for operation behavior, such as adjusting sensor parameters in debugging, and records show that the precision is improved to 0.1 milliampere, ensuring that configuration changes can be checked. This verification mechanism prevents invalid parameters from interfering with terminal operation, while providing data support for analysis.

[0126] S1063, obtain high-precision timestamp and identity information, construct exchange record and store in traceability database.

[0127] The terminal obtains a 64-bit timestamp through a clock synchronization module, with a precision of microseconds, calibrated based on a network time protocol, for example, recording a time of April 14, 2025, 14:22:45, 123456 microseconds. The timestamp is combined with a 32-bit session identification to generate an operation track identification, uniquely marking each debugging operation. The terminal queries a user information library according to a data packet header identification, extracts an 8-bit role code, for example, 0x04 representing a debugging personnel, and a 32-bit permission bitmap, for example, 0x00040002 representing an instruction execution and parameter reading permission. The terminal constructs a 256-byte exchange record, including a 32-byte header, a 64-byte instruction description, a variable-length parameter record, and a 32-byte identity and time information. The record is organized in a tag length value format and written into a trace database through a B+ tree index, with partitions divided by time, for example, one partition per month. When the debugging switch is controlled, the record captures the operation time, personnel role, and instruction details, generates an index number TX20250414X123, and ensures fast retrieval. The terminal parses the control instruction and parameter, records the time and permission information of the operator adjusting the switch state, and stores it into the database for auditing. If abnormal operation is found, the trace record can quickly locate the problem source. The partition design of the database optimizes the query efficiency, and the complete record of the identity information and the instruction details provides support for security management, ensuring the controllability of debugging in a multi-user scenario.

[0128] S107, extract data exchange and operation records from the trace database, analyze instruction execution frequency and abnormal behavior characteristics, and trigger security domain boundary redivision and permission update to deal with potential risks through threshold determination.

[0129] The power distribution automation terminal analyzes the operation trace record, identifies abnormal behavior such as unauthorized access or high-frequency operation, dynamically adjusts the security domain boundary and permission allocation, ensures the safety of the debugging process, prevents illegal operation from affecting system stability, and supports the operation and maintenance personnel to quickly locate the problem source.

[0130] S1071, construct a time sequence operation sequence based on the timestamp and instruction record, calculate the instruction frequency using a sliding window, and generate behavior characteristics.

[0131] The terminal retrieves operation records from a traceability database. Each record contains a 64-bit timestamp, a 32-bit instruction code, and a 32-bit resource identifier. For example, the debugging instruction code 0x0201 indicates parameter configuration, and the resource identifier 0x0503 points to the sensor module. The terminal sorts these records by timestamp to generate a three-dimensional time-series operation matrix. The horizontal axis represents a one-hour time window, the vertical axis represents the instruction type (e.g., data acquisition or switch control), and the depth axis represents the operation object. A sliding window algorithm counts the number of instruction executions per unit time. For example, if an operator performs 120 data reads and 30 parameter modifications between 9:00 and 10:00, a frequency sequence is generated. The terminal processes the sequence using a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network containing 256 hidden layer units. It takes frequency data as input and outputs a 64-dimensional behavioral feature vector. The first 32 dimensions capture the frequency patterns of operations, while the last 32 dimensions reflect the temporal patterns, such as frequent switching of instruction types. Training data includes normal and abnormal operation samples to ensure the model can distinguish between legitimate debugging and abnormal behavior. In debugging scenarios, the model identifies high-frequency parameter modifications within a short period and marks them as potential anomalies.

[0132] Analysis of operator records during power distribution switch adjustments revealed that the system executed 80 control commands within half an hour, far exceeding the normal frequency. This abnormal fluctuation in behavior triggered further access control. Compared to static statistics, dynamic time-series analysis captures behavioral changes, and feature vectors provide fine-grained evidence for anomaly detection, enhancing the system's ability to perceive potential threats.

[0133] S1072. Compare resource access records with the authorization list, calculate the unauthorized access ratio, and extract abnormal operation patterns.

[0134] The terminal reads a resource authorization list from the permission database. The list is represented by a 64-bit bitmap, with each bit corresponding to a resource permission; for example, bit 3 (1) allows access to the data collection module. The terminal parses resource access items in the traceability records, such as request access command caches, to check if they are within the authorized scope. Unauthorized access counts are statistically analyzed; for example, if a user attempts to access the unauthorized log area 10 times within one hour, the calculated rate is 15%. The terminal uses the Apriori algorithm to mine association rules with a confidence level of 0.85, finding that unauthorized access is often accompanied by high-frequency data queries. A dynamic time warping algorithm further clusters operation sequences, generating an anomaly feature library, including dimensions such as time distribution (e.g., late-night operations, resource switching frequency). For example, if a debugging user repeatedly accesses unauthorized configuration parameters, the clustering results show that their operations are concentrated in short bursts, marked as an anomaly pattern. This analysis reveals potential unauthorized intent, ensuring debugging security.

[0135] Operators frequently request unauthorized voltage data, analysis shows that their access rate exceeds 12%, association rule mining finds abnormal query and parameter modification combination mode, prompting the system to strengthen monitoring. Association rules and clustering analysis improve the accuracy of anomaly detection. Fine-grained authorization comparison reduces false positives, feature library supports cross-scenario reuse, and operation and maintenance personnel can optimize security policies based on analysis results to ensure stable terminal operation.

[0136] S1073, according to the frequency and abnormal feature judgment result, trigger security domain redivision and update permission configuration.

[0137] The terminal reads the restrictions from the threshold table, such as the upper limit of instruction frequency 100 times / hour and the upper limit of unauthorized access rate 8%. If the frequency feature value exceeds 150 times or the rate exceeds 10%, the terminal generates an alarm marker and triggers the security domain redivision module. The module calculates a 32x32 access control matrix, with element values from 0 to 5 representing permission levels, such as reducing from 3 to 2 from the acquisition domain to the instruction domain, limiting the modification of permissions. The matrix is generated based on abnormal features, such as tightening the boundaries for high-frequency operations. The terminal extracts a new set of permission rules, which are organized in a decision tree, with nodes defining inter-domain routing and access conditions, such as prohibiting cross-domain parameter writing. The security domain controller receives the update instructions, including the matrix and the rule set, and validates their legality through two-factor authentication before taking effect. The boundary verifier checks the routing reachability and consistency of the new boundaries, generates an adjustment record with the time 2025-04-14 16:10:22, and notes that the reason is unauthorized access exceeding the limit, and stores it in the change log. This dynamic adjustment effectively isolates the risk area and improves the controllability of debugging.

[0138] S1074, generate abnormal behavior analysis report and store in database, support operation and maintenance audit and strategy optimization.

[0139] The terminal constructs an analysis report based on the frequency sequence and the abnormal feature library, including statistical data such as instruction distribution and rate, and feature descriptions such as operation sequence fluctuations. The report uses a 256-byte structured format, with a 32-byte header recording the identifier AR202504140002, and the main body divided into statistics and features. Statistics show that a certain person read 120 times and unauthorized access 15 times within 1 hour, and the feature description is that high-frequency operations are concentrated in 10 minutes. The terminal fills in the data through the report generator and stores it in the report database, supporting retrieval by time or personnel. For example, debugging task analysis finds that abnormalities are concentrated at night, prompting adjustment of access time window. The report provides decision-making basis for operation and maintenance, optimizing permission allocation and monitoring strategy.

[0140] During the debugging of power distribution automation terminals, it is found that operators frequently modify parameters in a short period of time, triggering boundary redivision and reducing their access permissions to critical modules. The report records the details of the behavior for subsequent audit.

[0141] The preferred embodiments of the application disclosed above are only to facilitate the elucidation of the application. The preferred embodiments do not describe all the details of the application and limit the application to the specific embodiments. Obviously, many modifications and variations can be made in light of the teachings above. The description is chosen and described in order to provide the best illustration of the application and its practical application to those skilled in the art and to enable those skilled in the art to best utilize the application. The application is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims

1. A power distribution automation terminal security debugging method based on Bluetooth communication, characterized in that, The method comprises: (1) receiving a debugging request through Bluetooth, analyzing the operator identity and resource type, dividing the terminal system based on the authentication result using a hierarchical security domain model, assigning the instruction processing module and the data collection module to different security domains and determining the initial access boundary; (2) obtaining the operator identity information through Bluetooth communication, extracting its historical operation records and current task context, calculating the real-time permission range of resource access using a dynamic permission allocation model, and optimizing the initial access boundary according to the calculation result; (3) using the security gateway module integrated in the Bluetooth communication link to intercept and analyze cross-domain data exchange requests, verifying whether the request meets the adjusted access boundary, and if it exceeds the boundary, refusing transmission and generating an abnormal operation log; (4) parsing the cross-domain data exchange request in the Bluetooth communication link through the security gateway module, extracting the source domain identifier and target domain identifier, encrypting the data content and generating an integrity check value, and assembling the cross-domain transmission data packet; (5) verifying the decryption key distribution record of the cross-domain transmission data packet in the security domain of the receiving end, judging the key validity through the key matching mechanism, decrypting the qualified data and transmitting it to the target domain, otherwise discarding the data and recording the alarm log; (6) parsing the decrypted cross-domain data packet in the target domain, extracting the operation instruction and parameter configuration content, combining the timestamp and identity information to generate detailed traceability records and store them in the database to realize operation traceability; (7) extracting data exchange and operation records from the traceability database, analyzing instruction execution frequency and abnormal behavior characteristics, triggering security domain boundary redivision and permission update through threshold determination to deal with potential risks.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (1) comprises: Receiving an identity and resource access request transmitted by a Bluetooth low-power protocol, and obtaining an identity hash value and a resource type code by parsing, wherein the identity hash value is used to query authentication key data in a preset identity database; Using the authentication key data to perform decryption operation on the resource type code, obtaining a resource access permission level code and a resource identifier from the decryption result, and matching a security domain rule table according to the resource access permission level code to obtain a security domain identifier number; Dividing the instruction processing security domain and the data collection security domain according to the security domain identifier number, and establishing an encrypted transmission tunnel through a security domain communication rule library; According to the resource identifier, obtaining a collection instruction set from a resource mapping table, and obtaining a basic operation instruction sequence by decomposing the collection instruction set.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, Step (2) comprises: Reading the historical operation records from the identity database according to the operator identity, and generating a time sequence operation record list according to the time stamp; Based on the task code in the time sequence operation record list, a task description list is obtained by matching in a task rule library, and a task resource mapping table is generated according to the resource access list; The task progress database is queried through the task stage state in the task resource mapping table, the task progress database generates a context association data table in combination with the task resource mapping table, a resource access probability distribution is calculated to obtain a resource access weight matrix, a real-time authority range of resource access is calculated through the resource access weight matrix, and an initial access boundary is adjusted according to the real-time authority range.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (3) comprises: According to the Bluetooth communication data packet, the link layer frame header and the data domain are extracted, and the source security domain identifier and the target security domain identifier of the cross-domain access request in the data domain are obtained; The resource access type code and the operation command word are extracted for the cross-domain access request, and the resource access boundary and the permission control parameter are obtained in the access control table according to the resource access type code; The source security domain identifier and the target security domain identifier are used to query the inter-domain routing path in the gateway routing rule library, and the inter-domain routing hop corresponding to the inter-domain routing path is obtained; The actual authority level is generated through the operation command word and the permission control parameter, and if the actual authority level exceeds the resource access boundary, the cross-domain data channel is closed.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (3) comprises: setting an interception rule in the security gateway module, capturing all cross-domain data exchange requests, parsing the request data packet, extracting the key information of the source domain, the target domain and the request type, matching and comparing the key information of the request with the adjusted access boundary rule, and if the request exceeds the access boundary, returning a response message of refusing transmission to the source domain, generating an abnormal operation log, recording the key information of the request and the rejection reason, specifically comprising: According to the gateway interception rule, the cross-domain data request packet is captured, the source domain identifier code, the target domain identifier code and the request type code are read, and the request feature vector is obtained; The access control parameter table is read from the boundary rule library, the target request type limit value is searched in the access control parameter table according to the source domain identifier code and the target domain identifier code, and the permission comparison vector is obtained; The request type code in the request feature vector is compared with the permission comparison vector, the permission matching score is judged through the permission matching threshold, and the access control result code is obtained; The message routing module selects the response message type according to the access control result code, constructs the response data packet according to the response message format, and sends the response data packet to the source domain.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (4) comprises: The session key identifier is queried in the key manager through the source domain identifier and the target domain identifier of the data packet, and if the session key identifier is queried, the corresponding session key data is obtained from the key storage area; The encrypted data block is obtained by encrypting the to-be-encrypted data stream using the session key data, and the integrity check value is calculated for the encrypted data block; The transmission channel configuration parameters are read from the gateway configuration library, the encrypted data block and the integrity check value are packaged according to the transmission channel configuration parameters, and the transmission control field is added at the start position of the packaged data to obtain the encrypted cross-domain transmission data.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (5) comprises: According to the source domain identifier and the target domain identifier in the cross-domain transmission data packet, the key distribution record is obtained from the key distribution database, and the decryption key index is obtained through the key distribution record; The decryption key index is used to read decryption key data from the secure key library, a key verification sequence is generated through the decryption key data, and a verification score is obtained according to the key verification sequence; If the verification score meets the verification parameters in the verification rule table, the encrypted data payload is decrypted using the decryption key data, and a decrypted data packet is obtained through the decryption process; If the decrypted data packet passes the integrity check, a transmission path is obtained from the routing table according to the target domain identifier, and the decrypted data packet is sent to the target domain through the transmission path. If the verification result is not qualified or the integrity check fails, an abnormal event record is generated.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (6) comprises: Read the data length identifier and format version number from the data packet header, and obtain the corresponding parsing rule in the parsing rule table according to the format version number; According to the parsing rule, the instruction operation code is extracted through the instruction segment parser, the standard instruction description is obtained from the instruction mapping database, and the instruction operation object and operation method are obtained; The parameter configuration value in the data packet is read using the parameter segment parser. If the parameter configuration value has a matching item in the parameter definition table, a parameter configuration record is generated; According to the instruction operation object and operation method, the exchange record header is constructed, and the standard instruction description, parameter configuration record, operation time record and identity feature record are filled in the exchange record and stored in the traceability database.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (7) comprises: According to the timestamp and instruction record in the traceability record database, the instruction execution frequency in unit time is obtained using the sliding time window method, and the instruction frequency sequence is obtained; The long short-term memory network is trained through the instruction frequency sequence to obtain the operation time sequence feature and generate the behavior feature descriptor; The resource authorization list is read from the permission configuration database, and the unauthorized access ratio in unit time is calculated for the resource access item in the data exchange record; If the behavior feature descriptor indicates that the operation frequency exceeds the preset threshold or the unauthorized access ratio exceeds the preset upper limit, the security domain redivision unit generates new boundary values and permission rule sets, and the boundary value validation operation is performed by the security domain controller.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step (7) comprises: reading the data exchange and operation traceability records in a certain time range from the database, classifying the records according to the operation instruction type, obtaining the execution frequency of each type of instruction, setting the standard execution frequency threshold, identifying abnormal frequency operation instructions that exceed the threshold, analyzing operation records of illegal access to unauthorized resources, extracting common features of abnormal behavior operations, and generating an analysis report of operation instruction execution frequency and abnormal behavior features, which specifically includes: According to the data exchange time interval, the operation instruction code and resource access identifier are extracted to obtain the instruction operation sequence; The instruction operation sequence is calculated using the sliding time window to obtain the operation instruction execution frequency in unit time, and the execution frequency is compared according to the standard execution frequency upper limit value in the frequency control parameter table to determine whether the operation instruction is a frequency abnormal instruction; The authorized record table is queried in the authorization database through the resource access identifier, and a illegal access statistical list is generated for the resource access identifier that does not have a corresponding authorized record in the authorized record table; The correlation rule learner is used to extract the correlation operation sequence from the illegal access statistics list, the correlation operation sequence is analyzed by the time sequence clustering algorithm, the abnormal behavior characteristic library is obtained, and the analysis report content is generated according to the instruction frequency analysis result and the abnormal behavior characteristic library.

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